DOCSLIB.ORG

Proquest Dissertations

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Proquest Dissertations UNDERSTANDING THE HOUTHI CONFLICT IN NORTHERN YEMEN: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT APPROACH BY AndrewDumm Submitted to the Faculty of the School of International Service of American University in Partiai Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of the Arts m International Affairs Chair: Professor Carl LeVan Dean of the School of International Service CJOfD Date 2010 American University Washington, D.C. 20016 AMERICAN UNJVERSJTY liBRARY Cf:55() UMI Number: 1484559 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMI ....----Dissertation Publishing.....___ UMI 1484559 Copyright 2010 by ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Pro uesr ---- ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml48106-1346 ©COPYRIGHT by AndrewDumm 2010 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED To my parents UNDERSTANDING THE HOUTHI CONFLICT IN NORTHERN YEMEN: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT APPROACH BY AndrewDumm ABSTRACT Since 2004, the Yemeni government has been fighting a bloody civil war with local Zaydi Shia forces known as the Houthis in the country's north. Conventional explanations rooted in the recent history of the civil war fail to adequately account for the rise of the rebels and their fundamental grievances, however. A social movement approach, which can contextualize the Houthi rebellion within a historical evolution of Zaydi movements, is used here to · explain the transition of the Houthis from non-violent social movement to armed insurrectionary group. The Yemeni regime's anti-Zaydi policies and nationalist narrative, along with a competing Wahhabi religious movement, led to a series of inter- and intra-movement disputes that fostered the rise of increasingly oppositional Zaydi factions like the Houthi. The interplay between the Houthi leadership's complex framing of Zaydi grievances and escalating regime­ challenger interactions over a public protest movement explains the Houthis' recourse to violence in 2004. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................... .ii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ....................................................................................... v Chapter I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... ! II. A SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY FRAMEWORK. ............................................ 5 Rational Collective Action .............................................................................. 6 Examining Cultural Fault-Lines .................................................................. lO Inter- and Intra-Movement Framing Disputes ........................................... 12 Theoretical Explanations for Violence ......................................................... 17 III. THE HOUTHI CONFLICT SINCE 2004 .......................................................... 21 0 ngm. o fH ost1·1·. Itles, 2003-2004 ................................................................. 24 A 'Protracted' Conflict, 2005-2010 .............................................................. 31 Houthi Family Leadership ............................................................... 32 Aggressive Tactics ............................................................................. 35 Civilian Deaths and Displacement ................................................... 37 Arbitrary Detentions ......................................................................... 38 The Tribal Dimension ....................................................................... 39 Failed Mediation ............................................................................... 41 Conventional Explanations for the War ..................................................... -43 iii The Counterterrorist Argument ...................................................... -43 A Regional Proxy War ....................................................................... 50 The Houthis as a Charismatic Leadership Cult ............................... 58 The Houthis as Resource-seeking Separatists .................................. 61 IV. ZAYDI CULTURAL IDENTITY AND HISTORICAL GRIEVANCE. ................ 67 Zaydism within Islam .................................................................................. 67 The Imamate and Descent-based Rule ....................................................... 70 Zaydi Responses to the New Republic ......................................................... 73 State Frames of Zaydis and the Imamate: The Role of Past and Present.. 75 V. REVIVALIST CURRENTS: EARLY ZAYDI SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ................ 81 Wahhabi Influence in Saada........................................................................ 81 The Revivalist Response .............................................................................. 88 Political Opportunity Structure: The Failure of al Haqq............................ g2 VI. ZAYDI RADICALIZATION: THE BELIEVING YOUTH .................................. 97 Husayn al Houthi and a Militant Believing Youth .................................... 1o2 Revisiting the Houthi Slogan ..................................................................... 107 VII. EXPLAINING THE USE OF VIOLENCE. ..................................................... 114 Regime-Challenger Interactions and Framing, 2004-2010 ..................... 115 VIII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 123 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................... 127 iv LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 1. Historical Evolution ofthe Houthi Movement ................................................... 17 2. North Yemen ...................................................................................................... 30 3. Yemen: Administrative Divisions, 2002 .......................................................... -40 4. US Foreign Military Financing to Yemen, 1998-2010 ..................................... -48 5. Population Density in Yemen, 2002 .................................................................. 57 6. Distribution of Ethnoreligious Groups and Key Tribal Areas in Yemen, 2002 .................................................................................................................... 68 7· Cemetery in Saada .............................................................................................. 87 Table 1. Social versus Insurrectionary Movements ......................................................... 19 v CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Since 2004, the Yemeni government has been fighting a bloody civil war with _local Zaydi Shia forces in Saada and the surrounding provinces in the country's north. The rebels, collectively known as the Houthis (after their succession of leaders from the same prominent Zaydi family), claim to be fighting a reactive war in defense of a 'besieged' Zaydi religious community. For its part, Sanaa has variously characterized the Houthi leadership and their "Believing Youth" followers as radical religious extremists, terrorists, and historical revanchists. The intractability of the conflict and its seeming development along religious, tribal, and regional lines has also generated competing explanations for the war from observers outside of Yemen. While mainstream explanations for the Houthi rebellion offer important, partial accounts of the protracted nature of the war, they fail to explain the Houthis' fundamental motivations or contextualize the group's confrontation with the regime in 2004. In particular, these accounts do not isolate the exogenous and endogenous factors that led the Houthis to abandon a well­ developed model of non-violent Zaydi Islamic social movements for an insurrectionary protest movement in 2003. This paper applies concepts of social movement theory literature to account for the rise of a more militant Believing Youth faction within Zaydi 1 revivalism as well as the Houthis' embrace of violent resistance vis-a-vis the Saleh regime. This study finds that, as a social movement heir to Zaydi revivalism, the Houthi rebellion is a product of both exogenous and endogenous catalysts for violence. On one hand, regime-challenger interactions during a non-violent Believing Youth protest movement in 2003-4led the Yemeni government to crack down on the Zaydi cultural community at large, intensifying long-held grievances; on the other hand, rebel leaders' framing techniques effectively emphasized an escalating and existential communal threat using a critique of the regime's foreign policy to mobilize armed resistance. It was the specific interplay between social movement framing and regime repression that led to the Houthis' jump from peaceful protest movement to violent insurrectionary movement in 2004. The Houthi rebellion, therefore, is not merely a product of traditional social and political group grievances. Although a circumscribed political opportunity structure in Yemen and persistent socioeconomic underdevelopment in the Saada basin are underlying and contributing factors to the call to arms, Zaydi movements predating the Houthis confronted
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Uninvestigated Laws of War Violations in Yemen's War with Huthi Rebels
    Yemen HUMAN All Quiet on the Northern Front? RIGHTS Uninvestigated Laws of War Violations in Yemen’s War with Huthi Rebels WATCH All Quiet on the Northern Front? Uninvestigated Laws of War Violations in Yemen’s War with Huthi Rebels Copyright © 2010 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-607-1 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org March 2010 1-56432-607-1 All Quiet on the Northern Front? Uninvestigated Laws of War Violations in Yemen’s War with Huthi Rebels Map of Yemen’s Northern Governorates .....................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Geoeconomics of Reconstruction in Yemen
    The Geoeconomics of Reconstruction in Yemen Kristin Smith Diwan, Hussein Ibish, Peter Salisbury, Stephen A. Seche, Omar H. Rahman, Karen E. Young November 16, 2018 The Geoeconomics of Reconstruction in Yemen Kristin Smith Diwan, Hussein Ibish, Peter Salisbury, Stephen A. Seche, Omar H. Rahman, Karen E. Young Policy Paper #2 2018 The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW), launched in 2015, is an independent, nonprofit institution dedicated to providing expert research and analysis of the social, economic, and political dimensions of the Gulf Arab states and how they impact domestic and foreign policy. AGSIW focuses on issues ranging from politics and security to economics, trade, and business; from social dynamics to civil society and culture. Through programs, publications, and scholarly exchanges the institute seeks to encourage thoughtful debate and inform the U.S. policy community regarding this critical geostrategic region. © 2018 Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. All rights reserved. AGSIW does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of AGSIW, its staff, or its board of directors. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from AGSIW. Please direct inquiries to: [email protected] This publication can be downloaded at no cost at www.agsiw.org. Cover Photo Credit: AP Photo/Nariman El-Mofty About the UAE Security Forum For the third consecutive year, AGSIW will convene the UAE Security Forum, where U.S., UAE, and regional partners will gather to find creative solutions to some of the region’s most pressing challenges.
    [Show full text]
  • S/PV.8027 the Situation in the Middle East 18/08/2017
    United Nations S/ PV.8027 Security Council Provisional Seventy-second year 8027th meeting Friday, 18 August 2017, 10 a.m. New York President: Mr. Aboulatta .................................. (Egypt) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of) ..................... Mr. Llorentty Solíz China ......................................... Mr. Shen Bo Ethiopia ....................................... Mr. Alemu France ........................................ Mrs. Gueguen Italy .......................................... Mr. Cardi Japan ......................................... Mr. Bessho Kazakhstan .................................... Mr. Sadykov Russian Federation ............................... Mr. Nebenzia Senegal ....................................... Mr. Seck Sweden ....................................... Ms. Schoulgin-Nyoni Ukraine ....................................... Mr. Fesko United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland .. Mr. Allen United States of America .......................... Ms. Sison Uruguay ....................................... Mr. Bermúdez Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Between Egypt and Yemen in the Cairo Genizah Amir Ashur Center
    Between Egypt and Yemen in the Cairo Genizah Amir Ashur Center for the Study of Conversion and Inter-religious Encounters, Ben Gurion University, the Interdisciplinary Center for the Broader Application of Genizah Research, University of Haifa, and the Department of Hebrew Culture, Tel Aviv University [email protected] Ben Outhwaite University of Cambridge [email protected] Abstract A study of two documents from the Cairo Genizah, a vast repository of medieval Jewish writings recovered from a synagogue in Fusṭāṭ, Egypt, one hundred years ago, shows the importance of this archive for the history of medieval Yemen and, in particular, for the role that Yemen played in the Indian Ocean trade as both a commercial and administrative hub. The first document is a letter from Aden to Fusṭāṭ, dated 1133 CE, explaining the Aden Jewish community’s failure to raise funds to send to the heads of the Palestinian Gaonate in Egypt. It signals the decline of that venerable institution and the increasing independence of the Yemeni Jews. The second text is a legal document, produced by an Egyptian Jewish trader who intended to travel to Yemen, but who wished to ensure his wife was provided for in his absence. Both documents show the close ties between the Egyptian and Yemeni Jewish communities and the increasing commercial importance of Yemen to Egyptian traders. Keywords Cairo Genizah, history, India trade, al-Ǧuwwa, Hebrew, Judaeo- Arabic, marriage, Jewish leadership, legal contract, Aden, Fusṭāṭ. 1. Introduction The discovery of a vast store of manuscripts and early printed material in the Ben Ezra Synagogue in Fusṭāṭ at the end of the nineteenth century revolutionised the academic study of Judaism and provided a wealth of primary sources for the scrutiny of the Mediterranean world at large in the High Middle Ages and Early Modern period.
    [Show full text]
  • Struggle for Citizenship.Indd
    From the struggle for citizenship to the fragmentation of justice Yemen from 1990 to 2013 Erwin van Veen CRU Report From the struggle for citizenship to the fragmentation of justice FROM THE STRUGGLE FOR CITIZENSHIP TO THE FRAGMENTATION OF JUSTICE Yemen from 1990 to 2013 Erwin van Veen Conflict Research Unit, The Clingendael Institute February 2014 © Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holders. Clingendael Institute P.O. Box 93080 2509 AB The Hague The Netherlands Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.clingendael.nl/ Table of Contents Executive summary 7 Acknowledgements 11 Abbreviations 13 1 Introduction 14 2 Selective centralisation of the state: Commerce and security through networked rule 16 Enablers: Tribes, remittances, oil and civil war 17 Tools: Violence, business and religion 21 The year 2011 and the National Dialogue Conference 26 The state of justice in 1990 and 2013 28 3 Trend 1: The ‘instrumentalisation’ of state-based justice 31 Key strategies in the instrumentalisation of justice 33 Consequences of politicisation and instrumentalisation 34 4 Trend 2: The weakening of tribal customary law 38 Functions and characteristics of tribal law 40 Key factors that have weakened tribal law 42 Consequences of weakened tribal law 44 Points of connection
    [Show full text]
  • Yemen As an Ottoman Frontier and Attempt to Build a Native Army: Asakir-I Hamidiye
    YEMEN AS AN OTTOMAN FRONTIER AND ATTEMPT TO BUILD A NATIVE ARMY: ASAKİR-İ HAMİDİYE by ÖNDER EREN AKGÜL Submitted to the Graduate School of Sabancı University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History Sabancı University July 2014 YEMEN AS AN OTTOMAN FRONTIER AND ATTEMPT TO BUILD A NATIVE ARMY: ASAKİR-İ HAMİDİYE APPROVED BY: Selçuk Akşin Somel …………………………. (Thesis Supervisor) Yusuf Hakan Erdem …………………………. Bahri Yılmaz …………………………. DATE OF APPROVAL: 25.07.2014 © Önder Eren Akgül 2014 All Rights Reserved YEMEN AS AN OTTOMAN FRONTIER AND ATTEMPT TO BUILD A NATIVE ARMY: ASAKİR-İ HAMİDİYE Önder Eren Akgül History, MA, 2014 Supervisor: Selçuk Akşin Somel Keywords: Colonialism, Imperialism, Native army, Ottoman frontiers, Ottoman imperialism ABSTRACT This thesis is a study of the Ottoman attempts to control its frontiers and the frontier populations by basing upon the experience of the native army (Asakir-i Hamidiye) organized by Ismail Hakkı Pasha, who was a governor of Yemen province, between 1800 and 1882. This thesis positions Yemen into the context of the literature produced for the frontier regions; and tries to investigate the dynamics of the institutions and practices pursued in Yemen that differentiated from the financial, military and judicial institutions of the Tanzimat-era. This thesis puts forth that the Ottoman Empire was not a passive audience of imperial competitions of the nineteenth century, but engaged into the imperial struggles by undertaking aggressive measures with an imperialist mind and strategy. Herein, with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the Ottoman ruling elites detected the Red Sea as a strategic region too.
    [Show full text]
  • 0 Desk Study
    DESK STUDY Multidimensional Livelihoods Assessment in Conflict-Affected Areas 0 Contents Executive summary ............................................................................................................... 3 I. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 7 1. Background ....................................................................................................................................... 7 2. Objectives.......................................................................................................................................... 8 3. Methodology ..................................................................................................................................... 8 II. Population .................................................................................................................. 8 III. Poverty ....................................................................................................................... 9 IV. Structure of the Yemen economy .............................................................................. 11 V. Impact of the 2011 crisis on employment, skilled and unskilled labour, and the private sector ........................................................................................................................ 12 VI. Main livelihood activities and the impact of conflict on selected sectors .................... 14 A. Main livelihood activities ...............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Regional Programme Gulf States the Yemen
    Regional Programme Gulf States Policy Report – October 2019 The Yemen War Actors, Interests and the Prospects of Negotiations Introduction Fabian Blumberg Recently, there have been important developments in the war in Yemen; a war which has, according to the UN reports, created the worst humanitarian disaster of the 21st century. On the one hand, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) withdrew significant part of its military forces from Yemen declaring the time has arrived for a peace settlement to the conflict. On the other hand, militants of the South took control over Aden from the internationally-backed government amid a fierce armed confrontation between the forces of the two sides leading to a crack in the Arab Coalition that is fighting the Houthis since March 2015. News also has erupted as the Houthis claimed that they managed to attack Saudi Arabia’s largest oil facilities at the 19th of September. Back in March 2019, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) had organized a workshop in Cadenabbia, Italy, to discuss the prospects of peace in Yemen after the Stockholm agreement between the international recognised government and the Houthis. Entitled “Yemen’s War: Actors, Interests and the Prospects of Negotiations”, the workshop was attended by experts on Yemen from Europe, Germany, US, and Yemen who provided informed opinions about the conflict in Yemen and on the best way to advance peace among the warring parties. Building on that, KAS has asked experts to write down their analyses on the situation and their recommendations on how to bring about peace in Yemen. They also provide ideas for the contribution German foreign policy could provide.
    [Show full text]
  • Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report May 2019
    UNICEF YEMEN HUMANITARIAN SITUATION REPORT MAY 2019 - Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report marginalized community during a cholera prevention session conducted femaleby religious leaders in in Al Hasabah district, Sana’a.in ©UNICEF Yemen/2019/Mona Adel. childA from a Highlights May 2019 • On 16 May, multiple air strikes hit various locations in Amanat Al Asimah and Sana’a 12.3 million governorates, killing children and wounding more than 70 civilians. Seven children # of children in need of humanitarian between the ages of 4 and 14 were also killed on 24 May in an attack on the Mawiyah assistance (estimated) district, in the southern Yemeni city of Taiz. This attack increased the verified number 24.1 million # of people in need of children killed and injured the escalation of violence near Sanaa and in Taiz to 27 in (OCHA, 2019 Yemen Humanitarian Needs only 10 days, but the actual numbers are likely to be much higher. Overview) • The number of Acute Watery Diarrhoea/suspected cholera cases has continued to rise 1.71 million since the start of 2019, with 312 out of 333 districts reporting suspected cases this year # of children internally displaced (IDPs) so far. Since 1 January 2019 to 31 May 2019, there have been 365,223 suspected cases 4.7 million and 638 associated deaths recorded (CFR 0.20 per cent). Children under five represent # of children in need of educational assistance 360,000 a quarter of the total suspected cases. # of children under 5 suffering Severe Acute • UNICEF continues to assess and monitor the nutrition situation in Yemen.
    [Show full text]
  • Yemen's National Army in the Hot
    مركز أبعاد للدراسات والبحوث Abaad Studies & Research Center Yemen's National Army in the Hot Fighting Fronts Introduction The National Army and the Popular Resistance have been fighting the Houthis since the formation of the Yemeni government forces after the launch of the Saudi-led Arab Coalition in March 2015 (1) to confront the Houthi coup against the internationally-recognized legitimate government. The Arab Coalition depends upon these forces in its military operations in most of fighting fronts with the Houthis. The Houthis took control of the Yemeni state including military and security camps and weapons following their takeover of the capital Sana›a in September 2014 and the announcement of their Popular Committees /Revolutionary Committee as the main apparatus in the security, military and political institutions of the state. The army and security institutions were the most prominent institutions where the national creed was bulldozed into a sectarian creed and tens of thousands of fighters, loyal to the Houthi armed group, were recruited in both institutions. Research Methodology This analytical study is based on the collection of field information from the hottest military fronts and strategic fronts affecting the military equation. Those fronts are in contact points between the National Army forces under the authority of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi and the Houthi armed group. Those contact areas are included within five military regions (seventh, sixth, fifth, fourth and third). The Abaad Center held field meetings with new recruits and military officers in the National Army. The researchers also met with 15 military leaders to investigate the situation of the armed forces in the new Yemeni Army, the reasons behind the delay in the military decisiveness, information about military forces fighting on the fronts, their loyalty, their decision and their military plans.
    [Show full text]
  • Yemen Update Autumn 2018
    BRIEFING PAPER Number CBP 8433, 31 October 2018 Yemen update autumn By Ben Smith 2018 Summary 2 Worst famine in a century? 2 On the ground 3 Violations of International Humanitarian Law 5 UN Special Envoy and political consultations 5 Yemen and the UK 6 Scale of the crisis 7 Further reading 8 www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | 2 Yemen update autumn 2018 Summary In October 2018 humanitarian agencies warned that Yemen could by early 2019 tip into the biggest famine in a century with fully half the population, some 13 million people, at risk. The conflict on the ground has increased in intensity recently, largely because of the campaign for the crucial port of al-Hodeidah, which is presently responsible for about half of casualties. Houthi rebel forces have lost some territory in the north and pro-government forces are making some progress in Hodeidah. Nevertheless the conflict is often still described as a stalemate. There is a different and unpredictable battle going on in the south, involving separatists and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula as well as the Saudi-led Coalition and other pro- and anti-Government forces. The UN reported in September that individuals on all sides of the conflict had committed acts that might constitute violations of international law. The UN’s Special Envoy tried to get talks going in Geneva in September but the Houthi representatives did not attend, saying that the pro- government side had prevented them from flying from Sanaa airport. On 30 October US Defense Secretary Mattis called for a ceasefire and negotiations within 30 days.
    [Show full text]
  • The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1968
    The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1968 The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Orkaby, Asher Aviad. 2014. The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1968. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12269828 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1968 A dissertation presented by Asher Aviad Orkaby to The Committee on Middle Eastern Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of History and Middle Eastern Studies Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts April 2014 © 2014 Asher Aviad Orkaby All rights reserved. III Dissertation Advisor: Roger Owen Author: Asher Aviad Orkaby The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-68 Abstract The deposition of Imam Muhammad al-Badr in September 1962 was the culmination of a Yemeni nationalist movement that began in the 1940s with numerous failed attempts to overthrow the traditional religious legal order. Prior to 1962, both the USSR and Egypt had been cultivating alliances with al-Badr in an effort to secure their strategic interests in South Arabia. In the days following the 1962 coup d'état, Abdullah Sallal and his cohort of Yemeni officers established a republic and concealed the fate of al- Badr who had survived an assault on his Sana’a palace and whose supporters had already begun organizing a tribal coalition against the republic.
    [Show full text]