UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX

Topic A: The Situation in Topic B: The Situation in LETTER FROM THE CO-EXECUTIVE

Dear delegates,

Welcome to the United Nations Security Council! My name is Helen, and I’m your Co-Executive. Over the course of this conference, you will be engaging with a complex current conflict with serious implications for the international community.

To introduce myself, I’m a third-year undergraduate student at the University of Chicago. I’m majoring in in Public Policy with a specialization in Education Policy. Outside of class, I tutor students in local Chicago schools and work in the UChicago Admissions Office as a tour guide. I first became involved in Model UN in my Seattle-area high school, when my first conferences as a delegate gave me incredibly eye-opening experiences that have continued to influence me in my time here at UChicago. Outside of classes and MUNUC, I am also involved with our collegiate competitive Model UN team as well as ChoMUN (our collegiate MUN conference). This will be my third year in MUNUC and second year as an executive, as I chaired our Interpol committee last year. I’m very excited to be Co-Executive of the Security Council this year, and look forward to meeting you all.

The Security Council is charged with maintaining international peace and security. To carry out this responsibility, it is the only UN body authorized to impose sanctions or deploy peacekeeping forces. Of its 15 delegates, 5 will have veto power, making the diplomatic process in this committee particularly complex. The topics that the UNSC addresses are similarly complex, often requiring highly difficult conflict resolution processes, extreme differences in opinion and interests, and catastrophic humanitarian consequences when solutions are not found. In short, the Security Council plays high-stakes games – something that I believe makes it one of the most fascinating and exciting committees to simulate.

For your committee this year, we have selected the situations in Burundi (Topic A) and Yemen (Topic B). The post-election violence and human rights violations in Burundi have waxed and waned in their intensity over the past few years, but have problematically remained largely out of the international spotlight. On the other hand, the Yemeni has attracted very much international attention, leading to highly complex layers of domestic and international tension, along with the rise of extreme terrorist groups, complete lack of central power, and severe need for international aid. Whichever topic you pick, I hope it will bring out the most of your diplomatic, analytic, and creative abilities over our upcoming conference.

If you have any questions at all, please feel free to email me at [email protected]. The entire Security Council staff has been working hard to make your MUNUC XXIX one full of engagement with fascinating world issues, exciting debate, and the best experiences possible. We look forward to meeting you in February!

Best,

Helen Zhang

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX LETTER FROM THE CO-EXECUTIVE

Welcome to the United Nations Security Council!

We are Aiden and Helen, Co-Executives, and we are so excited to have you all here to participate in what will surely be an awesome and eventful weekend! We are both third year students at the University of Chicago who spend a ridiculous amount of time doing Model UN on campus. Helen is involved in our competitive traveling team as well as our college conference Chomun as an executive, whereas Aiden serves on ChoMUN’s Secretariat as an Under-Secretary General. We are also both tour guides who work for the UChicago Admissions Office as well as being roommates, so we tend to spend a lot of time together even outside of MUN. As far as what we study on campus, Helen is a Public Policy major while Aiden is a History and Political Science double major. Between the two of us we spend a lot of time reading and writing about the different social/political/economic issues that people face around the world and what we’re hoping for you all is to explore these issues in two particular countries.

For Topic A, we picked the situation in Burundi because we feel as though oftentimes African countries are only discussed in cases of war and famine. Aiden, whose family is from Ethiopia, has especially noticed this over the course of her political studies, because in many discussions of African politics the citizens of these countries are not really discussed in such a way that gives them political agency. So, what we’re hoping to for you all to get out of our discussions is mostly an opportunity to explore the political landscape of an African country that has a very interesting historical background. It isn’t about knowing everything there is to know about the conflict but rather to understand the ways in which history has shaped this country into what it is today so that we can figure out what we should do to fix its political problems going forward. We know this topic is going to be unfamiliar to many people, but we hope you all have as much debating it as we did researching it!

Topic B is the crisis in Yemen. Although, occasionally mentioned in discussions about terrorism, this politics of this particular country have often been relegated to the sidelines of our history books. Another former colonial state, Yemen as we know it is a relatively new state with very old political problems. Due to its strategic location, various groups within the country are always being supported by various international actors, meaning that its domestic politics have always been inextricably linked to the geopolitical situation which surrounds it. This is especially important when considering the fact that most of the world’s oil passes through the narrow strait between the Arabian peninsula and the African coast and thus just a few kilometers off the coast of Yemen. When considering how to solve its internal political crises it will be crucial to consider the international interests at play in the region and how this will influence their decision to either support or reject whatever coalition is created.

We look forward to seeing you all at MUNUC this year, and please do not hesitate to reach out to us with any questions at [email protected].

Best,

Aiden Million

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX COMMITTEE HISTORY

The Security Council has a long and storied history as the most powerful and influential organ within the United Nations (UN). Active since the UN was chartered in 1945, the Security Council has most visibly coordinated the actions of the military and peacekeeping forces in missions across the globe, but its role in the world extends far beyond overseeing field operations. The main goals of the Security Council are simple and explicitly defined: investigate and report on threats to international peace across the globe; resolve these disputes, using diplomatic means whenever possible and escalating to coercive measures, such as economic sanctions, as necessary; and facilitate disarmament and demobilization of belligerents in conflicts through the deployment of peacekeeping troops.1 It is fitting that, with such large responsibilities, the Security Council has the widest range of action across the UN: it is the only body capable of applying sanctions, deploying troops, and generally, writing binding resolutions that member states are obligated follow.

Reflective of its importance and influence, membership criteria for the Security Council was initially designed around the key players in the international order following the victory of the Allied nations in World War II, namely the “P5” nations of , the , the United Kingdom, the Republic of (today commonly known as Taiwan), and the Soviet Union; in the decades since its founding, the lattermost two countries have been replaced by the People’s Republic of China (1971) and the Russian Federation (1991) respectively. These five nations hold permanent seats on the Council and hold a veto power over any resolution. That is, in order for a resolution to pass, each of these five nations must either approve or abstain from voting on it; put another way, if any of these countries object, the resolution automatically fails to pass. The remainder of the fifteen-country roster of the Security Council is comprised of ten rotating spots, to which member nations of the UN are elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly.2 This basic structure has remained mostly intact since the UNSC’s founding, and was intended as a compromise of sorts between the practical balance of power in the world (hence, the P5) and the need for all members of the UN to be represented (the elected positions). However, while the original Council had only eleven members—its small size was supposed to enable it to make decisions more quickly—the number of elected seats was increased from six to ten in 1965.3

The Security Council was born at the end of the Second World War, at a time when many diplomats felt that some kind of collective security mechanism was necessary to prevent the world from descending into a third major conflagration. It was the spiritual successor to the , whose inability to compel nations to adhere to internationally agreed-upon standards led to the outbreak of WWII in the first place. Evaluating the record of the UNSC is less clear-cut. During the , the Council was rendered largely ineffective by the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, both of whom possessed veto power as

1 “What We Do,” United Nations Foundation. 2 “Current Members,” United Nations Security Council. 3 Zachary Laub, “The UN Security Council,” CFR.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX permanent members. As a result, little was accomplished until the early 1990s, as both countries saw international affairs as a zero-sum game, and certainly neither would approve of a resolution that they perceived to benefit the other at its own expense.

Proxy conflicts—armed engagements between two opposing forces that are armed and funded by larger foreign nations—throughout the world thus went unaddressed since intervention would create an imbalance in the global balance of power throughout the early years. The two main international missions authorized by the Security Council during this time were the Korean War in the early 1950s and the Congo conflict in the 1960s.4 Neither mission was overwhelmingly successful, with the Korean War resulting in the latitudinal partition of the Korean peninsula, and the United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC) leaving behind a long and lingering conflict. Overall, the UN was not able to undertake many peacekeeping missions of its own (apart from the intervention in 1956, the first deployment of peacekeeping troops) as a direct result of the Cold War dynamic. Troops were deployed to the Suez conflict, a struggle for control over the Suez Canal between French and British interests and the newly-minted Egyptian president Nasser, in order to preserve order and prevent Western advances. Unlike the or Congo crisis, the Suez Crisis was perpetrated by two of the permanent members--the goal was to stop the aggression of a colonial power, not to create order for a nation in-peril or draw Cold War borders.

The years following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the subsequent normalization of relations between the US and the newly formed Russian Federation saw a rapid expansion in the number and size of Security Council missions, as Cold War dynamics no longer constrained the situations in which the Council could act. Early in the 1990s, the Security Council used its powers to greatly increase its commitments worldwide, such as in Somalia in 1993.5 However, power struggles between the United States and other permanent members and the ultimate failure of the mission in Somalia caused policymakers to shy away from potentially costly foreign interventions in the following years, leading the

4 David Bosco, Five to Rule Them All, New York: Oxford, 2009. 5 Ibid.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Council to ignore several enormous humanitarian crises, including the and Yugoslavian conflict in the mid- to late 1990s. This post-Cold War era of Security Council politics has no doubt been blemished by its failures despite its increased interventions throughout the past two decades. Nonetheless, in light of the urgent and serious threats to international peace and security today, the Security Council, as an institution, is as needed as ever.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX TOPIC A: THE SITUATION IN BURUNDI

Topic A Statement of the Problem

Since April 2014, unrest in Burundi has grown to a full-fledged civil conflict. The Burundian conflict is rooted in incumbent president ’s running for a third term in office, violent government suppression of opposition, and ultimately the elections that allowed Nkurunziza to remain in power. The African Union, East African Community, and United Nations have all attempted to address the unrest and growing violence to varying degrees in recent years, with little success. Human rights violations, massive numbers of refugees and internally-displaced persons, and emerging claims of ethnic dimensions of the conflict have only complicated the situation. Delegates will need to address all of these nuances in order to successfully make progress in combatting the violence in Burundi.

On April 25, 2015, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) announced that the incumbent President Pierre Nkurunziza would be the party candidate for the June presidential . Widespread concerns about the constitutionality of this third term in presidential office made Nkurunziza’s decision to run strongly disputed. Widespread demonstrations

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX began in the capital, , nearly immediately. Police attempting to halt the influx of demonstrators into the city immediately resulted in violent clashes: even the first two days of demonstrations involved police use of teargas, water cannons, and live ammunition, and left at least two dead and several injured.6 In the wake of this emerging conflict, several questions must be answered by the international community. what underlying tensions sparked unrest following Nkurunziza’s candidacy? Do previous agreements disqualify Nkurunziza from a third term in office? How can the international community reconcile the various parties to the conflict in Burundi?

Ethnic Dimensions of the Conflict

While Nkurunziza has warned of escalations into the genocidal situation of the 1993 Burundian and Rwandan genocides, the extent to which the current crisis is ethnically motivated is complicated by several situations, particularly the origins of the CNDD-FDD and the power-sharing model of government from the past decade. In the current power-sharing system, the government is constitutionally obligated to divide power between major ethnic groups in the nation, the and .

Ethnic violence is intertwined with the history of colonialism and post-colonialism in the African Great Lakes region, particularly in the concentration of genocides in the three states of former Belgian Africa (Burundi, , and the Congo). Though the pre-colonial had been ruled by Tutsi Kings over a Hutu majority, Belgian colonialism created a deep animosity in a Hutu- Tutsi divide inhabiting Belgian Africa. This can be attributed to the Belgian use of as a ruling class to control the majority-Hutu population with brutal colonial policies, driven by extreme Belgian demand for profits from the region’s coffee cultivation. These policies (which involved

6 “Burundi: Crackdown on Protestors,” , April 27, 2015, accessed November 12, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/27/ burundi-crackdown-protesters.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX most severe punishments on Hutu workers for not meeting quotas) focused Hutu anger at their situation on the Tutsi elite.7

Since ceded control, a series of genocides by Tutsi of Hutu, and by Hutu of Tutsi, have been continuous in the African Great Lakes region. In the 1993 Burundian genocide that led to the 1993-2005 civil war in Burundi, the CNDD-FDD originated as a Hutu peasantry militia. It thus arose as a small armed struggle made up of convinced that Tutsis wanted to use the army to remain in power. Over the next decade, the CNDD-FDD’s power grew until it became a major political force necessary to the peace process finalized in 2005, when Nkurunziza (head of the CNDD-FDD), was elected to presidency by parliament with a large Hutu majority vote and some Tutsi support as well.

While the CNDD-FDD thus originated as a Hutu rebel group, the government since headed by the CNDD- FDD has by no means been one of a Hutu governing group. The peace accords that followed the Burundian genocide mandated that the government maintain proportional representation of Hutu’s and Tutsi’s in all parts of administration, military, and other branches. Thus, while the brutal repression of the Burundian public at this time has certainly reached levels of high violence, it has not been along the same ethnic lines driving the tensions and genocides in immediate post-colonial Burundi—and while the current violence certainly possesses potential to turn into an ethnic conflict, many would agree that it cannot yet be characterized as one. Delegates will thus need to be deeply aware of the distinction between genocide and non-genocidal violence.

The Arusha Accords

Central to the Burundian crisis is the argument that Nkurunziza’s third term in office is a violation of the Arusha Accords, which were crucial in ending the twelve-year civil war in Burundi from 1993-2005. The current violence is the worst that Burundi has seen since the war.

The erupted from systematic failures to address deep-rooted ethnic divisions between the Hutu and Tutsi. In 1988, repeated violent crises and significant international pressure did lead to Tutsi President Buyoya’s attempts to reconcile the gap between Tutsi-Hutu representation in government; indeed, Buyoya integrated Hutu into senior civil service positions for the first time, and formed a commission with six Tutsi and six Hutu members to guide the promotion of national unity.8 However, when he implemented the first free multi-party elections in 1933, Buyoya was severely defeated by Hutu opposition leader Melchior

7 Peter Langford, “The Rwandan Path to Genocide: The Genesis of the Capacity of the Rwandan Post-Colonial State to Organise and Unleash a project of Extermination,” Civil Wars (7), University of Leeds, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698280500074412.

8 Willy Nindorera, “The CNDD-FDD in Burundi: The Path from Armed to Political Struggle,” Berghof Transitions Studies (10), Berghof Foundation, http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/Transitions_Series/transitions10_burundi.pdf.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Ndadaye. Less than three months later, the army (still dominated by Tutsis) assassinated Ndadaye and several of his closest associates, sparking nationwide ethnic violence and the following twelve-year war.

The CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza’s party), originated in the midst of this war as the leading Hutu opposition group to the Tutsi military. It was initially composed of the Hutu peasantry, who were motivated by the previous decades of discrimination and by the army assassination of Ndadaye; growth of the movement it necessary to bring the CNDD-FDD to the negotiation table.9 Initial negotiations in the Pretoria Protocol allowed the CNDD-FDD fighters to be integrated into the military and security forces of Burundi, recognized the CNDD-FDD as a political party with provisions to enter political institutions. Indeed, the end of the civil war is largely attributed to the final Arusha Accords, particularly its reformation of the defense and security forces and return to a democratic system with regularly scheduled elections and universal suffrage. Nkurunziza came to power in 2005 with the first parliamentary elections for the transitional government.

The power-sharing model of government established by the Arusha Peace Accords have been applauded as instrumental in terminating the civil war, de-ethnicizing political competition, and reducing potential destabilizing effects of elections.10 The power-sharing model did put forth several provisions favorable to all parties involved. For example, the Arusha Accords stipulated that the President shall be assisted by two Vice- Presidents of different ethnic groups and political parties; a maximum of 60% of ministers may be Hutu, a maximum of 40% of ministers may be Tutsi, and at least 30% must be women; the Minister of National Defense and the Minister managing National Police must also belong to different ethnic groups.11 These stipulations clearly follow a model of Consociationalism, a political system in which the leaders of deeply divided factions share power in the government to create a stable democracy.12 Consociationalism thus involves four main characteristics: (1) a coalition government involving all factions, (2) some level of faction autonomy over policy, (3) proportional representation in the electoral system, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds, and (4) a minority veto.13

However, several weaknesses of the Arusha Accords should also be recognized. First, though the first Arusha Agreement certainly opened the way later peace agreements on ending the war, it was not negotiated nor signed by the Hutu rebel movements.14 Second, the Arusha Accords treated power-sharing as a division of power an incumbent party’s government and other major political parties involved in parliament, particularly in terms of different political, military, administrative, diplomatic, and economic positions—which did not

9 Ibid., 27. 10 Stef Vandeginste, “Power-sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi: Twenty Years of Trial and Error,” Africa Spectrum 44 (3), Institute of African Affairs at GIGA, Hamburg/Germany, 63, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40607824. 11 Ibid., 75. 12 “Consociationalism,” Britannica, accessed July 10, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/topic/consociationalism. 13 Ibid. 14 Vandeginste, “Power-sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi: Twenty Years of Trial and Error,” 71.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX explicitly address the role of Hutu rebel movements such as the CNDD-FDD until they made themselves a political party. 15

The Arusha Accords, while successfully ending the 1993-2005 Burundian civil war, thus resulted in discrepancy in understandings of the power-sharing model in the government and regular CNDD-FDD pushing of the boundaries of the peace agreement.

Origins of Unrest

The CNDD-FDD justified eligibility of the campaign by pointing to the parliamentary election that led to Nkurunziza’s first term in office; the constitution specifies that the president may stay in office for two terms, as elected by “the people.” As the violent demonstrations centered on the campaign controversy, the CNDD- FDD sought legitimacy by bringing the case before the Burundian Constitutional Court, the highest court of the nation. However, Judge Sylvere Nimpagaritse’s escape from Burundi revealed that senior figures of the CNDD-FDD government had placed enormous pressure and death threats on the court judges to rule in favor of Nkurunziza’s campaign.16 Nimpagaritse additionally revealed that a majority of the court’s seven judges believed it unconstitutional for Nkurunziza to run for a third term in office, but were fearful of humiliating the president and being forced into a dangerous opposition position against the government.17 While the remaining court members ultimately ruled in favor of Nkurunziza’s campaign, widespread knowledge of the CNDD-FDD manipulation of the court ruling only incited increasing violence in demonstrations.

By May 2015, the CNDD-FDD had refused to withdraw Nkurunziza’s candidacy and increased police force against demonstrators, leading to further escalation of the conflict. The first major opposition attack, carried out in the capital by unidentified gunmen using automatic weapons and grenades, left three dead; in response, Security Minister Gen Gabriel Nizigama labeled the protesters as “criminals, terrorists, and even enemies [of Burundi]… a terrorist enterprise.”18 Notably, however, while the Nkurunziza government continued to increase police force against demonstrators, the military appeared neutral throughout the protests—indeed, regularly breaking up violent clashes between police and demonstrators.19

Divisions within the military became apparent within on May 13, 2015 when Major General (a former army chief of staff and head of intelligence) declared a coup d’état while Nkurunziza

15 Ibid. 16 “Senior Burundi judge flees rather than approve president’s candidacy,” The Guardian, May 4, 2015, accessed July 11, 2016, http://www. theguardian.com/world/2015/may/05/senior-burundi-judge-flees-rather-than-approve-presidents-candidacy. 17 Ibid. 18 “Burundi calls opposition protestors ‘terrorists,’” BBC, May 2, 2015, accessed July 10, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32566213. 19 “Senior Burundi judge flees rather than approve president’s candidacy.”

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX was in discussing the situation with other East African leaders.20 However, Niyombare clearly lacked full command of the army—which contains a mix of ethnic and political groups which fought each other during the 1993-2005 Burundian civil war, including the Hutu militia once led by Nkurunziza. Indeed, army loyalists to the president quickly regained control of the airport, presidential offices, and state broadcaster, secured Nkurunziza’s return to Burundi, and shut down the coup; Nkurunziza’s return saw the deployment of heavily armed soldiers in Bujumbura.21 Though Nkurunziza largely retained international support, this coup drew in vast regional and international concern, including the UN Security Council Electoral Observation Mission to Burundi, sent to observe and report on fairness of the June elections. Despite the coup, public support for General Niyombare, and clear controversy and opposition regarding Nkurunziza, elections in June 2015 were conducted with Nkurunziza as the CNDD-FDD candidate.

The deaths and disappearance of opposition figures to Nkurunziza in the time immediately preceding and following elections destroyed any chance of negotiations between the opposition and the CNDD-FDD. Talks broke down following the assassination of Zedi Feruzi, the leader of a party opposed to Nkurunziza’s proposed third term. All opposition and civil society groups withdrew from negotiations in protest of the assassination, and boycotted the July 15 presidential election.22 Other prominent political figures who escaped Burundi earlier in the summer further delegitimized the election: both Second Vice President Gervais Rufyikiri and parliamentary speaker Pie Ntavyohanyuma released statements from Belgium regarding the humiliation and threats that had forced them out of Burundi.23 In an international recognition of the illegitimacy of the elections, the African Union and European Union both stood down their election observer commissions upon finding that the elections would not be free, fair, transparent, or credible.24

Nkurunziza was re-elected without opposition participation on July 21, 2015 and sworn in to his third term as president on August 20. In the time between his re-election and swearing in, government killings of opposition leaders and human rights activists continued to rise. Since then, violence in the nation has only increased to the point of concerns over another civil war in Burundi.

Major Parties in the Conflict

Burundi’s election controversy and violence has resulted in several opposition groups to Nkurunziza’s government. These groups have emerged at different times during the conflict, are governed by different

20 Njuwa Maina, “Crowds cheer as Burundi army officer says he has deposed absent president,” Reuters, May 13, 2015, accessed July 10, 2016, http:// www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-idUSKBN0NY0O020150513. 21 Patrick Nduwimana and Goran Tomasevic, “President returns to Burundi after army says coup bid failed,” Reuters, May 15, 2015, accessed July 10, 2016, http://in.reuters.com/article/burundi-politics-idINKBN0NZ0D920150514. 22 Clement Manirabarusha and Goran Tomasevic, “Opposition breaks off Burundi peace talks over killing of opposition leader,” Reuters, May 25, 2015, accessed July 10, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-idUSKBN0OA10T20150525. 23 Ibid. 24 Clement Manirabarusha, “African Union says Burundi election not free or fair, speaker flees,” Reuters, June 28, 2015, accessed July 10, 2016, http:// www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-africanunion-idUSKCN0P80YD20150628.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX motivations, and have taken different actions against Nkurunziza. It is thus important for delegates to understand not only Nkurunziza’s CNDD-FDD and general opposition actions, but to also understand these nuances within the opposition.

The National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD- FDD) is the incumbent party of Burundi. In the 1993 Burundian genocide, the CNDD-FDD originated as a small Hutu peasantry militia in an armed struggle; for the next decade, it continued to grow until it constituted a real military and political force that the international community needed to take into account in Burundi’s 2005 peace process.25 In 1993, with the assassination of President Ndadaye, many distraught Hutus killed their Tutsi neighbors; in response, the army deployed throughout the country and began massacring Hutus, often with the help of Tutsi militias.26 In this context, residents of the mostly Hutu working class neighborhoods of Kamenge and Kinama began to organize the resistance, Hutu students at the Higher Institute of Military Officers (ISCAM) deserted their camp, and surviving former members of Ndadaye’s government, all came together to form the rebel movement. Although the movement was initially an ethnic organization with propaganda songs and anti-Tutsi slogans, after 2000, hatred of Tutsis was progressively replaced with slogans promoting democracy for all Burundians, and the CNDD-FDD’s massive presence made it a key player in the signing of the Arusha Accords and following peace. 27 By the time the CNDD-FDD became the incumbent government of Burundi, the group had evolved from its identity as a Hutu militia to a group supported by both Hutus and Tutsis, and dedicated to the power-sharing model between both ethnicities as outlined in the Arusha Accords. As the incumbent leader of this party and of Burundi since the first elections after the end of the civil war, Pierre Nkurunziza is facing protestors and rebels who are fighting against his third term in office on the grounds that it is unconstitutional.

Created in 2010, the Imbonerakure is a group that consists of former military wing fighters from the CNDD- FDD’s time as a rebel force during the civil war.28 Members are on average between the ages of 25-35, and officially has a membership of about 5,000 people, though the number of armed youth is estimated to be as little as 500.29 The group has been accused of failing to demobilize after the civil war, and more recently of being involved in widespread violence and conducting an intimidation campaign against Tutsi refugees on behalf of the CNDD-FDD government. However, in the time between the civil war and more recent violence, most incidents involving Imbonerakure were more local or individual – for example involving land disputes.

25 Nindorera, “The CNDD-FDD in Burundi: The Path from Armed to Political Struggle,” 13. 26 Ibid., 14. 27 Ibid., 18. 28 Elsa Buchanan, “Burundi: who are the feared Imbonerakure youth?” IB Times, June 3, 2015, accessed July 10, 2016, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ burundi-who-are-feared-imbonerakure-youth-1504301. 29 Ibid.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Additionally, reports have shown that support for Nkurunziza with the Imbonerakure is strongly divided. This complicates accusations that the Imbonerakure are conducting politically motivated attacks. While there have been reports of the Imbonerakure heavily targeting FNL (National Forces of Liberation) opposition members to Nkurunziza, these attacks may be conducted by a small population of Imbonerakure, and may be rooted in earlier conflicts. Furthermore, while refugees reported Imbonerakure threats and intimidation referencing earlier genocides (using slogans such as “Tuzobameza” [We will wash you] and “N’ubu Nkambere” [Now like in the past]”), these campaigns and ethnically-targeting language were later heavily condemned by the CNDD-FDD government. 30 While the involvement of the Imbonerakure in the recent violence is nebulous, and the extent of their members carrying out intimidating or violent acts is ambiguous, the group has gained a more notorious reputation for remaining armed and participating in the recent conflict as a wing of the CNDD-FDD. A solution to the unrest in Burundi thus will necessarily address the failure to completely demobilize and disarm the Imbonerakure following the 1993-2005 civil war.

Rebellion forces against Nkurunziza are not well-defined. While protests have been ongoing, only a few major attacks against the CNDD-FDD government have been carries out. The May 13 attempted coup byGeneral Godefroid Niyombare was the first and largest attempt to overthrow Nkurunziza. Since then, general from the foiled coup have repeatedly threatened the government with smaller attacks across the country. In July 2015, General Leonard Ngendakumana, a deputy to Niyombare’s attempted coup, accused Nkurunziza of dragging Burundi back into civil war, and claimed responsibility or increased fighting and clashes with the army in Northern Burundi around the time of the election.31 Agathon Rwasa, a former Hutu rebel leader in Burundi’s civil war, has also begun leading the Amizero y’Abarundi coalition of the rebellion, and had been one of many threatening armed struggle in the face of Nkurunziza’s refusal to consider any challenges to his third term despite significant domestic and international pressure.32 While these rebel groups are still ill-defined, these many emerging leaders within the rebellion demonstrate the complexity of the rebel identity, and the need to consider many different parties in carrying out a successful negotiation.

Humanitarian Concerns

Human Rights Violations

The violence in Burundi has drawn increasing international attention, particularly from human rights organizations like Amnesty International. Amnesty International cites violations of the freedom of assembly, of expression (particularly of media and journalists), excessive use of force, and allowance of impunity (a lack

30 Elsa Buchanan, “Burundi: Imbonerakure youth militia wages intimidation campaign against Tutsi refugees,” IB Times, May 28, 2015, accessed July 10, 2016, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-imbonerakure-youth-militia-wages-intimidation-campaign-against-tutsi-refugees-1503199. 31 Clement Manirabarusha, “Gunmen captured, killed by Burundi army in clashes in north: governor,” Reuters, July 12, 2015, accessed July 10, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-idUSKCN0PM0EV20150712. 32 Clement Manirabarusha and Edmund Blair, “Burundi opposition leader calls for unity government to avert conflict,” Reuters, July 22, 2015, accessed July 10, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-opposition-idUSKCN0PW1E020150722.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX of consequences following injurious actions).33 Events exemplifying these human rights violations include a series of government force killings carried out on December 11, 2015, called the “single bloodiest day” of the crisis.34 After a rebel attack on three military installations in Bujumbura, Burundian security forces responded by entering homes in “opposition neighborhoods,” forcefully dragging men out of their houses, and shooting some at close range.35 Since then, satellite imagery has revealed several mass graves around these neighborhoods, suspected to hold bodies of the victims from the December 11 killings.36

The impunity enjoyed by government-affiliated forces, and the unlawful killings, torture, and other ill- treatment of rebels has further drawn international attention and condemnation. The crisis in Burundi has only escalated as the Nkurunziza government continues to meet protestors and rebels with violent force.

Refugees

As of May 2016, the number of Burundi-originating refugees has reached over 262,000. These refugees have fled to camps in their neighboring African Great Lakes region nations, including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (21,186), Rwanda (73,926), Tanzania (131, 834), and (22,330), and the average rate of new arrivals per week is over 1,000 in Tanzania, 500 in Uganda, 230 in Rwanda, and 200 in the DRC.37 The huge influx of refugees has led to a massively overwhelmed African Great Lakes region, with overcrowding in all host countries. Conditions in transit and reception centers have been reported as extremely dangerous, with continued reports on detention at various checkpoints, and high rates of gender-based and sexual violence persisting.

Regional Reactions

The African Union attempted to respond to the Burundian crisis in December 2015 by authorizing the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), a 5,000-srong peacekeeping force for Burundi. The peacekeeping force would have been in place for an initial period

33 “Burundi 2015/2016,” Amnesty International, accessed November 13, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/burundi/African Union rapid reaction force report-burundi/. 34 “Burundi: Extrajudicial executions and systematic killings must be investigated,” Amnesty International, December 22, 2015, accessed November 13, 2016. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/12/burundi-extrajudicial-executions-and-systematic-killings-must-be-investigated/. 35 “Burundi: Suspected mass graves of victims of 11 December violence,” Amnesty International, January 29, 2016, accessed November 12, 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr16/3337/2016/en/. 36 Ibid. 37 Leo Dobbs, “Number of Burundian refugees top 250,000 since April,” UNHCR, March 4, 2016, accessed November 13, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/ en-us/news/latest/2016/3/56d97f2d9/number-burundian-refugees-tops-250000-since-april.html.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX of six months, with military and police regiments drawn from the Eastern African Standby Force—a “regional force created for peace support operations that includes troops from , Rwanda, and Uganda, among others, and is mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat and support political dialogue.”38 The proposal was particularly groundbreaking in its recommendation to invoke Article 4(h) of the African Union’s constitutive act, which “allows the continental body to force a peacekeeping presence on recalcitrant members in order to prevent ‘genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.’”39 By authorizing this proposal, the African Union thus implied they would force an AU peacekeeping mission in Burundi even without President Nkurunziza’s approval. However, given strong pushback by Nkurunziza, and lack of authorization by the UN Security Council, MAPROBU ultimately was not carried out.

38 Ty McCormick, “African Union set to deploy 5,000 peacekeepers in Burundi,” Foreign Policy, December 18, 2015, accessed November 13, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/18/african-union-set-to-deploy-5000-peacekeepers-in-burundi/. 39 Ibid.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Topic A History of the Problem

The Legacy of Colonialism

The Kingdom of Burundi was a small independent African kingdom in the African Great Lakes region. It was a Kingdom whose population was made up of various ethnic groups who had settled in the region centuries ago. Most notably there were two large ethnic groups, the Hutus and the Tutsis, as well as several other smaller tribes present in other parts of the Great Lakes region. The Hutus, who had settled in the area after the Tutsis, were primarily an agrarian population which lead to them being relegated to a lower status than the ruling Tutsi tribes. Over time, the Hutus were able to establish some representation within the ruling Tutsi aristocracy but they were still far from equal in terms of representation in the aristocratic classes. Despite this complicated ethnic strife, the Kingdom was still one of the strongest civilizations in Africa and sought to remain an independent nation even in the face of colonial advances.

Unfortunately, Burundi was no match for the military might of the Germans. Colonialism in Burundi itself officially began in 1899 after its incorporation into German . Even through the Kingdom had resisted German advances by rejecting all attempts to incorporate Western values in the country, resistance was violently crushed in 1899 with the King forces to concede suzerainty to Germany. The Germans followed the example of many other European powers by ruling indirectly. There was a minimal foreign presence and the King was kept in power, leaving the previous political structure intact. Thus, under German colonialism, power continued to be concentrated within the Ganwa, the princely Tutsi aristocracy lead by the Mwami or King. This consolidation of power within the Tutsi tribes meant that the more agricultural Hutu tribes became further and further removed from the seats of power. The Tutsi political elite sought to create policies that would further benefit themselves and their new colonial overseers, therefore shutting out the old Hutu political elite who once stood as the lone representatives for the Hutu tribes. This was especially problematic because it meant that many of the policies enacted during this time were explicitly set up to benefit both Germany and the Tutsi aristocracy often at the expense of the Hutu tribes. This manifested itself very early in colonial period as the nation faced frequent famine due to diseases from Europe continually devastating livestock and local populations.

Belgian colonialism in the Great African lakes region began in 1885 after the conclusion of the Berlin Conference, which divided up the African continent into various European colonies. The resulting 1885 Treaty of Berlin codified trade and colonization in Africa and accelerated the Scramble for Africa between the great colonial powers, including France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium. Up until this point, Belgium (a nation that only gained its independence from the Netherlands in 1830) was not in the possession of any colonies, let alone African colonies which were widely sought after by the other major European nations. However, King Leopold II who had large colonial ambitions tried to change this by

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX pushing his government to take control of territory in the Congo Basin that until this point was not firmly under the control of any other colonial nation. His government remained unconvinced, leading Leopold to create the colony through his own means by setting up trading companies who essentially prepared the nation for colonialism by conducting research and setting up infrastructure. The area was officially recognized as a Belgian colony in the 1880s as the other imperial powers saw this as an opportunity to put a “buffer” between various colonies and check German interests in the region.

In the decades that followed, widespread and horrific use of violence by Belgium against indigenous Congolese populations proliferated in the pursuit of wealth, shocking the world. There was much pressure for Belgium to take official control of the colony and prevent such abuses, culminating in the official establishment of the in 1908. The government, although made up of local individuals, was completely guided by Belgian representatives as the economic interest of foreign corporations further shaped Congolese domestic policy. Additionally, certain ethnic groups which had previously faced discrimination, such as the Hutu, were heavily favored under this new regime. This policy was prevalent across all Belgian colonies and served as a way for the colonial powers to ensure that the local populations would not band together against them. For example, in the later years many members of the Hutu tribes in Burundi were educated by the Catholic Church and thus considered evolved enough to be involved in politics whereas many Tutsi, who were formerly the wielders of power, were shut out of the political process entirely.

The Founding of Ruanda-Urundi

After , Belgium was also given control of the and created the merged country of Ruanda-Urundi, which was made up of the populations of modern day Rwanda and Burundi. Although it was technically a United Nations trustee nation, Belgium, like their European colonial counterparts, treated this area like a colony. Although the political structure remained unchanged as Belgium continued the German tactics of indirect control, the entire social sphere was turned upside down. In this new Belgian society, the Hutus were now favored in Burundi over the Tutsis with the Tutsis being completely removed from any position of power. Over the next 50 years, the inequality established between Hutu and Tutsi only grew worse until Burundi gained independence in 1962.40 In the following decades, economic development sustained the country until the resurgence of violence in 1993.

40 Alan J. Kuperman, “Burundi’s Balancing Act,” Foreign Affairs, August 28, 2015, accessed November 11, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/burundi/2015-08-28/burundis-balancing-act.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Topic A Past Actions

UN-Led Efforts

The United Nations has maintained a presence in Burundi since the end of its civil war. In October 2006, the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) was established by the Security Council to assist the Burundian government in returning the country to a peaceful and stable state. BINUB implemented its mandate through activities in four domains:

• Peace consolidation and democratic governance; • Disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reform of the security sector; • Promotion and protection of human rights and measures to end impunity; and • Coordination with United Nations agencies.41

In 2011, the UN established the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) to further support the progress of BINUB. The resolution creating BNUB cited several challenges in Burundi that merited continued UN presence in the country, most pressingly democratic governance, the fight against corruption, civilian protection, and human rights protections, particularly regarding rights of women, children, and marginalized minorities.42 The UN resolution further emphasized the need to improve promotion and protection of human rights by citing continuing rights violations in extrajudicial killings, torture, media censorship, and restrictions on civils society and opposition political parties.43 In February 2014, BNUB began to transfer its responsibilities to the UN Country Team for Burundi. Priority areas for transition included (I) Democratic Progress, Governance, and Institution Building, (II) Human Rights and Transitional Justice, (III) Rule of Law, (IV) Security and Stability, and (V) Social and Economic Development.44 The joint transition plan outlined detailed benchmarks and indicators of success for each of these areas, and established the UN Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi (MENUB) in order to “follow and report on the electoral process in Burundi before, during, and after the 2015 elections.”45

MENUB began its mission in January 2015, and its statements on the Burundian presidential election served as an important source of information for the Security Council. The MENUB Preliminary Statement on the presidential elections was released on July 27, 2015, and concluded that “while Election Day was relatively

41 Office of Internal Oversight Services, Audit Report 2009/648/01, “The United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB),” December 23, 2009, https://usun.state.gov/sites/default/files/organization_pdf/159873.pdf. 42 “Security Council Extends Mandate of UN Political Mission in Burundi,” United Nations Office in Burundi, December 20, 2011, accessed November 11, 2016, http://bnub.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=2961&ctl=Details&mid=5312&ItemID=24129&language=en-US. 43 Ibid. 44 “United Nations in Burundi Joint Transition Plan 2014,” United Nations Office in Burundi, April 30, 2014, accessed November 11, 2016, http://bnub. unmissions.org/Portals/bnub/UN Burundi Joint Transition Plan 2014.pdf. 45 Ibid., 5.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX peaceful and conducted adequately, the overall environment was not conducive for an inclusive, free, and credible electoral process.”46 The report cited several challenges to the electoral process, including severe restrictions on media freedom, politically motivated violence, and inadequate training for polling station staff. This conclusion informed the Security Council response of concern to the elections and following violence.

Since the 2015 elections, the UN Security Council has addressed the Burundian crisis in several resolutions to voice international concern regarding increasing violence in the area. In July 2016, the Security Council deployed a UN police force of 228 additional officers for a one-year period to “monitor the security situation and to support the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in monitoring human rights violations and abuses.”47 However, Burundi’s parliament rejected the proposed police force, despite continuing violence. The UN has not attempted to take further collective action in Burundi since July 2016.48

AU-Led Efforts

The African Union (AU) has also attempted to address the violence in Burundi through several measures separate from those of the United Nations. In January 2016, the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) recommended the deployment of a 5,000-strong African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU).49 However, the AU ultimately rejected this recommendation for political reasons.

This failure to intervene in Burundi demonstrates the impact of African leaders’ disjointed and divided opinions on the situation. Though the AU initially left the situation in Burundi to theEast African Community (EAC), the EAC never condemned violence in Burundi carried out by Nkurunziza’s forces. The AU’s consequent attempts to intervene failed to ensure unity of political support against violence conducted by both the Nkurunziza government and the rebels. The AU’s weak response to the Burundian crisis can be seen actions prior to the election as well; while the AU Commission sent high-level delegations, a special envoy, human rights and military observers, sanctions, and investigations into human rights violations, all of these had little effect without member states’ full political support.50

MAPROBU similarly failed to pass due to lack of political support from AU member states. This lack of support was in large part due to the recommendation to invoke Article 4(h) of the AU Constitution should

46 United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi, “Preliminary Statement: Bujumbura, 27 July 2015,” July 27, 2015, United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi, https://menub.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/francee.pdf. 47 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2303, “The situation in Burundi,” July 29, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol=S/RES/2303(2016). 48 “Ambition Versus Reality,” International Crisis Group, 13, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/burundi/ african-union-and-burundi-crisis-ambition-versus-reality. 49 “Ambition Versus Reality,” 1. 50 “Ambition Versus Reality,” 5.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Burundi reject the MAPROBU force, which established the AU’s right to intervene in a member state in cases of “grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.”51 The recommendation for MAPROBU marked the first time that Article 4(h) would have been threatened against a member state; this threat thus touched a nerve with member states whose democratic credentials and human rights records have been criticized in the past and whom Article 4(h) may similarly be applied to in the future.52 Thus, invoking Article 4(h) divided member states, some of which claimed sovereignty trumps human rights, and some of which did not believe Burundi was near catastrophic violence.53 The failure to authorize MAPROBU despite the PSC recommendation severely damaged AU credibility, and the AU has not attempted to take further action in Burundi since the January 2016 proposal.

The only current mediator of the situation is Uganda’s President Yoweri Meseveni, who hosted a political dialogue on the crisis in Burundi in December 2015 and was appointed the EAC mediator of the crisis in July 2016. Though the efficacy and appropriateness of Museveni’s role as mediator has been questioned due to his own campaign to run for a fifth term in office (after thirty years in power), Museveni remains the only mediator whom President Nkurunziza has met with thus far.54

51 “Constitutive Act,” African Union, accessed November 13, 2016, http://www.au.int/en/about/constitutive_act. 52 “Ambition Versus Reality,” 8. 53 Ibid., 10. 54 Elsa Buchanan, “Burundi meditation talks: Is Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni the right man to broker peace?” IB Times, December 15, 2015, accessed November 13, 2016, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-mediation-talks-ugandas-yoweri-museveni-right-man-broker-peace-1533457.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Topic A Possible Solutions

The UNSC, AU, and EAC’s past attempts and failures to address the Burundian crisis have demonstrated deep divisions between different political actors and the need to unify political support behind clear, decisive, solutions. Collaboration between all three bodies, and establishing unified support within each of these bodies, will thus be crucial in preventing the continuation or escalation of violence in Burundi.

Collaboration and Political Unity

The UNSC will need to collaborate with African states to see change in the Burundian crisis, and should reach out to the AU and EAC to build common consensus and coordinate better to resolve the tensions in Burundi.55 While many states many not see Museveni as the ideal mediator, he remains the only individual Nkurunziza has met with on the topic of reconciliation thus far. As the only existing channel of communication between Nkurunziza and the opposition, and given Nkurunziza’s resistance to UN pressure, the UN should take note of Museveni’s position and support efforts at mediation. Though it has made little progress thus far, Museveni’s EAC-led mediation is currently the only mechanism for dialogue; thus it has been suggested that the UN and AU should provide logistical, financial, and political support for further, more involved, mediation by Museveni and other EAC leaders.56 The ultimate goal should be to reach open dialogue on the root of the conflict: all controversial articles in the constitution and Arusha Accords, including the power-sharing model and rules on presidential elections.

Economic Pressure via Targeted Sanctions

With government revenue falling, forecasts of further GDP slumping, and a generally weak economy, the Burundian government is currently highly vulnerable to economic pressures.57 Though internationally controversial, certain targeted sanctions could thus be a highly effective way to increase pressure on Nkurunziza. While the United States and EU banned certain Burundian leaders from travelling and froze their assets as early as 2015, such sanctions were primarily symbolically important and impacted Burundi very little.58 Indeed, these leaders don’t even have strong links with American or European banks, but rather African ones. 59 Any effective targeted sanctions will thus need to involve the African community and leaders in the African Union.

55 “Ambition Versus Reality,” 14. 56 Ibid. 57 “Ambition Versus Reality,” 14. 58 Benjamin Chemouni, “Burundi: how to stop the bloodshed and avert civil war,” The Guardian, January 29, 2016, accessed November 13, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/29/burundi-four-ways-to-stop-the-bloodshed-and-avert-civil-war. 59 Ibid.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX If the UN and AU should successfully collaborate and align their goals on Burundi, the international community could further increase economic pressure by threatening to remove Burundian troops from the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the UN mission in the Central African Republic. These two missions are a vital monetary lifeline for the Burundian government.60 Thus, if the EU and AU were to remove Burundian troops from the AMISOM mission, or pay AMISOM soldiers directly, these two groups could dramatically increase economic pressure on the Nkurunziza government to incentivize reducing violence and engaging in dialogue with the opposition.

60 “Ambition Versus Reality,” 15.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Topic A Bloc Positions

African Countries

Angola, , Senegal

The ramifications of the conflict and instability in Burundi has been relatively localized with African nations and neighboring countries in particular feeling the greatest brunt of the violence. As conditions continue to worsen in the country, massive numbers have continued to pour into neighboring countries triggering a significant refugee crisis. Due to the porous nature of borders in this region, many fear that this political instability and violence will spread endangering the unsteady status quo in nations like Kenya and Rwanda. Although, much effort has been made to solve the crisis through regional institutions such as the East African Community and the African Union, neither have been able to successfully broker peace. The African Union for its part has been closely working with the United Nations and European Union as this situation has continued to escalate creating political and economic ramifications.

As these three specific countries are not regionally near Burundi and do not host a significant population of Tutsi and Hutu, are not necessarily worried about supporting one specific group in the conflict. Instead, they would be more interested in ensuring that the resolution sets a precedence for peaceful outcomes to ethnic conflict.

NATO Members

Egypt, France, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America

Countries in Europe and North America have tried to broker peace between the warring factions through institutions like the United Nations and the European Union, however these efforts seem to be unsuccessful. These nations are not directly affected by the conflict, but do have significant interests in stabilizing the region. Fearing that continued instability could internally fracture the nation by prompting a renewal of the ethnic conflicts that have plagued the region for decades, they are eager to stop the blatant human rights abuses taking place on both sides of the conflict. Finally, as the primary export partners of Burundi and the primary sources of foreign aid, the nation is reliant on strong relations with this region61 that have fallen apart as a consequence of this crisis and plunged the economy into further danger.

61 “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, last modified November 3, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/by.html.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Latin America and the Caribbean

Uruguay, Venezuela

Similar to the NATO members, these countries are not directly affected by the Burundian crisis. But, because they do not have a vested interest in opposing Russian interests or supporting NATO interests it is likely that they are looking to solve this conflict peacefully and without any human rights transgressions.

Uruguay and Venezuela, as nations that have been greatly affected by political strife and the ensuing economic fragility, are seeking to improve the conditions in Burundi but are weary of western intervention. Furthermore, Latin American countries have started increase economic ties in Africa62 particularly in East Africa in the form of agricultural diplomacy,63 meaning that the continuation of this conflict is a threat to their commercial interests as well. Japan holds very similar views but Malaysia and New Zealand have been more amenable to western intervention.

Russia and China

China, Russian Federation

Like many other countries, neither China nor Russia have a direct investment in the situation in Burundi. Still, both have taken measures in the past to ensure that the West does not have unlimited power to make international military decisions. Most recently, they blocked a statement condemning the conflict in Burundi. Whether they have economic interests or simply want to block NATO resolutions, the ultimate motivations behind this move are unknown. But it is overwhelmingly clear that these two countries intend to keep the western countries in check.

62 “Peru plans to step up trade presence in Africa,” Andina, ed. Félix Paz Quiroz (Lima: Peru News Agency, 2014), last modified October 17, 2014, http:// www.andina.com.pe/INgles/noticia-peru-plans-to-step-up-trade-presence-in-africa-527933.aspx. 63 Calestous Juma, “AgroDiplomacy: Grpowing Relations Between Latin America and Africa,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, last modified August 3, 2011, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21271/agrodiplomacy.html.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Topic A Bibliography

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Buchanan, Elsa. “Burundi: Imbonerakure youth militia wages intimidation campaign against Tutsi refugees.” IB Times. May 28, 2015. Accessed July 10, 2016. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-imbonerakure-youth-militia-wages- intimidation-campaign-against-tutsi-refugees-1503199.

Buchanan, Elsa. “Burundi: who are the feared Imbonerakure youth?” IB Times. June 3, 2015. Accessed July 10, 2016. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-who-are-feared-imbonerakure-youth-1504301.

Buchanan, Elsa. “Burundi meditation talks: Is Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni the right man to broker peace?” IB Times. December 15, 2015. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/burundi-mediation-talks- ugandas-yoweri-museveni-right-man-broker-peace-1533457.

“Background.” United Nations Office in Burundi. http://bnub.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=2963&language=en- US.

“Burundi 2015/2016.” Amnesty International. Accessed November 13, 2016. https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/ africa/burundi/report-burundi/.

“Burundi calls opposition protestors ‘terrorists.’” BBC. May 2, 2015. Accessed July 10, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-africa-32566213.

“Burundi: Crackdown on Protestors.” Human Rights Watch. April 27, 2015. Accessed November 12, 2016. https://www. hrw.org/news/2015/04/27/burundi-crackdown-protesters.

“Burundi: Extrajudicial executions and systematic killings must be investigated.” Amnesty International. December 22, 2015. Accessed November 13, 2016. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/12/burundi-extrajudicial- executions-and-systematic-killings-must-be-investigated/.

“Burundi: Suspected mass graves of victims of 11 December violence.” Amnesty International. January 29, 2016. Accessed November 12, 2016. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr16/3337/2016/en/.

Chemouni, Benjamin. “Burundi: how to stop the bloodshed and avert civil war.” The Guardian. January 29, 2016. Accessed November 13, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/29/burundi-four-ways-to-stop- the-bloodshed-and-avert-civil-war.

“Consociationalism.” Britannica. Accessed July 10, 2016. https://www.britannica.com/topic/consociationalism.

“Constitutive Act.” African Union. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://www.au.int/en/about/constitutive_act.

“Current Members.” UN News Center. Accessed July 5, 2016.

Dobbs, Leo. “Number of Burundian refugees top 250,000 since April.” UNHCR. March 4, 2016. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/3/56d97f2d9/number-burundian-refugees-tops- 250000-since-april.html.

Laub, Zachary. “The UN Security Council.” Council on Foreign Relations. December 6, 2013. Accessed July 5, 2016.

“What We Do.” United Nations Foundation. Accessed November 10, 2016. http://www.unfoundation.org/what-we-do/ campaigns-and-initiatives/.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Chemouni, Benjamin. February 2, 2016. “Burundi: What Can Actually be Done?” The London School of Economics and Political Science. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2016/02/02/burundi-what-can-actually-be-done/.

Dumont, Gabriel A. Yemen: Background, Issues, and Al Qaeda Role. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010.

International Crisis Group. “Burundi: Bye Bye Arusha?” Africa Report (192). International Crisis Group. http://www. crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/burundi/192-burundi-bye-bye-arusha.aspx.

Langford, Peter. “The Rwandan Path to Genocide: The Genesis of the Capacity of the Rwandan Post-Colonial State to Organise and Unleash a project of Extermination.” Civil Wars (7). University of Leeds. http://www.tandfonline. com/doi/full/10.1080/13698280500074412.

Maina, Njuwa. “Crowds cheer as Burundi army officer says he has deposed absent president.” Reuters. May 13, 2015. Accessed July 10, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-idUSKBN0NY0O020150513.

McCormick, Ty. “African Union set to deploy 5,000 peacekeepers in Burundi.” Foreign Policy. December 18, 2015. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/18/african-union-set-to-deploy-5000- peacekeepers-in-burundi/.

Manirabarusha, Clement. “Gunmen captured, killed by Burundi army in clashes in north: governor.” Reuters. July 12, 2015. Accessed July 10, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-idUSKCN0PM0EV20150712.

Manirabarusha, Clement and Edmund Blair. “Burundi opposition leader calls for unity government to avert conflict.” Reuters. July 22, 2015. Accessed July 10, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics-opposition- idUSKCN0PW1E020150722.

Manirabarusha, Clement and Goran Tomasevic. “Opposition breaks off Burundi peace talks over killing of opposition leader.” Reuters. May 25, 2015. Accessed July 10, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-politics- idUSKBN0OA10T20150525.

Nduwimana, Patrick and Goran Tomasevic. “President returns to Burundi after army says coup bid failed.” Reuters. May 15, 2015. Accessed July 10, 2016, http://in.reuters.com/article/burundi-politics-idINKBN0NZ0D920150514.

Nindorera, Willy. “The CNDD-FDD in Burundi: The Path from Armed to Political Struggle.”Berghof Transitions Studies (10). Berghof Foundation. http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/ Papers/Transitions_Series/transitions10_burundi.pdf.

Office of Internal Oversight Services. Audit Report 2009/648/01. “The United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB).” December 23, 2009. https://usun.state.gov/sites/default/files/organization_pdf/159873.pdf.

Pago, Anais, and Melanie Wissing. “Burundi: Guarded Optimism that Long-Term IDPs May Achieve Durable Solutions”. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/ burundi/2015/burundi-guarded-optimism-that-long-term-idps-may-achieve-durable-solutions/.

“Peru plans to step up trade presence in Africa.” Andina, edited by Félix Paz Quiroz (Lima: Peru News Agency, 2014). Last modified October 17, 2014. http://www.andina.com.pe/INgles/noticia-peru-plans-to-step-up-trade- presence-in-africa-527933.aspx.

“Security Council Extends Mandate of UN Political Mission in Burundi.” United Nations Office in Burundi. December 20, 2011. Accessed November 11, 2016. http://bnub.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=2961&ctl=Details&m id=5312&ItemID=24129&language=en-US.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Schweiger, Romana. “Late Justice for Burundi”. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 55 (3). Cambridge University Press: 653–70. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092644.

“United Nations in Burundi Joint Transition Plan 2014.” United Nations Office in Burundi. April 30, 2014. Accessed November 11, 2016. http://bnub.unmissions.org/Portals/bnub/UN Burundi Joint Transition Plan 2014.pdf.

United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2248. “Burundi.” November 12, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/ view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2248(2015).

United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2279. “The situation in Burundi.” April 1, 2016.http://www.un.org/en/ ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2279(2016).

United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2303. “The situation in Burundi.” July 29, 2016. http://www.un.org/en/ ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2303(2016).

“Senior Burundi judge flees rather than approve president’s candidacy.” The Guardian. May 4, 2015. Accessed July 11, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/05/senior-burundi-judge-flees-rather-than-approve- presidents-candidacy.

United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi. “Preliminary Statement: Bujumbura, 27 July 2015.” July 27, 2015. United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi. https://menub.unmissions.org/sites/default/ files/francee.pdf.

“The World Factbook.” Central Intelligence Agency. Last modified November 3, 2016.https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html.

Vandeginste, Stef. “Power-sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi: Twenty Years of Trial and Error.” Africa Spectrum 44 (3). Institute of African Affairs at GIGA, Hamburg/Germany: 63–86. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/40607824.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX TOPIC B: THE SITUATION IN YEMEN

Topic B Statement of the Problem

The began with the overthrow of Yemen’sPresident Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi in March 2015 by Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), also known as the Houthis. However, roots of the civil war can be found in instability in Yemen resulting from the end of former President ’s 22-year reign following 2011 protests, and in armed conflict between the Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi’s followers and the Yemeni government has furthermore been ongoing 2004. The conflicts and relationships between the Hadi government, Houthi rebels, and pro-Saleh forces is only further complicated by the role of regional powers and other groups in the Middle East. and have both been heavily involved in supporting the Hadi government and Houthi rebels, respectively. Additionally, both Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have been attracted to the instability of Yemen and established a presence in the country. The conflict in Yemen has escalated to a humanitarian disaster, leaving 80% of its population in need of aid.64

64 “Yemen crisis: who is fighting whom?,” BBC, October 14, 2016, accessed November 13, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-middle-east-29319423.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Delegates will need to understand all layers of the current conflict in Yemen – from its causes and historical context, to details of domestic tensions, regional states vying for power, international involvement, and humanitarian crises in order to attempt to coherently address the multitude of problems the conflict presents.

Origins of Conflict: The and Hadi’s Transitional Government

Political instability rose in Yemen during the 2011 Yemeni Revolution against former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and has remained rampant throughout the Hadi presidency and current civil war. In January 2011, Tunisian street protests sparked similar demonstrations in Yemen.65 These protests in Yemen complained of mounting poverty, lack of political freedom, and government corruption, and escalated to calling for President Saleh to step down. Though Saleh originally resisted pressure from both domestic opposition and the international community, by November 2011 he signed a deal for immunity from persecution in exchange for handing over power to his then- vice president Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi, a candidate agreed upon by both Saleh’s government and parts of the opposition.66 President Hadi was inaugurated in February 2012 after uncontested elections. However, both Saleh’s step down from power and Hadi’s inauguration were undermined by violence in Yemen between supporters of different factions.

The Houthis, having opposed the Saleh government since the mid-2000s, comprised a large opposition faction. Though the Houthis originated in the late 1980s as a religious and cultural revivalist movement of Zaydi Shi’ite Islam in northern Yemen, they became politically active in 2004 in opposing Saleh for his support of the US invasion of Iraq.67 Beginning in 2004, the Houthis took up armed rebellion against the Saleh government, and continued low-level violence against both government and pro-government tribal forces. The Houthis thus comprised a major faction of opposition before, during, and after the 2011 Yemeni Revolution. Indeed, the Houthis opposed the deal allowing former President Saleh immunity from persecution in exchange for handing over power, and continued to oppose the government formed under President Hadi.

From 2012-2014, the UN-sponsored National Dialogue conference brought all opposition and government groups together to set the foundation for a new Yemeni constitution.68 The Hadi government, Houthis, and several other factions all participated. However, while the Houthis participated in these political negotiations, they maintained a revolutionary stance and continued expanding control on the ground.69 Additionally, President Hadi struggled to deal with several problems inherited from Saleh’s presidency: attacks by al-Qaeda, a southern separatist movement, continued loyalty of many military officers to Mr. Saleh, and government

65 “Yemen profile,” BBC, August 10, 2016, accessed November 13, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14704951. 66 “Yemen’s Saleh agrees to transfer power,” Al Jazeera, November 24, 2011, accessed November 13, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/ middleeast/2011/11/2011112355040101606.html. 67 Zachary Laub, “Yemen in Crisis,” CFR, April 19, 2016, accessed November 13, 2016, http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemen-crisis/p36488. 68 Laub, “Who Are Yemen’s Houthis?” 69 Ibid.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX corruption, high unemployment, food insecurity, and the Houthis.70 In this environment of political instability, the took control of their northern heartland of the province and surrounding areas.71 Many ordinary Yemenis, disappointed with their initial hopes for change under President Hadi’s transitional government, supported the Houthis, allowing for the Houthi’s entrance into the capital, Saana, in September 2014.72 However, it was widely perceived that the Houthis first arrived in Saana not to seize complete control over the government, but rather to help install a more competent one.73 When the Houthis placed Hadi under house arrest, marking a shift from supporting the interim government to seizing control, their popularity dropped. In February 2015, the Houthis appointed a presidential council to replace President Hadi, who fled the city of , located in the more firmly government-controlled southern area of Yemen.74

Main Parties to the Conflict within Yemen

The Hadi Government, Houthis, pro-Saleh forces, and Al-Qaeda

70 “Yemen crisis: who is fighting whom?’ 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Charles Schmitz, “In Cahoots with the Houthis,” Foreign Affairs, April 19, 2015, accessed November 11, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/yemen/2015-04-19/cahoots-houthis. 74 “Yemen profile.”

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX The Hadi Government

In March 2015, the Houthis and pro-Saleh forces attempted to take control of the entirety of Yemen, forcing Hadi to flee abroad.75 However, Saudi Arabia began leading a coalition to counter the Houthis with an air campaign aimed at restoring the Hadi government; while pro-government forces made up of Hadi-supporting soldiers, predominantly Sunni southern tribesmen, and separatists, helped keep Aden out of Houthi control.76 Coalition group troops then drove the Houthi and anti-Hadi forces out of much of the south, allowing the Hadi government to establish a temporary home in Aden.77 Borders between Houthi-controlled and Hadi- controlled areas have remained at approximately a stalemate in the time since, despite heavy fighting in the region by both sides in attempts to gain more territory.

Hadi’s support within Yemen remains thin, particularly after his highly-critiqued transition government. However, the international community continues to recognize the Hadi government as the legitimate government of Yemen, and has significantly aided Hadi’s side of the civil war. Amongst the countries backing Hadi, Saudi Arabia has played a particularly large role in its heavily involved campaigns against the Houthis.

The Houthis

The Houthi originated from northern Yemeni followers ofZaydi Islam, the second-largest branch of Shiite Islam.78 Though followers of Zaydi Islam comprise a majority of citizens in northern Yemen, they constitute just 40% of Yemen’s total population; the great majority of Yemen’s remaining population follows Shafi’i Sunni Islam.79 Furthermore, before the country’s unification in 1990, the northern majority-Zaydi region and the southern majority-Shafi’i region of Yemen were two distinctly separate areas.80 The struggle for power between these two groups is thus one that is centuries old.

The Houthis began in the late 1980s as a northern Yemeni movement to protect and revive Zaydi religious and cultural traditions, and became politicized in 2004 under their late leader, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi.81 Al-Houthi’s opposition to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and Saleh’s support for the United States, instigated a government order to arrest al-Houthi and the ensuing years of armed conflict between Hussein’s followers and the Yemeni government.82 From 2004 to 2010, the Houthis fought six rounds of armed conflict with the Saleh government.

75 “Yemen crisis: who is fighting whom?” 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Schmitz, “In Cahoots with the Houthis.” 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Laub, “Who Are Yemen’s Houthis?” 82 Ibid.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX As the Saleh government collapsed during the Arab Spring, the Houthis joined the Yemeni National Dialogue Conference (NDC) and dramatically increased their political relevance at the national level. The NDC aimed to bring together the Yemeni government and all opposition groups to create a peace plan. By joining the NDC, the Houthi movement gained a seat at the national bargaining table, where they advocated popular positions such as a federal state based on democratic principles, religious freedom, and balance of powers in the government.83 Their historic tensions with the Saleh government and openly voiced critiques of the transition led by Hadi thus lent them a reputation as outsiders to the Yemeni government, winning them further support.84

Since taking control of Sanaa, however, the Houthis’ popularity has declined dramatically in Southern Yemen. While their move into the capital to help install a more competent government was popularly supported across the country, their house arrest of Hadi, monopolization of control over Sanaa, and territorial expansion outwards all contributed to a rapid drop in public favor. Indeed, when Houthi militias reached southern Yemen, local tribesmen and other people perceived them as an occupying force.85 This incited the southern resistance that has since solidified, gained traction and tribal support, and formed the backbone of the domestic forces now opposing the Houthis in civil war.

Northern Yemen, however, continues to support the Houthi movement. As the historic heartland and stronghold of the Houthis, the Houthis have maintained military control and offer the only coherent leadership.86 Hadi has no connections to the north, and the Houthis historic entrenchment in the northern tribes and leadership will most likely continue to maintain their control and support in northern Yemen, regardless of national politics.

Pro-Saleh Forces

Though former President Ali Abdullah Saleh was deposed in the popular 2011 Yemeni Revolution, the failures of Hadi’s political transition have contributed to a gain in Saleh’s popularity. Furthermore, many of Yemen’s security forces, tribal networks, and members of the General People’s Congress (GPC) political party remain loyal to him and his son Ahmed Abdullah Saleh.87

Though the relationship between Saleh’s government and the Houthi movement was one of continual tension and conflict throughout Saleh’s presidency, many former Saleh government members have now chosen to ally with the Houthi movement. Despite a tenuous history, when the Houthis forced President Hadi to flee Sanaa

83 “The Huthis: From Saada to Sanaa,” International Crisis Group, June 10, 2014, accessed November 11, 2016, https://www.crisisgroup.org/ middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/huthis-saada-sanaa. 84 Ibid. 85 Schmitz, “In Cahoots with the Houthis.” 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX and Saudi intervention in Yemen began, Saleh offered to serves as a mediator between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis. Though these efforts went nowhere, Saleh continued to push for a new round of talks during the first month of Saudi airstrikes. Saleh is also thought to have influenced the Yemeni military in standing down to the Houthi’s entrance into Sanaa in September 2015.88 However, in April 2015 he also offered the Saudi coalition help in retiring the Houthis to Northern Yemen, which would leave Saleh at the center of Yemen’s political future.89

This offer to mediate with Saudi Arabia and growing influence with the Houthi thus shows Saleh’s primary motivation is to regain power within Yemen. While Houthi and Saleh-controlled areas of Yemen are considered one side of the civil war (against the side of Hadi’s government), it is important to note Saleh’s history of tension with the Houthis and offers of support to both sides of the war. Thus, while Houthi forces and pro-Saleh forces are allied for the time being, they should still be considered separate groups, with separate loyalties, ideologies, and motivations.

Other Domestic Actors

Though the Houthi movement and the Hadi government are the two main sides of the ongoing civil war, the problem of recreating the state is exacerbated by the presence of Al-Qaeda in the Peninsula (AQAP) and other southern secessionist movements. Much like the Houthi movement arose from lack of government services and control in norther Yemen, southern provinces have had similar complaints with the Saleh government and sought to secede. Though these secessionist movements have not developed the military capacity of the Houthis, they are still a major faction of Yemeni people who will need to play a role in any political resolution to the war.

AQAP has further complicated matters in many respects. When the Yemeni Revolution began in 2011, Saleh moved troops deployed throughout the country to Sanaa in an attempt to bolster security and maintain control of the capital.90 The resulting security vacuum allowed Ansar al-Sharia (either a rebranding of AQAP in Yemen or a group affiliated with AQAP), to take over the southern province of Abyan, where they have since restored social services, repaired infrastructure, established sharia courts, and declared Abyan an Islamic emirate.91 The rise of many extremist groups amongst the chaos of the Yemeni Civil War has thus created an additional dimension of the problem highly concerning to the international community. Yemen is torn between the Houthis, pro-Saleh forces, AQAP, and the southern secessionists, and none are capable of controlling the entire country.92

88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),” CFR, June 19, 2015, accessed November 11, 2016, http://www.cfr.org/yemen/ al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Regional Involvement

Tensions in Yemen have only been further heightened and complicated by the heavy involvement of regional powers, primarily Iran and Saudi Arabia. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have waxed and waned for centuries, but in the past few decades their rift has been especially hostile. Historically, the relationship has been fraught with religious tensions, a power struggle for regional leadership in the Middle East, and taking by opposing sides in major conflicts.

Though Saudi Arabia and Iran have been on opposing sides of the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam, respectively, it is important not to overstate the role of in their rivalry. Sunnis and Shia share many fundamental beliefs of Islam, and have co-existed for over a thousand years. However, it is noteworthy that these two

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX nations’ statuses as leaders of Sunni and Shia Islam have informed their foreign policies—specifically leading to alliances with countries sharing their respective theologies, and backing militant groups in countries that do not.93

There are currently two sites of conflict of greatest concern for Saudi Arabia and Iran: Syria and Yemen. In Syria, Iran has supported President Assad, while Saudi Arabia has opposed Assad’s continued stay in government; both countries have been supporting various rebel groups in Syria.94 In Yemen, Saudi Arabia has heavily intervened on behalf of President Hadi’s government, while Iran has been accused of supporting the Houthi forces.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen began when Hadi was forced to flee the country in early 2015. The Saudi response wasOperation Decisive Storm, a coalition of Saudi Arabia and nine other Middle Eastern nations that primarily conducted airstrikes to counter the rapid expansion of Houthi control. Operation Decisive Storm lasted approximately a month before Saudi Arabia ended the campaign claiming it had “achieved its military goals.”95 However, Saudi and coalition airstrikes, ground forces, and naval troops have since continued to maintain a presence in Yemen in hopes of restoring the Hadi government to power.

93 Thom Poole, “Iran and Saudi Arabia’s great rivalry explained,” BBC, January 4, 2016, accessed November 11, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-middle-east-35221569. 94 Ibid. 95 Jeremy Bowen, “Yemen conflict: Saudi Arabia ends air campaign,” BBC, April 21, 2015, accessed November 11, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-middle-east-32402688.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX The aftermath of Saudi air strikes in Yemen

Operation Decisive Storm was declared over in April 2015 with a statement that Saudi Arabia had successfully pushed back on Houthi expansion. However, at the end of Operation Decisive Storm, Hadi had not been restored to power, nor had most of the Houthi-controlled territories been regained. Saudi coalition spokesperson General Ahmed al-Asiri stated that the campaign was ending on the grounds that “the rebels no longer posed a threat to civilians,” but that the coalition would “continued to prevent the Houthi militias from moving or undertaking any operations inside Yemen [through] a combination of political, diplomatic, and military action.”96 Operation Restoring Hope, which succeeded Operation Decisive Storm and originally aimed to focus on political settlements and counterterrorism, has since involved Saudi Arabia in far more military action than political or diplomatic talks.

It should be noted that this is not the first time that Saudi Arabia has been militarily involved in combatting the Houthis in Yemen. Indeed, during the Saleh regime’s 2009 , Saudi Arabia openly entered the conflict with significant military operations against the Houthis following reports of Houthi incursions in Saudi territory that killed several Saudi border guards.97

96 Ibid. 97 Christopher Boucek, “War in Saada,” Carnegie Papers no. 110 (April 2016), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/war_in_saada.pdf, 11.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX The (GCC)

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a loose political and economic alliance between Saudi Arabia, , the , , , and Bahrain. The six members of the GCC share similar political systems and cultures, run by autocratic or sheikhdoms.98 Saudi Arabia is the most powerful member in the group, often leading initiatives by the group. The GCC collectively possesses nearly half of the world’s oil reserves. In 2004, GCC members signed a counterterrorism intelligence-sharing pact, and in 2008 the GCC’s common market came into existence.99

The GCC states, led by Saudi Arabia, initiated talks between Yemen’s various political factions during the Yemeni Revolution in 2011; negotiations were overseen by UN envoys and representatives from 10 countries.100 These talks led to the GCC Initiative, which set up the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) and created the idea of a “transitional phase” from Saleh’s regime to a new Hadi government. The obvious failure of the GCC Initiative and Hadi’s transitional government should serve as a lesson of mistakes not to be repeated in future solutions pursued.

Since Houthi takeover of control in the capital and onset of full-scale civil war, nearly all GCC states have contributed to the Saudi-led military intervention to bolster Hadi government control. While Saudi Arabia continues to deploy the largest military force dedicated to countering the Houthis, the role of the other Gulf States is not irrelevant. In Operation Decisive Storm, for example, Saudi Arabia’s 100 warplanes were immediately supported with 30 jets from the United Arab Emirates and many more from other allied states.101 Such regional support for Saudi Arabia’s continued military intervention should be noted.

Iran

It is widely believed that Iran has trained and armed Houthis since the early stages of the movement’s militancy in the 2000’s, particularly as Houthi and Shi’ite control in Yemen would serve Iran well as a strategic foothold in the Arabian Peninsula. Though Iran officially supports President Hadi’s government, many Gulf Arab states have accused Iran of backing the Houthi movement both financially and militarily.102 Iran continues to deny any involvement with the Houthis, but nevertheless has continually criticized political settlement efforts of

98 “Profile: Gulf Co-operation Council,” BBC, February 15, 2012, accessed November 11, 2016, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_ profiles/4155001.stm. 99 Ibid. 100 Maged Al-Madhaji, “How Yemen post-2011 transitional phase ended in war,” Sana’a Center, July 2016, accessed November 11, 2016, http:// sanaacenter.org/publications/item/39-how-yemen%E2%80%99s-post-2011-transitional-phase-ended-in-war.html. 101 “Saudi and Arab allies bomb Houthi positions in Yemen,” Al Jazeera, March 26, 2015, accessed November 11, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/ news/middleeast/2015/03/saudi-ambassador-announces-military-operation-yemen-150325234138956.html. 102 “Yemen crisis: who is fighting whom?”

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Saudi Arabia and the international community. For example, following the commencement of the Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm, Iran immediately condemned the air strikes as “US-backed aggression.”103

Though it is unclear exactly how much Iran is involved in the current conflict or how much influence Iran has over the Houthi movement, Yemen is still considered one of many current points of contention in Saudi-Iran hostilities. At the very least, Iran’s vocal criticism of Saudi coalition actions has lent anti-Hadi forces a small amount of regional support.

Terrorism in Yemen

Political instability in Yemen has led to a rising presence to both AQAP as well as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The presence of these two extremist groups in Yemen has only further complicated and destabilized the situation, and increased international concern.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula (AQAP)

AQAP has long been considered the most dangerous branch of al-Qaeda by western intelligence agencies.104 Formed in 2009 in a union of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of Al-Qaeda, AQAP carries out both domestic insurgencies while inspiring and directing attacks in the United States and Europe.105

Al-Qaeda has historically been based in certain areas of southern Yemen where central government control is weak or non-existent, tribal families rule, and the government is unpopular due to neglect and lack of development.106 Furthermore, Al-Qaeda has had a presence in Yemen since at least 1992, and has built deep relationships with Yemeni tribes in its controlled territories.107

The Houthi and Hadi government focus on the civil war has left counterterrorist measures by the wayside and AQAP unchecked, allowing AQAP to establish control over cities along more than 350 miles of coastline, ports along the coastline, profits from oil, and parts of Aden; furthermore, the rapid expansion of Houthi control in Yemen over the past year has pushed some Sunni tribes to align with AQAP against a perceived common threat.108 By establishing control over geopolitically strategic cities along the coast and major highways, AQAP has been able to create smuggling routes to supply its fighters and local people to create alliances.109 Thus,

103 Simon Tisdall, “Iran-Saudi proxy war in Yemen explodes into region-wide crisis,” Guardian, March 26, 2015, accessed November 11, 2016, https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/26/iran-saudi-proxy-war-yemen-crisis. 104 “Yemen crisis: who is fighting whom?” 105 “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” 106 Carla E. Humud, Al Qaeda and U.S. Policy (CRS. Report No. R43756) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/ crs/mideast/R43756.pdf, 15. 107 “Capitalizing on Chaos in Yemen,” Soufan Group, February 19, 2016, accessed November 11, 2016, http://soufangroup.com/ tsg-intelbrief-capitalizing-on-chaos-in-yemen/. 108 Laub, “Yemen in Crisis.” 109 “Capitalizing on Chaos in Yemen.”

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX recent conflict in Yemen has allowed for not only AQAP’s expansion of territory, but of influence in Yemen as well.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

In March 2015, ISIL carried out its first major attacks in Yemen with two suicide bombings, which targeted Shia mosques in Sanaa and killed 137 people.110 ISIL also claimed major attacks in May and June, including a suicide car bombing that killed at least 40 army recruits in Aden.111 However, ISIL remains a smaller, newer, presence in Yemen compared to AQAP. Whereas Al-Qaeda’s tribally-entrenched presence in Yemen holds thousands of members, ISIL’s ranks are still in the hundreds.112

Both the emergence of an ISIL presence in Yemen and the expansion of Al-Qaeda in the region are a testament to the environment of political instability and its consequences, and have been of great concern to the international community.

Other International Involvement

The United States, United Kingdom, and France

Saudi Arabia has seen support from not only its neighboring regional allies, but also from several western countries: namely, the US, UK, and France. Though these three nations have not engaged in the conflict militarily, they have continued to support the Saudi campaign and the Hadi government in providing arms to Saudi Arabia and other coalition states. Though the level of destruction caused by Saudi bombing has made the US, UK, and France increasingly reluctant to support the campaign with all sides of the war accused of war

110 “Yemen profile.” 111 Ibid. 112 Laub, “Yemen in Crisis.”

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX crimes, shipments of arms have not stopped. This is despite massive international pressure for these nations to stop shipping arms to Saudi Arabia, on grounds of human rights violations and bombings of schools, hospitals, and other civilian areas.

Though the United States claims that its primary involvement in the region is that of logistical and intelligence support, it remains the largest provider of arms to Saudi Arabia. During Operation Decisive Storm, the US authorized additional arms sales to coalition states. In November 2015, the US approved a $1.3 billion sale to restock Saudi’s depleted munitions, and has sold Saudi Arabia approximately $22.2 billion in weapons since the war began.113 The US has vested interests in Yemen due to the presence of Al-Qaeda, and in the overall region due to oil supply and trade. The Hadi government is, to the US, a government in Sana’a that will cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism programs; with the continued rise of Al-Qaeda influence during the destructive civil war, the US is also interested in restoring stability to Yemen and maintaining secure Saudi borders.114

The United Nations

The situation in Yemen has attracted high levels of international concern. The UN’s involvement has thus far primarily been one of mediation. In 2011, the UN was involved in mediating talks with the GCC during the transition government period. UN-sponsored talks between the Hadi government on one side, and the Houthi’s and pro-Saleh General People’s Congress members on the other, commenced in April 2016. 115 However, these peace talks collapsed by August 2016, which has since led to a series of tit-for-tat escalations in violence across Yemen.116 These include a Houthi attack on an Emirati vessel in the Red Sea, and a Saudi attack on a Yemeni funeral hall that led to massive regional and international shock and condemnation.

Though UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has condemned the carnage and called for an international investigation into the allegations of human rights violations and war crimes, the UN has yet to take decisive action on the civil war. The UN’s ability to intervene is further complicated by US, UK, and French arms support of the Saudi coalition.117 Thus far, the UN has neither helped broker peace nor secured an independent investigation into violations of international humanitarian law by both sides.

Humanitarian Situation

All sides of the civil war have been accused of human right violations, particularly due to rampant targeting of civilian areas, including schools and hospitals. Civilian casualties have comprised a majority of injuries and

113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 “Yemen Profile.” 116 April L. Alley, “Yemen’s Terrible War is About to Get Worse,” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2016, accessed October 13, 2016, https://www.crisisgroup. org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemens-terrible-war-about-get-worse. 117 Ibid.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX deaths consequent of the civil war, and have only escalated since the collapse of UN-sponsored talks in June 2016. By October 2016, over 4,125 civilians had been killed and 7,207 other had been injured in Yemen; children constituted a third of all civilian deaths during the first year of conflict.118 Additionally, child soldiers have been used in the conflict between the Houthi rebels and the Yemeni government since at least 2010.119

As attacks on civilian infrastructure became a commonplace tactic in the war, 21 million people have furthermore been deprived of life-sustaining commodities and basic services; over 14 million people suffering from food insecurity and no functioning healthcare facilities.120

118 “Yemen crisis.” 119 James Reinl, “UN calls for the prosecution of child soldier recruiters,” The National, February 14, 2010, accessed October 28, 2016, http://www. thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/un-calls-for-the-prosecution-of-child-soldier-recruiters. 120 Ibid.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Topic B History of the Problem

Yemen in the Colonial Era

The recent instability in Yemen has its roots in a complicated history. Yemen as we know it is a relatively new state. The northern half of the country was a part of the until 1918 while the southern half of the country stayed under British control until 1967. The two states merged in 1990 to become the Republic of Yemen but this road to unification was a long and violent path.121

After the dissolution of the power of the Ottoman Empire in the region, the northern half of the country was consolidated under the control of the Zaidi imam. Zaidiyyah Islam is a sect within Shi’ite Islam common in Yemen where the imam is believed to be “an absolute figure of spiritual authority” and therefore a spiritual as well as a political authority.122 Therefore, Imam Hadya, was able to use his authority as a spiritual leader and political leader to consolidate his position in what became the . However, his rule was brief as underground opposition to his feudal system, which had started growing in the 1930s, culminated in his assassination in 1948 at his royal palace. He was succeeded by his son, Ahmad, whose rule was significantly more repressive and was marked with growing tension with the British over their presence in Southern Yemen as well as increased pressure to support Arab nationalist objectives spearheaded by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Southern Yemen was an important colony for the British because its location allowed them to maintain control of Bab al-Mandab, the narrow strait between Africa and the Middle East, which was vital to British trading interests. After establishing the protectorate of Aden in 1937, the British sought to consolidate their power through agreements they established with the small tribes and communities that surrounded the Protectorate of Aden.123 By 1967, the Marxist National Liberation Front (NLF) was in control of much of the area and the British withdrew their last troops in November.124 On November 30, 1967, the People’s Republic of Yemen was formed as an independent nation outside the influence of the British Empire.

History of the Recent Crisis

The roots of the most current crisis can be dated back to June 2004, where Zaidi cleric Husayn Badr al-Din al-Houthi launched a scathing critique of the government of Ali Abdullah Saleh claiming that they are willing to sacrifice Yemeni lives in their appeasement of US and Israeli ambitions.125 The 3-month conflict in Sa’da escalated quickly as supporters of al-Houthi clashed with government forces resulting in 800 deaths, with 400

121 Gabriel A. Dumont, Yemen: Background, Issues, and Al Qaeda Role (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010), 31. 122 Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Imam,” accessed November 1, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/topic/imam. 123 Dumont, Yemen, 32. 124 Rabi, Yemen: Revolution, Civil War, and Unification (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2015), 4. 125 Ibid., 156.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX of them being soldiers. Al-Houthi was also among the dead. Yet, in March 2005, fighting was renewed with al-Houthi’s father, Badr al-Din al-Houthi taking leadership of his son’s revolutionary movement. This time the bloodshed spread beyond Sa’da and spread to the capital Sana, lasting several months.

By late 2005, the fighting had begun again as the Houthi rebel movement leadership was transferred to another member of the al-Houthi family, Adb al-Malik but a ceasefire was agreed upon by February 2006. Following this ceasefire, Ali Abdullah Saleh attempted to quell the Houthi rebel movement by pardoning all Houthi rebels who put down their arms and came to an agreement with the Government. This was in addition to releasing scores of prisoners as well as compensating those whose property had been damaged in the battles. However, during the conflict he made alliances with all those who would fight with him, lead to his government making alliances with extremists Sunni groups. This alliance in particular, embroiled the nation in the sectarian struggle between Sunni and Shiite Islam which had engulfed much of the Middle East.

Fighting continued for the next three years until Operation Scorched Earth began in August 2009. It sought to destroy the Houthi rebel movement once and for all, which would in turn give the central government more legitimacy as well as make an example out of the rebels opposing the current regime. The government deployed 40,000 troops, which is much more than it has in the past, and even deployed a Popular Army of local tribesmen and other citizen fighters.126 This lead to a significant escalation of the conflict as President Saleh told his men to quash the rebellion with an “iron fist.”127 The indiscriminate bombing of noncombatants as well as uptick in tribal conflict due to the arming and weaponization of various tribal groups, has led to an unprecedented number of casualties. The intensification of the violence also led to an escalation in the numbers of displaced individuals which numbered about 250,000 by this point.128 Internationally, the conflict in Yemen also attracted various global players. Saudi Arabia, a bastion of Sunni fundamentalism, does not want the Houthis getting power and establishing a Shi’ite nation right at their border.

Furthermore, this became the newest theater of the ideological conflict taking place between Saudi Arabia which is Sunni and Iran which is Shia. The two nations, seeking to establish their sect of Islam have been in various confrontations over the years, but none as bloody as the proxy war currently being waged in Yemen. Although Iran officially supports the Saleh regime and the current government of Yemen, American warships have intercepted various Iranian arms cargos which were believed to be en route to Houthi rebel groups. The US for its part, became embroiled in this conflict indirectly. Hoping to ensure its alliance with Saudi Arabia after the signing of the Iran nuclear deal, the US has tacitly supported Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government due to its support of its counterterrorism air strikes on Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). However,

126 Boucek, “War in Saada.” 127 Ibid., 128 Ibid.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX as the conflict has progressed and essentially reached a stalemate, the US is being further and further drawn into the conflict.129

129 Dumont, Yemen.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Topic B Past Actions

Both the Gulf Cooperation Council and UN made major attempts to resolve political tensions in Yemen following the 2011 collapse of the Saleh government. Since the deterioration of relations between the Houthis and central government, as well as other parties, both groups have taken further actions: military intervention on the part of the GCC, and various sanctions on the part of the United Nations. Knowledge of these current responses by the UN and regional actors will be necessary in navigating the way to peace talks between the Houthis and central Yemeni government. However, delegates must also understand the failures of the 2011 GCC Initiative talks in order to ensure that transitioning out of the current civil war.

The GCC Initiative and its Failures

GCC members, led by Saudi Arabia, initiated talks during the 2011 Yemeni Revolution that resulted in the removal of former President Saleh from power, establishment of the Hadi government, creation of Yemen’s ‘transitional phase’ under Hadi, and initiation of a National Dialogue Conference (NDC). Though the UN also contributed to brokering peace, these talks, Hadi’s transitional phase, and the NDC have been termed the ‘GCC Initiative.’ Understanding the failures of the GCC will be crucial in ensuring that when the international community can once again help facilitate peace talks in Yemen, it will be more successful in setting the foundations for long-term peace.

From its outset, the GCC Initiative marginalized many political groups and the public voice in the formation of the transitional government. For example, while the protester’s calls for Saleh to leave the presidency were met, he and his inner circle were granted unconditional immunity from any prosecution, and Saleh further maintained a place in the transition with the power-sharing model established.130 Thus, many Yemeni people who formed the backbone of the revolutionary protest movement immediately saw the GCC Initiative as a representation of continued ignorance of public demands for justice and accountability.

Furthermore, the talks leading to the GCC initiative failed to guarantee representation from any of the non- traditional, civil society-based groups that had formed during the 2011 uprising. The negotiations thus returned political decision making in Yemen to privileged traditional political forces, and those groups not invited to the GCC initiative talks were thus completely unrepresented in the transitional government agreements.131 Furthermore, the power-sharing model adopted by the GCC created a quota system to distribute influential governmental positions between different political parties. The nearly 50/50 share of seats in government between Saleh’s former General People’s Congress (GPC) and the ‘opposition groups’ to the GPC led to individuals focusing on their personal or party interests, rather than on the welfare of the Yemeni people as a

130 Al-Madhadji, “Yemen’s post-2011 transitional phase,” 4. 131 Ibid., 5.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX whole. The jostling for political power between parties only contributed to the Hadi government’s emerging reputation of corruption and detachment.132

Ordinary Yemenis were further disillusioned by the government due to the lack of economic reform carried out by Hadi’s government. Hadi’s power base thus disappeared with his failure to address two major problems deeply affecting Yemen: the economic crisis increasing poverty, and deteriorating social services.133 The lack of water, basic infrastructure, and medical and educational services would have left Yemen’s people completely dependent on humanitarian assistance regardless of the ongoing civil war.134

In addition to a lack of public support, Hadi’s government was fatally weakened by its neglect to carry out any military-security reform. Despite Hadi’s efforts to restructure military leadership, elite forces loyal to Saleh continued to manage a large majority of the military.135 With neither public support nor military support, political negotiations would have already been difficult to achieve. In pursuing such flawed and marginalizing political reconciliations backed by the Saudi coalition and supported by the UN, the Hadi government was set up for failure.

For many marginalized Yemeni groups that were key to the revolution, the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was the last straw. The NDC was originally extremely popular, especially amongst non-traditional civil society, women’s rights, and youth activist groups, who saw the democratic process of the NDC as their best chance for enacting change.136 President Hadi also began preparations for the dialogue on a positive note by appointing a 16-member preparatory committee with representatives from across the political spectrum, including many non-traditional groups.137 However, Hadi then commenced the NDC without implementing the committee’s resulting document, which outlined a 20-point plan for trust-building measures to be completed before beginning the NDC. For example, the committee recommended releasing political prisoners from the 2011 Revolution, returning land seized in the south, and formal apologies for earlier conflicts with the Houthis. In ignoring not only the costlier and time-demanding measures, but also easier, more symbolic, official apologies requested of Hadi, the Hadi government suggested a distinct lack of political will to engage in and lead a meaningful national reconciliation.138

In response to Hadi’s disregard to the committee’s proposals, the youth and civil society representatives on the committee resigned and thus removed their group’s participation in the NDC; the southern secessionist movement representatives did the same. For those who did participate in the NDC, major differences in

132 Helen Lackner, Yemen’s ‘Peaceful’ Transition from Autocracy (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2016), 65. 133 Ibid., 66. 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid. 136 Al-Madhadji, “Yemen’s post-2011 transitional phase,” 8. 137 Ibid., 9. 138 Ibid.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX opinion persisted throughout the 9-month dialogue, which resulted in a document lacking clear direction on Yemen’s most divisive issues: the southern cause, governmental structures, and transitional justice.139 This lack of genuine consensus in the final agreements of the NDC left various parties more divided than ever, forming the foundation for the dissolution of governmental power and current crisis in Yemen.

Though Hadi’s government has been blamed for many of the transition government’s failures, the international community shares a great responsibility for the situation. It pressured the GCC Initiative process by setting an unrealistic two-year time table for creating solutions to ambitious targets and rushing the resolution process. The international community has also offered strong support for Hadi’s presidency and Yemen’s transitional phase, but failed to implement any monitoring or accountability mechanisms.140 When international support for Hadi proved unyielding even as domestic support plummeted, many Yemenis began to lose faith in the international community as a mediator for the GCC Initiative process. In summary, the international community has largely focused on the most prominent political parties and violent conflicts, failed to provide needed support for reforming the Yemeni military and make basic humanitarian services available for the Yemeni people, ultimately contributing to the deterioration of the Yemeni population’s situation into the current catastrophically violent civil war.

The Security Council: Resolutions Passed in Response to Civil War

Since the beginning of the Yemeni Civil war in early 2015, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has passed three major resolutions (Resolutions 2266, 2216, and 2204).141 While several other statements have been made on behalf of the UNSC or UN as a whole, and the UN has encouraged peace talks and ceasefires while condemning major attacks and human rights violations, these three resolutions are notable in that they take direct action against the violence in Yemen. Namely, the UNSC has maintained sanctions and an arms embargo against the Houthis and Saleh loyalists and established a Panel of Experts on the Yemeni situation since 2014.

The Panel of Experts was originally established in February 2014 (Resolution 2140)142, primarily to assist the Security Council in identifying individuals and groups engaged in or supporting:

“(a) Obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition, as outlined in the GCC Initiative and Implementation Mechanism Agreement;

139 Ibid., 10. 140 Ibid., 7. 141 “UN Documents for Yemen,” Security Council Report, accessed November 3, 2016, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/yemen/. 142 Ibid.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX (b) Impeding the implementation of the outcomes of the final report of the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference through violence, or attacks on essential infrastructure; or (c) Planning, directing, or committing acts that violate applicable international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or acts that constitute human rights abuses, in Yemen.”143

This Panel was formed in conjunction with the first monetary pressures undertaken by the United Nations – namely, freezing all funds, financial assets, and economic resources of individuals deemed to fit in the above category.

In April 2015, Resolution 2216 established an arms embargo preventing the supply of weapons or any other military equipment to any individual or group acting for the benefit of former President Saleh or the Houthi movement.144 This arms embargo and the 2014 asset freeze have since been maintained throughout the current situation.

143 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2140, “Middle East,” February 26, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/ RES/2140(2014). 144 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2216, “Middle East (Yemen), April 14, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/ RES/2216(2015).

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Topic B Possible Solutions

Solutions to the current situation will need to broker immediate peace, work to alleviate the humanitarian situation, and plan to ensure that the next round of peace talks will not simply be another postponement of violence in Yemen.

Short-Term Solutions

In the short term, the priority for the international community should be bringing the Houthis and Hadi government together to broker peace. This will not only rely on cooperation from the Houthi and pro-Saleh opposition forces, but incentivizing the Saudi-led military intervention as well to work towards a ceasefire. The UN should be prepared to work with whomever both sides will accept as a mediator for peace, so as to immediately address pressing issues such as de-escalating tensions, agreeing to abide by laws of war, and allowing humanitarian aid access to the Yemeni people.145 Current UN actions—particularly its sanctions— should also be reviewed for optimal efficacy in the area.

Long-Term Solutions

In the long-term, the failures of the GCC and UN following the 2011 Yemeni Revolution should be most present in the international community’s mind. The resulting current civil war should serve as a reminder to all parties involved that any political solution must be accompanied with thorough discussion and clear direction for a unified Yemen, that sets in motion economic, military, and governmental reforms, to be carried out by a government that takes into account the voices and concerns of all Yemenis.

145 Yemen: Is Peace Possible?, International Crisis Group Middle East Report no. 167 (February 9, 2016), https://www.crisisgroup.org/ middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-peace-possible.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Topic B Bloc Positions

Although none of the delegate countries are actually agent countries in Yemen, many are invested in region’s stability, to which the situation in Yemen is a clear threat. Furthermore, several world powers are invested into the success of Iran or Saudi Arabia, both major players in this conflict. Thus, the overall attitude of delegates of such countries should reflect their relationship with the agent countries.

Other countries that do not have strong ties to either Saudi Arabia or Iran are more likely to object to the conflict because of human rights concerns. Above all else, they will be pushing for a peaceful resolution.

Supporters of Saudi Arabia and Hadi’s Government

Egypt, France, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America

As previously mentioned, France, United Kingdom, and United States of America are invested in the success of Saudi Arabia, either because of its military position in the Middle East or because of its wealth of oil. All three already support Saudi Arabia either financially and by supplying weapons, or in terms of military advice. Consequently, their goal would likely be aligned with Saudi goals, as they would stand to protect their interests there. Although this bloc would not condone a violent resolution to the situation in Yemen, an outcome that secures a Hadi government would be more important.

Besides the three mentioned above, this bloc also contains their close allies on the UNSC. These allies would likely vote with France, the UK, and the USA. China, while often considered an ally, would not openly support this bloc in order to avoid antagonizing the Russian Federation.

Egypt is unique in this group, as it already has troops in Yemen as part of the Saudi-led coalition against Saleh.146 It joined mainly to show support to Saudi Arabia, with whom there were rumors of a falling out over unrelated positions on the Muslim Brotherhood.147 Their involvement has sparked domestic outcries and it is unlikely that Egypt wishes to prolong this conflict.

146 “Egypt extends participation in Yemen conflict,” Reuters, last modified January 14, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/ us-yemen-security-egypt-idUSKCN0US1VF20160114. 147 “Egypt’s Unsettled Military Role in Yemen,” Worldcrunch, last modified August 26, 2015, http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/ egypt-s-unsettled-military-role-in-yemen/c1s19505/.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Opposing Saudi Arabia and Supporting a Houthi Government

Russian Federation

Russia opposes Hadi’s government for the sole reason that it wishes to oppose the NATO bloc described above. Still, Russia has met with Hadi in the past and has not public expressed interest in getting involved in Yemen. Some sources suggest that this may be because it is over extended, having decided to take military action in Syria148. Although Russia’s involvement has been much less in Yemen, it will likely still vote against the NATO bloc and attempt to find a resolution less favorable to Hadi, even if it does not put Saleh back in power.149

Interested in Regional Stability and Human Rights Aspects

Angola, People’s Republic of China, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, Uruguay, Venezuela

Angola and Senegal, as African countries, seek to lose face and financial interest if the violence in Yemen were to spread throughout Northern Africa. The AU is already involved in Burundi and a resurgence of the unrest seen in 2010 would mean the AU would have to divert its funds to aid refugees and victims in the north. Furthermore, at a significant time of development in Africa’s history, violence would hinder Angola and Senegal’s efforts to obtain respect and international status.

The rest, because they are not directly affected by the situation in Yemen, would be interested in protecting human rights and ensuring that no violations have or are occurring. China, specifically, would be interested in taking the lead to protect human rights, as it has been recently critiqued by the international theatre.

148 Diana Alghoul, “Russia’s role in the Yemen conflict,” Middle East Monitor, last modified January 22, 2016, https://www.middleeastmonitor. com/20160122-russias-role-in-the-yemen-conflict/. 149 Ibid.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Topic B Additional Sources

These sources are optional readings. They are listed to provide extended, in-depth, knowledge of the context for the topic at hand, should delegates be interested.

*An in-depth analysis of the political failures of the GCC: http://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/ yemens-peaceful-transition-autocracy-could-it-have-succeeded?lang=en

*In-depth information on rise of the Houthis, and their conflict with the Saleh government and Saudi Arabia (2004-2010): http://carnegietsinghua.org/publications/?fa=40731

Detailed Discussion of GCC military intervention activities in Yemen: http://www.washingtoninstitute. org/policy-analysis/view/gulf-coalition-operations-in-yemen-part-3-maritime-and-aerial-blockade

Prior UNSC Resolutions and other relevant documents: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un- documents/yemen/

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX Topic B Bibliography

Al-Madhaji, Maged. “How Yemen post-2011 transitional phase ended in war.” Sana’a Center. July 2016. Accessed November 11, 2016. http://sanaacenter.org/publications/item/39-how-yemen%E2%80%99s-post-2011- transitional-phase-ended-in-war.html.

“Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).” CFR. June 19, 2015. Accessed November 11, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/ yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369.

Alghoul, Diana. “Russia’s role in the Yemen conflict.” Middle East Monitor. Last modified January 22, 2016.https:// www.middleeastmonitor.com/20160122-russias-role-in-the-yemen-conflict/.

Alley, April L. “Yemen’s Terrible War is About to Get Worse.” Foreign Policy. October 12, 2016. Accessed October 13, 2016. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemens- terrible-war-about-get-worse.

Boucek, Christopher. “War in Saada.” Carnegie Papers no. 110 (April 2016). http://carnegieendowment.org/files/war_ in_saada.pdf.

Bowen, Jeremy. “Yemen conflict: Saudi Arabia ends air campaign.”BBC . April 21, 2015. Accessed November 11, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32402688.

“Capitalizing on Chaos in Yemen.” Soufan Group. February 19, 2016. Accessed November 11, 2016. http://soufangroup. com/tsg-intelbrief-capitalizing-on-chaos-in-yemen/.

Dumont, Gabriel A, Yemen: Background, Issues, and Al Qaeda Role, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010, 31.

“Egypt extends participation in Yemen conflict.” Reuters. Last modified January 14, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/ article/us-yemen-security-egypt-idUSKCN0US1VF20160114.

“Egypt’s Unsettled Military Role in Yemen.” Worldcrunch. Last modified August 26, 2015. http://www.worldcrunch. com/world-affairs/egypt-s-unsettled-military-role-in-yemen/c1s19505/.

Humud, Carla E. Al Qaeda and U.S. Policy (CRS. Report No. R43756). Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43756.pdf.

“The Huthis: From Saada to Sanaa.”International Crisis Group. June 10, 2014. Accessed November 11, 2016. https:// www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/huthis-saada-sanaa.

“Imam.” In Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed November 1, 2016. https://www.britannica.com/topic/imam.

Lackner, Helen. Yemen’s ‘Peaceful’ Transition from Autocracy. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2016.

Laub, Zachary. “Yemen in Crisis.” CFR. April 19, 2016. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/yemen/ yemen-crisis/p36488.

“Who Are Yemen’s Houthis?” CFR. February 25, 2015. Accessed November 11, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/yemen/ yemens-houthis/p36178.

Poole, Thom. “Iran and Saudi Arabia’s great rivalry explained.” BBC. January 4, 2016. Accessed November 11, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35221569.

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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL MUNUC XXIX “Profile: Gulf Co-operation Council.” BBC. February 15, 2012. Accessed November 11, 2016. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/middle_east/country_profiles/4155001.stm.

Reinl, James. “UN calls for the prosecution of child soldier recruiters.” The National. February 14, 2010. Accessed October 28, 2016. http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/un-calls-for-the-prosecution-of-child- soldier-recruiters.

“Saudi and Arab allies bomb Houthi positions in Yemen.” Al Jazeera. March 26, 2015. Accessed November 11, 2016. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/03/saudi-ambassador-announces-military-operation- yemen-150325234138956.html.

Schmitz, Charles. “In Cahoots with the Houthis.” Foreign Affairs. April 19, 2015. Accessed November 11, 2016. https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/yemen/2015-04-19/cahoots-houthis.

Tisdall, Simon. “Iran-Saudi proxy war in Yemen explodes into region-wide crisis.” Guardian. March 26, 2015. Accessed November 11, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/26/iran-saudi-proxy-war-yemen-crisis.

“UN Documents for Yemen.” Security Council Report. Accessed November 3, 2016. http://www.securitycouncilreport. org/un-documents/yemen/.

United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2140. “Middle East.” February 26, 2014. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/ view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2140(2014).

United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2216. “Middle East (Yemen).” April 14, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/ga/ search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2216(2015).

Yemen: Is Peace Possible? International Crisis Group Middle East Report no. 167 (February 9, 2016). https://www. crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemen-peace-possible.

“Yemen crisis: who is fighting whom?”BBC . October 14, 2016. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-middle-east-29319423.

“Yemen profile.” BBC. August 10, 2016. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle- east-14704951.

“Yemen’s Saleh agrees to transfer power.” Al Jazeera. November 24, 2011. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://www. aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/11/2011112355040101606.html.

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