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Iranian Proxy Development in Yemen and the Future of the Houthi Movement

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Iranian Proxy Development in Yemen and the Future of the Houthi Movement Could the Houthis Be the Next Hizballah? Iranian Proxy Development in Yemen and the Future of the Houthi Movement Trevor Johnston, Matthew Lane, Abigail Casey, Heather J. Williams, Ashley L. Rhoades, James Sladden, Nathan Vest, Jordan R. Reimer, Ryan Haberman C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2551 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0251-6 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover photo: Reuters/Naif Rahma; Flag: dikobraziy/GettyImages. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents the results of a project analyzing the prospects that Iran will further invest in the Houthis and develop them as an enduring proxy group in Yemen. The research in this report was completed in July 2018. In answering this question, the project focused on the history of the Houthi movement, its current relations with Iran, and future scenarios. To inform this analysis and better capture Iran’s strategic calculus vis-à-vis the Houthis, the project also explored Iran’s history of proxy development in three distinct contexts: Lebanon, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf. Lessons from these cases have informed the analysis of the future trajectory of the Houthi-Iran relationship. The project’s findings should be of interest to a wide-ranging audience in the for- eign policy and defense community, and particularly those interested in the broader Middle East. The analysis can help policymakers better understand Iranian motiva- tions throughout the region while offering clear signals and warnings of potential esca- lation in Yemen. This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the Cyber and Intelligence Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center spon- sored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense intel- ligence enterprise . For more information on the Cyber and Intelligence Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/intel or contact the director (contact information is provided on the webpage). iii Contents Preface ................................................................................................. iii Figures and Tables ...................................................................................vii Summary .............................................................................................. ix Acknowledgments ...................................................................................xv Abbreviations ....................................................................................... xvii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 Iran as a Strategic Actor ............................................................................... 3 The Houthis as a Potential Strategic Actor ......................................................... 6 Report Outline ......................................................................................... 8 CHAPTER TWO Sponsor-Proxy Relationships ......................................................................11 Defining Terms and Key Concepts .................................................................11 Sponsor-Proxy Relationships in a Principal-Agent Framework ..................................14 Sponsor-Proxy Relationships as Market Entry and Investment .................................17 CHAPTER THREE Iran’s History of Proxy Relationships ............................................................21 Investment and Partnership in Lebanon ...........................................................21 Portfolio Diversification in Iraq .....................................................................32 State Resistance and Proxy Failure in the Persian Gulf ......................................... 42 CHAPTER FOUR The Houthis and Their Relationship with Iran ................................................51 A Brief Note on Sources ..............................................................................51 The Emergence of the Houthi Movement and Ties to Iran .....................................53 Conflict and the Development of the Houthi Movement .......................................55 The Evolution of Iranian Proxy Investments in Yemen ..........................................63 v vi Could the Houthis Be the Next Hizballah? CHAPTER FIVE Scenario Analysis and the Future of the Houthi-Iran Relationship .......................73 The Yemeni Civil War: Military Stalemate and Political Intransigence ........................73 Near-Term Scenarios of the Yemeni Civil War ................................................... 80 Exploring Alternative Future Trajectories of the Houthi-Iran Relationship ...................83 Chapter Summary ................................................................................... 90 CHAPTER SIX Indicators of Political and Military Change ....................................................91 Fluid Military Conditions ...........................................................................91 Political Uncertainty ................................................................................. 97 Chapter Summary .................................................................................. 103 CHAPTER SEVEN Conclusion .......................................................................................... 105 The Houthis in Comparative Perspective ........................................................ 106 The Future of the Houthi-Iran Relationship .................................................... 110 References ........................................................................................... 115 Figures and Tables Figures 2.1. The Market Entry and Investment Model ............................................17 2.2. Stages of Iranian Proxy Development per a Market Entry and Investment Model .....................................................................................18 3.1. Growth in Hizballah Firepower .......................................................29 4.1. Houthi Influence, 2007–2009 .........................................................58 4.2. Houthi Influence, 2010 .................................................................58 4.3. Houthi Influence, 2011–2012 ..........................................................59 4.4. Houthi Influence, 2015 .................................................................63 5.1. Estimated Houthi Missile Ranges over the Course of the Yemeni Civil War ....79 5.2. Areas Controlled or Contested by Houthi Forces in 2017 ......................... 84 5.3. Possible Yemeni Governorates Controlled or Contested by Houthi Forces ...... 87 6.1. Wings of the Houthi Movement ..................................................... 101 7.1. Houthi Proxy Development over Time ............................................. 107 7.2. Houthi Proxy Development Across Future Scenarios ............................. 109 Tables S.1. Key Drivers and Future Trajectories of the Houthi-Iran Relationship ............ xi 5.1. Key Drivers and Future Trajectories of the Houthi-Iran Relationship ............83 6.1. Possible Indicators Related to the General People’s Congress ..................... 94 6.2. Possible Indicators Related to Coalition Cohesion ................................. 97 vii Summary Since 2015, Iran has dramatically increased its investment in the Houthi movement, raising speculation that the Houthis will evolve into another regional proxy that serves to protect and promote Iranian interests. Iran has frequently turned to sponsor-proxy relationships to expand its reach in the Middle East and antagonize its adversaries while minimizing the risk of inviting direct conflict. The Houthis represent an attrac- tive opportunity on both of these counts—giving Iran reach into Yemen and the adja- cent Red Sea and providing Iran a means to harass its rival, Saudi Arabia. However, its success in building proxy relationships in other arenas has been mixed, and Iranian investment does not guarantee it will be able to cultivate the Houthis into a reliable proxy group. In order to examine Iran’s prospects for success, we have considered
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