Egypt's Election: No Change, Many Challenges

EGYPT’S ELECTION: NO CHANGE, MANY CHALLENGES

EDITED BY GIUSEPPE DENTICE

The upcoming Egyptian presidential election, scheduled for March 26-28, should be a foregone conclusion. Without real opponents, the incumbent President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is waiting for a predictable verdict that will confirm him for a second term. The only question is whether or not this election will be a plebiscite. However, even after the election, the real struggle for a modern Egypt will persist: economic growth, social reforms, terrorism and, most of all, the need for an inclusive and tangible democratization process are challenges the regime cannot overlook anymore. Despite media fanfare and a certain triumphalism promoted by an apparently strong and unchallenged regime, five years after Morsi’s ouster the country is still far from the promise of political stability and economic prosperity pledged by al-Sisi when he came to power in 2014. What comes next? Are we witnessing a comeback of the Mubarak era? Or is any political space still open for the oppositions (including the Islamists)? What role do the public sector and the military play in today’s Egypt? What are the government’s international priorities, and what is al-Sisi’s regional vision for Egypt in a changing Middle East? * This Dossier has been edited by Giuseppe Dentice (Catholic University and ISPI)

1. ELECTIONS IN EGYPT: WHAT PURPOSE DO THEY SERVE?, Marina Ottaway (Wilson Center). 2 2. THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY’S ECONOMIC SOLUTION: IS IT WORKING?, Zeinab Abul-Magd (Oberlin College and the American University in Cairo) 3. IN HIS WORDS: A THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF AL-SISI’S TWITTER ACCOUNT, Matteo Colombo, (University of Milan (NASP) and ISPI) 4. ISLAMISM IN EGYPT AND THE EMERGING DIVIDE, Massimo Campanini (University of Trento) 5. THE MARKET OF VIOLENCE IN EGYPT, Georges Fahmi (European University Institute) 6. EGYPT VOTES AMIDST HARSH PRESS CENSORSHIP, Giuseppe Acconcia (University of Padua) 7. THE EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION’S LONG NIGHT, Federica Zoja (Avvenire) 8. ISRAEL, GAZA AND PALESTINE: COMMON INTERESTS, DIFFERENT VISIONS, Tewfik Aclimandos, (Collège de France and Cairo University) 9. SISI’S SECOND TERM: THE LIBYA QUESTION, Ziad Akl, (ACPSS) 10. EGYPT-GULF COUNTRIES: “NEW NORMAL” RELATIONS, Giuseppe Dentice (Catholic University and ISPI) 11. CAIRO AND WASHINGTON: THE END OF A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP?, Gianluca Pastori (Catholic University) 12. ITALY AND EGYPT, BETWEEN MORALITY AND RAISON D’ÉTAT, Ugo Tramballi (ISPI and Il Sole 24 Ore)

2 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

ELECTIONS IN EGYPT: WHAT PURPOSE DO THEY SERVE?

Marina Ottaway

he outcome of Egyptian presidential won easily against the banned candidates. elections scheduled for March 26 is Egyptians are tired of instability, they argue, a foregone conclusion – incumbent and more focused on their own economic sur- President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi will vival than on political change. The regime’s T win and serve his second term un- relentless propaganda portraying al-Sisi as the challenged. The only question is whether he country’s savior has also had an impact. will then abrogate the constitutional clause If al-Sisi is certain to win, what purpose do that imposes a two-term limit and become – elections serve? The answer is twofold. First, like all his predecessors — de facto president Egyptians have always respected the letter of for life. the constitution, even if they often disregarded Al-Sisi’s victory is certain because his only op- the spirit. When some constitutional clauses ponent is Moussa Mostafa Moussa, an obscure become inconvenient for the regime, they are politician who heads the al-Gad party, sup- amended—the process for doing so is very easy ports al-Sisi, and was allowed to register as a in Egypt. The present constitution prescribes candidate literally at the last moment. One elections every four years and a maximum of does not have to be particularly conspiracy two terms. If al-Sisi decides to run again in minded to recognize Moussa’s candidacy as a four years, he will abrogate the term limits in maneuver orchestrated by the regime to be a legal fashion. able to claim that al-Sisi won a competitive The second purpose of the elections is to re- election. Earlier, four candidates that had ex- affirm that Egyptians want al-Sisi to stay in pressed an interest in running were either de- power, possibly bolstering his position within clared ineligible for flimsy reasons or decided the military, the real arbiter of power alloca- to withdraw when faced with insurmountable tion. Al-Sisi did not rise to power on the obstacles. For example, Anwar el-Sadat, the strength of his own leadership qualities, popu- former president’s nephew, abandoned his pro- larity, or charisma. He was placed there by the ject to run when faced with the reality that no military after the coup d’état of July 2013 that hotel or other facility would allow him to even removed Mohammed Morsi from power. Pre- rent a room for a press conference announcing sumably, the military could replace him. A his intention to run. vote, indeed a plebiscite, confirming his popu- Paradoxically, both supporters and foes of the larity would be a disincentive to do so. present regime concur that al-Sisi would have

3 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

Nobody really knows what al-Sisi’s standing promises sapping efficiency and speed. This is within the military and security services is at a favorite refrain of authoritarian leaders. this point. Rumors circulate of dissatisfaction What is more unusual is that al-Sisi has taken within the military and even of attempted no steps to create a space for officially sanc- coups against him, but there is no specific in- tioned political activity. He has not set up a formation. The standard reply to any inquiry party, let alone one complete with women’s on this topic is that the military and security and youth organizations, as authoritarian forces are “a black box.” leaders tend to do. He has not set up government-controlled organizations of “civil society.” An electoral victory will not help al-Sisi unless He has simply tried to suppress all politics, voter turnout is high, demonstrating that he and opposition candidates represent politics. has real support, but this is problematic. His Moussa Mostafa Moussa, who continues to de- supporters have little incentive to vote, know- clare his admiration for al-Sisi even while the- ing that he will win in any case. Even his de- oretically running against him, is not keeping tractors have no reason to vote for his blatant- politics alive but adding to the chorus of sup- ly fake opponent. Some parties have called for port for the regime. an election boycott, and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, one of the most influential advocates In March, a tired and demoralized Egypt will of that course of action and a former high- re-elect al-Sisi. People are impoverished. ranking leader of the Muslim Brotherhood CAPMAS, the government organization that who broke with the organization, has been collects statistics, recently announced that the jailed as a result. The arrest will probably put poverty rate went up to almost 28 percent as a an end to open calls for a boycott but will not result of the decision to let the Egyptian pound dissuade people from staying home. Low turn- float (which halved its value), and of the elim- out was a problem in the 2014 election: in fact ination of most subsidies for food and energy. so few voted initially that the government de- Poverty rates in Upper Egypt are as high as 50 cided to keep the polls open for an additional percent. The regime has grandiose projects, a day and to give government employees a day vision for a new Egypt resembling the wealthy off from work so they could vote. The govern- Gulf states, symbolized by a new administra- ment will exaggerate the rate of participa- tive capital being built in the desert between tion—it always does—but there is a limit to Cairo and Suez, which will be reserved for civil what it can claim when the public has seen the servants, and only high-level civil servants at empty polling stations. that. For most Egyptians, the reality is not this vision of modernity and even opulence— Another question about the forthcoming elec- the only building completed in the new capital tions is why the regime has bothered to ex- at this point is a seven-star hotel that stands clude candidates al-Sisi would have easily fully staffed and empty in the middle of a con- beaten. The answer is that the regime rejects struction site—but the old Egypt with its over- politics in general, not just political activity crowded, dirty streets, crumbling buildings, that would threaten its power. Al-Sisi has de- and absence of economic opportunities. Ordi- clared repeatedly that Egypt is facing too nary Egyptians grumble, but not too loudly. many problems, both in the security and the They appear more resigned than rebellious. economic realms, to afford the luxury of de- Politics has been suppressed. The problems mocracy, with its eternal debates and com- are ever more blatant.

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THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY’S ECONOMIC SOLUTION: IS IT WORKING?

Zeinab Abul-Magd

gypt has many challenges in its his first term with sudden decisions to signifi- domestic economy, either inherit- cantly reduce food, gas, and electricity subsi- ed from Hosni Mubarak’s era or dies. By his midterm, al-Sisi’s regime had al- arising during the years of politi- ready secured a large IMF loan of $12 billion, E cal turmoil and instability that which necessitated another economic shock to followed the 2011 uprisings. During his first fix the country’s budget deficit and reduce pub- term as president, ex-field marshal Abdel Fat- lic spending. After drastic devaluation of the tah al-Sisi’s military regime tried to resolve Egyptian pound, the government proceeded the country’s chronic problems in its own way. with more cuts in bread, gas, and medicine Al-Sisi’s economic solution is based on two subsidies – amidst severe shortages and inflat- measures: rapid liberalization according to an ing prices of these basic goods. IMF plan, and great reliance on the military’s However, the rationalization in government civilian enterprises to undertake major state spending did not apply to the ruling military in- projects. As such solutions have been arousing stitutions: the army’s expenditure on new arms public discontent, it is not clear whether they deals skyrocketed during al-Sisi’s first term. will eventually work out – especially if they From France alone, one deal for Rafale jets cost continue to be adopted in an upcoming second €5.2 billion and another for Mistral warships presidential term for al-Sisi. cost around €1 billion. The Ministry of Defense This commentary will briefly detail these took loans from French banks to cover these measures and illustrate their outcomes. Egypt deals. In addition, al-Sisi annually increased the officially transitioned into a market economy military’s allocations in the national budget. The in the early 1990s, which entailed fundamen- Armed Forces received an increase of LE8.3 bil- tal cuts in public spending. A large item of lion (about $1.2 billion) in fiscal year (FY) such spending is government subsidizes, 2014/2015, and most recently in FY 2017/2018 it which were inherited from the 1960s’s socialist received another increase of LE 4.7 billion state. Mubarak’s successive cabinets of neolib- (around $266 million). He also repeatedly in- eral ministers were reluctant to eliminate food creased military pensions for retired officers. and other subsidizes that benefited the lower In addition to ruling the country, the Egyptian and middle classes for fear of mass riots. In military owns a vast business empire that in- the summer of 2014 – immediately after win- vests in almost every civilian economic sector, ning the presidential election – al-Sisi began from manufacturing to services. This empire

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developed in the 1990s-2000s,1[1] but it recent- Authority of the Armed Forces (EAAF) took ly expanded enormously as al-Sisi has heavily charge of al-Sisi’s ambitious project of digging relied on military contractors and manufac- a “New Suez Canal,” an extension parallel to turers to undertake public construction pro- the old canal. National banks issued invest- jects and provide the government with goods. ment certificates to sell to civilian citizens, and Functioning above the free market’s competi- succeeded in collecting LE64 billion (around $9 tion rules, military contractors directly receive billion) of their savings to fund the project. Al- government commissions to build roads, Sisi ordered the EAAF to complete the project bridges, schools, hospitals, highways etc. Mili- within only one year, instead of the originally tary factories provide the Ministry of Health scheduled five years, which required tapping with drugs produced in their pharmaceuticals into the country’s limited reserves of foreign plants, the Ministry of Power with electricity currency to hire international sub-contractors meters, the Ministry of housing with water and rent advanced equipment from them. Ex- sanitation equipment, and much more. vice admiral Muhab Mamish, head of the Suez Canal Authority, promised that the project Al-Sisi’s regime has embarked on several would increase the canal’s annual revenue by mega projects and assigned them to military LE40 billion per year ($5.5 billion). engineers, but these gigantic ventures were not always managed with sufficient business Have these policies worked so far? Evidently, experience and competence. The Engineering there are limited signs of their success, which generates public discontent with the regime. 1 For detailed info on the military business empire see: Zeinab Abul- The expedited economic liberalization scheme Magd, Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in has not adequately brought foreign direct in- Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), ch.3.

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vestment back into the country yet. Whereas shortage as a result, and its head was sacked Egypt’s FDI peaked to $11.8 billion in 2007, it after asserting that the project consumed huge remained lower than this figure with $8.1 bil- quantities of his bank’s foreign currency to be lion in 2016, which is mostly Arabian Gulf cap- unnecessarily completed in a short period. ital and with little technology transfer in- Moreover, despite the regime’s ambitious prom- volved. As a result of the scarcity of foreign in- ises of sizable increases, the Canal’s annual vestment, the unemployment rate remains revenue declined as soon as the extension high: it reached 11.6 percent in 2017. Instead opened, due to slower international trade. It of economic prosperity, the hasty liberalization dropped from $5.46 billion in 2014 to $5 billion scheme has brought about new waves of mass in 2016. The potential contribution of other protests. In early 2017, bread riots erupted in mega projects managed by military engineers, reaction to the decision of the Ministry of Sup- such as the “New Administrative Capital,” to ply – headed recently by two ex-generals in a economic growth are similarly questioned. row – to decrease amounts of subsidized bread Economist Galal Amin asserts that they are for lower-class families. Security forces dis- merely real estate investments, rather than persed the protests across the north and south long-term economic development ventures, of the country. Similar protests erupted in re- mostly funded by oil money and serving the up- action to severe shortages in medicine and ba- per classes in a “hungry country.”2 by formula after cutting their subsidies. Al-Sisi will win another presidential term in The economic value of the public mega projects this month’s election. Along with other gener- executed by the military has come under harsh als and ex-generals in the military ruling elite, scrutiny. For example, the military engineers it seems unlikely that the current economic financially mismanaged the Suez Canal’s ex- policies will change. Since they have not tension project, as its high cost drained the worked well during his first term, it is doubt- country’s reserve of foreign currency. The Egyp- ful that Egypt’s increasing economic dilemmas tian Central Bank suffered a crisis of dollar could be resolved in the foreseeable future.

2 Galal Amin, “Tanmiya Iqtisadiyya am Tanmiya ‘Aqariyya,” al- Shorouk, 14 April 2015; Raniya Badawi, “Galal Amin Ustadh al-Iqtisad bi-l-Jami‘a al-Amrikiyya: Tajdid al-Khitab al-Dini fi Balad Ja’i‘ Madya‘a li-l-Waqt,” al-Masry al-Youm, 5 May 2015.

7 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

IN HIS WORDS. A THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF AL-SISI’S TWITTER ACCOUNT

Matteo Colombo

bdel Fattah al-Sisi’s online com- growth to all Egyptians, especially the weaker munication strategy has mostly sections of society. centred on two themes: economic 4. There are powerful forces, including inter- development and a call for unity national jihadists, working to derail the future A to all Egyptians, regardless of of Egypt. These forces can only be countered their faiths and political orientations, in the by preserving national unity and through pub- name of the greater good of the country. Draw- lic support for the security forces. ing from 174 tweets from the official Twitter account of the Egyptian president over the last Praise to all the Egyptian people six months1, four recurrent ideas emerge in President al-Sisi does not miss a chance to the al-Sisi narrative: praise the Egyptian people for overcoming a 1. The Egyptian people should be praised for difficult period in the aftermath of the revolu- their achievements in the previous four years. tion and attaining their current achievements. However, it is essential to overcome religious, The tweets that convey nationalistic ideas social and ideological differences to preserve make up 13.8 per cent of the total. Some of these fragile results. them refer to women, Christians and youth to 2. The will of Egyptians legitimates the presi- stress their full membership in the national dent's decisions. The President works for a community. In a tweet on 19 January, for ex- more transparent and open society by fighting ample, al-Sisi proudly stated that “everything corruption and discussing current problems we achieved in the land of Egypt has been openly with citizens. achieved thanks to the wisdom and unity of 3. Infrastructure, such as the New Suez Canal, the great people”. and foreign investments are the keys to boost- ing economic development. The President’s intention is to extend the benefits of economic

1 It is worth mentioning that the collected tweets have always been posted on the President’s Facebook page, which includes an addition-

al 40-50 posts that have appeared only on this social platform. The two pages had 1.69 million followers (Twitter) and 7.2 million followers (Facebook) on March 11.

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On the same day, he also added that “the real This nationalist discourse can be understood as heroes in the battle for preserving the state a pragmatic strategy to maintain internal order are the Egyptians themselves”. and to present controversial decisions to citizens in the light of national interest. Further- more, it has proven a useful tool for convincing Egyptians to finance infrastructure projects, such as the New Suez Canal, which has been mostly funded by the purchase of state-issued bonds. Finally, al-Sisi uses nationalism because it is an ideology that has deep roots in Egypt and contributes to uniting all strands of society A day before Orthodox Christmas (January 7), that would otherwise define themselves in ideo- he posted pictures of his visit to the recently logical or religious terms. built cathedral in the new administrative capital to express his support for Egyptian Chris- My country asks me tians, who he claims to be “original Egyp- Al-Sisi’s online discourse conveys the idea that tians”. his legitimacy to govern relies mostly on his ability to solve people’s problems. A good 18.4% of the collected tweets contain the concept of “people’s will” for justifying his current power. For example, on 10 January he launched an online initiative for citizens to ask the president questions on Twitter by using the hashtag National narrative). It is interesting) حكاية_وطن# to note that this online initiative was launched Many other tweets praise Egyptian women shortly before announcing al-Sisi’s candidacy in (5.2 per cent of the total tweets), often defined the presidential elections, to once again stress as an indispensable part of Egyptian society. his determination to solve peoples’ problems. In In one tweet, al-Sisi claimed that ”everyone answering citizens’ questions, President al-Sisi must bow to the sacrifices made by Egyptian openly claims: “I have borne the responsibility of women”, trusteeship and I have made every effort to pro- tect the nation and assure you that I cannot stay against your will”.

while in another he praised their ability to work for peace and against terrorism. Finally, the President addressed Egyptian youth in many To further reinforce the message, he solemnly tweets during the “Egypt’s Youth Forum”, even proclaimed being “ready to sacrifice my soul launching the hashtag #WeNeedToTalk. Unfor- for my country”. tunately for al-Sisi, the hashtag was quickly adopted by activists to accuse the security forces of human rights violations.

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Big projects and ribbon-cutting The economic recovery is the most common topic of al-Sisi’s communication strategy. Al- most 1 out of 4 posts (23 per cent) refers to Egypt’s economy and al-Sisi’s endless efforts to improve his citizens’ material conditions, espe- During the same online initiative, he also cially those of the weaker. The two key words stated that he is working to build a more dem- which al-Sisi often uses to present his devel- ocratic Egypt, by stressing that the elections opment strategy to the citizens are “infrastruc- will be “fair and transparent”. ture” and “investments”. “Infrastructure” often refers to big projects, including the construction of the new administrative capital, which al-Sisi considers essential for the development of the country. For example, he stated in a tweet from last January that “no country wants to build an ambitious economy without sophisticate infrastructures”. This rhetoric is pivotal to justifying al-Sisi’s power, which emerged in the context of the military stance against President Morsi. Al-Sisi makes a considerable effort to present all his decisions within the framework of the people’s will and constitutional rules. For example, shortly after announcing that he would run in the presidential elections, he tweeted pictures of the documents needed to present his candi- Investments are also essential in al-Sisi’s eco- dacy to demonstrate that he was following pro- nomic vision, especially those that come from cedures like other candidates and that people foreign countries. It is not a coincidence that the visits of Gulf rulers are the occasion for al- Sisi to present new projects and show his citizens that there is an interest in investing in the country as long as stability is preserved. In a tweet he thus proudly stated that “the Egyp- tian state has been working around the clock to win the trust of foreign investors”.

were asking him to serve a second term.

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Foreign investments are also presented by al- rarely speaks about international issues, but Sisi as a way to partially solve the problem of when he does he often links them to the issue unemployment, which is one of the main wor- of internal cohesion. An example is this tweet: ries for Egyptian families. Finally, al-Sisi often “Our foreign policies are strong with the unity addresses the importance of sustainable devel- and cohesion of the Egyptians” to stress that opment, which could provide an improvement of any contestation of his rule and Egyptian in- conditions for the weaker members of society. stitutions is helping the enemies of Egypt to destabilise the country. Fighting the enemies of Egypt The issue of security comprises only 10.3 per cent of the analysed tweets. This percentage is quite low compared to the other topics, which seems to be quite surprising when considering that backing from the security forces has been pivotal to al-Sisi’s power. However, the Egyp- tian president does not need to win support Conclusions from this group of society, which is already The analysis of al-Sisi’s communication strat- widely supporting his presidency. He thus re- egy shows interesting insights into the often- fers to the army mostly in tweets on the war underestimated reasons for his support within against terrorism and national cohesion. For Egyptian society. The Egyptian president pre- example, in one tweet al-Sisi praised “The sons sents himself as a caring father who is driven of the armed forces and the police [who] fought only by patriotism and the will of the people to a huge battle against the forces of darkness”. serve his country. Al-Sisi does not refrain from addressing some controversial issues, such as terrorism in Sinai and human rights, but rein- terprets them within the framework of nationalism and the will of Egyptians. In this respect, al-Sisi presents himself as a pragmatic leader who mostly addresses issues like the economy and security, which pertain to all Egyptians, regardless of their ideological ideas. In al-Sisi’s view, all enemies come from He also regularly pays homage to the relatives outside the country, while all the Egyptians of the victims of terrorism among the security who are contesting this representation of na- forces. The Egyptian president describes secu- tional harmony are just serving foreign inter- rity forces as an indispensable pillar for na- ests to undermine Egypt. On his side are all tional cohesion against external forces who the good Egyptians, those that promote na- want to destabilise Egypt: a reference which tional cohesion based on shared nationality might refer to the Muslim Brotherhood but al- and Egyptian identity and regardless of their so to other international foreign powers. In differences. this respect, it is worth noting that al-Sisi

11 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

ISLAMISM IN EGYPT: THE EMERGING DIVIDE

Massimo Campanini

e could say that the history of ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi’s coup d’etat destroyed the Muslim Brotherhood, born the organizational web of the Brotherhood (it in Egypt in 1928 and wiped out is enough to remember the hundreds of deaths by ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi’s coup in Rabi‘a al-Adhawiyya Square). The crack- W d’etat in 2013, has been a his- down in the summer of 2013 allowed the new tory of failed opportunities. For although the regime to accuse the Brotherhood of all past Muslim Brotherhood has been a grass-roots and present (and future) misdeeds that oc- movement, deeply entrenched in civil society, curred and will occur in Egypt. It is practically it failed for decades to seize political power, impossible to know if and how the Brother- and when finally, for two years (2011-2013) it hood is re-organizing itself under the radar, succeeded in achieving its goal, its perfor- and, moreover, if and how this re-organization mance was poor. Applying Gramsci’s catego- will be successful. No doubt, the crackdown’s ries, we could say that the Muslim Brother- harshness could lead to further radicalization, hood was never able to capitalize on the credit encouraging the Brotherhood to seek a link it earned deploying a counter-hegemonic oppo- with jihadist groups operating in Egypt. After sition under Sadat (1970-1981) and Mubarak all, Sayyid Qutb’s jihadism in the Sixties was (1981-2011). It is true that many scholars and born precisely as a reaction to the Nasser re- observers argued that the Muslim Brother- gime’s repression. hood’s opposition was a smokescreen conceal- The vacuum left in the landscape of Political ing its effective will to be legitimized and co- Islam in Egypt could be filled by Salafism. opted in power. However, in the frenzied con- Salafism is today a growing phenomenon text of the first months of the Egyptian “revo- throughout the Muslim world, due to several lution” (or perhaps better “revolt”) of 2011, the factors. From the ideological point of view, Brotherhood actually did capitalize on a great many people yearn to reproduce the Prophet deal of its credit, winning the polls and the re- Muhammad’s perfect age, and from the politi- public’s presidency with Muhammad Morsi. In cal point of view Salafi propaganda is assertive their management of power until the military and vociferous. At least two issues prevent crackdown of July 2013, the Brotherhood Salafism’s growth, however. On the one hand, made a number of serious mistakes, trying to the very little room ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi’s re- impose from above an “Islamist” constitution gime grants to any kind of opposition, especial- and failing to improve the economy. ly if religious. On the other, the silent alliance

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between the Egyptian government and the of- opposition; the latter refers to a particular, ex- ficial Islamic establishment, represented treme and often distorted, reading of the tradi- mainly by the al-Azhar network. The govern- tional sources extolling violence through a bi- ment and al-Azhar need each other: the former ased interpretation of some controversial in order to find legitimization; the latter in or- Qur’anic verses. Moreover, “Islamist” thought der to extend its influence in society and espe- is not always violent: on the contrary, a num- cially in education. The al-Azhar network en- ber of Salafis are apolitical. And jihadism is a rolls about a half million (and probably more) largely minority phenomenon. What then are students at all levels of education, from ele- the connections between religious thought and mentary school to university. It is arguable Political Islam? Has Political Islam a future in that a substantial part of Egypt’s future intel- Egypt? And in the Muslim world at large? ligentsia will be educated in this cultural con- An answer can be only tentative. The “old” text. The al-Azhar establishment needs the shayks with their red turbans, walking proud- government’s benevolence to increase its au- ly in Cairo’s streets, still enjoy wide prestige thority; the government could find in al-Azhar among the populace. Islamic political thought (at least tacit) support for its policies. again rotates around the concept of shura A commonly neglected actor in Islamic polity (consultation) and ijma‘ (consensus), but with- is the establishment, the grassroots Islam tan- out explaining how these classical categories tamount to the Catholic parish system. Nor- must be interpreted in contemporary society. mally all eyes are concentrated on extremism Sometimes, Islamic political thought gives the and violence, which are on the contrary mar- impression of being in a stalemate. “Islamist” ginal and involve few people, while scant at- thought is in itself Manichaean and conceptu- tention is paid to institutional religion. In fact ally rigid, albeit sometimes more sophisticated institutional organizations represent the than would seem from outside. The idea of an backbone of religious systems in almost all Islamic state as a “civil state” (dawla Muslim countries. It is within this framework madaniyya), that is, a state grounded upon that most of religious thought is elaborated. law and not “theocratic”, (an idea especially supported by, among others, famous Egyptian Religious thought in contemporary Egypt ‘alims like Yusuf al-Qaradawi), is widespread seems less lively and original even in compari- among Islamic thinkers in Egypt and abroad. son with the most recent past. Al-Azhar’s “Islamist” thinkers never managed to clarify shayks often take conservative stances as if what the effective meaning is of God’s sover- they were besieged in a fortress: the times of eignty (hakimiyya). Although the two trends great figures like Mahmud Shaltut or Mu- are not completely at odds – sharing for exam- hammad al-Ghazali seem over. Other intellec- ple the concept of shura –, the differences are tuals are engaged in pure speculation. Cur- equally evident, both in tactics (education vs rently, secularism is also progressing in the compulsion) and in objectives (civil state vs Muslim world, and this progress sometimes God’s sovereignty). A number of scholars con- arouses the concern of religious establish- tinue to prophesize the death of Political Is- ments, as it fosters the blind violence of radi- lam. I believe that we must be more cautious cal ideologies. It is important to stress that Is- and that Egypt could return to being a labora- lamic thought is not “Islamist” thought: the tory of intellectual Islamic recovery former refers to classical paradigms and is normally an enemy of extremism and armed

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14 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

THE MARKET OF VIOLENCE IN EGYPT

Georges Fahmi

hile Egypt approaches the like Hassm and Liwa al-Thawra, however, re- upcoming presidential elec- ject the concept of excommunication and insist tions with an almost uncom- that state officials should be resisted not be- petitive political sphere, the cause of their faith but for their actions. The spectrum of violence in groups of the latter category also do not ad- WEgypt has become more diverse over the last here to the concept of Islamic governance. Ac- few years. It has developed to the extent that cording to Liwa al-Thawra, it is up to a nation we could speak of a “market of violence” to decide how to govern itself. While the among different groups who seek to maximize movement questions the Western roots of de- their respective market shares. These compet- mocracy, it also rejects the establishment of a ing groups can be divided into three main cat- despotic religious rule. egories: groups affiliated with the Islamic While all of these groups seek to topple the State (IS), that include those operating in current regime, they apply different strategies northern Sinai known as Wilayat Sinai (Sinai to achieve this goal. IS in general targets both Province or Islamic State in the Sinai) and state officials and civilians and attacks groups operating in mainland Egypt under the mosques and churches alike. Over the last name of The Islamic State in Egypt. Another couple of years, The Islamic State in Egypt has category is those affiliated with al-Qaeda and carried out three major terrorist attacks includes groups like Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of against Coptic Orthodox churches in Cairo, Islam) operating in the Western Desert and Alexandria, and Tanta that left more than 80 Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam) operating dead, while the Islamic State in Sinai stands in northern Sinai. Lastly, there are the groups accused of being behind the November 2017 emerging from the Muslim Brotherhood such attack on al-Rawdah mosque in northern Sinai as Hassm (The Arms of Egypt Movement) and that left more than 300 dead. On their part, Liwa al-Thawra (The Banner of the Revolu- Hassm and Liwa al-Thawra target both secu- tion) that operate in mainland Egypt. rity and religious figures connected to the re- These different groups differ in ideology and gime. However, and unlike IS, they refuse to strategy. On the ideological level the groups target civilians or religious minorities. Both affiliated to both the Islamic State and al- groups condemned the IS attacks against Cop- Qaeda adhere to Salafi-jihadism, which relies tic churches and the mosque in northern Sinai. on the principle of takfir – the process of ex- As for Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, they avoid communication as the basis for the military attacking civilians and mainly target security struggle against state institutions to establish officers. They also condemned the attack on al- Islamic governance based on sharia. Groups Rawdah mosque: Jund al-Islam described it as

15 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

“a great sin”, although they did not condemn Over the last few years, IS has been more ac- the attacks against the Coptic churches. tive in attracting Muslim Brotherhood youths to their ranks, particularly from inside pris- Despite sharing the same goal, there is fierce ons. Testimonies from inside prisons show that competition between these groups for influence the percentage of Muslim Brotherhood mem- and resources. A crisis of leadership within the bers who became more willing to join Salafi Muslim Brotherhood has led the other groups jihadi groups amounts to more than 20 per to solicit Muslim Brotherhood youths to join cent among detainees. An Egyptian newspaper their ranks instead. even referred to one of the prisons as “a gov- While some members of Hassm and Liwa al- ernmental centre to recruit members for IS”1. Thawra were previously associated with the Its military setback in Syria and Iraq over the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement failed to past year, in addition to its new strategy of at- attract large numbers of Brotherhood youth to tacking places of worship in Egypt, including their ranks. This is mainly due to the rejection mosques, are likely however to drive most of of both the ideological frame and the strategies the Muslim Brotherhood youths away from IS. that were promoted by the historical leaders of The return of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups to the the Muslim Brotherhood. Those who still be- market, on the other hand, and their strategy lieve in the Muslim Brotherhood are not likely of mainly targeting security officials might of- to join these new groups, while the youths who fer an alternative to the disappointed Muslim gave up on the Muslim Brotherhood ideology Brotherhood youths. altogether will not join them either, as these The threat of violent extremism is likely to people are looking for a more radical approach remain a key challenge for President Abdul and would hence be more likely join Salafi ji- Fattah al-Sisi in his second mandate. Alt- hadi groups instead. hough, until now, only a minority within the Last month the Islamic State in Sinai and the Muslim Brotherhood has taken up arms, the leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, each main risk remains that large numbers of posted a video message criticizing the Muslim Brotherhood youths will abandon their organi- Brotherhood’s non-violent political approach. zation and join Salafi jihadi groups. While IS The Province of Sinai revealed in its video that has attracted many youths, particularly from Omar al-Deeb, a member of the Muslim inside prisons, al-Qaeda-affiliated groups with Brotherhood who was killed in September a more radical discourse than that of Hassm 2017 in Cairo, had both left the Brotherhood and Liwa al-Thawra and a more nuanced and had pledged allegiance to the Islamic strategy than that of IS seem to be the more State. This statement was included so as to long-term competitors in this market of vio- implicitly encourage other Muslim Brother- lence in Egypt. hood youths to follow in his path. Ayman al-

Zawahiri’s message in turn was critical of a statement that Mohammad Badie had made on the occasion of the 2013 Rabaa sit-in.

Badie, the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood since 2010, had proclaimed that, “Our peaceful approach is stronger than bul- lets,” and al-Zawahiri insisted that the result of this approach was the killing of thousands without any resistance. 1 Mohamed Khayal, Hona Toura: Markaz Hikoumi li-tajnid al- dawa’sh (“Here is Torah: a governmental centre to recruit members for IS”), Shorouk newspaper, 21 April 2016, available online (Arabic).

16 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

EGYPT VOTES AMID HARSH PRESS CENSORSHIP

Giuseppe Acconcia

he Egyptians are going to vote in the ence to the awful description, given in the presidential elections amid harsh British documentary, of the human rights’ vio- press censorship. This is happening lations in prison. The victim of the violence, both to local and international media Zubeida Ibrahim, recently appeared on the TV T outlets working in Egypt. For this talk-show al-Youm, denying her mother's reason, on March 7, the UN High Commis- claims. However, many observers expressed sioner for Human Rights, Zeid Raad al- doubts about the authenticity of her interview. Hussein, accused Egyptian authorities of cre- Her mother was later arrested on suspicion of ating a “pervasive climate of intimidation” af- spreading “fake news”. ter freedom of expression for local media was Following the broadcast, SIS demanded a boy- suppressed. In this report, the UN criticised cott of the BBC. This was a good occasion for several measures taken by President Abdel the local authorities to stigmatise all foreign Fattah al-Sisi before the 2018 presidential media based in Egypt. According to a SIS elections. “Legislation prevents candidates and statement, foreign broadcasts should never supporters from organising rallies. Independ- publish news that has not been previously ap- ent media have been silenced, with over 400 proved by pro-government agencies. According media and NGO websites completely blocked”, to the Reuters correspondent in Cairo, Eric the report argued. Knecht, this is a clear attempt to intimidate in more general terms all foreign correspondents “The shadow over Egypt” and the BBC case based in Egypt. Egyptian authorities harshly criticised a BBC The most recent case of censorship involved documentary produced by the British public Mohammad Hashem, a young atheist, invited television correspondent, Orla Guerin. In “The as a guest on the TV show al-Hadath al-Youm shadow over Egypt”,the mother of a young in a debate with a sheikh of al-Azhar, Egyptian woman, victim of “enforced disap- Mahmoud Ashour. Before expelling him from pearance”, Zubeida Ibrahim, was interviewed. the broadcast for his “disruptive and inappro- The BBC's broadcast focused on the constant priate ideas”, sheikh Ashour and the TV pre- human rights' violations occurring in Egypt. senter Abd al-Halim suggested that Hashem Egyptian State Information Services (SIS) should go directly to “a psychiatric hospital” harshly criticised the BBC report and called it for his behaviour. After the July 3, 2013 mili- “baseless and full of lies”, especially in refer- tary coup, anti-atheist and anti-LGBT cam-

17 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

paigns have been conducted by the Egyptian 2011 uprisings, a law that prevented it authorities in order to demonstrate their brought about the closure of independent me- «moral commitments», despite the harsh re- dia in Egypt, including the Arabic and English pression of moderate Islamists. versions of the independent blog Mada Masr and the al-Jazeera office in Cairo, with the no- Censoring the Internet torious trial against its journalists. One of the Following the arrests of journalists and TV major protests involving Egyptian journalists hosts in recent weeks, many human rights took place in front of the Cairo Journalist Syn- NGOs asked the Egyptian authorities to put an dicate against the transfer of Tiran and Sanafir end to the “ongoing campaign of intimidation”. islands to Saudi Arabia in March 2016. Since then, the cases of journalists arrested or threat- But the censorship has been even harsher on ened in Egypt have been dozens. One of the lat- the Internet. The latest move, after blocking est cases is that of the blogger, Islam al-Refaie, the main independent media outlets, is cen- who is still under pre-trial custody. Arrested in sorship of cryptocurrency websites. This hap- November 2017, al-Refaie has been accused of pened using the same hardware utilised to being a member of the outlawed organization of block al-Jazeera and Human Rights Watch the Muslim Brotherhood and of organising un- websites. The think tank Citizen Lab analysed authorised demonstrations. In a related case, the means of web control used in Egypt and the public prosecutors asked for the death pen- found evidence of important similarities with alty for the photojournalist, Mahmoud Abou the techniques used in Turkey and Syria Zeid, better known as Shawkan, who has been aimed at controlling cyber-activism. in prison for more than four years for his cover- Last February, the Accelerated Mobile Pages age of the Rabaa al-Adaweya massacre in 2013. (AMP) of Google went offline in Egypt, thus The control over local media, purportedly part blocking access through mobile phones to inter- of the fight against terrorism, has been even national and independent websites. The Com- harsher during the electoral campaign in mittee for Journalists' Protection (CPJ) de- Egypt, preventing an open debate before the manded that the local authorities ensure facili- presidential elections. In recent months the tated access for Egyptians to information Egyptian military regime spread disinfor- sources during the electoral campaign. Howev- mation and extended its constant censorship er, according to the Association for Freedom of over the local and Arab press to foreign, Eng- Expression and Thought (AFTE), the major in- lish and innovative media, in order to filter the ternational websites recently blocked in Egypt potential diffusion of critical news during the are The Washington Post and The New York short electoral campaign, and to completely Times, together with the local independent blog shut down the remaining spaces of freedom of Maswry. The New York Times, especially, has expression and dissent. been harshly criticised for a report on the Israe- li military involvement in the Sinai Peninsula. After freedom of expression flourished in the aftermath of the

18 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

THE EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION’S LONG NIGHT

Federica Zoja

even years after the popular upris- a lawyer, Alaa had already been arrested in ing that led to the resignation of 2006 for organizing demonstrations against President Hosni Mubarak, political the Egyptian judicial system. But it was the activism continues to play the al-Sisi presidency to settle accounts with him: prominent role it had in the 18-day in 2015 Alaa was sentenced to 15 years for vio- Santi-regime demonstrations (25 January - 11 lating, in November 2013, the anti- February 2011) and the subsequent democrat- demonstration rules imposed by the armed ic transition, which soon got stuck. forces after the removal of Mohammed Morsi. The sentence was then converted into 5 years, According to the latest data released by Am- but the Supreme Court, by virtue of continu- nesty international, between April and Sep- ous procedural delays, has not yet pronounced tember 2017, 240 secular political activists definitively and four years have already and nearly 500 close to the Muslim Brother- passed. The #FreeAlaa campaign not only did hood were arrested in Egypt. Human Rights not have the desired effect, but was “frozen” by Watch points out the shutdown of hundreds of the authorities on Twitter. blogs and websites critical of the Abdel Fattah al-Sisi presidency. Now, a few days before the Ahmed Maher, a civil engineer who founded presidential vote on March 26, the repression the April 6 Youth Movement, the most famous of dissent rages throughout the country using and charismatic of the groups that emerged at every means. Because of intimidations, ar- the end of the Mubarak era, was freed at the rests, political trials, forced disappearances beginning of 2017, but national security still and anti-terrorism rules, free voices face end- keeps a special eye on him. Born in support of less obstacles. The stories of all these people the workers of the Mahalla al-Kubra textile are emblematic of an entire generation who factory, on strike in April 2008, the Movement believed that in Midan Tahrir, the heart of the (Haraka) was able to make the most of Face- rebellion in Cairo, they could change the book, Twitter and the blogs of the workers course of history. themselves to relate hard days of clashes between workers and police. At the forefront in Alaa Abd al-Fatah, the creator of “Manalaa”, a 2011, subsequently the April 6 activists never platform of Egyptian blogs conceived together ceased to be in opposition even in the post- with his wife Manal Hassan, has been in jail Mubarak period: in the autumn of 2013 they since winter 2013-2014. Politically active as a denounced the return of the military dictator- teenager, the son of a university professor and

19 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

ship and the harsh repression of Islamism. party al-Dustour (The Constitution) as well as Maher, like Alaa al-Fatah, was arrested and the Nasserist’s al-Karama (The Dignity), the tried at the end of 2013. He served all three Egyptian Social Democratic Party and the years to which he had been sentenced. Cur- moderate Islamist party of Misr al-Qawiya rently, he is trying to resume his public activi- (Strong Egypt). In particular, Abd al-Moneim ty, but other members of the Movement, split Abu al-Fotouh, the head of Strong Egypt, called in two and declared illegal, were arrested be- for a national boycott. A doctor and former tween the end of 2017 and the beginning of Muslim Brotherhood member, he is also known 2018. for his ability in dialogue - a quality that has earned him some enemies in the Brotherhood. Among the Egyptian dissidents there are also Al-Fotouh was stopped by the police on Febru- those who, scarred by too many battles, have ary 14 and accused of making false and damag- chosen to move abroad. One of them is Ayman ing statements against President al-Sisi, speak- Nour, founder of the al-Ghad party (The To- ing with the British press during a stay in Lon- morrow, 2004) and challenger of Hosni Mu- don. Likewise, Mohamed Abd al-Latif Talaat, barak in the 2005 elections, to whom he came general secretary of the al-Wasat party (The in second. Accused of falsifying signatures for Center, moderate liberal Islamists) has been in the registration of his party, the lawyer spent custody since February 9. several years in prison until 2009, when he was released for health reasons. And in Octo- An opponent of Mubarak, Morsi and al-Sisi, ber 2011 he founded the party Ghad al- the liberal Mohammed Esmaa Anwar al- Thawra (The Tomorrow of the Revolution), Sadat, nephew of the president killed in 1981, leaving his first political “creature” to his suc- was expelled from parliament a year ago and cessor Moussa Mustafa Moussa (pro- was recently “persuaded” not to run in the government, the only contender of al-Sisi for presidential elections. the presidency). The human rights lawyer Khaled Ali, a politi- Nour also tried to run for the 2012 presiden- cal activist, decided to withdraw from the elec- tial elections, without success. He has been liv- tion campaign on 24 January. ing between Turkey and Lebanon since the Ezzat Ghonim, a prominent lawyer and activ- coup d'état of 2013, but does not stop criticiz- ist, disappeared on March 1 while returning ing the totalitarian drift. He was recently sus- home from the headquarters of his NGO, the pended by the Egyptian journalists association Egyptian coordinator for rights and freedoms. and has risked losing his citizenship several times. Interviewed by The Telegraph in late January, Mohammed Esmaa Anwar Sadat said: “There The call for a boycott (“Stay at home” is the is no political life any more. It’s all dead. No campaign slogan) of the presidential elections one can dare to compete or even to speak out brings together all the faces of the Egyptian or challenge anything. It’s not allowed”. opposition who still have a voice: the liberal

20 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

EGYPT, ISRAEL, AND PALESTINE: COMMON INTERESTS, DIFFERENT VISIONS

Tewfik Aclimandos

audi Arabia, Egypt and the Emir- Egyptian army’s pressure was too strong. At ates, three close allies, are build- least key components of the Hamas leader- ing a new regional security order ship, and maybe all the movement’s branches, and want Israel on board. The Gulf have now changed their minds. Jihadist countries need it for countering groups are no longer a tool but a threat. There- SIran, Egypt needs it for the Mediterranean’s fore, Egypt wants to capitalize on this. Fourth, security. Nevertheless, this requires a solution Egypt wants Hamas to be less dependent (at to the Palestinian issue. least) on Iran, Turkey and Qatar. The Saudis and the Emiratis concur, and they can fund Some principles govern Egypt’s approach to Gaza. the Palestinian issue. First, it wants a unified Palestinian leadership. Therefore, it invests a There are of course many snags: for instance, lot in supporting a Palestinian reconciliation. the Palestinian authority’s security apparatus It suspects both Palestinian parties to be unin- has not monitored Gaza for more than a dec- terested in this. For the Palestinian authority, ade. It is unfamiliar with the cartography of Gaza is a mess, and a black hole difficult to jihadists there. Hamas’ security has much manage. Hamas does not want to relinquish deeper and more up-to-date knowledge, but is real control of Gaza. Second, Egypt wants Ga- less reliable in the long term, as they can at za, the branches of Hamas and Fatah in Gaza, anytime revert to their old policy of “looking and other forces in Gaza, to have a bigger say the other way”. Why the Palestinian authority in the Palestinian decision-making process. should accept leaving the security issue to its Those who live in Gaza are supposed to have a former foe is also a pertinent question. So the better understanding of Egypt’s preoccupa- question of “who should handle the security tions and to be more sensitive to its concerns. issues” in Gaza is a matter of debate. At one Third, Egypt wants to eradicate terror cells in point Egypt seemed closer to a solution built Sinai. Jihadist groups collaborate with their on leaving this to Hamas. I do not know if this Palestinian counterparts in Gaza, and Hamas is still the case. The snag is obvious: regaining too often tolerated this, turning a blind eye, or control of Gaza is much less interesting for worse, helped the Sinai insurgency. Gaza pro- Ramallah if these are the terms of the deal. vided weapons and safe havens when the

21 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

Of course the Egyptians keep an eye on the lem. Last, they think Israeli Prime Minister struggle for President Abbas’ successor, and on Netanyahu is the last “realist” in Israel and Mohammed Dahlan’s role in Gaza and his pos- the only one able to “deliver” a peace agree- sible role in Palestinian leadership. They ap- ment. The other side considers the probable preciate Dahlan’s clout in Gaza and the out- terms of the deal to be too unfair and, think comes his relations with Hamas can eventual- Egyptian public opinion will not swallow a so- ly bring, but they also know that many in Fa- lution entailing the loss of Jerusalem. The deal tah consider him to be the “man who lost Ga- would be a serious, potentially lethal threat to za” (in 2007). Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s stability. No deal, they conclude, is better than this deal. If we Everyone in the region is preparing for are to believe The New York Times (NYT), the Trump’s “deal of the century”. The main Arab first camp has the upper hand. It is interest- players think its terms will be prejudicial to ing, however, to note that al-Azhar’s institu- the Palestinians. The status of Jerusalem is tions, a key regime ally, adopted a very firm only a case in point. In Egypt’s regime circles, stance against Trump’s decision to move the heated debates oppose different views. To sim- American embassy to Jerusalem. And to note plify a complex matter, we can say that some that the regime carefully avoided any real es- want to capitalize on Egyptian public opinion’s calation [reaction?]. In any case, Egypt and unprecedented hatred for Hamas to settle the Saudi Arabia are cooperating to define a com- issue once for all, as it is vital for Egypt to sta- mon stance and to better the terms of the ex- bilize the region and to build a new security pected deal. order. They also add that the current balance of power means any escalation would lead to Relations with Israel are unexpectedly good. further Palestinian losses, notably in Jerusa- President al-Sisi and Prime Minister Netan-

22 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

yahu are said to regularly exchange views by ural gas and liquefy it. Egypt needs Israel to phone. be on its side, as a confrontation with Turkey, now Egypt’s worst enemy, on natural gas The international media often says Israel and fields is looming. Egypt collaborate on the security of Sinai. The NYT recently published a story saying Israel Egypt does not seem too worried about the in- frequently bombed the jihadists with the ap- ternal discussions in Israel, where some ques- proval of President al-Sisi. It was quoting tion the usefulness of a grand bargain with Western, not Israeli sources. Cairo denied this. Saudi Arabia, with some even preferring to Generally speaking, it tends to say such re- approach Iran. ports are either untrue or strongly exaggerat- Egypt also needs Israel’s advocacy in the USA. ed. They point to shortcomings in the coopera- The Israelis did indeed exert pressure on the tion, to second thoughts, etc. Obama administration after the toppling of Some foreign diplomats think the jihadi problem president Morsi. has paradoxically enabled Egypt to again estab- Economic relations are discreet and many- lish a military presence in areas where this was sided. There are the QIZ agreements, enabling forbidden by the peace treaty with Israel. Egypt to export some of its products to the Whatever the truth about this topic, Egypt USA without tariffs and quota restrictions, and Israel clearly cooperate on the crucial provided they have a percentage of Israeli natural gas issue. Egypt’s private companies, components. There is cooperation on hydraulic with the government’s approval, recently con- and agriculture technology. In addition, there cluded a deal with Israel to import Israeli nat- are tourist flows.

23 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

SISI’S SECOND TERM: THE LIBYA QUESTION

Ziad A. Akl

ater this month Egypt will wit- east-west division taking place in 2014, Egypt ness its third presidential election was very clear in its complete support for the since 2012. With only two candi- House of Representatives and its government. dates and very limited competi- Similarly, Egypt declared its support for Kha- L tion, there is no doubt that Egyp- lifa Haftar’s Operation Dignity as soon as it tian President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi is looking was endorsed by the House of Representatives at a second term in office. The cornerstone of as the state’s legitimate military arm. the Egyptian president’s first term in office Therefore, it is essential to realize that Egypt’s was countering terrorism and radicalization. It position towards the Libya question over the is fair to say that Egypt’s war against terror- past 4 years has been shaped within a specific ism and radical/jihadist Islam had an impact context. A context that on the one hand posed on numerous domestic policies as well as on a momentary national security problem for Egypt’s foreign policy. On numerous foreign Egypt, and raised signals towards a long-term policy issues, Egypt’s position was not only political elite conflict in Libya. The end result shaped through its interests, but also through was an Egyptian position that openly support- the anti-radicalization discourse that sees in ed all internationally recognized legitimacies organized Political Islam a security threat to in Libya, but at the same time covertly allied the region; specifically in zones of conflict like with one faction over the other. Egypt’s posi- Libya, Syria and Yemen. tion towards the Libyan question, and the fact The Libyan question in specific was of great that it was at odds with the Algerian position importance to Egypt during Sisi’s first term. at some point in time, has stalled the process The summer of 2014 witnessed the beginning of political settlement in Libya and significant- of Sisi’s term as well as the legislative elec- ly delayed it. tions that brought the House of Representa- However, as the Egyptian president approach- tives to power in Libya with dire electoral es the beginning of his second term, will the losses for the Muslim Brotherhood. The new Egyptian policy towards the Libyan question composition of the House of Representatives be different? In other words, over the past four came as good news to Egypt, especially since years, did Egypt merely seek its immediate the General National Congress did not wel- and political interests in Libya or did it devel- come ousting Mohamed Morsi from office and op an institutional vision of Egyptian interests the Muslim Brotherhood from power. With the in this crucial country? Several signs in Egyp-

24 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

tian foreign policy towards Libya point to the work in Libya returns to their jobs. At the fact that Egypt did manage to develop a long- same time, the economic opportunities that term strategy towards Libya; and that Egypt will be available by investing in the recon- will do its best to further pursue this strategy struction of Libya is something that both the over the upcoming 4 years of President’s Sisi’s Egyptian state and Egypt’s business elite pas- second term. sionately await. Primarily, Egypt is against foreign interven- Over the coming period, the regime in Egypt is tion in Libya, and it has made it clear more expected to handle the Libyan question from than once that Egypt is seeking a Libyan- two main perspectives, unifying the Libyan Libyan solution to the crisis of multiple sover- military and concluding the process of political eignty taking place at the current moment in settlement in the manner Egypt deems most Libya. At the same time, Egypt did not waste appropriate for its allies and its interests. a single opportunity at international confer- Egypt has adopted the case of unifying the ences to ask for lifting the ban on buying Libyan military, and has held more than one weapons for the Libyan National Army under meeting over the past year between represent- the leadership of Khalifa Haftar. Clearly, atives of the Libyan National Army and for- Egypt signaled out its allies very early on in mer military personnel who are currently oc- the conflict, and the sum of its cumulative in- cupying positions in western Libyan military terests in Libya show that Egypt’s current al- organizations. Bringing back former military liances will endure. Although Egypt repeated- officers to the ranks of the Libyan National ly claims that it is in equal contact with vari- Army will have both military and political im- ous parties in Libya, it is clear to any Libya plications, ones that will eventually favor observer that Egypt is in deep cooperation Egyptian interests. with eastern Libya in general, and Khalifa Egypt has designated criteria for those who Haftar in specific. return to the official military corps. Those who Egypt’s tangible interests in Libya are unlike- received military education and were official ly to change any time soon. Egyptian border members of the Libyan armed forces under security will remain a priority and a crucially Gaddafi will be reinstated into the ranks of the determining dimension of Egypt’s position. Libyan National Army. On the one hand, this Similarly, Egypt’s post June 30 government will empty the military entities in western made its anti-terrorism discourse one of the Libya of professional military cadres, creating pillars of the regime. Moreover, investing in a possible power vacuum within military lead- mega infrastructure projects was another pil- ership in the west. On the other, reinstating lar that the regime has relied upon during Si- former officers will be a step forward in the di- si’s first term. Both those pillars are likely to rection of both attempting to instill military continue throughout Sisi’s second term, and professionalism in the Libyan National Army both of them intersect with the Libyan ques- and evaluating institutional capacity for polit- tion. On the one hand, countering terrorism ical reconciliation. and radicalization in the region requires close Political settlement is the other dimension cooperation with Libyan authorities, especially that Egypt focuses on, and will continue to fo- since Egypt’s Western Desert and southeast cus on over the coming period, within the Lib- Libya have experienced terrorist attacks in re- yan question. Egypt will not oppose the United cent years. On the other, Egypt has a long- Nations backed political agreement, and it has term plan for economic cooperation with Libya no intention of disposing of the Skhirat as soon as the conflict ends. Egypt hopes that agreement and beginning coordinated efforts its 2.5 million official labor force that used to for a new framework for political settlement in

25 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

Libya. However, introducing modifications and Finally, the Libyan question is one of the most alterations to the Skhirat agreement, ones crucial on the Egyptian foreign policy agenda. that reflect the current balance of power, is a The transition from one presidential term to target that Egypt will work thoroughly for another will imply minor changes towards the during the coming period. Egypt is sincerely Egyptian position regarding Libya, but insti- interested in political settlement in Libya, and tutional interests in Libya will dictate a specif- it has been working with Algeria and Tunisia ic policy that Egypt is expected to pursue dur- (the neighboring countries’ axis) to facilitate ing Sisi’s second term. In Egyptian politics east-west political negotiation. The interests of Libya remains a strategically crucial issue, but Egypt in Libya’s political settlement are pri- one that still cannot gather sufficient popular marily concerned with securing the supremacy support behind it. Hence, the Libyan question of the House of Representatives over political will continue to be one of the essential cards decisions in Libya. At the same time, Egyptian that Egyptian foreign policy will resort to fre- interests would favor separation between po- quently over the coming period. In the pres- litical leadership and military leadership in ence of significant challenges to Egyptian in- Libya during the interim phase. As part of its terests in Africa and the Arab World, the foreign policy towards Libya, Egypt will work Egyptian regime will expectedly capitalize on hard in the coming phase to guarantee that any gains secured within the Libyan question. political settlement will maintain Khalifa Haf- Regarding Libya, Sisi’s second term will not tar’s position at the head of military decisions introduce tangible changes to the Egyptian po- in Libya. Along the same lines, Egypt will ex- sition. However, Egypt will face a foreign poli- ert its hardest efforts to secure a consultative cy challenge within the context of the Libyan role for the high state council, and to exhibit question to pursue its political and institu- its opposition to Islamized political institutional interests until a process of political set- tions in Libya. tlement is activated in Libya.

26 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

EGYPT-GULF COUNTRIES: “NEW NORMAL” RELATIONS

Giuseppe Dentice

ix years after the first free elec- main geopolitical competitor in the region, or tions in Egypt’s post-Arab upris- between Hamas and Israel, historically always ings era, the Persian Gulf media’s involved in different visions of Egyptian events attention to the country’s presi- in terms of its domestic policies and external S dential election has considerably dynamics. changed. Although the Gulf countries’ political Nonetheless, these circumstances did not arise support for Egypt remains unchanged – also and Egypt has remained a political and securi- expressed by Crown Prince Mohammed bin ty pillar for the Arab nations, especially for its Salman’s two-day visit to Cairo earlier this partners in the Gulf. In fact, as Ali Abdul Aal, month in which he reaffirmed the highest level Speaker of the Egyptian House of Representa- of bilateral cooperation – this election appears tives, stated, “The security of the Gulf is the to be less important for Cairo’s Arab allies. In security of Egypt, and the security of Egypt is fact, while in 2012 the Gulf governments were the security of the Gulf. […] Gulf security is most concerned about the way the situation inseparable from Egypt’s strategic security”5. had developed in Egypt (the rise of the Muslim These two sentences explain why Egypt is so Brotherhood and its electoral success), nowa- important for the Gulf countries and what days Gulf partners seem disinterested in an they expect from the Egyptian government. In election that most probably will confirm Abdel fact, Egypt was part of a Saudi-led military Fatah al-Sisi for a second term as president of coalition that intervened in Yemen in March Egypt. 2015 to fight Houthi rebels, an armed, pre- There are different reasons behind this cur- dominantly Shia, political movement allegedly rent lack of interest. First of all, in 2012 the supported by Iran. Moreover, Riyadh and Cai- electoral success of MB might have turned the ro are also part of a bloc of Arab states that political balance between Egypt and the Gulf has boycotted Qatar since June due to its al- governments regarding many regional issues leged ties to Iran and violent extremist groups. in which Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Since al-Sisi became president in 2014, Emirates were the most involved. Secondly, Egypt’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the and related to the first speculation, a MB gov- UAE have improved considerably, based on a ernment could have led to a political change in the relations between Cairo and other Middle Eastern players such as Iran, Saudi Arabia’s 5 “Gulf security is a red line, Egypt Parliament Speaker says”, Gulf News, February 26, 2018.

27 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

notable consensus on regional and interna- tion with several implications for this chang- tional issues, such as the fight against violent ing regional system of balances. Based on this, Islamist groups, the containment of MB and quite symbolic was the “Cairo Declaration” re- its regional allies (i.e. Qatar and Turkey), as leased in Egypt in May 2015, when al-Sisi and well as support for a Sunni bloc headed by the Saudi Prince Salman bin Salman signed a Saudi Arabia against the Shia Crescent (Iran multi-level pact to boost economic and military and Hezbollah in primis). ties. Furthermore, the agreement also provided for the enhance- ment of investments in the energy and transport sectors and contained a pledge to work together to create a joint Arab force, a military project also known as the “Arab NATO”. Despite this smokescreen of good intentions, the pact re- flects divergent interests: on the one hand, Egypt signed this agreement to procure funds for alleviating its political and security These issues pose the question: are Egypt and problems and thereby the Gulf countries reliable partners or strate- guarantee the stability and legitimate power gic allies? In the light of what we stated this of the al-Sisi government; on the other, Saudi could seem to be a foolish question, but it is a Arabia wanted to strengthen its alliance with constant dilemma in Egyptian-Gulf countries Cairo to contain the rise of Iranian influence relations. In fact in a changing Middle East, in the region, preserve its economic interests the many strategic transformations occurring in the MENA area and ensure Egypt’s ability in recent years have impacted and partially to provide military protection to Saudi author- redefined Egypt’s relationship with the Gulf ities. monarchies, especially with Saudi Arabia and Three years after the Cairo Declaration, this the UAE. In fact, a number of editors and ana- agreement showed all its limits when Egypt lysts in Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula usu- decided to pursue political choices not perti- ally consider this relationship to be a “useful nent to its geopolitical interests, such as the economic and military axis”, a “strategic part- military campaign in Yemen, setting aside the nership”, or, finally a “strategic alliance” with- Libyan problem, instead a very big issue on in the broader Middle East to fight all the the Egyptian foreign policy agenda. To this forces or phenomena that can destabilize the should be added Riyadh’s willingness to rea- region. lign Hamas - and all the other Islamist groups Beyond this rhetoric based on unity of purpose more or less directly connected to the Muslim and Arab brotherhood, Egypt’s relations with Brotherhood galaxy - into a Sunni-Saudi bloc Saudi Arabia and the UAE, especially under to oppose Iran and its Shia allies in the region. al-Sisi, reveal complex bi-/multilateral interac- Moreover, the alleged change in Saudi orienta-

28 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

tion was perceived by Egypt as a dangerous the Assad regime in Syria – against Saudi po- political sign, which clearly defines a discrep- litical expectations – is a symbolic choice ancy between Egyptian and Saudi foreign poli- demonstrating the Egyptian government’s cy interests. In fact, while for Cairo Egypt’s frustration with being exploited by and de- main foreign policy priorities are based on re- pendent on Saudi Arabia, as well as with its storing its central role in the region (Libya, the genuine inability to overcome Saudi suprema- Gaza Strip, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and cy as a regional power broker. Nile water issues ), the main aim of Riyadh is In the current volatile scenario, it is hard to to return to the status quo prior to the Iran determine whether Egypt is being held hos- nuclear deal and to use Egypt as its spearhead tage by Gulf States’ strategies or whether in regional dynamics. In this way it could con- there is potential for maintaining syner- tain any opposition to its leadership in the Ar- gy/convergence with its Gulf partners on a ab-Muslim world. number of regional issues. In any case, caught Drawing on Saudi positions, Egypt has played between support and discord, the Egyptian a role of junior partner and its own interests government will maintain its complex rela- have often been sidelined in the Saudi strategy tions with Gulf countries while seeking to pur- to contain Iran. From this standpoint, al-Sisi’s sue strategy independent from the political decision to support Russian intervention and choices of the House of Saud.

29 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

CAIRO AND WASHINGON: THE END OF A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP?

Gianluca Pastori

he United States looks at the up- Libyan National Army against the UN- and coming Egyptian presidential US-backed Fayez al-Sarraj’s Government of elections with mixed – although National Accord. The coming elections also increasingly critical – feelings. risk becoming a thorny issue, with Washing- T During his recent state visit to the ton increasingly embarrassed by al-Sisi’s re- Middle East, at the end of January, Vice Pres- pressive measures and by the crushing of any ident Mike Pence paid traditional lip service to opposition. These and other elements all con- Cairo’s strongman, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, con- verge in making US-Egypt relations far weak- firming President Trump’s will to re-establish er than in the past and cast a dim light on the good political relations “after a time when our future of their political relations. countries seemed to be drifting apart”1. Security issues are still the most solid common However, while the general mood is certainly ground. Since 1979, the US has given over 47 improving, especially if compared to the harsh billion dollars to Egypt in the form of military times of the Obama administration, several assistance, although in summer 2017 Wash- issues still hinder a real rapprochement. Be- ington has partially reduced its engagement. fore the meeting between Pence and al-Sisi, Humanitarian concerns, coupled with Trump’s White House staff said Pence was expected to feeling of having been “blindsided” by al-Sisi raise the issue of human rights, political free- on some issues, go a long way towards explain- doms, and freedom of expression, all sensitive ing this changing attitude. However, pressures issues for the Egyptian leadership. to revive the frozen packages remain. Al-Sisi’s effort to eradicate militia movements in north- On the other hand, Trump’s position on Jeru- ern Sinai fits into the narrative as well as into salem as Israel’s capital opened a new front of the broader US campaign against the so-called crisis, forcing al-Sisi to distance himself from Islamic State and its local branches, such as the ally’s position and to reaffirm Egypt’s the Wilayat Sinai (“Sinai Province”), now one commitment to a two-state solution, consid- of the main targets of the Egyptian armed ered “the only way to end Palestinian-Israeli forces. conflict”. In the Libyan conflict, al-Sisi’s Egypt openly sides with General Khalifa Haftar’s Al-Sisi’s efforts to promote a rapprochement between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestinian

territories are another common ground, being 1 “VP Pence says US stands ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with Egypt”, ABC seen as instrumental in supporting Trump’s News, January 20, 2018.

30 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

Israel-Palestine policy. In Congress too, al-Sisi as well as the “dangerous relations” that Egypt commands good (although shrinking) support. entertains with North Korea. On the other hand, Recently, several Congressmen have voiced these moves contribute to confirming the country their doubts, the most prominent of them be- as an unreliable ally. The point was recently ing Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), who publicly raised in a New York Times op-ed by Andrew raised concerns about the fairness and demo- Miller and Richard Sokolsky, affirming that cratic nature of the upcoming elections. “[b]ecause of its internal decay, Egypt is no long- McCain’s criticism of an “unprecedented er a regional heavyweight that can anchor crackdown on political activism and funda- America’s Middle East policy” and calling for a mental human rights”2 led to a slamming re- sharp reduction in US military assistance “to ply from the Egyptian foreign ministry; how- align our resources with our priorities”3. ever, reinstatement of the cash flow to Egypt Until now, Washington has reaffirmed its tra- did not drop from the debate: while critics of ditional Egyptian policy of supporting the Egypt’s human rights record have opposed it, country and its leaders, turning a blind eye to others have suggested that cash flow could be their misdemeanours and generously financ- restored, although under certain conditions. ing the military apparatus. However, this poli- Nonetheless, Egypt’s importance in US eyes is cy is becoming less and less sustainable, espe- clearly declining. Trump’s choice to revive the cially due to its poor results. Since the Camp US-Saudi Arabia “special relationship” weak- David agreements, Egypt has been one of the ens Egypt’s ambitions to act as the leading pillars of the American order in the Middle country in the Arab world. At the same time, East, a role that Cairo widely exploited to en- Trump’s Israel policy confirms Jerusalem as hance its political and military standing. Now the military pivot of the region, thwarting Cai- things are changing and (even worse from an ro’s ambition in this field too. The willingness Egyptian perspective) a largely bipartisan to reaffirm a threatened regional role can ex- consensus seems to emerge around the need to plain the recent rapprochement with Russia, change the “old rules”.

2 See https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press- 3 3] Andrew Miller, Richard Sokolsky, “Actually, Egypt Is a Terrible releases?ID=BC673C75-838F-4067-80C2-779782718BA3 Ally”, The New York Times, December 18, 2017, Retrieved from

31 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

ITALY AND EGYPT, BETWEEN MORALITY AND RAISON D’ETAT

Ugo Tramballi

hat’s what we will be working on, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi asked ENI’s CEO Claudio to follow the president’s instruc- Descalzi at the Zohr inauguration ceremony. tions. We will try to complete all “So that we would not be here. [...] I will not the phases by the end of 2018 or forget the Regeni case and we will not stop un- T early 2019”, said Petroleum Min- til we will bring the perpetrators to justice”. ister Tarek El Molla with great fanfare. It was For quite some time President al-Sisi has been on February 1, at the inauguration of the first repeating this statement to every ENI and phase of developing Zohr, the giant offshore Italian official, as if he were not the strongmen gas field near the Egyptian coast. Zohr is es- of Egypt, in apparent control of his country. timated to have a reserve of 30 trillion cubic Some in Italy argue that we will obtain justice feet of natural gas, the largest in the Mediter- very soon. We should be close the truth – they ranean. say – because we somehow know the names of A few minutes before, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi had asked Molla to finish work on the field by the end of 2018. In fact, Zohr is one of the big businesses – likely the biggest – in Egypt today. It has already created more than 40,000 direct and indirect jobs in the development phase and should attract about $US 12 billion in investments. Zohr began its initial production with 350 million cubic feet per day and when development of the field will be complete, Egypt should save $US 2.5 billion on natural gas per year. ENI discovered and developed the field, investing in it about $US 12 billion dollars. Recently it sold 30% of its shares (worth $US 1.250 billion) to Russian Rosneft and 10% (worth $US 375 million) to the UK’s BP. “You know why they wanted to compromise relations between Egypt and Italy?” President

32 Egypt’s Elections: No Change, Many Challenges

some officers who tortured and killed Giulio After 19 month of a complete boycott, the Ital- Regeni. Moreover, the Italian General Prosecu- ian ambassador returned to Cairo last Sep- tor Giuseppe Pignatone demonstrated that the tember. His mandate was to resume diplomat- “research activity” of the young graduate stu- ic relations but not to promote business. Since dent was the primary reason for his torture. In then, Italy’s Interior Minister, Marco Minniti, Cairo Regeni was studying Egyptian labor un- visited Cairo to meet with President al-Sisi on ions, on behalf of Cambridge University. African migration and security in Libya. But no other ministers, official economic, cultural However, this is something that has been or tourist delegations are allowed to enter known since the beginning of this tragedy. Egypt at the moment. The work of the Italian- Italian prosecutors and Giampaolo Cantini, Egyptians Business Council has been frozen the newly appointed Italian Ambassador to and no new contracts have been signed. Egypt (since last September) are bravely pres- suring Egyptians authorities. Nevertheless, Big Italian companies, deeply rooted in the justice will be obtained only when the perpe- Egyptian economy like ENI, AlexBank and sev- trators are indicted and sentenced by an Egyp- eral others, never stopped their activities. But tian court. This is justice. But this, I am for many others, business is not as usual any- afraid, will only happen if and when the Sisi more. Many smaller Italian companies cannot military regime will fall. afford a complicated and bureaucratic environ- ment like Egypt without the backing of national The Regeni case will have no effect whatsoever institutions. Even before the assassination of on the campaign and final result of the upcom- Giulio Regeni, SACE, the Italian financial and ing Egyptian elections. Because no one in credit insurance service, found it difficult to Egypt is interested in that case: certainly not promote more Italian investments in Egypt. those in power or the opposition, or the press or public opinion; and also because these elec- Today the components industry linked to Zohr tions are not going to be a real contest. By ar- development, fresher projects like the “New resting and threatening all real contenders, Cairo”, the industrial and commercial devel- the regime has already fixed the final outcome opment of the Suez Canal, as well as the Lux- in favor of the incumbent. or corridor are all opportunities to capture. Furthermore, over the last two years Egypt All this considered, should Italy do business has been promoting an increasing number of with Egypt? The answer is yes, despite the ev- trade and bilateral agreements with Africa. ident clash between morality and raison d’état. Cairo is back as a renovated hub of the sub- Last February Moscow revoked its 27- month Saharan countries, and that is a strategic area ban imposed after the Islamic State blew up for Italy, too. an airliner over the Sinai desert, killing 224 Russians. Still, in these two years and more of China and Russia are actively exploiting these the ban, Vladimir Putin signed deals totaling new Egyptian opportunities, alongside Ger- $US 21 billion, mostly for its state nuclear many, the UK and other EU members. The company, Rosatom, to build a power station in very same countries that were supposed to Egypt. Sisi’s government is also considering show some modicum of solidarity with Giulio buying Russia’s S-400 missile system. Regeni and Italy.