Unraveling Yemen's Crisis

Home , Abdul Fattah Ismail, Al Bayda Governorate, Blockade of Yemen, North Yemen Civil War, Radda District, Saada Governorate

Master Thesis Political Science - Political Economy

Unraveling Yemen’s Crisis An analysis of the root causes of the 2015 Yemeni Civil War

Renée Hoekstra (10548483) Supervisor: dr. F. Boussaid Second reader: drs. P.W.H. Aarts Word count: 22.784

The Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Amsterdam June 22, 2018

Abstract

The 2015 Yemeni Civil War is often framed as being a sectarian conflict between Shiite Houthi rebels and the Sunni government of president Hadi. However, various shifts in sectarian alliances in the conflict indicate that there is more to the conflict than sectarian issues. This thesis examines to which extent the 2015 Yemeni Civil War can be seen as being caused by sectarian struggles or by economic grievances. Using the theory of Kalyvas about micro- and macro-cleavages in civil wars and through the method of process-tracing, an analysis has been conducted of various wars Yemen has experienced over the course of the years, previous to the 2015 civil war, in order to determine the root causes of these conflicts and subsequently the root cause of the 2015 Yemeni Civil War. The research concludes that the 2015 Yemeni Civil War has mainly been caused by structural economic grievances that have existed for a long time in the country and not by sectarian struggles. The sectarian narrative seems to be a result of the proxy-war Saudi-Arabia and Iran are fighting on Yemeni territory.

KEY WORDS: yemen, civil war, sectarianism, economic grievances

Contents

List of Abbreviations 4 Glossary 5 Reference map Yemen 7

Introduction 8

Chapter 1: Literature, theory and methodology 9 1.1 Literature Review 9 1.2 Theoretical Framework 11 Macro- and micro-level cleavages 12 Cleavages and alliances 13 Usefulness of Kalyvas’ theory 15 1.3 Methodology 15 Data collection 15 Process-tracing 16 Definitions 16 Operationalisation 17 Limitations and implications 18 Chapter 2: Historical Chapter 18 2.1 South Yemen: 1960’s-1990 19 2.2 North Yemen: 1960’s-1990 22 2.3 Clashes and cooperation between North- and South Yemen 25 2.4 Unified Yemen: 1990-2011 26 Chapter 3: Actors in Yemen’s conflicts 27 3.1 Local actors 27 3.2 National and regional actors 32 Chapter 4: Economic situation and conflicts prior to the 2015 Yemeni Civil War 34 4.1 Economic situation prior to the 1994 Yemeni Civil War (1990-1994) 34 4.2 The 1994 Civil War 35 Cleavages, alliances and grievances in the 1994 Civil War 37 4.3 Economic situation after the 1994 Civil War (1995-2004) 37 4.4 The Sa’ada Wars (2004-2010) 38 Run up to the first Sa’ada War 39 First Sa’ada War 40 Second Sa’ada War 41 Third Sa’ada War 43 Fourth Sa’ada War 45 Fifth Sa’ada War 47 Sixth Sa’ada War 48 Cleavages, alliances and grievances in the Sa’ada Wars 50 4.5 Economic situation during and after the Sa’ada Wars (2005-2010) 51 4.6 The 2011 Yemeni Uprisings 53 Run up to the Yemeni Uprisings 53

The 2011 Yemeni Uprisings 53 Cleavages, alliances and grievances in the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings 55 4.7 Economic situation after the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings (2011) 56 Chapter 5: Laying the foundations for the 2015 Yemeni Civil War: Transition 57 Period (2012-2014) 5.1 Political situation during the transition period 57 5.2 Economic situation during the transition period (2012-2014) 61 Chapter 6: The 2015 Yemeni Civil War 62 6.1 Actors, cleavages and alliances 63 6.2 Economic grievances and sectarian issues as cause of the Yemeni Civil War 66 Sectarian issues as cause of the Yemeni Civil War 66 Economic grievances as cause of the Yemeni Civil War 68 Conclusion 69

Bibliography 71

Appendix 79 Appendix 1: Economic Overview Yemen 79 Appendix 2: Events during the Sa’ada Wars 83 Appendix 3: Events during the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings 92 Appendix 4: Events during the Transition Period 97 Appendix 5: Events during the 2015 Yemeni Civil War 114

Abbreviations

AQAP al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula CDC Constitutional Drafting Committee DRY Democratic Republic of Yemen FAES Federation of Arab Emirates of the South FLOSY Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen FSA Federation of South-Arabia GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GoY Government of Yemen GPC General People’s Congress IMF International Monetary Fund JMP Joint Meeting Parties NDC National Dialogue Conference NDF National Democratic Front NLF National Liberation Front PDRY People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (1970-1990) PNPA Peace and National Partnership Agreement PRSY People’s Republic of South-Yemen (1967-1970) PSA Protectorate of South Arabia ROY Republic of Yemen (1990-present) SAM Shabab al Moumineen SAP Structural Adjustment Plan SM Southern Movement SRC Supreme Revolutionary Committee TPSD Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development UAR United Arab Republic YAR Yemen Arab Republic YCW Yemeni Civil War YSP Yemeni Socialist Party

Glossary

Abdu Rabbu Mansur Hadi President of Yemen since 2012, previously vice-president under Saleh’s reign. Originally from South Yemen, fled from the country to Sana’a in 1986 after supporting Ali Nasser during a civil war

Ali Abdullah Saleh Former president of the ROY (until 2012) and the YAR. Part of the Sanhan tribe in the Hashid Confederation. Sided with the Houthis in 2015, murdered by Houthis in 2017 al-Ahmar family Leading family of the Hashid Confederation. Joint leaders of the Islah party. Enjoy(ed) close ties with the central government in unified Yemen

Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar Military leader, head of the First Armoured Brigade. Originates from same village as Saleh, part of the Sanhan tribe in the Hashid Confederation. Longtime ally of Saleh since the 1970s, but defected in March 2011. Not related to the leading al-Ahmar family of the Hashid confederation

AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) Established in 2009 out of a combination of Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda. Seen as one of the most dangerous branches of the organisation

GCC Initiative GCC initiative to resolve the crisis in Yemen after the 2011 uprisings. Transition proposal drafted by GCC states, in which president Saleh would resign and outlining a transition process to form a new government in Yemen

General People’s Congress (GPC) President Saleh’s ruling party. Established as a civil-society institution in 1982 when political parties were illegal in the YAR. All influential people from the country were gathered in this organisation, which was entirely loyal to Saleh

Husayn al-Houthi Leader of the Houthi Movement. Killed by GoY forces in september 2004 in the first Sa’ada War, after opposing the close ties of the government to the United States and the discrimination of Zaydi people by the government

Houthi movement (or SAM) Also known as Ansar Allah or Shabab al Moumineen (Believing Youth). Zaydi revivalist movement based in

the northern governorate of Sa’ada. Involved in six wars (Sa’ada Wars) against the government from 2004-2010. Allied with Saleh in 2015 to fight Hadi’s government

Islah Political party established in 1990. Drew power from two main sources; the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashid Confederation. Officially Yemeni Congregation for Reform

Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) Coalition of opposition parties in Yemen. Consists of Islah, the Yemeni Socialist Party, al-Haqq, Union of Popular Forces, the Nasserite Party and the Baath. Opposed president Saleh during his final year as president, partially responsible for his resignation

National Dialogue Conference Transitional dialogue process after the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings. Implemented as part of the GCC Initiative; goal was to bring all political forces together in the conference to discuss the Yemen’s problems and facilitate a peaceful transition process

Salafi Part of Sunni Islam, fundamentalist

Southern Movement (SM) Or al Hirak. Emerged in 2006, fights for more independence of southern Yemen. Consists of an extreme faction that demands secession of the South, and a more moderate faction pledging for more regional autonomy

Shayk Tribal leader

Zaydi Branch of Shia Islam, found mainly in Yemen’s northern highlands. Zaydis believe that descendants of the prophet Mohammed (sada) are the only rightful rulers of the country and the Muslim community. Zaydis are known to be very moderate, and are theologically speaking closest to Sunni islam

Figure 1: Reference Map Yemen

Source: https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Yemen/YEMEN%202017%20HNO_Final.pdf

‘’Ruling Yemen is like dancing on the heads of snakes’’ 1

Some 50 years ago, North- and South Yemen were seen as relatively prosperous countries in the Arabian Peninsula and surpassed the living standards of the now thriving cities Abu Dhabi and Dubai. However, nowadays the tables have turned; the unified country of Yemen is the poorest country in the Arabian Peninsula, with many internal conflicts and sharply deteriorating living standards, while other countries in the region are among the richest in the world (Lackner, 2014; Thiollet, 2014). The consecutive conflicts Yemen has experienced in the last few years have led to widespread internal displacement and an overall humanitarian crisis in the country. The current conflict in Yemen, which started in 2015, has been called the ‘forgotten war’ by some people, since it seems the world is paying little attention to the conflict and its consequences for the Yemeni people (Amnesty International, n.d.; Chang, 2018). Amnesty International even goes as far as to argue that the world has ignored the conflict altogether (Amnesty International, n.d.). An example of this ignorance is the fact that relatively little research has been done into the conflict and its underlying causes.

The current conflict in Yemen, dubbed the Yemeni Civil War, started in 2015 when former president Saleh publicly stated he had formed an alliance with the Houthi rebels, who used to be his enemies, to fight the central government of president Hadi (Salisbury, 2017a, p.9). This conflict followed on the Yemeni Uprisings of 2011, which saw then-president Saleh resign from office (Salisbury, 2011, p.13). Most often, the Yemeni Civil War is described as being a sectarian conflict between Shiite Houthi rebels and the Sunni government; the main explanatory factor for the existence of the conflict is found in the tensions that exist between these two groups, and the proxy-war Saudi-Arabia (Sunni) and Iran (Shiite) are fighting on Yemen territory (Ahmed, 2017, p.52; Salisbury, 2017a, p.8; Salisbury, 2017b, p.32).

However, it seems that when one attributes the root-cause of the conflict solely to sectarian causes, other factors are ignored. For the past few years, shifts have taken place in which actors are fighting each other in Yemen. In 2015, the unlikely Saleh-Houthi alliance was formed to fight the Hadi-government, even though Saleh’s government and the Houthis used to fight each other since 2004 and the Houthis were (partially) responsible for the resignation of Saleh as president. Then in 2017, Saleh was killed by Houthi rebels because he shifted his allegiance back to the central (Sunni) government of president Hadi (Salisbury, 2017b, p.6). What is striking about the before mentioned information, is that the Houthi rebels were willing to engage in a strategic partnership with their former enemy Saleh, and vice versa. This implies that there are other causes for their grievances than sectarian ones. I believe that structural economic problems can form another explanatory factor for these grievances. Economic

1 Quote from (then) Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, interview in Al-Hayat newspaper, 28 March 2009 8

problems have plagued Yemen for a long time, and since the Arab Uprisings these structural economic problems have not been addressed and solved, but have become worse. An important explanatory factor for the Yemeni Uprisings of 2011 has been found in the lack of economic diversification and the distribution of revenues towards a small group elites, which has led to great poverty among the general population (Henry & Springborg, 2012, p.114; Salisbury, 2011, p.3). However, in explaining the current crisis in Yemen, economic factors have received relatively little attention in the literature and research, while it seems that they can form an(other) important explanatory factor.

It thus seems that there are at least two phenomena at work in Yemen right now. The first are the ongoing economic struggles in the country, and the second the shift in sectarian alliances and parties fighting each other in the conflict. But which one of these phenomena forms the more important explanation for the conflict in Yemen that is taking place nowadays? This puzzle leads me to the following research question: To which extent can the current crisis in Yemen (2015 -present) be explained by sectarian tensions or by economic grievances? This thesis, which will try to provide an answer to the above posted question, will be a qualitative, empirical thesis. Through the method of ‘process-tracing’, the conflicts Yemen has experienced before the 2015 Civil War will be analyzed, and it will be investigated whether economic struggles or sectarian tensions form the main explanatory factor for the existence of the current crisis in Yemen. This thesis is thus not an IR study, since the focus is on the internal conflicts Yemen is experiencing and the internal factors that could (possibly) explain the current conflict in Yemen.

Chapter 1: Literature, theory and methodology

1.1 Literature Review Many authors argue that the current conflict and humanitarian- and economic crisis in Yemen cannot be explained when one does not look at the past of the country. According to Colton (2010), Lackner (2014) and Thiollet (2014), the origin of Yemen’s present economic (and resulting humanitarian) struggles can, among other causes, be found in the changes that have taken place in the Yemeni economy between 1970-1990. Yemen was on a unique path to development, wherein its economy was mainly based on remittances citizens received from migrant workers in the Gulf States. This flow of remittances suddenly ended after the Gulf Crisis in 1990 and the government became reliant on oil wealth in order to sustain itself. Colton (2010) argues that when this developmental model collapsed and this new form of rents was introduced, that, contrary to the remittances, did not trickle down to the general population, ordinary Yemenis that used to rely on remittances were left with little means to sustain themselves and became trapped in situations of extreme poverty.

One of the main reasons given by various authors for the recurrent crises in the country is the lack of economic diversification and the distribution of revenues towards a small group of elites. The state is very reliant on the export and production of gas and oil in order to generate revenues; the prices of oil are highly volatile and can greatly influence the state of the economy of Yemen (Salisbury, 2011, p.3). These revenues only trickle down to a few people closely related to the government, and are commonly not used for development- and social work within the country (Ahmed, 2017, p.54; Colton, 2010, p.425); large parts of the country’s economy have been allocated to small groups of elites in return for political support (Henry & Springborg, 2012, p.114; Salisbury, 2011, p.3). The oil production in the country is depleting however and this has led to a decline in exports, resulting in less revenues and an inability of the government to sustain even the most basic social investments (Ahmed, 2017, p.53; Salisbury, 2011, p.7). All this is taking place while the global commodity prices are rising. As a result of the lack of diversification and of water scarcity in the country, most food has to be imported. The prices of food are highly volatile and most Yemenis are simply not able to afford these commodities anymore (Ahmed, 2017, p.54). As a result of migration in the 1970s-1990s, the service and informal sectors in Yemen grew rapidly, but the industrial sector did not; the country had a highly unskilled labour force and a lack of urbanization (Colton, 2010, p.411; Henry & Springborg, 2012, p.114/p.139). This, and rapid population growth, has led to great poverty among the Yemeni population and high unemployment rates (Dahlgren, 2014). The unification of North- and South-Yemen in 1990 also forms an important explanation in the literature for the situation in the country nowadays. When the republican North and the socialist/marxist South were unified in 1990, mainly for the reason of oil exploitation along the border (Henry & Springborg, 2012, p.159; Lewis, 2013, p.4), the Southern government was dismantled, privatization of services took place and subsidised healthcare and education were ended. Southern tensions towards the central government arose and this resulted in the 1994 Civil War for separatism, which the ‘North’ won. Consequently, all government officials in the South were replaced by Northern people. Up to this day, Southern people feel like their grievances are not heard, and this has led to continuing hostility towards the regime (Corstange, 2016, p.93; Lewis, 2013, p.4). As a result of economic competition between the North and the South (before and after the unification), the people in the Northern and Southern peripheries both feel that they have been ignored by the central government, which focused on the capital region and regions with natural resources. This has led to growing tensions (Salmoni, Loidolt & Wells, 2010, p.5). Many authors argue that the various conflicts Yemen has experienced over the years have been caused by sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shiites in the country; the Yemeni Civil War has often been interpreted as being a sectarian struggle (Müller, 2018, p.455). The majority of the people in Yemen are Shafi’ Muslims, a branch of Sunni Islam, except for the Northern and Central highlands. Here most people identify themselves as Shia Muslims (Lackner, 2017a, p.13). The Shiites claim they are economically, politically and religiously marginalized and neglected by the central government, and this

has led to tensions and conflicts between the Shiites and the central government (Blumi, 2018, p.159; Lackner, 2017a, p.149), who most people perceive as being Sunni-dominated (Rabi, 2015, p.166). Finally, a regional dimension forms an important explanatory factor for the existence of the current conflict in Yemen. This is the proxy-war between Saudi-Arabia (which supports president Hadi and its loyalists) and Iran (which allegedly supports the Houthis) (Ahmed, 2017, p.52; Salisbury, 2017a, p.8; Salisbury, 2017b, p.32). Saudi Arabia and Iran have a longstanding history of competition for regional influence (Salisbury, 2015, p.2) and Shia Iran has been accused of supporting the Houthi rebels in Yemen (Salisbury, 2015, p.7). This support has caused concerns in Saudi Arabia over expansion of Iranian influence in the Arabian peninsula (Rabi & Mueller, 2018, p.59). Yemen appears to have become a playground where the regional Saudi-Iran tensions have found a way to complicate the internal conflicts in the country even further (Salisbury, 2015, p.12).

1.2 Theoretical framework Civil wars are most often described by scholars as being binary conflicts, classified by their perceived overarching issue or cleavage (Kalyvas, 2003, p.476). Weidmann (2016, p.541) states that in the literature civil wars are portrayed as ‘binary actor constellations’, in which there is a conflict between the government and a rebellious party that experiences a difference along some dimension. Almost every civil war has such a overarching issue that separates the parties fighting each other in the conflict; Kalyvas calls this overarching issue the ‘master cleavage’ in a civil war (Kalyvas, 2004, p.475; Weidmann, 2016, p.541). Two prevailing and competing theories in explaining civil wars point to two different motivations for the violence that takes place in these wars; the greed vs. grievance dichotomy (Kalyvas, 2003, p.475). Both the concepts of greed and grievance are used to gain an understanding of the causes of civil wars (Hoeffler, 2011, p.274). In both these theories, civil wars are seen as a conflict between where a rebel army challenges the government. As Collier, Hoeffler & Rihner (2009, p.3) state; ‘’The defining feature of a civil war is large scale organized violence on the part of a rebel army. [...] the distinctive feature of civil war is the existence of a non-government army.’’ In the ‘greed’ explanation the focus is on economic motivations for the existence of a civil war (Keen, 2012, p.757). Civil wars are characterized by the breakdown of authority and the resulting situation of anarchy (Kalyvas, 2003, p.475). Rebellion in civil wars is seen as a public good and the result of collective action (Hoeffler, 2011, p.275). However, collective action problems like free-riding are inherent to the process of collective action; this habit of individuals to free-ride can only be reduced when actors actively involved in the action receive private benefits or so-called ‘selective incentives’ (Hoeffler, 2011, p.275). The ‘greed-theory’ can be seen as focussing on the importance of private gains and selective incentives, where the privatization of violence is encouraged and there is a war

of all against all. Ethnic civil wars are often described as a result of this greed and the wars have a private nature (Kalyvas, 2003, p.475). The grievance explanation on the other side prioritizes the political nature of civil wars (Kalyvas, 2003, p.475). In this theory, the focus is on the existence of horizontal inequalities, which can be of social, economic, cultural or political nature. Inequalities are seen as the main cause of civil war (Keen, 2012, p.757). As Kalyvas and Weidmann both argue, and as the ‘greed versus grievance’ dichotomy shows, in the literature local-level violence in civil wars is most often seen as a result of the overarching master-cleavage supposedly leading the conflict; the analysis of civil wars thus takes place at the country-level (Kalyvas, 2003, p.476; Weidmann, 2016, p.541). Various scholars have started a debate and argue that this country-level analysis, focusing on a conflict between the government and rebellious parties among a certain cleavage, is not the right level to study civil wars and have moved on to a ‘disaggregated approach’. In this approach, the focus is on the local-level violence dynamics in civil war (Weidmann, 2016, p.539). However, this approach still assumes that there is a ‘dyadic actor constellation’ between the national level, thus the government, and local challenging groups (Weidmann, 2016, p.540). In this debate about the causes of local-level violence, Kalyvas (2003) presented his theory about the ‘Ontology of Political Violence’.

Macro- and micro-level cleavages Kalyvas disagrees with this classification of civil wars being binary conflicts and the dichotomy between greed and grievance, and argues that these wars usually entail a combination of different identities and actions, supralocal and local actors, and a combination of the private and the political (Kalyvas, 2003, p.475/p.486). According to Weidmann (2016, p.541), Kalyvas was one of the first authors to criticize the assumption that civil wars are always fought between the government and a rebel group among a certain master cleavage, and to make the resulting claim that violence in civil wars is often unrelated to the master cleavage. In his theory, Kalyvas argues that civil wars are too often qualified among an overarching issue, a ‘master cleavage’, which is commonly described in ethnic, political or ideological terms, while the true causes of the conflicts can be of a drastically different nature (Kalyvas, 2003, p.476). According to Kalyvas, these macro-level cleavages, that are seen as the main cause of the civil war, are often not sufficient in explaining the motivations for violence at the micro-level. He argues that there is a ‘’disjunction between identities and actions at the central or elite level, on the one hand, and the local or mass level, on the other.’’ (Kalyvas, 2003, p.475). Actions that take place ‘on the ground’ are more likely to be related to or caused by local and/or private issues, and not by the war its main cleavage; personal conflicts, hatreds and envy play a large role in the violence that erupts at the micro-level during civil wars (Kalyvas, 2003, p.483). These micro-level cleavages are often not caused by and have no relation to the war itself or its overarching cleavage, but often existed before the war had even started (Weidmann, 2016, p.541). In some cases individuals make use of the war to settle these local/ and or

private issues and conflicts, that bear no relation to the causes of the war (Kalyvas, 2003, pp.474-476). Kalyvas argues that ‘’both the distribution of allegiances across the population and the violence that takes place are often (though not always) a function of preexisting local rivalries whose connection to the cleavage that informs the civil war is tenuous and loose’’ (Kalyvas, 2003, p.479). Weidmann argues that ‘’conflict among a master cleavage is a coordinating device that allows private actors to use violence for their private means.’’(Weidmann, 2016, p.541). A civil war thus creates an opportunity for the settling of pre-existing local conflicts by violent means (Weidmann, 2016, p.541). Kalyvas gives several examples illustrating civil wars wherein the various micro-cleavages seem to be unrelated to the overarching supposed macro-cleavage of the civil war. One example is the case of the French Revolution, where the divisions in the provinces were highly local and bore little to no relation to the central issues (or master-cleavage) of the Revolution (Kalyvas, 2003, p.477). During the English Civil War, local structures and rivalries were still omnipresent and the labels of the struggle taking place at the national level were imposed on the local-level struggles (Kalyvas, 2003, p.478). In all the examples of sharply polarized societies Kalyvas provides, a salience of local cleavages is visible, and there is a separation visible between the center and the periphery in terms of causes and cleavages leading to violence (Kalyvas, 2003, p.479). Overall, Kalyvas states that ‘’ambiguity is endemic to civil wars’’ (Kalyvas, 2003, p.476); interaction between different actors, with different identities and interests is being fostered by the presence of a civil war, and the cause for the existence of a civil war is most often hidden under facades. The motives that drive the existence of a civil war are inherently complex, and framing civil wars as being binary conflicts, is misleading (Kalyvas, 2003, p.487).

Cleavages and alliances As a result, one should not only look at the overarching cleavage as a means of linking center and periphery. Kalyvas argues that violence in civil wars is not the result of a cleavage, but of an alliance between the centre and the periphery, which consequently forms the microfoundation of a civil war (Kalyvas, 2003, p.486). Alliances entail transactions between local and supralocal actors. Supralocal actors provide the local actors with means that allows these local actors to gain a local advantage (e.g. weapons). In exchange, the supralocal actors rely on local conflicts and grievances to gain supporters and obtain local control and information (Kalyvas, 2003, p.485). Alliances can thus be seen as a simultaneous top-down and bottom-up process. These alliances allow local actors to participate in the conflict and bring more actors into it, whose issues and grievances do not align with the ones described in the master cleavage (van Baalen, 2014, p.15). The ideological agendas of the two parties involved do not have to be structured around the same issue; the selective benefit of violence provides support and leads to collective action. Violence in these cases is used as a resource that can lead to widespread mobilization, not as a means of coercion. When talking about alliances rather than cleavages, multiple actors rather than unitary

ones can be included in the analysis, agency that is located in both the center and the periphery can be included and the focus is not just on one overarching issue or cleavage, but various preferences and identities can be taken into the analysis (Kalyvas, 2003, p.486). Alliances are not a goal in themselves for local actors, but they can be a mean to achieve their local goals. The difference between a cleavage and an alliance becomes clear in the following quote by Kalyvas:

‘’We [...] want to think of cleavage as a symbolic formation that simplifies, streamlines, and incorporates a bewildering variety of local conflicts [...]. Similarly, alliance allows us to see civil wars as concatenations of multiple and often disparate local cleavages, more or less loosely arrayed around the master cleavage.’’ (Kalyvas, 2003, p.486).

As a result of the focus on alliances instead of on macro-cleavages in civil wars, one should not see the political and the private as separate spheres, but look at them as a combination. As Weidmann summarizes; ‘’[...] conflict along a master cleavage is a coordinating device that allows private actors to use violence for their private means. [...] political violence activates private violence’’ (Weidmann, 2016, p.541). Alliances are a means for local actors to reach certain goals, and action in civil wars is both decentralized and linked to the overarching conflict a country experiences. Violence that takes place can be simultaneously of private and political nature (Kalyvas, 2003, p.486). As Kalyvas states; ‘’[...] the intimate character that ‘’political violence’’ often displays is not necessarily the reflection of impersonal or abstract ideological or identity-based polarization and hatred; it is also the surprising result of the interaction between the political and the private spheres.’’ (Kalyvas, 2003, p.486). There is a mutual dependence between the macro- and the micro-level, and between the public and the private spheres in civil wars.

Concluding, according to Kalyvas’ theory, one has to look further than the binary face of the conflict and the perceived overarching issue or cleavage, in order to understand the true causes of a civil war (Kalyvas, 2003, p.476). Civil wars cannot be explained by only looking at greed or grievance explanations, and political violence does not always have to be political in nature. Deriving actions in civil wars solely from the master cleavage is misleading; local dynamics, conflicts and cleavages have to be included into theories of civil wars (Kalyvas, 2003, p.487). Kalyvas’ argument is summarized in the following quote: ‘’It is the convergence of local motives and supralocal imperatives that endows civil war with its particular character and leads to joint violence that straddles the divide between the political and the private, the collective and the individual.’’ (Kalyvas, 2003, p.487).

Usefulness of Kalyvas’ theory Kalyvas’ theory provides a perfect guidance for the research which will be conducted in this thesis. As argued before, it seems that there are more causes to the Yemeni Civil War than just sectarian tensions, which are commonly seen as the ‘macro-cleavage’. The various conflicts Yemen has experienced before the civil war started and the Yemeni Civil War itself will be analyzed using Kalyvas’ theory. It will be determined whether these conflicts, and eventually the civil war, are indeed mostly caused by sectarian tensions, or whether there are certain other (micro-)cleavages in the country that have also led to the situation we can observe in Yemen nowadays.

1.3 Methodology The method used in this thesis will be, as mentioned before, a case study, and the study is qualitative in nature. This means that an intensive, in-depth analysis of Yemen will be conducted, with the goal of understanding a larger population (Creswell, 2014, p.14; Gerring & Seawright, 2008, p.296). A case can be seen as a specific phenomenon that is demarcated in space and time; in a case-study, one can look directly at a sequence of events that leads to a specific outcome, and not just at the outcome itself (Ulriksen & Dadalauri, 2016, p.225; Peters, 1998, p.141). The population targeted in this thesis will be all the countries in the MENA (Middle East and North-Africa) region experiencing some sort of sectarian conflict. The case of Yemen has been chosen since it can be seen as a typical case (Bryman, 2012, p.70; Gerring & Seawright, 2008, p.297) with regard to sectarian conflicts. Many of the conflicts the country has experienced since its unification in 1990 are/have been (partially) explained as being sectarian conflicts. The conflict which started in 2015 is no different; sectarian struggles are often seen as the main explanatory factor for the current conflict since the country has a well-known history of sectarian struggles ever since its unification in 1990. The current conflict does bear all the hallmarks of being a sectarian conflict (Ahmed, 2017, p.52; Al-Muslimi, 2015; Salisbury, 2017a, p.8; Salisbury, 2017b, p.32). But are these sectarian struggles the only explanation for the existence of the current conflict? The hypothesis tested in this thesis is that the current conflict in Yemen, which started in 2015, cannot fully be explained by sectarian struggles, but that structural economic grievances also play a major role in the origin of the conflict. In this research, the dependent variable is the Yemeni Civil War, and the independent variables consist of sectarian tensions and structural economic grievances.

Data collection Data will be collected through primary and secondary sources. The primary sources which will be used will be newspaper articles. Data will not be collected by the author itself through visiting Yemen, since this is not possible in the given timespan and because of safety-issues. Data will also be collected

through secondary sources, being literature and government statements. Data with regard to the economic situation will be mainly collected through the World Bank database, since this is the only database that provides data on Yemen’s economic situation for the timespan to be studied.

Process-tracing The method which will be used in this thesis to investigate what the decisive factors are in the explanation for the Yemeni Civil War is the method of process-tracing. The foundation of process-tracing is the intensive description of certain events (Collier, 2011, p.824). According to Mahoney (2012, p.571), process tracing is ‘’[...] arguably the most important tool of causal inference in qualitative and case study research.’’ The core of process-tracing is to look at and identify causal mechanisms that link various causes (independent variables) with the outcomes (or dependent variable) in a case (Beach, 2016, p.463). One can define a causal mechanism as ‘’a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts’’ (Glennan, 1996, p.52). According to Bennett (2004), the goal of process-tracing is ‘’[...] to establish which of several possible explanations is consistent with an uninterrupted chain of evidence from hypothesized cause to observed effect.’’ (Bennett, 2004, p.22). Process-tracing is a useful means to analyse causal relationships and the unfolding of events over an extensive period of time (Collier, 2011, p.824), and is a method that can be conducted while only looking at one single case (Ulriksen & Dadalauri, 2016, p.225). To determine to which extent structural economic grievances and sectarian tensions can explain the Yemeni Civil War, the four questions posed by Mahoney (2012, p.588) in his article on process-tracing will be used. He argues that these four questions ‘’[...] are often essential to the explanation of a specific outcome in a particular case.‘’ (Mahoney, 2012, p.588). The questions posed are the following (Mahoney, 2012, pp.558-589): 1) Did the outcome to be explained actually occur? 2) Did the causal factors hypothesized to explain this outcome actually occur? 3) Did the posited cause(s) actually cause the outcome? 4) How are rival hypotheses eliminated?

Definitions In order to prevent ambiguity, two important concepts stated in the research question, will be defined, being sectarianism and economic grievances. Sectarianism is, in the words of Salameh Kaileh, ‘any religious or sectarian barrier that is based on inherited beliefs against the ‘other’ and ‘is the tendency to undermine social cohesion by pushing for the reproduction of ancient beliefs and separations’ (Kaileh & Shams, 2014). Waseem (2010) describes sectarianism as an excessive attachment to an individual group, a particular sect or party, through which inequalities and discrimination can occur and be practiced (Waseem, 2010, p.34). In this light, sectarian

tensions are defined as the tensions that arise from a groups inherited beliefs against the ‘other’. These tensions, inequalities and practices of discrimination can in turn lead to sectarian conflicts, in which religious or sectarian diversities are turned into a breeding ground for conflicts (Mathie, 2016, p.603). Grievances are real or imagined causes for complaint, especially when they take place under unfair treatment, or a feeling of resentment over something one believes is wrong or unfair2. In this thesis, economic grievances are defined as feelings of unfair treatment with regard to economic activities.

Operationalisation Kalyvas (2003) does not provide a clear definition of what cleavages exactly entail. In the following part, the concepts of cleavage, micro-cleavage and macro-cleavage will be operationalized. Much literature on the subject of cleavages focuses on the conflicts that arise out of the existence of a certain political system, and thus provide a definition of political cleavages. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) provide a rather broad definition of cleavages and focus on the social aspect of these cleavages. They see social cleavages as the ‘’Conflicts and controversies [that] can arise out of a great variety of relationships in the social structure.’’ (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p.6). In this thesis, cleavages will be seen as conflicts and divisions that exist between different population groups among a certain dimension, e.g. race, faith, region, political beliefs, along which violence is perpetrated. A rather broad definition has been chosen, since the conflicts in Yemen seem to be not only of a purely political nature, but sociological dimensions and structures in the country also seem to play an important role. Micro-cleavages will be seen as conflicts that originate from individuals’ behaviour and their interaction with their surroundings (Verwimp, Justino & Brück, 2009, p.308). These conflicts can thus be seen as sub-national level conflicts that take place between certain sub-national level groups, and that do not have a relation to the overarching conflict (or macro-cleavage) that takes place in the country. Micro-level cleavages encompass the processes of conflict that involve either individuals, households, groups at the community level or sub-national groups and organizations or a combination of these groups; the national level (state-level) plays no significant role in these conflicts (Balcells & Justino, 2014, pp.1345-1347). Micro-cleavages and conflicts are thus the conflicts that arise at a personal or communal level. Examples of micro-cleavages are battles between different neighbourhoods, personal vendettas and clan rivalries (Weidmann, 2016, p.540). Macro-cleavages are the conflicts that occur at the regional, national and international level and that do not really take into account the role of individual- and group interactions in a given conflict zone (Verwimp et al., 2009, p.308). Macro-level conflicts or cleavages are defined as the ‘’processes of conflict and violence that take place at the level of the sovereign state.’’ (Balcells & Justino, 2014, p.1345).

2 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/grievance 17

Examples of macro-cleavages that can lead to conflicts are nation-wide ethnic identities and political ideologies (Weidmann, 2016, p.540)

Limitations and implications The main limitation of this study is that Yemen is quite a unique country in the Middle East. The country has experienced many conflicts, of which several have been attributed to sectarian causes, that have been going on ever since 1990. Other causes have also formed important explanations, but throughout all the conflicts, sectarian struggles have always been on the forefront. Also, by researching just one case, it will be hard to generate broad generalizing statements with regard to the causes of conflicts in other MENA countries. The research findings will thus not have a high degree of external validity (Bryman, 2012, p.390). However, findings with regard to the causes and actors playing a role in the Yemeni Civil War can possibly lead to more in-depth knowledge about the complexity of civil wars, and to new insights into the structures of civil wars other countries are experiencing. A final limitation is that first-hand experiences and data will almost not be used in this thesis. The author does not have the means to collect this data by herself. Also, relatively little data is available on the topic in general. The conflict is a relatively new ‘phenomenon’ and little research has been done into the subject yet. However, if the research conducted in this thesis shows that there are other causes for the existence of the conflict in Yemen besides sectarian struggles, this will have implications for conflicts that exist in other countries in the MENA region. The results will then imply that even though a conflict seems to have been caused by sectarian struggles, this does not have to be the main explanatory factor in the origination of the conflict. If this is the case, the case of Yemen could be seen as a deviant case in the overall area of conflicts ascribed to sectarian tensions, since a new explanation is given for the existence of the conflict in Yemen, which is most commonly seen as conflict with sectarian roots.

Chapter 2: Historical Chapter

In order to be able to understand the situation in Yemen nowadays, it is important to look at the past of the country and have knowledge of the events that have led the country to its current situation. Therefore, an empirical overview of Yemen will follow. This overview is divided into two parts. The first part will describe the situation in North- and South Yemen separately from the 1960’s until the unification of the countries in 1990. Not all the events that took place can be described due to limits of time and space, so only the main events and characteristics will be mentioned. The second part will shortly look at the period of the unified Yemen, from 1990 until the Yemeni Civil War in 2015. The overview of the period of unified Yemen until 2015 will be relatively short in order to prevent iteration, since these situations will be abundantly covered in the analysis of the causes of the Yemeni Civil War.

Figure 2: Yemen’s historical divisions

Source: http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen

2.1 South Yemen: 1960’s-1990 In 1960, South Yemen consisted of various parts, that where either directly or indirectly under British rule. Back then, South Yemen was known as the Aden Colony (direct British rule) and the Eastern- and Western Aden Protectorates (indirect British rule). In 1959, the Federation of Arab Emirates of the South (FAES) was established, with the goal of bringing the various British protectorates and statelets together. On September 26, 1962, the Aden Colony was incorporated into the FAES, and the name changed to the Federation of South Arabia (FSA) (Brehoney, 2017, p.428; Lackner, 2017, p.97). However, three large states in the Eastern Aden Protectorate refused to be incorporated into the FSA; they hoped to discover oil on their territories and did not want to share these expected oil-incomes with their poor

western neighbours. These states also differed greatly from the ones incorporated into the FSA with regard to their cultural and historical characteristics (Lackner, 2017a, p.97; Smith, 2017, p.85). Together they formed the Protectorate of South Arabia (PSA). Both the PSA and the FSA were still tied to Britain, who promised them they would gain independence in 1968 (Smith, 2017, p.87). The southern Yemeni liberation war was fought over five years, from 1963-1967, and mainly played out between two different liberation movements: the National Liberation Front (NLF), which had a nationalist anti-British sentiment, and the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), which followed a Nasserist ideology (Brehoney, 2017, p.429; Lackner, 2017, pp.98-99). The British Federal Army played a relatively minor role in this liberation struggle, as the two liberation movements fought as violent battles against each other as they did against the British. In August 1967 the NLF won the battle decisively. The British handed over the symbols of power on November 30, 1967 (Lackner, 2017a, p.99) and the NLF proclaimed the People’s Republic of Southern Yemen (PRSY). Qahtan Muhammad al-Shaabi became president of the PRSY (Brehoney, 2017, p.430; Lackner, 2017, p.18). In 1970, southern Yemen was renamed into the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) (Lackner, 2017a, p.100). At independence, the PDRY inherited an appalling economic situation; there were limited natural resources and in the highlands were few agricultural areas. The PDRY had expected to rely its economy on the Aden Port and its associated industrial industries. This however was thwarted by the 1967 Arab-Israeli war which led to the closure of the Suez Canal, which continued until 1975. The PDRY had almost no resources to build its economy on (Brehoney, 2017, p.429; Lackner, 2017, p.106). The resulting economic policies of the NLF-regime focused on agricultural areas that had previously been neglected and began a policy of land reform. The former lands of British and FLOSY supporters were handed over to sharecroppers and the government implemented a policy that reduced the size of land an individual could hold. It also sponsored (sometimes violent) uprisings from peasants against their landowners and seized their lands (Lackner, 2017a, p.105). This policy of turning land into state farms was not very successful, but it did led to more equality within the new country (Lackner, 2017a, p.106). Other policies of the NLF included the nationalisation of many industrial and commercial businesses, development policies focussing on agriculture and infrastructure and the restriction of foreign finances. This eventually led to a more stable economic situation. The PDRY was the only socialist state in the Arabian Peninsula and received economic aid from countries like Russia and China, which helped the country develop, but the aid was not enough to drastically strengthen the PDRY economy (Brehoney, 2017, p.430; Lackner, 2017, p.108). The living standards in the country were quite high, education and medical aid were free and housing rents low (Lackner, 2017a, p.107). Social and economic differentials were greatly reduced by the time of the unification and men and women were seen as equals. Tribal tensions were seen as a social problem, and in 1968 the Tribal Reconciliation Decree was issued, which stated that tribal disputes had to be solved through the judicial system (Lackner, 2017a, p.110). The regime tried to (forcibly) reduce

tribalism, which was seen as allegiances based on ethnicity or family origin (Lackner, 2017b, p.698). The government ensured all groups were reasonably represented in the government and parties, as a means to reduce conflict.

In the period after southern independence until unification, internal struggles and conflicts dominated the country. Many leaders of the FLOSY had been exiled into North Yemen, but there were significant struggles within the NLF. There were two different factions, being the hard-line Marxist revolutionaries and the still extreme, but more realistic socialists (Brehoney, 2017, p.429). These struggles were partially solved in June 1969 when the ‘lefts’ (Marxists) within the NLF expelled the ‘rights’ and Salem Ruba’i Ali, known as Saleem, replaced president Qahtan Muhammad al-Shaabi (Lackner, 2010, p.100). The period from 1969 onwards was politically speaking a violent period, with frequent uprisings. The NLF integrated other left-wing parties into its organisation; in 1978, the NLF, Baath and Communist parties merged into the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP). The YSP became the sole party in the country (Brehoney, 2017, p.430; Lackner, 2017, p.111). Various political struggles took place during the above mentioned period, mainly between a more populist, Maoist NLF faction led by president Saleem, and the Marxist faction (Brehoney, 2017, p.432). President Saleem attracted many ordinary Yemenis with his policies, but other NLF politicians did not appreciate these policies, as Saleem reduced the power of the bureaucracy and frequently bypassed administrative- and party structures (Lackner, 2017a, p.112). In June 1978 the tensions reached their peak when the opposing faction accused Saleem of being involved in the assassination of Ahmad al-Ghashmi, president of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). Saleem was demanded to go into exile on June 25, but was arrested and executed after a failed coup on June 26. This led to a few days of fighting and the imprisonment of various supporters of Saleem (Brehoney, 2017, p.432). By the end of 1978, Saleem’s rival Abdul Fattah Ismail had become both the president of the PDRY and secretary general (party leader). In April 1980 he went to the Soviet Union into exile as a result of his insistence to be both president and leader of the YSP-party, and the less ideological prime minister Ali Nasser Mohammed became president, secretary general and remained prime-minister (Brehoney, 2017, p.433). In 1985, members of the opposition and Abdul Fattah’s allies accused Ali Nasser of accumulating too much personal power and of monopolization of all three leadership positions. He handed over his position as prime-minister to Haidar al-Attas and agreed to let Abdul Fattah return to the political stage (Brehoney, 2017, p.434; Lackner, 2017, p.113). The political situation escalated in 1986 into what has come to be known as the ‘13 Januari Events’, when Ali Nasser tried to assassinate all his enemies during a meeting. Many leaders were killed, Abdul Fattah being one of them. This was followed by a short civil war which lasted for 12 days and cost an estimated 10.000 lives (Salisbury, 2017a, p.5). Ali Nasser was defeated and fled to Sana’a, accompanied by many supporters (Brehoney, 2017, p.434). Among these supporters was Abdu Rabbu Mansur Hadi, the future president of unified Yemen. After these events, Ali

Salem al-Beedh became secretary general and Haidar Abu Bakr al-Attas president of the PDRY (Lackner, 2017a, p.114). The 13 January events led to a reconsideration of the policy the party used to follow, and political and economic reforms were initiated. During the last few years of the PDRY, oil was discovered, economic diversification was attempted and foreign financial support was more and more accepted. The economic situation improved, but in 1989 unification negotiations had started, a process which was initiated by Saleh, the president of North-Yemen (Lackner, 2017a, p.114).

Figure 3: Timeline South Yemen 1960’s-1990

2.2 North Yemen: 1960’s-1990 North Yemen used to be part of the Ottoman Empire until 1918, when it became part of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen (led by Iman Badr of the Zaydi Hashemite Hamid-al Din family). On september 26 1962, the same day the FSA was proclaimed in South Yemen, the Mutawakkilite Imamate in Sana’a was overthrown during a military coup, led by officers influenced by the ideas of Arab Nationalism (Blumi, 2018, p.85; Lackner, 2017, p.98). They established the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) on the same day (Lackner, 2017a, p.98). Abdullah Sallal became president (Burrowes, 1991, p.484). This coup led to the Northern Yemeni civil war, which played out between 1962 and 1970 between forces loyal to the Imam (royalists) and republicans. The republicans were supported by Nasser and his Egyptian troops until the Six Day War in 1967 led to a withdrawal of these forces (Burrowes, 1991, p.486). The royalists (Zaydis) were openly supported by Saudi Arabia (Lackner, 2017a, p.99)3. The main goal of the republicans was to

3 This was the time of the ‘Arab Cold War’, when there were tensions between Arab republics and Arab monarchies. There was great regional Saudi-Egyptian rivalry during this period: Egypt wanted all monarchies to be overthrown 22

establish a state that could maintain public security, while providing society a minimal level of services (Burrowes, 1991, p.486). With the help of Egyptian advisers, many ministries and state agencies were quickly erected; however, these institutions mainly existed in name, and did not function (Burrowes, 1991, p.486). On November 5, 1967 the republicans started the Siege of Sana’a in order to remove president Sallal from his office. He was sent into exile and replaced by Abdul Rahman al-Iryani (Burrowes, 1991, p.486). The North Yemen Civil War ended with the defeat of the royalists in 1970 and the consequent Compromise of 1970, and the republicans set up a new regime that included remnants of the royalist regime (Burrowes, 1991, p.486; Lackner, 2017a, p.100).

The Egyptians left behind an economically ruined country with nothing as much as resembling a government, and the political situation after the civil war was very troubling (Blumi, 2018, p.121). al-Iryani led a succession of various governments and switched often between accepting and declining Saudi Arabia’s influence into the domestic politics of the YAR (Lackner, 2017a, p.101). A Republic Council was established by al-Iryani in 1970 in an effort to impartially distribute the spoils of the new state that would be erected after Egypt’s occupation. The goal was to grant tribal leaders high state offices in exchange for their allegiance (Burrowes, 1991, p.486). The objectives of the council to create political and economic stability were greatly undermined by concessions that were being made to the al-Ahmar clan, which is a leading shaikhly family from the Hashed confederation (Lackner, 2017a, p.11) and this partially led to the fall of the government in 1974 (Blumi, 2018, p.121). al-Iryani did manage to erect some ministries and agencies, like the Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank of Yemen and the Central Planning Organization (CPO) (Burrowes, 1991, p.487). In 1974, al-Iryani was overthrown in a bloodless coup and Ibrahim Muhammad al-Hamdi became president (Blumi, 2018, p.124). al-Hamdi wanted to establish an independent, modern Yemen wherein everyone would benefit from its good governance and economic policies (Lackner, 2017a, p.101). al-Hamdi set up locally run projects based on incomes out of remittances and the local zakat (an annual tax Muslims pay) to develop communities with minimal state interference, which became an important part of the national economy (Blumi, 2018, p.127). For many people, al-Hamdi was the ‘ideal’ president, admired because of his ambitions to create a modern, independent Yemen (Lackner, 2017a, p.101). However, al-Hamdi was assassinated in October 1977 after only three years of rule and was succeeded by Ahmed al-Ghashmi, who in turn was assassinated in June 1978 as a revenge for the execution of al-Hamdi. This assassination led to the execution of president Salem Ruba’i Ali (Saleem) in the PDRY. Colonel Ali Abdullah Saleh became president of the YAR in July 1978. Almost immediately after Saleh came into power, the YAR reversed its locally focused development agenda (Blumi, 2018, p.134). Saleh built a regime based on patronage and benefited from the shift that took place in the balance of power and establish a pan-Arabic republic under Egyptian leadership. Saudi-Arabia saw this as a threat to its own monarchy, and saw the Egyptian interference in Yemen as a threat to its influence in Yemen (Katz, 1992, p.119). 23

between the population and the ruler. Starting in the mid-1980s, remittances send back to ordinary Yemenis dropped, while the government suddenly had a large income through the export of oil (Lackner, 2017a, p.102). Through the use of these oil incomes, Saleh ensured the loyalty of different groups and institutions in the country. In 1982, he established the General People’s Congress (GPC), which supposedly was a civil-society institution in which all political interests and views had to be represented. However, the GPC turned out to be an organisation entirely loyal to Saleh (Burrowes, 1991, p.493; Lackner, 2017a, p.102). During the time the GPC was established, political parties were illegal in the country, and all influential people were gathered in this institution (Lackner, 2017a, p.102). Under Saleh’s rule, five-year plans from the World Bank were executed and foreign development aid was accepted. Saleh facilitated the establishment of a modern financial infrastructure in a bid to please foreign donor, made sure that the productivity of Yemen could be monetized and he facilitated the labor-export from Yemen to neighbouring oil-economies. Under Saleh’s rule, the YAR was open for both development and capital investment at the same time (Blumi, 2018, p.139).

The YAR had a striking tribal organization; tribes played a large role in the political, social and cultural spheres (Burrowes, 1991, p.484). Especially in the Northern Highlands, tribes are an important unit of identification and action for people, and could be organised into large tribal confederations (Burrowes, 1991, p.484). During the 1962-1970 Civil War, the balance of power between the state and the tribal peripheral areas was in favor of the tribes, who saw the battle between the republicans and the royalists as a way to gain autonomy. After the Civil War the influence of the central YAR government did not reach these peripheral areas, even though al-Iryani tried to achieve this by granting these tribal leaders high state offices in exchange for their allegiance (Burrowes, 1991, p.486). In the 1980s however, president Saleh did manage to increase the government's’ presence in the Northern Highlands; he launched development projects in remote areas, erected regional development authorities and harshly shut down any tribal challenges and protests (Burrowes, 1991, p.488). Contrary to the PDRY, the YAR relied heavily on foreign aid. Saudi-Arabia was its largest contributor, and these incomes were used to solve the economic crises of the 1970s. Northern-Yemenis had free entry into Saudi-Arabia and other Gulf States, and many men migrated to these countries during the 1970s, sending their remittances back to the YAR (Blumi, 2018, p.122). This led to an unusual situation, since the population in the YAR was relatively wealthy, while the state was poor (Blumi, 2018, p.123; Lackner, 2017a, p.103). As a result, people invested in improving their living situations out of their own pockets, and did not rely on the state for this. This time was seen as a hopeful period in the YAR’s development path. As a result of these economic improvements, education expanded and the lifestyles of many people changed (Lackner, 2017a, pp.103-104). Another result of this inflow of remittances was that rural communities were not involved in development programs advocated by organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Remittances were spend locally and ensured that

the YAR continued to be a ‘traditional’ economy, wherein the peasants preserved their economic independence (Blumi, 2018, p.123; Burrowes, 1991, p.497). All of this however changed after the drop in oil prices in the 1980s, which meant that many Yemeni men could no longer work abroad, and the flow of remittances stopped (Burrowes, 1991, p.498). The patronage system implemented by Saleh led to dissatisfaction among the general population, since the state could not provide adequate and expected services to its population and uphold the living standards the population had become used to (Burrows 1991, p.499). The state tried to perform its more traditional functions and introduced new plans to develop, among other things, the oil and gas sectors, infrastructure and agricultural production (Burrowes, 1991, p.499), and in 1984, oil was discovered in the Mareb region (Blumi, 2018, p.149; Lackner, 2017a, p.107). From the mid-1980s onward, it seemed that the government could make true on its promises about political and socioeconomic development and change (Burrowes, 1991, p.500)

Figure 4: Timeline North Yemen 1960’s-1990

2.3 Clashes and cooperation between North- and South Yemen The YAR and PDRY had a longstanding relationship before their formal independence in respectively 1962 and 1967. People had moved between the two countries for centuries, either as a result of conflicts, political disagreements or natural causes like drought, that led to famines (Lackner, 2017a, p.114). Many communities in both the PDRY and the YAR welcomed people from the other country through these refugee flows (Lackner, 2017a, p.115). After the declaration of independence in de PDRY, supporters of the FLOSY movement, merchants and industrialists affected by the nationalization movement taking place and ousted rulers, fled to the YAR (Lackner, 2017a, p.115). What makes this long standing relationship even more obvious is the fact that the YAR reserved seats in its National Assembly

for southern delegates, while the PDRY openly pledged its commitment to the idea of Yemeni unity in a pledge of allegiance (Lackner, 2015, p.116). However, even though the two states seemed open to the idea of unity, this did not stop them from fighting two border wars in 1972 and 1979 respectively, which both ended with a unification agreement (Lackner, 2017a, p.116). Even though these agreements were not seen as being taken seriously by both the countries, the agreement of 1979 did lay the foundation for the unification of both countries in different sectors, such as health and education (Lackner, 2017a, p.116). The relationships between the YAR and PDRY greatly improved between 1982 and 1988 (Burrowes, 1991, p.500). In May 1988 a process of demilitarization was started in the border areas of Marib and Shabwah, because of the oil that was found in these regions (Blumi, 2018, p.152; Burrowes, 1991, p.500). The idea of unification became even more attractive because the unification promised the generation of great oil revenues. In 1989, a national pact (al-Mithaq) was drafted and approved through separate referenda in the YAR and PDRY (Blumi, 2018, p.152). The process of unification had begun.

2.4 Unified Yemen: 1990-2011 After the positive results of the referendum, many joint meetings were held between representatives of the YAR and the PDRY and on November 13, 1989 a complete unification was agreed upon between YAR president Saleh and PDRY secretary general al-Beedh (Lackner, 2017a, p.117). The Republic of Yemen (ROY) was proclaimed by president Saleh on 22 May 1990 (Burrowes, 1991, p.501; Lackner, 2017a, p.118). Despite large popular support, a few groups in both countries (and abroad; mainly Saudi Arabia) strongly opposed the unification (Lackner, 2017a, p.118). A transition period of 30 months was agreed on, in order to merge the various state institutions and reorganize the political lives. Legislative elections would be held in November 1992 (Burrowes, 1991, p.501). The ROY was to be governed by a Presidential Council, which consisted of five members and from which the president and vice-president would be chosen, a 39-member cabinet, built up from representatives from both the YAR and the PDRY, and a House of Representatives with 301 members. The country would be governed from Sana’a (Burrowes, 1991, p.501). YAR president Saleh became president of the ROY, while PDRY secretary general al-Beedh became vice-president. Even though legislation would be combined and adjusted to incorporate wishes from both the countries, unified Yemen was ruled by the form of administration and the laws that had existed in the YAR, generating dismay in the former PDRY (Lackner, 2017a, p.118). Only a few months after the unification, political rivalries emerged and the administrative quality quickly deteriorated; killings and assassinations among YSP militants were common during the 1990-1992 period; these murders were attributed to Saleh’s security services (Blumi, 2018, p.168; Lackner, 2017a, p.119). In 1994 a civil war broke out between the central government of president Saleh and a southern secession movement led by vice-president al-Beedh. The war was won by Saleh’s forces on July 7 (Lackner, 2017a, p.119). After this

war, the YAR was ruled by the principles that had been common in the YAR under Saleh’s rule and systems of patronage were omnipresent (Lackner, 2017a, p.119). After the end of the 1994 civil war, political power became more and more concentrated in the hands of shaykhs, the military and northern businessmen (Brandt, 2017, p.127). The formal government had basically no power and was a tool in the hands of the elite. The democratic foundation and freedom of speech the country started out with in 1990, did not last. However, the ROY held up a facade of democracy and this facade was enough to gain the support from many Western states, (Lackner, 2017a, pp.119-120). After the Civil War of 1994, many more conflicts followed between the central government and various rebellion groups, mainly playing out in the Northern area of the country, along the Yemeni-Saudi border (Blumi, 2018, p.166). The Saleh-government resorted to a policy of sectarianism against these rebels, and made use of the anti-Iranian rhetoric that circulated in the ROY (Blumi, 2018, p.165). Of all these rebellion groups, the North Yemen Houthi Movement is the most well known. The Houthi insurgency started in 2004 when Saleh’s forces were sent on a mission to kill Houthi leader Husayn al-Houthi because of his opposition to the central government, which had gained popular support. Between 2004 and 2009, six wars between the Houthis and the central government were fought; the conflict ended with a ceasefire in 2010 (Lackner, 2017a, p.20). Eventually, after the Yemeni Uprisings of 2011, in which many people were killed by the government security services and Saleh was severely wounded during an attack, Saleh resigned from office and vice-president Hadi became president of the ROY for a two year transitional period (Lackner, 2017a, p.20). After the Yemeni Uprisings, violence in the country endured while president Hadi tried to create a new government in the country (Lackner, 2017a, pp.20-21). In 2015, the Yemeni Civil war broke out between the Houthi movement and its allies, and the central government of president Hadi (Salisbury, 2017a, p.9).

Chapter 3: Actors in Yemen’s conflicts

For the sake of clarity and because of the complex nature of the past and present conflicts in Yemen, an overview of the actors involved in Yemen’s conflicts will be given before the actual analysis of the causes of the Yemeni Civil War will be conducted.

3.1 Local actors The Houthi Movement, also known under the name of Shabab al Moumineen (SAM), meaning ‘Believing Youth’ or Ansar Allah, meaning ‘Partisans of God’, originated from the Northern Yemeni Governorate of Sa’ada and is part of the Zaydi branch of Shi’a Islam (Freeman, 2009, p.1008). Zaydis believe that descendants of the prophet Mohammed (the sada) are the only rightful rulers of the country and the Muslim community, which differentiates them from other groups in Yemen (Lackner, 2017a,

p.148)4. The Houthi movement gained its name after the prominent Zaydi cleric and leader of the SAM Hussein al-Houthi (Freeman, 2009, p.1009). The insurgency group is mainly build up of Zaydis (Freeman, 2009, p.1011), even though not all Zaydis are followers of the Houthi Movement (Lackner, 2017a, p.149), while some Sunnis are part of the movement (Clausen, 2015, p.22). The SAM started in the 1992 as a religious political movement that objected the economic and political marginalisation of Zaydis in Yemen under president Saleh (Lackner, 2017a, p.147). Saleh’s policy left the Sa’ada governorate underdeveloped in order to prevent the emergence of a strong power center in the region (Salisbury, 2016, p.11). In their early days, they were tolerated by president Saleh and many Zaydi summer schools were set up. The GoY at first saw the SAM as a mechanism to distract people from the growing influence of Salafism (or Wahhabism), coming from Saudi-Arabia, in the region and supported it financially (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.99). At the end of the decade, the SAM became an important regional force in the Sa’ada governorate, and the GOY began to fear its popularity (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.107). However, the movement split into extremists and moderates (Clark, 2010, p.249). The extremists were led by Husayn al-Houthi, a former MP for the al-Haqq party (a Zaydi political party) (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.98). The political agenda of the Houthis is not clear, but there are fears that they will try to restore the Zaydi imamate that ruled Yemen until 1962 (Fraihat, 2016, p.52), even though Husayn al-Houthi never mentioned this in his lectures (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.121). The Houthi family is not part of a specific tribe, but through four marriages, Hussein al-Houthi’s father Badr a-Din al-Huthi connected his family to two tribes which are part of the Khawlan bin ‘Arm confederation (Brandt, 2017, pp.139-140). Confederations are ‘’unions based on perceived common descent’’ (Brandt, 2017, p.24) and can be seen as groupings of tribes. These confederations are divided into various sub-sections (Brandt, 2017, p.24); tribes in Yemen consist often of a cluster of extended families, and are thus networks of kin (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.46). Tribes are led by Shaykhs, whose main goal is to solve tribal problems (Al-Dawsari, 2012, p.4). Tribal customary law is used to solve these conflicts between and within tribes, and it is based on maintaining relationships and consensus building (Al-Dawsari, 2012, p.9). Tribal law has for a long time been able to resolve many conflicts and maintain stability in Yemen (Al-Dawsari, 2012, p.1). The area in Northern Yemen that is now controlled by the Houthis is home to many different tribal confederations, of which the Zaydi confederations of Hashid, Bakil and Khawlan bin ‘Amr are the most well known (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.51). The Hashid confederation consists of seven main tribes (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.50) and is the most powerful tribal confederation in the country, even though none of the tribal confederations uphold an absolute hegemony (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.45). The Hashid

4 Zaydis also believe that their leider has a religious duty to fight against corruption and unjust rulers. Zaydism is different from ‘Twelver Shiism’, which is the dominant branch of Shia Islam (Sharp, 2015, p.18). Of all the Shi’a sects, Zaydis are the closest to Sunni Islam, especially the Shafi’i branch of Sunni Islam that is the largest branch of Islam in Yemen (Clausen, 2015, p.22) and they are known to be very moderate (Freeman, 2009, p.1012). In Yemen, Sunnis and Zaydi Muslims practice their faith together in the same mosques (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.66). 28

confederation is part of the grand confederation of Hamdan b.Zayd (Brandt, 2017, p.30). The al-Ahmar family is the leading family of the Hashid confederation (Lackner, 2017a, p.11) and the Hashid tribes maintain close relationships with the government of Yemen (GoY) (Brandt, 2017, p.58). President Saleh belonged to the Sanhan tribe in the Hashid confederation, and many members of the Sanhan have become leading figures in Saleh’s political establishment (Brandt, 2017, p.59). This is unlike the Bakil and Khawlan bin ‘Amr tribes, who have never been so close to the central government (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.56). Figure 5 shows an overview of the structure of the Hashid tribal confederation.

Figure 5 - Overview of the Hashid Tribal Confederation

Source: Adapted from Salmoni et al., 2010, p.50

The second confederation in the Sa’ada governorate is the Bakil, located in Yemen’s extreme north (Brandt, 2017, p.30), which consists of 13 tribes; it is the largest tribal confederation in Yemen (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.50). The Bakil confederation belongs to the grand confederation of Hamdan b. Zayd, together with the Hashid confederation (Brandt, 2017, p.30). The Bakil confederation has historically been quite involved in national power struggles in Yemen (Brandt, 2017, p.351) and some members of its tribal elite have gained access to Saleh’s political power circle. Bakil members however have not nearly gained as much influence as the members of the Hashid confederation (Phillips, 2011b, p.40). Figure 6 shows an overview of the Bakil tribal confederation and its various clans.

Figure 6: Overview of the Bakil Tribal Confederation

Source: Adapted from Salmoni et al., 2010, p.50

The final confederation of Khawlan bin ‘Amr is situated in the western mountain range of Sa’ada and consists of six different tribes, divided into various sub-sections and clans. Khawlan bin ‘Amr is seen as a confederation built up from ‘peripheral’ tribes and has very limited political influence (Brandt, 2017,

p.351; Salmoni et al., 2010, p.49). Figure 7 shows an overview of the Khawlan bin ‘Amr tribal confederation, its various clans and sub-moieties.

Figure 7: Overview of the Khawlan bin ‘Amr Tribal Confederation

Source: Adapted from Salmoni et al., 2010, p.49

The political under-representation of tribes other than those part of the Hashid confederation has led to dissatisfaction among tribal leaders; the GoY tried to compensate these leaders through giving them financial support and executing relatively little government interference on their territories. The amount of financial support granted to different shaykhs depended on their strategic importance to the GoY (Brandt, 2017, p.59). Meanwhile in various Southern governorates the Southern Movement (SM) or Al Hirak, which emerged in 2007 as a peaceful rights-based movement but became a secessionist movement after harsh reactions by GoY forces, fights for (more) independence of Southern Yemen. The SM was born out of frustrations among former government- and military officials that had been removed from their positions after the 1994 civil war (Salisbury, 2015, p.6). They feel economically and politically disadvantaged by the central government (Fraihat, 2016, p.42) and argue that the unification of Yemen was only implemented to plunder the South’s mineral potential (Blumi, 2087, p.184). The SM has a well-organised and heavily armed extreme faction that demands the complete separation of the south and a more moderate faction that pledges for regional autonomy under a federal system (Fraihat, 2016, p.43; Salisbury, 2018a, p.2). Hirak is not a unified movement, but consists of many different separatist organisations (Lackner, 2017a, p.181). A final local actor playing a role in the conflicts in Yemen is al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP is part of al-Qaeda and is seen as one of the most dangerous branches of the organisation. It was formed in 2009, out of a combination of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda (Lackner, 2017a, p.137). AQAP has become embedded in certain tribes in Yemen, playing into the grievances that exist in these tribes with regard to the policy of the Yemeni government (Phillips, 2011a, p.105). The organisation was able to expand its reach in Yemen following the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings, and holds territory and exerts influence in various governorates, especially in southern and eastern Yemen (Baron, 2015, p.2). The AQAP has mainly launched attacks on Houthi rebels, who they see as infidels, and fights against the central government (Lackner, 2017a, p.137; Salisbury, 2018a, p.22).

3.2 National and regional actors The Islah party, officially called the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Lackner, 2017a, p.126), is an important political party. Islah was created in 1990 by Shaykh Abdullah al-Ahmar (head of the Hashid tribal confederation) with the intention of competing with the YSP (Clark, 2010, p.271). Islah was thus a rival to the GPC, but at the same time also complementary (Lackner, 2017a, p.127). During the parliamentary elections in 1993 Islah gained 62 seats and the YSP 56 (Carapico, 1998, p.254); this allowed Saleh (who’s GPC party won the elections) to reduce the YSP’s influence in the government (Lackner, 2017a, p.127). Islah is built up from three main factions. The first is a tribal element, built up mainly from the Hashid confederation and to a lesser extent from the Bakil confederation and thus consists of Zaydis. The second element is the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood, which consists both of Zaydis and Shafi’is

(branch of Sunni islam). A third element is the more hardline Islamist faction, which some believe to be involved in jihadists practices; it also includes both Zaydis and Shafi’is (Lackner, 2017a, p.126). The Islah engages in charity work and has a strong grassroots support base; it does not only operate on the ‘elite’ level (Phillips, 2011b, p.42). Ali Abdullah Saleh is the former president of the ROY and the YAR and head of the GPC-party. During his reign, he built a system of patronage, in which he ensured the loyalty of security institutions (Lackner, 2017a, p.102). Saleh acknowledged the importance of tribes in Yemen and created coalitions based on patronage with the most important ones (Rabi, 2015, p.139). Especially the al-Ahmar family has been an important beneficiary of this patronage system (Blumi, 2018, p.142). Saleh is from the Sanhan tribe, which is part of the Hashid confederation. This explains his close ties to this specific confederation (Lackner, 2017a, p.127). Being from the Sanhan, Saleh is thus of Zaydi descent. Even though the Yemeni government under president Saleh has often been described as Sunni-dominated, this is not true. Many government members were also of Zaydi descent (Rabi, 2015, p.166) Abdu Rabbu Mansur Hadi became president of the ROY in February 2012, before that he was the vice president of the country. Hadi originates from the Abyan governorate in southern Yemen (Lackner, 2017a, p.41). He is of Sunni descent, and has also been accused of using patronage principles in the formation of his new regime, just like his predecessor Saleh (Lackner, 2017a, p.41). Hadi’s government was overthrown by the Houthis in January 2015, but after 8 months of exile spent in Saudi Arabia he came back to Yemen (Lackner, 2017a, p.184). Hadi’s government is supported by the United States, Saudi Arabia and other countries of the GCC (Blumi, 2018, p.3). Saudi Arabia has a long history of intervening into Yemeni internal affairs (Fraihat, 2016, p.52). The main policy of Riyadh with regard to Yemen is, and has historically been, to prevent state collapse in the country, since a collapse of the Yemeni state could have strong impacts on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Salisbury, 2015, p.3). It is often stated that Saudi Arabia prefers a ‘’weak but stable Yemen’’ (Clausen, 2015, p.20), in which Saudi Arabia can exert influence. The country supports whatever regime is in power in order to obtain its goal; Saudi Arabia has supported various actors in Yemen from the 1960s onwards, among which Saleh’s regime, the Southerners during the 1994 Civil War and the Zaydi imamate in the 1960s (Salisbury, 2015, p.4). In the Yemeni Civil War, Riyadh supports the government of president Hadi. Saudi Arabia also meddles in the conflict because they fear an expansion of Iranian influence in Yemen through Iran’s alleged support for the Shia Houthi Movement (Fraihat, 2016, p.53). Predominantly Shia Iran (following the branch of ‘Twelver Shi’ism’) is thus accused of supporting the Houthi rebels, mainly through supplying weapons, training & military advise (through Hezbollah camps in Lebanon) and monetary support, even though there is no strong evidence for these allegations (Lackner, 2017a, p.82/p.155) . There is some evidence that Iran is supporting southern separatist groups like the SM (Lackner, 2017a, p.82). This attempted expansion of Iranian influence in Yemen is antagonizing Riyadh and has further increased the Saudi-Iranian regional rivalry (Lackner, 2017a, p.83).

Chapter 4: Economic situation and conflicts prior to the 2015 Yemeni Civil War

In the following section, the 1994 civil war, the six Sa’ada Wars, that took place between 2004 and 2010, and the 2011 Yemeni Revolution will be analyzed. A short overview of the triggers of each war or conflict will be given, and the most important actors playing a role in the conflicts will be presented. The economic situation in Yemen after each of the conflicts will also be discussed. After each conflict, a short analysis of the cleavages guiding the conflict(s) will be presented.

4.1 Economic situation prior to the 1994 Yemeni Civil War (1990-1994) After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, many Yemenis (estimated to be around 800.000) that had worked in various GCC countries had to return to Yemen, which resulted in a deprivation of income remittances in the country (Colton, 2010, p.415). Sana’a’s stance in the conflict (supporting Iraq) also led to the isolation of Yemen and a significant reduction of external financial support (Lackner, 2017a, p.235). This return of workers meant that thousands of new people needed new jobs and access to social services; however, there were limited jobs available for these mostly unskilled labourers (Colton, 2010, p.415). Population growth was also relatively high at around 5% per year (see Appendix 1). As a result, the unemployment rate in Yemen was high; unofficially it was estimated to be around 30-40% of the labor force (Colton, 2010, p.415), while official numbers estimated the unemployment to be around 8%5 (see Figure 8). There was a positive economic growth during this time, even though it was a highly volatile economic growth. The GoY had to spend significantly more resources on paying people in the public sector; during the period of 1990-1995, more than 50% of the government spending was directed towards the public sector, while the development of the private sector did not receive nearly as much attention (Al-Hawri, Cicowiez, Lofgren & Pournik, 2011, p.10). The rapid period of growth coincided with the expansion of the oil sector in Yemen, which at that time generated a relatively high output and resulting GDP growth (Al-Hawri et al., 2011, p.7) (see Figure 8/Appendix 1). GDP per capita did grow, but GDP numbers can provide a deceitful image of the economic situation of citizens in a country, since it does not take into account the distribution of income among the population. The GINI coefficient in Yemen is on average 35.466, which means that income inequality in Yemen is relatively high, probably as a result of the patronage policies of president Saleh. One can thus expect that the largest part of the GDP is located in the hands of a relatively small portion of the population. Oil revenues were an important driver of economic growth in Yemen (Al-Hawri et al., 2011, p.8). As a result of the oil production, the exchange rate of Yemeni Rial was strengthened, which meant that the

5 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=YE 6 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=YE; Measured in 1998 (35.0), 2005 (34.7) and 2015 (36.7). 34

production of oil had a negative influence on the growth of industrial and agricultural sectors. The underdevelopment of the agricultural sector and the focus on oil-export meant that Yemen had to import many basic commodities in order to provide food for its population (Al-Hawri et al., 2011, p.9). Inflation rates were extremely high during the period (see Figure 8/Appendix 1), possibly as a result of the increasing influx of oil dollars. Figure 8 presents an overview of the economic situation in Yemen from 1991-1994. For a full overview of the development of various economic aspects, see Appendix 1.

Figure 8 - Yemen Economy 1991-1994 Indicator 1991 1994 Inflation consumer prices (annual %) 36% 49.40% GDP per capita growth (annual %) 1.20% 1.80% GDP growth (annual %) 6.30% 6.70% Oil rents (% of GDP, annual) 15.20% 31.10% Total unemployment (% of total labor force)7 8.60% 8.30% Crude oil production (unit 1000 tonnes) 9925 16160 Oil exports (unit 1000 tonnes) 7028 13255 Data retrieved from the World Bank Open Data and International Energy Agency. Table produced by author.

4.2 The 1994 Civil War (May 4, 1994 - July 7, 1994) Four years after Yemen’s unification, a civil war broke out between Southern secessionists and the central government of the ROY. The secessionists were led by former PDRY secretary general and vice-president of the ROY Ali Salem al-Beedh, who was part of the Yemeni Socialist Party. Tensions between the North and the South had existed ever since the unification of 1990, as the South, mainly the YSP, argued they were politically and economically marginalized by the central government, with president Saleh seeking ultimate power in the ROY (Rabi, 2015, p.129). Southerners also complained of ‘retribalisation’ of the south after unification and the return of tribal rule (Dresch, 2000, p.197). After unification in 1990, southern government structures were dismantled, services privatised and subsidised healthcare and education were ended. This led to the feeling that southern resources and revenues were being transferred to the North, ignoring the needs in the south (Lewis, 2013, p.4). The south felt the unification had been uneven in terms of distribution of resources and power (Colton, 2010, p.417). Saleh and the GPC on the other hand accused the South, and especially the YSP, of being unwilling to embrace the unity of Yemen and trying to secede as a result of the discovery of a major oil field in 1992 (Day, 2012, p.127).

7 The unemployment numbers supplied by the World Bank and the unemployment numbers found in the literature differ greatly from each other; the ones found in the literature are significantly higher, but also differ among each other. It has been chosen to use the data supplied by the World Bank, since all the economic data has been retrieved from this source. However, one could expect the real unemployment numbers to be higher. 35

The turmoil started in August 1993 when al-Beedh left for Aden after losing many seats during the elections, refusing to accept an even more diminished role in the ROY. He issued a list of demands that had to be met by the GoY before he would take the oath of office and join the Presidential Council, paralyzing the GoY (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 1994, p.6). During the time, various assassinations (and attempts) were carried out on southern politicians that opposed president Saleh (Lackner, 2017a, p.172). On February 22, 1994, the two warring parties had signed an agreement, the Document of Pledge and Accord, aimed at solving Yemen’s unity problems, but conflicts between northern and southern army brigades broke out the next day (Day, 2012, p.127). According to some, this was the actual start of the civil war (Lackner, 2017a, p.172). The northern forces were made up of tribesmen (mainly Hashid) and the military forces (HRW, 1994, p.5), in which many of Ali Nasser’s supporters who fled to Sana’a in 1986 after the ‘mini’ civil war in the PDRY, were incorporated. Abdu Rabbu Mansur Hadi was one of the military leaders of Saleh’s forces (Lackner, 2017a, p.113). The South could only rely on its military, parts of which were isolated in the Amran governorate and could not reach Aden after the conflict started (Lackner, 2017a, p.173). Sporadic clashes between the northern and southern armies continued, and on the 5th of May the Civil War truly became full-scale, when fighting broke out (AP, May 7 1994). Northern troops crossed the demarcation line and advanced towards Aden (Rabi, 2015, p.127), with the goal of unifying Yemen by force (HRW, 1994, p.7). The Northern troops focused their action on the city of Aden and besieged it from June until the fall of Aden on July 7th. During the time, they deliberately destructed Aden’s water supply, which is a violation of the rules of war, causing a shortage in Aden (HRW, 1994, pp.14-15). On May 21 1994 the South, led by al-Beedh, issued a formal declaration of secession and declared the Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY) (Lackner, 2017a, p.173). al-Beedh believed that Saudi-Arabia and other GCC states would support the DRY, but they did not officially recognize the state. Saudi Arabia actively support the DRY in other ways (Brandt, 2017, p.81) and provided the DRY with weapons and financial support (Lackner, 2017a, p.172). Saudi Arabia in turn argued that Iraq, Eritrea and Sudan were assisting the North (HRW, 1994, p.7). Haydar al-Attas, former president of the PDRY and prime minister of the ROY, became prime minister of the DRY, while al-Beedh became president (Rabi, 2015, p.128) On July 7th, Aden surrendered and the secessionist leaders fled the country. Large parts of the infrastructure in the south were destroyed (Lewis, 2013, p.4) and Aden was looted both by secessionists and the northern army (HRW, 1994, p.19) After the Civil War, Saleh’s regime disarmed the southern military and police forces. Even though the disarmed personnel were retained as state employees, many of them were never recalled to active duty again, and northern forces took over control of the southern territories (Day, 2012, pp.137-138), imposing unification of Yemen by force (Rabi, 2015, p.128).

Cleavages, alliances and grievances in the 1994 Civil War The main cleavage among which the Yemeni Civil War of 1994 was fought out was around the (perceived) economic and political marginalization of the South. In this war, sectarian issues did not play a role; the war was the result of the failed unification process that had taken place in Yemen from the 1990s onwards. The northern government was supported by the Hashid tribe in its fight against the secessionist south. This however is not a new alliance, since Saleh promoted many people of his Sanhan clan into the military and political ranks, after he came to power, and secured the loyalty of the Hashid in the process (Brandt, 2017, p.58).

4.3 Economic situation after the 1994 Civil War (1995-2004) As mentioned before, the infrastructure in southern Yemen was largely destroyed as a result of the 1994 civil war; the reconstruction of this infrastructure put a large demand on the government budget and foreign direct investment (FDI) was very little, since potential investors had a lack of confidence in the Yemeni economy (Lackner, 2017a, p.236). After the Yemeni Civil War of 1994 the GoY changed its economic policy towards a policy focused on market-oriented reforms. The policy became more liberal in nature and subsidies on goods like petroleum were reduced; this stabilized the economy. The GoY turned to the IMF and the World Bank for assistance. The first phase of the IMF structural adjustment program (SAP), implemented in March 1995, focused on restoring monetary stability through reducing government spending. The measures included an increase of electricity tariffs, oil product prices and interest rates and a decrease of the exchange rate. The first phase, which ended in October 1995, led to a reduction of the inflation rate in Yemen (see Figure 9/Appendix 1). During the second phase (January 1996-October 1997), the focus was still on a reduction of government spending, this time through the dischargement of thousands of public employees, cutting subsidies (e.g. on fuel and wheat), floating of the exchange rate and the start of a privatization program with regard to public enterprises (Colton, 2010, p.418). Public sector wages were also reduced, and the GoY could spend more money on investing in other sectors (Al-Hawri et al., 2011, p.10). The second phase was less successful and did not achieve clear results; the living situation of ordinary Yemenis did not improve and unemployment levels continued to rise (Colton, 2010, p.418). The programs were thus putting a heavy burden on Yemeni citizens and were unpopular (e.g. in 1998 protests broke out against the removal of subsidies on basic commodities (Lackner, 2017a, p.240)). In 1998, 7.4% of Yemenis were living below the poverty line of $1.90 a day; in 2005, this number had reached 9.8%8, while the percentage of people living below the national poverty line was 34.8%9. During the given timespan time, there was a reduction in the expansion of oil related industries, which negatively influenced the economy. The country was not able to maintain the high growth rates it

8 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY?locations=YE 9 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=YE 37

experienced during the first half of the 1990s, but the economy was stabilized (Al-Hawri et al., 2011, p.7). There was a decline in GDP growth per capita, but the population growth also declined in the period from 1994-2004 (see Appendix 1); however, GDP growth per capita was reducing faster than the population growth, which indicates that the growth rate in Yemen during this period is not sufficient to alleviate many citizens out of their poverty-stricken situation (Al-Hawri et al., 2011, p.7). Figure 9 presents an overview of the economic situation in Yemen from 1995-2004.

Figure 9- Yemen Economy 1995-2004 Indicator 1995 2004 Inflation consumer prices (annual %) 49.40% 12.50% GDP per capita growth (annual %) 1.30% 1.10% GDP growth (annual %) 5.70% 4.00% Oil rents (% of GDP, annual) 34.70% 33.00% Total unemployment (% of total labor force) 8.90% 16.20% Crude oil production (unit 1000 tonnes) 16462 19356 Oil exports (unit 1000 tonnes) 13514 14686 Gini coefficient 35.0 (1998) No data Data retrieved from the World Bank Open Data and International Energy Agency. Table produced by author.

4.4 The Sa’ada Wars (2004-2010) Due to limitations of space, the Sa’ada wars will not be discussed in full detail. For an overview of the events in each of the six Sa’ada Wars, see Appendix 2. Overall, six Sa’ada Wars took place, with relatively short interim periods in between them, as can be seen in Figure 10. However, even in these interim periods, when there was officially no war taking place, some clashes occurred between the GoY and the Houthis, albeit on smaller scales. Clashes between the Houthis and regional tribes, and between regional tribes themselves were more prevalent. In the interim periods, processes of revenge attacks and tribal solidarity became very clear and there was a constant climate of mistrust among tribes (Brandt, 2017; Salmoni et al., 2010).

Figure 10: Timeline Sa’ada Wars (2004-2010)

Run up to the first Sa’ada War Husayn al-Houthi, who had parted ways with the SAM and found his own revivalist Zaydi movement (Salisbury, 2016, p.11), opposed the central government’s, in their eyes, deliberate political and economic discrimination of the Zaydi community; the Sa’ada governorate is one of the poorest of the country, despite the abundance of oil reserves in the governorate (Colton, 2010, p.423). al-Houti also opposed the close ties of the government with America (they specifically opposed the government’s support for the U.S. in the ‘War on Terror’) (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.131). al-Houthi also opposed the influence Saudi Wahhabi Salafism had gained among tribes (with help of the GoY) in the Sa’ada governorate and wanted to protect the Zaydi identity from these groups (Rabi, 2015, p.155; Salmoni et al., 2019, p.107). He managed to mobilize popular support for his views in the Sa’ada Governorate (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.131) and challenged the authority of the RoY (Rabi, 2015, p.154). al-Houthi was accused by the GoY of encouraging his followers to chant anti-U.S. slogans in mosques (DPA, June 21 2004) and leading anti-US demonstrations after weekly Friday prayers (AFP, June 26 2004). The main slogan of the Houthis is the following: ‘’God is great. Death to America. Death to Israel. Curse on the Jews. Victory for Islam.’’ (Lackner, 2017a, p.157). al-Houthi also encouraged his followers to stop paying taxes to the state and to block the highway between Sa’adah and Sana’a (Clark, 2010, p.249). According to observers, the slogan shouting is what triggered the start of the first Sa’ada War. The GoY saw Husayn al-Houthi as a political threat (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.7). He in turn saw the GoY as being illegitimate and accused them of

wanting to restore the Zaydi imamate that had ruled Yemen until 1962; however, Husayn al-Houthi never explicitly made these claims (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.121). The cleavage among which the first Sa’ada War started was thus an ideological and political cleavage between the Houthis and the GoY.

First Sa’ada War (June 22, 2004 - September 10, 2004) The first Sa’ada War started on June 22, 2004 when GoY security forces were sent to the Marran area in the Sa’ada Governorate to either arrest or kill SAM-leader Husayn al-Houthi , which was the GoY’s main goal (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.134), and crush the rebellion in the area (Brandt, 2017, p.154). The GoY forces were made up of the military led by ‘Ali Moshin al-Ahmar (part of Sanhan tribe, like Saleh) and by ‘irregulars’, which are local tribes that sided with the GoY in the conflict, but were not part of the regular army10 (Brandt, 2017, p.160). The irregulars in the Sa’ada Wars are thus local actors that are in an alliance with the central government. In the first Sa’ada War, the only irregulars playing a role were tribesman from the al’Usimat tribe, which is part of the Hashid confederation (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.134). Saleh asked for the support of other tribes in Sa’ada; they agreed that the Houthis were dangerous but did not agree with the way the GoY was handling the conflict. They also did not want to throw their man into the battle and risk igniting tribal feuds and processes of blood revenge (Brandt, 2017, p.161). There was also very limited support for the Houthis from other local tribes and Saleh’s forces faced only small groups of dissidents (Lackner, 2017a, p.152); only the al-Razzamat tribe, part of the Wada’a in the Bakil Confederation (Brandt, 2017, p.123), supported the Houthis (Brandt, 2017, p.158). Figure 11 presents an overview of the actors involved in the conflict. Clashes also broke out between the al-Razzamat tribe and the al-Nimri tribe on one side and the al-Mahdi tribe on the other side when a historical tribal feud was reignited11. During the First War, various mediation attempts took place, but to no avail (AFP, June 26 2004; DPA, July 27 2004). The First Sa’ada War ended with the killing of Husayn al-Houthi on September 10, 2004 (DPA, September 10 2004). Badr al-Din al-Houthi, Husayn’s father, took over the leadership of the Houthi rebel group.

Figure 11: Overview of (known) actors in the first Sa’ada War (besides the Houthis and the GoY).

Actor Fighting along Involvement in Side macro- or micro conflict cleavage

Abdullah al-Razzamat/ Macro- and micro Ally of Husayn Houthis

10 Irregulars were not included in the ‘official army ranks’. The GoY avoided to appoint tribal leaders and combatants, beside those from the Hashid confederation, to military positions. According to Brandt, this was because conflicting tribal interests had to be excluded from the army, since the army could not become involved in local feuds (Brandt, 2017, p.160). 11 In the 1990s the Al-Mahdi and Al-Nimri tribes experienced a conflict over the construction and management of a school. A member of the Al-Mahdi was killed, which led to a cycle of revenge killings and blood feuds. The Al-Nimri were a relatively weak tribe and allied themselves with the Al-Razzamat (Brandt, 2017, p.123). 40

al-Razzamat clan cleavages, local level al-Houthi, provoked (Wada’a tribe, Bakil actor conflicts on his territory Confederation) in order to take the pressure of al-Houthi. Involved, together with al-Nimri tribe, in tribal feud against the al-Mahdi tribe

al-’Usimat tribe Macro cleavage, local GoY mobilized support GoY (irregulars) (Hashid Confederation) level actor of the clan, who were stationed in the area where they were fighting out a tribal feud before the First Sa'ada War started

al-Nimri clan (Bani Micro cleavage, local Clashed, together with n.a. Hushays tribe, Bakil level actor al-Razzamat clan, with Confederation) al-Mahdi tribe. Reignition of pre-existing tribal feud.

al-Mahdi clan (Wa’ila Micro cleavage, local Clashed with the n.a. tribe, Bakil level actor al-Razzamat clan and Confederation) the al-Nimri tribe. Reignition of pre-existing tribal feud. *Table drafted by author, using newspaper articles, Brandt (2017), Salmoni et al. (2010) & Lackner (2017a)

Second Sa’ada War (March 19, 2005- April 13, 2005) The second Sa’ada War started in March 2005 after Badr al-Din al-Houthi returned to the Sa’ada governorate after a failed negotiation with president Saleh. On March 19th, three or four Houthis were killed in an attack by the GoY after they tried to buy weapons and ammunition (AFP, March 19 2005; DPA, March 19 2005). In the following days, the tensions flared up again as a result of this attack and various clashes between GoY troops and the Houthis took place. Some of these clashes were, according to tribal sources sparked by GoY attempts to take heavy weapons away from the Houthis (DPA, March 28 2005). Yemeni security forces however argued that the clashes were erupted by attacks from Houthi supporters and said Badr al-Din al-Houthi was to blame for the renewed violence. According to them, al-Houthi had suddenly left Sana’a, where the state had granted him a safe stay, and went to Wadi Nushur where he assembled the Houthi rebels and ordered them to attack security forces in the area (IHS, March 30 2005).

The objective of the GoY in the second Sa’ada War seemed to be dismantling the Houthi leadership through targeting high profile individuals within the group (Brandt, 2017, p.170; Salmoni et al., 2010, p.136). The Houthis on their part carried out some attacks on high profile GoY members (AFP, April 3 2005). There was a wider range of tribal involvement in the Second Sa’ada War (Lackner, 2017a, p.152), with the GoY openly asking for tribal support (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.136). Processes of asabiyyah (tribal solidarity) also began to show during the war (Brandt, 2017, p.171). Not all actors involved sided with either one of the warring parties as a result of their ideological stance (e.g. al-Hamid clan; see Figure 12). Within the ranks of the Houthis, Husayn al-Houthi’s brother Abdulmalik al-Houti, became the new Houthi rebel leader in an uneasy alliance with Abdullah al-Razzami (Brandt, 2017, p.171). On April 13th, the government declared an end to the Second Sa’ada War (AFP, April 13 2005).

Figure 12: Overview of (known) actors in the Second Sa’ada War (besides the Houthis and the GoY).

Actor Fighting along Involvement in Side macro- or micro conflict cleavage

Abdullah al-Razzami/ Macro- and micro Ally of Husayn Houthis al-Razzamat clan cleavages, local level al-Houthi. Involved, (Wada’a tribe, Bakil actor together with al-Nimri Confederation) tribe, in tribal feud against the al-Mahdi tribe

Various tribes of Macro cleavage, local GoY mobilized support GoY (irregulars) Hashid Confederation level actors of Hashid tribesmen to fight the Houthis

al-Nimri clan (Bani Micro cleavage, local Clashed, together with n.a. Hushays tribe, Bakil level actor al-Razzamat clan, with Confederation) al-Mahdi tribe. Again reignition of pre-existing tribal feud.

al-Mahdi clan (Wa’ila Micro cleavage, local Clashed with the n.a. tribe, Bakil level actor al-Razzamat clan and Confederation) the al-Nimri tribe. Again reignition of pre-existing tribal feud

Shaykhs of al-Faris, Macro cleavage, local Asked by GoY to GoY (irregulars) al-Qadami and level actor prevent Houthi al-Abqur movement on their territories

Mijalli clan (al-Abdin Macro- and micro Supported the GoY, GoY tribe, Khawlan bin ‘Amr cleavage, local level involved in tribal feud Confederation) actors with the al-Hamid clan

al-Hamid clan Micro cleavage, local Involved in tribal feud Houthis (al-Abdin tribe, level actor with Mijalli clan, sided Khawlan bin ‘Amr with the Houthis since Confederation) they had a common enemy in aforementioned GoY supporting clan. Were not Houthi supporters before start of the Second Sa’ada War *Even though these are the known local actors to have played a role in the conflict, many other tribes were involved in the war. Local level actors that have been mentioned to have played a role in the earlier wars can be expected to also have played a role in the current one; these will not be mentioned again, unless some new events occured that made them change their stance. ** Table drafted by author, using newspaper articles, Brandt (2017), Salmoni et al. (2010) & Lackner (2017a).

Third Sa’ada War (November 28, 2005 - February 23, 2006) When Houthi fighters attacked police stations and checkpoints in Al-Khafji and Al-Eind on November 28, 2005, killing eight policeman, the third Sa’ada War started (AFP, November 29 2005). The government responded by attacking civilian homes in which the Houthis were allegedly hiding (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.138). The conflict was also sparked by the reingition of a pre-existing tribal feud between the al-Mahdi on the one side and the al-Razzamat, al-Nimri and al-Shafi on the other (Brandt, 2017, p.187). Fighting took place in various regions and spread further in geographical terms compared to the two previous wars. According to Marieke Brandt, the war became more tribal in nature, and less about ideological differences. As Brandt (2017), states, during the third Sa’ada war

‘’thousands of men were fighting for the Houthis, but not all of them shared the Houthi ideology. Rather, they were ‘coasting the wave’ of the rebellion in order to fight for their tribe, or against their rivals, the government or a hated shaykh. Thus many supporters of the Houthi movement had no ‘real’ loyalty to it; they switched sides based on immediate private interests.’’ (Brandt, 2017, p.199).

The involvement of irregulars in the conflict increased, and inter-tribal fighting took place on a larger scale (Salmoni et al., 2014, p.141). Again, some tribes sided with either the GoY or the Houthis as a result of actions that had nothing to do with the overarching macro-cleavage of the conflict (e.g. al-Maqash tribe and various tribes located in Sa’ada governorate, see Figure 13). The Third Sa’ada War was characterized

by a crackdown on the press (AP, November 28 2005). Increased censorship by the GoY led to an information blackout, which made the Third War look less intense than its predecessors (Brandt, 2017, p.184). Heavy clashes in the region stopped when Yahya al-Shami, an Hashemi, became the new governor of the Sa’ada governorate (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.141). He was respected by the Houthis since he was governor of Sa’ada in the 1980s and achieved many developments at the time. al-Shami met with Houthi delegates on February 21 (BBC, February 22 2006) and a few days later a ceasefire was agreed upon between the GoY and the Houthis (Brandt, 2017, p.185). For the first time, the conflict ended because of mediation- and negotiation processes between the GoY and the Houthis (Brandt, 2017, p.185).

Figure 13: Overview of (known) actors in the Third Sa’ada War (besides the Houthis and the GoY).

Actor Fighting along Involvement in Side macro- or micro conflict cleavage

Various tribes of Macro cleavage, local GoY mobilized support GoY (irregulars) Hashid Confederation level actors of Hashid tribesmen to fight the Houthis

Mijalli clan (al-Abdin Macro- and micro Supported the GoY, GoY tribe, Khawlan bin ‘Amr cleavage, local level involved in tribal feud Confederation) actors with the al-Hamid clan

Bani Mu’adh clan Macro cleavage, local Sided with the GoY and GoY (irregulars) (Malik tribe, Khawlan level actor fought against the bin ‘Amr Houthis Confederation)

al-Maqash tribe (Bakil Micro cleavage, local Houthis killed their GoY Confederation) level actor Shaykh, sided with the GoY for revenge

Various Sa’ada tribes Micro cleavage, local Sided with Houthis as a Houthis level actors result of hostility

towards Hashidi tribal groups; saw them as tribal invaders and had concerns about looting by Hashidi tribesmen *Even though these are the known local actors to have played a role in the conflict, many other tribes were involved in the war. Local level actors that have been mentioned to have played a role in the earlier wars can be expected to also have played a role in the current one; these will not be mentioned again, unless some new events occured that made them change their stance. ** Table drafted by author, using newspaper articles, Brandt (2017), Salmoni et al. (2010) & Lackner (2017).

Fourth Sa’ada War (February 16, 2007 - June 16, 2007) On February 16th, the Fourth Sa’ada War started with the Houthis shooting down a military helicopter and blowing up a bridge, killing many GoY soldiers (Brandt, 2017, pp.222-223). The catalyst for start of the fourth Sa’ada War was the forced expulsion of 45 Jews from the Jewish community in Al Salim by Houthi supporters (Brandt, 2017, p.214).12 During the five months of the conflict, the GoY stayed on the offensive the entire time and undertook continued bombings on Houthi strongholds and locations (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.143). Some international tensions also rose, with the GoY accusing Libya and Iran of supporting the Houthis. On May 19th Libya stressed its support for the GoY (AFP, May 19 2007), while an Iranian envoy arrived on May 28 to strengthen the relationship with the GoY (DPA, May 28 2007). Tribal dynamics continued to be important. The GoY asked openly for tribal support on February 17, urging local leaders to take actions against the Houthis (BBC, February 18 2007). Hundreds of tribesman from the ‘Amran and Hajja governorates travelled to Sa’ada to support the GoY in their fight against the Houthis (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.146) and other local tribes also pledged their allegiance to the GoY. The Houthis were joined by some tribal shaykhs that supported their cause, while others changed sides as a result of the GoY activities (see Figure 14) (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.147). Tribal allegiance to the GoY campaign was thus far from absolute; in this stage of the conflict, more and more tribes started to complain about the effects of the GoY campaign on their territories (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.147). The GoY used resources to buy tribal allegiances, but the Houthis were also able to gain them since tribes choose

12 The tensions started with a letter send on January 18 by Yaha al-Khudayr in which the Jews were urged to leave the community within ten days, and face the consequences otherwise. The Jews fled with support of three Sahar shayks (Arif Shuwayt, Hasan Mana and Uthman Mujalli) (Brandt, 2017,p.219). Locals from Al Salim also tried to protect the Jews and took care of their possessions after they left. The Houthis claimed that Yahya al-Khudayr acted alone and that he did not represent the Houthi movement. After this, GoY troops marched into Wadi Madhab with the intention to block Houthi supply routes and demanded the Houthis would lay down their arms. The Houthis refused and demanded that the GoY forces would leave the areas of Sufyan, Al Ammar and al-Mahadir, where they had recently been stationed (Brandt, 2017, pp.221-222). On February 10, the parliament decided that the Zaydi revolt had to be crushed (AFP, February 10 2007). 45

their side or defected to them for various reasons (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.148). There were also reports of infighting in the Houthi movement between Abdulmalik al-Houthi and Abdullah al-Razzami (BBC, February 12 2007). The Fourth Sa’ada War ended on June 16, 2007 when the Houthis and the GoY concluded another ceasefire as a result of Qatari mediation, which led to the First Doha Agreement (AFP, June 16 2007; DPA, June 16 2007).

Figure 14: Overview of (known) actors in the Fourth Sa’ada War (besides the Houthis and the GoY). Actor Fighting along Involvement in Side macro- or micro conflict cleavage

Abdullah al-Razzami/ Macro- and micro Ally of Husayn Houthis al-Razzamat clan cleavages, local level al-Houthi. (Wada’a tribe, Bakil actor Confederation)

Various tribes of Macro cleavage, local GoY mobilized support GoY (irregulars) Hashid Confederation level actors of Hashid tribesmen to fight the Houthis

Jahli tribe, Munnahbih Local level actors, Mobilized by the GoY to GoY (irregulars) tribe (Kwahlan bin reason for exact fight the Houthis ‘Amr Confederation), participation in fight Daris clan, tribesman unknown from ‘Amran and Hajja governorates

Tribes of Razih area Local level actors, Opposed the Houthi n.a. micro cleavage advance on their territory, but did not explicitly side with GoY

Talh tribe (Khawlan bin Local level actors, First sided with GoY, First GoY (irregulars), ‘Amr Confederation) micro cleavage were under equipped later Houthis and changed sides to fight for the Houthis

al-Afwan clan Local level actors First sided with GoY, First GoY (irregulars), changed sides after GoY later Houthis airstrike hit their territory * Even though these are the known local actors to have played a role in the conflict, many other tribes were involved in the war. Local level actors that have been mentioned to have played a role in the earlier wars can be expected to also have played a role in the current one; these will not be mentioned again, unless some new events occured that made them change their stance.

** Table drafted by author, using newspaper articles, Brandt (2017), Salmoni et al. (2010) & Lackner (2017a).

Fifth Sa’ada War (May 2, 2008 - July 17, 2008) The fighting in the Fifth Sa’ada War started after the bombing of the Bin Salman mosque in Sa’adah on May 2, 2008, killing at least 18 people, mostly soldiers. The GoY blamed the Houthis for the bombing, but they denied any involvement in it (DPA, May 2 2008). Right after the bombing, clashes between the GoY and the Houthis started again (AFP, May 2 2008). On the 4th of May, Abdulmalik al-Houthi warned that the Houthis would escalate its fighting against the GoY and open up new fronts all over Yemen if the army would not stop its offensive that started after the bombing (AP, May 4 2008). On the same day, a group of Qatari mediators arrived to lead negotiations between the GoY and the Houthis (AFP, May 5 2008), but these mediations failed. Both the government and the Houthis blamed each other for the renewed violence, with Abdulmalik al-Houthi stating in an interview with RMC Middle East that "The renewed tension is because of the repeated aggressions of the army... which is using tanks and other weapons... in unjustified operations.’’ (AFP, May 5 2008) and blaming the government for blocking the Qatari mediation efforts (IHS, May 6 2008). The GoY on the other hand blamed the Houthis for various breaches and acts of violence violating the Doha Agreement and for refusing mediation efforts to end the conflict in the governorate (BBC, May 12 2008). The Houthis acted on their threat and deliberately pushed new areas into the war, coming dangerously close to the capital of Sana’a (Brandt, 2017, p.252). Tribal dynamics were again important during the Fifth Sa’ada War; events of retaliatory violence and blood feuds had become very complex (Brandt, 2017, p.249) and ancient feuds were reignited (see Figure 15); e.g. the 100-year old territorial feud between the al-’Usimat tribe and the Sufyan tribe flared up again; this was thus a dispute over economic assets. Tribes that had previously sided with the GoY were now more realigned with the Houthis Lackner, 2017a, p.153) as a result of the GoY policies and tactics (Brandt, 2017, p.265). On July 17th Saleh unilaterally declared the end of the Fifth Sa’ada War (AFP, July 17 2008; DPA, July 17 2008), after meditations by a group of Sa’ada shaykhs, led by Faris Mana (Brandt, 2017, p.274).

Figure 15: Overview of (known) actors in the Fifth Sa’ada War (besides the Houthis and the GoY).

Actor Fighting along Involvement in Side macro- or micro conflict cleavage

Abdullah al-Razzami/ Macro- and micro Ally of Husayn Houthis al-Razzamat clan cleavages, local level al-Houthi. (Wada’a tribe, Bakil actor Confederation)

Various tribes of Macro cleavage, local GoY mobilized support GoY (irregulars)

Hashid Confederation level actors of Hashid tribesmen to fight the Houthis

al-‘Usimat tribe Micro cleavage, local Decade-old territorial n.a. (Hashid confederation) level actors feud with Sufyan tribe reignited

Sufyan tribe (Bakil Micro cleavage, local Decade-old territorial n.a. confederation) level actors feud with al-’Usimat tribe reignited

al-Qa’ud clan (Bakil Local level actor Tribal conflict with Houthis confederation) (gained support from Saghir b. Aziz clan Houthis who wanted to reignited; Houthis spread their influence) supported them

Saghir b. Aziz clan Local level actor (fought Tribal conflict with GoY (Hashid confederation) for regime in order to al-Qa’ud clan reignited provide security in the region)

Dhu Ma’qil clan (Bakil Local level actor Ally of the GoY GoY (irregulars) confederation)

Clans of Sufyan (Bakil Local level actors Some sided with the GoY and Houthis confederation) GoY, others with the Houthis

Tribes of al-Jawf area Local level actors Parts of them GoY, later on fighting (Bakil confederation) supported the GoY, the Houthis on their came in direct conflict own with Houthis later after attack on one of their tribal leaders * Even though these are the known local actors to have played a role in the conflict, many other tribes were involved in the war. Local level actors that have been mentioned to have played a role in the earlier wars can be expected to also have played a role in the current one; these will not be mentioned again, unless some new events occured that made them change their stance. ** Table drafted by author, using newspaper articles, Brandt (2017), Salmoni et al. (2010) & Lackner (2017a).

Sixth Sa’ada War (August 11, 2009 - February 11, 2010) The Sixth Sa’ada War started on August 11, 2009 after the GoY launched ‘Operation Scorched Earth’, which had the purpose of destroying the Houthis (AFP, August 11 2009). The trigger for the Sixth War was the abduction of eight foreigners on June 12, 2009, of which the GoY accused the Houthis13. The

13 On the 14th of June, the bodies of 3 of the hostages were found in al-Razzamat. The GoY first suspected Abdullah al-Razzami of kidnapping the people, since the bodies were found on his territory. It was speculated that al-Razzami no longer obeyed any of Abdulmalik al-Houthi’s orders, since they were alienated from each other. However, there 48

Houthis denied involvement in the incident as saw it as a conspiracy to legitimate the start of the Sixth War (Brandt, 2017, p.290). The Sixth Sa’ada War was the longest and bloodiest war to take place between the GoY and the Houthis, with the GoY following the ‘scorched earth policy’14, which was aimed at destroying anything the Houthis could use in their fight against the GoY (Brandt, 2017, p.295). Through Operation Scorched Earth, which mainly consisted of arbitrary air strikes, the GoY created many grievances among civilians and alienated them from the central government (Brandt, 2017, p.295). On the 5th of November, Saudi Arabia entered the conflict after an attack by Houthis on Saudi territory (AFP, November 5 2009). The country mainly carried out airstrikes on Houthi positions (Salmoni et al., 2010, p.156). The war was characterized by various negotiation attempts and ceasefires. Two days after the start of the war, the GoY put forward six conditions which the Houthis would have to meet in order to negotiate a ceasefire15 (Brandt, 2017, p.318). The Houthis rejected the points and isisted the GoY was to blame for the eruption of the Sixth war. The Sixth Sa’ada War ended on February 11, when president Saleh announced the end of its campaign and Abdulmalik al-Houthi acknowledged the ceasefire (AFP, February 11 2010).

Figure 16: Overview of (known) actors in the Sixth Sa’ada War (besides the Houthis and the GoY).

Actor Fighting along Involvement in Side macro- or micro conflict cleavage

Abdullah al-Razzamat/ Macro- and micro Alienated from n.a. al-Razzamat clan cleavages, local level Abdulmalik al-Houthi, (Wada’a tribe, Bakil actor objective was to weaken Confederation) the state

Various tribes of Macro cleavage, local GoY mobilized support GoY (irregulars) Hashid Confederation level actors of Hashid tribesmen to fight the Houthis

was no proof he had anything to do with the kidnappings and he strongly denied any involvement, condemning the kidnapping. The GoY argued that the Houthis had to be involved, since al-Razzamat was considered Houthi territory and the bodies were found there (even though the foreigners were abducted in the Sahar district, which was under control of the GoY). Foreign embassies suspected that either Salafi groups or people affiliated with AQAP had carried out the kidnappings (Brandt, pp.289-292). 14 The scorched earth policy, which is ‘’the systematic destruction of whole areas by occupying forces withdrawing before the enemy’’ (Geneva Convention, 1949, article 50) has been prohibited by the Geneva Conventions. The destruction of cities and devastation that is not justified by military necessity is considered a war crime (International Committee of the Red Cross, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/COM/380-600060?OpenDocument). 15 These conditions were the following: 1. Withdraw from all districts of Sa’ada and remove all checkpoints, 2. Descend from the mountains and end banditry and destruction acts, 3. Hand over all military and civil equipment that had been captured, 4. Clarify the situation of the kidnapped foreigners as information indicate that al-Houthis were behind their abduction, 5. Hand over kidnappers from Sa’ada, 6. Refraining from intervention into local authority affairs in any form (BBC, August 13 2009; AFP, August 13 2009). 49

Dhu Ma’qil clan (Bakil Micro cleavage, local Changed sides in the Houthis confederation) level actor Sixth war after dispute over payment with GoY

Saudi Arabia Regional actor Started aerial campaign GoY after Houthis killed Saudi soldier

*** *Even though these are the known local actors to have played a role in the conflict, many other tribes were involved in the war. Local level actors that have been mentioned to have played a role in the earlier wars can be expected to also have played a role in the current one; these will not be mentioned again, unless some new events occured that made them change their stance. ** Table drafted by author, using newspaper articles, Brandt (2017), Salmoni et al., (2010) & Lackner (2017a). *** Many tribes sided either with the GoY or the Houthis, or switched sides during the Sixth Sa’ada War. It is mentioned in the literature that this was the case, but the exact names of the tribes are not mentioned, and can thus not be included in this figure.

Cleavages, alliances and grievances in the Sa’ada Wars As showed, the Sa’ada Wars involved many different actors and clashes erupted among different cleavages. The wars started as a conflict between the GoY and the Houthis, where the Houthis challenged the authority of the central government, accusing them of corruption, a close alignment with the US and discrimination and marginalisation of the Zaydi community. The macro cleavage in the first war was thus not necessarily of sectarian nature, but rather of ideological and political nature. The many tribes in the region are all of Zaydi descent, just like president Saleh and a large part of the government (Rabi, 2015, p.166). The GoY later introduced a sectarian dimension into the conflict, in which they accused Shia Iran of helping the Houthis, even though both the Houthis and Iran have always strongly denied this. The GoY also asserted that the Houthis were followers of ‘Twelver Shiism’ the dominant branch of Islam in Iran, even though they were Zaydis and Zaydism is very different from Twelver Shiism (Salisbury, 2016, p.23). Some actions of the Houthis, have also led to the believe that the Sa’ada Wars were fought alongside a sectarian dimension, for example their targeting of the Jews. Even though these actions were coming from a sectarian nature, they do not seem to have been one of the main cleavages among which the conflict was fought. Also, these actions were along a different sectarian ‘line’; they did not target other Muslim sects, but rather an entirely different faith, while the main sectarian explanation of the conflicts focuses on rivalries between different Muslim sects. The GoY also accused the Houthis of trying to restore the imamate in Yemen, but this has always been denied by the Houthis; this sectarian aspect of the conflict was thus added by the GoY, but does not seem to have been an actual cleavage among which the conflicts erupted.

The clashes that occured between different (sections of) tribes, can be seen as micro-cleavages, since they were often motivated by individual or group behaviour and were not related to the overarching macro-cleavage of the conflict. Rather, the GoY-Houthi conflict sparked reignitions of historical feuds between groups and processes of revenge and blood feuds were omnipresent during the Wars. The Sa’ada Wars caused an internal polarization in the tribal structures of northern Yemen and led to increases in intra-tribal conflicts (Brandt, 2017, p.350) and the overarching conflict taking place in the country was used to settle these feuds. There was a strong prevalence of private interests among the tribes involved in the conflict. This can be seen in the easy shift of tribal alliances in the Six Sa’ada Wars; as a result of certain policies or actions by either the GoY or the Houthis, tribes switched sides and fought the group(s) they were previously aligned with. Also, many of the local tribes and groups that joined the Houthis did not necessarily agree with their ideological views, but either resented the marginalization of the Sa’ada governorate by the GoY or joined to protect their territories against the GoY (Salisbury, 2016, pp.11-12). During the Sa’ada Wars, economic grievances also played a role, as can bee seen in the tribal conflicts focused on territorial disagreements and the shifting tribal allegiances as a result of disputes over payments with the GoY. The GoY actively tried to create alliances with the local tribes, using them to fight the Houthis in places that were hard to gain access to for the GoY and to gather information about the Houthis (Brandt, 2017, p.160). In return, the government supported these groups financially (although not always). However, the exclusion of tribal mediators by the GoY in trying to solve the conflict has led to more hostility of tribes towards the GoY, since tribal law is an important aspect of live for these people (Al-Dawsari, 2012) and the GoY’s policy of only allowing Hashid tribesmen into its military ranks also undermined the strength of its alliances. The Six Sa’ada Wars can thus not be seen as being primarily driven by sectarian tensions and cleavages, but should be viewed as wars that have been driven by many different political, religious, economic and tribal motives and interests, that strongly influenced each other and allowed the conflict to continue for many years. The GoY tried to present the conflicts as being sectarian in nature, but political demands formed the main causes of the conflicts.

4.5 Economic situation during and after the Sa’ada Wars (2005-2010) After the Sa’ada Wars, an estimated 200.000 civilians were internally displaced and living in refugee camps (AFP, January 11 2010). This means that these people had no means to support themselves, leading to further poverty among the general population. There is not much data available on the poverty levels in Yemen, but in but in 2005 9.8% of people were living below poverty line of $1.90 a

day, while in 2014 18.8% were living below this line16, and 48.6% of the population was living below the national poverty line, while in 2005 34.8% of the population was living below this line17. Starting in 2003, there has been a constant decline in oil production in the country (see Appendix 1) while food imports continue to grow; 33% of export consisted of food imports in 2009 (USAID, 2011, pp.1-2). This puts a heavy burden on the countries fiscal situation. In 2009, the World Food Programme estimated that at least 30% of the Yemeni population can be seen as being food and water insecure, and food prices have been rising ever since (USAID, 2011, p.2). The IMF continued to apply pressure on the GoY to implement liberal policies and continue the reduction of subsidies (BMI, 2005). Unemployment levels continued to rise during and after the Sa’ada Wars (see Figure 17/Appendix 1); in 2010, 17.82% of the total labor force was unemployed18. The oil output continued to decline during the 2004-2010 period, which led to decreasing exports and less oil revenues (see Figure 17/Appendix 1). The internal oil consumption, which is the difference between the volume of production and the volume of export of oil, increased during the period of intense IMF reforms, indicating an increase in the domestic use of oil and thus possibly indicating increasing economic welfare in the country. However, during the Sa’ada Wars the gap is decreasing, indicating declining domestic demand for/use of oil and possible signalling decreasing economic welfare. The inflation rate fluctuated between 5% and 18%19. Figure 17 presents an overview of the economic situation in Yemen from 2005-2011.

Figure 17 - Yemen Economy 2005-2010 Indicator 2005 2010 Inflation consumer prices (annual %) 11.80% 11.20% GDP per capita growth (annual %) 2.70% 4.80% GDP growth (annual %) 5.60% 7.70% Oil rents (% of GDP, annual) 40.10% 20.50% Total unemployment (% of total labor force) 16.10% 17.80% Crude oil production (unit 1000 tonnes) 19172 12669 Oil exports (unit 1000 tonnes) 14686 8773 Gini coefficient 34.7 No data Data retrieved from the World Bank Open Data and International Energy Agency. Table produced by author.

16 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY?locations=YE 17 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=YE. The national poverty line is based on an income of 10.913 YRI (around $50) per capita per month in 2014 prices (World Bank Group, 2017, p.72). 18 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=YE 19 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=YE

4.6 The 2011 Yemeni Uprisings Due to limitations of space, the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings will not be discussed in full detail. For an overview of the events during the uprisings, see Appendix 3.

Run up to the Yemeni Uprisings Ever since the ceasefire that ended the Sixth Sa’ada War, clashes between the Houthis and either the GoY or other tribes still occurred, with the Houthis greatly expanding their territory. During this time, they clashed increasingly with radical Sunnis and tribes allied with Salafis and the Islah Party20, which gave the conflict a sectarian character (Brandt, 2017, p.387). Throughout 2010 demonstrations against the government increased in Yemen (Lackner, 201a, p.35). Parliamentary elections that had been scheduled for 2009 were postponed until 2011, something the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) (coalition of opposition parties21) reluctantly agreed upon. The JMP and the GPC had been in a struggle over who should be included in the electoral register (Lackner, 2017a, p.35). Saleh further fueled the conflict by trying to change the constitution, so he could stand for a third term in the 2013 presidential elections, something that had been prohibited by the constitution; this move led to the suspicion that he wanted to remain president until his son Ahmed could succeed him, even though Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar was commonly seen as his successor (Lackner, 2017a, p.35; Rabi, 2015, p.194). These conflicts in the parliament and Saleh’s move to try and retain his position as president led to demonstrations in Sana’a, which started on 17 January 2011; the GoY aggressively tried to shut down these protests (BBC, January 21 2011). In South Yemen, anti-unity protests broke out and clashes with GoY forces occurred as well (AFP, January 18 2011). The SAM joined forces with other protesters demanding the removal of president Saleh, briefly putting their secessionist narrative aside (Lewis, 2013, p.4). By January 27, thousands of protesters were on the streets demanding Saleh’s resignation; these protests are seen as the start of the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings (AFP, Januari 27 2011).

The 2011 Yemeni Uprisings22 In early 2011, inspired by the uprisings against the central government in Tunisia and Egypt, mass protests and demonstrations against corruption by the GoY, high unemployment rates and poor economic conditions broke out (Lackner, 2017a, p.36). As stated earlier, Yemen’s economy has been characterized by a heavy dependence on oil revenues. These revenues however did not trickle down to the general population, but which were used by Saleh to support his system of patronage. The Yemeni population felt that the ruling elite had enriched itself at the expense of the ordinary Yemeni. Tawakul Kirman, a female journalist and prominent figure in the early days of the uprising who had been arrested

20 The Islah Party is a Sunni political party; the Hashid al-Ahmar family leads a faction of the party (Lackner, 2017a, p.12). 21 The JMP consisted of, among other parties, the Islah Party and the Yemeni Socialist Party. 22 For a full overview of the events during the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings, see Appendix 3. 53

by the GoY (AFP, January 23 2011), called for a Day of Rage to take place on February 3 (Rabi, 2015, p.194). On February 2, Saleh announced he would not try and change the constitution and leave office after his second term as president was over (AFP, February 2 2011). He also announced increased decentralisation, postponement of parliamentary elections due in April, the establishment of a government of national unity and wage rises for military and security personnel (Lackner, 2017a, p.35). Nevertheless, demonstrators set up tents on Taghyeer (change) Square, which became the central place of anti-regime protesters (Rabi, 2015, p.195) and on February 3, mass demonstrations took place (AFP, February 3 2011). On Taghyeer Square, people of all social groups mixed, some who had earlier been in conflict with each other, and discussed shared grievances, ranging from anger towards Saleh to grievances about the economic situation in the country (Blumi, 2018, p.185). Youth dominated in these demonstrations and debates (Lackner, 2017a, p.36) and strived to accomplish a free and democratic Yemen through their actions (AP, September 28 2011). The most used slogans in the protests where ‘’Irhal!’’ (Leave!) (Bonnefoy & Poirier, 2012, p.900), ‘’No partisan politics, no political parties, our revolution is a youth revolution’’ (Alwazir, 2016, p.171) and ‘’The people want the downfall of the regime!’’ (Day, 2012, p.280). The JMP soon joined the movement and took up an active role (Lackner, 2017a, p.36), setting aside their political and ideological differences and forming a strong coalition that included Islamists, Socialists and Ba’athists (Rabi, 2015, p.1). The situation escalated after the events of the ‘Friday of Rage’ on March 18 which angered the population. Armed men in civilian clothes and security forces opened fire on the protesters, killing 52 (Lackner, 2017a, p.37). The GoY denied any involvement in the massacre (Rabi, 2015, p.196). As a result of this violent crackdown on the protesters, many defected from Saleh’s GPC party, as did various leaders of the al-Islah party and the Hashidi al-Ahmar brothers, also part of the Islah party (Lackner, 2017a, p.37). Hamid al-Ahmar, one of the brothers, had earlier already called for Saleh’s resignation during the Sixth Sa’ada War in 200923 (Rabi, 2015, p.200), and the events on the Day of Rage proved to be the final straw for the al-Ahmar family. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, leader of the First Armoured Brigade, also defected and swore to protect the protesters24 (IHS, March 22 2011). The JMP officially declared its allegiance to the revolution after this wave of defections (Lackner, 2017a, p.37). After these events, violence greatly increased with the remaining GoY forces cracking down on the mass protests, killing and injuring many civilians, and clashes occurred between the GoY army and both al-Ahmar’s First Armoured Brigade and Hashid tribesmen (Lackner, 2017a, p.38). On the 21st of April, the GCC presented Saleh with a transition proposal, the GCC Initiative, in which Saleh would hand over power to vice-president Hadi, a new constitution would be drafted, new presidential elections would be

23 The al-Ahmar family, even though they were beneficiaries of Saleh’s patronage system, had become critical of Saleh’s policies, since they felt that the Sanhan tribe was receiving more and more privileges, while those of the al-Ahmar were shrinking (Rabi, 2015, p.196). Hamid al-Ahmar also accused president Saleh of centralizing Yemen’s power in his hand in an interview with the Dubai newspaper Al-Bayan (BBC, February 4 2010). 24 Ali Moshin al-Ahmar’s relationship with Saleh was already strained; a few days before the end of the Sixth Sa’ada War, reports emerged that Saleh had tried to kill Ali Moshin through an airstrike (Lackner, 2017a,p.153). 54

called in 60 days and Saleh, his family would be immune from prosecution and a JMP-headed coalition government would be installed (AFP, April 21 2011; Lackner, 2017a, p.38; Rabi, 2015, p.198). Saleh refused to sign the Initiative and the immunity that would be granted to Saleh angered the population (Rabi, 2015, p.199). The following months were characterized by ongoing demonstrations, Saleh alternately rejecting and supporting the GCC initiative and several clashes between armed forces (either between tribes, parts of the defected army and the GoY army). On June 3, Saleh was injured in an explosion on his compound (AFP, June 3 2011) and he flew to Saudi Arabia for treatment (AFP, June 4 2011), unexpectedly returning on September 23rd (AFP, September 23 2011), against the wishes of both the Yemenis and the Saudis (Lackner, 2017a, p.38). On November 23 Saleh finally signed the GCC initiative, after pressure by the international community, the UN (AP, October 21 2011) and the deteriorating conflict in Yemen (Lackner, 2017a, p.38). Saleh officially resigned as president in February 2012, leaving president Hadi in charge of the transition process (Fraihat, 2016, p.39). The GCC Initiative Saleh signed was accompanied by a UN implementation document that outlined a roadmap for the transition, and focused on three main points: producing a new constitution after holding a national dialogue, addressing issues of transitional justice and reforming the armed forces (Brandt, 2017, p.338). During the period of the Yemeni Uprisings, AQAP managed to gain territory in the Southern governorates in Yemen, and there were great fears over expansion of AQAP influence in Yemen. Various fights between GoY forces and AQAP militants took place, with the GoY carrying out airstrikes on AQAP positions and strongholds (AP, August 24 2011). The Houthis also managed to consolidate their hold of the Sa’ada governorate and surrounding territories (Rabi, 2015, p.203). As a result of the disintegration of the regime, these groups managed to truly challenge the central government for the first time (Salisbury, 2016, p.13).

Cleavages, alliances and grievances in the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings The Yemeni Uprisings were in no aspect sectarian in nature; as mentioned before, people from different social layings and groups in the Yemeni society gathered around common grievances and together rose up against the central government. Various high ranking political leaders defected, under whom Saleh’s longtime ally Ali Moshin al-Ahmar and the al-Ahmar family, with whom Saleh had enjoyed a long time partnership, even though the al-Ahmar were part of the Islah party and not of the GPC ruling party. These people resigned as a result of disagreement with Saleh’s harsh policy towards anti-government protesters, and as a result of earlier disagreements and conflicts with Saleh. The uprisings gave them the opportunity to finally openly criticise and challenge Saleh’s legitimacy (Rabi, 2015, p.196). Alliances were formed among all aspects of society, between elites and locals, battling tribes and political parties.

The Yemeni Uprisings took place among a common, overarching cleavage of disagreement of Saleh’s rule over Yemen, but old feuds and cleavages were again important in the decisions actors made during the uprising.

4.7 Economic situation after the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings (2011) The 2011 uprisings took a large toll on the Yemeni economy. GDP growth in 2011 was negative at -12%25, which is a rare phenomenon; negative growth rates are almost never seen in developing countries (Khan, 2014, p.2). The oil production severely declined, leading to a decreasing export of oil and declining oil revenues (World Bank, 2012a, p.14) (see Figure 18). Reductions in fuel availability as a result of the uprisings led to increased shortages in electricity and water which resulted in rising production costs and declining outputs in the industry, agricultural and service sectors (World Bank, 2012b, p.5). Many people lost their jobs and incomes during the uprisings, and rising prices led to a decreasing purchasing power and increasing poverty levels (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MPIC), 2012, p.8). The inflation rate rose to 19.6% (see Figure 18), with food prices sharply increasing as a result of significant food inflation, caused by disruptions in the supply chain (World Bank, 2012a, p.14). According to the UN World Food Program, around 10 million people in Yemen (45% of the total population) could be classified as being food insecure in 2012; in 2009 around 32% of the population could be classified as such (Engelke, 2012, p.1). The quality of public services, like health and education, was also affected (World Bank, 2012b, p.6). Figure 18 provides an overview of the economic situation in Yemen at the end of the 2011 Yemeni uprisings.

Figure 18 - Yemen Economy 2011 Indicator 2011 Inflation consumer prices (annual %) 19.60% GDP per capita growth (annual %) -15.00% GDP growth (annual %) -12.70% Oil rents (% of GDP, annual) 20.90% Total unemployment (% of total labor force) 15.40% Crude oil production (unit 1000 tonnes) 9416 Oil exports (unit 1000 tonnes) 6789 Gini coefficient No data Data retrieved from the World Bank Open Data and International Energy Agency. Table produced by author.

25 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=YE 56

The overviews of the economic situation in Yemen from the 1990’s until 2011 shows that the economy has mainly deteriorated since the mid-1990s. Even though the country experienced times (mainly in the 1990s) of relatively large economic growth, the general population has not benefited from this growth. The main cause of GDP growth was the increase in oil revenues during the given timespan, but these revenues were located in the hands of a small portion of the population (Henry & Springborg, 2012, p.114). As a result of the influx of oil dollars, inflation reached high peaks. The general population was hit hardest by this inflation, since commodity prices rose but their incomes in general did not. The decline of subsidies on - and increasing prices of - commodities only further aggravated their situation. The subsequent conflicts the country experienced also did not help economic restoration, unemployment levels remained high and the poverty levels in the country continued to rise, possibly leading to grievances among the population.

Chapter 5: Laying the foundations for the 2015 Yemeni Civil War: Transition Period (2012-2014)

The 2015 Yemeni Civil War started after the Houthis, who had by this time formed an alliance with Saleh and forces loyal to him, took over Sana’a in September 2014. In order to understand the events that have led to the Yemeni Civil War, it is important to first look at the events that took place during this period, and how they have influenced the eventual rise of the Houthis in Yemen, and the outbreak of the Civil War. For a full overview of the events and clashes during the transition period, see Appendix 4.

5.1 Political situation during the transition period After Saleh resigned and Hadi became president on February 21, 2012, the transition period, as described in the GCC Initiative, started. A Government of National Unity (GNU) was established, which was made up of a 50:50 mix of JMP and GPC representatives (Salisbury, 2016, p.14) but the process that guided this process inherently led to internal conflicts. The largest party and elite faction in the JMP, the Islah party, provided the majority of the ministers on the JMP side and used this as a means to increase their influence in the government. The GPC (Saleh’s faction) and the Islah party fiercely competed for power in the government, each trying to become the dominant power in Yemen’s government institutions. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, affiliated with the Islah party, became a senior adviser to Hadi (Lackner, 2017a, p.49). Rivalry between the two parties led to a dysfunctioning government (Salisbury, 2016, p.16), and representatives of minority parties were unable to influence the situation. Soon the government was again prone to corruption and incompetence (Lackner, 2017a, p.40). Hadi tried to reform the armed forces and replace Saleh cronies within the security department right from the start of his presidency (AFP, April 6 2012; AP, August 6 2012), but this proved to be very

difficult, and many Saleh loyalists stayed part of the department (Salisbury, 2016, p.18). When Hadi did manage to remove some of the high-ranking officers, the newly appointed members turned out to be mostly from Abyan, Hadi’s home governorate, leading to accusations of him filling the vacant posts with his own cronies and operating the same principles of patronage as Saleh did (Lackner, 2017a, p.41). The intention of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which started on March 18, 2013, was to bring all political forces together to discuss the countries problems and facilitate a peaceful transition process (Brandt, 2017, p.339). Yemeni citizens hoped that, through the NDC, a more fair society would be created and that their living standards and public services would improve (Salisbury, 2016, p.14). The NDC included the Houthis, the Southern Movement, the traditional political parties and civil society forces that had played a role in the 2011 uprisings26 (Lackner, 2017a, p.42); it thus gave a voice to groups that had historically been ignored in the Yemeni political arena (Lackner, 2017a, p.46). Most areas and groups Yemen were represented in the NDC, except for AQAP jihadis and people from rural areas (Lackner, 2017a, p.47) and the newly formed Salafi al-Rashad Union, who claimed they were being excluded from the NDC (AFP, July 16 2012). However, some of the secessionist parties from the South did not participate in the NDC, saying that their secessionist agenda would not be accepted in the NDC-debate (Salisbury, 2016, p.17). The parties that did participate used the NDC to call for southern independence (AP, March 19 2013). The Houthis had initially opposed the GCC Initiative, especially the clause about Saleh’s immunity, but did take part in the NDC (Salisbury, 2016, p.16). They focused on al-Houthis social revolutionary agenda and advocated the establishment of a ‘participatory state’, in which there would be equality and political representation of all groups and sects in the country and called for the end of corruption and patronage. Abdelmalik al-Houthi said that the Houthis were ready to ‘’take part in building a state for all the citizens of Yemen’’ (AFP, May 31 2012). Their agenda greatly overlapped the agenda of the SM and youth groups, which called for disempowerment of old elites and the creation of a ‘civil state’ (Brandt, 2017, pp.339-340). The GoY tried to sideline the Houthis during the NDC, and they did not receive any governing roles during the transition period (Blumi, 2018, pp.195-196). The breaking point for the Houthis’ participation in the NDC and the transitional process was the plan to turn Yemen into a federal state, which would consist of six regions; this decision was neither welcomed by the SM (Lackner, 2017a, p.46). According to the Houthis, the proposed structure of the federation would divide Yemen into wealthy and poor regions (AFP, February 11 2014); this would mean that the economic marginalization of the Houthis (and other groups) would be aggravated. The Sa’ada governorate would become part of the Azal region, which was landlocked and separated from the natural resources found in its neighbouring governorates

26 The member seats (565 in total) were distributed as follows. The GPC had 112 seats and the JMP 129. Southerners took up 85 seats (which is 56% of the total seats, while Southerners form aprox. 30% of Yemen’s population), while the Houthis had 35 seats. The rest of the seats were distributed along other parties and forces. In total, 28% of the members were female and 20% young people (Lackner, 2017a, p.43). 58

(Brandt, 2017, p.341). The SM opposed the idea since they wanted a single state in which all of South Yemen would be incorporated; this idea was rejected by other members of the NDC (Lackner, 2017a, p.46). After this, the Houthis reinforced their military presence in Sana’a and increasingly pressured Hadi’s government (Brandt, 2017, p.341). In late January 2014, the NDC finished its work and produced a document with decisions and outcomes that should form the basis for the draft of the new constitution. The NDC failed to reach agreements on some fundamental issues (like the Southern issue), and on other issues various outcomes were not mutually compatible, leaving a difficult task for the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) (Lackner, 2017a, p.49). Hadi however faced scrutiny from various groups that accused him of failing to implement decisions that had been made in the NDC and not following the transitional guidelines; it was argued that the decision-making processes were not taking place in the NDC and the GNU, but outside of these mechanisms (Salisbury, 2016, p.19).

During the transition period, various clashes throughout the country took place. Local tribes in Mareb repeatedly attacked the oil- and gas infrastructures27, demanding part of the revenues should be used for development in their region. In Hadramawt, local tribes opposed the presence of military units in the region and demanded their tribesmen would be given jobs in the oil companies operating in the area (Salisbury, 2016, p.17). Saleh was accused of supporting these attacks (Salisbury, 2016, p.20). There were also clashes between tribes over land disputes (AP, September 13 2013) and protests against electricity blackouts in the country (UPI, June 25 2012). AQAP made use of the political situation in the country to expand its influence. The transitional government focused on fighting AQAP, after U.S. pressure and with U.S. help, but this was not in line with goals of peaceful transition (Fraihat, 2016, p.53). The forces were also facing difficulties targeting the AQAP fighters since they had become ingrained within the local tribal structures in southern Yemen (UPI, June 5 2012). Many clashes and attacks between the GoY and AQAP occurred; see Appendix 4 for an overview of the clashes. Even though the Houthis were involved in the NDC, they were also involved in various battles with Salafi (Sunni) Islamists (part of the Islah party (Yadav, 2015, p.17)) in governorates east- and northeast of Sana’a as they tried to expand their influence (AFP, September 21 2012; UPI, June 3 2012). In the northern governorates the Houthis faced little resistance. Fighting also took place between the Houthis and the Islah- and al-Ahmar affiliated tribes (Clausen, 2018, p.566). Hadi was accused of not doing enough to stop the rise of the Houthis, with Islah supporters accusing him of using the Houthis in order to weaken the influence of the Islah party (Salisbury, 2016, p.20). The fact that Hadi appointed many Islah-affiliated officials to Houthi territory also led to rising tensions between both groups (Blumi,

27 The author found 28 cases (in news articles) of attacks on oil- and gas pipelines during the period 2012-2014. However, there probably have been many more attacks. For an overview of the attacks, see Appendix 4. 59

2018, p.197). Fighting between the GoY and the Houthis, despite the fact that the GoY tried to sideline the Houthis (Blumi, 2018, p.195), was rare in the period until the Houthis’ withdrawal from the NDC; after this clashes started again when the Houthis began their advance on Sana’a (see Appendix 4). After the NDC, the Houthis also openly called for protests against the ‘corrupt’ government (AFP, March 14 2014) and the economic policies of the GoY (AP, August 18 2014). Finally, the SM (or Hirak) openly demonstrated for secession (UPI, June 19 2012). The GoY reacted harshly, violently breaking up the protests and arresting SM leaders (AP, August 15 2012). Both the GoY (AFP, October 5 2012) and the al-Rashad Union (BBC, May 27 2013) accused Iran of supporting the SM in their fight for independence; this was a new development since Iran had so far only been accused of supporting the Houthis.

On September 26 2014 the Houthis took over Sana’a. A few days prior, Houthis had attacked the military headquarters of Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar. Even though al-Ahmar asked for back-up, Hadi would not provide troops to support him in the fights (Clausen, 2018, p.567). The Houthis could take over Sana’a without facing much opposition. Because of Hadi’s refusal to send in troops, the Islah network ordered the forces in Sana’a to stand down and the Houthis could take the city. After this, the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) was signed by the main political parties and Houthi representatives (Salisbury, 2016, p.21). The focus of the PNPA was the establishment of a technocratic government and greater political inclusivity (Clausen, 2018, p.566). Even though one of the elements of the PNPA was that Houthis would withdraw from Sana’a, they further secured their grip on the city. Saleh’s involvement with the Houthis became clearer, since many of the checkpoints the Houthis set up throughout the city were manned by Saleh loyalists (Salisbury, 2016, p.22). The PNPA led to the resignation of the government and Hadi experienced problems over the formation of a new government, with the Houthis opposing many of his candidates (Lackner, 2017a, p.50). The Houthis placed Houthi loyalists as advisers in many government positions and demanded that Hadi would accept Houthi nominees as vice president and other top positions in the government (Lackner, 2017a, p.51). The PNPA collapsed, with some accusing the Houthis authoritarian behaviour, while others blamed president Hadi of being unwilling to share power (Clausen, 2018, p.567). President Hadi decided to resign on January 22, 2015, refusing to become a Houthi puppet, and was placed under house arrest (Lackner, 2017a, p.51). It is important to note that the Houthis did not formally remove president Hadi, but that he resigned on his own account (Blumi, 2018, p.195). It seems that the Houthis at first tried to change the political situation through forming committees that would review (and change) policies that had been implemented during the transition period and who would implement a timeframe for new elections (Blumi, 2018, p.196). Almost immediately a power struggle between Saleh and the Houthis became clear. Saleh wanted the parliament to accept Hadi’s resignation, but the Houthis opposed this since that would mean that the speaker of Parliament would become president, who happened to be an ally of Saleh. Instead, the Houthis

created the Supreme Revolutionary Committee (SRC) that would run the country for two years, and suspended the Parliament (Lackner, 2017a, p.51). Hadi escaped house arrest and arrived in Aden on 21 February, where he withdrew his resignation, attempted to establish a government and declared Aden to be the temporary capital of Yemen. In response, the Houthis and Saleh’s military forces advanced on Aden, facing resistance by Southern separatists who gave Hadi support (Lackner, 2017a, p.51). After heavy fighting, Hadi escaped to Riyadh. On the 25th of March, a Saudi-led military campaign into Yemen, with the goal of restoring Hadi’s government, was announced and a full-on war had started (Clausen, 2018, p.567).

5.2 Economic situation during the transition period (2012-2014) President Hadi’s government launched the ‘Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development’ (TPSD) in June 2012, which describes its short- and mid-term priorities with regard to the situation in Yemen (Bertelsmann Stiftung BTI, 2016, p.29). Outlined are the government's plans to rebuild the economy and achieve macroeconomic stability, increase security and the rule of law, advance the political transition process and to improve the living conditions and overall welfare of the Yemeni people and meet their urgent humanitarian needs (MPIC, 2012, p.2). However, the TPSD was only partially implemented and has not led to improvements in situation of Yemeni population (Bertelsmann Stiftung BTI, 2016, p.30). In early 2014, Hadi said the largest challenge Yemen was facing was still the economic situation (BBC, March 9 2014). The IMF and the World Bank urged the Yemeni government to complete the liberalization process and reforms the country had started in the 1990s, which included the lifting of fuel subsidies and the floating of the Yemeni riyal (Salisbury, 2018b, p.4). One of the decisions actually made in the TPSD was the reduction of fuel subsidies, but these soon had to be revoked as a result of popular resistance (Bertelsmann Stiftung BTI, 2016, p.29). Hadi also made Yemen a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of 2012, which led to backlash from the population since the WTO membership required economic austerity measurements and liberalization processes; these reforms hit the poorest people in Yemen the hardest (Blumi, 2018, p.189). During the transition period oil production and oil revenues continued to decline (see Figure 19), partially because of the attacks on and sabotage of oil pipelines and oil fields (World Bank, 2014, p.3). The fiscal management in Yemen worsened and officials warned at the end of 2014 that the state would soon not be able to pay the salaries of state employees (Salisbury, 2018b, p.5). Social welfare payments were also not made to the Yemeni population, even though Saudi Arabia had provided a grant for these payments; it is unknown where this money has gone to (Salisbury, 2018b, p.5).

GDP growth right after the start of the transition period was positive at 2.4%, but in 2014 this had plummeted to -0.2%28; GDP per capita growth was also negative (see Figure 19). Economic grievances among the population focused on water scarcity, food insecurity, fuel shortages and rising fuel prices and a weak infrastructure, which had been destroyed by the previous conflicts in Yemen (Bertelsmann Stiftung BTI, 2016, p.2). In 2014, 48.6% of the population was living below the national poverty line29 and 41% of Yemenis (10.6 million people) were classified as being food insecure30 (World Food Programme (WFP), 2014, p.4). The living situation of Yemeni citizens thus deteriorated even further during the transition period, as did the quality of public services (Salisbury, 2016, p.4). Figure 19 provides an overview of the economic situation in Yemen during the transition period.

Figure 19 - Yemen Economy 2012-2014 Indicator 2012 2014 Inflation consumer prices (annual %) 11.80% 8.10% GDP per capita growth (annual %) -0.30% -2.70% GDP growth (annual %) 2.40% -0.20% Oil rents (% of GDP, annual) 15.20% 10.20% Total unemployment (% of total labor force) 15.10% 13.50% Crude oil production (unit 1000 tonnes) 7396 6953 Oil exports (unit 1000 tonnes) 5881 4028 Gini coefficient No data 36.7 (2015) Data retrieved from the World Bank Open Data and International Energy Agency. Table produced by author.

Chapter 6: The 2015 Yemeni Civil War

Even though the Yemeni Civil War (YCW) will not be analyzed in this thesis, as a result of limited space and since the focus of this thesis is on finding the causes of the eruption of the 2015 YCW, a short overview of the actors involved in the conflict will be given, since this is important in order to understand among which cleavages the various actors are fighting (for a full overview of the various clashes and events during the 2015 YCW, see Appendix 5). Afterwards, an analysis of the causes of the YCW will be presented.

28 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=YE 29 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=YE. The national poverty line is based on an income of 10.913 YRI (around $50) per capita per month in 2014 prices (World Bank Group, 2017, p.72). 30 This is a small decrease from the percentage of food insecure people in 2011 (45%), but taking into account the population growth, the number of food insecure people remains the same (WFP, 2014). 62

6.1 Actors, cleavages and alliances Figure 20 presents an overview of the various actors involved and their alliances and cleavages; these will be further elaborated below.

Figure 20: Actors in the Yemeni Civil War

Actor Involvement in Allied with Fighting against conflict/fighting for

Houthi-Saleh Fighting against GoY; Receives political GoY, AQAP, Arab alliance reject political support from Iran coalition, al-Islah, legitimacy of GoY, Southern Movement against corruption and economic deterioration

GoY (Hadi) Fighting to restore his Arab coalition, Islah Houthis, AQAP, government Southern Movement

al-Islah Opposed to GoY Houthis Houthi-Saleh alliance;

AQAP Try to extend their No allies SM, GoY, Houthis, influence in Yemen; al-Islah fight against Houthis because they see them as infidels

Southern Movement/ Fighting for southern Arab coalition (in GoY, Arab coalition, Hirak secession beginning of conflict) AQAP, Houthis

Arab coalition Restoration of the GoY Houthis, AQAP internationally recognized government of president Hadi

United Arab Emirates Accused by Hadi of Start of conflict allied pro-Hadi forces, AQAP, (UAE); part of the Arab backing the southern with GoY; later on Houthis coalition* secessionists backing SM forces

Iran Accused of backing the Houthis - Houthis, no strong proof for this. * The UAE became involved in a micro-level cleavage during the course of the YCW, contrary to other countries part of the coalition. For this reason, the UAE will be seen as an individual actor in the YCW. ** Table drafted by author

The alliance between the Houthis and former president Saleh was a surprising development. As seen in the analysis of the Sa’ada Wars, the Houthis and Saleh used to be each other's archenemies and in

the 2011 uprisings, Houthi supporters were a part of the uprisings against Saleh and they did not agree with the GCC Initiative, since it granted immunity to Saleh. So how did this unlikely alliance come into existence? The exact moment of the start of the Houthi-Saleh cooperation is hard to determine; according to Salisbury (2016, p.22), communication between the two factions started in early 2012 through already existing communication networks of tribal negotiators in the Sa’ada Wars. In November 2012 Yemeni analysts confirmed that the Houthis and Saleh’s relatives have had meetings and that they were cooperating to disrupt Yemen’s political settlement (BBC, November 8 2012). The driving force between the connection of the two parties in 2012 seems to be their shared animosity towards the Islah party (Salisbury, 2016, p.22), who was the best-organized party in the JMP and had become a great beneficiary of the transitional agreement (Yadav, 2015, pp.6-7) and, as mentioned before, a fierce competitor of Saleh’s GPC in the transitional government. Another common ground both parties found themselves connected on was the mutual hatred towards Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and the Hashidi al-Ahmar family. Both defected from the GoY during the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings, angering Saleh, and both were important players in the Sa’ada Wars against the Houthis. The alliance between the Houthis and Saleh started to collapse in August 2017, after Saleh called the Houthis a ‘militia’ in a speech (AFP, November 23 2017). The Houthis accused Saleh of turning back to the Saudis, while Saleh accused the Houthis of trying to monopolize power (AFP, December 2 2017). On the 4th of December Saleh was killed by the Houthis (Clausen, 2018, p.568). The main cleavage among which the Houthi-Saleh alliance was fighting was along the line of a political power struggle with president Hadi. Hadi and his forces thus fight against the Houthis, in order to restore his (internationally recognized) legitimate government in Yemen. He is backed by the Arab coalition and the Islah party in his endeavor to achieve this. Hadi has argued that the YCW is about stopping the Iranian expansion in the region (AFP, August 29, 2015). Clashes between Hadi’s forces and AQAP and the Southern Movement have also taken place (these clashes will be further elaborated below). The Southern secessionists are still fighting for independence of southern Yemen; this is the main cleavage around which they are involved in the YCW (Clausen, 2018, p.569). They have repeatedly clashed with forces loyal to president Hadi (Sharp, 2018, p.9), even though they supported Hadi during the beginning of the YCW, when he sought refuge in Aden and the secessionist forces tried to stop the Houthi advance on Aden (AFP, March 23 2015). However, this ‘support’ can also be seen as a private interest of the SM, since they oppose Houthi presence on their territories. They also support Hadi since he is backed by the GCC coalition which provides humanitarian aid and pays salaries (Al-Dawsari, 2017). Many members of Hirak are actually opposed to president Hadi since he fought against them in the 1994 civil war as a military officer in Saleh’s army, even though he is a ‘southerner’ (Lackner, 2017a, p.113) and because of the events that took place during and after the 1994 Civil War (when Hadi was vice-president) (Blumi, 2018, p.159), which have been described in Chapter 4.2. The clashes between GoY forces and the

SM started to escalate after Hadi sacked the governor of Aden, who had close ties with the UAE, whom Hadi accused of offering patronage to the southern secessionists (AP, April 28 2017). The SM has also clashed with the AQAP, which has tried to increase its influence in (especially southern) Yemen ever since the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings (see Chapter 3.1) and the Houthis. AQAP makes use of a sectarian rhetoric in its opposition to the Houthi-Saleh alliance; they portray themselves as the defenders of Sunnis against the Shia-Houthis. The AQAP is using the growing sectarian tensions that have existed after the Saudi-led intervention as a means to expand their powers. It has entrenched itself among tribes that see the Houthis as a great threat, and has been involved in fierce battles against the Houthis (Clausen, 2018, p.570). AQAP has also clashed with GoY forces, who try to limit the expanse of AQAP throughout Yemen, has been the target of air strikes from the Arab Coalition who backs the GoY and has clashed with the SM (as mentioned earlier). Islamic State (IS) also plays a role in the conflict, albeit a small one; it has repeatedly carried out attacks against Houthis and on government officials, mainly in southern Yemen. The Islah party is another opponent of the Houthi-Saleh alliance; during the transition period, the Houthis and Islah members already often clashed with each other, with the Islah being joined by forces loyal to Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (Salisbury, 2017b, p.9). Many members of the Islah party originate from Zaydi families, and are thus not opposed to Zaydism. One thing they do oppose however, is the idea of the restoration of the Imamate which in the past had led to discriminatory practices and segregation among the Yemeni society (Salisbury, 2016, p.23). In the NDC and during the transition period, the Houthis and Islah members also often clashed; as mentioned earlier, this was mainly due to the expansion of Houthi influence on Islah-affiliated territories. Islah sees the YCW as an attempt from Iran to expand its influence in Yemen and as a revenge action by Saleh (Chatham House, 2015, p.3). Islah is affiliated with Hadi and fights alongside his forces against the Houthis (Salisbury, 2018a, p.13). The US-backed Arab coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, further consists of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Pakistan and Qatar (until June 2017 (AFP, June 5 2017)) (Knights & Mello, 2015). Oman is the only member of the GCC that has not joined the coalition. The coalition started its operation, named Decisive Storm, on March 25, 2015 (AP, March 26 2015) after an appeal by president Hadi to save Yemen from a complete Houthi takeover. The goal of the operation was to restore the internationally recognized government of president Hadi and destroy the Houthi locations and arms depots (Knights & Mello, 2018) while it is also used to stop the Iranian expansion on the Arabian Peninsula (Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2015). On April 21 2015, operation Decisive Storm was ended, and operation Restoring Hope started; the goal of this operation was to find a political solution for the conflict (UPI, April 21 2015). The coalition thus fights against the Houthi-Saleh alliance, but also targets other actors that form a threat to Hadi’s government. The operations of the coalition are mainly based on airstrikes, and the coalition has earned much criticism for the large amount of civilian casualties as a result of its actions (AP, July 11 2016). The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is part of the Arab

coalition, but their backing of separatists in southern Yemen has led to growing tensions within the coalition and clashes with president Hadi. As mentioned earlier, Iran has been accused of supporting the Houthis during the YCW, just like they were accused during the previous conflicts in Yemen. During the YCW, various Iranian ships destined for Yemen carrying arms have been stopped (DPA, September 30 2015). Tehran has always denied sending arms and military assistance to the Houthis (BBC, November 25 2017), but the Iranian minister of Foreign Affairs has stated its political support for the Houthis (BBC, December 26 2016). Iran however advised Houthis against takeover of Sana’a, which they ignored31 (Hiltermann & Alley, 2017); this shows that the extent to which Iran can actually influence the Houthis is very limited, but it is clear that there is some Iranian involvement in the conflict. It seems that Iran is using the current conflict in Yemen to antagonize Saudi-Arabia at a relatively low cost (Hiltermann & Alley, 2017; Lackner, 2017, p.83).

6.2 Economic grievances and sectarian issues as cause of the Yemeni Civil War In this final part, the root-causes of the YCW will be analyzed, making use of the four questions posed by Mahone (2012) in the methodology section of this thesis. The first two questions posed by Mahone, whether the outcome to be explained and whether the hypothesized causal factor actually did occur, will not be taken into account in the coming analysis, since it is clear that the YCW is taking place right now and through the analysis conducted in this thesis, it has also become clear that economic grievances have played a large role in the country. In the following analysis, it will be explained whether or not the causal factor analyzed in this thesis (economic grievances) did lead to the outcome of the YCW, and if the rival hypothesis of sectarian struggles can be eliminated.

Sectarian issues as cause of the Yemeni Civil War As stated earlier, many people view the YCW as being a sectarian conflict between the Houthis (Shia) and the Sunni majority in Yemen. However, as has been shown through the root-cause analysis conducted in this thesis, internal sectarian issues have never played a large role in the various conflicts Yemen has experienced. As mentioned earlier, Zaydism and Sunnism are theologically closely connected, and in Yemen, Sunnis and Shiites used to pray together and there was an overall atmosphere of religious tolerance in the country before the start of the conflict. Zachary Laub of the Council of Foreign Relations stated in April 2016 that the Saudi-led intervention was encouraged by the perceived Iranian backing of the Houthis, and that there was a chance that the foreign involvement could lead to the eruption of a sectarian conflict in Yemen (Laub, 2016). It seems that this is the case. Sectarian struggles do not seem to be one of the root causes of the 2015 YCW, but rather a result of the war in Yemen, and especially a result of the influence of Riyadh and Tehran in the conflict.

31 According to various interviews with Houthi leaders and U.S. officials the Houthis ignored the advice coming from Tehran saying they should not take over Sana’a (Hiltermann & Alley, 2017). 66

The role of Iran in the conflicts in Yemen is highly contested and the fact that the Houthis are commonly portrayed as being Iranian proxies is problematic. Even though both Iran and the Houthis are part of Shia islam, they follow different branches of Shia Islam (as mentioned in Chapter 3), and before the start of the 2015 YCW, there were few institutionalized links between Iran and the Houthis (Sharp, 2017, p.4). Iran has, as stated earlier, always strongly denied its involvement in the conflicts the Houthis and the GoY experienced before the YCW. According to Clausen (2015, p.20), both Saleh and Saudi Arabia have made use of the Houthi-Iran narrative in order to delegitimize the Houthis. As mentioned in the analysis of the Sa’ada Wars, the Houthis have deliberately been portrayed by Saleh as being Iranian Shia proxies, playing into fears of Iranian expansion in the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia has often used the sectarian ‘tool’ and blamed Iran of backing Shiites in the Gulf Region, which also influences their policy in Yemen (Clausen, 2015, p.22). As mentioned earlier, Saudi-Arabia has a long history of interfering in Yemeni internal affairs, and seems to prefer when there is some sort of conflict in Yemen, as this means that Yemeni state will not become too strong and stable and will be open for Saudi support and influence. The growth of the Houthi movement, which at the start of the YCW posed a real threat to Hadi’s government, made the Saudis nervous of the possibility of having a Iran-backed regime in Yemen (Clausen, 2015, p.20). However, the degree to which Iran actually influences the Houthis is unknown. Saudi Arabia’s repeated allegations of Iranian involvement in the conflict and putting the blame on Iran for the conflict Yemen is experiencing seem to actually have fuelled the involvement of Iran; during the 2015 YCW there is more proof that Iran does indeed provide the Houthis with arms and training, as mentioned in the description of actors in the YCW. It seems that the Saudi-led intervention does not have that much to do with internal Yemeni politics; rather, the intervention seems to be part of a larger regional competition for power between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran in the conflict, and the proxy-war they are fighting in Yemen as a result of regional tensions, has fuelled the sectarian narrative and has resulted in the framing of the YCW as a sectarian conflict. It thus seems that the 2015 YCW has led to an increase in sectarian conflicts and rhetorics in the country, and that sectarian issues have thus been fuelled and activated by the events of the 2015 YCW, and not the other way around.

A final argument against portraying the YCW as being caused by sectarian struggles can be found in the fact that various actors in the country have formed alliances that conquer sectarian lines. The Houthi-Saleh alliance is, as stated before, very surprising since they used to be each other’s arch enemies and Saleh has long accused the Houthis of being Iranian proxies. Saleh and the Houthis however formed an alliance based on immediate private interests, that had nothing to do with sectarian issues but with a quest for political power. Tribal alliances have shifted many times (also along sectarian lines) as a result of private interests, as mentioned in the analysis of Yemen’s previous conflicts. The Islah party, which had accused Hadi of trying to undermine its power during the transition period, does support Hadi’s regime

during the YCW. In the 1960s, Saudi Arabia used to support the Zaydis, based on its own direct interests; now the Houthis are forming a threat to Saudi-Arabian stability, and they oppose them. The strongest argument to support the statement that the Yemeni Civil War has not been caused by sectarian issues is the fact that not all Zaydis are Houthis, and not all Houthis are Zaydis; as mentioned before, some Sunni Muslims are also part of the Houthi group. If sectarian aspects had been the main driver of the conflict in Yemen, it would have been impossible for Sunnis and Shiites to fight together against the central government of president Hadi.

Economic grievances as cause of the Yemeni Civil War The main cause of the failure and the subsequent fall of the transition government, and thus the trigger for the YCW, can be found in the government’s inability to address the grievances that have lived for so long under the Yemeni population. During the 2011 uprisings, the Yemeni people had called for an inclusive and fair government and had hoped for a change in the economic situation in the country; expectations among the population were high (Bertelsmann Stiftung BTI, 2016, p.2). As mentioned earlier, living standards in Yemen deteriorated even further after the uprisings and the implementation of the transition government. Beside these economic grievances, Hadi’s government was also seen as being untransparent and corrupt. Civilians openly complained that the NDC did not lead to a more accountable and transparent government, which was one of the key demands they made during the 2011 uprisings (Salisbury, 2016, p.15). Representatives of groups, part of the NDC, complained that the president would make promises to groups when he needed their support, and then never address the subjects again (Salisbury, 2016, p.17). Hadi seemed to rely on the same systems of patronage as Saleh had done during his reign. The fact that president Saleh was granted immunity and was allowed to still play a role in Yemeni politics, remaining head of the GPC, also led to many grievances among the population (Fraihat, 2016, p.53), who felt that he had not been held accountable for his actions and was not sanctioned for his extreme use of political violence (Salisbury, 2016, p.15). The Houthis played into these existing grievances and won popular support. First of all, the Houthis’ political objectives in the NDC greatly surprised many people who were not familiar with the Houthis’ roots, since the dominant narrative during the past ten years, ever since the First Sa’ada War, had been that the Houthis were an Iranian proxy (Brandt, 2017, p.340) and that their ultimate goal was to re-establish the imamate in Yemen (Dorlian, 2011, p.184). The fact that they (seemed to) strive for an inclusive and representative government, won them popular support. However, the main platform for the support and the lack of popular resistance against the Houthis can be found in the economic problems ordinary Yemenis suffered, of which the Houthis made use by criticizing the transitional government. As mentioned before, the population shared deep grievances over the lack of improvement with regard to the economic situation in Yemen (Lackner, 2017a, p.48). In July 2012, Hadi’s government decided, in compliance with IMF demands, to raise the diesel prices to ensure they would get a disbursement of the

pledged IMF development funds (Lackner, 2017a, p.49). This led to protests among the population and increased support for the Houthis, who chanted slogans like ‘’reduce fuel prices’’ and ‘’change the inefficient transitional government’’ (Fraihat, 2016, p.51), which resonated with the citizens. Even though many citizens initially had felt a deep aversion towards the Houthis, the economic situation and the apparent corruption in the transitional government led them to welcome the Houthi takeover of Sana’a after all (Fraihat, 2016, p.52) and generated popular support for the Houthis. The resulting battle for political power between the Houthis and president Hadi led to the eruption of the YCW, which has thus (at least partially) been caused by structural economic grievances in the country.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

In this thesis, it has been investigated to which extent the 2015 Yemeni Civil War can be explained by sectarian struggles or by economic grievances. The focus has thus been on identifying the root causes of the 2015 Yemeni Civil War, which has been done through an analysis of various conflicts Yemen has experienced since its unification in 1990. Yemen has experienced many conflicts over the years; in this thesis, the root causes of the 1994 Civil War, the six Sa’ada Wars, the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings and the subsequent Transition Period (2012-2014) have been analyzed through using Kalyvas’ theory about micro- and macro cleavages in civil wars, in order to be able to provide an answer to the research question guiding this thesis. The analysis conducted in this thesis has led to the conclusion that the Yemeni Civil War can be characterized as being a political power struggle between different groups in the country. This power struggle seems to be the result of decades of economic problems in the country and the marginalization and discrimination of various groups. This marginalization, however, was not along sectarian lines, as both the Shia Houthis and the Sunni southerners have complained about this. The analysis of the previous wars and unrest Yemen has experienced since its unification in 1990 has shown that economic grievances have been a very important driver, while sectarian issues never have formed the main cause for the start of any of the analyzed conflicts. After the start of the 2015 Yemeni Civil War the sectarian discourse with regard to Yemen has increased; the influence of the proxy-war Saudi Arabia and Iran are fighting on Yemen territory has led to the framing of the conflict as being a sectarian struggle. However, sectarianism does not seem to be the cause of the conflict, but has gained importance during the course of the civil war. Thus, the conflict taking place in Yemen nowadays does not seem to have been caused by sectarian struggles, but the sectarian struggles Yemen experiences can be seen as a result of the Yemeni Civil War, of which the eruption seems to have been primarily driven by structural economic grievances. The findings of this thesis implicate that when a conflict is commonly framed as being sectarian in nature, this does not necessarily have to be the case. It is important to conduct research into the root causes of a conflict, and not look at the (perceived) overarching cleavage guiding the conflict. Conflicts

that originate from a local level have the possibility to evolve into a national level conflict, structured around various cleavages and grievances. Future research into the nature and causes of civil wars should thus not only focus on the (perceived) overarching narrative guiding the conflict. They should take into account the local level dynamics and the mechanisms which link these local level factors and supralocal dynamics, and how this convergence of conflicts, grievances and dynamics from different levels explain the eruption of civil wars.

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78 Appendix 1 – Economic Overview Yemen

This appendix provides a full overview of the various economic factors that have been discussed in this thesis, from 1990 until 2016. Yemen crude oil production & export volume Yemen crude oil production & export(1990 volume-2015) (1990-2015) 25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

Crude oil production Net exports (unit 1000 tonnes) (unit 1000 tonnes)

Source: Graph composed by author, data retrieved from International Energy Agency; https://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/report/?country=Yemen&product=oil

Yemen oil rents (% of GDP)Oil (1990 rents-2016) (% of GDP) 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5%

1990 1993 1994 1995 1998 1999 2000 2003 2004 2007 2008 2009 2012 2013 2014 1992 1996 1997 2001 2002 2005 2006 2010 2011 2015 2016 1991 Source: Graph composed by author, data retrieved from World Bank Open Data; https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS?locations=YE 79

Yemen % %of populationof population living below living poverty below lines poverty lines

2014

2005

1998

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population) % of population living below poverty line of $3,20 a day % of population living below poverty line of $1,90 a day

Source: Graph composed by author, data retrieved from World Bank Open Data; https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY?locations=YE http://data.worldbank.org/indicatior/SI.POV.LMIC?locations=YE http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=YE Total unemployment Yemen: Total unemployment(% of rate total (% of total labor labor force) force) 20% 18% 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2%

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2014 2015 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2000 Source: Graph composed by author, data retrieved from World Bank Open Data http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=YE

Yemen: InflationInflation rate consumer rate consumer prices (annual prices %) (1990 (annual-2013) %) 60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 2001 2002 2003 2004 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 1991 1997 1998 1999 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 1990 Source: Graph composed by author, data retrieved from World Bank Open Data; https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?locations=YE GDP: overall growth & per capita growth Yemen: Overall GDP growth and GDP(annual per capita %) growth (annual %) (1991-2015) 15% 10% 5% 0%

-5%

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 -10% -15% -20% -25% -30% -35%

Growth in GDP per capita (annual %) - GDP growth (annual %) -

Source: Graph composed by author, data retrieved from World Bank Open Data; https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?end=2005&locations=YE&start=1990 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=YE

Yemen populationPopulation growth (annual growth %) (1990 (annual-2016) %) 6%

1991 1993 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2012 2014 2016 1992 1995 1997 1999 2001 2004 2006 2008 2010 2013 2015 1990 Source: Graph composed by author, data retrieved from World Bank Open Data; https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=YE

Appendix 2 – Events during the Sa’ada Wars

Articles have been selected using the LexisNexis Database and the search term ‘Saada’. The author only used articles from selected sources, as a result of the overwhelming amount of articles that had to be analyzed. The press agencies that have been used are Agence France Presse (AFP), Associated Press (AP) British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), IHS Global Insight (IHS) and United Press International (UPI).

Events First Sa'ada War (22-06-2004 - 10-09-2004)

Date Event Source GoY forces launch hunt for radical cleric Husayn al-Houthi for 21-06-2004 incitement against U.S. (tribal sources) DPA 21-06-2004 2 GoY soldiers killed, 5 wounded in Marran region AFP 22-06-2004 3 GoY soldiers killed, 6 injured DPA Clashes near border Saudi Arabia in Hidane region; 7 GoY soldiers 23-06-2004 killed, number of civilians killed; more than 30 Houthis arrested AFP Many Houthi supporters arrested; negotiations by tribal 24-06-2004 dignitaries failed DPA 25-06-2004 Around 50 Houthis killed in clashes, 43 arrested UPI 26-06-2004 Jews accused by Saleh of helping Houthis UPI 26-06-2004 Start second mediation efforts AFP Second mediation attempt failed; al-Houthi won't surrender. Mediators accuse troops of deliberately undermining deliberation 27-06-2004 efforts AFP 27-06-2004 6 Houthis killed in clashes AFP 29-06-2004 6 civilians killed by GoY by mistake UPI 29-06-2004 2 GoY soldiers and 6 Houthis killed in clashes AFP 29-06-2004 Zaid bin Ali al-Houthi killed by GoY AFP 30-06-2004 More than 10 Houthis killed in GoY bombing AFP 01-07-2004 3 Houthis killed in Marran AFP 02-07-2004 23 Houthis killed by GoY DPA 04-07-2004 President Saleh calls for Houthis to surrender AFP Fierce clashes; around 35 Houthis killed, including their field 05-07-2004 commander AFP 06-07-2004 Yemen accuses Iran of supporting Houthis UPI 10-07-2004 Around 25 Houthis killed in clashes; GoY asks for tribal support DPA 15-07-2004 Tribal leader killed by Houthis UPI 20-07-2004 Husayn al-Houthi blames his anti-U.S. views for conflict AFP

20-07-2004 al-Islah Party condemns Houthi uprising AFP 22-07-2004 Saleh gives Houthis chance to surrender UPI/DPA 27-07-2004 Renewed mediatino efforts announced UPI 04-08-2004 Official mediation started UPI 05-08-2004 Fierce clashes in past 48 hours; many GoY soldiers killed AFP 08-08-2004 Husayn al-Houthi narrowly escapes GoY forces DPA 19-08-2004 Around 30 Houthis killed in Marran UPI 23-08-2004 GoY army declares victory; fighting continues UPI 24-08-2004 11 GoY soldiers killed in Houthi ambush DPA/AFP 24-08-2004 Husayn al-Houthi's brother killed AFP 01/02-09- Fierce clashes, around 50 casualties AFP 2004 07-09-2004 Yemeni Socialist Party accused of supporting Houthis UPI 08-09-2004 Explosion in Sa'adah market, 6 killed DPA/AFP 10-09-2004 GoY announces it has killed Husayn al-Houti; end of first Sa'ada war DPA/UPI/AFP

Events Second Sa'ada War (19-03-2005 - 11-04-2005)

Date Event Source 19-03-2005 Houthis killed by GoY during arms deal; refused to surrender DPA/AFP GoY army attacks Houthis in al-Razzamat & al-Shafiaa areas; 28-03-2005 retaliation for Houthi attack on Akwan military post DPA Houthis attack GoY forces in Sahar, Dahyan & Bakem; ambush 29-03-2005 police in Amran DPA 31-03-2005 GoY forces attack Nushur, Al-Shafia & Razzamat AFP 01-04-2005 Houthis attack checkpoint in Sa'ada; big losses for Houthis AFP 03-04-2005 Police chief Sa'adah ambushed by Houthis AFP Clash between pro-Houthi tribe and pro-GoY tribe (result of ongoing 04-04-2005 vendetta) in Bani Muadh DPA 04-04-2005 Clash between al-Majalli tribe and Houthis AFP 06-04-2005 Army bombs al-Shafia and Nushur districts DPA/AFP 06-04-2005 Mediation effort, al-Razzami won't surrender DPA 08-04-2005 Street battles in Sa'adah; Houthis attack military positions DPA GoY takes control over rebel positions in al-Razzamat, Wadi 08-04-2005 Nushur & al-Shafia; try to track down Houthi leaders AFP 09-04-2005 GoY tracks down Houthi leaders to Lawdiya & clashes; no casualties AFP

GoY captures stronghold in al-Razzamat; thought al-Razzami was 10-04-2005 hiding there DPA Saleh says Houthi rebellion has been crushed and that Houthis are 12-04-2005 surrounded AFP 13-04-2005 Government announces end to second Sa'ada war AFP

Events Third Sa'ada War (28-11-2005 - 23-02-2006)

Date Event Source 28-11-2005 Journalists report crackdown on press AP Houthis attack police station and checkpoint in al-Khafji & al- 29-11-2005 Eind, kill 8 police AFP 30-11-2005 Tribesman killed by police after they tried to disarm them AP 21-12-2005 2 tourists kidnapped in North-Yemen by tribesman; freed after 2 days AP Ambush near Yemeni Oil Company outside Sa'adah by Houthis; 25-12-2005 4 GoY soldiers killed BBC 30-12-2005 Houthis attack army checkpoint in Kataf BBC 02-01-2006 Germans that had been kidnapped freed, used in tribal vendetta UPI 03-01-2006 Italians kidnapped by al-Zaydi tribe in al-Mihgiza AP 17-01-2006 Attack by Houthis on GoY official Yeyha Mousa in Zumar AP GoY & Houthis clash after Houthis wanted to celebrate religious 19-01-2006 event despite government ban AP 21-01-2006 Houthis forced out of Jebel Khazaen UPI 24-01-2006 GoY attacks Bani Ma'adh, Sahar, Fullah, Al-Salim and al-Talh areas BBC 28-01-2006 4 GoY soldiers killed in Houthi ambush BBC 06-02-2006 Clashes in Saada and Imran governorates BBC Clashes in Sahar & al-Sayfi regions; Shaykh Jayyash from al- 20-02-2006 Maqqash tribe killed by Houthis BBC Saada governor al-Shami meets Houthi delegates to discuss 22-02-2006 ceasefire BBC

Events Fourth Sa'ada War (16-02-2007 - 17-06-2007)

Date Event Source 10-02-2007 Parliament announces to 'crush Zia revolt' AFP Reports of infighting between Abdul-Malik al-Houthi & Abdullah al- 12-02-2007 Razzami BBC Severe clashes between GoY and Houthis, around 70 Houthis 13-02-2007 killed, and 18 GoY forces AP/DPA

17-02-2007 Saleh issues final ultimatum for rebels DPA 18-02-2007 Saleh openly asks for tribal support BBC 20-02-2007 5-day clashes kill more than 100 people AP/DPA 21-02-2007 5 civilians killed by airstrike AP 24-02-2007 Houthis threaten to expand conflict AFP 02-03-2007 Yahya al-Houthi's (MP, Abdulmalik's brother) immunity lifted BBC 06-03-2007 Assassination attempt on Shaykh Faris Mana, government loyalist BBC 06-03-2007 Jews targeted by Houthi rebels DPA 08-03-2007 Iran denies involvement in Saada War AFP 12-03-2007 Saleh says no room for mediation between GoY and Houthis AFP GoY seizes 2 villages (Zaydan & Jaldan) from Houthis with tribal 14-03-2007 support BBC 18-03-2007 Shaykh al-Arjali killed while supporting GoY troops DPA 19-03-2007 Military crackdown has led to 2500 refugees AP Houthis kill French and British student at Dammaj Centre for Islamic Studies; were accused of being GoY allies by tribesmen. 26-03-2007 Centre run by Sunni Salafist Group AP/AFP 07-04-2007 Attack on mosque in Amran; not sure who conducted it AP 12-04-2007 GoY announces plan to stop the sale of arms DPA 18-04-2007 Governor Yahya al-Shami of Saada sacked DPA Saleh says force is only solution in conflict and there will be no 27-04-2007 negotiations; accuses Libya and Iran of supporting Houthis AFP 28-04-2007 Houthi leader denies foreign support; accuses GoY of genocide AP 29-04-2007 MP Yayha al-Houthi says military is not the solution AFP 30-04-2007 More than 5000 families displaced in North-Yemen DPA 01-05-2007 Jews face threats by Houthis AFP Ambassadors of Iran and Libya summoned over alleged support for 11-05-2007 Houthis AFP 18-05-2007 Houthis pushed out of several places by GoY IHS 19-05-2007 Libya pledges support for Saleh AFP 21-05-2007 Saleh calls for Houthi surrender DPA GoY gains tribal support in bin-Amir, Qatabir, Sammar al-Sam & 21-05-2007 Baqqam regions BBC 28-05-2007 Iranian envoy arrives in Yemen DPA 29-05-2007 Tribes oppose disarment plans GoY IPS GoY accidentally bombs petrol station; 15 civilians killed. GoY 31-05-2007 blames Houthis BBC/AFP

14-06-2007 GoY offers rebels ceasefire if they hand in their weapons AFP/DPA 15-06-2007 GoY & Houthis clash in Qatabir & al-Ubar; GoY supported by tribes BBC 16-06-2007 Truce reached in conflict; First Doha Agreement AFP/DPA/AP

Events Fifth Sa'ada War (02-05-2008 - 17-07-2008)

Date Event Source bin Salman mosque in Sa'adah bombed; 18 people killed. Target was A. al-Zuail (aide of Ali Mushin al-Ahmar), escaped 02-05-2008 unharmed. GoY accuses Houthis, they deny involvement DPA/AFP/BBC GoY and Houthis clash in Haidan & Munnabeh; attack on army 03-05-2008 patrol and on military checkpoint AP/DPA/AFP Houthis warn for escalation of conflict if the GoY continues its 04-05-2008 offensive AP Qatari mediators arrive, talk with GoY and Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. DPA Clashes occur in Munnabeh and Bani-Muadh. GoY denies this. BBC 04-05-2008 Houthis blame army for escalation of conflict AFP Clashes in Harf Sufyan between GoY and tribesmen 08-05-2008 (thought to be Houthi allies) DPA/AFP 12-05-2008 Riyadh urges for peaceful solution to conflict DPA GoY blames Houthis for violence; also blames them of killing many 12-05-2008 civilians AFP Clashes in Harf Sufyan between Hashid tribesmen and Houthis; 2 13-05-2008 Houthis surrender to Hussein al-Ahmar BBC Red Cross states that more than 10.000 civilians have been 16-05-2008 displaced AP GoY attacks Houthis in Bani Hushaysh; according to 27-05-2008 Abdul al-Houthi, none of the GoY objectives have been reached DPA Interior minister calls on Houthis to surrender; GoY claims Houthis have been 'liquidated' in Bani Hushayhs area (near 27-05-2008 Sana'a) BBC/AFP Houthis come close to Sana'a; fighting continues contrary to 31-05-2008 claims by GoY AP 04-06-2008 Saleh says end to Houthi rebellion is 'imminent' BBC 07-06-2008 Yahya al-Houthi's immunity stripped again (brother of Abdul al-Huthi) DPA/AFP 09-06-2008 Governor asks for tribal support against Houthis in Saqh district BBC 15-06-2008 Saada governor: Qatari peace talks have failed DPA 18-06-2008 GoY announces Houthis have been defeated in many areas BBC 27-06-2008 GoY closes 200 weapon shops in bid to stop Houthis AP 05-07-2008 Houthi suicide bombing kills 7 by government compound in Sa'adah DPA/AFP/AP

09-07-2008 4 Houthi leaders surrender in Bani Hushaysh near Sana'a BBC Houthi gunman kills 3 tribal chieftains & governor of al-Jawf in al- 17-07-2008 Zahir district; retaliation for murder of Abdu Abu-Rass by tribesmen DPA Saleh announces fighting has ended; partially result of mediation 17-07-2008 by tribal chieftains. DPA/AFP

Events Sixth Sa'ada War (11-08-2009 - 11-02-2010) * During the Sixth Sa'ada War, continuous clashes between the GoY and the Houthis took place; these will not all be mentioned because of the large amount of confrontations that took place during the given timespan Date Event Source GoY launches 'Operation Scorched Earth' against Houthis, who condemn the offensive as a 'criminal act' by the GoY. GoY claims it was its 'last option' 11-08-2009 after Houthis did not respond to call for peace by the government. AFP/DPA 12-08-2009 Houthis accuse GoY of killing civilians after launching offensive AFP State of emergency imposed in Saada governorate; call from GoY on citizens 12-08-2009 to confront the rebels DPA GoY sets up 6 terms for ending Sixth Sa'ada War and demands information about the fate of 6 European hostages; Houthis deny holding the hostages 13-08-2009 and claim that GoY does not want to reach a solution AFP/BBC 15-09-2009 GoY claims the aim of its latest offensive is to 'save´ civilians from the AFP Houthis 19-09-2009 Saleh pledges to crush the Houthi rebellion in Saada and destroy the group AFP Yemeni opposition parliamentarian says in interview president Saleh is responsible for the crisis, war and corruption in Yemen and that his policy 19-09-2009 towards Saada does not address the root causes of the problem BBC President Saleh gives Houthis final chance to consider the Six 21-08-2009 Points; final peace offer BBC/DPA 21-08-2009 UN: 35.000 people displaced by latest fighting AFP Army seizes Iranian-made weapons from Houthis; accuses Iran of 22-08-2009 supporting Houthis AFP 23-08-2009 GoY denies involvement of Saudi-Arabia in war BBC 24-08-2009 Iran urges GoY to find political solution to conflict AFP 25-08-2009 UN warns that humanitarian crisis in North Yemen is getting worse AFP Saleh says Yemen is changing tactics to crush Houthi revolt, that has 27-08-2009 turned into a guerilla war APF/DPA Yemen denies air raids on Houthi bases are being carried out by Saudi- 28-08-2009 Arabia DPA 30-08-2009 Nine Hashid tribesman killed during fights with Houthis AFP Houthis offer truce proposal to GoY, which should stop its offensive and retreat to its positions before the beginning of latest war. No 31-08-2009 commitments made on Houthi side DPA 88

GoY rejects truce offer Houthis, says Houthis must comply with Six 01-09-2009 Points peace plan; intensifies its offensive AFP 01-09-2009 Fleeing civilians turned back by Saudi authorities AFP 02-09-2009 Houthis warn it will wage 'war of attrition' after GoY rejects peace offer DPA GoY offers ceasefire to Houthis, suspends its offensive, in order to 04-09-2009 ease work of aid agencies. AFP Houthis agree to stop attacks against GoY and clear roads from 04-09-2009 landmines; to help aid agencies. Call for permanent end to fighting DPA/AFP 05-09-2009 GoY accuses Houthis of violating ceasefire; clashes continue DPA/AFP 07-09-2009 Houthis argue GoY violated ceasefire, used it to bring in military AFP reinforcements Iran denies involvement in war; stresses it does not intervene in internal 07-09-2009 affairs of nations BBC 08-09-2009 GoY argues it is still honoring ceasefire UPI 09-09-2009 GoY insists on implementation of Six Points to reach peace in Saada BBC Yemeni tribesman (al-Shaafa tribe) with grievance against GoY kidnaps 11-09-2009 Uzbek doctor; freed him after realizing he was Muslim AFP GoY airstrike hits displacement camp in North Yemen; GoY denies, but civil 17-09-2009 servant & tribal leader confirm attack. More than 80 civilians killed AP/AFP 17-09-2009 US warns al-Qaeda is growing in Yemen amid turmoil in Saada AP GoY declares second (unilateral) ceasefire in order to secure passage of 18-09-2009 humanitarian aid DPA 19-09-2009 Houthis accuse GoY of continuing attacks despite ceasefire AFP 20-09-2009 Ceasefire collapses DPA Houthis want independently monitored ceasefire as result of lack of trust 22-09-2009 between GoY and Houthis. Houthis want war to stop AFP 24-09-2009 Thousands civilans trapped in warzone, aid agencies cannot reach them AP Saleh urges Houthis to stop fighting; says they can't re-establish the 25-09-2009 imamate in Yemen AFP Saleh announces he will not stop war for years if Houthis don't abide by Six 26-09-2009 Points truce plan on anniversary of 1962 revolution AFP Houthis announce they will keep on fighting against GoY to end discrimination, marginalization and separation practiced by GoY against the 27-09-2009 Zaydis AFP 30-09-2009 Saudi Arabia provides aid for displaced people BBC 04-10-2009 Arab league voices support for president Saleh AFP 13-10-2009 Reports that Hezbollah fighters are fighting along Houthis against GoY UPI 14-10-2009 Houthis say they want to open humanitarian corridors for displaced civilians AFP 19-10-2009 Saleh again accuses Iran of funding the Houthis AFP 20-10-2009 GoY denies involvement of Saudi-Arabia in war, as claimed by Houthis BBC

GoY official says boatload of Iranian arms, meant for Houthis, is seized in 26-10-2009 Red Sea AFP 30-10-2009 Civilians in displacement camp killed in fighting between GoY and Houthis AFP 30-10-2009 Houthis claim GoY air raid killed more than 20 civilians API Saudi soldier killed by Houthi infiltrators in attack near Saudi-Yemen border 04-11-2009 on Saudi territory AFP 05-11-2009 Saudi warplanes target Houthi rebel camps AFP 05-11-2009 Houthis claim 5 civilians killed in Saudi airstrikes DPA 06-11-2009 Saudi Arabia claims the strikes were conducted with the knowledge of the AFP GoY Saudi Arabia continues strikes on Yemen territory, despite its claims that the 08-11-2009 strikes are limited to Houthi locations on Saudi territory AFP Saleh claims real war has only just started after Saudi involvement, and 08-11-2009 will keep his military offensive going AFP 09-11-2009 Houthis accuse Saudi Arabia of using phosphorus bombs AFP 09-11-2009 Saada governor accuses Iran of involvement in military training of Houthis BBC 15-11-2009 Saudi Arabia & GoY resume air strikes on Houthis AFP Tribesman from Jub Zindani tribe kidnap Japanese engineer; demand 16-11-2009 member of tribe being held without charge by GoY will be freed AFP Houthis plead with Arab League to stop 'Saudi aggression', deny involvement of outside groups in conflict and call for national dialogue 16-11-2009 between GoY and Houthis AFP 22-11-2009 GoY denies claims al-Qaeda has seized Japanese engineer from tribe AFP 24-11-2009 Houthis claim Saudi-Arabia fights them through air strikes and ground AFP battles 25-11-2009 Saudi Arabia denies military troops have entered Yemen AFP 20-12-2009 Houthis claim Saudi airstrikes kill 54 civilians AFP Opposition parties call for dialogue between GoY and Houthis; urge Houthis to lay down arms and peacefully pursue their own demands; hold 21-12-2009 GoY accountable for consequences as result of foreign involvement in war BBC 23-12-2009 Houthis will withdraw from Saudi territory if Saudi attacks on Yemen AFP territory end 28-12-2009 Saada governor claims Houthis have killed 500 civilians since August UPI Clashes between Houthis and Shawlan tribesman kill 8 after tribesman lift 08-01-2010 roadblock erected by Houthis AFP 11-01-2010 UN says more than 200.000 Yemenis are displaced as result of conflict AFP Houthis deny mediating in case of German hostages; claim they have nothing to do with the issue. The day before, Yemen's foreign minister 16-01-2010 claimed the hostages were located in Saada, a Houthi stronghold AFP Houthi leader declares war with Saudi Arabia over; will pull fighters from 25-01-2010 Saudi territory. Will fight back if Saudi Arabia continues attacks on Houthis API

Houthi leader says he will accept GoY's Five Points if attacks on Houthis 30-1-2010 stop, in order to end bloodshed and genocide against civilians AFP GoY rejects Houthi peace offering, since it does not include a pledge that they will stop attacks on Saudi territory; the sixth point has been 31-01-2010 added after Saudi Arabia became involved AFP Saleh appoints Abdullah Taha Hajar as new Saada governor; no reason given 06-02-2010 for replacement of current governor Hassab Manaa AFP Saleh announces ceasefire with Houthi rebels; Houthi leader Abdul al- Houthi in response ordered his troops to cease combat at the hour announced by the GoY. Truce possible after Houthis accepted Six Points 11-02-2010 of the GoY AFP

Appendix 3 – Events during the 2011 Yemeni Uprisings

Articles have been selected using the LexisNexis Database and the search term ‘Yemen’. The author only used articles from selected sources, as a result of the overwhelming amount of articles that had to be analyzed. The press agencies that have been used are Agence France Presse (AFP), Associated Press (AP) British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), IHS Global Insight (IHS) and United Press International (UPI).

Events 2011 Yemeni Uprisings

Date Event Source

Yemeni police clash with student protestors chanting pro-Tunisia 18-01-2011 slogans at Sanaa university AFP Protests in Southern Yemen; rebels kidnap soldiers; GoY arrests 18-01-2011 protestors over 'anti-unity' slogans AFP/BBC 20-01-2011 GoY and protestors clash again in South-Yemen (Aden) AFP

Southern Yemeni politician (and former jihadist) burns American flag 21-01-2011 and pictures of Saleh, accuses him of conspiracy against the South BBC 21-01-2011 GoY accused of aggressive clampdown on protests BBC

Dueling students protests in Sana' a; some call for Saleh to step 22-01-2011 down, others want him to stay in office AFP 22-01-2011 Student dies from injuries in clash between protestors and GoY forces AFP

22-01-2011 Large scale demonstrations against Saleh; first of its kind in Yemen AP

Journalists protest; demand release of Tawakel Karman who was 23-01-2011 arrested overnight on charges of organizing unlicensed rallies AFP 23-01-2011 South Yemen: police and al-Qaeda clash AFP

24-01-2011 Tawakel Karman released AFP

Saleh denies he wants to install his son as successor; raises salaries 24-01-2011 armed forces AP 26-01-2011 Saleh says parliamentary elections will be free, fair and transparent BBC

Thousands of protesters in various cities demand Saleh steps down; 27-01-2011 GPC holds counter marches AFP 29-01-2011 Protestors and GoY supporters clash in Sana'a AFP

31-01-2011 Protest by supporters of Yemeni opposition movement in the South UPI

Saleh announces he won't try to change the constitution, which would 02-03-2011 allow him to stay in office for another term AFP Tens of thousands stage demonstrations against Saleh in 7 cities; 03-02-2011 counterdemonstration in Sana'a. Protests largely peaceful AP

Five straight days of demonstrations; celebrating ousting of 11-02-2011 - Mubarak; police crack down on protestors; clash with Saleh 16-02-2011 supporters AP Police kill 2 protestors in Aden; first to be killed in six consecutive 16-02-2011 days of demonstrations in Yemen's biggest cities AP 21-02-2011 Protestors start camping near square at Sanaa University

23-02-2011 Saleh calls for formation of unity government and halt to demonstrations UPI

Saleh orders forces to offer full protection to anti-regime protestors & loyalists; Group of MPs resign as result of government crackdown on 24-02-2011 Friday of Rage AFP Saleh orders formation of government committee to start dialogue with 24-02-2011 protestors AP 03-03-2011 Saleh offered 'smooth exit' by opposition; peacefil transition of power AFP

06-03-2011 al-Qaeda ambush GoY troops AFP

Friday of Rage'; 52 killed by armed men; GoY forces don't attempt to stop 18-03-2011 the massacre AFP Saleh imposes state of emergency across Yemen after many people are 18-03-2011 killed in protests AFP After the Friday of Rage, protests keep on occurring, with GoY forces often breaking them up by force; these protests are too much to mention here. Only the big protests will be mentioned Saleh makes speech calling on unity of the army after dozen military 22-03-2011 commanders defected on 21st of March, led by Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar IHS Saleh announces to defend himself against protestors; urges military 24-03-2011 defectors to return AFP 25-03-2011 Massive pro-regime rally

Saleh won't offer more concessions to opposition; tribes back 28-03-2011 antigovernment movement UPI Hamid al-Ahmar warns Saleh to leave country immediately, after he offered to step down by end of the year; proposal rejected by 31-03-2011 opposition; demand immediate resignation. UPI 03-04-2011 GCC urges GoY and opposition to have national dialogue AFP

05-04-2011 Saleh invites opponents to join him at negotiating table UPI

Saleh rejects GCC plan calling for departure and creation of opposition- 08-04-2011 led national unity government; still open for mediation AFP GCC urges Saleh to announce transfer of power to vice-president; drafts proposal for graduate departure; Saleh rejects proposal, calls it 10-04-2011 interference in Yemeni affairs AFP 14-04-2011 Yemeni delegation appointed to discuss political solution in Saudi Arabia UPI

15-04-2011 Influential tribal and religious chiefs abandon Saleh AFP

Opposition coalition JMP expresses reservations about Saudi led 17-04-2011 mediation efforts, since there is no resignation deadline BBC GCC proposes new plan, giving Saleh 30 days to quit after the formation 21-04-2011 of an unity government and granting him immunity of prosecution AFP 22-04-2011 al-Qaeda and tribesmen kill GoY soldiers in separate attacks AFP

Saleh will hold on to his constitutional legitimacy, but will also cooperate 22-04-2011 with GCC AFP 24-04-2011 GPC (ruling party) accept GCC plan in which Saleh will quit AFP

Saleh warns of al-Qaeda growth, group takes advantage of political 24-04-2011 unrest UPI 26-04-2011 Opposition will sign GCC power transfer plan AFP

28-04-2011 Opposition accuse Saleh of derailing GCC deal after killing 14 protestors AFP

Saleh threatens to quit GCC deal; accusing Qatar of causing unrest in 29-04-2011 Yemen AFP 01-05-2011 GCC rejects Salehs conspiracy claim AFP

06-05-2011 Saleh vows to resist calls to quit AFP

Saleh vows to stay in power and defend his people; rejecting transition 13-05-2011 plan AFP 15-05-2011 Gulf mediator meets with Saleh in bid to solve crisis AFP

19-05-2011 Saleh promises to sign deal that will end his rule AP

Saleh calls for early presidential election; opposition and GPC insist on 20-05-2011 implementing GCC plan AFP Saleh refuses to sign new GCC plan in which he would quit in 30 days; 22-05-2011 GPC signed deal. Gulf countries suspend mediation efforts AFP Saleh backs out of GCC deal; clashes in Sana'a between (Hashid) 24-05-2011 tribesmen and security forces BBC 26-05-2011 Saleh orders arrest of Shaykh Sadeq al-Ahmar and his brothers AFP

Sadeq al-Ahmar has become leader of movement to oust Saleh; used 27-05-2011 to be Saleh's ally AP 30-05-2011 GoY forces crush sit-in in Taez, killing many protestors AFP

02-06-2011 Thousands of tribesmen march towards Sana'a AFP

03-06-2011 Saleh wounded in attack on his compound AFP

04-06-2011 Saleh arrives in Riyadh for treatment AFP

Thousands celebrate in Sana'a after Salehs departure; opposition vows 05-06-2011 to prevent Saleh's return AFP 07-06-2011 Clashes between army and anti-government forces AP

Army clashes with al-Qaeda who tried to bring southern towns under 11-06-2011 their control AP 22-06-2011 al-Qaeda militants escape prison in South Yemen AP

Economic problems thriving in Yemen; scarcity of basic commodities 27-06-2011 leading to clashes IHS 18-07-2011 Saleh calls for peaceful dialogue to end crisis AFP

Opposition groups announce new alliance, uniting all forces seeking to oust president Saleh. al-Qaeda continues to seize towns in Southern 19-07-2011 provinces AP 28-07-2011 Heavy clashes between Yemen army and tribesmen north of Sana'a AP

Tribal leaders announce creation of coalition to bolster protest 30-07-2011 movement AFP 01-08-2011 Heave clashes between Yemen army and tribesmen in Taiz AFP

09-08-2011 UN wars of growing al-Qaeda threat in Yemen AFP

Opposition announces formation of ' umbrella national council' aiming to 09-08-2011 take over power; meeting set for August 17 AFP 11-08-2011 Saleh says GCC power transfer proposal should be treated positively AFP

Saleh won't step down until Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and Sadiq al-Ahmar 13-08-2011 leave country (both opponents of Saleh) UPI GCC plan amended; two-phased plan in which Hadi will become 15-08-2011 president for two years, following elections and draft of new constitution IHS 24-08-2011 Air strikes kill may suspected al-Qaeda militants AP

26-08-2009 Hundreds of thousands take part in anti-regime protests AFP

Hundreds of thousands march in Sana'a against Saleh; troop deployed 04-09-2011 to prevent mass protests AFP Opposition shuns GCC deal that will give Saleh immunity in exchange 06-09-2011 for resignation UPI Big demonstrations begin again in Yemen, harsh crackdown by army; 16-09-2011 many protestors killed AP/AFP Saleh returns to Yemen while clashes in Sana'a have been raging for 6 23-09-2011 days AFP Saleh says he is ready to quit through early elections, is committed to 25-09-2011 GCC transfer deal (without committing himself to signing it) AFP Protestors accuse army and tribes of 'stealing' their revolution after tribal fighters and military have been battling in Sana'a for over a week; blame the tribes/military that switched sides for taking over the uprising that was previously organized by pro-reform youth groups 28-09-2011 with vision for free and democratic Yemen AP 02-10-2011 Soldiers killed in clashes with al-Qaeda AFP

08-10-2011 Saleh makes comments he is willing to leave power AP

21-10-2011 UN urges Saleh to accept deal to transfer power to Hadi and end violence AP

Saleh welcomes UN resolution urging him to quit; does not mention if he 24-10-2011 will comply and resign, or stay in office AFP Protestors call for Saleh to face trial for his crackdown on protesters; 10-11-2011 gunmen kill protestors AP Saleh says he wil quit after government agrees with opposition on a 14-11-2011 mechanism for implementing the power transfer plan AFP Saleh signs deal to quit power, making Hadi president. Thousands protest against deal that grants Saleh immunity from prosecution. Saleh promises 'real partnership' with opposition in implementing deal and 23-11-2011 rebuilding of country. Will stay president for another 90 days AFP

Appendix 4 – Events during the Transition Period

Events Transition Period (24-02-2012 - 22-01-2015) * During the transition period, many clashes and events took place. It is impossible to mention all of these clashes, so only the events described by the AP, AFP, BBC, DPA, IHS and UPI will be mentioned Date Event Source Hadi gets 99.8% of votes in single-candidate presidential election; 24-02-2012 turnout of 66% AP/AFP 25-02-2012 Saleh returns to Yemen after medical treatment in U.S. AP 02-03-2012 Demonstrations across Yemen demanding restructuring of army AFP 05-03-2012 AQAP launces surprise attack on military bases in south Yemen AP 13-03-2012 AQAP attacks Yemeni army post AP 14-03-2012 Yemeni Salafists form a political party; the Al-Rashad Union AFP Reports that Saleh works behind the scenes to obstruct new U.S. backed government (air force commander Mohammed Saleh al-Ahmar, Saleh's half-brother, refused to evacuate wounded after 15-03-2012 AQAP attack) AP 30-03-2012 U.S. airstrike kills 5 AQAP members AFP 30-03-2012 Gas pipeline sabotaged in southern Yemen AFP 31-03-2012 Heavy clashes between GoY forces and AQAP members in Lahij AFP 02-04-2012 AQAP militants killed during air raids AP SM sets conditions for negotiations with GoY; will participate in National Dialogue (boycotted and obstructed February elections; 04-04-2012 clashed with armed forces in recents months) IHS 06-04-2012 Hadi sacks 2 military leaders who were close to Saleh AFP Sana'a airport closed after threats by military forces loyal to 07-04-2012 general Naji Jamaan (Hamdan tribe), who was close to Saleh AFP 11-04-2012 3 days of fighting in south Yemen between GoY and AQAP kills 31 AP 15-04-2012 AQAP attack in southern town of Lawder kills 7 civilians AP 18-03-2012 Battle for Lawder kills 2 children, 6 AQAP members AP 19-04-2012 19 AQAP members killed in military offensive AP Saleh criticizes Arab Uprisings, says implementation of power-transfer 22-04-2012 deal was biased AP

23-04-2012 U.S. airstrike kills 7 AQAP members AP 27-04-2012 Gas pipeline in south Yemen blown up, stopping Yemen’s export of gas AFP 06-05-2012 Yemeni minister discusses aid package with World Bank BBC 12-05-2012 U.S. drone strike kills 11 AQAP members AP 13-05-2012 Many casualties in clashes between army and AQAP AP Many casualties in clashes between army and AQAP; GoY 16-05-2012 supported by tribal militiaman AP 19-05-2012 Fresh clashes between AQAP and GoY; many killed AP 21-05-2012 AQAP suicide bomber kills at least 50 during military parade in Sana'a AFP 21-05-2012 U.S. worried about AQAP terrorism and extremism in Yemen AP South Yemen protestor killed by police during (violent) separatist 22-05-2012 demonstration AFP 23-05-2012 Clashes between GoY and AQAP in south Yemen AP 25-05-2012 12 killed in suicide attack on Houthi-held post in northern Yemen AFP 26-05-2012 27 AQAP members killed by GoY in Zinjibar AP 28-05-2012 GoY forces retakes most of AQAP-stronghold Zinjibar AP Houthis agree to join National Dialogue; goal is to 'take part in building 31-05-2012 a state for all the citizens of Yemen' AFP 01-06-2012 AQAP claims responsibility for suicide attack against Houthis on May 25 AFP Hadi seeks international economic back-up for implementation of 5- 03-06-2012 year economic plan UPI 03-06-2012 Houthis and Salafi’s clash in northern Yemen over territorial disputes UPI Yemenis demonstrate, demanding removal of Saleh's relatives from 04-06-2012 military BBC 05-06-2012 Clashes between GoY and AQAP in south Yemen AP 07-06-2012 Oil pipeline sabotaged in Marib AFP Clashes between GoY and AQAP in south Yemen; army advances to 11-06-2012 AQAP strongholds AP 12-06-2012 AQAP driven from 2 strongholds in south Yemen (Jaar & Zinjibar) AP 15-06-2012 Clashes between GoY and AQAP in south Yemen AP 17-06-2012 Tribal mediation for peaceful withdrawal of AQAP from their territories UPI 18-06-2012 Suicide bomber kills army general fighting AQAP in south Yemen AP SM will participate in National Dialogue without any of the 18-06-2012 preconditions they earlier stated BBC SM announces it will step up calls for independence and renounce state authority; will no longer tolerate security forces crackdown against its 19-06-2012 militants; call for demonstrations UPI

20-06-2012 Many AQAP militants killed in Yemeni airstrike AFP 25-06-2012 Hundreds of students demonstrate against electricity blackouts in UPI Sana'a 26-06-2012 AQAP landmines kill 73 civilians in their former strongholds AP 02-07-2012 Bomb kills Yemeni intelligence officer; responsible party unknown AP 03-07-2012 Attacks on pipelines have cost more than $4 billion since start of AFP uprisings 4 killed by security forces during southern secessionist march; unknown 07-07-2012 which side started violence AP 11-07-2012 Southern separatist killed in clashes with police in Aden AFP 14-07-2012 Hadi calls on EU to provide aid for security and stability in Yemen BBC Al-Rashad Union (salafists) want to be part of National Dialogue; say 16-07-2012 they are being excluded AFP GoY claims it uncovered Iranian spy cell; tells Iran to stop meddling in 19-07-2012 its internal affairs. Iran denies existence of cell AFP 19-07-2012 Car bomb kills Aden's police chief; reportedly work of AQAP AFP 28-07-2012 Protesters in Sana'a demand release of protesters arrested during AP uprisings 29-07-2012 Parcel bomb by AQAP kills son of tribal chief who is opponent of AQAP AFP 31-07-2012 Policemen loyal to Saleh storm Defence Ministry AP Yemenis protest in several cities demanding removal of Saleh loyalists 03-08-2012 from armed forces AP Two separate explosions in marketplaces kill 6 civilians; unknown 03-08-2012 attackers AP 04-08-2012 AQAP suicide attack in Jaar kills 20 civilians AFP Hadi strips Salehs son of part of his military command; step forward to 06-08-2012 reforming of armed forces AP 06-08-2012 AQAP suicide attack on funeral in Jaar kills 46 UPI 07-08-2012 AQAP militants killed by U.S. drone strike and army attack AP Hadi curbs command of rival army chiefs; Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar 07-08-2012 becomes part of Presidential Protection Force AFP 14-08-2012 5 killed after forces loyal to Saleh's son attack Defense Ministry in Sana'a AFP Opposition leader (against Saleh) and southern secessionist Ahmed 15-08-2012 Abdullah al-Hassani arrested in Aden by security forces AP 18-08-2012 AQAP attack Yemeni intelligence HQ in Aden, killing 14 AP 21-08-2012 Export gas pipeline blown up by unknown gunmen in Zahira AFP 26-08-2012 Unknown gunmen kills south Yemen separatist in protest camp in Aden AFP 29-08-2012 U.S. drone attack in east Yemen kills 5 AQAP militants AP

30-08-2012 Yemen appeals for $11 billion in foreign aid IHS 31-08-2012 U.S. drone attack in east Yemen kills 8 AQAP militants AP Yemeni army accidentally hiy vehicles carrying civilians in south 02-09-2012 Yemen; 14 killed AP 04-09-2012 Donor conference in Saudi Arabia pledges $6.4 billion in aid for Yemen AP 04-09-2012 Gas line blown up in Marib province AFP 08-09-2012 Clashes in south Yemen between AQAP and GoY AP 10-09-2012 Hadi accuses tribesmen of hiding AQAP fighters after they were AP defeated 11-09-2012 Yemen defense minister survives assassination attempt in Sana'a UPI 13-09-2012 Clashes between anti-US protesters and police in Sana'a kills 4 people AFP 21-09-2012 Salafist killed in clash with Zaydi rebels in north Yemen (Amran) AFP 25-09-2012 Two blasts hit oil- and gas pipelines in Marib AFP 28-09-2012 Protests demanding recovery of stolen assests under Saleh's regime AP 03-10-2012 Tribesman blow up pylons, cutting power in Sana'a AP Yemen accuses Iran of supporting a faction of southern separatists 05-10-2012 movement AFP 11-10-2012 GoY seizes Iranian arms slated for Houthi rebels UPI 12-10-2012 Several officials referred to courts by anti-corruption authority IHS 18-10-2012 U.S. drone strike kills 7 AQAP supporters in south Yemen AFP 19-10-2012 Suicide attack kills 11 GoY soldiers in Abyan province; AQAP suspect AP 21-10-2012 4 AQAP militants killed in airstrike AP 25-10-2012 Two security officers assassinated by AQAP AP AQAP members killed in airstrike in north Yemen; first air strike in 28-10-2012 Saada governorate AP 31-10-2012 Gas pipeline blown up in Marib; blame on AQAP AFP 07-11-2012 Security official assassinated in Sana'a AP Yemeni analysts affirm that Saleh and Houthis are cooperating to disrupt Yemen's political settlement; members of Saleh's family have 8-11-2012 had meeting with al-Houthi BBC 12-11-2012 Two bomb blasts hit oil pipeline in Marib AFP 16-11-2012 AQAP attack kills 3 pro-government tribesman in south Yemen AP 24-11-2012 4 Shiites killed in attack on worshippers in Sana'a AP 28-11-2012 Saudi officer killed; attackers unknown AP Protests in south Yemen for autonomous state on 45th anniversary of 30-11-2012 independence AP

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02-12-2012 Army kills 2 tribesman in attack on suspects of bombing oil pipeline AP 08-12-2012 8 soldiers killed in ambush by AQAP militants in Marib province AP 09-12-2012 GoY attacks on AQAP positions in Mareb AP 93 soldiers of Republican Guard (elite faction) jailed for trying to occupy 15-12-2012 Defense Ministry in August AP 16-12-2012 Gas pipeline hit by blast in Shabwa province AFP 19-12-2012 Hadi removes some Saleh cronies from army positions AP 25-12-2012 Gunmen kill 2 security officers in Sana'a AFP Airstrike kills two suspected AQAP members in south Yemen; GoY suspects tribesman with links to AQAP are behind attack on oil 28-12-2012 pipeline AP Yemeni minister and Iranian ambassador meet to discuss ties; Iran expresses keenness to solve situation in Yemen and succeeding of 29-12-2012 National Dialogue Conference BBC Activists and politicians call for expulsion of Iranian ambassador after 08-01-2013 mocking Yemenis and Hadi and not respecting diplomatic principles BBC 08-01-2013 AQAP members withdraw from city of Rada'a BBC 16-01-2013 Senior police official assassinated by AQAP AP 19-01-2013 US drone strike kills 8 people in Marib province; some AQAP members AP 22-01-2013 US drone strike kills 5 AQAP suspects in Al-Jawf province AFP 25-01-2013 Houthis kill member of Salafi Al-Rashad party in Dhamar governorate BBC 14 killed in clashes between AQAP militants and pro-government local 31-01-2013 militiamen AP 02-02-2013 Town seized from Al-Qaeda in south Yemen AP 05-02-2013 Houthis arrest youths in Saada governorate BBC Yemen calls for Iran to stop sending arms and supporting southern 07-02-2013 separatists movement AP Clashes between Islamists and separatists in south Yemen kill 2 on 11-02-2013 anniversary of uprising AP Clashes during secessionist demonstrations in south Yemen between 12-02-2013 'Sunni rivals' and separatists UPI Two killed in clashes between police and Southern Movement members 21-02-2013 in Aden AFP Bystander shot death in clashes between protesters and police in south 26-02-2013 Yemen AP Saleh pleads for forgiveness in speech and prosecution of those responsible for deaths of protesters in 2011; announces his party will 27-02-2013 oppose upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections AP 02-03-2013 Security forces kill protestor in clashes in south Yemen AP

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04-03-2013 Hadi rejects 2-month truce offer of AQAP militants AP 06-03-2013 Oil pipeline blown up in Marib province AFP 07-03-2013 First session of National Dialogue to take place on 18 March in Sana'a BBC General strike in Aden to protest start of National Dialogue after call 16-03-2013 by Ali Salem al-Beedh; SM is boycotting National Dialogue AFP Protestor killed by police during southern demonstration against 18-03-2013 National Dialogue AFP 19-03-2013 Southern secessionist calls for independence during National Dialogue AP Iran slammed for meddling in Yemeni affairs by Yemeni Minister; Iran 21-03-2013 claims it is not involved in any way BBC 23-03-2013 3 Houthis killed in attack on Houthi rebel leader in Al-Jawf AFP 24-03-2013 Rabbi decries exclusion of Jewish community from National Dialogue BBC 24-03-2013 Clashes between AQAP and pro-government fighters in Abyan province AP 02-04-2013 Saleh leaves for Saudi Arabia for medical treatment AP Gunmen blow up 2 electricity towers in Mareb province, leading to 09-04-2013 blackouts in Sana'a and other cities BBC 18-04-2013 US drone strike kills 5 AQAP members in western Yemen AFP 20-04-2013 AQAP gunmen kill Yemeni intelligence officer in Mukalla AFP 21-04-2013 US drone strike kills 2 AQAP militants in Mareb province AP 27-04-2013 Large secessionist protests in southern Yemen AP 27-04-2013 Fighting between GoY forces and AQAP in Radda AP Salafist cleric al-Ahdal (deputy head of Sunni Clerics Body) criticizes US policy towards Yemen; blames US for killing innocents and American 01-05-2013 infringement of Yemeni sovereignty BBC 09-05-2013 Gunmen kill police officer in south Yemen; AQAP suspected AFP Yemeni enthusiasm over national dialogue decreases; feel disconnected 10-05-2013 from major issues being tackled at the conference BBC Prominent Yemeni cleric Aqil al-Maqtari slams US ambassador for 13-05-2013 deviating from diplomatic norms BBC Chief of Sunni Clerics Body al-Mu'alim expresses resentment at Yemeni situation; claims Hadi's government has handed over power to US and 16-05-2013 EU enemies BBC 18-05-2013 AQAP kill Yemeni intelligence officer in Mukalla in south Yemen AFP 18-05-2013 US drone strike kills AQAP militants in south Yemen AFP 21-05-2013 Protesters in Aden call for renewed independence of the South AFP 24-05-2013 Clash between AQAP and GoY in southern Yemen AP 24-05-2013 Main oil pipeline blown up by saboteurs in Mareb province AFP

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Suspected AQAP militants kill policeman and civilian in southeastern 25-05-2013 Yemen AFP Al-Rashad Party says Iran interferes in Yemeni affairs; accuse Iran of 27-05-2013 supporting southern separation BBC 28-05-2013 AQAP suspects killed in US drone strike in Hadhramawt BBC 30-05-2013 AQAP affiliated group siege army camp in Al-Bayda Governorate BBC 31-05-2013 Saleh blames GoY for power outrages that have hit Yemen AP 01-06-2013 Unidentified gunmen kill air force officer in Hadramawt; AQAP AFP suspected Member of YSP and adviser to Hadi attacks 'inherited corruption 04-06-2013 triangle' in Yemen BBC 05-06-2013 At least 8 killed in military offensive against AQAP in Hadramawt UPI Hadi warns that AQAP is trying to retake areas they previously 08-06-2013 controlled in southern Yemen AP 13 killed and 10 injured in clashes between Shiite protesters (demanding 09-06-2013 release of political detainees) and security forces AP 11-06-2013 GoY says attacks on power lines are cause of widespread electricity AP blackout Protests in Sana'a against 'excesses' by security forces; calls for 13-06-2013 overthrow of president and national security apparatus AP 13-06-2013 Tribesman blow up pipeline in Sarwah region AFP 19-06-2013 Suicide attack on market kills civilian in Sa'ada AFP Secessionists will call for end to all ties with northern Yemen on July 7, 06-07-2013 will close borders BBC Rallies in southern Yemen on anniversary of civil war to demand 07-07-2013 secession of south AFP 08-07-2013 Top Yemeni officer killed in Hadramawt AFP 12-07-2013 Houthis are in 'arrest campaign' in Sa'ada against its opponents BBC 13-07-2013 2 Soldiers killed in AQAP ambush in Marib province AP 25-07-2013 Tribesmen kidnap soldiers in order to press GoY to release arrested AFP relative 26-07-2013 Suspected AQAP militants kill former senior government official in AP Aden 01-08-2013 Obama applauds Hadi for government reforms and fighting terrorism AP 05-08-2013 AQAP gunmen kill military intelligence official in central Yemen AP 06-08-2013 4 suspected AQAP militants killed in US drone strike BBC 08-08-2013 Suspected US drone strike kills 3 AQAP militants AP 10-08-2013 Two AQAP suspects killed in US drone strike AFP

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AQAP gunmen shoot up gas terminal checkpoint; killing 5 soldiers in 11-08-2013 Shabwa province UPI 21-08-2013 Members of Southern Movement quit national dialogue BBC GoY issues apology to southern separatists and northern rebels for wars against them; seeks to encourage national dialogue and national 22-08-2013 reconciliation AFP 23-08-2013 Hadi says GoY asked US for drones as part of anti-terrorism cooperation AFP 23-08-2013 AQAP suicide attack kills 2 soldiers in Hadramawt AFP US military chief confirms Yemeni-US partnership against terrorism has 27-08-2013 achieved great successes BBC GoY issues formal apology for acts during 1994 civil war on behalf of 28-08-2013 former regimes UPI 30-08-2013 Senior AQAP leaders killed by US drone strikes UPI 31-08-2013 Intelligence officer killed in south Yemen by AQAP militants AFP Thousands protest in Aden to renew calls from independence; reject 01-09-2013 GoY's apology for 1994 civil war AFP 04-09-2013 National dialogue members stage sit-in against Huthi 'crimes´ in BBC Dammaj 06-09-2013 AQAP suspects kill Yemen intelligence officer in Hadramawt AFP 09-09-2013 SM factions return to participate in National Dialogue BBC Hadi issues decree reinstating 800 army officers in south who had been 11-09-2013 retired after 1994 civil war AFP Tribal clashes in north Yemen kill at least 60; clash about land dispute between two tribes. Intensified when Houthis backed one tribe and al- 13-09-2013 Ahmar tribe the other AP 15-09-2013 Oil pipeline in Marib province blown up AFP 17-09-2013 National dialogue agrees on federal state but disagree on regions BBC 18-09-2013 8 Police killed in ambush in south Yemen near gas terminal AFP 18-09-2013 Gunmen kill policemen in Aden ahead of planned protest AFP 20-09-2013 AQAP attacks kill at least 56 security forces in southern Yemen AFP Saleh criticizes southerners' push for greater autonomy and federalism; 21-09-2013 calls it treason AP 22-09-2013 Clashes between GoY and AQAP in Marib province AFP 22-09-2013 Clashes between Obeida-tribe and AQAP militants in Marib province AP 24-09-2013 AQAP militants kill military officer in Sana'a AP 30-09-2013 Gunmen kill police officer in Taez; probably AQAP militants AFP 30-09-2013 AQAP militants attack military base in Hadramawt AP

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Final proceedings of national dialogue started on 8th of October, but SM and Houthis have announced they will boycott the talks because of lack of consensus on recommendations regarding Southern issue and Houthi issue. 9-10-2013 Final proceedings likely to last at least another month IHS Suicide bomber targets southern separatists in Aden; no claim of 11-10-2013 responsibility AFP Yemen cities in darkness for over 2 weeks after continuous attacks on 12-10-2013 power lines; tribesman loyal to Saleh accused of the sabotage BBC 15-10-2013 Southern Yemenis stage secessionist rally in Aden BBC 15-10-2013 Police officer killed by suspected AQAP members in southeast Yemen AFP 18-10-2013 AQAP bombing kills soldiers at army headquarters in Abyan province AP Suspected AQAP militants kill security officer and his driver in southeast 19-10-2013 Yemen AP 30-10-2013 10 Islamists killed in attack by Houthis in Dammaj AFP 31-10-2013 Houthis and Salafi’s clash in Dammaj in northern Yemen AP Ceasefire between Houthis and Salafists after fighting killed more than 02-11-2013 100 in 3 days AP UN announces new ceasefire between Houthis and Sunni Islamists fighting in northern Yemen, allowing aid organizations to evacuate wounded. Fighting in recent week focused on city of Dammaj where there is a Sunni preacher school; Houthis accuse Salafi’s of trying to gain 04-11-2013 foothold in their territory and spread their school of Islam AFP 04-11-2013 Saboteurs blow up pipeline in Shabwa province; probably AQAP AFP militants 04-11-2013 4 killed in clashes between Houthis and Salafis, breaking ceasefire AP 05-11-2013 Truce between Houthis and Salafists in northern Yemen UPI 08-11-2013 Clashes between Salafists and Houthis in Dammaj AP 08-11-2013 Yemeni air force strikes kill 5 AQAP militants AFP 19-11-2013 US drone strike kills 3 AQAP suspects in Hadramawt province AFP Yemeni officials say country will adopt a 5-region federal system, even 21-11-2013 though some groups (SM/Houthis) oppose this BBC Houthi MP who represents Houthis at national dialogue assassinated in 22-11-2013 Sana'a AFP Coalition commission of National Dialogue Conference claims it has 01-12-2013 resolved all controversial points in the report through full consensus BBC 01-12-2013 Tribesmen blow up main oil pipeline near Sana'a BBC 02-12-2013 More than 120 Salafists killed in clashes with Houthis UPI Nine killed in clashes between GoY forces and AQAP militants in 02-12-2013 Hadramawt AFP

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12-12-2013 Civilians killed in drone attack in Radaa AFP 20-12-2013 Attackers blow up oil pipeline in Marib province AFP Clashes between Houthis and Islamists (supported by local tribes) kill 9 20-12-2013 in Kitaf area in Saada governorate AFP Thousands protest in Mukalla to protest killing of local tribal chief in 20-12-2013 clashes with Yemeni army (which took place on December 2) AFP 21-12-2013 Tribesmen kill 3 soldiers in Hadramawt AFP 2 policemen and civilian killed in Daleh in clash between police and 23-12-2013 southern secessionists AFP Clash between army and southern tribesmen (who are angry because of 30-12-2013 shelling that killed 8 people) claims 8 lives in southern Yemen AP Clash between GoY and tribesmen (who blocked access to damaged 03-01-2014 pipeline) kill 4 in Marib province AFP 04-01-2014 Clashes in north between Houthis and Salafists kill 17 AP Houthis and Hashid tribe clash in northern Yemen for third straight day, after Houthis attempted to take over towns of Wadi Khaywan and Usaimat. 08-01-2014 Launched attack in retaliation for Hashid tribe's support for Salafists AFP 08-01-2014 Houthis and Hashid tribe agree on ceasefire in northern Yemen AFP 13-01-2014 Houthis and Salafists reach ceasefire; Salafists will depart city of AP Dammaj Clashes between army and tribesman in southern Yemen; retaliation for 17-01-2014 shelling in December that killed 19 people at a funeral AP 19-01-2014 Police chief assassinated in Taiz; AQAP suspected AP Senior Houthi member killed on his way to attend reconciliation talks in 21-01-2014 Sana'a DPA 22-01-2014 Iran angered by attack on diplomat in Yemen UPI 22-01-2014 Clashes between Houthis and Hashid tribe kill 20 AFP 27-01-2014 Clashes between Houthis and Salafi’s kill at least 21 after truce falls AP apart 27-01-2014 Clashes between GoY and separatists during secessionist protest in Atal AFP 28-01-2014 Clashes between Houthis and Hashid tribe kill 13 AFP 31-01-2014 Tribesman attack power lines and blow up pipeline in Sana'a BBC governorate 01-02-2014 Clashes between Houthis and Hashid tribe kills dozens DPA 02-02-2014 Houthis seize key towns in northern Yemen from Hashid tribe and DPA Salafists New clashes between Houthis and Hashid tribe in Amran governorate 03-02-2014 after Houthis advance towards Al-Ahmar strongholds BBC 07-02-2014 Tribesmen kill 4 soldiers protecting oil pipeline in Hadramawt AP

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09-02-2014 Bomb kills Yemeni intelligence officer in Sana'a; AQAP suspect AFP Yemen will be divided into six federal states, Hadi decides. Houthis, SM 10-02-2014 and YSP want two federal states DPA Houthis slam federation plan as unfair as it 'divides Yemen into poor 11-02-2014 and wealthy regions' AFP 18-02-2014 Clashes in southern Yemen between army and separatists DPA 19-02-2014 AQAP militants kill ultraconservative Islamists in Hadramawt AP 23-02-2014 Security officer killed in south Yemen; gunmen unidentified AFP 26-02-2014 Intelligence chief killed in Hadramawt; attackers unknown AP 28-02-2014 Clashes between army and Houthis kill 7 in al-Jawf AP 02-03-2014 Army colonel ambushed in Sana'a; 2 tribesman killed in clashes with AP army 03-02-2014 AQAP fighters kill 8 security forces in 2 attacks AP 07-03-2014 Hadi appoints new interior- and oil ministers and new security chief DPA Hadi says economy is biggest challenge for Yemen; hails success of 09-03-2014 national dialogue BBC Thousands Houthis march in Sana'a demanding resignation of 'corrupt' 14-03-2014 central government AFP 15-03-2014 Clash between army and militants in southern Yemen BBC 17-03-2014 Hadi names new commander of special forces and new chief of staff AP 22-03-2014 Clashes in northwest Yemen between Houthis and army AP 24-03-2014 Militants kill 20 soldiers in Hadramawt in attack on checkpoint DPA 28-03-2014 Clashes between army and AQAP militants in southern Yemen AP 30-03-2014 Pro-government militamen killed in AQAP ambush in southern Yemen AFP

AQAP attacks army complex in southern Yemen, killing 6 soldiers and 2 02-04-2014 civilians AP Iran rejects Hadi's accusations that it is stoking unrest in Yemen; urges 02-04-2014 Hadi to track down killers of Iranian diplomat in Sana'a AFP Attack on military post in northern Yemen kill 5 soldiers; no one claims 04-04-2014 responsibility AP AQAP militants kill 4 soldiers in attack on special forces checkpoint in 08-04-2014 southeast Yemen AFP 10-04-2014 Saudi border guards killed in clashes near border; unknown attackers AP

Houthis attack army post near Sana'a, killing 3 soldiers, during their 10-04-2014 'advance' on Sana'a. Objective is to seize Amran AFP 15-04-2014 Deputy governor of Baida province killed by gunmen; probably AQAP DPA 20-04-2014 AQAP suspects killed in airstrike in southern Yemen DPA

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21-04-2014 Houthis set up new camps in Amran province north of Sana'a BBC 21-04-2014 Air strikes on AQAP bases kill 55 militants AFP 22-04-2014 Clashes between army and AQAP in Hadramawt province BBC 27-04-2014 Secession protests in Mukalla AFP 28-04-2014 Police arrests secessionists during protest in Mukalla BBC 04-05-2014 GoY claims it killed 37 AQAP fighters during southern offensive DPA

Saudi Arabia confirms its full support for Yemen to complete Gulf 05-05-2014 Initiative terms and achieve political and security stability BBC 07-05-2014 Gunmen attack oil pipeline in Marib province UPI 09-05-2014 Attack on presidential palace in Sana'a by AQAP gunmen; 5 guards AFP killed 10-05-2014 GoY army kills 7 alleged AQAP militants as part of major offensive AP 11-05-2014 Suicide attack on military police base in Mukalla by AQAP AFP 12-05-2014 US drone strike kills 6 AQAP militants in Marib province AP

Security forces on high alert over fears of terrorist attacks in Sana'a 19-05-2014 after 3 week offensive against AQAP in southern Yemen AP Yemen will cut fuel subsidies to meet requirements of IMF loan; will 20-05-2014 spike rise in commodity prices BBC Clashes between army and Houthis in Amran after Houthis attack army 20-05-2014 position AFP 21-05-2014 Thousands rally for southern independence in Aden AFP

Fuel subsidies likely to removed in stages; protests in major cities and 23-05-2014 expected rise in fuel subsidies IHS Yemeni minister pledged to fight Islamist radicals in Yemen; AQAP 24-05-2014 highest priority BBC 24-05-2014 Soldiers kill 15 AQAP militants in Sayoun, Hadramawt province AP

Houthis blow up house of Al-Islah official, claiming he was sheltering 25-05-2014 and importing foreign fighters into the region BBC Clashes between Houthis and Al-Islah affiliated tribesman backed by 30-05-2014 army units in Amran AP Clashes between army and Houthis in Amran for past few days have 31-05-2014 killed more than 200 BBC 02-06-2014 Clashes between Houthis and Salafists in Amran kill dozens AP 03-06-2014 Yemen warplanes strike Houthi positions in northern Yemen AFP 04-06-2014 Truce between Houthis and GoY after week of clashes in northern BBC Yemen 05-06-2014 AQAP gunmen kill 14 soldiers and a civilian in Shabwa province AFP

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05-06-2014 GoY says it has killed 5oo AQAP militants during 5-week offensive AFP 07-06-2014 AQAP attack on army checkpoint in Hadramawt province AFP 10-06-2014 Series of attacks on power lines in Sana'a and Marib; total blackout in AP Yemen Hadi sacks 6 ministers (oil, electricity, foreign, finance and information 11-06-2014 ministries) amid protests over blackouts in Sana'a and fuel shortages DPA/AP Protests against fuel shortages and electricity cuts have escalated in 12-06-2014 recent weeks IHS 15-06-2014 Clashes end truce between Yemeni army and Houthis AFP Fierce fighting between GoY troops and Houthis has forced mass 19-06-2014 exodus of humanitarian groups in northern Yemen DPA Clashes between Houthis and Islamist tribesman supported by the 20-06-2014 army kill 85 in one week AP 21-06-2014 Houthis seize town of Mitna near Sana'a DPA 22-06-2014 Houthis open 'new battlefronts' as they advance further near Sana'a BBC 22-06-2014 AQAP militants kill senior army officer in Sana'a AP 25-06-2014 Clashes between army and Houthis in Amran kill 13 civilians AFP 26-06-2014 AQAP launces wave of attacks in southern Yemen AP 30-06-2014 Fierce clashes between Houthis and army in Amran province BBC 04-07-2014 AQAP attacks military post near Saudi border AFP 06-07-2014 Clashes between Houthis and GoY-allied tribesman (Hashid) kill at least AP 40 08-07-2014 Houthis seize control of Amran, north of Sana'a AFP 12-07-2014 Tribesman blow up oil export pipeline in Marib AFP Hadi sacks 2 top military chiefs following sweeping advances by Houthis 13-07-2014 and surge in AQAP attacks BBC 16-07-2014 Clashes between Houthis and Islamist tribesman in northern Yemen kill AP 35 Houthis pull out of city of Amran, hand it over to GoY; military loss for 25-07-2014 Hashid tribesman who used to control the city before Houthi takeover AP 27-07-2014 AQAP carries out car bomb attacks on army posts in southern Yemen AFP 07-08-2014 Army clashes with AQAP militants in Hadramawt AP AQAP militants kill 15 soldiers after seizing them from a bus in 08-08-2014 retaliation to military offensive AP 09-08-2014 Tribal militants blow up oil pipeline in Marib province BBC AQAP militants and army clash in southeast Yemen after AQAP attacks 17-08-2014 special forces base DPA

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Thousands protest in Sana'a and other cities against end of fuel subsidies; answer to call from Houthis to rise up against the country's 18-08-2014 'corrupt' government AP Yemen seeks Oman mediation to intervene with Iran in order to stop the escalation of the Houthi group and its advance towards Sana'a; high 20-08-2014 level sources BBC Houthis refuse to stop their rallies and protests after rejecting draft proposal to stop their demonstrations in return for a new government 24-08-2014 and a review of Yemen's economic policies AP 27-08-2014 Tribesmen blow up major oil pipeline in Mareb province BBC UN backs GoY in their fight against Houthis; calls on Houthis to cease 29-08-2014 armed hostilities against GoY AFP 30-08-2014 Clashes between army and AQAP kill at least 17 in Hadramawt AP 01-09-2014 Houthi leader calls for civil disobedience against GoY BBC Presidential envoy travels to Houthi stronghold in effort to end standoff with the government after al-Houthi calls for civil disobedience. Latest 01-09-2014 bid to end the crisis AP Houthi supporters demanding reinstatement of fuel subsidies block 03-09-2014 major roadways in Sana'a AP 06-09-2014 Clashes between Houthis and Islamist tribesman kill 40 in al-Jawf AP province 07-09-2014 Houthis restore sit-in the army briefly broke up, blocking the highway AP again 4 anti-government Shia protesters killed as they attempt to storm 09-09-2014 government building in Sana'a UPI 25 killed in clashes between Sunni tribesman affiliated with Yemen's Muslim 15-09-2014 Brotherhood and Houthi rebels in Jawf AP At least 20 killed in clashes with army as Houthis take control over 17-09-2014 suburb of Sana'a UPI Houthis take over Sana'a, prime minister resigns. Immediately conduct ceasefire with GoY (Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA)); nominate PM within 3 days, form a technocrat government within a month, reduce fuel prices. Houthis refused to sign security extension that demand they hand over territory they seized in the last week, withdrawal of fighters from Sana'a and laying down their 21-09-2014 weapons. Houthis withdraw from government buildings AFP 25-09-2014 SM establishes military body to 'seize the southern governorates' BBC 25-09-2014 Houthis continue to storm the houses of political opponents in Sana'a BBC Houthis celebrate 'Friday of victory' after seizing key state installations 26-09-2014 in Sana'a without facing much resistance BBC Houthi spokesman says Gulf Initiative is terminated and that PNPA is the new political partnership based on national dialogue's outcomes in 26-09-2014 response to the peoples demands BBC

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26-09-2014 Yemen cuts fuel prices in line with PNPA BBC Iran welcomes the political agreement reached between protesters and 26-09-2014 the president in Yemen BBC Hadi urges Houthis to leave Sana'a, accusing them of breaching PNPA 26-09-2014 agreement AFP Houthis sign final part of PNPA; is expected to put an end to weeks of violence in the country. Under final agreement, Houthis must stop all 27-09-2014 acts of violence BBC 27-09-2014 Houthis clash with presidential guards, ignore demand to leave Sana'a AFP 09-10-2014 Suicide attack in Sana'a kills at least 10; blast targeted Houthi gathering DPA Houthis control crossing near Saudi border with backing from local 17-10-2014 authorities, try to expand territory DPA Houthis attack home of rival Islamist politician, starting clashes that kill 18-10-2014 at least 12 AP 18-10-2014 Houthis clash with Sunni tribesman in northern Yemen AFP 19-10-2014 Protestor killed after army attacks secessionist demonstration in Aden BBC 20-10-2014 JMP denounces Houthi expansion an its violence that undermines BBC PNPA 20-10-2014 At least 20 Houthis killed in clashes with AQAP militants in Rada AFP Clashes between Houthis and influential Qifa tribe in Radda kills at least 27-10-2014 250 in 3 days AP 29-10-2014 Houthis seize town of Radmaa after fierce clashes with local tribes DPA 01-11-2014 3 killed as Houthis attack headquarters of Al-Islah party in Ibb AFP UN warns of rising sectarian tensions in Yemen; urges political rivals to 02-11-2014 form new government AFP Saleh supporters rally in various cities against potential UN sanctions 07-11-2014 against Saleh DPA 08-11-2014 GPC (led by Saleh) and Houthis reject newly formed government AP Yemen swears in new government despite objections from ruling party 09-11-2014 and allied Houthis; call it unrepresentative AP Clashes between Houthis, tribesman and AQAP kill at least 20 after they 10-11-2014 Houthis try to take over AQAP stronghold in Radaa DPA 12-11-2014 Dozens killed in bomb attack on gathering of Houthis in Radaa AFP 18-11-2014 Car bombing kills senior Al-Islah member in Taez AFP 21-11-2014 AQAP warns Houthis to prepare themselves for 'horrors´ BBC SM set to form its own government; sets deadline for northern 25-11-2014 government employees and armed forces to leave the south BBC 26-11-2014 Tribesman blow up oil export pipeline in Marib province AFP

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Houthis and Sunni Islamists hold rare meeting to ease country's 28-11-2014 political deadlock and ease tensions between groups AP 28-11-2014 Houthis are advancing towards Aden as they seek to expand their AFP influence Thousands rally for southern independence in Aden; police breaks up 30-11-2014 gathering AP Bomb targeting Iranian ambassador kills 6; ambassador unharmed. 03-12-2014 AQAP expected to be responsible UPI 05-12-2014 Houthis seize military academy in Sana'a DPA 09-12-2014 AQAP suicide attack on army base kills 7 UPI 12-12-2014 AQAP attack kills 6 Houthis in Baida AFP 14-12-2014 Houthis take control over Arhab, near Sana'a DPA 14-12-2014 Houthis replace governor of Hodeida, replace him with Houthi loyalist AP Car bomb in Radaa kills dozens near a Houthi checkpoint; Houthis blame 16-12-2014 AQAP BBC 18-12-2014 Parliament approves new government AP Attack on Sunni tribal chief by Houthis sparks ambush in retaliation in 21-12-2014 Arhab AFP 22-12-2014 South Yemen protestor killed by police in Ataq AFP 23-12-2014 5 bombs hit Sana'a, killing 1 Houthi AFP 25-12-2014 Houthis abduct senior Yemeni intelligence officer in Sana'a AFP 12 people killed in clashes between Houthis and tribesmen north of Sana'a; Houthis wanted to search home of tribal chief they suspected of 28-12-2014 being allied with Al-Islah party AP 31-12-2014 Suicide attack targeting Houthis in Ibb kills dozens DPA 07-01-2015 Houthis launch arrest campaign against activists in Arhab BBC Thousands protest against Houthi presence and demand resignation of 10-01-2015 president Hadi AP 17-01-2015 Head of presidential office in Sana'a, Ahmed bin Mubarak, kidnapped DPA Governor of Shabwa province warns that oil companies will turn of taps 18-01-2015 unless Houthis free Ahmed bin Munarak (who originates from Shabwa) AFP 19-01-2015 Arab League calls on all political factions in Yemen to stop fighting AFP Ceasefire takes effect in Sana'a, ending hours of fighting between 19-01-2015 Houthis and army troops near presidential palace AFP Houthis seize prime minister’s residence in Sana'a; Hadi calls for crisis 20-01-2015 meeting DPA 20-01-2015 Houthis shell Hadi's home and take over presidential palace in Sana'a AP 20-01-2015 AQAP ambush in Hadramawt kills 5 soldiers AFP

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Hadi reaches peace deal with Houthis; will give Houthis greater political role. New constitution will be amended to include fair representation for diverse groups; Houthis will withdraw from Sana'a in 21-01-2015 return UPI 21-01-2015 Presidential aides claim Houthis hold Hadi captive in his house AP Aden airport shut in protest against Houthi attacks on Hadi and other 21-01-2015 state figures AFP 21-01-2015 Houthis allow prime minister Bahah to leave his house after two-day AFP siege Saleh calls for early elections to bring country out of crisis in letter send 21-01-2015 to Hadi in December AFP 22-01- 2015 Government resigns after standoff with Houthis DPA Nasir al-Nubah, founder of al-Hirak, announces independence of south 22-01-2015 Yemen BBC Hadi says Yemen is in total deadlock in his resignation letter; speaker of 22-01-2015 parliament rejects Hadi's resignation AFP Four provinces of the former South Yemen say they will defy all military 22-01-2015 orders coming from Sana'a after Hadi resigns AFP

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Appendix 5 – Events during the 2015 Yemeni Civil War

Events 2015 Yemeni Civil War (23-01-2015 - 05-12-2017) *Many attacks, airstrikes and clashes have taken place during this period; they will not all be mentioned. Only the attacks that came up using the search terms will be mentioned in the list. The list is thus not complete. Date Event Source 24-01-2015 Southern separatists seize police checkpoints in Ataq AFP 20-01-2015 Houthis take over military base south of Sana'a AP 31-01-2015 Hadi refuses to reconsider resignation despite pressure by Houthis AP Houthis give political forces three day ultimatum to fill power vacuum that came into place after Hadi's resignation; otherwise the 01-02-2015 Houthis will take over power themselves AP Main political parties suspend UN-brokered talks with Houthis; talks 02-02-2015 centered on finding framework for national consensus AP Houthis announce an interim constitution; tightening their hold on power. Parliament dissolved and Houthis are taking over country. Houthis to form 551-member national council and 5-member 06-02-2015 presidential council for two-year interim period DPA/AP/AFP Houthis meet with political rivals for first time since their power 09-02-2015 takeover AP 15-02-2015 Central bank Yemen: economic/monetary situation under control BBC 20-02-2015 Yemen political parties getting closer to political deal to end crisis; UN AFP Hadi escapes house arrest in Sana'a; flees to Aden. Says all decisions 21-02-2015 made by Houthis since September are null and illegitimate AFP Oil revenues Yemen suffered 37% drop in 2014 due to sabotage of 21-02-2015 pipelines and drop in crude oil prices AFP Hadi says he is still legitimate president of Yemen and is now ruling 22-02-2015 from the south; withdraws resignation and challenges Houthis AP 24-02-2015 UN extends sanctions on Saleh and 2 Houthi leaders

Houthis say Hadi is 'wanted for justice' for his actions that harmed the 24-02-2015 Yemeni people AP Abdelmalik al-Houthi accuses Saudi Arabia and other international 26-02-2015 powers of pushing for a division of Yemen along sectarian lines AP

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02-03-2015 US drone attack kills 3 AQAP militants in Shabwa AFP 08-03-2015 Defense minister flees to Aden to join Hadi AP 10-03-2015 Protesters demand return of Saleh's son; urge him to run for presidency AP 16-03-2015 Houthis release prime minister and cabinet members from house arrest AP 20-03-2015 Dozens killed in attack on mosques, frequented by Houthis, in Sana'a DPA Clashes in south Yemen between the army and separatists and AQAP 20-03-2015 militants kill 29 AFP 22-03-2015 Houthis overrun strategic city Taiz (north of Aden) ahead of UN DPA meeting Houthis send reinforcements to the south, where they have clashed 23-03-2015 with local Sunni tribes and separatists as they approached Aden AFP Hadi flees by sea as Houthis advance on Aden; Saudi-led coalition 26-03-2015 begins airstrikes against Houthis in Yemen; operation 'Decisive Storm' AP 26-03-2015 Calls for southern independence fueled by Yemen's conflict AP 26-03-2015 Saudi US ambassador claims Iran is advising Houthi rebels AP Abdulmalik al-Houthi slams Saudi-led intervention as unjustified. 26-03-2015 Accuses Saudi Arabia of killing civilians AFP Hezbollah leader slams Saudi intervention in Yemen; claims that only reason Saudi Arabia is involved in the war is to restore its control and 27-03-2015 hegemony over Yemen; calls for political solution to conflict AP 28-03-2015 Intense bombing on Sana'a AFP At least 40 people killed in airstrike on refugee camp; conflicting stories on who is accountable. Yemeni minister accuses Houthis, Doctors 31-03-2015 Without Borders spokesman says it was coalition-led airstrike UPI 01-04-2015 Saudi-led coalition pounds rebels in Aden AFP At least 37 civilians killed in bombing of dairy; either Houthis or 01-04-2015 coalition responsible AFP Dozens killed in clashes between Houthis and army (backed by 06-04-2015 militiamen) in southern Yemen AFP Houthis capture Ataq in Shabwa province despite coalition bombings; 09-04-2015 oil-rich city DPA Houthis clash with Hadi-loyalists in Mareb province; key oil-producing 12-04-2015 area. Try to capture the province DPA 14-04-2015 Tribesmen capture Yemen's only gas export terminal in Aden AFP 16-04-2015 AQAP captures major port and oil terminal in southern Yemen AP 18-04-2015 Iran army commander says Iran has no military presence in Yemen BBC 18-04-2015 Militiamen loyal to Hadi besiege air base captured by Houthis AP 19-04-2015 GPC welcomes UN resolution calling for a cease-fire AP 20-04-2015 Coalition airstrikes on missile depot in Sana'a kills 28; many civilians AFP

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Saudi Arabia ceases bombing campaign 'Decisive Storm' in Yemenl new campaign called 'Restore Hope' which focuses on political solution in 21-04-2015 Yemen UPI UN chief Ban Ki-moon calls for quick end to fighting in Yemen and 22-04-2015 resumption of UN-lead peace talks AP 22-04-2015 7 AQAP suspects killed in US drone strike in southern Yemen AFP New division of Islamic State, called 'Green Brigade', claims bombing 23-04-2015 on Houthis that killed 5 AFP Aden hit by coalition airstrikes, street battles in the city as Houthis try to gain foothold in various districts. Many Houthis and pro-Saleh 25-04-2015 forces killed by strikes AP 28-04-2015 Houthis advance in heart of Aden; heavy fighting kills at least 20 AFP Iran Deputy Foreign Minister says Iran will not let Yemen 'be besieged'; will continue to support 'oppressed' nation of Yemen and send humanitarian aid. Supports negotiations between opposing factions in 05-05-2015 Yemen BBC Arab coalition carries out airstrikes on Houthis in Sa'ada province; first 08-05-2015 time it is attacking entire Houthi leadership UPI Thousands protest in Sana'a to denounce Saudi Arabia's deadly aggression against their country. Slogans against Saudi Arabia, the US 09-05-2015 and Israeli regime BBC Houthis agree to temporary humanitarian truce proposed by Saudi 10-05-2015 Arabia; 5-day cease-fire DPA Iran human rights official slams Saudi aggression on Yemen; says it is 11-05-2015 war against whole humanity and innocent people BBC 12-05-2015 Five-day humanitarian cease-fire begins AP At least 69 dead after coalition warplanes hit arms depot in Sana'a; 12-05-2015 most victims civilians AFP Shelling reported in central and southern Yemen after start ceasefire; 13-05-2015 Houthi rebels and allies started shelling DPA 14-05-2015 UN envoy urges warring parties to respect the humanitarian ceasefire AFP Fighting continues in several provinces on 4th day of ceasefire; each 16-05-2015 side blames the other for breaking truce AP 17-05-2015 Ceasefire ends with no word on extension; UN calls for this AFP 17-05-2015 Coalition airstrikes resume on Aden AFP 21-05-2015 Houthis attack Saudi border post DPA Fresh air strikes in southern Yemen; pro-government tribesmen 21-05-2015 advance on Houthi strongholds in the North AFP Houthis intensify attacks in Taiz in attempt to secure the area; civilians 24-05-2015 killed (either by coalition airstrikes or street battles) DPA 26-05-2015 Oxfam warns 16 million Yemenis have no access to clean water DPA

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At least 30 killed as coalition airstrikes hit Yemen security forces loyal 27-05-2015 to Saleh DPA Houthis kill Sana'a governor in clashes that erupted during attempt to 29-05-2015 detain him AFP 02-06-2015 Coalition pounds Houthis strongholds across the country BBC 04-06-2015 Heavy airstrikes hit Houthis near Aden AP 05-06-2015 Pro-Hadi fighters cut off key rebel supply route in eastern Yemen DPA At least 44 killed during coalition airstrike on army headquarters in 7-6-15 Sana'a; many civilians killed DPA 10-06-2015 Iran deputy foreign minister urges UN to end war in Yemen BBC 11-06-2015 Coalition airstrikes kills 20 civilians after hitting public bus AP 13-06-2015 10 civilians killed in coalition strikes on residences of relatives of Saleh DPA Yemeni political groups delegation, including Houthis, leave for Geneva 14-06-2015 for UN peace talks AP 16-06-2015 AQAP leader killed in US drone strike DPA 17-06-2015 Iran diplomat says attacks on defenseless people of Yemen need to stop BBC Warring factions try to gain ground advances before accepting humanitarian pause proposed by UN during deadlocked negotiations in 19-06-2015 Geneva AFP 19-06-2015 No agreement reached in Geneva, ceasefire possible: UN AFP 24-06-2015 UN warns of famine in Yemen AP 25-06-2015 Houthis kill 3 Saudi soldiers in border attack AP 25-06-2015 Coalition airstrikes and Houthi shelling kill 9 civilians AP 04-07-2015 Iran says it has no military advisor in Yemen BBC 06-07-2015 Airstrike hits market north of Aden, killing more than 45 civilians AP 07-07-2015 Islamic State claims bomb attack on Shiite mosque in Sana'a AFP 08-07-2015 At least 30 soldiers killed as they tried to defect to Houthi rebels UPI GoY spokesman says a truce would hold if guarantees are in place to make Houthis withdraw from major cities; Houthis have rejected these 08-07-2015 demands DPA 09-07-2015 New AQAP leader calls for attacks on US DPA Arab coalition spokesman says coalition is not bound by new truce 11-07-2015 deal; coalition strikes Houthis after UN truce begins AFP 11-07-2015 US drone strikes kill 10 AQAP suspects AFP 12-07-2015 Coalition airstrikes continue despite truce AP 15-07-2015 Aden airport retaken from Houthis by pro-Hadi forces UPI

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Some government officials return to Aden after pro-Hadi militiamen 16-07-2015 retake most of Aden DPA 22-07-2015 Exiled government reopens Aden airport DPA 23-07-2015 Saudi-backed troops and pro-Hadi militiamen seize full control of Aden AP

Coalition suspends airstrikes to allow aid deliveries; Houthis say they 27-07-2015 have not been consulted about unilateral ceasefire AFP 28-07-2015 UN says civilian death toll since start of civil war has risen to nearly AP 1900 28-07-2015 Pro-Hadi militiamen besiege military base held by Houthis AP 28-07-2015 Humanitarian truce shatters after coalition resumes air strikes AFP 30-07-2016 AQAP kills 6 captured Houthis north of Aden AP 31-07-2015 AQAP car bombs at military base kill 6 soldiers in Hadramawt AP 05-08-2015 Pro-government troops retake most of Lahj province from Houthis AP 06-08-2015 AQAP exploits chaos in Yemen to capture 3 towns near Aden AP 09-08-2015 Pro-government fighters recapture Zinjibar in southern Yemen AP 13-08-2015 Houthi shelling kills 6 civilians in Taiz AP 15-08-2015 Pro-government fighters claim recapture of Ataq from Houthis DPA 17-08-2015 Two Saudi border guards killed by Houthis AFP

Houthis attack pro-government forces after weeks of retreating and 19-08-2015 losing cities AP 20-08-2015 Coalition airstrike kills 17 civilians, among which 4 children AFP

Hadi calls for 15-day ceasefire and withdrawal of Houthis from 21-08-2015 government institutions and military bases in all cities and provinces AP 22-08-2015 AQAP seizes key neighborhoods in Aden AP 22-08-2015 Fighting and air strikes in Taiz kill at least 80; mostly civilians AFP 25-08-2015 At least 40 killed in coalition airstrikes in Baida province; 6 civilians AFP

Hadi says his forces are fighting the Houthis to stop Iranian expansion 29-08-2015 in the region; this is what the war is based on AFP 30-08-2015 Coalition airstrike on factory in northern Yemen kills 31; 17 civilians AFP Houthis to form cabinet in 10 days as talks with GoY hit impasse in 01-09-2015 Oman AP 01-09-2015 Coalition airstrikes on south Yemen kill 20 AFP

Islamic State claims bombings on Shiite mosque in Sana'a which killed 03-09-2015 at least 32 AFP Coalition airstrikes on Houthi encampment in Sana'a also hit school, 06-09-2015 restaurant and embassies. 17 wounded AP

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Qatar deploys 1000 ground troops for first time to fight Houthis in oil- 07-09-2015 rich Marib province AP 10-09-2015 US drone strike kills 4 AQAP suspects in Hadramawt province AFP 11-09-2015 Houthi rockets hit market in Marib, 20 civilians killed AFP 12-09-2015 Houthis intensify attacks in Taiz against pro-GoY forces AP 13-09-2015 Hadi refuses to participate in peace talks with Houthis DPA

Pro-GoY forces launch major ground offensive against Houthis east of 13-09-2015 Sana'a AFP 15-09-2015 Houthis capture two neighborhoods in Taiz AP

GoY cabinet returns to Aden after months of self-imposed exile in Saudi 16-09-2015 Arabia; work from Aden to restore security and stability in the country AP 18-09-2015 Coalition airstrike kills at least 14 pro-GoY troops 'by mistake' AFP 19-09-2015 Coalition airstrike in Sana'a kills 29, including civilians AP 21-09-2015 Coalition airstrikes kill 15 civilians, members of 1 family, in Sana'a AP 22-09-2015 Hadi arrives in Aden AP 22-09-2015 US drone strike kills 2 AQAP suspects in Marib AFP 24-09-2015 Islamic State claims bombing targeting Shiites in Sana'a; killed at least AFP 25 28-09-2015 Coalition airstrikes kill 76 in village in western Yemen DPA Coalition airstrikes kill 31 civilians at wedding in Mokha, southwest 28-09-2015 Yemen AFP 30-09-2015 Coalition claims it seized Iranian arms boat destined for Yemen DPA 02-10-2015 Yemen cuts diplomatic ties with Iran BBC At least 55 killed in battles in Marib province between Houthis and 05-10-2015 GoY-forces/ Saudi led coalition AP Houthis and their allies agree to UN peace plan which demands that Houthis withdraw from areas under their control and hand over their weapons (resolution 2216); GoY has repeatedly refused to participate in 07-10-2015 peace talks unless the Houthis would accept the resolution DPA 07-10-2015 Suicide bombing in Sana'a kills 7; no claim of responsibility AFP Pro-GoY forces retake seaside town of Dhubab; cutting of Houthi 09-10-2015 supply lines to Taiz AP 09-10-2015 Coalition warplanes raid Houthi positions in Marib province AFP Iran calls on Saudi Arabia to reconsider its approach in Yemen; denies 14-10-2015 Saudi accusations that Iran is meddling in Yemen's internal affairs BBC 16-10-2015 AQAP suspects kill 3 Yemeni soldiers in ambush in Hadramawt AFP Hundreds Sudanese troops arrive in Aden as reinforcement for Saudi 17-10-2015 led coalition fighting Houthi rebels AP

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Coalition raids 'mistakenly' hit position of pro-GoY forces, killing at least 17-10-2015 40 AFP 21-10-2015 Houthi shelling kills at least 17 civilians in Taiz AP 03-11-2015 Fighting in Taiz between Houthis and opponents have killed at least 33 AP Guards clash with militiamen providing security at presidential palace 03-11-2015 in Aden in dispute over unpaid wages AFP 05-11-2015 11 civilians killed in indiscriminate bombing by Houthis in Taiz AFP 08-11-2015 Bomb kills 16 pro-GoY soldiers in Sana'a DPA Hundreds Sudanese troops arrive in Aden as reinforcement for Saudi- 09-11-2015 led coalition fighting Houthi rebels AP GoY says coalition airstrikes have killed 40 Houthis and their allies in 16-11-2015 Ibb province AP 17-11-2015 Ambush by Houthis kill 44 anti-rebel fighters in Mocha AP 17-11-2015 UN says more than 500.000 children threatened by malnutrition AFP Iran deputy foreign minister urges resumption of national dialogue in 18-11-2015 Yemen; Iran willing to help doing this. Calls for end of Saudi-led strikes BBC Islamic State claims responsibility for attacks on army positions in 20-11-2015 which more than 50 troops were killed AFP 25-11-2015 Fighting in Dabad kills 47 people, including 2 civilians AP Human Rights Watch alleges that at least 10 strikes carried out by 27-11-2015 Saudi-led coalition broke the laws of war and killed civilians AFP 02-12-2015 AQAP seizes strategic town Jaar from pro-GoY forces in Hadramawt AFP

AQAP offers bounty for head of commander of Popular Resistance (is 04-12-2015 alliance of Sunni Islamists, GoY loyalist soldiers and secessionists) AFP 06-12-2015 Aden governor killed in car bombing AFP 07-12-2015 UN says warring parties have agreed to peace talks in Geneva AP 08-12-2015 Battle in port city of Mokha kills 35 AP

Hadi and Houthis agree on weeklong ceasefire in order to deliver 12-12-2015 humanitarian aid AP 15-12-2015 Ceasefire starts DPA 18-12-2015 Ceasefire falls after army retakes control of Hazm in northern Yemen DPA 19-12-2015 Fighting in northern Yemen kills at least 75 AP 23-12-20125 US drone strike kills 4 AQAP suspects in central Yemen AFP 26-12-2015 Fighting in Taiz kills at least 8 civilians AP 01-01-2016 GoY-loyalists kill senior AQAP leader in Abyan province AP

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Saudi Arabia ends truce in Yemen; had already been repeatedly 02-01-2016 breached since start of truce mid-December DPA UN says civilian death toll from 9 months of fighting has reached nearly 05-01-2016 2800 AP Coalition intensifies airstrikes on Sana'a as Houthis fire back and 06-01-2016 launch rockets into Saudi Arabia AP 11-01-2016 Islamic State militants kill senior security officer in Aden AP 13-01-2016 2 policemen killed by gunmen in Aden AFP 17-01-2016 2 security officials killed in separate attacks in Yemen DPA 17-01-2016 Suicide car bombing in Aden kills 10, mostly civilians. AFP 20-01-2016 US drone strike kills 2 AQAP suspects in Hadramawt province AFP 22-01-2016 22 killed in airstrikes on Sana'a; 26 in Dahyan AP

Gunmen kill police colonel and 4 others in Aden in wave of attacks on 24-01-2016 security forces AFP 30-01-2016 Coalition airstrikes kill at least 32 in Sana'a; at least 8 civilians AP 01-02-2016 AQAP seizes another town, Azzan, in southern Yemen AP 02-02-2016 Intense fighting outside Sana'a, killing at least 40, among which AP civilians 03-02-2016 3 AQAP militants killed in clashes with pro-GoY forces in southern AFP Yemen 04-02-2016 US drone strike kills 6 AQAP militants, among which AQAP leader AFP 06-02-2016 AQAP attacks government facilities in Zinjibar after leader is killed DPA

AQAP militants battle each other in Zinjibar; appears to be internal 08-02-2016 power struggle after senior militant was killed AFP 10-02-2016 Family of 5 killed in coalition airstrike in Sana'a AFP 15-02-2016 UN warns of famine in Taiz (city besieged by Houthis) AP 15-02-2016 US drone attack kills 3 in AQAP controlled area; 3 killed, details AFP unknown 17-02-2016 Islamic State suicide bomber strikes army camp near Aden, 9 killed AP

Saudi foreign minister says the Saudi-led intervention will continue 18-02-2016 until the country's legitimate government is restored to power AFP 24-02-2016 GoY accuses Hezbollah of supporting the Houthis DPA 26-02-2016 Senior intelligence officer killed by gunmen in Aden AFP

Around 25 civilians killed when coalition airstrike hits market in Nahm, 27-02-2016 northern Yemen DPA Suicide car bombing in Aden kills 4 during gathering of loyalist forces in 29-02-2016 Aden AFP

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04-03-2016 16 civilians killed during attack on nursing home in Aden DPA 05-03-2016 Police commander killed in Aden in attack by Islamic militants AP Clashes in Taiz between Houthis and local fighters kill 45 fighters and 6 11-03-2016 civilians AP 12-03-2016 GoY forces clash with Islamists (AQAP and IS) in Aden, 22 killed AP Coalition airstrike hits market in Mastaba, at least 65 civilians killed. No 15-03-2016 military targets nearby according to witnesses (new count: 119 killed) AP UN says none of the warring parties in Yemen are protecting civilians 16-03-2016 or facilitating humanitarian assistance AP 20-03-2016 35 fighters killed in clashes between Houthis and GoY forces in Taiz AP Houthis and GoY have agreed to begin a ceasefire before the next round 20-03-2016 of negotiations, taking place in April AP 24-03-2016 US air strike on AQAP training camp kills more than 70 militants AFP At least 22 killed in Aden in 3 separate attacks by Islamic State; many 25-03-2016 civilians killed DPA Hadi sacks vice-president and head of cabinet; reason is shortcomings in government's performance. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar becomes vice 03-04-2016 president, Ahmed Obaid bin Daghr head of cabinet AP 03-04-2016 Houthi rocket attack on hospital kills 3 civilians AFP 04-04-2016 Houthi delegation in Riyadh for talks about political solution to war AFP 05-04-2016 Former vice-president Khaled Bahah rejects his sacking; calls move AP 'coup' 08-04-2016 Clashes between loyalists and Houthis in Marib kill at least 12 AFP 09-04-2016 AQAP militants kill 19 GoY soldiers in southern Yemen DPA 10-04-2016 Ceasefire takes hold in Yemen DPA 10-04-2016 Houthis accused of breaking ceasefire in Taiz BBC Arab coalition says it will respect the ceasefire at demand of Hadi; will 10-04-2016 react to any rebel attacks AFP 11-04-2016 Ceasefire marred by fighting between Houthis and coalition fighters UPI 12-04-2016 Fighting between Houthis and loyalists in several locations AFP 13-04-2016 Coalition targets AQAP militants in southern Yemen, at least 10 killed DPA 16-04-2016 Committees monitoring the ceasefire begin to work AP 17-04-2016 Mass protests in Taiz protesting the months-long siege of the city DPA 18-04-2016 Peace talks in Kuwait delayed by absence of Houthi representatives UPI Houthis agree to join peace talks in Kuwait; didn't show up at first since they demanded end of airstrikes carried out by coalition forces, 20-04-2016 breaking ceasefire UPI 21-04-2016 Peace talks in Kuwait start AFP

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23-04-2016 Yemeni forces start campaign to retake Zinjibar from AQAP DPA 24-04-2016 7 AQAP suspects killed in coalition airstrikes in Mukalla DPA GoY troops, backed by the UAE, retake Mukalla, kill more than 800 25-04-2016 AQAP fighters UPI 26-04-2016 US drone strike kills 3 AQAP leaders in Zinjibar AP Thousands march in Taiz to call for ceasefire; hundreds march in 29-04-2016 Zinjibar to demand withdrawal of AQAP forces AP GoY suspends participation in peace talks after cease-fire violations by 02-05-2016 Houthis (with regard to takeover of military base in Amran province) UPI 04-05-2016 Peacetalks in Kuwait resumed DPA AQAP withdraws from 2 coastal cities after tribal-led negotiations (Jaar 05-05-2016 and Zinjibar) AP Market bombing in Marib kills 3 soldiers and 3 civilians; unknown who 06-05-2016 is responsible AFP 07-05-2016 Army colonel killed in Aden AFP 09-05-2016 Coalition air strike hits military base held by Houthis, killing at least 11 AFP IS claims responsibility for suicide bombing in Mukalla, killing at least 12-05-2016 15 GoY soldiers UPI Kuwait peace talks suspended after weeks of no progress; Houthis 17-05-2016 refuse to accept legitimacy of internationally-recognized president Hadi AP At least 20 killed in suicide bombing in Aden; target was young man 23-05-2016 lining up to enlist in the Yemeni army; probably AQAP or IS AFP 25-05-2016 At least 4 family members killed in coalition airstrike in Lahj DPA 26-05-2016 UN says Kuwait peace talks are resumed AP Saudi-led coalition says it respects international humanitarian law; 26-05-2016 denies accusations by various human rights groups AFP Clashes in southern Yemen between GoY forces and Houthis kill 39 29-05-2016 after Houthis attack government positions AFP Houthis retake ground from GoY forces in 2 provinces (Marib & 02-06-2016 Shabwa), killing at least 85 on both sides AP At least 9 civilians killed in shelling in Taiz (shelling either by Houthis 03-06-2016 or GoY forces) DPA 06-06-2016 Jihadists attack Aden airport; 1 civilian killed AFP 13-06-2016 US drone strike kills 3 AQAP suspects in Shabwa province AP Parties struggling to make peace deal in Kuwat amid mutual mistrust; 16-06-2016 foreign minister accuses Houthis of continuing to reject peace AFP 17-06-2016 US airstrike kills 6 AQAP militants in central Yemen AFP Clashes between Houthis and Saudi-led coalition intensify as Kuwait 21-06-2016 peace talks are stalled BBC

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21-06-2016 Coalition airstrike mistakenly kills 8 civilians AP UN: Yemen is facing severe food shortages, 7 million people in 21-06-2016 'emergency situation' AFP AQAP returns to Jaar and Zinjibar, captures cities without encountering 23-06-2016 resistance from GoY troops DPA 24-06-2016 Renewed clashes across Yemen kill 33 AFP 27-06-2016 Islamic State attack in Mukalla kills 35 GoY soldiers AFP 28-06-2016 Coalition airstrike kills 25 people (10 civilians) in Taiz AP 2 week break in Kuwait peace talks after flare-up of violence across 29-06-2016 Yemen kills 80 people, almost half of them civilians AFP 04-07-2016 US drone strike kills 3 AQAP suspects in Shabwa province AFP Human Rights Watch says coalition airstrikes have led to destruction of many factories and businesses, death of many civilians and increased unemployment in Yemen. Says 10 strikes have been unlawful; meaning there were no military targets in the vicinity of the strikes. These strikes can be seen as war crimes. HRW says that there are concerns the coalition has deliberately sought to inflict widespread damage to 11-07-2016 Yemen's production capacity AP Fighting kills at least 44 people in 24 hours as coalition forces clash 13-07-2016 with Houthi rebels in western Yemen AFP Government officials say peace talks will not resume unless Houthis acknowledge legitimacy of Hadi's government. GoY delegation will not 15-07-2016 meet Houthis, who have travelled to Kuwait for second phase of talks AP GoY resumes talks in Kuwait with Houthis, despite earlier threats to 17-07-2016 boycott the talks AP 18-07-2016 Car bomb kills at least 9 in Mukalla; no group claims attacks AP 20-07-2016 Suicide bomber kills 4 soldiers in Aden AP 23-07-2016 Coalition airstrikes hit AQAP positions in Yemen, killing several AFP militants 5 Saudi border guards killed in clashes along border; attackers not 25-07-2016 identified AP Five days of fighting near Saudi border kills at least 48 Houthis and 34 25-07-2016 GoY forces AFP 27-07-2016 Market bomb in Marib kills 7 people AFP Houthis set up a council to rule Yemen despite UN talks in Kuwait. GPC & Houthis form 10-member higher political council to be in charge of 28-07-2016 Yemen's affairs DPA 30-07-2016 GoY withdraws from Kuwait peace talks AP 31-07-2016 Houthi attack at Saudi border kills 7 Saudi guards AP GoY accepts UN proposed peace agreement to end conflict; no word 31-07-2016 from Houthis; the 'Kuwait Agreement' AFP

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01-08-2016 GoY leaves Kuwait talks after agreeing to UN peace draft DPA 02-08-2016 2 suicide attacks in southern Yemen kill 5 soldiers; AQAP responsible DPA 06-08-2016 US airstrike kills 3 AQAP members in central Yemen DPA Minister says that peace talks in Kuwait ends without headway; blames 06-08-2016 'intransigence' of Houthis DPA 07-08-2016 Coalition strikes hit Sa'ada province after end of peace talks DPA 09-08-2016 At least 14 civilians killed in coalition airstrike on food factory in Sana'a DPA 13-08-2016 Hundreds' of Houthis join the national army BBC 13-08-2016 Coalition airstrike on school in Sa'ada kills 10 children AP 14-08-2016 Army recaptures southern town Zinjibar from AQAP DPA Coalition airstrikes on Doctors Without Borders hospital in Hajja 15-08-2016 province kill 14 AFP 16-08-2016 Houthis condemn hospital airstrike AP 17-08-2016 UN chief Ban Ki-moon calls for an immediate cease of all hostilities AFP Hundreds of thousands march in Sana'a in support of the Houthis and 20-08-2016 Saleh AP 24-08-2016 US drone strike kills 5 AQAP suspects AP 26-08-2016 Iran denies delivering weapons to Houthis DPA 29-08-2016 Suicide attack targeting army recruits in Aden kills 18 DPA 31-08-2016 At least 16 civilians killed in coalition airstrike in Sahan, Sa'ada province DPA 02-09-2016 Houthis say coalition airstrike kills 9 civilians in Sa'ada province AFP 05-09-2016 US drone strike kills 7 suspected AQAP members AFP 05-09-2016 Clashes between GoY troops and Houthis in oil-rich Sarwah kill 26 AFP UN calls upon all warring parties to halt military activities and abide by 08-09-2016 the term of a Cessation of Hostilities, agreed upon in April AP 08-09-2016 Coalition raid kills 8 civilians in Amran AFP 11-09-2016 AQAP suicide attack kills 6 soldiers in Abyan province DPA 12-09-2016 Airstrikes in Sa'ada province kill 30 civilians DPA 14-09-2016 US drone strike kills 5 AQAP suspects in Rada (Baida province) AFP Hadi moves the Yemeni Central Bank from Sana'a to Aden in order to put pressure on Houthis and deprive them of money. Move will likely cause further economic deterioration in the north, where government employees have not been paid in months and there are water, fuel, food 18-09-2016 and electricity shortages AFP 22-09-2016 Coalition airstrikes in Red Sea port city kill 32 civilians AP 24-09-2016 UN says 180 civilians have been killed in 1 month AP

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25-09-2016 Coalition airstrike kills 9 members of same family in Ibb AFP Houthi leader proposed rebels to stop attacks along Yemen's border in 26-09-2016 exchange for cease of airstrikes UPI 28-09-2016 US drone strikes kill 4 AQAP member AFP 29-09-2016 Coalition airstrikes kill 8 civilians in Sa'ada province AFP 30-09-2016 Senior intelligence officer assassinated in Aden; IS claims responsibility AP 04-10-2016 10 civilians killed in rocket attack in Taiz AP Houthis form 'National Salvation' government to rival Hadi's 04-10-2016 administration AFP Clashes between Houthis and GoY-loyalists kill 7 during fight for 06-10-2016 control of area in in Lahj province AFP Airstrikes on funeral hall in Sana'a kill civilians; believed to be coalition 08-10-2016 strikes DPA Iran condemns Saudi-led airstrikes in Yemen and calls for talks with all 08-10-2016 Yemeni groups to end the war BBC 08-10-2016 Coalition air raids in Sana'a kill dozens of people AFP Iranian minister condemns air strikes on Yemen; describes Saudi 09-10-2016 leaders as 'war criminals' BBC 12-10-2016 GoY loyalists advance into Shia rebel heartland in the Sa'ada province AFP Coalition says 'misinformation' led to attack on Yemen funeral on 8th 15-10-2016 of October, killing 140 civilians UPI 18-10-2016 US drone attack kills 8 AQAP suspects in Shabwa province AFP UN brokered ceasefire takes effect; sixth ceasefire attempt since start of 19-10-2016 civil war AFP Houthis accused of breaking ceasefire; Houthis accuse coalition of 21-10-2016 carrying out airstrike which killed 3 civilians DPA 22-10-2016 UN envoy calls for extension of 72-hour ceasefire AFP 23-10-2016 Coalition launches series of airstrikes around Sana'a after ceasefire AP ends 25-10-2016 Hundreds protest in Sana'a against UN 'complicity' in conflict AFP 26-10-2016 US airstrike kills 6 AQAP militants AFP 30-10-2016 Coalition airstrikes on Houthi-held prison in Hudaydah kill at least 60 DPA 01-11-2016 Houthis say UN envoy is biased towards the Saudi-led coalition BBC Saleh positive about UN peace plan for Yemen; says its good foundation for negotiations. Some say this signals retreat on his part from the Houthi rebellion. Saleh's conditions for peace are for the Saudi-led 06-11-2016 intervention to stop and withdraw from Yemen BBC 06-11-2016 Fresh fighting in Yemen kills 20 AFP 09-11-2016 GoY forces kill 30 AQAP suspects in raid in Mukalla DPA 126

Hundreds protest in Sana'a and Aden against unpaid salaries, power 13-11-2016 outages and fuel shortages AP GoY troops drive Houthis out of presidential palace and military 16-11-2016 hospital in Taiz AP Coalition announces 48-hour ceasefire; truce will be renewed if Houthis 19-11-2016 allow aid deliveries to besieged cities AFP 20-11-2016 Truce shattered; both sides blame each other for violations DPA 20-11-2016 Houthis block humanitarian aid from reaching Taiz AP 21-11-2016 Truce in Yemen over, will not be extended says coalition DPA 22-11-2016 Red Cross warns of deteriorating humanitarian situation in Taiz AP Amnesty says hospitals in Taiz have been targeted by local forces loyal to 23-11-2016 the GoY DPA 28-11-2016 Coalition airstrike kills at least 13 civilians in Hodeida AP Houthis and Saleh allies form new government, the National Salvation 28-11-2016 Government AP Coalition says Doctors Without Borders hospital bombing of August was 06-12-2016 unintentional DPA Doctors Without Borders reject claim that hospital bombing was an accident; says it does not reflect conversations aid group had with Saudi 09-12-2016 Arabia after the attack AP 10-12-2016 IS suicide bomber kills 35 soldiers in Aden AFP 13-12-2016 UN says 2.2 million Yemeni children are acutely malnourished AFP 18-12-2016 At least 48 soldiers killed in suicide bombing in Aden claimed by IS UPI Move of central bank from Sana'a to Aden hampers wheat imports in 18-12-2016 Yemen AFP 20-12-2016 Clashes in Taiz between GoY forces and Houthis kill at least 22 AFP 21-12-2016 US drone strike kills 3 AQAP members in Shabwa province AFP Head of Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Committee says Iran will continue providing political support for Yemeni dissidents; will provide humanitarian aid to Yemen's oppressed people. Also congratulates Houthis on recent victories. Still denies providing Houthis with arms or ammunition, only supports Houthis resistance to Saudi led 26-12-2016 invasion BBC 02-01-2017 9 civilians killed in Houthi bombing and coalition air strike AFP 03-01-2017 GoY troops attack AQAP militants in Abyan province, killing 15 AP Heavy fighting in western Yemen kills dozens as GoY forces and allies 11-01-2017 seize territories from Houthis AP 11-01-2017 UN says nearly 1400 children have been killed since start of war AFP 16-01-2017 UN: 10.000 civilians killed, 40.000 wounded since start of conflict AP

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16-01-2017 Suspected AQAP attack kills 4 soldiers in southern Yemen AFP 19-01-2017 Rockets fired from rebel-held outskirts of Taiz kill 9 civilians AFP 20-01-2017 Coalition airstrike kills 29 Houthis at Red Sea coast AFP 22-01-2017 Clashes in southwest Yemen kills dozens of Houthis DPA 22-01-2017 7 AQAP militants killed in US drone strikes AFP 24-01-2017 Battle for port city at Red Sea coast kills 40 Houthis and GoY fighters AFP 29-01-2017 US raid on AQAP kills 41 suspected militants and 16 civilians in Baida AFP 30-01-2017 Coalition claims it destroyed Iranian-made drone BBC 02-02-2017 US military admits civilian casualties in AQAP raid DPA 02-02-2017 UAE protest Tehran's alleged arming of Houthi rebels in Yemen AFP AQAP overruns 3 towns in southern Yemen after US raid, withdraws 03-02-2017 from 2 AFP GoY withdraws consent for US special operations missions after 08-02-2017 civilians are killed during military operation on January 29 UPI 08-02-2017 31 combatants killed in battle for coastal town of Mokha AFP 10-02-2017 GoY loyalists retake port of Mokha from Houthis AFP Inter-militia fighting at Aden airport kills 3; GoY allied helicopter fires 12-02-2017 on fighters in the area AP 13-02-2017 At least 20 killed in clashes on western coast in Midi and Mokha AFP 16-02-2017 At least 9 civilians killed in coalition bombardment at funeral near DPA Sana'a 24-02-2017 8 soldiers killed in suicide attack in Jaar, southern Yemen AP 27-02-2017 UN warns Yemen faces serious risk of famine AFP 28-02-2017 UN says at least 1500 child soldiers are involved in the war DPA Iran foreign ministry spokesman criticizes UAE for accusing Iran of 01-03-2017 intervention in Yemen BBC 06-03-2017 Five nights of US raids on AQAP territories in Yemen AFP 11-03-2017 At least 22 civilians killed in coalition airstrike on market in Khokha AP Tens of thousands protest in Sana'a against the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen on its second anniversary; protests organized by 26-03-2017 Houthi rebels. Call for end of conflict. AP 27-03-2017 Suspected AQAP bomber kills 5 soldiers in Lahj province AP 06-04-2017 US airstrike kills 3 AQAP militants in Bayda province AP 12-04-2017 GoY forces attack Houthis near Mocha, killing 38 from both sides AP 15-04-2017 Fight for key military base near west coast kills at least 25 on both sides AFP 19-04-2017 US drone strike kills 5 suspected AQAP members in Shabwa & Marib AFP

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Hadi fires cabinet minister and governor of Aden; both known to be close to the UAE. Hadi and UAE have experienced tensions over allegations by Hadi that the UAE are offering patronage to southern 28-04-2017 secessionist politicians AP 04-05-2017 Thousands secessionists rally in Aden against sacking of Aden's AP governor 10-05-2017 Yemen's planning minister says 60% of the population is in dire poverty AP Sacked Aden governor forms new 'transitional political council of the 11-05-2017 south' after rally in his support AP Sacked Aden governor departs to Saudi Arabia after forming separatist 12-05-2017 council AP 15-05-2017 State of emergency declared in Sana'a over cholera outbreak DPA 17-05-2017 At least 15 civilians killed in coalition airstrike in Taiz province DPA 18-05-2017 Houthis form emergency ministerial committee to combat cholera BBC 22-05-2017 Protesters linked to Houthis pelt UN motorcade with rocks and eggs AP 23-05-2017 US raid kills 7 AQAP members with support of Yemen government AP Yemen minister says that Houthis will not relinquish Hudaydah despite 24-05-2017 UN pressure BBC Yemen cuts ties with Qatar shortly after its Gulf backers cut ties with the country in escalation of regional tensions. Accuse Doha of supporting extremism in Yemen. Qatar used to be part of the Arab 05-06-2017 coalition AFP 06-06-2017 Houthis reject UN special envoy as a peace negotiator AP 09-06-2017 4 civilians killed after coalition airstrike on Sana'a AP 18-06-2017 Coalition airstrike on market in Saada province kills 24 civilians DPA 18-06-2017 Coalition airstrike on qat farm in Saada province kills 25 AP 28-06-2017 3 soldiers killed in AQAP attack on military zone in Hadramawt AFP Yemen's cholera outbreak exceeds 200.000 suspected cases, 5000 new cases recorded each day: world's worst documented cholera outbreak says 29-06-2017 WHO IHS 29-06-2017 6 soldiers killed and 14 Houthis in fighting for Sarwah (held by AFP Houthis) Thousands of secessionist supporters rally in Aden, backing new group that calls for autonomy of the south of Yemen (led by former Aden 07-07-2017 governor) AP 16-07-2017 5 soldiers killed when AQAP militants open fire on military checkpoint AFP 19-07-2017 Coalition airstrike on fleeing civilians in Taiz kills 20 AP 23-07-2017 Hadi fires governor of al-Bayda, accuses him of having ties with AQAP AP 26-07-2017 AQAP gunmen kill 3 soldiers in attack in Hadramawt AFP

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29-07-2017 Houthis capture military posts near border with Saudi-Arabia DPA UN: Saudi coalition obstructs deliveries of jet fuel to UN planes 01-08-2017 bringing humanitarian aid to Sana'a; reason unknown AFP 03-08-2017 AQAP suicide attack kills 6 soldiers in Shabwa province AFP 04-08-2017 Coalition airstrike kills 12 civilians in Sa'ada province AP 07-08-2017 UN seeks to revive peace talks between GoY and Houthis BBC 14-08-2017 Bomb kills 13 civilians on market in Qataba; attackers unknown AP 18-08-2018 First Saudi ground forces deployed in Aden AP Yemeni diplomat says Iran is part of the problem in Yemen, and not of 21-08-2017 the solution AFP Houthis warn Saleh that he will 'bear the consequences' after calling them militias. Houthi-Saleh alliance begins to show cracks after both accuse the other of backstabbing in televised speeches. Houthis in 23-08-2017 return call Saleh a traitor AFP 23-08-2017 Air raids on Sana'a kill at least 30, including civilians. AFP Hundreds of thousands rally in Sana'a in public show of support for Saleh during celebration of 35th anniversary of founding of GPC party, 24-08-2017 amid rising tensions between his loyalists and the Houthis AP 25-08-2017 Air strike on Sana'a kills 9, including children AFP Coalition says airstrike that killed civilians was result of 'technical 27-08-2017 mistake' AP Nearly 60 rights groups urge UN to establish international body to investigate abuses that may amount to war crimes by all parties of the 29-08-2017 civil war AP 30-08-2017 Coalition airstrike kills 7, at least 5 civilians, near Sana'a AP UN human rights report says AQAP has become 'operational' in the city 05-09-2017 of Taiz AP Human Rights Watch denounces coalition for failing to investigate 08-09-2017 airstrikes in Yemen that led to killing of civilians AP UN will expand its role in southern Yemen to support humanitarian 14-09-2017 needs in de areas AFP Hadi loyalists clash with UAE-backed forces in Aden. Latest events in escalation of rift between Hadi and the UAE. Rift focuses on Hadi's embrace of local affiliate of Muslim Brotherhood (Islah) the UAE sees 16-09-2017 as a threat; Hadi accuses UAE of violating Yemen's sovereignty AP 18-09-2017 Coalition airstrike kills 12 civilians in Marib province AP Coalition accuses Houthis of delaying vital food imports through major 19-09-2017 Red Sea port of Hodeida AFP Hadi promises UN to open the entire country to aid; comes after UN warning of 'shrinking humanitarian space' in Yemen after obstruction 21-09-2017 by both sides AFP

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Hadi says civil war will most likely require a military solution because 24-09-2017 of Tehran's influence AFP 02-10-2017 5 civilians killed in air raid in southern Yemen AFP 08-10-2017 US drone strike kills 5 suspected AQAP members in Marib province AP Doctors say airstrikes and artillery have killed 13 civilians in fighting 09-10-2017 near Saudi border AP UN envoy says civil war is making leaders richer as people suffer and get poorer; say leaders are not interested in finding solution as they will 10-10-2017 lose their power and control DPA UAE-backed forces arrest 10 members of local Muslim Brotherhood 11-10-2017 affiliate (Islah) in Aden; heightened tensions within Saudi-led coalition AP 12-10-2017 13 killed in clashes between soldiers and Houthis in southern Yemen AFP Separatist council unveils plan to set up parliament to represent 14-10-2017 southerners DPA 2 protesters and policeman killed in Marib as clash breaks out at rally 16-10-2017 to demand jobs for- and better representation of- Yemeni tribes AFP 17-10-2017 US forces kill dozens IS members in strikes on training camps DPA 20-10-2017 US drone strike kills 6 suspected AQAP militants in Abyan province AFP 3 soldiers and 5 assailants killed in attack on military base in Abyan 23-10-2017 province AFP Saudi Foreign Minister accuses Iran of obstructing peace in Yemen by 30-10-2017 supporting the Houthis BBC At least 26 civilians killed in airstrike in northern Yemen; Houthis say it 01-11-2017 was coalition airstrike UPI/DPA/AFP 05-11-2017 Suicide attack in Aden kills at least 5 soldiers; AQAP suspected DPA 05-11-2017 Airstrikes hit Sana'a AFP Saudi-led coalition closes all Yemeni ports in response to Houthi 06-11-2017 missile attack near Riyadh DPA Houthis threaten Saudi and UAE ports and airports in retaliation 07-11-2017 against the closing of Yemeni land, sea and air borders AFP Humanitarian groups warn that population only has 6 weeks of food left before the food aid runs out, unless the coalition lifts its blockade of 09-11-2017 the country DPA 10-11-2017 Coalition bombs Defense Ministry in Sana'a DPA 2 soldiers and 2 jihadists killed as UAE-backed forces seize AQAP 10-11-2017 foothold in southern Yemen AFP 16-11-2017 UN chief urges coalition to lift its blockade of Yemen AFP 20-11-2017 US drone strike kills 4 suspected AQAP members in Bayda province AFP 21-11-2017 21 UN flights to Yemen stopped by Saudi-led coalition DPA

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Saudi-led coalition will allow humanitarian aid to arrive through Sana'a 22-11-2017 airport and Hodeida port DPA Iran denies sending arms and military assistance to Yemen and says it 25-11-2017 has no military links with Yemen BBC 26-11-2017 US drone strike kills 7 suspected AQAP members in Bayda province AFP 27-11-2017 First food aid ship docks in Hodeida province after coalition lifts DPA blockade 29-11-2017 IS car bomb explodes at Ministry of Finance in Aden, killing at least 4 BBC Clashes between Houthis and Saleh loyalists in Sana'a kill 14 after 29-11-2017 Houthis storm mosque controlled by Saleh loyalists AFP Fighting between Houthis and Saleh loyalists kills at least 3 people; 01-12-2017 violence threatens the alliance that has existed for over 3 years AFP Abdelmalik al-Houthi calls for dialogue with Saleh to end street battles 02-12-2017 in Sana'a DPA Houthis slam Saleh's speech as coup; Saleh said that he was open to talks with the Saudi-led coalition that was fighting them. Tensions between Saleh and Houthis are focused on the Houthis accusing Saleh of treason because of his suspected contacts with Saudi Arabia, while 02-12-2017 Saleh accuses Houthis of seeking to monopolize power AFP 03-12-2017 Coalition intensifies airstrikes on Houthis in Sana'a DPA 04-12-2017 Intense battles in Sana'a as Houthis and Saleh loyalists clash DPA GPC confirms Saleh has been killed in Sana'a by Houthis as he fled the 04-12-2017 city AFP Red Cross says fighting between Houthis and Saleh loyalists since 29th 05-12-2017 of November have killed 234 people UPI

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