The Subnational Foundations of the European Parliament

Wolfgang Wagner The Subnational Foundations of the European Parliament

Introduction European Court of Justice are the exclu- > sive domain of the Council, the EP has As the only directly elected par- been given a right to (dis)approve of any liament to ever exist beyond the incoming Commission and to dismiss the nation-state, the European Parli- entire Commission by a vote of censure. ament (EP) is one of the most distin- Most impressive, however, are the EP’s guishing features of the European legislative powers. In a series of treaty Union (EU). Over the course of the last revisions following intergovernmental fifty years, the EP has evolved from an conferences, the EP’s legislative powers “assembly” with a merely consultative have been permanently enhanced. In role to a parliament whose legislative and 1987, the Single European Act introduced budgetary powers are not too far behind the so-called co-operation procedure those of many national parliaments. which gave the EP the right to suggest Whereas the founding treaty of the Euro- amendments to a Council proposal and pean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) even to reject it entirely. However, the established only an assembly consisting of power of the EP remained conditional on representatives of national parliaments, the Commission and the degree of unity the Rome Treaty already envisioned among the member-states: in the case the direct elections to the EP, which eventu- EP rejected a proposal, it could still be ally first took place in 1979. Even before overruled by the Council if the Council the initial direct elections, the EP had decided unanimously and the Com- received significant budgetary powers. mission did not withdraw the proposal. Within the boundaries of a budgetary This co-operation procedure applied to ceiling fixed by the member-states and the bulk of Single Market legislation.2 limited to so-called non-compulsory The EP’s legislative powers were fur- expenditure,1 the EP has been granted the ther enhanced with the coming into right to increase, reduce and redistribute force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. spending. Moreover, it acquired a right to The so-called co-decision procedure reject the whole annual budget. The EP is gave the EP the right to reject any pro- also endowed with a range of supervisory posal during its second reading, while powers: it has a right to receive and debate depriving the Council of its right to annual reports of activity from the Com- overrule the EP’s rejection. Moreover, a mission, and a right to receive oral and conciliation committee is convened written replies to parliamentary ques- when the Council does not approve all tions. Although appointments to the amendments proposed by the EP. At

JIRD (2002) 5(1), 24-36 24 Copyright  2002 by Faculty of Social Sciences, Centre of International Relations Journal of International Relations and Development 5(March 2002)1 that stage, the EP either reaches agree- the EP only the right to subject the ment with the Council or may reject the Commission in its entirety to a vote of proposed legislation in which case the (dis)approval. In 1999, the EP used the regulation or directive in question can- possibility of rejecting the incoming not be adopted. Because of the introduc- Prodi Commission in its entirety to elicit tion of the co-decision procedure, the the concession from the Commission EP has been regarded as the “major win- President that he would consider request- ner” of the intergovernmental conference ing any Commissioner to resign if the EP leading to the Maastricht Treaty (Wal- expressed a lack of confidence in him or lace 1996:157). her (Nugent 2001:86). By using its exist- The co-decision procedure received ing powers to the maximum extent possi- some minor changes under the Amster- ble, the EP has thus managed to further The Sub- dam Treaty of 1997 which came into force enhance its powers. Moreover, other national in 1999. Under co-decision, the Council supranational institutions, most notably Foundations and the EP now legislate on an equal foot- the European Court of Justice, have sup- of the ing. Even more important, however, was ported the EP’s requests for enhanced European the extension of the co-decision proce- competencies. The European Court of Parliament dure to some twenty provisions including Justice contributed to the establishment R& D (research and development) policy, of parliamentary democracy as an EU environmental policy and development constitutional principle by declaring that aid (Griller et al. 2000:314). The propor- ‘the people should take part in the exer- tion of co-decisions will expand even cise of power through the intermediary of more when (and if) the Nice Treaty is rat- a representative assembly.’3 ified by the member-states. The Nice However, the question remains as to Treaty provides for a further extension of why the member-states repeatedly a- co-decision-making to a range of treaty greed to extend the EP’s powers and articles (among others, parts of social pol- competencies. A cursory look at the var- icy, industrial policy and cohesion; see ious treaty negotiations reveals that Fischer 2001:565). enhancing parliamentary powers has This impressive history of enhanced always been among the most contested powers poses the question of why the EP issues on the agenda. During negotia- has been so successful in acquiring new tions on the Single European Act (1985), powers. The question is particularly puz- the Maastricht Treaty (1990/91) and the zling because any delegation of compe- Amsterdam Treaty (1996/97), there were tencies to the EP can be regarded as de always a number of member-states that facto irreversible not only because una- saw the strengthening of the EP as a nimity and ratification is required to high priority. In each negotiation, the change the treaties but because it seems member-states pressing for a strength- practically unfeasible to withdraw powers ened EP obtained some concessions from a directly elected institution from the more reluctant member-states (Jachtenfuchs 1999:329). To be sure, the and were thus instrumental in endowing EP has frequently used its existing powers the EP with significant powers.4 In order to acquire further competencies. For to explain the strengthening of the EP, it example, the EP had no right of approv- therefore has to be analysed why those ing every Commissioner individually and member-states have held such a strong having him/her resign if it lacks confi- preference for this particular institu- dence in him/her. The Treaties have given tional choice.

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Because the literature on institutional dures other than unanimity,’ sovereignty choice has been dominated by rationalist is ‘delegated when supranational actors theorising, this paper starts by examining are permitted to take certain autonomous whether the rationalist theory of institu- decisions, without an intervening inter- tional choice is capable of explaining state vote or unilateral veto’ (Moravcsik member-states’ preferences for strength- 1998:67). ening the EP. As will be demonstrated in From an institutional choice point of Section II, however, the delegation of view, the assignment of competencies to power to the EP cannot be explained by the Commission embodies the ideal-type rationalist institutional choice theory. of delegation. However, strengthening Section III, therefore, addresses the issue the EP is also best understood as a case of Wolfgang from a constructivist perspective, which the delegation (as opposed to the pooling) Wa gner has emerged as the major challenger to of sovereignty (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis rationalist theorising. Starting from the 1999:76). Clearly, the EP does not take constructivist assumption that ideas play decisions autonomously — as would be an important and independent role in the ideal type of delegation — but partic- preference formation (and thus institu- ipates in joint decision-making with the tional choice), it will be shown that the Council. However, in contrast to the key to the answer lies in the member- Council, the EP is designed as an inde- states’ internal political systems, particu- pendent body whose members are not larly the extent to which direct parlia- instructed by their national governments. mentary control can be found at the sub- Though Members of the European national level. Parliament (MEPs) remain dependent on their national parties to be nominated, they are legally independent of their Rationalist Institutional national governments. Moreover, though Choice Theory national cleavages remain visible, parliamentary work is effectively organised There is a growing body of liter- along party lines (Hix 1999:76). Indeed, a ature dedicated to a rationalist ex- recent empirical study found that ‘legisla- planation of member-states’ deci- tive behavior in the EP is structured more sions to design international insti- by party affiliation than national affilia- tutions in various ways (Garrett 1992; tion,’ i.e. ‘MEPs are more likely to vote Pollack 1997; 1998; 1999; Moravcsik 1998; with their EP party group than with Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis 1999). The MEPs from their Member State (who sit rationalist theory of institutional choice in other EP groups)’ (Hix 2001:684). is functionalist, i.e. it ‘explains institution- Ta k en together, by strengthening the EP al choices in terms of the functions a the member-states delegate sovereignty given institution is expected to perform to a supranational actor. and the effects on policy outcomes it is From an institutional choice point of expected to produce, subject to the view, delegation addresses the problem uncertainty in any institutional design’ of incomplete contracting, i.e. the fact (Pollack 1997:102). With regard to the EU, that states (or any other group of actors) two main forms of institutional choices are unable to cover every aspect of an can be distinguished. Whereas sovereign- agreement and are therefore forced to ty is ‘pooled when governments agree to agree on decision-making procedures for decide future matters by voting proce- secondary (implementing) decisions. Pol-

26 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(March 2002)1 lack (1997:103) listed several functions sions by the EP cannot be forecasted. that the delegation of sovereignty may Independent agencies with a “technical” fulfil: delegation may increase the credi- mandate (such as the European Central bility of commitments. This function is Bank) are better suited to increasing the particularly prominent whenever incen- credibility of commitments. The EP tives to defect continue to exist, as is the could be endowed with a right, or even case in monetary policy (Sandholtz 1993). monopoly, to initiate proposals as well as Further, there are incentives to delegate a right to detect defection from co-opera- the right to initiate proposals. Because tion. However, the Commission and the initiatives are costly and may weaken a European Court of Justice are better suit- state’s position in the ensuing negotia- ed to meet these tasks. In principle, the tions, states face incentives not to take EP could make proposals of the same sub- The Sub- the initiative themselves even if this strat- stance and number as the Commission. national egy results in a failure to co-operate (Geh- However, the Commission is better suit- Foundations ring 1994:231). Moreover, under qualified ed to initiate proposals in the name of a of the majority-voting there are incentives to common European interest because its European delegate a monopoly of initiative. Other- internal decision-making procedures are Parliament wise outvoted states may try to reverse a based on reaching consensus rather than decision through a new policy initiative. on building majority coalitions.5 As a con- This may lead to an ‘endless series of pro- sequence, Commission proposals already posals from disgruntled participants who reflect a consensus among politicians had been in the minority in a previous from, though not representatives of, all vote’ (Pollack 1997:104). Thus, the Euro- member-states. In contrast, and notwith- pean Commission’s monopoly over initia- standing a high degree of co-operation tive can be well explained by rationalist between the two biggest political groups, institutional choice theory. Finally, the proposals emerging from the EP are more delegation of sovereignty may serve to likely to reflect the perspective of a detect defection from agreements. majority coalition and are therefore more Because the member-states encounter likely to elicit opposition from those out- incentives not to blame other member- side this coalition. Since European legis- states for any (alleged) defection, the del- lation should be based on the greatest egation of this function can be explained. consensus possible (because the EU is not However, the delegation of decision- a state and peoples’ loyalties largely making power to the EP cannot be ex- remain with their nation-states), the plained by rationalist institutional choice Commission is best suited to initiate the theory. The function of increasing the respective proposals. credibility of commitments is simply not The same applies with regard to the served by the delegation of decision-mak- detection (and sanctioning) of defection ing power to the EP at all. At the same by and in member-states. The Commis- time, the Commission better fulfils the sion acting as a college is least likely to be functions of initiating proposals and blamed for acting on national or party detecting defection than the EP could if political motives when it sues member- it were endowed with these tasks. The states before the European Court of delegation of power to the EP does not Justice. Adjudication and the imposition increase the credibility of substantive of fines are better left to the independent commitments (e.g. to keep interest rates European Court of Justice whose mem- low) because the substance of future deci- bers do not strive for re-election. Though

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court rulings still have a political dimen- only in the governance of the Common sion (Burley and Mattli 1993), their accep- Market and with intergovernmental deci- tance depends on the authority of the sion-making in the realm of political co- Court as a non-political interpreter of operation. Whereas the Leitbild shared in given agreements. Germany includes strong support for the EP, the British vision relies on the member-states and their parliaments because AConstructivist integration is limited to the Common Explanation Market. The constructivist explanation that Even prominent adherents of will be developed in this section supports Wolfgang rationalist institutional choice these findings. However, the argument Wa gner theory themselves concur that the presented here draws on a different causal strengthening of the EP can hardly mechanism that does not depict ideas as be explained by institutional choice goals which governments hold and follow theory (Pollack 1997:107; Moravcsik and but instead regards ideas as tools available Nicolaïdis 1999:61). Instead, they have to governments and that help govern- pointed to the role of “federalist ideolo- ments manage previously unknown prob- gy” (Moravcsik 1998:70) and thereby lems.6 In particular, it will be argued that handed the issue over to constructivist there are different principles of the ap- theorising. According to Moravcsik, the propriate parliamentary legitimation of pressure ‘for greater EP powers came non-national politics institutionalised in from countries with a tradition of the domestic political systems of member- European federalism and with strong states. These principles which are consid- domestic parliamentary systems’ (Mora- ered valid domestically can be understood vcsik 1998:376). as tools that governments employ to Constructivism holds that actors’ address the new problem of the parliamen- preferences are not exogenously given but tary legitimation of EU policy-making. socially constructed and, therefore, Different principles of parliamentary involve ideas, norms and values (Adler legitimation can be considered part of a 1997; Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1999). The cor- state’s political culture, i.e. ‘those world- nerstone of any constructivist explana- views and principled ideas — norms and tion therefore lies in the identification of values — that are stable over long periods those social constructions (“ideas”) that of time and are taken for granted by the can be assumed to have an impact on the vast majority of the population’ (Risse- state preferences at stake. In a research Kappen 1994:209). The principles, values project dedicated to explaining the Ger- and norms that have become a state’s man, French and British EU policies political culture usually become institu- Jachtenfuchs et al. (1998) identified differ- tionalised in a state’s political institu- ent Leitbilder that are regarded as influ- tions. In institutionalised form, encing these states’ EU policies. Ac- cording to them, Germany’s support for a the impact of ideas may be prolonged for strong EP is driven by its attempt to cre- decades or even generations. In this sense, ate a European federal state (Bundesstaat). ideas can have an impact even when no one By contrast, British politicians want the genuinely believes in them as principled or EU to remain an economic community causal statements (Goldstein and Keohane with strong supranational institutions 1993:20).

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From a constructivist perspective, a that any strengthening of supranational state’s institutions are ‘not only neutral institutions (particularly the EP) will also devices for the accommodation of differ- further a common European identity ent interests in the pursuit of common (Habermas 1992; Zürn 1996:45). policies, but also provide symbolic guid- The constructivist explanation pre- ance for society’ (Jachtenfuchs 1995:116). sented here holds that member-states will Societal institutions affect the prefer- respond to the question of supranational ences and actions of the members of soci- democracy in the same way they have ety. They addressed the question of subnational democracy. The constructivist explana- provide moral or cognitive templates for tion thereby draws on the so-called interpretation and action. The individual domestic analogy whereby decision-mak- The Sub- is seen as an entity deeply imbricated in a ers ‘want their international environment national world of institutions, composed of symbols, to be ordered by the same values and prin- Foundations scripts and routines, which provide the fil- ciples as their domestic system’ (Billing et of the ters of interpretation, of both the situation al. 1993:163).9 Thus, we should expect sup- European and oneself, out of which a course of action port for direct parliamentary legitimation Parliament is constructed (Hall and Taylor 1996:939). by those countries whose policy at the regional level has been legitimised by Since member-states have been forced directly elected regional parliaments, i.e. to address the issue of the EU’s so-called by federal states. By contrast, countries democratic deficit, they have faced two whose regional-level policy has been legit- options because, in principle, decision- imised indirectly by the national parlia- making at the international level can ment, i.e. unitary states or states with only receive parliamentary legitimation in two a minimum of parliamentary devolution, ways, i.e. directly via a supranational are expected to prefer indirect parliamen- parliament or indirectly via the nation- tary legitimation for the EU as well. al parliaments of the member-states.7 The principle of indirect parliamentary legitimation is based on the notion that only Plausibility Test for the nation-states possess social legitimacy,8 Constructivist Explanation whereas the EU misses both a common European identity and a European public The issue of strengthening the (Kielmannsegg 1996). According to that EP was most prominent during nego- principle, the democratic deficit should tiations on the Maastricht Treaty be addressed by preserving social legiti- in 1990 and 1991, when crucial macy at the national level. By contrast, changes in terms of the present EP the principle of direct parliamentary powers took place (Earnshaw and legitimation is based on the notion that Judge 1996: 110; Westlake 1994:146; Cor- the need for direct legitimation increases bett et al. 2000:176, 188). Hence, this with every transfer of decision-making period is useful for running the plausibil- competencies to the European level. ity test for the constructivist explanation Adherents of indirect legitimation are of the EP’s strengthening. The explana- criticised because they only allow for tory power of the constructivist model unanimous decision-making which must outlined above can be assessed by com- be regarded as highly inefficient. Pro- paring the observed member-state pref- ponents of direct legitimation point out erences on the introduction of the co-

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decision procedure with the preferences At the time of the Maastricht negotia- that can be expected from externalisa- tions, three member-states were classi- tion of the principle applied to the legiti- fied as federal states. Whereas the classi- mation of regional policy. fication of the Federal Republic of Support for the EP and the introduc- Germany was beyond doubt, Belgium was tion of a co-decision-procedure is expect- in the final stage of a constitutional ed from those states that established reform that has transformed it into a fed- directly elected regional parliaments in eration (Alen 1995). Finally, Spain whose order to legitimate policies at the sub- territory had been divided into 17 comu- national level. However, the principle of nidades autónomas was considered a ‘feder- direct parliamentary legitimation is not ation in all but name’ (Elazar 1991:227). Wolfgang fully realised if a national parliament may Germany, Belgium and Spain were indeed Wa gner withdraw competencies from the region- strong supporters of a strengthened EP in al parliaments or may even dissolve them. general and of co-decision in particular. In those states, the principles of direct The Belgian memorandum of 20 March and indirect parliamentary legitimation 199011 helped set the agenda for strength- have been mixed because the direct par- ening the EP. The issue was taken up and liamentary legitimation of regional policy further supported by Germany which is exists only at the mercy of and under the held responsible for the respective pas- control of the national parliament. From sages in two joint letters to the the perspective of a domestic analogy, Presidency by Chancellor Kohl and Pre- these decentralised unitary states do not sident Mitterrand (Wagner 2001: 206).12 belong to the same category as federal Although the Spanish government did states and are not necessarily expected to not present any paper on institutional be supporters of a strengthened EP. As a questions, observers had no doubts about consequence, no constructivist expecta- Spanish support for co-decision (Corbett tion can be derived for France, Italy, and 1992; Gil Ibañez 1992:110). the Netherlands.10 At the time of the Opposition to a strengthened EP and Maastricht negotiations, directly elected to the introduction of co-decision could regional parliaments existed in each of have been expected from those states in these member-states. However, the re- which policies at the regional level are gional parliaments in France, la republique legitimised indirectly by the national par- une et indivisible, lacked legislative powers. liament and in which no regional parlia- Moreover, French regions were not even ments exist. The United Kingdom, mentioned in the constitution and can Greece, Portugal, Denmark and Ireland easily be dissolved by a majority in the belong to this category. In the United national parliament (Constantinesco Kingdom, whose political system is based 1990). In Italy, too, the national parlia- on parliamentary sovereignty, regional ment determined the competencies of parliaments may be entrusted with com- the regions. Moreover, the Italian govern- petencies (as is currently the case in ment kept a veto over legislative decisions Scotland and Wales). But Westminster of the regional parliaments (Trautmann can withdraw these competencies at any- 1995:682). Finally, the Dutch “provinces” time by a simple majority (which hap- are considered to be mere administrative pened to Northern Ireland in 1972). In units (Andeweg and Irwin 1993) whose 1986, regions were established in Greece competencies may also be changed by the but not endowed with their own parlia- national parliament at any time. ments (Engel 1991:12). In both Portugal

30 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(March 2002)1 and Denmark, there is a “partial federal- In sum, the constructivist expectation ism” for the Azores and Greenland but is satisfied for seven states, namely all fed- the mainland is organised along unitary eralist and unitary states, with the excep- principles (Opello 1992; Hansen 1993). tion of Greece. No expectation could be Ireland, too, is a unitary state which only derived (let alone “tested”) for the mini- has a variety of (cross-cutting) ad hoc state of Luxembourg, nor for France, Italy regions for various administrative purpos- and the Netherlands because as ‘decen- es, but which lacks a regional tier of gov- tralised unitary states’, French, Italian ernment let alone regional parliaments and Dutch principles of parliamentary (Voß 1989:427; Laffan 1991). legitimation remain ambiguous. With During the intergovernmental confer- regard to Germany, Belgium, Spain, the ence, the United Kingdom was a strong United Kingdom, Portugal, Denmark and The Sub- opponent of co-decision and even boy- Ireland, the constructivist explanation is national cotted the respective negotiations. Ac- highly plausible. The constructivist expla- Foundations cording to former Prime Minister John nation presented above is further sup- of the Major, ‘the Council of Ministers, whose ported by an analysis of the domestic European members are answerable to their national cleavages on the issue of parliamentary Parliament parliaments, must be the body which ulti- legitimation.13 Cleavages are particularly mately determines the Community’s law visible in those states in which the princi- and policies’ (quoted from Laursen and ple of parliamentary legitimation of non- Vanhoonacker 1992:425). The Portuguese national politics has been challenged, e.g. representative to the intergovernmental in the United Kingdom. As would be conference also signalled opposition by expected from a constructivist perspec- abstaining from discussing the matter. tive, supporters of regional parliaments According to the Irish government, ‘the (especially the Scottish National Party democratic legitimacy of the Community but also large parts of the British Labour is ensured by the fact that the representa- Party) tended to support the strengthen- tives of the Member States in the ing of the EP while opponents to regional European Council and the Council are parliaments (particularly the British elected and responsible to their national Conservative Party) tended to regard the parliaments’ (quoted from van Wijn- national parliament as the appropriate bergen 1992:134). Though a Danish mem- level for legitimising European politics as orandum mentioned the necessity to well. Thus, during debates on the so- strengthen both the national parliament called European Communities Amen- and the EP, Denmark disapproved of all dment Bill in the House of Commons proposals for co-decision. The Greek pol- Alex Salmond of the Scottish National icy on co-decision, however, remains puz- Party argued that he was ‘attracted by the zling from the constructivist point of idea ... of this place losing powers to the view. After many years of firm opposition European Parliament, to European insti- against any form of co-decision, the new tutions and to the people of Scotland.’14 In government of Konstantin Mitsotakis contrast, the representative of the preferred the EP to become ‘a real legisla- Conservative Party, Graham Brady, found tive and monitoring body’ (quoted from it ‘disturbing that the Government are Laursen and Vanhoonacker 1992:278). The moving political power and sovereignty in ‘decisive U-turn’ (den Hartog 1992:80) in two directions; on the one hand, to Greek European policy runs contrary to Brussels and Strasbourg, and on the other, the constructivist expectation. to Scotland, Wales and the regions.’15

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Conclusion an explanation of one of the most distin- guishing features of the EU. What is Member-states with regional or more, the constructivist perspective federal traditions have been at the points out certain future scenarios with forefront of promoting the strengt- regard to strengthening the EP. First, the hening of the EP. These states have process of devolution and regionalisa- applied the principle of direct parliamen- tion in many member-states, most tary legitimation, as institutionalised notably in the United Kingdom, is likely within their own domestic political sys- to increase member-states’ support for tems, to the realm of European policy- the EP. As the principle of direct parlia- making. Externalisation of the principle mentary legitimation becomes estab- Wolfgang of direct parliamentary legitimation has lished in ever more member-states, gov- Wa gner been the chief force of support for an EP ernment policy on the EP is likely to with considerable budgetary and legisla- become more supportive. tive powers. It should be noted that this However, the ramifications of the explanation differs from both the “strong EU’s eastern enlargement on future sup- parliamentary traditions” — and the “fed- port for a strong EP are difficult to assess. eralist ideology” — argument launched by Most applicant-countries have devolved Moravcsik. A strong parliamentary tradi- power to regions which in many cases tion at the national level might even con- were newly created (Council of the tribute to a viable opposition to the EP. Regions 2000). What is more, in many Indeed, member-states with strong par- applicant-states regions have been liamentary traditions such as the United endowed with directly elected parlia- Kingdom and Denmark are among the ments to legitimise regional policy-mak- most prominent opponents to any ing. However, devolution and regionalisa- stronger EP. Also, there is no inherent tion in the applicant-countries is often link between strong support of the EP said to serve the requirements of the EU’s and adherence to European integration or regional policy. At the same time, a strong an Europeanised identity which is partic- central government is still highly valued. ularly strong among those states which Therefore, it remains to be seen whether emerged from World War II with their the eastern enlargement brings about fur- legitimacy in tatters.16 To b e sure, ther supporters of a strong EP or whether Germany in particular has tied its post- the future new member-states will remain war identity to the process of European hesitant with regard to the delegation of integration and this may also have con- power to supranational (as well as region- tributed to a favourable attitude to the al) parliaments. EP. But the example of other states demonstrates that this link is by no means First version received: July 2001. inherent. Thus, adherents of European Final version accepted: December 2001. integration, e.g. Ireland, do not necessarily support a strong EP. At the same time, the EP has received support from states Notes: whose national legitimacy hardly suffered from World War II such as Belgium and Wolfgang Wagner is Research Associate at the Netherlands. the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and The constructivist perspective em- at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University in ployed in this article does not only offer Frankfurt/Main, Germany.

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Addresses: Wolfgang Wagner, PRIF — Peace Katzenstein’s (1993) analysis of German and Research Institute Frankfurt, Leimenrode 29, Japanese security policies. D-60322 Frankfurt am Main, Germany [E-mail: 7 Of course, improving policy output could also con- [email protected]]; or Johann Wolfgang Goethe tribute to the EU’s legitimacy. Notwithstanding this University, Institute for Comparative Politics and additional possibility to increase the legitimacy of International Relations, Robert Mayer Straße 5, EU policies, however, member-states cannot evade Fach 102, D-60054 Frankfurt am Main, Germany the question of input legitimacy, i.e. whether parlia- [E-mail: [email protected]]. mentary legitimation should take place indirectly via the national parliament or directly via the EP. 1 Compulsory expenditure refers to expenditure 8 Whereas formal legitimacy can be achieved by an necessarily resulting from the Treaty Establishing adherence to constitutional procedures, social legit- the European Community and from the acts adopt- imacy refers to the broad acceptance of the political The Sub- ed in accordance therewith. In practice, the distinc- system in society (Weiler 1989:79). national tion between compulsory and non-compulsory 9 This argument is particularly prominent in the Foundations expenditure shields spending on agriculture from constructivist explanations for the so-called of the parliamentary intervention. Democratic Peace according to which democratic European 2 A comprehensive overview of the EP’s competencies politicians externalise the norm of non-violent con- Parliament and functioning can be found in Corbett et al. (2000). flict resolution, which is acknowledged domestical- 3 The so-called Isoglucose ruling of 1980 (Case C- ly, to their international environment (Russett 1993; 138/79); here quoted from Corbett et al. (2000). See Weart 1994). also Zuleeg (1982:26;1993). 10 Because of its small territory and, as a conse- 4 The question why those member-states opposed quence, the missing possibility to establish regions, to a strengthening of the EP eventually compro- no principle of regional legitimation can be found in mised is an issue of bargaining theory and will not be Luxembourg. addressed here. For a brief overview of “suprana- 11 Reprinted in Laursen and Vanhoonacker (1992). tional” and “intergovernmental” bargaining theo- 12 The two letters are reprinted in Laursen and ries, see Moravcsik (1998:50-67). Vanhoonacker (1992:276, 313). 5 The College of Commissioners can decide by a 13 For the significance of domestic cleavages, see simple majority of its members, but Commissioners Moravcsik (1998:27). prefer to seek consensus and hardly make use of the 14 Alex Salmond (SNP), House of Commons voting procedures (Nugent 2001:100). Debates (Hansard), 21 May 1992, col. 555. 6 For the concept of culture as a toolkit, see Swidler 15 Graham Brady (CP), House of Commons Debates (1986). In International Relations literature, similar (Hansard), 15 January 1998, col. 515. arguments can be found in the literature on democ- 16 The author owes this point to one of the anony- ratic peace (Russett 1993; Weart 1994) and in mous reviewers.

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