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Unraveling Yemen's Crisis

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Unraveling Yemen's Crisis Master Thesis Political Science - Political Economy Unraveling Yemen’s Crisis An analysis of the root causes of the 2015 Yemeni Civil War Renée Hoekstra (10548483) Supervisor: dr. F. Boussaid Second reader: drs. P.W.H. Aarts Word count: 22.784 The Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Amsterdam June 22, 2018 Abstract The 2015 Yemeni Civil War is often framed as being a sectarian conflict between Shiite Houthi rebels and the Sunni government of president Hadi. However, various shifts in sectarian alliances in the conflict indicate that there is more to the conflict than sectarian issues. This thesis examines to which extent the 2015 Yemeni Civil War can be seen as being caused by sectarian struggles or by economic grievances. Using the theory of Kalyvas about micro- and macro-cleavages in civil wars and through the method of process-tracing, an analysis has been conducted of various wars Yemen has experienced over the course of the years, previous to the 2015 civil war, in order to determine the root causes of these conflicts and subsequently the root cause of the 2015 Yemeni Civil War. The research concludes that the 2015 Yemeni Civil War has mainly been caused by structural economic grievances that have existed for a long time in the country and not by sectarian struggles. The sectarian narrative seems to be a result of the proxy-war Saudi-Arabia and Iran are fighting on Yemeni territory. KEY WORDS: yemen, civil war, sectarianism, economic grievances 1 Contents List of Abbreviations 4 Glossary 5 ​ Reference map Yemen 7 ​ Introduction 8 Chapter 1: Literature, theory and methodology 9 ​ 1.1 Literature Review 9 1.2 Theoretical Framework 11 Macro- and micro-level cleavages 12 Cleavages and alliances 13 Usefulness of Kalyvas’ theory 15 1.3 Methodology 15 Data collection 15 Process-tracing 16 Definitions 16 Operationalisation 17 Limitations and implications 18 Chapter 2: Historical Chapter 18 2.1 South Yemen: 1960’s-1990 19 2.2 North Yemen: 1960’s-1990 22 2.3 Clashes and cooperation between North- and South Yemen 25 2.4 Unified Yemen: 1990-2011 26 Chapter 3: Actors in Yemen’s conflicts 27 ​ 3.1 Local actors 27 3.2 National and regional actors 32 Chapter 4: Economic situation and conflicts prior to the 2015 Yemeni Civil War 34 ​ 4.1 Economic situation prior to the 1994 Yemeni Civil War (1990-1994) 34 4.2 The 1994 Civil War 35 Cleavages, alliances and grievances in the 1994 Civil War 37 4.3 Economic situation after the 1994 Civil War (1995-2004) 37 4.4 The Sa’ada Wars (2004-2010) 38 Run up to the first Sa’ada War 39 First Sa’ada War 40 Second Sa’ada War 41 Third Sa’ada War 43 Fourth Sa’ada War 45 Fifth Sa’ada War 47 Sixth Sa’ada War 48 Cleavages, alliances and grievances in the Sa’ada Wars 50 4.5 Economic situation during and after the Sa’ada Wars (2005-2010) 51 4.6 The 2011 Yemeni Uprisings 53 Run up to the Yemeni Uprisings 53 2 The 2011 Yemeni Uprisings 53 Cleavages, alliances and grievances in the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings 55 4.7 Economic situation after the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings (2011) 56 Chapter 5: Laying the foundations for the 2015 Yemeni Civil War: Transition 57 ​ Period (2012-2014) 5.1 Political situation during the transition period 57 5.2 Economic situation during the transition period (2012-2014) 61 Chapter 6: The 2015 Yemeni Civil War 62 ​ 6.1 Actors, cleavages and alliances 63 6.2 Economic grievances and sectarian issues as cause of the Yemeni Civil War 66 Sectarian issues as cause of the Yemeni Civil War 66 Economic grievances as cause of the Yemeni Civil War 68 Conclusion 69 ​ Bibliography 71 ​ Appendix 79 ​ Appendix 1: Economic Overview Yemen 79 Appendix 2: Events during the Sa’ada Wars 83 Appendix 3: Events during the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings 92 Appendix 4: Events during the Transition Period 97 Appendix 5: Events during the 2015 Yemeni Civil War 114 3 Abbreviations AQAP al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula CDC Constitutional Drafting Committee DRY Democratic Republic of Yemen FAES Federation of Arab Emirates of the South FLOSY Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen FSA Federation of South-Arabia GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GoY Government of Yemen GPC General People’s Congress IMF International Monetary Fund JMP Joint Meeting Parties NDC National Dialogue Conference NDF National Democratic Front NLF National Liberation Front PDRY People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (1970-1990) PNPA Peace and National Partnership Agreement PRSY People’s Republic of South-Yemen (1967-1970) PSA Protectorate of South Arabia ROY Republic of Yemen (1990-present) SAM Shabab al Moumineen SAP Structural Adjustment Plan SM Southern Movement SRC Supreme Revolutionary Committee TPSD Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development UAR United Arab Republic YAR Yemen Arab Republic YCW Yemeni Civil War YSP Yemeni Socialist Party 4 Glossary Abdu Rabbu Mansur Hadi President of Yemen since 2012, previously vice-president under Saleh’s reign. Originally from South Yemen, fled from the country to Sana’a in 1986 after supporting Ali Nasser during a civil war Ali Abdullah Saleh Former president of the ROY (until 2012) and the YAR. Part of the Sanhan tribe in the Hashid Confederation. Sided with the Houthis in 2015, murdered by Houthis in 2017 al-Ahmar family Leading family of the Hashid Confederation. Joint leaders of the Islah party. Enjoy(ed) close ties with the central government in unified Yemen Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar Military leader, head of the First Armoured Brigade. Originates from same village as Saleh, part of the Sanhan tribe in the Hashid Confederation. Longtime ally of Saleh since the 1970s, but defected in March 2011. Not related to the leading al-Ahmar family of the Hashid confederation AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) Established in 2009 out of a combination of Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda. Seen as one of the most dangerous branches of the organisation GCC Initiative GCC initiative to resolve the crisis in Yemen after the 2011 uprisings. Transition proposal drafted by GCC states, in which president Saleh would resign and outlining a transition process to form a new government in Yemen General People’s Congress (GPC) President Saleh’s ruling party. Established as a civil-society institution in 1982 when political parties were illegal in the YAR. All influential people from the country were gathered in this organisation, which was entirely loyal to Saleh Husayn al-Houthi Leader of the Houthi Movement. Killed by GoY forces in september 2004 in the first Sa’ada War, after opposing the close ties of the government to the United States and the discrimination of Zaydi people by the government Houthi movement (or SAM) Also known as Ansar Allah or Shabab al Moumineen (Believing Youth). Zaydi revivalist movement based in 5 the northern governorate of Sa’ada. Involved in six wars (Sa’ada Wars) against the government from 2004-2010. Allied with Saleh in 2015 to fight Hadi’s government Islah Political party established in 1990. Drew power from two main sources; the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashid Confederation. Officially Yemeni Congregation for Reform Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) Coalition of opposition parties in Yemen. Consists of Islah, the Yemeni Socialist Party, al-Haqq, Union of Popular Forces, the Nasserite Party and the Baath. Opposed president Saleh during his final year as president, partially responsible for his resignation National Dialogue Conference Transitional dialogue process after the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings. Implemented as part of the GCC Initiative; goal was to bring all political forces together in the conference to discuss the Yemen’s problems and facilitate a peaceful transition process Salafi Part of Sunni Islam, fundamentalist Southern Movement (SM) Or al Hirak. Emerged in 2006, fights for more ​ ​ independence of southern Yemen. Consists of an extreme faction that demands secession of the South, and a more moderate faction pledging for more regional autonomy Shayk Tribal leader Zaydi Branch of Shia Islam, found mainly in Yemen’s northern highlands. Zaydis believe that descendants of the prophet Mohammed (sada) are the only rightful rulers of ​ ​ the country and the Muslim community. Zaydis are known to be very moderate, and are theologically speaking closest to Sunni islam 6 Figure 1: Reference Map Yemen Source: https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Yemen/YEMEN%202017%20HNO_Final.pdf 7 ‘’Ruling Yemen is like dancing on the heads of snakes’’ 1 ​ Some 50 years ago, North- and South Yemen were seen as relatively prosperous countries in the Arabian Peninsula and surpassed the living standards of the now thriving cities Abu Dhabi and Dubai. However, nowadays the tables have turned; the unified country of Yemen is the poorest country in the Arabian Peninsula, with many internal conflicts and sharply deteriorating living standards, while other countries in the region are among the richest in the world (Lackner, 2014; Thiollet, 2014). The consecutive conflicts Yemen has experienced in the last few years have led to widespread internal displacement and an overall humanitarian crisis in the country. The current conflict in Yemen, which started in 2015, has been called the ‘forgotten war’ by some people, since it seems the world is paying little attention to the conflict and its consequences for the Yemeni people (Amnesty International, n.d.; Chang, 2018). Amnesty International even goes as far as to argue that the world has ignored the conflict altogether (Amnesty International, n.d.). An example of this ignorance is the fact that relatively little research has been done into the conflict and its underlying causes. The current conflict in Yemen, dubbed the Yemeni Civil War, started in 2015 when former president Saleh publicly stated he had formed an alliance with the Houthi rebels, who used to be his enemies, to fight the central government of president Hadi (Salisbury, 2017a, p.9).
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