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Downloads/Codebook.Pdf Distribution Agreement In presenting this thesis or dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree from Emory University, I hereby grant to Emory University and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive, make accessible, and display my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known, including display on the world wide web. I understand that I may select some access restrictions as part of the online submission of this thesis or dissertation. I retain all ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis or dissertation. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation. Signature: ||||||||||||||| |||||| Goran Pei´c Date Civilian Defense Forces, Tribal Groups, and Counterinsurgency Outcomes By Goran Pei´c Doctor of Philosophy Political Science ||||||||||||||| Dan Reiter Advisor ||||||||||||||| Clifford Carrubba Committee Member ||||||||||||||| Kyle Beardsley Committee Member Accepted: ||||||||||||||| Lisa A. Tedesco, Ph.D. Dean of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies |||||| Date Civilian Defense Forces, Tribal Groups, and Counterinsurgency Outcomes By Goran Pei´c M.A., Villanova University, 2006 Advisor: Dan Reiter, Ph.D. An abstract of a dissertation submitted to the faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 2013 ABSTRACT Civilian Defense Forces, Tribal Groups, and Counterinsurgency Outcomes By Goran Pei´c How do states maintain their authority given that even weak non-state groups are now capable of challenging states by resorting to irregular warfare? In Part I of the dissertation, I propose that one of the ways in which states pursue internal se- curity is by recruiting civilians into lightly armed self-defense units referred to as civilian defense forces (CDFs). In their role as government auxiliaries, these units as- sist the counterinsurgency (COIN) effort by counteracting insurgent guerrilla tactics. CDFs' relative affordability, local intelligence, and the propaganda value of coopting civilians, help offset insurgents' superior mobility, concealment, and covert civilian support. Empirical tests of the argument on two different crossnational data sets of all insurgencies completed between 1945 and 2006 reveal that incumbents who deploy CDFs are 53 percent more likely to be victorious. Given that CDF deployment is a more easily manipulable variable than many state attributes such as economic devel- opment or military power, CDFs appear to be an effective COIN policy deserving of further academic and policy attention. The finding that this particular COIN policy is associated with incumbent victory raises an important theoretical puzzle. Namely, if CDFs really are as beneficial to COIN, why do all incumbents not deploy them? In Part II of the dissertation, I lay out a formal principal-agent model which posits incumbent fear of civilian defection to rebels as the main impediment to CDF formation. However, the model also reveals that this impediment should be more easily overcome in areas predominantly popu- lated by tribal groups, where pre-existing intertribal blood feuds incentivize them to comply with the principal's wishes in order to maintain CDF membership and there- fore an advantage relative to local rivals. Consistent with theoretical expectations, empirical analyses of a novel province-level data set (N=100) encompassing Turkey and the Philippines suggest that areas with substantial tribal populations tend to station twice as many CDF personnel as those with no tribal populations. Civilian Defense Forces, Tribal Groups, and Counterinsurgency Outcomes By Goran Pei´c M.A., Villanova University, 2006 Advisor: Dan Reiter, Ph.D. A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 2013 Ovaj vrhunac svojeg akademskog postignu´caposve´cujemMugiju, mojoj najdraˇzoji najboljoj mami na svetu. Acknowledgements This dissertation would not have been possible if it were not for the assistance and support of a number of people. First, I wish to thank my advisor, Professor Dan Reiter for his extensive feedback on draft after draft of this dissertation as well as for helping me throughout my graduate career in ways too numerous to list here. I can honestly say that I have never in my entire personal experience met any other professor who has come even close to matching Professor Reiter's level of commitment to the academic success of his students. In addition, I am very grateful to Professors Cliff Carrubba and Kyle Beardsley for their valuable input and heartfelt words of praise which have helped me persist in this laborious effort. I also wish to thank Ariel Ahram, Jacob Shapiro, and Stathis Kalyvas for providing comments on parts of this dissertation. Last, but not the least, I cannot express enough gratitude to my mother Slavica and my wife Nataˇsa| were it not for their unwavering support over the years, this dissertation would undoubtedly not be in existence today. Contents 1 Introduction1 1.1 Civilian Self-Defense and Internal Order................4 1.2 Civilian Rivalries and CDF Deployment................7 1.3 Layout of the Dissertation........................ 13 I CDFs and Counterinsurgency Outcomes 15 2 Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Civilian Auxiliaries 16 2.1 Insurgency................................. 16 2.2 Counterinsurgency............................ 22 2.2.1 COIN Policies........................... 27 2.3 Civilian Defense Forces.......................... 34 2.3.1 CDFs and Rebel Mobility.................... 35 2.3.2 CDFs and Rebel Concealment.................. 37 2.3.3 CDFs and Popular Support for Rebels............. 40 2.3.4 Hypothesis............................. 41 2.3.5 Caveats and Concluding Remarks................ 43 3 CDFs and COIN Victory: An Empirical Test 46 3.1 Research Design.............................. 47 3.1.1 Dependent Variable........................ 50 3.1.2 Explanatory Variables...................... 52 3.2 Statistical Analysis............................ 56 3.3 Alternative Model Specifications..................... 60 3.4 Endogeneity and Selection Effects.................... 60 3.5 Maximizing CDF Effectiveness...................... 69 3.6 Concluding Remarks........................... 76 II Tribal Groups and Civilian Defense Forces 78 4 Intertribal Rivalry and CDF Formation 79 4.1 CDF Formation as a Delegation Problem................ 80 4.2 Formal Model............................... 83 4.2.1 Players and Moves........................ 83 4.2.2 Payoffs............................... 85 4.3 Formal Model Analysis.......................... 87 4.3.1 Non-Rivalrous Village...................... 87 4.3.2 Rivalrous Village......................... 87 4.3.3 Government............................ 88 4.3.4 Equilibria............................. 90 4.3.5 Comparative Statics....................... 90 4.4 Implications................................ 91 4.5 Tribal Society: A Proxy Measure of Rivalries.............. 92 4.5.1 Definition............................. 93 4.5.2 Lex Talionis: The Imperative of Blood Vengeance....... 96 4.5.3 Concluding Remarks....................... 101 5 CDFs in Turkey and the Philippines: An Empirical Test 103 5.1 Research Design.............................. 103 5.1.1 Dependent Variable........................ 105 5.1.2 Explanatory Variable....................... 106 5.1.3 Controls.............................. 108 5.1.4 Estimation............................. 112 5.2 Empirical Analysis............................ 113 5.3 Sensitivity Analysis............................ 116 5.4 Discussion................................. 118 5.4.1 Illustration: Tribal Rivalries and CDF Service......... 119 5.5 Concluding Remarks........................... 123 6 Conclusion 124 6.1 Unanswered Questions For Future Research.............. 133 Appendix A Documentation for COIN Outcome Codings 137 Appendix B Revisions to the Lyall/Wilson Data 170 Appendix C Documenting Civilian Defense Forces 181 Appendix D The Data At A Glance 203 List of Figures 3.1 Substantive Impact of CDFs on COIN Outcomes........... 59 3.2 The Timing of CDF Deployment.................... 64 4.1 A Formal Model of CDF Formation................... 85 5.1 Administrative Map of Turkey...................... 104 5.2 Administrative Map of the Philippines................. 105 5.3 Tribal Groups and CDFs: A Scatterplot................ 108 5.4 Substantive Impact of Tribal Groups on CDF Deployment...... 115 List of Tables 3.1 Crossnational CDF Deployment: Summary Statistics......... 55 3.2 CDFs and COIN Outcomes....................... 56 3.3 CDFs and COIN Outcomes: 1945{2006................ 57 3.4 Brant Parallel Regression Assumption Test.............. 61 3.5 Multinomial Logit Analysis....................... 62 3.6 CDFs and Selection Effects....................... 64 3.7 CDF Selection Effects: A Multivariate Analysis............ 66 5.1 Provincial CDF Deployment: Summary Statistics........... 111 5.2 Regression Analysis of Subnational CDF Deployment......... 114 5.3 Substantive Effects of Key Variables.................. 116 5.4 Sensitivity Analysis........................... 117 D.1 CDFs and COIN Outcomes, 1945{2006................. 203 D.2 Province-Level CDF Distribution: Turkey and the Philippines.... 206 Chapter
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