Wolfgang Wagner The Subnational Foundations of the European Parliament Introduction European Court of Justice are the exclu- > sive domain of the Council, the EP has As the only directly elected par- been given a right to (dis)approve of any liament to ever exist beyond the incoming Commission and to dismiss the nation-state, the European Parli- entire Commission by a vote of censure. ament (EP) is one of the most distin- Most impressive, however, are the EP’s guishing features of the European legislative powers. In a series of treaty Union (EU). Over the course of the last revisions following intergovernmental fifty years, the EP has evolved from an conferences, the EP’s legislative powers “assembly” with a merely consultative have been permanently enhanced. In role to a parliament whose legislative and 1987, the Single European Act introduced budgetary powers are not too far behind the so-called co-operation procedure those of many national parliaments. which gave the EP the right to suggest Whereas the founding treaty of the Euro- amendments to a Council proposal and pean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) even to reject it entirely. However, the established only an assembly consisting of power of the EP remained conditional on representatives of national parliaments, the Commission and the degree of unity the Rome Treaty already envisioned among the member-states: in the case the direct elections to the EP, which eventu- EP rejected a proposal, it could still be ally first took place in 1979. Even before overruled by the Council if the Council the initial direct elections, the EP had decided unanimously and the Com- received significant budgetary powers. mission did not withdraw the proposal. Within the boundaries of a budgetary This co-operation procedure applied to ceiling fixed by the member-states and the bulk of Single Market legislation.2 limited to so-called non-compulsory The EP’s legislative powers were fur- expenditure,1 the EP has been granted the ther enhanced with the coming into right to increase, reduce and redistribute force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. spending. Moreover, it acquired a right to The so-called co-decision procedure reject the whole annual budget. The EP is gave the EP the right to reject any pro- also endowed with a range of supervisory posal during its second reading, while powers: it has a right to receive and debate depriving the Council of its right to annual reports of activity from the Com- overrule the EP’s rejection. Moreover, a mission, and a right to receive oral and conciliation committee is convened written replies to parliamentary ques- when the Council does not approve all tions. Although appointments to the amendments proposed by the EP. At JIRD (2002) 5(1), 24-36 24 Copyright 2002 by Faculty of Social Sciences, Centre of International Relations Journal of International Relations and Development 5(March 2002)1 that stage, the EP either reaches agree- the EP only the right to subject the ment with the Council or may reject the Commission in its entirety to a vote of proposed legislation in which case the (dis)approval. In 1999, the EP used the regulation or directive in question can- possibility of rejecting the incoming not be adopted. Because of the introduc- Prodi Commission in its entirety to elicit tion of the co-decision procedure, the the concession from the Commission EP has been regarded as the “major win- President that he would consider request- ner” of the intergovernmental conference ing any Commissioner to resign if the EP leading to the Maastricht Treaty (Wal- expressed a lack of confidence in him or lace 1996:157). her (Nugent 2001:86). By using its exist- The co-decision procedure received ing powers to the maximum extent possi- some minor changes under the Amster- ble, the EP has thus managed to further The Sub- dam Treaty of 1997 which came into force enhance its powers. Moreover, other national in 1999. Under co-decision, the Council supranational institutions, most notably Foundations and the EP now legislate on an equal foot- the European Court of Justice, have sup- of the ing. Even more important, however, was ported the EP’s requests for enhanced European the extension of the co-decision proce- competencies. The European Court of Parliament dure to some twenty provisions including Justice contributed to the establishment R& D (research and development) policy, of parliamentary democracy as an EU environmental policy and development constitutional principle by declaring that aid (Griller et al. 2000:314). The propor- ‘the people should take part in the exer- tion of co-decisions will expand even cise of power through the intermediary of more when (and if) the Nice Treaty is rat- a representative assembly.’3 ified by the member-states. The Nice However, the question remains as to Treaty provides for a further extension of why the member-states repeatedly a- co-decision-making to a range of treaty greed to extend the EP’s powers and articles (among others, parts of social pol- competencies. A cursory look at the var- icy, industrial policy and cohesion; see ious treaty negotiations reveals that Fischer 2001:565). enhancing parliamentary powers has This impressive history of enhanced always been among the most contested powers poses the question of why the EP issues on the agenda. During negotia- has been so successful in acquiring new tions on the Single European Act (1985), powers. The question is particularly puz- the Maastricht Treaty (1990/91) and the zling because any delegation of compe- Amsterdam Treaty (1996/97), there were tencies to the EP can be regarded as de always a number of member-states that facto irreversible not only because una- saw the strengthening of the EP as a nimity and ratification is required to high priority. In each negotiation, the change the treaties but because it seems member-states pressing for a strength- practically unfeasible to withdraw powers ened EP obtained some concessions from a directly elected institution from the more reluctant member-states (Jachtenfuchs 1999:329). To be sure, the and were thus instrumental in endowing EP has frequently used its existing powers the EP with significant powers.4 In order to acquire further competencies. For to explain the strengthening of the EP, it example, the EP had no right of approv- therefore has to be analysed why those ing every Commissioner individually and member-states have held such a strong having him/her resign if it lacks confi- preference for this particular institu- dence in him/her. The Treaties have given tional choice. 25 Journal of International Relations and Development 5(March 2002)1 Because the literature on institutional dures other than unanimity,’ sovereignty choice has been dominated by rationalist is ‘delegated when supranational actors theorising, this paper starts by examining are permitted to take certain autonomous whether the rationalist theory of institu- decisions, without an intervening inter- tional choice is capable of explaining state vote or unilateral veto’ (Moravcsik member-states’ preferences for strength- 1998:67). ening the EP. As will be demonstrated in From an institutional choice point of Section II, however, the delegation of view, the assignment of competencies to power to the EP cannot be explained by the Commission embodies the ideal-type rationalist institutional choice theory. of delegation. However, strengthening Section III, therefore, addresses the issue the EP is also best understood as a case of Wolfgang from a constructivist perspective, which the delegation (as opposed to the pooling) Wa gner has emerged as the major challenger to of sovereignty (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis rationalist theorising. Starting from the 1999:76). Clearly, the EP does not take constructivist assumption that ideas play decisions autonomously — as would be an important and independent role in the ideal type of delegation — but partic- preference formation (and thus institu- ipates in joint decision-making with the tional choice), it will be shown that the Council. However, in contrast to the key to the answer lies in the member- Council, the EP is designed as an inde- states’ internal political systems, particu- pendent body whose members are not larly the extent to which direct parlia- instructed by their national governments. mentary control can be found at the sub- Though Members of the European national level. Parliament (MEPs) remain dependent on their national parties to be nominated, they are legally independent of their Rationalist Institutional national governments. Moreover, though Choice Theory national cleavages remain visible, parlia- mentary work is effectively organised There is a growing body of liter- along party lines (Hix 1999:76). Indeed, a ature dedicated to a rationalist ex- recent empirical study found that ‘legisla- planation of member-states’ deci- tive behavior in the EP is structured more sions to design international insti- by party affiliation than national affilia- tutions in various ways (Garrett 1992; tion,’ i.e. ‘MEPs are more likely to vote Pollack 1997; 1998; 1999; Moravcsik 1998; with their EP party group than with Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis 1999). The MEPs from their Member State (who sit rationalist theory of institutional choice in other EP groups)’ (Hix 2001:684). is functionalist, i.e. it ‘explains institution- Ta k en together, by strengthening the EP al choices in terms of the functions a the member-states delegate sovereignty given institution is expected to perform to a supranational actor. and the effects on policy outcomes it is From an institutional choice point of expected to produce, subject to the view, delegation addresses the problem uncertainty in any institutional design’ of incomplete contracting, i.e. the fact (Pollack 1997:102). With regard to the EU, that states (or any other group of actors) two main forms of institutional choices are unable to cover every aspect of an can be distinguished.