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THE CHINESE AND ITS STATE JINPING’S CONSERVATIVE TURN

Michał Bogusz, Jakub Jakóbowski WARSAW APRIL 2020

THE AND ITS STATE ’S CONSERVATIVE TURN

Michał Bogusz, Jakub Jakóbowski © Copyright by Centre for Eastern Studies

CONTENT EDITOR Adam Eberhardt, Krzysztof Strachota

EDITOR Małgorzata Zarębska, Szymon Sztyk

CO-OPERATION Anna Łabuszewska

TRANSLATION Jim Todd

CHARTS Urszula Gumińska-Kurek

MAP Wojciech Mańkowski, Urszula Gumińska-Kurek

GRAPHIC DESIGN PARA-BUCH

DTP IMAGINI

PHOTOGRAPH ON COVER Hung Chung Chih / Shutterstock.com

Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw, Poland tel.: (+48) 22 525 80 00, [email protected] www.osw.waw.pl

ISBN: 978-83-65827-49-4 Contents

THESES | 5

INTRODUCTION | 8

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS | 12

1. THE PARTY AND ITS STATE: THE PRC’S POLITICAL SYSTEM | 13 1.1. The structure and operation of the CCP | 13 1.2. The PRC’s state structures | 39 1.3. The relationship between the centre and the provinces | 50

2. XI JINPING’S CONSERVATIVE TURN | 63 2.1. Challenges for the Party and the selection of Xi Jinping | 65 2.2. The conservative turn in the CCP: the end of the ? | 80 2.3. Reconstruction of the state apparatus | 95

3. CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF SECTORAL POLICIES | 106 3.1. Economic policy | 106 3.2. Foreign and security policy | 115 3.3. Control of society and the Party | 123

CONCLUSIONS | 134

ANNEXES | 137 • • • THESES

up which began in 1978, the CCP entered the twenty-first century with century twenty-first the entered CCP the in 1978, began which ‑up The official image of the Party monolith hides a dynamic, hides monolith the Party of image The official pol foreign and decisions,domestic The Partypersonnel makescontrols all within the PRC’s present political system.political present PRC’s the within Despite the spectacular success of thereform andtheopening­ programme Despite thespectacularsuccess of the Chinese In accordance with the Leninist model, the total dominance of members. It is an arena for struggles for power between factions and in and factions between power for struggles for arena an It is members. thestate’s ‘nervous system’,role of andassuch, thereisno alternative toit influence prevailing the has army,and the over control direct icy,wields nese politicalsystem; thestatestructures’solepurposeistoaidParty mation; this latter was driven by the shifting of much power to the regional regional power the much to of shifting drivenwasbythe latter this mation; in theCCP, thestate’s structures, are andconsequently thefunctioningof trol over all organised forms of sociallife andsuppressingtrol over any symptoms allorganisedforms of the opportunitytoimprove theirmaterialstatus, while maintainingcon influ the balance to and governanceParty of rules the institutionalise to powerwith of increasingly, The dynamics and, clans. family groups terest they alsotransmitthosedecisions’intothecomplex andmulti-level state power. on monopoly Party’s the guarantee and effectively govern to personality; itexists outsidethestatestructures, inparalleltothem,and undergoing constant transformation, demonstrating the PRC’s great flexi great PRC’s the demonstrating transformation, constant undergoing from the politically unstable one-man rule of . It also began It also Zedong. Mao of rule one-man unstable politically the from ly jeopardise its continued rule over China. The decentralisation in the in The decentralisation China. over rule continued its jeopardise ly a strength and Party.reforms the Comprehensive of top the leadership’at bility. Upon initiating the reform process after 1978, the Party moved Party away the 1978, after process reform the bility.initiating Upon gan to withdraw from the ideological disciplining of society, and offered it society,offered and of disciplining ideological the from withdraw to gan Communist Party (CCP) over state structures is inscribed into the Chi a feeling of growing, multidimensional problems which could potential could which problems multidimensional growing, of a feeling 90 million of a total with organisation, multilevel complex and internally its also above them,actingastheirbindingagent, andalsoasthesourceof structures and opening up the economy to the world. The Party also be also The Party world. the to economy the up opening and structures playsthe thus (PRC).The CCP China of RepublicPeople’s the of structures of independence. the state structures were initiated, as wellening of as economic transfor ‘collective internalpoliticalforces, representedby theconceptof ences of taken; are decisions where place the also are structures cadres.The Party’s legal no sector.state-owned enterprises the economyIt has through the on ­inter-generational ------

5 OSW REPORT 4/2020 6 OSW REPORT 4/2020 • •

When Xi Jinping assumed power as General Secretary in 2012, received he in 2012, Secretary General poweras assumed Xi Jinping When The essence of the changes Xi The essencepoweris making of is the concentration of in the which poses a challenge to the existing international order and has led to led has and order international existing the to a challenge poses which with changes the in CCP.the internal operation of However, there are many thetwentieth century,which was devised attheendof thetoolsXihasused . United Party’s power law and the political byrule liberalisation. of In the means of its re-evaluation.its programme Xi’s see who elders Party some of and clans influential most nature, andhasnotincludedcountry-wide massrepressionsorthecentral selectivein been has this although concepts, Leninist-Stalinist by inspired the of renewal a neoconservative – context,precisely, Chinese more the in and a conservative – been has Party the facing problems the to response His China. in rule indivisible continued, CCP’s the for prospects the ing economic themodelof theongoing exhaustion of inthefaceof necessary regions, the in forces centrifugal of emergence the fighting, factional ing theCCP,ism atthetopof broughtseriouspoliticalchallenges: debilitat the Party structures in the the state and the inclusion of management of in theParty; the cadresatthelocallevel; andthestate andParty bureau to implement these changes are revolutionary in nature, and areassociated restor at aimed turn conservative of a kind state, and Party the of tures the with competition its of intensification the including China, to tance keyimpor of are environmentwhich international the in transformations planning of the economy. From the perspective of the political the of perspective economy.the the From of planning foundations of the PRC as established in 1949, including the strengthening the including in 1949, established as PRC the of foundations hands of the CCP top leadership, at the expense of sectoral interest groups sectoralinterestgroups theCCPtopleadership, attheexpense of hands of have alsolowered thecapacityfor theinternalreforms thathave become a mandate from the CCP’s leaders to make a major adjustment in the struc the in adjustment a major make to leaders CCP’s the from a mandate problems legitimacy.These social CCP’s the undermining corruption and as a way to save the special Party-state project which the PRC is. This con This is. PRC the which project Party-state special the save to a way as servative turn has led to a change in direction in the PRC’s foreign policy,foreign PRC’s the in direction in a change to led has turn servative Party’s the of support the with place taking is turn policy Xi’s that signs previous experiments inlimitingthe social control,andtherejectionof development of a capitalist economy, in conjunction with the new plural new the with conjunction economy,in a capitalist of development cracy at the central level. This is being done through an unprecedented an through done being is This level. central the at cracy socio-politicalgovernance,dimension of themethodsXihasemployed are of a tool as ideology to a return state, the of expense the at Party the of development the by which was devised 1978.after off topped been has This status quo ------

•

i ipn’ cnevtv tr tasae it mjr hne i te for the in changes major into translates turn conservative Jinping’s Xi venting potential sources of oppositionarisingamongthepublic,aswell venting potentialsourcesof The personalisation of power in China increases the importance of people of importance the increases China in power of The personalisation themostimportant This isalsocallingintoquestiontheimplementationof who have personal ties to Xi Jinping. Decision-making powers – not only not powers – Decision-making Xi Jinping. to ties personal have who mulation of sectoral policies in the PRC, affecting both decision-making both affecting PRC, the in policies sectoral of mulation reform package announced by Xi Jinping – the a newdevelopment model of risinginternalandin manageable andincreasesocialstabilityinthefaceof Party the cadresthroughtheanti-corruptioncampaign, replacement of inner circle and positions within informal Party bodies.Partyinformal within positions and circle inner mosaic a new creating is This circle. inner Xi Jinping’s from individuals to formal and informal structures within the CCP’s central structures. De structures. central CCP’s the within structures informal and formal to those affecting policy, but also the governance the state – are being moved of create to attempts its with conflict into comes often economy overthe trol however, challenges.a result, ternational As ever-tighteningCCP’s con the processes and communication channels in foreign relations with the PRC. the with relations foreign in channels communication and processes parallel, Xi has been developing an extensive social control based system of In administration. state the of reforms centralising the as well as process, pending on the particular policy sectors, the decision-making process is process decision-making the sectors, policy particular the on pending formal positions is increasingly giving way to political membership of Xi’s formal positionsisincreasingly giving way topoliticalmembershipof both the internal ideological disciplining of the CCP members, and at pre both the internal disciplining ideological of a modern, innovative economic system based largely on the private sector.private the on largely based systeminnovative economic a modern, more state the make to intended are surveillance of strengthening the and power of The concentration level. individual the at behaviour shaping as significant concentration of prerogatives and positions into the hands of of hands the into positions and prerogatives of concentration significant of personnel at the top of the CCP, in which the importance of people in people of importance the which CCP,in the of top the at of personnel centralised eitherby strengtheningorcreatingnew institutions, orby the PRC. the forgrowth economic of at aimed intelligence, artificial and technologies surveillance modern on decision-making the controlling bodies Party informal of development - - - - -

7 OSW REPORT 4/2020 8 OSW REPORT 4/2020 This paper describes contemporary China through the prism of theideology Chinathrough theprismof This paperdescribescontemporary inthe thepoliticalregime This isalsoonereasonwhy thecharacteristicsof subject is it such as and governance, of a tool as state the regards The CCP the of primacy the is system political Chinese the of feature The fundamental which bore the traits of a civil war, and whose aims included the destruction the included aims whose war,and a civil of traits the bore which PRC cannot be described in terms of its institutional structure or the formal PRC cannot be described in terms of INTRODUCTION its internal and foreign policy. However, the ideology of -, of policy.ideology However,foreign the and internal its ex a great to Asia, East of system philosophical-religious traditional the ism, trans a deep to as well as China, in operated previously had which isation organ state of forms the with break institutional an to led China mainland tent ceasedshapingthesocio-politicalspaceand theinstitutionaldimension extent a large to are positions state and bodies representative the system, the to regulartransformations corresponding to the political objectives andthe The dominance 1949. after up built as institutions state new the for basis the political system mustfocus moreonanswering thefollowing questions: how present in China, such as the identity of a developing country; as a repre as country; a developing of identity the as such China, in present theCulturalRevolution, Mao Zedong’svastperiod of campaign, ideological formation of Chinese society, including its political culture. Contemporary Contemporary culture. political its society,including Chinese of formation lisational achievements, which the CCP (often instrumentally) draws upon in upon draws instrumentally) (often CCP the achievements,which lisational China; therefore, in accordance with the Leninist model, they served as lic of by the Chinese people. Today other ideological currents and identities are identities and currents ideological other Today people. Chinese the by China, itsinstitutionalform andtherelationshipbetween theParty andthe Chinese CommunistParty thestate’s anditscontrolover operation allareasof and legal dimension of the state. Consequently, any description of the PRC’s the of description Consequently,any state. the of dimension legal and RepubPeople’s the of existence the preceded structures decision-making and organisational CCP’s economy.Historically,the the of part a large as well as analysis of the political system in the PRC. The CCP’s assumption of powerin of assumption The CCP’s PRC. the in system political the of analysis sentative of the global South; and a nationalism based on the pride of its civi its of pride the on based a nationalism and South; global the of sentative accel the After Stalinism. late of model Soviet the on directly based are state character. Leninist its retains still Party Communist the and facades, simply of the Party thus became permanently inscribed in the structure of the PRC. the of structure the in inscribed permanently became thus Party the of of China, although it still has some influence on individual attitudes held attitudes individual on influence some has still it although China, of Confucian a result, As institutions. family and social political, traditional of decade-long the began China years, first PRC’s the of modernisation erated interpretativeany to key important most the is which Marxism-Leninism, of does theParty ruleChina,who manages theParty, andhow dothey manage it? within flows power real how Party.Regarding the within dynamics current ------Xi Jinping’s neoconservative power turnislinked tochanges inthedynamics of Another fundamental feature of the Chinese political system is its flexibility.its is system political Chinese the of feature fundamental Another This paper’saimistodescribe, ascomprehensively aspossible, theoverall po with the aim of portraying the political system of the PRC on three different three on PRC the of system political the portraying of aim the with within the CCP, the state structures deriv together with the transformation of It presents the conditions under which Xi Jinping has undertaken his conserv his undertaken has Xi Jinping which under conditions the It presents thepoliticalsystem, aswellParty andstatestructures, asthe themechanicsof internalandexternal challenges, theCCPhasconstantly sought In thefaceof implemented within the broad and relativelyand broad the within implemented frameworkinstitutional static of Overthe overChina. rule indivisible its strengthen and maintain to tools new importance the Furthermore, PRC. the of evolution and operation the into andshapesitsaspirations,ruling eliteitsbasicconceptualgrid translating ing fromthem,thesechanges have beencarriedout withinthebroad,relatively elements. namic the dynamics resulting from its flexibility.its from resulting dynamics the the PRC’spoliticalsystem bothitsinherently liesingrasping staticnature, and describing in challenge A major in 2012. CCP the of power taking since taken the PRC as created in 1949. This also applies to the actions Xi Jinping has under model classical the towardsturn’ a ‘conservative implementing started then up’ period, in the form which was consolidated in the 1990s. It describes the It describes 1990s. the in consolidated was which form the in period, up’ planes, to each other, complementary which describe both its static and dy at 2 Part Part 1 flexible framework of the PRC’s political system as described herein. described as system political PRC’s the of framework flexible char a static has part this governance. design By of rules informal and formal litical system of China,coveringlitical system bothfundamentalissues such astherelations of the decadesthishasledtosomefundamentalre-evaluations of last coupleof between Party andstateinChina,aswell asthecurrentdynamics associat Chinese system of government. However, in each case the changes have been havechanges the case government.However,each in of system Chinese ative turn:thefundamental challenges facingthePRC,aswell asthe solutions the and China modern of framework institutional main the outlining acter, operational rules of Party and state, as based on the Leninist model. Although model. Leninist the on based as state, and Party of rules operational parts three into divided is The work turn. conservative Xi Jinping’s with ed Leninism-Stalinism. of and in 2012, power to came Xi Jinping since risen has Marxism-Leninism of developed over decadesby theCCP, successive leadersof gives theChinese is a guide to the PRC’s political system during the ‘reform and opening and ‘reform the during system political PRC’s the to a guide is ecie te urn dnmc o te oiia rgm i te PRC. the in regime political the of dynamics current the describes ------

9 OSW REPORT 4/2020 10 OSW REPORT 4/2020 Another serious problem in analysing the PRC stems from the fact that many that fact the from stems PRC the analysing in problem serious Another Therefore, analyses of Chinese policy are often based on readings of the cur the of readings on based often are policy Chinese of analyses Therefore, which display extremely low transparency, the current state of affairs is pre is affairs of state current transparency,the low extremely display which curtain’.‘bamboo a so-called behind power of mechanics the all hiding world, the of a selection presents part This elites. CCP’s the to proposed Xi has which In describingtheChinesepoliticalsystem, obstacleistheopaque thegreatest decision-making -transformed or newly-created the describing to addition In functions. PRC mainland ChinaandTaiwan, Chinese sourcespublishedabroad,aswell asthe In media. the to struggles political about leaks rare and rituals, political rigid rent power structurebasedonindirectevidence, minorchanges intheCCP’s outside the to image a monolithic present to tries it as regime, the of nature March 2019. in known as them, between relationships most importanttrendsandprocesseswhich theParty andstatestructuresin the US, Europe and East Asia. In those areas of the Chinese political system political Chinese the of areas those In Asia. East and Europe US, the cold-war ‘Krem Chinesepolitics isreminiscentof this respect,thestudy of also It structures. state the within decision-making centralise and CCP the Xi changes the of logic the It explains undergoing. currently are PRC the performance, this section contains basicinformation about the persons who ping isimplementing,andthetoolshehasusedtoconcentratepower within Part 3 limited use, and are used in this study mainly to describe formal structures, con of policy CCP’s the with Confronted limitations. its of all with linology’, Xi Jinping’sgovernmenthave andthe formed statepolicyinthesecondtermof bodies within the Party and state, together with an assessment of theirpast bodies withintheParty andstate, together withanassessmentof by sectoralpolicies. Xi Jinpinghave It focuses on contributedtothecreation of applicable to the Chinese system. In the Leninist model, the ‘Party’ is an entity an ‘Party’is the model, Leninist system.the Chinese In the to applicable dynamics real the describe to policy.Attempts current state’s the as well as sented in the form of the most likely hypotheses. More complex subjects are subjects complex More hypotheses. likely most the of form the in sented foreign the of view of point the from important are which areas key several the how on turn neo-conservative Jinping’s Xi of consequences the shows of the basic terms used topolitical describe systems contemporary are not of annexes. the developedin thePRC’spolitical system debatesontheevolution conducted in of content of in years severalover held talks informal and formal on based are CCP the of government,cealing theinternaldynamics Chinesepublicsources areof of observer: economicpolicy, securityandforeign policy, aswell associalcontrol. shows how farthechanges tothePRC’spoliticalsystem implemented - - - - - reader, butwillallow ustoavoid concepts. Tohelpthereader any confusionof Chinesepoliticalsystem aredescribed reason, inthistext, theinstitutionsof that have already been established in the tradition of English spelling as used that have names already been established in the tradition of for made are Exceptions tones. omitting Mandarin, of transcription body, a decision-making as seen be cannot ‘government’ the hand, other the Note onChinesetranscription. language arewritteninaccordancewith by newspapers, governments, major dictionaries etc. governments,major newspapers, by them. to refer to text the in used abbreviations the with together beginning, the of behalf on China administers which creation a bureaucratic as only but grasp the multitude of institutions involved, a list of them is attached at the at attached is them of involved,a list institutions of multitude the grasp CCP. In turn, the word ‘’ to a large extent reflects the more formal more the reflects extent a large to ‘parliament’ word the turn, CCP.In according totheirofficialnames;thiswillcreatesome obvious difficulty the for characteristics of the Chinese counterpart than its actual functions. For this For functions. actual its than counterpart Chinese the of characteristics comprehensivemore much systems.democratic in parties political than On of l nms n prss rm h Chinese the from phrases and names All Romanisation, thestandard 11 OSW REPORT 4/2020 12 OSW REPORT 4/2020 APM LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS OF LIST MSS MPS PRC PLA Politburo NSC NPC NDRC NC CCP CPPCC CMC CC CCP Party’) ‘the simply (or CCP CC CCP SPC SCS SC PB CC CCP SC NPC SASAC SAR

Ministry of State Security State of Ministry Security Public of Ministry People’s of China People’s Republic of Chinese of the Committee Central the of Bureau Political Commission Supervisory National National People’s Congress National Development andReform Commission Party Communist Chinese the of Congress National People’s Liberation Army Liberation People’s Chinese People’s PoliticalConsultative Conference Committee Central the of Commission Military Central Party Communist the officially (also Party Communist Chinese Party Communist Chinese the of Committee Central Supreme People’s Court People’s Supreme System Credit Social Committee Central the of Politburo the of Committee Standing Congress People’s National the of Committee Standing Administration and Supervision Assets State-owned AdministrativeRegionSpecial People’s Armed Commission Communist Party of theChineseCommunistParty of Party Communist of the Chinese China) of (). Until the PRC’s break with Moscow in 1960, the in 1960, Moscow with break PRC’s the Until International). (Communist srn bn wih od te C tgte i is es o hsoia mis historical of sense its is together CCP the holds which bond strong A The CCP was established in 1921, with active involvement from the Comintern activeinvolvementthe with from in 1921, established was The CCP so-called the ending China, of reunification the in role its emphasises The CCP and CCP the of identity the both defined have factors these degree a great To who since 2012 has been General Secretary of theCCP(seepart 2). Initsinstitu who since2012hasbeenGeneralSecretaryof Par a ruling to movement guerrilla Communist a battle-hardened from way 1 1.1.1. The structure 1.1. 1. rapid social transformations of the ‘reform and opening-up’ period after 1978. after opening-up’period and ‘reform the of transformations social rapid indications thattheChinesepoliticalsystem iscurrently undergoing another members. Despite its internal differences and particular interests, the is interests, the Party particular and differences internal its members.Despite stage.world the on place rightful its assume can it that so China, modernising tect China from chaos and disintegration is,tect Chinafromchaosanddisintegration the intheParty’s narrative, oneof elites. its worldviewof and tools aims, the twentieth century, MaoZedong’stotalitarianrule, andthevery theperiodof dimensions,tional, personnelandideological theCCPisa uniqueentitywhich are there and evolving, still is The Party members. 90 million nearly with ty privileged position. Therefore, theParty’s currentpositionwithinthePRCwill ‘conservativeprofound transformation, a kindof turn’, whose faceisXi Jinping, foundations of itssociallegitimacy,foundations of andiscommonly encounteredamongParty hundred years of humiliation (1840–1949), the period of colonial oppression, colonial of period the (1840–1949), humiliation of years hundred the of half first the in China in power for struggle the experience: historical character current However,world.its democratic the in counterpart no has be protected at all costs. all at protected be Overyears,nearlyhundred one Party Communist a long Chinese come the has also has its roots in Chinese traditions of secret societies, as well as a specific a specific as well as societies, secret of traditions Chinese in roots its has also seen as a ‘common good’ among the members, as well as the guarantor of their a ‘commonas seen members,the good’wellof among as guarantor the as and reconstructing of task historical its in a belief cultivates The Party sion. civil wars andforeign invasions

The description of these events is even found in the preamble to the Chinese constitution. constitution. Chinese the to preamble the in found even is events these of The description tion of the People’s Republic of China of Republic People’s the of tion THE PARTYTHE STATE: ITS AND THE PRC’STHE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The identity of the contemporary CCP contemporary the of The identity and operation , en.people.cn. , 1 . The notion that only the CCP’s rule can pro can rule CCP’s the only that The notion . of

the CCP Constitu - - - - - 13 OSW REPORT 4/2020 14 OSW REPORT 4/2020 War it was able to defeat the Nationalist Party ( ( After the CCP’s decisive victory in the Civil War and the creation in 1949 of the Civil decisive the CCP’s of in the After in 1949 victory creation the and War The constant fear of an external intervention which could facilitate internal facilitate could which intervention external an of fear The constant 2 3 4 People’s Republic of China, the new state was built on the model of the USSR the of model the on built was state new the China, of Republic People’s neversurrender.will it which rule, Party’s Zedong fromactive politics by death the to led (1958–62) Forward campaign Leap Great his When Zedong. itself, and led to a period of chaos and violence lasting several years several lasting violence and chaos of a period to led and itself, personality, strong Party leadershipandthe cult of in this case Mao model of as role structures’ state the defining (1946–53), Stalinism late of period the in the is fear greatest its so and syndrome, fortress’ a ‘besieged it in invoking its membersoneachoccasion.Despitealltheadversity, afterthe Second World to unleashtheCulturalRevolution, which was aimedattheParty apparatus to ,andthe‘sword’ (which inChinasymbolises execution) tothe this challenge, theParty hastheobligation towieldpower by holdinginits government.CCP the preventand peace internal maintain to The ability chaos of three-quarters than less no March’),losing ‘Long (the in 1934 and terror’) ‘white (the in 1927 twice, least at extinction of verge the on stood Party the period, assistance.Duringthis political and personnel material, with tunities – hands ‘the rifle, pen and sword’, where the ‘rifle’ refers to the army, the ‘pen’ army, the the to refers ‘rifle’ the sword’, where and pen rifle, ‘the hands Soviet Union provided it – in accordance with its changing needs and oppor and needs changing its with accordance in it – provided Union Soviet at eliminating the CCP.the eliminating at China (excluding )and gain control over of the entire territory adaptability to local political traditions, it was based on the USSR’s Stalinist USSR’s the on based was it traditions, political local to adaptability starvation of at least 30 million citizens of the PRC, the Party removed Mao removed Party the PRC, the of citizens 30 million least at of starvation great showed system political the Party.Although ruling the to subordinate Communist the of bases indisputable three the are These apparatus. security experiences still influence the Communist Party’s institutional memory today, memory institutional Party’s Communist the influence still experiences civilisation, and is the basis of political legitimacy of the CCP. In response to response CCP.In the of legitimacy political of basis the is and civilisation, for priority a top is destabilisation social preventing that means disturbances analternative politicalorganisation,inspiredfromabroad,aimed creation of

hundun Walker and Company/Bloomsbury 2010. Company/Bloomsbury and ­Walker Frank Dikötter, Dikötter, Frank Dikötter, Frank Fenby, Jonathan See China China J.K. Fairbank (ed.), J.K. Fairbank bridge 1983; J.K. Fairbank, A. Feuerwerker (eds.), A. Feuerwerker J.K. Fairbank, 1983; bridge 1912–1949 ) hasa pervasive culturalandeven importanceinChinese cosmological (part 2), Cambridge 1986. Cambridge (part 2), The Cultural : A People’s History, History, A People’s Revolution: The Cultural Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, Catastrophe, Devastating Most China’s of History The Famine: Great Mao’s The Cambridge History of China of History The Cambridge Modern China: The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850 to the Present the to 1850 Power, a Great of Rise and The Fall China: Modern 3 . In response, he used his strong personal position personal strong his used he response, In . The Cambridge History of China of History The Cambridge , Vol. 12: Vol. 12: , Guomindang 1962–1976 Republican China China Republican , Bloomsbury 2016. Bloomsbury , ) of Chiang Kai-shek ) of 1912–1949 , Vol. 13: Vol. 13: , (part 1), Cam , Ecco 2008; 2008; Ecco , 2 Republican 4 . These . . After . 1958–62 - - , ‘the Party allows tosocietyget rich,and inreturnitwillnotunderminethe Another shock for the Chinese Party elites came with the collapse of the USSR. the of collapse the with came Partyelites Chinese the for shock Another The CCP elite concluded that the Soviet elite made the mistake of introducing of mistake the made elite Soviet the that concluded elite The CCP Mao’s death in 1976, the old elites regained power and influence, but the expe the but influence, powerand regained elites old the in 1976, Mao’sdeath Party’s power’. At the same time, fear of the advent of an internal reformer, internal an of advent the of fear time, same the power’.AtParty’s the of rule the of collapse the 1960, after Moscow with rivalry their Despite However, liberal authoritarian leaders, but also of the Party is afraid not only of in the creation of the PRC and its own structures – presented a real prospect of the PRCanditsown structures –presenteda realprospectof in thecreationof the strengthened and CCP) the of Secretary General Ziyang,then the ing governance thathave informal principles of preventedin thecreationof the theCulturalRevolution lefta lastingimpactontheCCP.rience of Thisresulted the same time neglecting economic issues, which served to deepen the crisis. the deepen to served which issues, economic neglecting time same the studiesandresearch the Party losingpower. a seriesof This led tothelaunchof individual. an of rule the political reforms (letting the ‘rifle, pen and sword’ fall from its hands) while at while hands) its and sword’‘rifle, from pen the fall (letting reforms political disintegration. USSR’s the for causes the discovering at aimed programmes more liberal cadres (includ political crisis within the CCP led to the removal of has created an unwritten social contract that is the basis of the country today; thecountry has createdanunwritten socialcontractthatisthe basisof So the CCP decided to do the opposite: never to cede absolute political power,political absolute cede to never opposite: the do to decided CCP the So but at the same time to carry out deep economic reforms. In this way,China this In reforms. economic deep out carry to time same the at but Communist Party of the Soviet Union – upon which the CCP had modelled itself the Soviet Union – upon which the CCP had modelled itself Communist Party of and so all manifestations of ‘liberal’ inclination are quashed. are inclination ‘liberal’ of manifestations all so and ranks, Party the within prevalent remains type Gorbachev’ ‘Chinese of a kind anmen Square, which were brutally repressedinJune 1989. The accompanying such currents in the 1980s contributed to the outbreak of the protests in Tian in protests the of outbreak the to contributed 1980s the in currents such conservative factions within the CCP’s ranks. CCP’s the within factions conservative ownits ranks.within of currents AccordingParty strengthening elders,to the a ‘new Mao’emergence of and the return to political instability associated with The CCP is fundamentally an elite formation. Membership in the Party is Party the in Membership formation. elite an fundamentally is The CCP in the Party. Nevertheless, one can also apply for membership with the with membership for apply also can Party.Nevertheless,one the in already are whoco-workers or friends by nominated are Others refuse. can ‘invitation’people an few that universitydepartments – individual in those joiningtheParty today arerecruited fromamongthebeststudents Recruitment both a source of personal influencesuccessboth and in a source life. evidenceof Many of of to the CCP - - - 15 OSW REPORT 4/2020 16 OSW REPORT 4/2020 The economic reforms alsoledtoserioussocialchanges inChina,which forced 6 5 ic rejection of applicants because of their inappropriate class origin was theirinappropriateclassorigin also applicantsbecauseof ic rejectionof rec were intellectuals rule, Xiaoping’s during eighties, the In recruited. the rule of , who as part of his ‘Three Representations’ theory Representations’ ‘Three his of part as who Zemin, Jiang of rule the also opened the CCP up to entrepreneurs and cultural animators.cultural and The automat entrepreneurs to up CCP the opened also are members Party which from spectrum social the of expansion a significant abandoned. This reflects the Party’s ambition to present itself as representative abandoned. Thisreflectsthe Party’s ambitiontopresentitself of all social groups. social all of under place took opening The biggest first. class’ a ‘revolutionary as ognised

(see box ‘The CCP in numbers’), the greatest emphasis at present is on is present at emphasis greatest the numbers’), in ‘The CCP box (see At the end of 2016 the CCP had c. 86.5 million members. 785,000 of them 785,000 of members. c. 86.5 million had CCP the 2016 of end the At workers, and 7.5 millionworkers,and (8.7%)cadres. are In 1949 the CCP numbered just under 4 million people. 4 million under just numbered CCP the In 1949 onlyMarch’; ‘Long the on departed civilians and 130,000 soldiers In 1934 first its attended 57 members, of a total representing 13 delegates, In 1921, The CCP number of CCP members throughout China fell from c. 300,000from fell to 40,000.China throughout members CCP of number overcontrol of a form a privilege,also onlyas but not seen is membership materially are who those and education a higher with people recruiting tially supplemented by an influx of people from other regions. other from Finally, people tiallysupplementedby of influx an the had highereducation(0.9%); 1.57 million (1.8%) age, were under35 years of byloyalty, Often, Party indoctrination. ideological byto susceptibilityand and 22.98 million were women (26.6%). 9 million (10.4%) are governmentare (10.4%) (26.6%).women9 million were 22.98 million and par were losses Their destination. their reached them 7,000 of around society – by absorbing local elites, the Party also largely incapacitates them. each In circles. social their of opinions the influence can and successful this reflect not do statistics the Although member. one just of support of thesecases, acceptanceisdeterminedby severalof factorssuch associal congress. class, family connections, scientific or professional achievements; but also See See sixiang’ zhongyao daibiao’ ge ‘‘San Chinese Communist Party – Statistics and Facts and Statistics Party – Communist Chinese in numbers 6 , 31 May 2011, www.china.com.cn. 31 May 2011, , , www.statista.com., - - - 5

vincial committees make up the majority.the up make committees vincial 7 The CCP does not formally haveformally not personality.anydoes legal rath or The CCP outside, It exists led It is nature. in hierarchical and rigid is structure organisational The CCP’s which sits once every five years. Despite the formally representative nature representative formally the Despite years. five every once sits which 1.1.2. Formally, according to the statute the Formally,to according rules of Party governance, of bya ‘collectiverules within individualfactions balancing important representative body intheCCP, theCCP, theNational of Congress in thepower structure, gathersthemostimportant cadres fromtheprovincial ritorial division – municipalities, counties, prefectures and provinces – select provinces – and prefectures counties, municipalities, division – ritorial a multilevel through emerging management top senior the with file, and rank tion 1.3.3) up to the CCP’s central congress, where the delegates from the pro the from delegates the where congress, central CCP’s the to up tion 1.3.3) the moreseniorcommittees(for moreontheCCP’slocalcommittees, seesec the citydistrict,andtheirsubsequent levels correspondtotheadministrative ute of the CCP represents the ultimate source of authority in the PRC. the in authority of source ultimate the represents CCP the of ute from the preamble to the Constitution. In practice it is the law, including the law,including the is it practice In Constitution. the to preamble the from leadership’ system, althoughtheserulesarecurrently undergoing partialrevi level, aswell asfromthearmy, thebureaucracyandcentralstate-owned next the Committee, The Central levels.Party and state both at positions key General the by led is country,and the and Party the in power highest the has Secretary of the CCP. On the level below, the Politburo brings together repre together brings Politburo below,levelthe the CCP.On the of Secretary by the higher levels of the hierarchy; thus, power flows from the top down, top the from flows power thus, hierarchy; the of levels higher the by which Committee, Central the of Politburo the of Committee Standing the by Constitution, which must adapt to changes in the statute of the CCP.the The stat of statute the in changes to adapt must which Constitution, and the Politburo and its Standing Committee elect their successors through successors their elect Committee Standing its and Politburo the and system of electoral colleges. the basic Party Party system structures start atthe level of of rule. Xi Jinping’s under sion alltherelevant andfactionswithintheCCP, groups sentatives of covering the division of the PRC (see Annex 1). Party delegates at successive levels of ter of levelssuccessive at delegates Party Annex 1). (see PRC the of division or township countryside, the in committee local the or workplace, the in cell powerderivedentire is its Theoretically PRC. the systemof above,legal er the the institutionalise to sought has CCP the 1990s, early the Since co-optation. theindividual organs isdetermined theCCP’sstructures, thepersonnelof of most the formally is what represents Committee Central The enterprises. Today the CCP’s operating structure derives from the statute of the CCP with regard to the changes changes the to regard with CCP ofthe statute the from derives structure operating CCP’s the Today made in October 2017. See See October 2017. in made

The CCP’s organisational structure at the central level central the at structure organisational The CCP’s Constitution of the Communist Party of China of Party Communist the of Constitution 7 , power intheCCPderives fromtheParty’s , www.china.org.cn. , ------17 OSW REPORT 4/2020 18 OSW REPORT 4/2020 8 Its delegates, who number around 2300, are formally selected by 40 electoral 40 electoral by selected formally are 2300, around number who delegates, Its The National of mechanisms real the reflect not does structure formal CCP’s However,the members fromTaiwan the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Armed People’s Militia (APM)andCCP tral Committee, centralgovernment bodies, thelargest state-owned enterprises, is it but intervals, five-year regular at met has it years, recent Party.In the a facade. just is congress to delegates sending of system the tion 1.1.3),and power within the Party itself, or by extension within the PRC. In fact, the main main the fact, In PRC. the within extensionby or itself, Party the powerwithin units, theCCP’sCen includingprovincial Party organisations, departmentsof has always relied heavily on factional politics and clientelist networks (see sec (see networks clientelist and politics factional on heavily alwaysrelied has bodies is a source of the constant struggle for power within the CCP,which the within power for struggle constant the of a source is bodies Chart 1. and the membership of the lower-level committees. According to the Leninist Leninist the to According lower-levelcommittees. the of membership the and always the CCP’s Central Committee which decides to convene the congress. the convene to decides which Committee Central CCP’s the always cal promotion of individual members. The assignment of key decision-making decision-making key of The assignment members. individual of promotion cal verti the determine organs Party highest the co-optation – of principle the on democraticcentralism,theleadershipcentresinCCPareformed doctrine of atthehelm.ThesebodiescontrolpersonnelpolicywithinCCP eral Secretary Gen the with Committee, Standing its and CCP the of Committee Central the of decision-making andexecutive centrewithinthePRCislocatedinPolitburo In fact, on every such occasion the CCP tries to find someone who was born in Taiwan, or at least least at or Taiwan, in born was who someone find to tries CCP the occasion such every on fact, In had ancestors from Taiwan, in order to use the arrival of a delegate from the ‘breakaway province’ province’ ‘breakaway the from a delegate of arrival the use to order in Taiwan, from ancestors had in its propaganda. its in General Secretary of theCCCCP Secretariat The CCP’s institutional structure, central level central structure, The CCP’s institutional Congress 8 . The Congress istheonly. The Congress body authorised tochange the of

the Standing Committee Central Committee National Congress of thePolitburo CCP of theCCP of theCCP Politburo is formally the most important body in Commission oftheCCCCP for DisciplineInspection Central Commission Central Military - - - - voting rights and 171 alternate members (non-voting). It is formally the most the formally (non-voting).It is members 171 alternate and rights voting 9 The Central ment the decisions of the NC CCP,ment the decisions of out Party carry work and represent the Party imple to is task Its congresses. between Party the governing body important Central outgoing the by picked actually are candidates the but members, its the General Secretariat and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Discipline for Commission Central the and Secretariat General the the and CC CCP, the of Politburo the of Committee Standing the CC CCP, the whothe delegatestocongress ‘select’ theCentralCommitteefromamong Central Military Commission of the CC CCP.the Generally, of Commission Military Central however, members the Committee. also elects the General Secretary of the CCP, the members of the Politburo of of Politburo the of members CCP,the the of Secretary General the elects also statute of the CCP, which regulates the internal Party functions. Formally it is Formallyfunctions.Partyit CCP,internal the the regulates which of statute describe this as a process of co-optation. The CC also appoints the members of of members the appoints also The CC co-optation. of a process as this describe officerecommendthe new members,to soitisreasonable ending theirtermof tasks.The CC these itself sets CC the fact, actual In stage. international the on

The CC customarily meets between National Congresses of the CCP the of Congresses National between meets customarily The CC The 3 The 2 on. so Politburo’sand members, The 1 The seven nounced. Also it always attracts the most attention from foreign observers. is theoccasionwhen majorpoliticaloreconomic changes areusually an thestatetoanymainly devotedchanges that toadaptingthestructureof the previous year; and to staffing positions in the state hierarchy. state the in positions staffing to and year;previous the fined. They are used to announce major changes in the CCP’s policy. CCP’s the in changes major announce to used are They fined. by the new Party leaders to make their mark on the CCP and China. This China. and CCP the on mark their make to leaders Party new the by sues within the Party: the agenda the forCCP, the General Secretary of the seven sessions, plenary whose agenda isalsogenerally customarily de occurred during the NC CCP, which always takes place in the autumn of of autumn the in place takesalways which NC CCP, the during occurred ec sc nmnltr: h Tid lnm f h 18 the of Plenum Third the nomenclature: such Hence Committee took place in November 2013, a year after the 18 the after a year November 2013, in place took ­Committee rd st nd plenum plenum plenum Committee plenary meets the day after the NC CCP ends, and focuses on is on focuses and ends, NC CCP the after day the meets meets in the autumn, a year after the NC CCP, and is used takes place before the spring session of the NPC, and is and NPC, the of session spring the before place takes sessions numbers 376 people, including 205 members with full of

the CC CCP th National Congress of the CCP’s Central Central CCP’s of the Congress National th Party Congress. 9 in in - - - - 19 OSW REPORT 4/2020 20 OSW REPORT 4/2020 10 h General The The Politburo of rent affairs, and should act in accordance with the agenda determined by the by determined agenda the with accordance in act should and affairs, rent Meeting state. and Party overpower absolute virtually having management, ty, the government and the state”, in accordance with the statute of the CCP.the of statute the with accordance state”,in the and government ty,the pres is who see cannot and room, a darkened to alwaysspeak they but topics, the most important people in the CCP. the most important Party It comprises of power is concentrated in the Politburo’s Standing Committee, which current which Committee, Standing Politburo’s the in concentrated is power procedures governing it are not known. From leaks and offhand remarks, it remarks, offhand and leaks From known. not are it governing procedures ly consists of seven members and represents the inner circle of theCCP’s seven members andrepresentstheinnercircleof ly consistsof general policy directions and devising compromises between the various inter General Secretary. The functioning of these bodies is largely hidden, and the and hidden, largely is bodies these of Secretary.The functioning General at lower levels, and that the body functions more as a forum for working out working for a forum as more functions body the that and levels,lower at freedomforappears thatthereisgreater discussionwithinthePolitburothan complete secrecy.complete ent; questions areasked by assistants. The experts arealsoobliged tomaintain selected present to experts of kinds all invites often The Politburo groups. est cur in role a decisive has Committee Standing the a week, once average on political The Politburo’s levels. provincial and central the both from cadres

The 7 The 6 The 5 The 4 introduced at the 3 at introduced to resolving issues from the history of the CCP.the of history the from issues resolving to takes place; it is dedicated to drawing up ideological bases, and sometimes cuses on issues concerning the PLA, and on implementing the changes the implementing on and PLA, the concerning issues on cuses of the outgoing leadership, personnel recommendations, etc. leadership,personnel outgoing the of ed topreparingtheagenda for thecongress, acceptingthepoliticalreports five-yearnext the plan. concerning issues on (1921–2), of the Chairman CCP (1922–5, 1928–31 and 1943–82) and (1925–8, General Secretary 1931–43 and Over the years the formal title of the supreme leader has changed: Secretary of the Central Office Office Central the of Secretary changed: has leader supreme the of title formal the years the Over Beijing1994. from 1982 to the present day). See (ed.), Hu Sheng See day). present the to 1982 from th th th th plenum plenum plenum plenum Secretary theCentralCommittee , which meets in the fourth year after the NC CCP, focuses takes place a week before the next NC CCP, and is dedicat falls at the beginning of the year when the next NC CCP NC CCP next the when year the of beginning the at falls falls in the third year after the NC CCP, and usually fo usually and NC CCP, the after year third the in falls rd plenum. 10 has“supreme power andauthorityover thePar A Concise History of The Communist Party of China of Party The Communist of History A Concise has25 membersdrawn fromamong ------, vidual characteristics of the person holding the position, as well as the support vidual characteristics of which he enjoys within the Party apparatus. The informal requirements for requirements The informal apparatus. Party the within enjoys he which 12 11 In practice, his power within the whole political system depends on the indi the on depends system political whole the within power his In practice, the CCP’s Central Committee, and ideally a member of itsStandingCommittee. the CCP’s CentralCommittee, andideally a memberof of Politburo the of a member been have already must he term previous the more­ power); taking (55–60 upon age right the being including position the over, power, thecandidatemustalready bewithin the innercircleof i.. during

vice-chairmen), who are elected from among the members of theCC’sPo vice-chairmen), who areelectedfromamong the membersof The Central Committee of the CCP consists of several Party organs which severalorgans Party of consists CCP the of Committee The Central who rank below the Politburo members in the Party hierarchy (unless they The Secretariat the of one also possibly (and Chairman the of exception the with PLA, The Central The most itary units, etc., and its Chairman is also the commander-in-chief. Since commander-in-chief. the also is Chairman its and units, etc., itary matters relating to the PLA; budget, mil appointments, the distribution of mittee. Since the Fifteenth Congress it has consisted of seven secretaries seven of consisted has it Congress Fifteenth the Since mittee. Com Standing its and Politburo bythe set tasks the out carries and ments several members (usually sevenmade up of to eleven) derived from the the CC CCP’s operations. It coordinates the work of individual depart individual of work the It coordinates operations. the CC CCP’s the PLApower is the ultimate guarantor of for the CCP itself, the Chairman positions of General Secretary, Chairman of the CMC and the Chairman the and CMC the of Secretary,Chairman General of positions litburo. In practice, in recent years the General Secretary of the CCP has CCP the of Secretary General the years recent in practice, In litburo. also been the Chairman of the CMC of the Central Committee the CMC of also been the Chairman of controllingboththe very politicalimportance, great intermsof are of state and the structures of the CCP itself. They include: They itself. CCP the of structures the and state of the PRC have become concentrated in one person’s hands. The CMC is The CMC person’shands. one in concentrated havebecome PRC the of the CMC actually has the of strongest position. However, over the years the (although not always) identical to the CMC CC CCP. Its existence is dictated only by procedural mat procedural by only dictated is existence Its CMC CC CCP. the to identical always) not (although 1989. Despite the fact that he held no other Party or state positions, this post guaranteed him the the him guaranteed post this positions, state or Party other no held he that fact the Despite 1989. The main author of Chinese reforms after 1978, , was the chairman of the CMC until until CMC the of chairman the was Xiaoping, Deng 1978, after reforms Chinese of author The main Mil Central the PRC, the in authority state a similar also is there CMC CC CCP, the to addition In final say in Party and state matters. Jiang Zemin ‘extended’ his in a similar fashion, fashion, a similar in office of term his ‘extended’ Zemin Jiang matters. state and Party in say final only handing the presidency of the CMC to his successor, , after a two-year delay. a two-year after Hu Jintao, successor, his to CMC the of presidency the handing only itary Commission of the State Council of the PRC, elected by the NPC. Its composition is usually usually is composition Its NPC. the by elected PRC, the of Council State the of Commission itary ters, and has no real impact on the functioning of the army. the of functioning the on impact real no has and ters, important Military of

the organs Commission CC CCP. of

the This is the administrative backbone of of backbone administrative the is This Central of

the CC CCP Committee 11 . This deals with all with deals This . of

the 12 . CCP ------21 OSW REPORT 4/2020 22 OSW REPORT 4/2020 After the political crisis linked to the bloody crackdown bloody the Square Tiananmen on to linked crisis political the After 13 in in 1989, the CCP tried to institutionalise its internal procedures, in procedures, internal its institutionalise to tried CCP the in 1989, Beijing in treat each other. One of the primary purposes for clarifying the rules of gov of rules the clarifying for purposes primary the of One other. each treat rules unwritten of a number of formalisation) the not (albeit definition the for Party governance, duties, the range including term lengths, the division of lution of conflicts within the Party itself Party the within conflicts of lution ciple was the establishment of the rule of generational change withinthe theruleof ciple was theestablishmentof prin fundamental The group. or individual one in power of concentration excessive the prevent to as well as summits, CCP at conflicts avoid to order in factions competing between power of a balance maintain to was ernance responsibilities, topleaders should andeven specifyinghowof of thegroup reso the regulate to order in all above but confidence, public regain to order

‘propaganda department’, alsoindiscourse withintheCCP)isresponsible The Publicity and apparatus Party the in appointees of selection the influences It also The Organisational The Central in the media. the in control direct assumed has it March 2018 since but media, the ministered necessary. Council. State the of members trol of the media. Previously it worked with the state bodies which ad which bodies state the with worked it Previously media. the of trol personal files on all CCP members and verifying their ideological stance. ideological their verifying and members CCP all on files personal for ‘leadership’ in the mass media, which is a Party euphemism for con for euphemism a Party is which media, mass the in ‘leadership’ for bers. It is charged with combating corruption. It has the right to arrest to right the It has corruption. combating with charged It is bers. gives instructions as to the content, form and direction of programming gives instructions as to the content, form and direction of any member of theCCPand‘detainany themfor investigation’ memberof for aslong the than status protocol a higher havewho but PB), the of members are sible for enforcing the rules of behaviour anddecencyuponCCPmem sible for enforcing therulesof of state. The department decides on the issue of licenses, but above all it all above but licenses, of issue the on decides The department state. of content,leaving administrationandtechnicalfunctionstothebodies of staff. of rotation constant the ensures 1995. See W. Wo-Lap Lam, Lam, W. Wo-Lap See Commission Department China after Deng Xiaoping: The Power Struggle in Beijing Since Tiananmen Since Beijing in Struggle The Power Xiaoping: Deng after China Department for of Discipline

the of CC CCP

the 13 . This was to have been achievedby havebeen to was This . Inspection. CC CCP (commonly referred to as the isengaged incompiling Thisbody isrespon , Hoboken Hoboken , ------‘seasoned’ cadres, theso-calledParty elders At the same time the concept of the so-called collective( so-called leadership the of concept the time same Atthe The idea was particularly intended to apply within the CC’s Politburo and its and Politburo CC’s the within apply to intended particularly was The idea transferring power hadbeen This createdtheimpressionthatprocessof The Chinese Communist Party is a heterogeneous structure, and its official im official its and structure, a heterogeneous Partyis Communist The Chinese was chosen as General Secretary in 2012, it seems that the stabilisation in op in stabilisation the that seems it in 2012, Secretary General as chosen was bytaken being decisions to down boils form basic its in developed,which was 14 1.1.3. In the light of how the Chinese political system has evolved since Xi Jinping Xi Jinping since evolved has system political Chinese the how of light the In Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (1993–2013) resulted primarily from the inertia of of inertia the from primarily resulted (1993–2013) Hu Jintao and Zemin Jiang ies, and decisions were to have been taken by vote, but only after a search for a search after only but vote,by taken havebeen to were decisions and ies, bod both to apply to intended was votes of equality of The principle mittee. Com Standing the of member each to responsibilities specific i.e. assigning institutionalised. ical culture and mode of operationevolveical cultureandmodeof inresponsetothenew challenges rability and internal cohesion. They are linked to family relationships, as well as relationships,family to linked are They cohesion. internal and rability to power of Xi Jinping and the actions he has taken show that the CCP’s polit CCP’s the that show taken has he actions the and Xi Jinping of power to thepreviousthe system leadership. andtheweak The coming political force of of seventy. age the reaching after office of terms five-year two after leave to facing the Party, and also depend to a great extent on the personality of the of personality the on extent a great to depend also Party,and the facing leader (see part 2). (see leader emergence the prevent to a mechanism as both interpreted be can leadership leadership: power was tobeassumed by personsintheirsixties, who were Standing Committee.Standing body The latter was supposedprin also the on operate to as extensive patron-client networks, built up by leading cadres as they climb they as cadres leading by up built networks, patron-client extensive as party transforming constantly diverseand a dynamic, hides a monolith of age erations and the routine generational transfer of leadership during the rule of leadershipduringtheruleof erations andtheroutinegenerational transfer of retired, to priority giving meant also this context, a broader In compromises. labourwithindividual responsibility( thedivision of ciple of structure. internal complex CCP’s the of a confirmation as Mao’and a ‘new of collectiveconsensus andcompetingopinionsbeinglevelled out.The conceptof of power. It includes interest groups of varying sizes, scopes of operation, du operation, of scopes sizes, varying of groups interest power. It includes of

See Yun- , Yunhan Zhu, Zhicheng , Chih-cheng Lo, R.H. Myers (ed.), R.H. Myers Lo, Chih-cheng Luo, Zhicheng Zhu, Yunhan Chu, Yun-han See s e u s 16 s the ­I after Opportunities and Challenges Leadership:

Factions and interest groups within the CCP the within groups interest and Factions ), Cambridge 2004. Cambridge ), th 14 Party Congress Congress Party . ( The China Quarterly Special Special Quarterly China The geren fengong fuze The New Chinese Chinese The New jiti lingdao jiti ), ), ) ------

23 OSW REPORT 4/2020 24 OSW REPORT 4/2020 The struggle for power in the CCP’s structures is limited to a relativelyto narrowlimited is structures powerCCP’s for the in The struggle local from system – political PRC the of areas all in operating cadres The CCP 16 15 In the contemporary CCP,In thecontemporary several majorcentral-level factionscanbedistin Internal tensions among the factions result from a competition for positions in in the central bureaucracy, or going off to work in the provincial Party struc Party provincial the in work to off going bureaucracy,or central the in which isincreasingly hereditary,membership of althoughinternalpromotion functionaries as apparatus Party the in working people the is, lev various at game’‘power the involvedin are people, 7.5 million i.e. around key decision-making themainfactorsinfluencingappointmentof is oneof re personal on based alliances changing a system of of creation the resultedin tures. In any case, however, they should necessarily spend some time (prefer time some spend necessarily however,should case, theyany In tures. the vast resourcescontrolledby theCCP, for personalgainandpromotion, to access their expand to positions their exploit PLA – the or bureaucracy tral thebureaucratic the Party’s highestdecision-makingbodies, andfor controlof bureaucracy.central and structures regional Party’s the in ladder career the positions at different levels of the CCP. the levels of different at positions ultimately toachieve power intheParty’s decision-makingstructures. Thishas lationships, patron-client networks and common objectives.politics Factionalcommon and networks patron-client lationships, guished (see Annex 2). However, in recent years the factional mosaic has un has mosaic factional the years recent However,in Annex 2). (see guished and provincial committees, state companies, through to the technocratic cen base. a political up building and ably a minimum of one year) working in the provinces in a basic Party unit. Party a basic in provinces the in working year) one of a minimum ably around threetofour thousandpeopleatthecentrallevel still depends on other factors, such as good management skills and political and skills management good as such factors, other on depends still state – make uptheParty’s same timearerecommendedfor positionsinthestructuressubordinate tothe waybenefits the Partystate,personal whichopen and gaining to of structures efficiency. Party cadres have two possible career paths before them: working them: before paths career possible two have cadres efficiency. Party of group a relativelysmall only is there these, of And structure. the within els cadres, Party full-time the only members, Party 90 million circa the Of elite.

To which they were appointed by the appropriate CCP body. CCP appropriate the by appointed were they which To come Thereafter (376 persons). Committee Central CCP’s the of members alternate and Permanent dependent on individual ministries; CCP committee members from the 31 territorial units (except (except units 31 territorial the from members committee CCP ministries; individual on dependent any formal posts) control various various control posts) formal any and Council State the to subordinate also are who companies, state-owned largest the of a hundred h cmad tf o te L, rm rvnil omnes pad; h has f oe than more of heads the upwards; commanders provincial from PLA, the of staff command the the and Macao SARs); retired activists and their families, who (although not holding holding not (although who families, their and activists retired SARs); Macao and Kong Hong the something which enables all the members of the Party elite to enrich themselves. enrich to elite Party the of members the all enables which something nomenklatura nomenklatura -owned companies whose number is hard to estimate, estimate, to hard is number whose companies -owned . Thisisa privileged, hierarchicalclass, 15 . The cadres – that The cadres – . 16 , who atthe ------ihn h CP Te iepn f hs idvda fatos s ey different, very is fractions individual these of lifespan The CCP. the within 18 17 Membership of the individual fractions is quite fluid, and each of them also them of each and fluid, quite is fractions individual the of Membership League); or if they hold similar views on the development of the PRC. the developmentof the on views similar hold they if or League); istics, and even their names, largely represent attempts by external observers in one city orcommon region; interests based in business or corruption; ex section 2.2.2). (see revealed been yet not has configuration new the part most to capture the hidden, dynamic phenomenon of unceasingpower struggle to capturethehidden,dynamic phenomenonof Youth Communist the or companies state as (such organisation same the to periences of cooperation while advancing through the Party ranks; belonging belonging ranks; Party the through advancing while cooperation of periences has a different level of internal integrity. internal levela different has linked be can of cadres CCP personal by One must also remember that the discernment of factions and their character their and factions of discernment the that remember also must One and family connections, theso-called and many of them,especially intheregions, remaininvisibleand many toexternal of observers. the for and rule, Xi Jinping’s with linked transformation significant dergone

who came to dominate Chinese political and economic life from the 1990s.the from life economic and political Chinese dominate to came who economic back the became empires, business up vast built often who of control took Xiaoping, Deng by led group, This purges.Mao’s and war was completely dominatedby the‘LongMarch’, Party veterans of thecivil In the first decades after the PRC’s foundation in 1949, Chinese politics Chinese in 1949, foundation PRC’s the after decades first the In the CCP and the PRC after 1978. With the generational shift in the Chinese the in 1978. shift after the generational PRC With the and CCP the person to Party work within a given generation. Other family members, family Other generation. a given within work Party to person unwritten rulewas adoptedthateachParty clan Party have started to be included in key political positions, as they were seen as theywereseen positions,as key political in included havebe to started bone for thefamily guarantors of the specific project of the CCP and its state. At that time an time that state. At its and CCP the of project specific the of guarantors elite during the 1980s and 1990s, the descendants of those Party veteransParty those of descendants 1990s,the and 1980s the during elite The so-called ‘Panama Papers’, published by the international press in 2016, reveal the Chinese elites’ elites’ Chinese the reveal in 2016, press international the by published Papers’, ‘Panama The so-called ( clan the culture Chinese In collectively owned large assets, hence clan identity is stronger there than in the north, and often often and north, the in than there stronger is also identity group clan this hence China of assets, south large the owned in past, collectively the In generation. living oldest the of representatives of generation of top-level activists who founded the PRC. the founded who activists top-level of generation System in China’, China’, in System prevails over ethnic self-identification or nationality. See Chenggui, ‘A Study of The Rural Clan Clan The Rural of ‘A Study Li Chenggui, See nationality. or self-identification ethnic over prevails extensive network of investments in tax havens. See J. Garside, D. Pegg, D. Pegg, J. Garside, See havens. tax in investments of network extensive up made is which elders, clan the of power patriarchal the to subordinate are who and other each shore secrets of China’s red nobility’ red of China’s secrets shore clans and Management World Management family 18 . In this way, a new caste of ‘’ developed, ‘princelings’ of caste way, this a new In . zongzu ties ) is an important social unit. This is a group of people related to to related people of a group is This unit. social important an is ) 1994, no. 5. In the CCP, Party clans are descended from the first first the from descended are clans CCP,Party the In no. 5. 1994, , Guardian among guanxi , 6 April 2016, www.theguardian.com. 6 April 2016, , the CCP (see section 1.1.4); by their origin origin their by section 1.1.4); (see elite 17 couldonly appointone ‘Panama Papers reveal off reveal Papers ‘Panama - - - - 25 OSW REPORT 4/2020 26 OSW REPORT 4/2020 20 19

nte wl-nw ca i te aiy f i eg Peir rm 1987 from Premier Peng, Li of family the is clan well-known Another the Party’sAs a result, highest elites membership is of gradually becoming Today, thetieswithin theeliteresult bothfromtheirlife iniso many of minister the of position the holds , son, Todayeldest ’s work included a period in military intelligence. Jinyang and Ye and Jinyang Wang intelligence. military in period a included work His youngest son, Li Xiaoyong, married Ye Xiaoyan, the granddaughter of youngestHis Li Xiaoyong,son, Xiaoyan,married Ye of granddaughter the company.energy Datang the of vice-president is Li Xiaolin daughter His 1976. to 1949 from Premier Enlai, Zhou of ward the was he Li Shuoxun, PRC’s main armaments company, the andatthe same time president of Jingzi have also been involved in investment projects as part of the Belt Belt the of part as projects investment in involved been also have Jingzi into the Party’ are Premier and , Vice-Chairman WangQishan, and Li Keqiang Premier are Party’ the into whose Xuanning, Ye General was father March’.Her ‘Long the of roes he the of one Jianying, Ye Marshal of granddaughter Ye Jingzi, married talented and ambitious cadres with no political base marry intothePartytalented andambitiouscadreswithnopoliticalbase marry Jianying above-mentionedYe Marshal the CCP,the of a hero of son the and three, of age the at Orphaned 1998. to lation, and from arranged marriages. However, it does also happen that happen also However,does marriages. it arranged from and lation, alli­ of result the often more also are factions Party the hereditary,and One excellent example of a Party clan can be found in the descendants the in found be can clan a Party of example excellent One China InternationalTrustandInvestment Corporation(CITIC), themain and Road Initiative.Road and WangJinyangson his and PLA’sdeath, the his in Forceuntil Air a general ances between individual Party clans state-owned investment firm. The general’s second son, Wang Bing, was Bing, Wang son, second The general’s firm. investmentstate-owned the Technologies, Poly of board the of Chairman was Jun, Wang sons, elite. The highest-ranking figures in the hierarchy at present who ‘married Committee. Central the of member a permanent also is and of transport, his of One in 1988–93. PRC the of Vice-Chairman WangZhen, General of For more on the Wang and Li clans and other Party families, see see families, Party other and clans Li and Wang the on more For sen Everyone struggle. a factional lose they if even status their lose not do elite the of Members Princelings in China in Princelings calligraphy, tending to the gardens or playing table tennis. See See tennis. table playing or gardens the to tending calligraphy, Bloomberg, 26 December 2012, www.bloomberg.com; K. Brown, K. Brown, www.bloomberg.com; 26 December 2012, Bloomberg, ’ food from a special farm in , and spend time indulging in various hobbies, such as as such hobbies, various in indulging time spend and Mongolia, Inner in farm a special from food at Yancheng (called the ‘tiger cage’) in the northern outskirts of Beijing. They do not wear prison prison wear not do They Beijing. of outskirts northern the in cage’) ‘tiger the (called Yancheng at tenced to prison, from the rank of vice-minister and above, is currently serving prison sentences sentences prison serving currently is above, and vice-minister of rank the from prison, to tenced uniform, they have access to the media and (like the rest of the elite) are served healthy organic organic healthy served are elite) the of rest the (like and media the to access have they uniform, , Morning China South , London 2014. London , , 22 September 2013, www.scmp.com. 22 September 2013, , 19 . 20 . ‘Hotel-style prison awaits China’s China’s awaits prison ‘Hotel-style The New Emperors: Power and the the and Power Emperors: The New ‘Mapping China’s Red Nobility’ Red China’s ‘Mapping - - - , The main object of these factional andclan struggles is to take leading positions The main object of 22 21 within theCCP’sCentralCommitteeanditsorgans, primarily inthePolitbu ment, which themselves are instruments of factional struggle), and make it make and struggle), factional of instruments are themselves which ment, over influence direct obtaining to addition In Committee. Standing its and ro res build up the support among regional factions and interest groups whichres buildupthesupport factionsandinterestgroups is amongregional rise throughthehierarchy in thestate-owned enterprisesthemselves, becausethisiswhere thecapital possible to fight their competitors effectively. Secondarily, the factions fight effectively. factions Secondarily, competitors the their fight to possible flows are managed. These can be exploited to pay off the political debts the debts political the off pay to exploited be can These managed. are flows for positionsingovernment departmentsrelatedtotheeconomy, aswell as leading cadres have incurred and with sectoralthe regional factions in their take to succeed who those allows it state, the and Party the in decisions key broad patron-client networks within the local Party and state structures, thus structures, state and Party local the networkswithin patron-client broad CCP’s highestleadership. Only attheprovincial level can theleadingParty cad Party work atthelocallevelGreat experience of isessentialinthebattlefor the as the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection or the Publicity Depart sive localadministration,theCCPcadresstrugglingfor power levels create of crucial in any effective battle for Party succession. While climbing the succes the climbing While succession. Party for battle effective any in crucial control over other important bodies within the CCP’s Central Committee (such

The identification of such Party clans is hampered not only not hampered such is clans Party the by general of The identification many of the most senior CCP veterans led fairly activemany of social lives and in 1988–93. Vice-Premier first Yilin, Yao is their names after marriage).after names their known under known not do children those of Many relationships. various from children had bear the names of their fathers, and the fathers themselves are often only themselvesoften fathers are the fathers,and their of names the bear and the head of the Council to Combat Poverty in the 1980s, who was Xiaoping Deng whoof associate a close 1980s, the in Poverty Combat to Council the of head the and secrecy concerningtheParty cadres’private lives, butalsoby thefactthat origins underassumedorigins names(inChinawomen donotformally change League Youth Communist the and CCP the of activist an Jinrui, of Cheng daughter the Premier,is Hong,current Cheng the of The wife PRC. the of See T.R. Heath, T.R. Heath, See Li, Cheng See Rejuvenation , 2014. , Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership Collective Reassessing Era: Xi Jinping the in Politics Chinese China’s New Governing Party Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of National National of Pursuit the and Renewal Political Paradigm: Party Governing New China’s noms de guerrede noms 22 . . Daughters in particular choose to hide their hide to choose particular in Daughters . 21 . In turn, Wangturn, In . Qishan’s father-in-law , 2016. Washington , - - - - 27 OSW REPORT 4/2020 28 OSW REPORT 4/2020 The factions jockeying for power within the Party also look for support from support for look also Party the within power for jockeying The factions local cadres The various to solicit the support factions at the CCP’s centre of try that ensures Committee Central CCP’s the of Department The Organisational with by offering them either political (positions in the hierarchy) or economic hierarchy) or the in (positions political either them byoffering with For provincial is sometimes secretary thestrongest localcadres, thepositionof resources, helpful legislative instruments, and political protection. political and instruments,legislative helpful resources, the state-owned companies. Representatives of the bureaucracy and army are army and bureaucracy the Representativescompanies.state-owned the of section 1.3.3).(see particularisms regional of strengthening the province,one in a verybase preventup strong to build activistand can no that the mostseniorpersonnelarecontinually rotatedbetween theprovinces, so China. their patron-clientnetworks arenotlinked of tojustonespecificregion CCP.and However,the cadres individual of Secretary General of position top themselves.promoted being of expectation in patron, main their their resources, bothpoliticaland financial (throughcorruption), to supporting provides the foundation for the power of a specific group of leaders in Beijing. in leaders of group a specific powerthe of for foundation providesthe port for individual localfactions moves) orlong-term, in which anallianceof for patronsinthecentrewho canprovide themwithappropriateaccessto benefits (for example, in the form of favourable regulations for each province, each favourablefor regulations of form the in example, (for benefits generally unable to aspire to the highest positions in the Party, but they look they Party,but the in positions highest the to aspire to unable generally a springboard into the CCP’s highest decision-making bodies, including the including bodies, decision-making highest CCP’s the into a springboard sectoral interest groups, including in the PLA, the central bureaucracy,and central the PLA, the in including groups, interest sectoral devote supporters Party.Their the within positions own their strengthening or greater accesstostateloans).or greater (building up sup Thesefavours canbeone-off The Party cadres’ actions and achievements are indeed of importance, but but importance, of indeed achievementsare and actions cadres’ The Party of tradition the upon draws meritocracy China’s of myth The powerful Party ‘barons’ and the main political circles in the CCP’s Central Commit The myth in practice the advances within the hierarchy are often the result of per of result the often are hierarchy the within advances the practice in generation. given any of representatives best the by governed being is PRC the that ensure promotion of rules strict that It argues institution. tee. Transition to a higher level comes from strengthening one’s political one’s strengthening from comes level a higher to Transition tee. a meritocratic of image an buildingby legitimacy social their reinforce to trying is CCP Today,the period. imperial China’s in exams mandarin the position in Beijing, the power of one’s own political base, and successes and base, political own one’s of power the Beijing, in position sonal manoeuvres, and represent the creation of political bases bysonal manoeuvres, local and represent the creation of of

meritocracy - - - A characteristic feature of the political system built up by the CCP is the wide the is CCP the by up built system political the of feature A characteristic the relativelyrare, are sessions NC CCP between changes personnel Although This manifests itself in press announcements about the removal of officials, of removal the about announcements press in itself manifests This power synchronisedare factions CCP the among of balance the The changesin with the CCP’s political calendar, primarily the National Congresses of the CCP with the CCP’s political calendar, primarily the National of Congresses 1.1.4. Party bodies Party apparatusoutsidetheofficialdecision-makingstructures. Inmany areas is usually linked to factional infighting. Another method of gaining an advan an gaining of method Another infighting. factional to linked usually is political remove to used widely are investigations The anti-corruption nents. tem’) and small leading groups. The annual holidays for the elites at the resort the at elites holidaysthe for The annual groups. leading tem’)small and informal These lower-levelbodies. the to decisions those of transmission the overcircumventtagestructures to decision-making is formalone’s opponents power. The two basic types of informal institutions are called are institutions informal of types basic ­power. The two the over control complete maintain to only not CCP the helps This process. system. political forms for internal coordination, decision-making, andarethe main channelfor held every five years. The personnel decisions taken at that time reflect the reflect time that at taken decisions The personnel years. five every held by means of theinformal institutionswhich arewidespreadintheChinese by meansof gles. Even when individual appointments are fixed from above, the number the above, from fixed are appointments individual when Even gles. state structures, but also broadens the scope of theCCPleadership’sstate structures, personal but alsobroadensthescopeof the mechanisms,and informalof groups members linking existenceof spread scenes. the behind ceaselessly continues apparatus Party the within struggle strength. their show the various within groups the Party,strength of with the strongest groups of of Party andstategovernance,of theseinformal structuresarethemainplat corruption for members CCP high-ranking of sentencing the and opponents, oppo factions’ the by taken actions specific criticising articles anonymous or votes castfor individual candidatesisonewayof for theinternalfactionsto thesefactionalstrug thefew of visiblesigns on personnelproposalsisoneof occupying key Party andstatepositionsduringtheupcoming term. The voting in effectively managing the jurisdictions subordinate to oneself (which oneself to subordinate jurisdictions the managing effectively in preventing social unrest. social preventing since 1978 has usually equated to achieving high local GDP growth) and growth) GDP local high achieving to equated usually has 1978 since Beidaihe are also of great importance in the decision-making process. decision-making the in importance great of also are ­Beidaihe

Informal institutions: institutions: Informal de facto circumvent andsubstitute for theformal decision-making xitong and small leading groups small and xitong (‘thesys ------29 OSW REPORT 4/2020 30 OSW REPORT 4/2020 vincial, prefectural, county andmunicipallevels, butalsowithinotherminis The term 25 24 23 xiaozu includes theofficialbodiesresponsible for environmental protectionatthepro technocratic factions within the CCP’s central and local bureaucracy.local and central CCP’s the within factions technocratic a within created tacts a given within tion they aresubordinate totheParty hierarchy. The commandsfor policycoordina view, the of point legal government.the central From the in agencies and tries formal decision-making bodies known as the ‘small leading groups’ ( groups’ leading ‘small the as known bodies decision-making formal levels of the state and regional administrationandwho thestateandregional areresponsiblefor the levels of between the Party cells and the CCP cadres who perform functions at different at functions perform who cadres CCP the and Partycells betweenthe One special feature of the political system built by the CCP is the set of in of set the is CCP the by built system political the of feature special One same areas official bodies at the various government levels retain full autonomy; autonomy; however, full various government retain levels the at bodies official

The phone itself does not have a dial. One simply picks up the phone and phone the up picks simply One havea dial. not does itself The phone se This PRC. the in authority political of a symbol is telephone The red whom are women) are trained in recognising the dozens of languages and whomwomen)are of dozens the recognising in trained are The ‘red itary communications unit of the PLA; the switchboard operators (all of of (all operators switchboard the PLA; the of unit communications itary provincial level, members of the central government, and the heads of the provincial thecentralgovernment, level, andtheheadsof membersof largest state-owned enterprises and banks.and enterprises state-ownedlargest authorities from the rank of vice- or CCP vice-secretary at the at vice-secretary CCP or vice-governor of rank the from authorities asks for a specific person. The network is supported by a dedicated mil a dedicated by supported is The network person. a specific for asks of the conversations of the conversations.cords of Nobody has the right to make audio recordings re shorthand take to requested are they case in minute, per characters 150 Chinese least at write haveto and ability China, the in spoken dialects local the CCP’s Central Committee, commanders, military membersof of members comprising 3000 people, around connects line encrypted cure 1988. They also take different names: small leadership groups, only under the leadership of the Gen the of leadership the under only groups, leadership small names: different take also They R. McGregor M. Oksenberg, K. Lieberthal, See eral Secretary or any member of the CC’s Politburo; small coordinating groups ( groups coordinating small Politburo; CC’s the of member any or Secretary eral ) operating at the central level xitong 23 phone’ . For example, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment’s and Ecology of Ministry the example, For . The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers Communist China’s of World The Secret The Party: refers to the vertically integrated network of informal contacts refers tothevertically network integrated of xitong xitong 24 . are usually transmitted via Party channels. The con channels. Party via transmitted usually are often form the basis for the creation of sectoral or or sectoral of creation the for basis the form often Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes and Structures, Leaders, China: in Making Policy 25 . This term covers four types of groups: groups: of types fourcovers term This . , London 2012. London , xietiao xiaozu xietiao , Princeton , Princeton lingdao xitong - - - ); ); ------

(b) those operating within the central government; (c) those formed within formed (c) those government; central the within operating (b) those Politburo; CC’s the or CC the of guidance direct the under operating (a) those The actual effectiveness of the small leading groups is directly related to the to related directly is groups leading small the of effectiveness The actual PRC, the in bodies decision-making main the are groups leading small These 26 way they operate (from loose panel discussions to teams tasked with devising with tasked teams to discussions panel loose (from operate theyway with a much-needed internal flexibility.internal a much-needed with normally operate at various levels of the bureaucratic ladder. This means theyladder. means bureaucratic This the levelsvarious of at operate normally icy directives andrecommendationsthey introduce, writtendown inthe 18 the at CCP the of leadership the in 83 groups to refer mates based on press reports and statements from people in the leadership rule is that the more important or more urgent the matter, the more important influence wielded by their key members, and their ability to mobilise the Party tee of the CC’s Politburo which appoints the members of themostimportant theCC’s Politburowhich appointsthemembersof tee of ministries. the including administration, state the the of issue the to economy,through the of reconstruction the and PLA the Esti Annex 5). (see them of most of competence the and membership their vertically,connecting operate which (d) those and PLA; the of structures the people fromvarious structuresinthestate-Party bureaucracy fectiveness of these small groups stemsfromthefactthatthey thesesmallgroups shortenthe fectiveness of lead CCP’s the of position official the become memoranda, internal of form leading groups, providing for it with the facilities and personnel necessary hold regularmeetings every month,othersonan and often have a rigid agenda, the leading small groups provide the system the provide groups small leading the agenda, a rigid have often and are theexecutives inthegroup. It istheCC’sPolitburoor theStandingCommit action.The general and stateapparatusinordertoachieve a specifiedcourseof legitimacy.legal The pol any rarely powersand formal haveno they ­although specific solutions).specific is as unknown, is number exact their secret: in operate groups leading small daily operations. As the political processes in the PRC are very much ritualised and CCP the within both decision-making of inertia overcomethe to help can who stakeholders the all place one in concentrating chain, decision-making The ef administration. the for guidelines as function to start thus and ership, theirmeetings (some football inthePRC)andfrequencyof development of of reform (from duties their of scope the in differ They (2012–17). CCP the of

( K.E. Brødsgaard (ed.), K.E. Brødsgaard at the lower levels, there are coordinating workers’ groups ( groups workers’ coordinating are there levels, lower the at weiyuanhui ). Critical Readings on the Chinese Communist Party Communist Chinese the on Readings Critical ad hoc ad xietiao gongzuo zu gongzuo xietiao , vol. 4, Leiden 2017. Leiden vol. 4, , basis), andalsointhe th National Congress Congress National 26 . Most of the of Most . ) or committees committees ) or - - - - - 31 OSW REPORT 4/2020 32 OSW REPORT 4/2020 29 28 27 National Congresses. Every year for two weeks in early August, the Party lead Party August,the early weeksEverytwo in Congresses.foryear National key discuss to together vacations its spends also elite Party the year,Every in Beidaihe that the CCP’s agenda for the nextin yearthe agendaforand usually CCP’s discussed, is the that Beidaihe in havegovernance.become meetings state These and Party the to related issues that duringtheday they spendtimerelaxingontheclosely guardedbeachesor Party life, apart from the CCP’s the most important dates in the calendar of ple. The evenings are devoted to seminars and meetings in larger groups. It is It is groups. larger in meetings and seminars devotedto are The evenings ple. here, as does anyone of anyhere, asdoesanyone politicalimportanceinthePRC.Thisismostse of Standing Committee are worked out worked are Committee Standing going on walks. This gives opportunities to exchange ideas and meet new peo new meet and ideas exchange to opportunities giveswalks. This on going Congress years,Congress compromisesontheappointmentsfor thenext Politburo and cret part of the Party’s inner life, but from the few availablecret part of reports it is known assemble elders The Party Sea. Yellow the on Bohai of Bay the in Beidaihe, of BeijingcalledZhongnanhai ership moves fromtheclosedareaof

which meansthatthey play animportantroleinbuildingsocialbonds rule China, although they remain an important part of building networksbuilding of part important an theyremain although China, rule things have in reality. However, whereas thought, for one’s son or finance one’s father’s funeral, they do not of themselves of not do they funeral, father’s one’s finance or son one’s for gations, borne by the individual and his family. In China Guanxi and factions within the Party apparatus.Party the within factions and and family influences and social dependence, privileges, but also the obli the also privileges, but dependence, social and influences family and and informal social security networks. Under the influence of Confucian of influence the networks.Under security social informal and Guanxi es them to assign greater driving greater forcees themtoassign topoliticsorbusinessthanthese ciety so Chinese of diversification and transformation the with along changes commitment, trust and fidelity.and trust commitment, of The concept culturally reinforced principles, creationandcultivation, oreven rituals, of It must be remembered that the Chinese leaders live in the closed district of in in Zhongnanhai of district closed the in live leaders Chinese the that remembered be It must See T. Gold, D. Guthrie, D. Wank (ed.), D. Wank D. Guthrie, T. Gold, See Bo Zhiyue, world. Even if they have any extended episodes of stays abroad in their CVs, these will have been been have will these CVs, their in abroad stays of episodes extended any have they if Even world. jing, in isolation not only from their own society, but also from any direct knowledge of the outside outside the of knowledge direct any from also but society, own their from only not isolation in jing, far away in time. in away far ing Nature of Guanxi of Nature ing 29 . Since foreigners do not usually participate in participate usually not do foreigners Since . (‘connections’) is a term used to describe the networks of personal (‘connections’) networksthe describe to used a term of is guanxi China’s Elite Politics. Governance and Democratization and Governance China’s Politics. Elite arealsohierarchicalinnature, andarebasedonmutual , Cambridge 2004. Cambridge , Social Connections in China: Institutions, Culture, and the Chang the and Culture, Institutions, China: in Connections Social 28 . guanxi make it easier to find a job guanxi , Singapore 2010. Singapore , hasalsoundergone guanxi guanxi 27 is rooted in is rooted in , thiscaus to the resort totheresort ------ and elements of classicalChinesephilosophy,‑communism andelementsof withConfucianism (of which the Cultural RevolutionCultural expression). the one was whichwas 1978, After (of As part of Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic policy, in the decades following Mao’sfollowing decades the policy,in pragmatic Xiaoping’s Deng of part As Today’s CCPemphasisesinstitutionalviolenceover politicalterror, butdoes 30 which he had created. According to the PRC’s constitution of 1978, the Party the 1978, of constitution PRC’s the to According created. had he which 1.1.5. 1978, the Party retained Mao Zedong as the founder figure of thePRC;however,1978, theParty retainedMaoZedongasthefounder figureof In the agrarian China of theearly twentieth century, Chinaof In theagrarian asinmany othercoun mobilise the public and accelerate the process of modernisation. The ideology The ideology modernisation. of process the accelerate and public the mobilise necessary.it deems it when degree a limited to latter the use to hesitate not the and management internal its for model the remains which (1946–53) ism the to a reference is characteristics”.This Chinese with “ building is Marxism with Chinese traditional philosophy it departed from the amalgam of industrialised economy, which DengXiaopingcalled“building socialismwith tries withstronganti-colonialmovements, Marxismbecame theideologyof pragmatic philosophy of Deng Xiaoping, which reduced the impact of ideology DengXiaoping,which reduced the impact of philosophypragmatic of led the CCP to victory in the Civil War and the establishment of thePRCwas intheCivil led theCCPtovictory War andthe establishmentof Stalinism, this ideology was used by Mao Zedong in the PRC’s first decades to decades first PRC’s the in Zedong Mao by used was ideology this Stalinism, Chinese characteristics”.Chinese China’s to adapted as Officially Marxism-Leninism, Zedong conditions Mao by and extended by successive leaders, is the ideological basis for the CCP.After the for basis ideological the is leaders, successiveby extended and also served as a tool to gain advantage in the political struggle within the CCP the within struggle political the in advantage gain to a tool as served also and Legalism at its head anarcho­ agrarian Marxism-Leninism, of Zedong, Mao by created a synthesis, that ideology the end, the In emancipation. national for tool important an death orthodox Marxism largely ceased to define the Party’s objectives and objectives Party’s the define to ceased largely Marxism orthodox death a highly of development the and urbanisation modernisation, of a path onto China,which entered contemporary deemed inappropriatetotherealitiesof state. the and organisation Party the between relationship the of construction Stalin late still is it Party the However,forstate. the of management the on

York2008. ( A New Theory of Chinese History Chinese of Theory A New L. Shaffer, Shaffer, L. Fu, Fu, pp. 42–5. Legalism (a.k.a. Chinese legism) is based on several scrupulously observed principles, principles, observed scrupulously several on based is legism) Chinese (a.k.a. Legalism 42–5. pp. such as the strict and literal application of the law, strict liability (also collective), ‘showing nothing’ nothing’ ‘showing collective), (also liability law, strict ofthe application literal and strict the as such wuxian

China’s Legalists: The Early Totalitarians The Early Legalists: China’s The role of ideology of The role ), or hiding power from the population, and economic coercion by the state. See Zhengyuan Zhengyuan See state. the by coercion economic and population, the from power hiding or ), Mao Zedong and Workers: The in Province, Province, Hunan in Movement Labour The Workers: and Zedong Mao 30 . In conjunction with a cult of personality inspired byinspired personality of a cult with conjunction In . , Oxford 2015; A.S. Cua (ed.), A.S. Cua 2015; Oxford , , London 1996; Dingxin Zhao, Zhao, Dingxin 1996; London , Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy Chinese of Encyclopedia The Confucian-Legalist State: State: The Confucian-Legalist 1920–23 , Oxon 1982, 1982, Oxon , , New New , - - 33 OSW REPORT 4/2020 34 OSW REPORT 4/2020 (the ‘The Scientific Outlook on Development’) to Xi Jinping (‘ vision for the development of the Party and the state, are placed in key Party key in placed are state, the and Party the of development the for vision The ideology is also used to build up the authority of the CCP’s senior lead senior CCP’s the of authority the up build to used also is The ideology 32 31 Marxism, and a good knowledge of the doctrine is still a prerequisite for pro for a prerequisite still is doctrine the of knowledge a good and Marxism, Party apparatus, andremainsanimportantcognitive tool,giving itcohesion the and policy-makers Chinese influences invariably still However,Marxism ing Theory’), Jiang Zemin (the Theory of the ‘’), Hu Jintao Hu Jintao Represents’), ‘Three the of Theory (the Zemin Jiang Theory’), ing in activities similar undertake places different in people different that means ap Party the controlling for a tool also is The ideology relations. international entire an Party Communist the of members gives Marxism-Leninism motion. society action;italsoceasedtobeusedinthemassmobilisationof means of ty, but they are also a tool to influence the thought and actions of the Party the of actions and thought the influence to a tool also are they ty,but the PRC: Mao (‘Mao Zedong Thought’),the Constitution of Deng (‘Deng Xiaop reality,which of perception a common (b) creating indoctrination; through paratus in several dimensions: (a) ensuring cohesion within the membership the within cohesion (a) ensuring dimensions: several in paratus for the Party apparatus, so that all of its members are aware of thecurrent itsmembersareawarefor of theParty apparatus, sothatallof the to contributions theoretical original own their made have leaders five far leadership’spriorities. always be accused of deviationalways fromideology beaccusedof in training continuous to subjected are elites Party act. to strength the and apparatus. References to the leader’s current theories, containing an overall an containing theories, current leader’s the to References apparatus. aimed atsymbolically sanctioningtheleader’ssupreme positioninthe Par conceptual framework in the field of socialsciences, as conceptual frameworkwell asa perspective inthefieldof on documents or sectoral policy projects. Ideology thus serves as a kind of guide of a kind as serves thus Ideology projects. policy sectoral or documents are actions era’).These a new for characteristics Chinese with socialism on Marxism-Leninismwhich havedevelopment formally of beenincludedinto So development. Party’s the of directions general the convey to also and ers, anyone personnel – can discipline to a tool (c) as and other; each of dependent

The CCP skilfully exploits the traditionalist attitudes of a large part of so of part a large of attitudes traditionalist the exploits skilfully The CCP The Party minology to the official narrative, as well asof its by a certain ritualization activities. The narrative of the Confucian nature of China’s contemporary of nature Confucian the activities.The narrative of ciety and often refers to Confucian ideas, introducing the Confucian ter Confucian the introducing ideas, Confucian to refers often and ciety See Jinghan , Zeng, section 2.2.6. Jinghan see more See for trend; this of a reversal about brought power to rise Xi Jinping’s n o i s e h o ­C , 2016. , and The Chinese Communist Party’s Capacity to Rule: Ideology, Legitimacy and Party Party and Legitimacy Ideology, Rule: to Capacity Party’s Communist Chinese The Confucianism 32 . - - 31 ------. After several decades in which the CCP had relatively refrained from ideologi from relatively refrained had CCP the which in several decades After vival of the great ideological campaigns (see section 2.2.6). One should expect should One section 2.2.6). (see campaigns ideological great the of vival 35 34 33 which to this day wields direct control over it. The army also represents the represents also The army it. over control direct wields day this to which 1.1.6. Deng Xiaoping, and its role inside the CCP gradually decreased CCP,to the came within powerand struggles internal the into drawnwas PLA MaoZedong,especially duringtheCulturalRevolution,In thedays of the and structure a civilian as CCP the betweendivision clear no is there China In in China. res, including Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao, passed smoothly between their Party their between smoothly passed Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping including res, the PLA as a military organisation. It was the CCP which created the PLA, and PLA, the created which CCP the It was organisation. a military as PLA the change cultural and economic rapid of a period during section 3.3.2) (see trol Marxismonly togrow overthe roleof thecomingyears, astheParty elitesare play an important political role in the system. After 1978 the army supported army the 1978 After system. the in role political important an play theParty,political andpersonnelbaseof anduntilrecently many Party cad functions and the political or command positions in the army.the in positions command or political the and functions seeking tools to discipline the Party’s rank and file and maintain social con social maintain and file and rank Party’s the discipline to tools seeking cal interference in the daily lives of the Chinese people, Xi’s rule has seen a re seen has rule Xi’s people, Chinese the livesdailyof the in interference cal

Leninism. This is especially true in the case of Xi Jinping, who in his in who Xi Jinping, of case the in true especially is This ‑Leninism. narrative addressedtoParty membersconsistently refers tothethoughts to metaphysics) on the functioning of the Party itself islimited,andits theParty itself to metaphysics) onthefunctioningof dis and power soft China’s expand to order in audience, foreign the to political system and the rich traditions of Chinesestatehoodissupported political system andtherichtraditionsof SovietMarxism-Leninism by the Publicity Department of the CC, particularly in media addressedby the Publicity Department of guise the Leninist nature of the Party guise the Leninist nature of Confucian concepts(includingsocialidealism,humanity, theattraction ation of leaders who were raised on Chinese translations of the classics of theclassicsof leaderswho were raisedonChinesetranslationsof ation of gener first the to belongs Xi also Stalin. and Lenin Marx, of writings and self-identification and conceptual system are actually based on Marxism­ on based actually are system conceptual and self-identification See D.M. Finkelstein, K. Gunness (ed.), K. Gunness D.M. Finkelstein, See Xi Jinping, Xi: by articles and speeches of A collection Weiwei, is narrative of type this of representative One Sea State

, 2007. , The CCP and the People’s the Army Liberation and The CCP , Hackensack 2012. Hackensack , 34 . Civil-Military Relations in Today’s China: Swimming in a New a New in Swimming China: Today’s in Relations Civil-Military 33 . However, the real influence of of influence real However,the . of The Governance The China Wave. Rise of a Civilizational a Civilizational of Rise Wave. The China , 2015. Shanghai , 35 . However, the ------35 OSW REPORT 4/2020 36 OSW REPORT 4/2020 38 37 36 need to deploy the PLA domestically, although this cannot be ruled out. ruled be cannot domestically,this PLA although the deploy to need implement to developingmethods is which People’sMilitia, Armed the marily civilian powerinternal securitylargely structures, remainsinthehandsof pri of The development below). box (see crisis Taiwanese third so-called the in external security rently focused onissues of defence for theCCP’srule. Nevertheless,remains thelastlineof thePLA iscur the bloodless suppression of so-called‘massincidents’;thisalsominimisesthe the bloodlesssuppression of suppression of the protests on in 1989 showedPLA the in 1989 SquareTiananmenthat on protests the of suppression

visits abroadby rulingTaiwanese dignitaries, becauseitconsidersthem The PLA analysts behind Beijing’s policy incorrectly assessed both the both assessed incorrectly policy Beijing’s behind analysts The PLA Taiwan’s by visit then unofficial an with connection in erupted The crisis United States’ determination to defend the island and the socio-cultural the and island the defend to determination States’ United Lee. But Washington reacted, sending two aircraft carrier striking groups groups striking carrier aircraft two sending Washingtonreacted, But Lee. The crisis region; and Lee, despite being plagued by a series of scandals, was elected elected was scandals, of a series by plagued being despite Lee, and region; in units several mobilised PLA the response, In a visa. Lee ident Pres grant to Department State the on calling a resolution passed ington tions made at that time have not changed to this day.this to changed havenot time that at made tions the of west the in Fleet Pacific the assembling and Strait Taiwan the to WashHowever,‘oneChina’in principle. the Congress of a violation be to province, and prepared an exercise for its missile divisions in the Taiwan to scheduled was he where States, United the to -hui Lee president for a second term. a second for leadership that the failure was not the result of itsincorrectassumptions, leadership thatthefailurewas nottheresult of re-elect to not voters the influence would force of show the that hoped Strait as well as manoeuvres involving its parachute regiments. At the At regiments. parachute its involving manoeuvres as well as Strait but rather of having too little military force at its disposal. The assump disposal. its at force military little too having of rather but give a lecture at the university he graduated from. Beijing opposes any opposes Beijing from. graduated he university the at a lecture give a great loss of prestige. a greatThe PLA loss of itself, however, won additional funding to same time presidential were approaching in Taiwan, and Beijing Beijing Taiwan,and in approaching were elections presidential time same develop the Navy which sufferedBeijing changes Taiwan,in occurred had that a resultas of (ed.), (ed.), 2015. S. Dewan, S. Dewan, B.A. Elleman, (ed.), A. Scobell P.C. Saunders, See Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis The U.S.-Taiwan-China Strait: Dangerous China’s Maritime Ambitions and the PLA Navy the and Ambitions Maritime China’s in Taiwan Straits: Crisis in Asia and the Role of the U.S. Navy the of Role the and Asia in Crisis Straits: Taiwan the 38 Taiwan because the military managed because the military to convince the civilian Strait, PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking Security National China’s on PLA Influence 1995–6 , New York 2005. York New , 37 , New Delhi 2013. Delhi New , 36 , which hasfound itsexpression , Lanham 2015; N.B. Tucker N.B. Tucker 2015; Lanham , , Stanford Stanford , - - - - - represented on the NPC (see section 1.2.2): one delegate from the army rep army the from delegate one section 1.2.2): (see NPC the on ‑represented All the middle- and senior-level officers belong to the CCP, which is a prereq is CCP, which the to belong officers senior-level and middle- the All very elaborate structure. In the spirit of Mao’s statement that “political power“political Mao’s that statement of spirit the In structure. elaborate very The army is also a tool for the control and indoctrination of thepublic.The PLA The army isalsoa toolfor thecontrolandindoctrination of interest and factions various the between rivalry for a stage also is The PLA to loyalty political complete PLA’s the guarantee commissars political The is The PLA when it thought that its rule of China was under threat. The CCP wields di wields The CCP threat. under was China of rule its that thought it when Ministry of Defenceonly providessupport. material and At logistical same the of Ministry rect, operational control over the PLA through the Central Military Commis Military Central the through PLA the over control operational rect, resents an average of 10,000 soldiers, while one civilian delegate represents delegate civilian one while of 10,000 soldiers, average an resents tration and the Party structures. It is a valuable source of information for the for information of source a valuable It is structures. Party the and tration decisive as plays longer no it although PRC, the in effectively exercised be to is itself The PLA commander-in-chief. as himself present also must leader ty Par new each army,and the within networks patron-client up build to them the and soldiers rank-and-file both of training continuous through CCP the a facade. purely is Council State the of Commission Military Central the time part of the CCP’s propaganda, and the ability to build a strong army is one el one is army a strong build to ability the and propaganda, CCP’s the of part a group sends PLA Moreover,the elite. military the to promotion for uisite body with respect to the CCP; the army is rather one of the divisions of the thedivisions of body withrespecttotheCCP; thearmy isratheroneof groups, and its officer corps also participates in the intra-Party power game. power intra-Party the in participates also corps officer its and groups, the of guarantor ultimate the is PLA the a gun”, of barrel the of out grows CCP’s leadershiponthelocalsituation within the state, andinpastemergen CCP.Many Party officers,political as careers their began cadres allowed which the for reserve a personnel also is The PLA one. specific a very CC CCP,albeit CCP’s rule, and the Party violence on several has used the military occasions as a Party militia, and its character has not changed to this day, despite its day,despite this to changed not has character its and militia, a Party as administration during periods of crisis. The cult of the army is an important an is army the of The cult crisis. of periods during administration 400,000 civilians.around over­ still is PLAHowever, Revolution.the Cultural the during did it as a role withinthesystem,an interestgroup whose support isessentialfor authority sion of the CC CCP (see section 1.1.2), and the state administration led by the by led administration state the and section 1.1.2), (see CC CCP the of sion ement from which the regime derives its legitimacy. Also, one of the primary primary the of legitimacy.one Also,its derives regime the which from ement haveunits cies,military regional local successfully taken over of functions the creates an informational in the country, grid in parallel to the state adminis a separate as seen be cannot PLA the Thus NPC. the to delegates own its of officer cadre. de facto de an organ of the Party, and not the state. It was founded It was state. the not Party,and the of organ an ------37 OSW REPORT 4/2020 38 OSW REPORT 4/2020 At present, the multiplicity and diversity of the security services in China is China in services security the of diversity and multiplicity the present, At The 1990s saw the practice of seconding a committee member to the role of of role the to member a committee seconding of practice the saw The 1990s Committee Standing the by directed been always has apparatus The security beginning the since but rule, CCP’s the of basis the is apparatus The security 39 well as organisations created is body former the Theoretically in 1983. MPS the from separated was which 1.1.7. Department of Social Affairs in 1949; and the Ministry of State Security (MSS), Security State of Ministry the and in 1949; Social Affairs of Department CCP,the of emanations are state,and organs the security not the PLA, Likethe responsible for internal security and the latter for external security, but both Central the replaced which (MPS), Security Public of Ministry the isations: new leadershipunderXi Jinpingtochange theformula, andledtothecreation PLA’sthe operations.streamline and modernise termingle. Added to this is a range of specialised organisations, such as the as such organisations, specialised of a range is this to Added termingle. organ major two are there level central the At competition. internal of tion intelligence andinternal securityarenotclearly separated, the conceptsof theservices tion of probably intended to play a similar role in managing the security apparatus security the managing in role a similar play to intended probably functions of intelligence and counter-intelligence. In the Chinese perception, Chinese the In counter-intelligence. and intelligence of functions have the right to operate inside and outside China, and their tasks often in often tasks their and China, outside and inside operate to right the have Office for the Protection of State Secrets and the Central Protection Office, as Office, Protection Central the and Secrets State of Protection the for Office and the services’ common task is to ensure the sustainability of the CCP’s rule. CCP’s the of sustainability the ensure to is task common services’ the and the fulfilling secondarily only police, a political of role the play they aboveall as the CMC does to the PLA. the to does CMC the as supervisor of the services, but the Bo Xilai case (see section 2.1.2) forced the forced section 2.1.2) (see case Bo Xilai the but services, the of supervisor fragmenta the and changes frequent in effectively, resulting sphere security of the PRC the Party has been faced with the question of how tomanage the thePRCParty hasbeenfacedwiththequestionof of thestateisto theeconomicreforms andthemodernisationof objectives of of the state and are intended to fulfil specific tasks. It may be assumed that assumed be It may tasks. specific fulfil to intended are and state the of due totheirspecialisation,aswell astheCCPleadership’s deliberatestimula It is section 3.2.1). (see CC CCP the of Security National for Committee the of forms. of a variety taken has direction CC CCP,this the but of Politburo the of

See Xuezhi Guo, Xuezhi See Tajne służby chińskie. Od Mao do igrzysk olimpijskich igrzysk do Mao Od chińskie. służby Tajne ], Games], Olympic The CCP and the security apparatus security the and The CCP China’s Security State: Philosophy, Evolution, and Politics and Evolution, Philosophy, State: Security China’s Katowice 39 . 2009. ad hoc which often operate outside the structures [The Chinese secret services. From Mao to the , Cambridge 2012; R. Faligot, R. Faligot, 2012; Cambridge , - - - - At the central level, authority in the PRC formally rests in the hands of the of hands the in rests formally PRC the in authority level, central the At Therefore, in the case of China, a considerable variety in the professionalism the in variety a considerable China, of case the in Therefore, while in others they cooperate with each other. This diversification of the se the of diversification This other. each with cooperate they others in while 41 40 1.2.1. The PRC’s 1.2. From a formal point of view, the political system of the People’s Republic of of Republic People’s the of system political view,the of point a formal From margins the from people organising to limited often are they areas, rural In services, regional and central the between tensions are there fields some In moment whether or not it is under observation by another institution. another by observation under is it not or whether moment reality all state institutions are under the full control of theCCP reality allstateinstitutionsareunderthefullcontrol of in and a facade, merely are PRC the of constitution the in written power ing that the formal source of allpower,that theformal sourceof includingexecutive andjudiciary, isthe CCP the of independent organisations political of Front United so-called the given any at knows service way, no This intermingle. often operations their of courses specific given is them of each Although agencies. other on spy to is function sole whose organisations larger or smaller many a great are there people, as personified in the National People’s Congress. The delegates to the to The delegates Congress. People’s National the in personified as people, upon theirown security unitstoprotectthemagainstcompetitive CCPgroups from the same region; butabovefrom thesameregion; all,they work toprevent Beijingfromhearing level of power. Local CCP committees create subordinate services, usually by usually services, subordinate create committees CCP power.Local of level China is a socialist country ruled by the of the people. The prin people. the of dictatorship the by ruled country a socialist is China of 1982 constitution bythe determined is China Chinese people, asrepresentedin theNational People’s (NPC)and Congress action, they then have great freedom to define their activities, and in practice in and activities, their define to freedom have great then they action, about public protests or abuses by the local elites. local the by abuses or protests public about call also organisations Party Regional observed. be can services secret among ciple of the unity of state power (the absence of separation of powers) means separationof statepower (theabsenceof theunity of ciple of exercis for Howeverwell.principles government as the the in co-participates inhabitants. local the threaten to used be can which militias into society of creating special departments in the police units which are subordinate to them. isfound notonlycurity services atthecentrallevel butalsoatvirtually every

Constitution of the PRC the of Constitution Cottey, A. Collins, N. Republic of China of ­Republic

The CCP and the central-levelinstitutions the and The CCP , Manchester 2012. Manchester , state , nesadn Ciee oiis A itouto t gvrmn i te People’s the in government to introduction An politics: Chinese Understanding op. cit. op. structures 41 . According to this document, this Accordingto . 40 . - - - 39 OSW REPORT 4/2020 40 OSW REPORT 4/2020 which are of political importance, whichsuch as are officials,the of media and the training of 42 However, this formal structure of the state is a facade, and the Chinese Com Chinese the and a facade, is state the of structure formal However,this below).chart (see ConsultativeConference Political representative Congresses; People’s of a system by selected formally are NPC is responsible for all key political decisions, leaving their legal implementation their defining institutions, state PRC’s the controls completely Party munist thePRC in thegovernment of ment. The People’s atthecentralandlocallevels – Congresses – appointandsu the Party’s control over state institutions is the personnel policy. CCP mem policy.CCP personnel the is institutions state over control Party’s the pervise the state administration, thecourts,pervise prosecutors’ offices and regulators position in the Party. The CCP also continually monitors the administration the monitors continually also Party.The CCP the in position flects a fundamental feature of theChinesepolitical system, in which the Party flects a fundamental feature of bers occupy all the politically important official positions, according to their to according positions, official important politically the all occupy bers bodies selectedby Chineselocalgovern multi-stage electionsatalllevels of Chart 2. at the relevant level. Formally, alongside the Chinese Communist Party,eight Communist Chinese Formally,the level.relevant alongside the at and gets involved in micromanagement. In some areas of the state’soperation the of areas involvedsome gets In and micromanagement. in for channel The primary structures. state the to administration ongoing and structure, rules of operation and the composition of their personnel. This re This personnel. their of composition the and operation of rules structure, democratic parties and unaffiliated delegates sit in the NPC and are involved are and NPC the in sit delegates unaffiliated and parties democratic STATE PARTY At present (2018) they have 861 seats in the NPC (28.9% of the total). the of (28.9% NPC the in 861 seats have they (2018) present At (advisory body) (advisory The PRC’s institutional structure – the central level central the structure – The PRC’s institutional (parliament) CPPCC Courts NPC CCP 42 , as is the advisory body, asistheadvisory theChinesePeople’s (government) State Council CMC CCCCP Ministries CMC ofStateCouncil PLA - - - - - 43 Party structures which are the main channel for conveyingmaking decisions,for channel main the are which structures Party In lesspolitically sensitive areas, thestate’s activity isconstantly monitored the management is transferred directly to the CCP’s bureaucratic structures. bureaucratic CCP’s the to directly transferred is management the up a kind of ‘nervous system’ of the PRC. the system’‘nervous of of a kind up groups, aswell astheParty cells existing inevery publicinstitutionandstate and controlledthroughinformal Party institutions, such asthesmallleading enterprise, which decide their day-to-day activities. In many cases, it is the is it cases, many In activities.day-to-day their decide which enterprise,

Work the CC CCP whichthe chooses not Department onlyof the leaders of All-Chinese Federation of Industry and Commerce (which formally rep formally (which Commerce and Industry of Federation All-Chinese The members of the elected by the CCP are also delegates to delegates also are CCP the by elected Front United the of The members a pluralistic The United Front’s main task is to give China the trappings of United Front’s individual organisations, but also determines which people PRC, under the leadership of the CCP. In practice, it is the United Front United the is it practice, CCP.In the of leadership the under PRC, of a coalition Front, United so-called the view, of point a formal From The United resents industry andcommerce),resents industry the participateinthegovernment of the NPC, but they are completely subordinate to the CCP.the to subordinateMoreover, completely are they from but NPC, the parties belong to the CCP at the same time. same the at CCP the to belong parties ple’s Political Consultative Conference, which meets once a year in paral in a year once meets which Conference, Consultative Political ple’s theChinesePeo political system; thisisinstitutionalisedintheform of legal-constitutional legitimacy, although it is mentioned in the preamble body. a consultative as serves and NPC, the of session annual the with lel a formal point of view, the Conference is not an organ of state and has no has and state of organ an view,not is Conference the of point a formal other the of members many indeed, them – to belong can many how and of the constitution as a consultative body.a consultative as constitution the of eight The Revolutionary Committee of the , the Chinese Democratic League, the Chinese As Chinese the League, Democratic Chinese the Kuomintang, the of Committee The Revolutionary and Hegemony and Democracy, the Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party of China, the Party of Chinese Efforts for for Efforts Chinese of Party the China, of Party Democratic Workers’ and Peasants’ the Democracy, Justice, the September Third Scientific Association, and the Democratic League of Taiwan’s Autono Taiwan’s of League Democratic the and Association, Scientific Third September the Justice, my. See G. Groot, G. Groot, See my. sociation for the Democratic Construction of the State, the Chinese Association for the Promotion of Promotion the for Association Chinese the State, the of Construction Democratic the for sociation 43 (apartfromtheCCP)legalpoliticalparties, together withthe , New York 2004. York New , Front Managing Transitions: The Chinese Communist Party, United Front Work, Corporatism Corporatism Work, Front United Party, Communist The Chinese Transitions: Managing - - - - - 41 OSW REPORT 4/2020 42 OSW REPORT 4/2020 (the Chinesegovernment), andalsocontrolsthejudicialsystem. By controlling The NPC’s term of office lasts five years, and since the 1980s, the number of number the the 1980s, since and years, five lasts office of term The NPC’s high the formally is parliament, Chinese the Congress, People’s The National for Congresses, People’s of a system on based are structures state The PRC’s 44 1.2.2. Prosecution Office, and the President of the Supreme People’s Court. People’s Supreme the of President the and Office, Prosecution overseesalso NPC section 1.2.1),(see Council State the Military Central the and may notperform any otherfunctionsinthestate, andthey operate Commit Standing the of deliberations the during period, this outside out ried for responsible also It is posts. state key fill should who decides and laws, ing businesses. state-run the and institutions regulatory levels: territorial all at elections of process a complex through selected mally tions. Members of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Congress People’s National the of Committee Standing the of Members tions. from elected are body,who this of 175 members the It is NPC. the of (SC) tee the exclusive prerogative toamendtheConstitution,isresponsiblefor pass thePeople’s Congresses, the CCP has full authority overthe membership of all Council State the law,appoints the creating for responsible thus is NPC the the at structure CCP the by decided is membership bodies’ the representative fact, In parliament. of equivalent Chinese the Congress, People’s National the passing the central budget and ratifying international treaties. Formally,treaties.the international ratifying and budget central the passing professional parliamentarians. The SC NPC has the same powers as the NPC, the as powers same the has The SC NPC parliamentarians. professional relationship the or citizens the of obligations and rights the modifying posals from the municipality level, through the prefectures and provinces, up to between the state bodies are voted on. However, most legislative work is car is work legislativeHowever, most on. voted are bodies state the between Commission of the State Council, the Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme People’s Prosecutor of the State Council, the Chief Commission of appropriate local level. In China, there is no formal separation of powers, so powers, of separation formal no is there China, In level. local appropriate among the delegates, which in practice carries out most of theNPC’s func among the delegates, which inpractice carries outmost of pro legislativenew time, that During for 10–14 days. March, in usually a year, deputies hasstoodat2980 people(2019) has it PRC, the of Constitution the Under PRC. the powerin state of organ est theChinesestate, includingparliaments, courts, administration,the organs of

Theoretically, elections to the new NPC are organised by the NPC’s Standing Committee from the the from Committee Standing NPC’s the by organised are NPC new the to elections Theoretically, ­Review On The Composition of The Deputies in The National People’s Congress of China of Congress People’s The National in The Deputies of Con People’s On The Composition National the to elections on a law in 1979 but 3497, were there in 1978 of delegates; gress introducing a limit of 3000 delegates was passed. For the law on elections see Zhao Xiaoli, Xiaoli, Zhao see elections on law the For passed. was 3000 delegates of a limit introducing gress previous term, and this body determines the number of delegates in the next NPC. In practice practice In NPC. next the in delegates of number the determines body this and term, previous the Politburo of the CCP decides. The Constitution does not provide for a rigid limit on the number number the on limit a rigid for provide not does The Constitution decides. CCP the of the Politburo

The National People’s The National Congress , www.tsinghuachinalawreview.org., 44 . At fullstrengththeNPCmeetsonce , Tsinghua China Law China Tsinghua de facto de as ------The NPC and its Standing Committee does not have a monopoly on legislative on havea monopoly not does Committee Standing its and The NPC 49 48 47 46 45 NPC plays a confirmatory, not an innovative role. an a confirmatory,plays not NPC modify the proposals submitted. In the dimension of law-making, then, the then, law-making, of dimension the In submitted. proposals the modify initiative: hasbeendeveloped thePRC’slegislation inrecentyears, by mostof including legislative functions. Moreover, itsown functions: ithasa numberof the State Council State the PRC. the of history the Council (to which the administration is obliged to respond), but they cannot appointments, supervision, etc. appointments, sions of the SC NPC during its annual session, but this has never happened in neverhappened has this but session, annual its during SC NPC the of sions

vertically-aligned electoral colleges. This is consistent with the principle the with consistent is This colleges. electoral vertically-aligned The NPC is formally chosen in a multi-stage process of electoral choices, electoral of process a multi-stage in chosen formally is The NPC PRC The multi-level in which the system of People’s Congresses plays the role of consecutive, People’s plays Congresses in which thesystem theroleof of toral process. Only the People’s Congresses at the municipal and county and municipal the at Congresses People’s the Only process. toral partly also to the provincial People’s Congress. The majority of the del the of The majority Congress. People’s provincial the to also partly level are elected by universal suffrage, although even here the CCP’s local CCP’s the here even universal although bysuffrage, elected levelare atives prefectural People’s tothenext-level Congresses, and meetingof egates theprovincial People’s isselectedby Congress thedelegates from dates candi the wholecells supervise voting procedureandtheselectionof the so-called written into the Constitution of of After more public consultations, the electors’ representatives refer the assembled opinions to the the to opinions assembled the refer representatives electors’ the consultations, public more After (‘the third down’). See B.L. McCormick, B.L. McCormick, See down’). third (‘the G. , See acts. legal of number the of 58% of creation the in participated Council State (2013–16)the Candidates are selected in a process called ‘three up, three down’ ( down’ three up, ‘three called a process in selected are Candidates See Art. 3. see NPC, the to elections regulating law the on more For twelfth the for acts; legal of number the of 74% was this (2008–13), term eleventh NPC’s the For appointment the on more For ranks. diplomatic and military of degrees of conferral the Including M. Stepan, M. Stepan, first down’). At a meeting between the representatives and the committee, the lists of candidates are are candidates of lists the committee, the and representatives the between a meeting At down’). first of candidates (‘the first up’) and presents it for comment from a representative group of electors (‘the (‘the electors of group a representative from a list comment for it announces presents CCP) and up’) the first by (‘the controlled candidates of is and PRC the in elections the organises (which committee Congresses laws, see section 1.2.4. see laws, reduced (‘the second up’), then the new lists are presented to the public opinion (‘the second down’). down’). second (‘the opinion public the to presented are lists new the up’), then second (‘the reduced electoral committee (‘the up’), third after thewhich latter publishesand closes the final electoral list in a Leninist State a Leninist in and dismissal of ministers outside the NPC session and the interpretation of the Constitution and and Constitution ofthe interpretation the and session NPC the outside ofministers dismissal and 48 49 , and leaves the CCP’s leadership with full control of thewhole elec , andleaves theCCP’sleadershipwithfullcontrolof . Then the county People’s Congresses delegate their represent their delegate Congresses People’s county the Then . , 11 February 2011, www.china.org.cn. 11 February 2011, , Constitution of the PRC the of Constitution ‘Activating the National People’s Congress’ People’s National the ‘Activating , Berkeley 1990, p. 141. 1990, Berkeley , 46 . Delegates have the right to petition the bodies of the State the of bodies the petition to right havethe Delegates . electoral , op. cit. op. system 45 Political Reform in Post-Mao China: Democracy and Bureaucracy Theoretically, theNPCmay change thedeci of

People’s , MERICS Electoral Law of the NPC and Local People’s Local and NPC the of Law Electoral Congresses , March 2017, www.merics.org. March 2017, , san shang san san shang san 47 ). The electoral The electoral ). - - - - - 43 OSW REPORT 4/2020 44 OSW REPORT 4/2020 The sessions of the NPC Congress are synchronised with those of the CCP (see CCP the of those with synchronised are NPC Congress the of The sessions NPC is to institutionalise the decisions taken by the Party. The role of the par the of Party. the byThe role taken decisions the institutionalise to is NPC Despite these formal prerogatives, in practice the NPC is completely controlled informally taken by the new Party leadership, and key positions within the within positions key and leadership, Party new the by taken informally system. political Chinese the within importance for NC CCP),practice the wellits with synchronisedas as are (whichmeetings the state appointments agreed at the NC CCP. The number of delegates who delegates of The number NC CCP. the at agreed appointments state the Peo the formal carriedoutthrough thesystem electionstotheNPCbegin, of tem hasoperatedaccordingtothefollowing scheme:intheautumn theNation them intothePRC’slegalsystem, althoughitdoeshave somelimitedpolitical tional People’s (which Congress imitatestheCCP’sbodies), itsmodefor holding ple’s Congresses (see box above). In the March of the following year, the first year,the following the of March the above).In box (see Congresses ple’s liament, then, is to formally accept the decisions of theParty andtointegrate liament, then,istoformally acceptthedecisionsof bodies, the Politburo and its Standing Committee. Then most important deci important most Then Committee. Standing its and Politburo the bodies, by the CCP, the CCP. and is a subordinate body to the National of Congress This al Congresses of the CCP is held, appointing the Party’s key decision­‑key Party’s the making appointing held, is CCP the of Congresses al session of thenew National People’s isconvened, Congress session of which approves all Then assigned. are ministers) or Premier the (including administration state are Committee Standing its and NPC the of composition the regarding sions the of all section 1.1.2), everywhichheld also are five office years. of The terms selecting delegates (the lists are created by the CCP). the As a result, the role of the of structure organisational the from results subordination This state. other organs of state are linked to the term of theNPC.Sincethe 1980s, thesys statearelinked tothetermof other organsof theParty’s controloverconnection isthemostimportantinstrumentof the At every level the delegate’s mandate is a dependent mandate. Delegates mandate. a dependent is mandate delegate’s the levelevery At various levels. Only the delegates from the Hong Kong and Macao SARs Macao and Kong Hong the from delegates the levels.Only various which can be removed from them with the consent of the SC NPC (or by (or SC NPC the of consent the with them from removed be can which the Presidium of the NPC during a session), as well as material immunity.material as well as a session), during NPC the of Presidium the send which congresses provincial the is It congresses. prefectural the process, asdostateuniversities, andeven large state-owned industrial are bound by the instructions of thebodieswhich sentthem,andmay be are boundby theinstructionsof legislativeauthorities. local their by NPC the to directly sent are whole the in participate also PLA the of units division, administrative companies. The whole process involves around 2.7 million delegates at delegates 2.7 million around involves process The whole companies. the of units the to addition In level. central the at NPC the to delegates dismissed by them at any time. Deputies to the NPC have formal immunity, ------At the central level, the state is governed by the State Council, which includes which Council, State governedthe byis state level,the central the At This is emphasisedonevery occasion in thestate media, includingby television 50 1.2.3. 1978 the State Council became a technocratic body, whose delegates were cad were delegates body,whose a technocratic became Council State the 1978 PRC, who also traditionally sits in the highest organs of the CCP.the Formally, of organs highest the the in sits traditionally also who PRC, importance some of a role play does NPC autonomy,the of lack this Despite 20 sectoral ministries and 13 agencies with ministerial status. Its key body is body key Its status. ministerial with 13 agencies and ministries 20 sectoral in the political process. The legislative proceedings in the NPC allow the Party the allow NPC the in proceedings The legislative process. political the in CCP.the to regard has however,years,number recent this In decisions. personnel of case the in 3% exceeds rarely very voting from abstain or proposals submitted the reject in the day-to-day the state administration and the economy, management of often who and state, the of management the in extensiveexperience with res the Standing Committee of the State Council, chaired by the Premier of the of Premier the by chaired Council, State the of Committee Standing the entrepreneurs).private as (such it within represented well less are who those Currently,abroad. and public Chinese the both to system political Chinese the tion, including by blocking or harmonising conflicting legislation submitted to passed 30% several times in controversial cases, including the adoption of the of adoption the including controversialcases, in severaltimes 30% passed up the laws governing conflicts between citizens and the bureaucracy (at the (at bureaucracy the and citizens between conflicts governinglaws the up mem NPC’s the Sometimes agencies. and ministries individual by parliament had education in the natural sciences.natural the in education had received The Council competence broad liberations eachyear areusedtoemphasisethe(formally) pluralist natureof administra state the within interests conflicting the out balance to leadership law ontheThreeGorges Dam andthelaw onthecentralbankin 1995.However, bers are also granted the role of mediators; the body is involved the role of bers are also granted in drawing Chairman of the PRC is the , buthehaslimitedprerogatives; itis the PRCistheheadof Chairman of and not any real autonomy on the part of theNational People’sand notany with Congress realautonomy onthepartof a representative position assigned to the General Secretary of the CCP.the of Secretary General the to assigned position a representative Congress.People’s National the in serving celebrities and the thedelegatesdonotbelongtoCCP; thesearemembersof around 30%of so-called democratic parties and unaffiliated delegates. The NPC gives a sense gives The NPC delegates. unaffiliated and parties democratic so-called consensus withintheParty, unanimitytendstorepresenta lackof such lackof coverage of delegates from the national minorities,coverage or theChinesebillionaires of (minimal)participationinstategovernance tothenon-Partyof orto groups central andlocallevels)

G. Chen, M. Stepan, ‘Activating The National People’s Congress’, Congress’, People’s The National ‘Activating M. Stepan, G. Chen,

The Chairman of the PRC and the State Council State the and PRC the of The Chairman 50 . In addition, the NPC’s approximately ten-day de ten-day approximately NPC’s the addition, In . op. cit. op. ­After - - - - 45 OSW REPORT 4/2020 46 OSW REPORT 4/2020 (now functioning as the Central Foreign Affairs Commission).ForeignAffairs Central the as functioning (now contacts diplomatic facilitates functions two the Combining section 1.1.2). (see 51 on of GeneralSec with itslink,a practiceimplementedsince1993,tothefunctionof The State body.decision-making important most Party’s the Politburo, The Premier The Chairman is thehighestauthorityfor the entireChinesegovernment, includingminis gov highest-ranking the As term. a five-year for NPC the by elected is man theCCP, of retary which isthemostimportantpositioninParty structures tries, the key institutions of economic governancetries, thekey (includingthecentralbank), institutionsof the premier’srealpower dependsprimarily withintheCCP onhislegitimacy authority premier’s the of area main the the 1990s, Since Council. State the to the Leading Small Group for Foreigntraditionally serves Affairs as Chairman of thePRC, whose realpower depends the PRCalsoappointsvice-presidentof mainlyassociated is position this of The importance parliament. the from ture limitedandlargely tions. InthePRC’sconstitutionalsystem, theChairmanisof decora and orders emergency.confers He of states declares and lawsnew the CCP.the of bodies highest the position is taken by one of the members of the Standing Committee of the CC’s theCC’s theStandingCommitteeof themembersof position istaken by oneof for the General Secretary; he pays or receives foreign visits as the Chairman the as visits foreign receives or pays he Secretary; General the for has been issues of administrative reform and economic governance.However,economic and reform administrative of issues been has bers of the State Council, including the Premier and the ministers,announces the and Premier the including Council, State the of bers a five-year period by the NPC. Formally, the Chairman appoints the key mem key the appoints Chairman Formally, NPC. the the by period a five-year although themostimportantdecisionsguidingstatepolicyarestillmadein and his ability to enforce his decisions on his subordinates. Traditionally,subordinates.his his on decisions his enforce to ability his and supreme governing the state under the Chinese constitution. This body body of a countersigna require decisions symbolic president’s the all significance, and darin Chinese ernment official, the Premier serves as head of government, and formally exercises over controlandsupervision theministriesandagencies subordinate of government, head as serves Premier the official, ernment on hisparticipationinotherinformal bodieswithintheCCP. Among others, he of state, the theof not Party). The Chairman affiliation (whichan PRC is the of

The Chinese title is officially translated into English as ‘president’, and so the chairman of the PRC the of chairman the so and ‘president’, as English into translated officially is title The Chinese United States.United is often also referred to incorrectly as ‘president’ in foreign discourse. China does this on purpose purpose on this does China discourse. foreign in ‘president’ as incorrectly to referred also often is to equate the status of Chairman of the PRC with other presidents, especially the President of the ofthe President the especially presidents, other with PRC ofthe ofChairman status the equate to Council ( zhuxi zongli of

the (also known as the as known (also ) fulfils the role of head of state in the PRC. He is elected for head of ) fulfils the role of ) chairs the State Council of the PRC, and like the Chair the like and PRC, the of Council State the chairs ) PRC (sometimes also known as the President the as known also (sometimes Central People’s Government 51 ; in Man ) is the ------(see section 1.3.2).(see The ministries are responsible for dozens more specialised agencies. In ad In agencies. specialised more dozens for responsible are The ministries 13 gov and ministries 20 sectoral includes (2019) currently Council The State these Between months. six every session plenary in meets Council The State who convenes and chairs the Permanent Session, Vice-Premiersit is made up of In practice, nominationsaccruetopersonswho have securedimportantposi ministries andagencies alsohave divisions attheprovincial andlocallevels thepeople’s governments, thehierarchicalstructuresof as is alsoincharge of institutions, Social such astheChinese Sciences.Academy The StateCouncil of themaindecision-makingbody istaken by thePermanent meetings theroleof laws. new of creation the influencing by development,including nomic mandate toruntheday-to-day thestateandpromoteeco administrationof tions in the CCP, usually the Politburo of the CC CCP.the of CCP,Politburo the the usuallyin tions the of start the Since personnel. and decision-making of areas the in CCP the prises. Like the Chinese parliament, the State Council is strictly subordinate to Session of the State Council, which meets weekly. In addition to the Premier, the to addition weekly.In meets which Council, State the of Session and stateadvisers ( specialised institutions and services, as well as the largest state-owned enter diaspora (theso-called Chinese the and TaiwanMacao, and Kong Hong including matters with deal which offices, administrative so-called six includes Council State the dition, it. to subordinate directly are which status ministerial of agencies ernment economic reforms in 1978, however, theState Councilhasreceived a significant The People’s ment) are also members of the CC CCP;ment) are also theymembers of thus implement the decisions times of economic instability and high inflation. high and instability economic of times usually educated in economics-related fields and have experience in the in experience have and fields economics-related in educated usually Tra rank. ministerial with Council State the of a body is and pendence, Central area of financial markets. Their political role rises in importance only in only importance in rises role political Their markets. financial of area supervisory functions)andgovernorssupervisory (involved inday-to-day manage composed of CCP cadres of relatively low political importance. They are They importance. political lowrelatively of cadres CCP of composed institution, a technocratic is bank The central bodies. Party higher the of and decision-making the perform (who secretaries Party ditionally,its institutions Bank guowu weiyuanguowu of huaqiao of

China

economic ). It also controls the largest Chinese research Chinese largest the controls It also ). , China’s central bank, has no formal inde formal no has bank, central China’s , ), who are assigned specific responsibilities. specific assigned are ),who management ------47 OSW REPORT 4/2020 48 OSW REPORT 4/2020 After the start of the reform period in 1978, the political importance of the State theState thereform period in 1978, thepoliticalimportanceof After thestartof The personal connections between Party and state mean that the central ad central the that mean state and Party between connections The personal of composition current the to correspond to changed are structures The state State the in centred bureaucracy,as central the of structure The institutional ministration is the political base for a substantial part of the CCP’s members. CCP’s the of part a substantial for base political the is ministration in theadministration;they allow coordination,reinforce someinstitutions responsibilities, combiningministries, creatingorganisingcommittees, and in theChinesesocio-economicsystem, andtothestate’s ongoing transforma the CCP’s structures, as well as the personal configurations within the Party’s the within configurations personal the as well as structures, CCP’s the most overhauls economy.The institutional a market to a planned from tion ly involve their liquidating and creating new institutions or transferring of bureaucratic transformations are also influenced by changes within the CCP. the within changes by influenced also are transformations bureaucratic groups (see section 1.1.4), also influence the government’s relationships with relationships government’s the influence also section 1.1.4), (see groups Council increased greatly. It controls China’s vast bureaucracy; it was entrusted about experienced has it 30 years past the Over nature. in flexible is Council, against others, and resolve conflicts of interest. of conflicts resolve and others, against session of the NPC in 2018 (see section 2.3.2). The aim of these waves of re structuring hasbeentoadapttheChinesebureaucracydynamic changes of waves these of The aim section 2.3.2). (see in 2018 NPC the of session decision-making bodies. The informal institutions, such as the small leading small the as such institutions, The informal bodies. decision-making These institutions. other to relation in bodies various of status the changing which was carriedoutduringthe restructuring,thelastof eight bigwaves of owned companies belonging to the local governments.local the to belonging companies ‑owned 100 of the largest state-owned conglomerates which are still under the under still are which conglomerates state-owned largest the 100 of h State-owned The The National in the hands of the CCP.the of hands in the macroeconomic policy, co-ordinatingstructural changes intheeconomy, menting economicdevelopment strategies, monitoringandsupervising main planningauthorityinChina,responsiblefor formulating andimple limited, although it remains one of the main tools of economiccontrol themaintoolsof limited, althoughitremainsoneof and operating the assets of companies under its supervision, andalso companiesunderitssupervision, and operatingtheassetsof been has institution this of role the 1978 investment.Since regulating and ­ 150,000 state around manage these level; provincial the at counterparts its has Commission sector.The Central state the for regulations drawsup managers appointing for responsible It is control. government’s ­central sion (SASAC) was established in 2003. This institution supervises around around supervises institution This in 2003. established was Development

Assets Supervision and

Reform and Commission

Administration (NDRC) Commis isthe ------(such as instability on the financial markets) financial the on instability as (such codn t te rnil o te nt o sae uhrt, h Pol’ Con People’s the authority, state of unity the of principle the to According volvement of the central bureaucracyvolvement is therefore essential in order to intro of The judiciary in the PRC is fundamentally dependent on the Party-state. The Party-state. the on dependent fundamentally is PRC the in The judiciary 57 56 55 54 53 52 with the task of supervising and supporting China’s economic growth. The in growth.China’s economic supporting and supervising of task the with 1.2.4. NPC The Supreme representatives theParty generally donotreachthehighestlevels of thebureaucracy,relaxing mostpricecontrols)anditsslimmingdown of the in other countries. The SPC has a right of supervision over supervision in othercountries. thelegalverdicts The SPChasa rightof of the lower courts, andcantheoretically interfere withtheirdiscretionineach Justice of Ministry the of responsibility usuallythe are which functions tional court supreme a national of the functions derivedtions andinterestgroups fromthecentraladministrationandstate people who have the full confidence of the local Party structures Party local the of confidence full the have who people rse satn fo te onhp ee pon jde t te people’s the to judges appoint level – township the from starting gresses – courts thanks to the institution of lay judges, who are selected from among from selected are who judges, lay of institution the to thanks courts over the control additional ensured is level.The CCP appropriate the at courts performs Court People’s Supreme the and structure, a four-tier have courts companies traditionally holdstrongpositionswithintheCCP, althoughtheir fac the reason, this For companies. public largest the of around 100 controls central stateadministrationstillretainsextensive authorityand regulatory planning, detailed up (i.e. giving economy planned socialist the from dication andresolve implementreformsduce legislation, inthecountry crisissituations

2011; P. Potter, P. Potter, 2011; The role of interpreting the law is split between the SPC, which provides linguistic interpretation, interpretation, linguistic provides which SPC, the between split is law the interpreting of The role Office. Prosecution People’s Supreme the for prosecutors selects also The SC NPC cases civil or criminal minor when and appeals during is sit not do judges lay when time The only N. Madson, Wang, Chang see system, judicial PRC’s the about more For General of position the of assumption the including rule, this to exceptions important some are There V. Shih, Cambridge 2013; A. Chen, A. Chen, 2013; Cambridge Secretary of the CCP by Jiang Zemin (who was formerly associated with the state-owned companies nomic bureaucracy). nomic and the Standing Committee of the NPC, which provides legal interpretation. legal provides which NPC, the of Committee Standing the and considered. being are sector and the Ministry of Industry) and Premier (who had worked in the central eco central the in worked had (who Rongji Zhu Premier and Industry) of Ministry the and sector 56

, and combines the functions of thesupreme court , andcombinesthefunctionsof The judicial system The judicial Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation and Conflict Elite China: in Finance and Factions China’s Legal System Legal China’s

People’s An introduction to the legal system of the People’s Republic of China of Republic People’s the of system legal the to introduction An

Court , Cambridge 2013. Cambridge , (SPC) is made up of judges selected by the SC SC the by selected judges of up made is (SPC) 54 . 52 . Despite the state’s relative ab relativestate’s the Despite . , Cambridge 2007. Cambridge , 57 Inside China’s Legal System Legal China’s Inside withtheorganisa 55 . 53 , New York New , . ------, 49 OSW REPORT 4/2020 50 OSW REPORT 4/2020 (appointed byrelevant(appointed the People’s Congress), theyoffice exerciseso their and The PRC is made up of 33 provincial-level administrative units, which is the is which units, administrative 33 provincial-level of up made is The PRC two at compulsorily proceeds it but system, judicial a four-tier has The PRC 60 59 58 The relationship 1.3. The Chairman nese language or languages belonging to other linguistic groups. The PRC has The PRC groups. linguistic other to belonging languages or language nese residents have theChi stronglocalidentities, andspeakeitherlocaldialectsof ment economic andsocialdevelopna’s population,levels provinces of intermsof ap an and instances, two in automatically examined is case each instances – regard. this in restrictions no lower the courts or SC NPC) the (appointed by SPC the in judges rank-and-file the centrifugalforces which theCCP’shierarchicalstructureisintendedto re socio-economic significant its of light the in state the of unity the taining the lower courts,the chairmen of who are appointed by People’s Congresses provincial courts are the appeal instance. appeal the are courts provincial peal isnotrequired until they retire or aredismissedby the appointing authority, which acts with five autonomous regions (including and ) inhabited by compact by inhabited Xinjiang) and Tibet (including regions five autonomous five of first gional diversity.gional the state governance drives decentralisation of The significant One of the fundamental challenges facing the PRC’s political system is main is system political PRC’s the facing challenges fundamental the of One at the appropriate level. The legislation does not specify term limits for the for limits term specify not does The legislation level. appropriate the at to applies The same NPC. the of term the with along expires term his and SPC the byapproval pending yearstwo for suspended automatically are case. The SPC also approvesalso case.The SPC byissued sentences death lowerthe courts, which division of the PRC see Annex 1). There are profound differences among Chi among differences profound are There Annex 1). see PRC the of division counteract. the which for courts, prefectural the to first go cases economic and criminal cases, and for them the prefectural courts are the appeal instance. More serious

For example, the GDP law. of the force by example, For instance first the is SPC the where cases those is exception An after immediately executions public out carry and solution, this ignore provinces some practice, In Ukraine). Data: World Bank. World Data: Ukraine). the verdict is announced. is verdict the ble to Poland and Slovakia); and in the poorest province of it is c. US c. is it Gansu of province poorest the in and Slovakia); and Poland to ble 60 , as well as in terms of culture and language. In all regions of China, of regions all In language. and culture of terms in as well as , de facto de

of

tiers of localgovernment (for moreontheadministrative tiersof the 59 per capita per . County courts deal with minor criminal cases and civil and cases criminal minor with deal courts County .

SPC between (PPP) of the coastal province of is c. US c. is Jiangsu of province coastal the of (PPP) (currently ) is appointed by the NPC, the by appointed is Qiang) Zhou (currently the centre and the provinces $ 8,000(comparable to $ 32,000 (compara32,000 58 . ------‘economic miracle’, decentralisation increases the risk of strengthening local strengthening of risk the increases miracle’,decentralisation ‘economic The local authorities in China have considerable budgetary autonomy,well budgetary as haveconsiderable China in authorities The local 61 jing, which sets out the general directions of change, leaving theirimplemen jing, which setsoutthegeneral directionsof ical break-up of China and civilwarsand China break-upical of particularismandcentrifugalforces,regional many timesleadingtothepolit tation to local authorities. Although this philosophy underpinned the Chinese the underpinned philosophy this Although authorities. local to tation authorities. local overthe control political ensure to is China of rule CCP’s the particularities, and the setting of localinterestsaboveparticularities, thegeneral objectives andthesettingof set latest of which has been implemented bylatest of Xi Jinping since 2012 (see section 2.3.1). larism andcompetitionbetween theprovinces inordertorevive economic by Beijing. In recent years this has led to several waves of centralisation, the centralisation, of wavesseveral to led has this years recent In Beijing. by growth. However, the reforms have been carried out under the tutelage of Bei However,growth.of tutelage the under out havecarried reforms been the socio-political modernisation on selectivegan in 1978, basing the of programme be China reforms the of a consequence is This conditions. local to guidelines stimulated differences internal past, the In . and Kong Hong of gions Chart 3. as high competence to devise economic and social policies, adapting Beijing’s adapting policies, social and economic devise to competence high as decentralisation, local experiments with reforms, and the use of localparticu decentralisation, localexperiments with reforms, andtheuseof Re Administrative Special the as well as minorities, ethnic of communities

4 3 2 1 The documented history of China dates back to c. 1600 BC, which gives a continuity of 3619 years 3619 years of a continuity gives which c. 1600 BC, to back dates China of history The documented of Chinese civilisation, during which China was united for only 1646 years at best (just under half half c. 150 years. under lasted (just unity of best at periods the average 1646 years On time). only for total united of the was China which during civilisation, of Chinese Formal administrative division Township level County level Prefectural level Provincial level within districts rural city , precinctscommunes, mous local councils, city districts in metropolitan cities counties, autonomous counties, local councils, prefectures and autonomous prefectures provinces, regions, autonomous special regions Structure of administrative divisions in the PRC the in divisions of administrative Structure autono- 61 . Hence, one of the fundamental aims of of aims fundamental the Hence,. of one 1½ 2½ 5 Local committees Units outsidetheformaldivision Sub-prefectural level Sub-provincial level counties with counties prefectural rights and law authorities, but with independency in areas of economy prefecture-level cities under direct control of provincial ------51 OSW REPORT 4/2020 52 OSW REPORT 4/2020 making, budgetary expenditures, and managing the state-owned enterprises state-owned the managing and expenditures, budgetary ‑making, ‘reform andopening-up’. It didnot,however, completely eliminatethetensions The local authorities in China have considerable autonomy in terms of law of terms in autonomy considerable have China in authorities The local 62 1.3.1. In addition, the Party structures penetrate society deeper than those of the In addition, the Party structures penetrate society deeper than those of thecentrifugalforces autonomy, associatedwithregional In thefaceof the including significant reforms, is formulated through a set of general objec of set a through is formulated reforms, significant including conditions. local to reforms adapting in structures Party the structures, state PRC the CCP.Like the of structure ised tives: themethodsfor implementing themandthedetailedregulationsare competence the greatest China’s growth andflexibility post-1978reforms,tion of ensuring highratesof arecounteredby organisationalsolutions ticularisms withintheParty itself par regional and forces hierarchy.Centrifugal Party the of levels higher the c. 10 million the of majority The vast assemblies. residents’ of means by tion through theprefectures andcounties, down tothelocalmunicipalcommittees. political cohesion of Chinaisprimarily basedonthehierarchicalandcentral political cohesionof passed in Beijing). As a rule, the content of the regulations devised in Beijing, in devised regulations the of content the a rule, Beijing).As in passed laws created in Beijing to local conditions, including the development of their developmentof the including conditions, local to Beijing in created laws local cadres. Thissystem allowed theCCPtomaintaincohesionduringpolitical local representative andexecutive bodies, whose membersaresubordinate to the over control Party direct for allows CCP. This the to belong officials local between the centre and the provinces within the Party.the within provinces the and centre the between government, theprovinces theauthorities atthelevel andmajorcitieshave of One of the foundations of the so-called ‘reform and opening-up’ period ( opening-up’period and ‘reform so-called the of foundations the of One kaifang and personnel policies of theCCP’sCentralCommittee, intendedtocontrolthe and personnelpoliciesof and social development to the level of the local authorities. Of the four tiers of of tiers four the Of authorities. local the levelof the developmentto social and responsibilityfor economic away fromcentralplanningandthetransfer of sector. These ‘systemic flexibility’ in the political system became the founda the became system political the in flexibility’ ‘systemic These sector. popula the manage which committees Party local of a network creating state, extend down government, throughthefour levels fromtheprovincial of level, own regulations (unlessthey to the constitution and the laws are contrary of period decentralisation significant the during unity maintain and crises,

These powers are wielded by provinces, autonomous regions, cities with provincial rights, provincial provincial rights, provincial with cities regions, autonomous provinces, by wielded are powers These capitals, and other cities selected by the State Council. State the by selected cities other and capitals,

The extent of the local authorities’ autonomyauthorities’ local the of The extent ), initiated in the late 1970s by Deng Xiaoping, was a progressive move a progressive was Xiaoping, Deng by late 1970s the in initiated ), 62 ; they have a great deal of flexibility in adapting the adapting in flexibility of deal havea great they ; gaige ­ - - - - - (around US$2.3 trillion), while the central government’s spending amounted spending government’s central the while US$2.3 trillion), (around The broad influence that the local CCP cadres have over the economy stems economy the over have cadres CCP local the that influence The broad 65 64 63 ible. For example, the type and amount of contributions to social insurance, social to contributions of amount and type the example, For ible. the financing and establishing for things, other among responsible, are ities mally belongs to the local provincial or municipal structures. Through formal Through structures. municipal or provincial local the to belongs mally ties arecommercially involved, amongothers, inmanufacturing, themining Chinese of 50% around cooperatives,for or responsible authorities are local to the provinces. well as granted, benefits tax of amount the and collected taxes of types the expenditure) public total of (15% yuan 3 trillion around only to yuan 16.4 trillion around to amounted expenditure total authorities’ local the thorities atalladministrative levels adopttheirown budgets,Au which aresup China. in expenditure public all of 85% around up make expenses their them. below level the le fo lcl ae, rnfr fo Biig ad te sources other and Beijing, from transfers taxes, local from plied planning. Due to provincial autonomy and local adaptation practices, regional regional practices, adaptation local and provincialautonomy to Due planning. from theircontrolover thepowerful state-owned enterprisessector, which for housing, transportation,publicsafety, and agriculture andthedevelopment of bank assets). They also control land sales, which in China belongs to the state the to belongs China in which sales, land control also assets).They bank China’s localgovernments inChina,and thepublicservices provide mostof and have the right to overturn decisions taken by the People’s Congresses at Congresses People’s the by taken decisions overturn to right the have and and prefectures alsoformulate theirown plansfor economicdevelopment, and is only leased to its users. Local authorities (at the provincial, prefectural, provincial, the (at authorities Local users. its to leased only is and and informal ties, they influencethebankingsector(localbanks, which belong among significantly vary may education, concerning regulations detailed as sector, entertainment, construction, services, etc. construction, entertainment, sector, authori The local services. public providing beyond far goes which of scope county or township levels) own around 100,000 state-owned enterprises, the enterprises, 100,000state-owned around own levels) township or county discern are sectors policy many public in solutions systemic the in differences infrastructure, education system, healthandsocialcare, theconstructionof governments The provincial Congresses. People’sprovincial the bydeveloped

The entire state sector (including c. 100 businesses controlled by the central government, which which government, central the by controlled c. 100 businesses (including sector state The entire 2017 nianjian tongji Zhongguo These include sales of land (which, depending on the province makes up between 30% and even 50% Tao Sun, Sun, Tao of the local governments’ revenues), and income from the monopoly on salt production. See Yinqu , Markets Over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China in Business Private of The Rise Mao: Over Markets Paper, October 2013, www.imf.org. 2013, October Paper, manage c. 50,000 companies) is responsible for c. 20% of Chinese industrial production. See N. Lardy, ‘Local Government Financing Platforms in China: A Fortune or Misfortune?’ , www.stats.gov.cn. , , PIIE 2014. , 65 Inaddition,they directly 64 . Local author Local . , IMF Working IMF Working , 63 I 2017 In . ------53 OSW REPORT 4/2020 54 OSW REPORT 4/2020 ‘reform and opening-up’period. and ‘reform vate resourcestoprovide the extra-budgetary financing for thedevelopment of 68 67 66 in ordertostimulatetheinvestment boom which hasbeenongoing sincethe infrastructure early 1980s, and has been the foundation of China’s economic growth in the in growth economic China’s of foundation the been has and early 1980s, pri sector,extensive mobilising institutions the financial control indirectly or

At the end of the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of China’sre of architect chief the Xiaoping, Deng the 1970s, of end the At which was directly related to the control of loans by local cadres which was directly related to the control of 28% reached had mid-1989 by which were mostfrequently haltedby short-terminterventions by themore were hostile towards market changes. To this end, Deng appealed to local Beijing’s lack of control over monetary policy contributed to one of the of one to contributed policy monetary over control of lack Beijing’s Party cadresinChina’s traditionally moreliberal southernprovinces by The partial in spring 1989. One of the main demands of the protesting workers and workers protesting the of demands main the of One 1989. spring in pro SquareTiananmen the China: in rule CCP’s the of crises serious most rival ) Chinese the in cells Party local the 1980s, In zones. economic special in tests in Beijing and a number of smaller demonstrations in Chinese cities Chinese in demonstrations smaller of a number and Beijing in tests which inflation, rising rapidly of periods several to led decade next the currency.the local issuance of credit This overuncontrolled expansion of provinces alsogained urban residents who supported the student protests was to halt inflation, halt to was protests student the supported who residents urban from state banks, but also the possibility to put pressure on the local the on pressure put to possibility the also but banks, state from forms, sought allies against the left-wing hardliners within the CCP who branches of the People’s Bank of China (the central the bank),People’s Bank of branches and of influence of loans. of conservative central bureaucracy (which was then run by Deng’s chief including growth, economic local stimulate to tools the them offering For more about China’s monetary policy during this period see V. Shih, Ibid. Shih, V. see period this during policy monetary China’s about more For im a particularly played (LGFV), Vehicles Financing Government Local called institutions, These Chinese central government, which is concerned about the solvency of local authorities. local of solvency the about concerned is which government, central Chinese a n i h ­C governments to bypass budgetary constraints. This sector is gradually being dismantled by the the by dismantled being gradually is sector This constraints. budgetary bypass to governments portant role in the programme to stimulate the economy after the crisis of 2009, by allowing local local allowing by of 2009, crisis the after economy the stimulate to programme the in role portant …, op. cit. op. 66 re-centralisation . Local authorities have been able to use these vast resources vast these use to able been have authorities Local . 67 , and by Beijing taking direct control over the allocation de facto control over not just the allocation of loans controlover notjusttheallocationof of

economic per annum per policy , and to fight corruption, fight to and , after Factions and Finance in in Finance and Factions 1989 68 . - - - - (desired by Beijing) of strong economic competition between the provinces, the between competition economic strong of Beijing) by (desired The CCP exercises control over local state apparatus in a similar manner to manner a similar in apparatus state local over control exercises The CCP au local strengthening between a choice is CCP the facing dilemma The basic 69 ward for their good economic results. On the other hand, the transfer of pow of transfer the hand, other the On results. economic good their for ward 1.3.2. Beijing across the country. Another effect of decentralisation was the revival the was decentralisation of effect country.Another the across Beijing river, sensing the stones with one’s feet’ ( the state at the local level, allowingin the management of for experimentation rising debt. As Chinese society’s contact with the Party primarily comes via the torial division, controlling thelocalPeople’s Congresses, localadministration, terri Chinese the of level every at operate structures Party level. central the resourcesfor politicalpurposes(theconstructionof the unsustainable useof lo over control central of terms (i.e. in object regularly cadres local which to ‘crossing themethodpromotedby the DengXiaopingof the implementationof tonomy, which stimulateseconomicgrowth, andthepoliticalsocialcosts patron­‑client networks, or stimulating GDP to achieve promotions) and rapidly local cadres, this causes political problems and local protests. local and problems political causes this cadres, local and the adjustment of development tostrategies local conditions.and the adjustment of This enabled cal budgets), corruption resulting from the control of economicresources,cal budgets), or corruption resulting from the controlof reforms ers to local authorities raises problems with the implementation of a re as promotion expected who cadres CCP local of ambitions the by driven experiments, withthemostsuccessful reforming solutionstobedeployed by freedom a certain provides Decentralisation cadres. local to control ceding of

Among other moves, he introduced reforms centralising the issuance of of issuance the centralising reforms moves,introduced other he Among in changes and June 1989 in protests the of suppression brutal the After tral government; strengthened the Beijing-managed state-owned banks’state-owned Beijing-managed the government;strengthened tral 1993 from affairs economic for responsible was who bureaucracy tral economic of centralisation CCP,a selective the of management the top privatisation of a large part of the state-owned enterprises run by local by run enterprises state-owned the of part of a large privatisation cen the of a member Rongji, Zhu Premier by implemented was policy authorities. control over theirlocalrepresentatives; andalsoarranged the cen the to revenue tax the of portion a significant redirected currency; Vice-Premier in 1993–8 and Premier in 1998–2003. Premier and in 1993–8 Vice-Premier

Party control over administration local Party mo zhe shitou guohe shitou zhe mo ), allowing local de facto de 69 - - .

- - - - - 55 OSW REPORT 4/2020 56 OSW REPORT 4/2020 As a result, at every level of local government, real power is exercised by the by exercised is power real government, local of levelevery at a result, As lo of a system by exercised is state the in authority formal level, local the At 72 71 70 However, therealpower restsintheCCP’slocalstructures, which exist atevery merely facades. All the important political decisions in the local congresses are section 1.3.2).see details (for regulations implementing local plans for development, adopting budgets and creating local prosecutors’ and courts local of chairmen as well as cities, etc.), for mayors the state structures often has no executive power, which belongs to someone to belongs power, executive which no has often structures state the secretary.Party the of hands the in powerrests real and tion, organisa every in operates cell A CCP companies, etc. state-owned the courts, for the city, the mayor etc. In practice, the governor is usually someone who someone usually is governor the practice, In mayor etc. city,the the for the whom to level, given the at structures Party CCP’s the of secretary first heads of administration at the respective levels (e.g. governors for provinces, for (e.g. governors levelsrespective the at administration of heads Sometimes the governor is a person tipped to assume the post of provincial of post the assume to tipped a person is governor the Sometimes administrative level. Just asatthecentrallevel, themechanismsfor bottom-up elect also congresses These section 1.2.2). (see procedures democratic of ance appear an giving levels, higher to lower from delegates sending of a system and operate similarly to the NPC at a lower level, the orperhapseven completely outsidetheformal structureof secretary.the of activities the oversee to is role their CCP; the to belongs also secretary, with the position intended to give him a chance to learn about the about learn to a chance him give to intended position the secretary,with selection andexercising power inthelocalPeople’s aretherefore Congresses of administrative division (provincial,of prefectural, county and municipal), levels all at operate These Congresses. People’s local the bodies, elective cal corresponding state official is subordinate: for the province, the governor; the province, for is subordinate: official state corresponding controlled by localgovernments ofcompanies the boards and posts office of filling the and budgets, draft of thePeople’s Congresses, theacceptance listsfor theelectionof composition of and involve Congresses People’s up drawing of competencies The core offices. arcana facto de

The exceptions are the autonomous regions, where the secretary is always and a na and Chinese Han always is secretary the where regions, autonomous the are The exceptions local lowest the at procedures ofdemocratic use the with experimented has CCP the years, recent In work and committees standing own their appoint upwards) level township (from assemblies Local level, but the authorities have now given up this idea. See Annex 1. See idea. this up given now have authorities the but level, in five-year terms of office linked to the terms of the NPC. the of terms the to linked office of terms five-year in tive becomes governor, but only acts as a figurehead. as acts only but governor, becomes tive of power of taken by CCP Committees at the appropriate levels. This includes the includes This levels. appropriate the at CCP Committees by taken 72 . That is why a person holding an administrative position in position administrative an holding a person why is That . 71 70 . . Formally, their membership is selected by selected is Formally,membership . their - - - - The supervisory role of thelocalCCPcellsover thestatestructuresatany roleof givenThe supervisory institution – but who is placed higher in the Party hierarchy. The situation in hierarchy. Party The situation the in higher placed is who but institution – the provinces in China. in provinces the the at control social for a tool Beijing gives this affairs; of state formal the to the realpower inlocalstatestructuresrunsfromtoptobottom,contrast similar,is tration theyas always bydirected cells CCP contain secretary.the In the institutionsandstate-owned companiescontrolledby thelocaladminis policy, regulations, andtheday-to-day the thepreparationof management of local resources to the structures of the CCP means that it is they – and not the not and they – is it that means CCP the of structures the to resources local local level, andalsoprevents politically dangerous localvested interestsfrom level meansthattheCCP’scentreisabletoindirectly controllocalpersonnel Chart 4. state authorities – which are the main arena of tension between the centreand state authorities –which arethemainarenaof level,local the provincialat the state from level areas. urban Thus and rural to secretary. some cases, Party anexecutive statepositioniscombinedwiththeof developing. At the same time, transferring political decisions and control overcontrol and decisions political developing.transferring time, same At the Real flowof power Precincts orvillageCommittee Central CommitteeoftheCCP Prefectural CCPCommittee Provincial CCPCommittee Township CCPCommittee County CCPCommittee The CCP’s institutional structure – local level local structure – The CCP’s institutional PARTY Formal flow of power Prefectural People’s Congress Provincial People’s Congress Township People’s Congress National People's Congress County People’s Congress STATE - 57 OSW REPORT 4/2020 58 OSW REPORT 4/2020 73 The main tool of the Party centre’s day-to-day control of the local members is members local the of day-to-daycentre’sPartycontrol the of tool The main 1.3.3. Party cells Party authoritiesdonotexercise sovereignty over localstructures, they have and isambiguous, operate authorities local the how on influence Beijing’s not directly involved the state and Party in determining the composition of humanresourcesattheprovincial levelmally controlsthemanagement of levels.recommendations for appointments and salary Within the framework of and Beijing between tensions the Thus regions. the in bases political manent the Beijing-based Organisational Department of the Central Committee for Committee Central the of Department Organisational Beijing-based the the ‘one-level-down management’ ( rules complex includes This evaluation. and management cadre of system the con Party level local via delegates selecting for a system on based top, to tom personnelevaluation, discipline, ideological andanti­‑the system of corruption provinces. prefectural level for counties, etc. The Party bureaucracy in Beijing is therefore for periodic assessments of CCP members, which among other things affect things other among which members, CCP of assessments periodic for the country,ferent partsof which prevents localcadresfrombuildingupper local governments frequently relate to administrative competences and the leadership tocontrollocalcadresstemsdirectly fromtheactualpoliticalpow Similar to the state structures, power in the CCP also formally flows from bot from flows formally also CCP the powerin structures, state the to Similar before the CCP local congresses convene, the list of delegatesissetbybefore convene, theCCPlocalcongresses senior thelistof gresses, startingfromthelocallevel (villages or a broad range of tools to exercise both direct and indirect influence, including including influence, indirect and direct both exercise to tools of range a broad aged by higher-level CCPcommittees:theprovincial level for prefectures, the send delegates to the central National Congress of the CCP. In fact, however,fact, CCP. In the of Congress National central the to delegates send er of the supreme leadership within the Party. Although formally the central the formallyParty. Although the within leadership supreme the of er Beijing the of CCP.The ability the within dynamics internal the on depends only (secretaries, governors, their deputies). Cadres at other levels are man are levels other at Cadres deputies). governors,their (secretaries, only county andprefectural Congresses, uptotheprovincial assemblies, which then resources, individual withoutany strugglefor theautonomydistribution of of dif between cadres rotating of system the is control for tool The key drives.

Over the past 20 years, some elements of competition have been introduced to voting in the CCP, by by CCP, the in voting to introduced been have competition of elements some 20 years, past the Over placing c. 10–15% more candidates than there are seats on the lists. This theoretically allows some of of some allows theoretically This lists. the on seats are there than candidates more c. 10–15% placing rule is broken by political interventions from influential CCP members. See T. Wright, T. Wright, See members. CCP influential from interventions political by broken is rule the least popular candidates to be removed during the electoral process. In practice, however, this this however, practice, In process. electoral the during removed be to candidates popular least the State in Post-Mao China Post-Mao in State

Relations between the centre and the provinces within the CCP the provinces within the centreand Relations between the 73 . , Cambridge 2015. Cambridge , xiaguan yiji xiaguan ) principle adopted in the 1980s,in adopted principle ) shequ ), throughthetownship, Party and Party ------74 The CCP’s centre also has tools for emergency intervention in local personnel local in intervention emergency for tools has also centre The CCP’s which is carried out through the regular training of local cadres. In sectoral In cadres. local of training regular the through out carried is which Beijing has great informal control over the CCP structures below the provin the below structures CCP the over control informal great has Beijing main objectives.main evaluation the for guidelines official the of formulation the through regions, level.provincial the at structures CCP’s the to ity representative bodiesbelow theprovincial author level, leaving dealof a great tions of conflict, if there is the political will. political the is there if conflict, of tions mech Such CC CCP. the of Inspection Discipline for Commission Central the customs, (e.g. taxation, bodies local the integrate vertically which tion 1.1.4) partment of the Central Committee has a long-term influence on policy in the in policy on influence a long-term has Committee Central the of partment used to discipline them is accusations of corruptionanddemotionorarrestby used todisciplinethemisaccusationsof the by audit an of a result as mismanagement alleging byexample, for policy; policy, the tool for controlling local structures is the systems ( by the Beijing-controlled process of ideological indoctrination (see section 1.1.5), ideological by the Beijing-controlled process of anisms mean that Beijing has the ability to impose its own decisions in situa in decisions own its impose to ability the has Beijing that mean anisms centre, which discredits local cadres. One of the instruments most commonly most instruments the of One cadres. local discredits which centre, environmental protection) withtheircentralcounterparts, which decidethe playedis personnel local of control the in role implement. A further to obliged personnel,theirtrainingandmonitoring,which itslocalcounterpartsare of cial level, includingtheprefectures andmunicipalities. The OrganisationalDe

The senior cadres at the provincial level (secretaries, governors and their governorslevel(secretaries,provincialand the at cadres The senior vested ical importance of thelocalparticularitiesexisting in China,which could ical importanceof the powers of local secretaries,the powers as well as to prevent of them from building up of 96% around 1995–2002 years the in example, for lower-levelcadres; to potentially be reinforced if localauthoritiesarepermittedlarge amounts potentially bereinforced if prefectural secretaries were shifted to other regions local support bases. Rotation is the main mechanism for reducing the polit by the CC CCP. the Organisational Department of This practice also applies of autonomy. of deputies) are rotated between the Chinese provinces, a process carried out Staff Chae-ho Chong, Chong, Chae-ho p. 27.

rotation interests Centrifugal Empire: Central-Local Relations in China in Relations Central-Local Empire: Centrifugal and preventing the growth of

regional , Columbia University Press 2016, 2016, Press University Columbia , 74 . This is done to limit

xitong , see sec ------59 OSW REPORT 4/2020 60 OSW REPORT 4/2020 making body. The importance of patron-client networks focused around the around focused networks patron-client of body.The importance ‑making 75 They have both very (they theregions broad competences inmanaging can Beijing’s control over local cadres is limited by the latter’s own political po political own latter’s the by limited is cadres local over control Beijing’s jing, but they play a very important role in the day-to-day management of the day-to-daythe of managementin role important a very playthey but jing, rank) is equal to that of ministers in the central governmentcentral the in ministers of that to equal is rank) the exact form of the reforms implemented, and the quality of public services publicservices thereforms implemented,andthequalityof the exact form of espe Beijing, in struggles factional in crucial is support their obtaining that levelprovincialadministrativeand units, richest) (i.e. the important most the position. strong a particularly hold secretaries Party provinciallevels, tivethe policy within the CCP’s central structures. Their formal position (bureaucratic (bureaucratic position formal Their structures. central CCP’s the within policy personnel changes at the top, and the implementation of key reforms).key of implementation the and top, the at changes personnel means section 1.1.3) (see struggles factional CCP’s the in secretaries provincial fluence the political process in Beijing. Among the cadres at all administra all at cadres the Among Beijing. in process political the fluence knowledge of local conditions and the economic situation – facts which are which facts situation – economic the and conditions local of knowledge Cadres at the lower administrative levels do not have direct influence on Bei on influence direct have not do levels administrativelower the at Cadres all depend on the involvement of local officials. These same people also have also people same These officials. local involvementof the on depend all the Central Committee, the Party’s highest decision also sit in the Politburo of current over influence much level),and prefectural the at secretaries appoint state and the economy. The effectiveness of sectoral policies, the speed and speed the policies, sectoral of economy.The effectiveness the and state usually Annex 1), (see rights prefectural with towns in those also sometimes the on influence their as well as structures, central Party’s the within sition often inaccessible to Beijing. to inaccessible often (including CCP the within moments decision-making key the during cially in to able themselves are they a result, As state. the of running day-to-day

(such as mayoras (such governor),or successiveat secretary a CCP becoming then The traditional path of promotion for CCP members assigned to work in work to assigned members CCP for promotion of path The traditional would be unable to build a political base for himself anyway. himself for base a political build to unable be would positions state involvestaking agencies)government central the within mainly occur in the autonomous regions, where a ‘non-local’ Han Chinese than five (occasionally a maximum of ten) years; exceptions to this rule this to exceptions years; ten) of a maximum (occasionally five than the provinces (asdistinct,for example, fromthetechnocratsadvancing levels of local government (cities, prefectures, provinces) – each in differ in each governmentprovinces) – prefectures,(cities,local levelsof ent regions of China. Terms of office in a given place do not last longer last not do place a given in office of Terms China. of regions ent This means, among other things, that ministers cannot issue binding orders to them. to orders binding issue cannot ministers that things, other among means, This 75 . Secretaries of of Secretaries . ------­ vention in the economy. One phenomenon noted over the last few decades is decades few last the over noted phenomenon economy.One the in vention 77 76 The main reasons for the tension between the centre and local cadres, then, cadres, local and centre the between tension the for reasons The main local CCP cadres stems from the autonomy transferred The political strength of which are inconsistent with the spirit of Beijing’s instructions. For example, For instructions. Beijing’s of spirit the with inconsistent are which Beijing is often based on their patron-client networks and support in the prov the in networkssupport and patron-client their on based often is Beijing accumulate to opportunities fewerhave will they believe they where Beijing, inces, which allows the local cadres – especially at the provincial level – to lob to level –provincial the at especially cadres – local allowsthe which inces, networks, interest their gains.make in therefore financial to personal and It is institutions financial local supervising regulations, own their implementing tary Hu Jintao (2002–2012), factions and interest groups present in the CCP’s the in present groups interest and factions (2002–2012), Hu Jintao tary centralisation and decentralisation – are thus primarily the dependent cycles of thedebtsrunupby localauthorities, who regularly avoidthe truescaleof supervision. thorough their own assets, andwhere atthesametimethey willbesubject tomore that many provincial cadreschoosetoavoid any promotiontothecentre, to inter state of degree a high as well as autonomy local broad both maintain to to builduptheirpositionintheCCP, by expanding theirown patron-client tive government, thecourts, government agencies, security and law andorder to thelocalstatestructuresthey control,which gives themthepossibilityof lies in preventing the provinces from building new coal power blocks, which blocks,power coal new building from provinces the preventing in lies by against or block unfavourable policies. Lower-level executives have ample Lower-levelhaveexecutivespolicies. unfavourable block or against by Changes to the and state enterprises, as well as exercising sovereignty over the local execu and the political power of the local cadres. In the case of relatively weak lead weakrelatively of case the In cadres. local the of power political the and assess to attempts its is Finance of Ministry Chinese forthe problem a chronic in cadres CCP’s the of The power authorities. local the to unfavourable are which solutions impose to attempts its and efforts centralising Beijing’s are stimulates local GDP local stimulates problem the policy,where energy is example Another data. reliable sharing structures, etc. (seesection 1.1.7) ership at the top of the CCP, as was the case during the term of General Secre General of term the during case CCP,the the was as of top the at ership Beijing, in leaders the Party, the within powerdynamicsof the political the on opportunities for obstruction,tofalsifystatistics, ordevise localregulations

For more see see more For provin the at units administrative those in cadres of position the strengthens particularly This cial level which have the biggest economies, such as , , Jiangsu, Shanghai and and Shanghai Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, as such economies, biggest the have which level cial . economic reform process’ reform economic JakubJakóbowski status quo 77 . , OSW Commentary between Beijing and the provinces – as expressed in expressed as provinces – the and Beijing between , ‘Green economy or coal ‘counter-revolution’? Challenges to China’s China’s to Challenges ‘counter-revolution’? coal or economy ‘Green 76 . Access tolocalresourcesallows localcadres , no. 220, 29 July 2016, www.osw.waw.pl. 29 July 2016, no. 220, , ------61 OSW REPORT 4/2020 62 OSW REPORT 4/2020 block any reforms which were unfavourable for themselves. Ontheotherhand, government – opens the way to both changes in the competence and degree of of degree and competence the in changes both wayto government –the opens Central Committee (based on alliances of local cadres) were able to effectivelyto able were cadres) local of alliances on (based Committee Central autonomy enjoyed by the local authorities, and to the subordination greater Xi Jinping’s of term second the in visible currently as leadership – a strong of the local cadres to the central Party structures. Party central the to cadres local of the Xi’s policy explicitly refers to the foundations of the PRC,which was created Xi’s policyexplicitly refers tothefoundations of At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the Chinese Communist Party faced Party Communist Chinese century, the twenty-first the of dawn the At veterans – presented the Party with a vision of a conservative turn within the within turn a conservative of a vision with Party the presented veterans – The essence of Xi Jinping’sconservative turnisto bringabouttheinnerrenew The essence of revolution internal the then and selection, Xi Jinping’s of The circumstances 18 the during CCP the of Secretary General as Xi Jinping of The choice which was torpedoed by bureaucratic inertia and the opposition of internal which was torpedoed by bureaucratic inertia and the opposition of PRC, aimed at renewing the foundations of the CCP’s absolute rule in China. in rule absolute CCP’s the of foundations the renewing at aimed PRC, mentally friendly model of economicgrowth, somethingwhich hadalready mentally friendly modelof in groups influential most the and elders Party the on dependent is he as run, long the in rule absolute Xi Jinping’s to limit a fundamental puts also mandate consensusat a deep of part as seen Partybe the should in conducted, whichhe power,taking Xi Jinping – 1989.Upon since China in rule CCP of history the in in 1949 according to the Leninist-Stalinist model of the Party-state.the field the In of model Leninist-Stalinist the to according in 1949 China. powerin maintaining goal – absolute overridingand mental, achieving theParty’s funda menting changes became an essential means of elites CCP the Moreover,groups.among growinterest to convictionbegan the that the ‘window of strategic opportunities’inwhich strategic Chinacouldgrow,that the‘window of taking power.to him brought who Party the CCP.the in one powerof its top placed of the elite hands The Party’stop the in ap an of backdrop the against place took in 2012 CCP the of Congress tional parent politicalcrisisinChina,andbecamethemostimportantturningpoint urgent need for fundamental change towards a more sustainable and environ and sustainable towardsa more change fundamental for need urgent XI JINPING’S 2. been evident during the reign of Hu Jintao and (2002–2012), but (2002–2012), JiabaoWen and Hu Jintao of reign the during evident been a strong personality, and also the son of one of the most distinguished Party distinguished most the of one of son the also personality,and a strong al of the Party and to affirm its sovereignty over the state institutions, while institutions, state the over sovereignty its affirm to and Party the of al the stable international environment advantagewithout antagonising the of challenges,political severeincluding the among conflict factional of a number simultaneously restoring the importance of the Party’s ideology,simultaneously restoring the importance of increasing supreme leadership, risingsocialunrest,andfraudcorruptionamonglocal of socio-political management, Xi has openly drawn upon Stalinist concepts, Stalinist upon drawn openly Xi has management, socio-political of character: a conservative have does programme the respect, this In cadres. control over society, the and conducting an internal ‘revolutionary’ purge of view,imple of point CCP’s the From closing. now was countries, developed cadres, which allunderminedtheParty’s sociallegitimacy. Chinaalsofacedan However,China. in rule continued CCP’s same secure that to order in dividual CONSERVATIVE TURN th Na ------63 OSW REPORT 4/2020 64 OSW REPORT 4/2020 ‑ Xi Jinping’s programme is neoconservative by nature: the implementation of of implementation the nature: by neoconservative is programme Xi Jinping’s 79 78 wider world. Since coming to power, Xi has presented the Party with an am an with Party the presented power,Xi has to coming Since world. wider maintenance of the economic model developed in China after 1978, in which in 1978, after China in developed model economic the of maintenance the PRC’s inhabitants and the Party cadres (see sec individual behaviour of the shape to data big and intelligence artificial of use the including nologies, toincreasecontroloveris trying societyby usingmoderninformation tech leadership CCP’s the Instead, minorities). religious (including groups narrow of cult (e) the life; cultural and intellectual of shaping and (d) control isation; central (c) bureaucratic repression; of use the with and ministrativemethods a bureaucracy and apparatus security bythe joined elite,narrowParty i.e. the the Party moved away from autarky and central planning of the economy in economy the of planning central and autarky from awaymoved Party the the is model Stalinist the from departure significant The second tion 3.3.1). social of tools modern of means by achieved is concepts Stalinist classic the ad by implemented differences, religious and ethnic despite population the personality. All these elements are to be found on the political agenda of the of agenda political the on found be to are elements these personality.All favour of competition, market mechanisms and a partial opening-up to the to opening-up a partial and mechanisms market competition, of favour bitious agenda of economic reforms based on deepening the use of market of use the deepening on based reforms economic of agenda bitious theso-calledcore leadership,been characterisedby thereinforcement of globalised economy. The fundamental difference of Xi’s programme with re with programme Xi’s of difference economy.The fundamental globalised CCP’s currentleadership although in a somewhat selective way which does not include mass country mass include not does which way selective a somewhat in although spect to the Stalinist model is the limitation of direct repression to relatively to repression direct of limitation the is model Stalinist the to spect soci of control and indoctrination permanent (a) the are: management social ety through manipulation and coercion; (b) the strive for uniformity among uniformity for strive (b) the coercion; and manipulation through ety of model Stalinist the of elements Important fashion. a military in disciplined control, andtheCCP’sleadershipisalsoattemptingtoadaptitmodern wide terror or the central planning of theeconomy wide terrororthecentralplanningof

war ‑war See S. Fitzpatrick, S. Fitzpatrick, See devel were government of principles seven so-called the the 1940s, of end the at Union Soviet the In Oxford 2000; D. Priestland, D. Priestland, 2000; Oxford of the Party and Marxism-Leninism; (2) the Party’s right to control; (3) one-man rule strengthens strengthens rule (3) one-man control; to right Party’s primacy (2) the (1) the were: They Marxism-Leninism; fifties. and the in Party PRC the of the of construction the underlie to came these oped; and reinvention and p. 44. With some modifications, these seven principles have formed the basis of Xi Jinping’s neocon Xi Jinping’s of basis the formed have principles seven these modifications, some With p. 44. ensuring greater business efficiency. business greater ensuring specific in companies state of a monopoly as China today’s in understood is production of division accounting. See D.A. Kaple, D.A. Kaple, See accounting. linist Society Society linist through trade unions and youth organisations; (6) the territorial division of production; (7) the cost cost (7) the production; of division territorial (6) the organisations; youth and unions citizens trade and employees of through involvement (5) the centralism; (4) democratic Party; the of authority the sectors of the economy; and the cost accounting has been expanded to include market mechanisms mechanisms market include to expanded been has accounting cost the and economy; the of sectors territorial the rules: two last the to relation in found be can differences The biggest turn. servative , Oxford 2007; S. Fitzpatrick (ed.), S. Fitzpatrick 2007; Oxford , 1928–1953 , London 2006. London , Everyday Stalinism Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s in Russia Soviet Times: Extraordinary in Life Ordinary Stalinism Everyday , Oxford 2011; J. Fürst (ed.), J. Fürst 2011; Oxford , Dream of A Red Factory. The Legacy of High Stalinism in China in Stalinism High of The Legacy Factory. A Red of Dream Stalinism and The Politics of Mobilization. Ideas, Power, and Terror in Inter in Terror and Power, Ideas, Mobilization. of The Politics and Stalinism 79 . Stalinism.NewDirections Late Stalinist Russia. Society between reconstruction reconstruction between Society Russia. Stalinist Late 78 . Xi’s governments havegovernments Xi’s . , London 2000; M. Edele, M. Edele, 2000; London , , Oxford 1994, 1994, Oxford , Sta - - - - - ­ - - - - ­ - , Xi Jinping’s rule. Xi Jinping’s 40 years started to run dry, the fundamental task which the Party demanded Party the which task fundamental dry,the run to started 40 years As the sources of the growth which drove the Chinese economy for nearly for economy Chinese the drove which growth the of sources the As velopment of innovation. The contradiction between the progressive increase progressive the between innovation.The contradiction of velopment The basic tool of the conservative turn taken by Xi Jinping has been the con the been has Xi Jinping by taken turn conservative the of tool The basic which had hitherto belonged to the state. The changes in the functioning of of functioning the in The changes state. the to belonged hitherto had which However, his early thought on economic reform, with the attempt to reduce to attempt the with reform, economic on thought early However,his decades. for seen not manner a in provinces, the of expense the at Beijing 2.1.1. Challenges 2.1. in both Party and state structures, as well as the centralisation of powerin bothParty andstatestructures, aswell in asthecentralisationof mechanisms, which to ensureis designed continued modernisation and the de ingly evident desire to strengthen the CCP’s position. This, together with the with together This, position. CCP’s the strengthen to desire evident ingly role for the state in the economy, opened up a political conflict within the CCP’s the state’s burden on the economy, is in direct contradiction with the increas have 2012 since implemented been have which structures state and Party the new competences tration, aswell asthe transfer totheParty bureaucracyof thePRC,statestructureshave beenrestructured of times inthehistory many happened has As authorities. local the and governmentbureaucracy the tions, by meansincludingthelargest inthehistory anti-corruptioncampaign led to the partial revision of the post-1978 political system, although they havethey although system, political post-1978 the of revision partial the to led territorialadminis someministries, thevertical of integration liquidation of ic tkn pwr X hs agnlsd r rkn p optn Pry fac Party competing up broken or marginalised has Xi power, taking Since based on market mechanisms is one of the most important challenges facing challenges important most the of one is mechanisms market on based and adapted to the new dynamics of powerand adaptedtothenew inthePRC,includingthrough dynamics of state created in 1949. created state Leninist the of framework flexible and broad the within place taking been still on reform, and became one of the driving forces of the ‘conservative turn’.‘conservative the of forces driving the of one became and reform, on theXi Jinping’s thought cadres’ vested interestsgroups. Thislay atthebasisof a reduced assumed initially which in 2013, presented he prescription the of However,model. implementation economic the PRC’s the change to was Xi of of powers the reducing centre, decision-making Party’s the in located cells part thestateandreformtransfer processtospecialised thecurrentmanagement of to of able been has he means informal and formal By PRC. the of with circle, his and Secretary General the of hands the powerin of centration overcontrol political develop to desire the and economysociety a globalised of

Economic reforms and the new growth model Economic new growth the and reforms for the Party and the selection of Xi Jinping ------65 OSW REPORT 4/2020 66 OSW REPORT 4/2020 When submitting his report on the government’s activity totheNPC valued rate. This created room for growth in the export sector (the second (the sector export the in growth for room created This rate. valued 80 wages anddomesticconsumption (which for many years hadrisenmoreslow Following the example of the so-called ‘Asian tigers’ and the experiences of of experiences the and ‘Asiantigers’ so-called the of example the Following market and urban development. The Chinese state-owned enterprises sector enterprises state-owned The Chinese development. urban and market industry,invest ininfrastructure, theproductioncapacityof andthehousing success spectacular the economy.Despite the in role dominant state’s the ing otherEast Asian countries;andthegradual model, similartotheexperience of years.recent the national banking system, and then using the capital thus accumulated to accumulated thus capital the using then and system, banking national the post-war Japan, after 1978 China based its economic growth on ramping up ramping on growth economic its based China 1978 after Japan, post-war economicreforms in thevestedpower interests, of ledtothestagnation of pillar alongside investment growth), which was dominatedby private Chinese millions employing hundreds of unlimited capital, as well as the possibility of for years the Chinese government pegged the yuan to the dollar at an under ly than GDP), institutionally forcing Chinese citizens to store their savings in savings their store to citizens Chinese forcing institutionally GDP), than ly the China’sgrowthand to economic threat further a serious poses it that large ginning of thetwenty-first thismodelbeganto exhaust itself. century A broad of ginning China’s economic growth after 1978 was based on two parallel major processes major two parallel on China’s based was 1978 growthafter economic and unsustainable”. The scale of the growing economic challenges is still so still is challenges economic growing the of unsustainable”.The scale and and a privileged part of the private sector received access to cheap, almost cheap, to access received sector private the of part a privileged and of suppression the was model the of The essence investmentboom. a massive scribed the Chinese growth model as “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated Wen Premier then the by 2007 in expressed was growth of sources maintain while property private and mechanisms market of strengthening export- andinvestment-led bysupervised growth theCCP: theintroductionof of both approaches, which led to China’sof transformation from an agricultural companies and foreign investors.foreign and companies addition, In cities. the to countryside the from migrating workerslow-paid of society.Chinese and CCP the between contract social unspoken the of elements essential people, Chinese the of enrichment new for search the and transformation a thorough for need the on consensus be the at 30 years, than less powerin industrial largestworld’s the to country

‘Wen confident in maintaining economic growth’ economic maintaining in confident ‘Wen , Xinhua , 16 March 2007, www.chinadaily.com.cn. 16 March 2007, , 80 , he de ­Jiabao. - - - - - Although the model of export and investment growth was visibly running dry dry investmentrunning visiblyand wasgrowth export of model the Although The Chinese economic miracle of the past three decades, based on investmentsThe Chinese economic miracle of 82 81 In addition to its powers resulting from the regulation of theeconomyIn additiontoitspowers (licenses resulting fromtheregulationof to control the allocation of capital and determine the directions of economic capitalanddeterminethedirectionsof to controltheallocationof trepreneurs – theCCP, thestate, hasretainedcontrol throughthestructuresof Mao the of planning central the from awaymove the economy.Despite the financial system, which belongs entirely to the state. With it, the CCP is able is CCP the it, With state. the to entirely belongs which system, financial after the global crisis of 2008. In 2009–11, China introduced a huge economic a huge introduced China In 2009–11, 2008. of crisis global the after this century,at the start of its negative consequences manifested most strongly and permits, taxes, planning), the CCP dominates the economy through the deepstateintervention in and exports, hasbeencarriedoutonthebasisof stimulus package (around US$590 billion) and used the state banking sector banking state the used and US$590 billion) (around package stimulus en private to sectors many of opening-up the and plans, production specific ety during the ongoing market transformation. market ongoing the during ety development, thusretainingthisunusually powerful toolfor controllingsoci the through all above and sector, (SOEs) enterprises state-owned expanded China’s growth. the fruits of goods and the distribution of over theallocationof of out phasing the controls, price all almost of relaxation the including era –

According to the annual report on the state of the companythe in 2018 of state the on report Accordingannual the to which the employees (96,768 31 December 2018) are shareholders,as of not employee-ownedcompany,an in is Ltd. Co., Holding and Investmentwei joined the CCP. In 1987 he founded the Huawei company,Huaweiimmedi the which founded he CCP. In 1987 the joined rank he held when he retired from the military. It is also unclear when Ren before 1983, or in 1982 work movedcivilian overand to institute research communications a military in worked who PLA the in officer a former is individually but collectively through a . The company’s general the restoration of ranks in the PLA in 1984; thus it cannot be stated what stated be cannot it thus in 1984; PLA the in ranks of restoration the himself Ren shares. the of 1.4% holds who Zhengfei, Ren Chairman the Private ately began importing, and then producing telephone and communication two entities: the CCP-controlled trade assemblyunion consists of equipment for military and civilian use. civilian and military for equipment Trade unions are controlled by the CCP through the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, which is is which Unions, Trade of Federation All-China the through CCP the by controlled are unions Trade Report 2018 Annual Ltd. Co., Holding and Investment Huawei Front of the CCP’s Central Committee. Central CCP’s the of Front administered by staff members of the CCP and is subordinate to the Works Division of the United United the of Division Works the to subordinate is and CCP the of members staff by administered companies in the PRC: the case of .

Huawei 81 82 , , and - - - - 67 OSW REPORT 4/2020 68 OSW REPORT 4/2020 up of previously closed sectors of theeconomy totheprivate previously sector(above closedsectorsof all ‑up of vision presented at the Third Plenum of the 18 vision presentedattheThirdPlenumof The CCP’s response to the growing economic challenges was expressed in the in expressed was challenges economic growing the to response The CCP’s of rate low the as well as allocation, capital for mechanisms The imperfect was thecommitmenttoallow themarket a ‘decisive’ roleinresourceallocation, ambi an delivered document – the preparing for responsible personally was theseeventswhich hasbeenextremely burdensomefor thepublic.Whileallof However, although this move successfully brought about a short-term stim a short-term about brought successfully move this However,although model. It will primarily be based on the partial dismantling of the investmentthe of dismantling partial the on based be primarily It will model. growth friendly societally and environmentally balanced, a more by replaced GDP, growth:growthnomic the of priority,top had hitherto whichhad be to is the began, records since time first the for in 2013, economy: Chinese the in amount a significant to led projects, construction housing and infrastructure the in debt in increase a sharp to led investments,intensive these on return infra developing at mainly Directed model. growth economic investment-led the state’s withdrawal fromregulationover many industries, andtheopening ­ growth for economicreform intended toensure new sourcesof tious agenda of power inthePRC.The challenges macro facingthecountry’s the succession of with China of regions many of saturation the as well as package, stimulus the the with together abroad, products Chinese weakeningfor demand of face the In year). on year 30% by increased was loans of value (the credit expand to lto, t a as acmaid y nme o ngtv consequences. negative of number a by accompanied also was it ulation, recession,theCCPdecidedtoexpend vast resourcesusingtheold prospect of had occurred in China before, they culminated at the turn of the during the 2010s of turn the at culminated theybefore, China in occurred had brought about an accumulation of so-called non-performing loans. The end of of loans.The end non-performing so-called of accumulation an about brought glass etc.). A side effect of this industrial development was the progressive the was development industrial this of effect A side glass etc.). China. The common factor in the dozens of detailed sector reforms presented reforms sector detailed of dozens the in factor The common China. Central CommitteeinNovember 2013. Soon aftertakingoffice, Xi Jinping –who economy.Chinese financial system and the on pressure the raised turn in This and export model of growth, which directs the wealth to the business sector,and export model of creatingeco anadjustmentto thephilosophy of also saw theannouncementof shrink. to began China’ssociety in force labour active service sectors). The Third Plenum (as well as the five-year plan for 2016–20) for 2016–20) five-year plan the as well (as Plenum The Third sectors). service structure andhousing,thesemeasures were supplemented by investments in other sectors of the economy,industry.heavythe including of sectors other economic policywere exacerbated by another fundamentalprocessoccurring theenvironment, includingairpollutioninnorth-easternChina of degradation productionsurpluses, especially inheavy (steel,cement,chemicals, industry of th National Congress of the CCP’s the CCP’s National of Congress - - - - - The implementation of the Third Plenum’s ambitious agenda of economic re economic of agenda ambitious Plenum’s Third the of The implementation economicreforms initially laidoutby Xi Jinpingcontainsa certain The path of 83 would deprive itself of itsmostimportanttoolsfor intervening intheecono of would deprive itself maintain growthinvestmentmaintain through prevalentBeijing be the to among seems the on effect consequent the with situation, economic the stabilising and my inevitably will market the society.Strengthening within position political its intended to give new impetus to economic growth and provide the Party with international situation, Xi Jinping is faced with the choice between securing between choice the with faced is Xi Jinping situation, international the short-term stability of theCCP’sruleandimplementinghislong-termvi the short-termstabilityof and local the at apparatus – Party the which in system economic the of tling disman a partial mean would reforms these society.Implementing over trol paradox which was highlighted during the first years of his rule. The agenda The agenda rule. his of years first the during highlighted was which paradox previously controlledby thelocalandcentral level Party cadres, into thehands economyand the stimulate Party.further the to The need of legitimacy public forms would alsomean the legitimacy among the population. the among legitimacy be guaranteedby a transitiontohigh-techindustriesandservices. The agenda China’s reformplunged programme intostagnation and the stimulation of Chinese domestic consumption. High incomes should incomes High consumption. domestic Chinese of stimulation the and any visible breakthroughs in implementing the Third Plenum’s agenda, and agenda, Plenum’s Third the implementing in breakthroughs visible any CCP the Plenum, Third the of agenda the implementing Moreover,by arise. evencon has more which CCP enhanced a renewed, of vision the with odds at sion of reform. As a result, the first years of Xi Jinping’s rule did not produce not did rule Xi Jinping’s of years first the a result, As reform. of sion of the public, which would result in a deep political conflict within the Party. the within conflict political a deep in result would which public, the of economic instabilityandanuncertain economic transformation. Ina period of elite; however, debtandslow thecountry’s thiswilldeepen theproblemsof theCCPcould entail thepossibilitythatstrongsocialactorsindependentof reinforcing thus resources, of allocation the controls largely levels – central theprivate sector.economy Thisconcept,however, andthestrengtheningof is thestatefrom theThirdPlenum assumes withdrawal thegradual of of elites, was the CCP’s response to the economy’s increasing problems, and is Chinese the within debate a broad from resulted which Plenum, Third the of

This has led to the postponement or limitation of key reforms, and the economic policy during Xi’s Xi’s during policy economic the and reforms, key of limitation or postponement the to led has This OSW, Warsaw 2017, www.osw.waw.pl. 2017, Warsaw OSW, first term focused on focused term first policy (reducing surplus production and developing of modern branches of industry through sub through ofindustry branches of modern developing and production surplus (reducing policy lisingmarkets financial the(with use of state-ownedinstitutions), financial aswell as structural on sidies). JakubJakóbowski ad hoc ad , The drifting of China’s reforms. Economic policy during Xi Jinping’s first term first Xi Jinping’s during policy Economic reforms. China’s of The drifting measures, including debt relief for state-owned enterprises and stabi and enterprises state-owned for relief debt including measures, de facto de handover of sources of personalwealth, sourcesof handover of 83 . ------, 69 OSW REPORT 4/2020 70 OSW REPORT 4/2020 The need to break the deadlock over the reforms and implement the new eco new the implement and reforms the over deadlock the break to The need The fierce competitionamong Party factions –fighting for power and resources, 84 with a vision of internal ‘moral renewal’, based on disciplining the Party cad Party the disciplining on renewal’,based ‘moral internal of a vision with waters’ ( Party’s social legitimacy. Upon taking power, Xi Jinping presented the Party the presented power,Xi Jinping taking legitimacy.Upon social Party’s with associated system, political the of crisis a serious with faced was Party the twenty-first century the of turn the at elite, CCP’s the of perception the In Jiabao, Xi’s policy was intended to suppress the resistance to the reforms lo reforms the to resistance the suppress to intended was policy Xi’s Jiabao, 2.1.2. res and ensuring ideological purity. Thanks to this programme, he was given was he programme, this to purity.Thanks ideological ensuring and res the internal tensionswithintheParty apparatusandtheongoing erosionof local the at changes make and sector, companies state powerful the reform interest among struggle the of narrative the in contained as model – nomic the economy – unleashed powerful centrifugal forces within the CCP,threat the within forces centrifugal powerful unleashed economy – the their strengthderiving fromtheresourcescomingstate’s controlof theParty apparatusfor to buildupsupport amongpublicopinionandsomeof haveorder Plenum instrumentallyin byThird treated the been Xi Jinping, not whether the widely propagated reforms of the question is inevitably raised of political recentralisation and the expansion of the writ of his own rule. own his of writ the of expansion the and recentralisation political ples of this trend was the case of Bo Xilai (see box ‘The Bo Xilai case’),which Xilai Bo ‘The box (see Bo Xilai of case the was trend this of ples undermine the CCP’s social legitimacy forces of his ‘conservative turn’ in the PRC. In Xi’s own words, the period of of period the words, own Xi’s In PRC. the in ‘conservativeturn’ his of forces government thereforms’ over stagnation level. thelast few Inthefaceof years, driving the of one power,and his strengthen to Xi Jinping by used guments ar main the of one become has 2013 – since ongoing been has which groups as well as the centralisation of activities toimplement the economic policy,as well asthecentralisation of a broad mandate to centralise power in the CCP, in particular from the Party the from particular CCP,in the in power centralise to mandate a broad shook Chinese politics during the 18 cated intheParty apparatus, bureaucracyandthestate-owned thecountry’s ‘navigating deep easy reforms hasended,andChinaenteredtheperiodof of corruption and abuses of power at the local level had begun to significantly to begun levelhad local the powerat of abuses and corruption of ening itscohesionatbothcentralandlocallevels. At thesametime, thespread position. own their for feared who elders, hands, Xi’s in power of concentration the sanctioned vision This companies.

See Tun-Jen Cheng, D.A. Brown, J. deLisle (ed.), J. deLisle D.A. Brown, Cheng, Tun-Jen See Dilemmas

The crisis of the political system political the of The crisis shui qu shui shen , Singapore 2006. Singapore , ). After the so-called lost decade under Hu Jintao and and Hu Jintao Wen under decade lost so-called ). the After th National Congress of the CCP in 2012 and National of Congress 84 China Under Hu Jintao: Opportunities, Dangers, and and Dangers, Opportunities, Hu Jintao: Under China . One of the most spectacular exam spectacular most the of One . ------viet Union (CPSU). The Party elites in Beijing ascribe the collapse of the CPSU the of collapse the ascribe Beijing in elites (CPSU). The Party Union viet The sense of a political turning point revived the concerns, present in the CCP the in revivedpresent concerns,point the turning a political of The sense 85 Party leadership. This event, followed by the ostentatious punishment of the of punishment ostentatious the by followedevent, This leadership. Party internal revolution in the CCP.the revolutionin internal the by controlled not state­‑ services secret of and influence companies owned people involved in it, became one of the foundations legitimising Xi Jinping’s Xi Jinping’s legitimising foundations the of one became it, involvedin people localcadres’independence, thelarge-scale corruption power onthebasisof and ostentatiously lavish lifestyles of CCPmembers, aswelland ostentatiously lavish asthepowerful lifestyles of since the 1990s, that it might share the fate of the Communist Party of the So the of Party Communist the of fate the share might it that the 1990s, since embodied allthemajorpoliticalchallenges facingtheCCP: attemptstorise scandal This Xi. to power of handover the jeopardised have potentially could

‘tsar’ on behalf of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CCP’s the of Politburo the of Committee Standing the of behalf on ‘tsar’ Xi Jinping. His main ally was , then the special services’ services’ special the then Yongkang, Zhou was ally main His Xi Jinping. This was a multi-threaded and multi-level corruption scandal that came that scandal corruption multi-level and a multi-threaded was This where he had worked for many years. Apart from the elements of crime, of elements the from Apart years.many for worked had he where The Bo Xilai most important instruments in consolidating his power.his consolidating in instruments important most Secretary’s General new the of one CCP,was whichthe of history the in in thecasestimulatedXitoinitiatelargest anti-corruptioncampaign selectingthe new andtheprocess of relationship with the securityservices the challenges facing the CCP at that time. those The showinvolved trial of pow of succession the in moment a critical at February 2012, in light to leadership. It is hard to say how real the plan to interfere with the succes the with interfere to plan the real howsay to hard leadership.It is the CCP and bring about his own selection in the place of leadership of Central Committee, but who was also closely linked to the state oil sector,oil state the to linked closely also was who but Committee, Central the in handover generational fixed the change to attempted , succession of power asdetermined bysuccession of the Party’s elders, shows thescale of section 3.2.1). The fact that a factional alliance had formed which was based to leadership new the for a pretext as served it much how and was, sion on thesecurityapparatusandlocalcadre, andwas aimedatdisruptingthe outpersonnelchanges andrestructurethesecurityapparatus(see carry corruption and immorality, the scandal concerned the CCP’s the essence of in CCP the of secretary influential the CCP.Bo Xilai, the of top the at er See Pin Ho, Wenguang , Huang, Wenguang Ho, Pin See Struggle in China in Struggle , Public Affairs, 2013. Affairs, Public , case 85 A Death in the Lucky Holiday Hotel: Murder, Money, and an Epic Power Power Epic an and Money, Murder, Hotel: Holiday Lucky the in A Death - - - 71 OSW REPORT 4/2020 72 OSW REPORT 4/2020 (and thus the USSR) to the Soviet Party’s inability to effectively reform and reform effectively to inability Party’s Soviet the to USSR) the thus (and In the last two decades, the Party has faced a significant challenge in the form the in challenge a significant faced has Party the decades,two last the In ‘cleansing’renewal’and ‘moral the of of a vision proposed has he Partyelders; the of thinking the in trend this grasped correctly has Xi Jinping that It seems CCP the of levels many at present conviction, the of a question rather It is makers in Beijing know that this strategy may soon exhaust its possibilities, its exhaust soon may strategy this that know Beijing in makers compensa without peasants from land confiscating of practice the mainly in 2012, The situation successors. their appoint cadres outgoing the that rule cohesion. internal centre. the from control proper of lack the of a symptom as rather seen is tion, or for just token amounts, as well as local environmental contamination environmental local as well as amounts, token just for or tion, personally.them to a threat posed which trend Party the purge to a programme conceals Party.This Communist Chinese the point in the post-1989 history of the CCP. The Party elders decided that they that decided elders CCP.The Party the of history post-1989 the in point far been successful and is being continued by Xi Jinping. However,policy the Xi Jinping. by continued being is and successful been far has adopted a strategy of directing discontent at the local structures, empha structures, local the at discontent directing of a strategy adopted has this reverse could he that so mandate, a broad with Xi Jinping entrust to had bad elements, while simultaneously increasing its professionalization and professionalization its increasing simultaneously while elements, bad theParty corruption,which apparatusgoes farbeyondbers of theissue of One of the biggest sources for the protests has been abuses by local cadres, local by abuses been has protests the for sources biggest the of One and the executive bodies in Beijing, that the Party needs to be purged of its of purged be to needs Party the that Beijing, in bodies executive the and themem of thepersonalintegrity and theone-Party system. The problemof and fear that the scattered protests may find a common denominator in the in denominator a common find may protests scattered the that fear and repression against the cadres and small concessions towardsa mixture localof a turning case’),marked Xilai Bo ‘The box (see rule this violate to attempt an as well retiredcadres, linked asa way tothe tosafeguard thepersonal safety of sising that the regional abuses are the source of the unrest. At the local level, local the At unrest. the of source the are abuses regional the that sising health or food of quality the over supervision of lack the to related scandals society, andgenerally toreinforce theCCP’spower andcontrolover allaspects evolve, in tandem with the collapse of the integrity of the Party apparatus evolve, of the integrity in tandemwith the collapse of come toperceive thecentralauthorities astheirdefenders. Thismethodhas so often protesters the and spots, hot of pacification the in results communities outlet, an find to need tensions social these that realising Beijing, care, etc. cadres. CCP local by abuses and corruption with connected protests social of edy for Party’s internaldisorderandthedeclineinParty elders’authority, a rem as pictured is CCP the of renewal’ The ‘moral functioning. PRC’s the of en Beijing’s control over the provinces, renew indoctrination of the ideological theirmostcorruptelements, recentraliseeconomicpolicy,cadres of strength - - - - - 89 88 87 86 90 n epne o hs cnen, i ipn hs rpsd nte solution another proposed has Jinping Xi concerns, these to response In NGOs, involvement greater by internetusersinhighlightingabuses, andabove itself would have created itself toobey thelaw which ithaditself the state structures, and a return to increased social control, this time with time this control, social increased to over a return primacy and structures, Party’s the state the of restoration and maintenance the CCP: the to undertaken which involved various forms of social participation aimed at the at aimed participation social of involvedforms which various undertaken form of political demands. In the Hu–Wenwerethe (2002–2012), experiments In era demands. political of form all, the idea of the rule of law – something which would mean that the CCP the that mean would which something law – of rule the of idea the all, supervision of localpersonnel of supervision

(at least 65 million housing units remain unoccupied) and fear a drop in a drop fear and unoccupied) remain units housing 65 million least (at From year to year the number of so-called mass incidents, as the author the as incidents, mass so-called of number the year to year From 2005 the number of protests rose tenfold, from 8,700 to 87,000. In 2010 87,000.In 2010 to 8,700 from tenfold, rose protests of number the 2005 ities define public protests, has been rising. In the period from 1993 to 1993 from period the In rising. been has protests, public define ities rising, and the protests are also driven by rising costs of livingrising, andthe protests are also driven and the by rising costsof tryside against the expropriation of land predominated. After Xi Jinping Xi Jinping After predominated. land of expropriation the against tryside 180,000 than more reached figure the property values China Labour Bulletin Labour China average worker’s lack of prospects of buying their own homes. Another homes. own their buying of prospects of lack worker’saverage Wage are trade. demands and services the in place taking increasingly are and sector, production the beyond gone have strikes the 2013 since and rising, is cities the in workers by strikes of The number changing. also 230,000between250,000 ates and annually. independent the to According dissatisfied group are property owners, who cannot rent their apartments apartments their rent cannot who owners, property are group dissatisfied fluctu currently protests of number the that say estimates dependent in but figures, official publishing ceased authorities power,the to came Social The speculative bubble in the property market is the result of programmes to stimulate the economy Bulletin Labour China L.H. Ong, C. Göbel, T. Wright, See The most advanced concept assumed controlled, but relatively free political participation for citizens which were introduced in response to the 2008 crisis. 2008 the to response in introduced were which www.chathamhouse.com. of the PRC through internet forums (‘netizens’); this would allow the CCP to receive feedback from from feedback receive to CCP the allow would this (‘netizens’); forums internet through PRC the of the public, and also to achieve a new form of legitimacy. of form a new achieve to also and public, the thoritarianism in China in thoritarianism protests Popular Protest in China in Protest Popular Social Unrest in China 90 in . ,www.clb.org.hk. , Cambridge 2012; K.J. O’Brien (ed.), K.J. O’Brien 2012; Cambridge , the 89 PRC from Hong Kong, the nature of the protests is protests the of nature the Kong, Hong from 86 , Cambridge 2018; Xi Chen, Xi Chen, 2018; Cambridge , , permitting a certain freedom of action for action of freedom a certain permitting , , Europe China Research and Advice Network, London 2012, 2012, London Network, Advice and Research China Europe , 88 ; atthattime, protestsinthecoun Popular Protest in China in Protest Popular Social Protest and Contentious Au Contentious and Protest Social 87 . , Cambridge 2008. Cambridge , - - - - - 73 OSW REPORT 4/2020 74 OSW REPORT 4/2020 Xi’s rule has seen the unprecedented (since the time of MaoZedong Xi’s rulehasseentheunprecedented(sincetimeof (in the Hu–Wen period there was quite considerable room for public debate public for room considerable quite was there Hu–Wenperiod (in the volvement of China in the global arena and its assumption of a more assertive a more of assumption its and arena global the in China volvementof 92 91 without coming into confrontation with the West, is coming to an end. Bei end. an to coming is West, the with confrontation into coming without In the long term, the essence of Xi’sambitiousplanistochange themethods In thelongterm,essenceof jing’s more assertive policy is also a method for consolidating society around society consolidating for a method also is policy assertive more jing’s 2.1.3. neighbours in Asia and global actors like the US and the EU. Xi’s policy is policy Xi’s EU. the and US the like actors global and Asia in neighbours quickly react to also but individuals, over control effective allow to intended in China), andrepressionagainstsocialactivists andacademicswho criticise the Party, for playing the nationalism card, and for the further concentration localcadrestogive falsereports the tendencyof to threatsonthemicro-socialscalebefore they metastasise intoelementsof is This section 3.3.1). (see apparatus Party the over control for allowing tures lead CCP’s the among diagnosis current the to due partly is This the Party. a signifi by accompanied been has rule Xi’s technology. of modern the use foreign policy. This has created new tensions and conflicts with both China’s both with conflicts and tensions new created has policy.This foreign society.in position Party’s the undermined and disarray social ­favoured ble information aboutwhat ishappeninginthecountry, which results from government is intended to be part of the construction of the PRC’s own model the construction of government is intended to be part of a response to the growing belief among decision-makers in Beijing that the that Beijing in decision-makers among belief growing the to a response ­so­‑ opportunities’, strategic duringwhichcalled ‘periodof Chinacouldexpand ers that the experiments during Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao’s rule (2002–2012) rule Jiabao’sWen and Hu Jintao during experiments the that ers expression of freedom of a restriction censorship, internet of tightening cant of power in the hands of Xi Jinping. of hands the powerin of democracy.liberal of del Westernmo­­the to alternative an as serving development of socio-political relia of lack the to response CCP’s the as intended also It is destabilisation. fea additional with expanded (SCS),System Credit Social the is plan this of The heart managed. be to are a whole as society and Party the both how of

This in itself due to the design of the system, but because it is a necessary element, it cannot be be cannot it J. Gittings, See element, a necessary is it because but system, the of design the to due itself in This changed without threatening the CCP’s power as such. as power CCP’s the threatening without changed

The end of the ‘period of strategic opportunities’ opportunities’ strategic of‘period the of The end in international politics international in The world and China China and The world 1922–1972 , London 1974. London , 91 . Finally, the new system of of system newFinally, the .

92 ) in ------94 93 ude to implementing the second goal: to make China a superpower on a global a global a superpoweron China make to goal: second the implementing to ude until 2021,thesocio-economictransformation thatwillbuilda ‘middle-income lined his ambitious goals for strengthening China’s position, using the formula Shortly after taking office as the Chairman of the PRC in 2013, Xi Jinping out Xi Jinping in 2013, PRC of the Chairman as the office taking after Shortly scale by 2049. When starting his second term as General Secretary of the CCP the of Secretary General as term second his starting When 2049.by scale society’ ( of the founding of the CCP in 2021 and of the PRC in 2049. In the first period, first the In in 2049. PRC the of and in 2021 CCP the of founding the of ( Goals’ Centenary ‘Two of

‘The period ‘peaceful growth’ was intendedtoreassure theWest, which atthesame At the end of AtHu Jintao’s the end of the CCP,term as General Secretary of a conviction war on terrorism. The situation changed due to China’s relatively good relativelyChina’s to due changed The situation terrorism. on war relatively smoothly, thus strengthening its relative economic power.At economic relative its strengthening smoothly,thus relatively beneficiary. of the narration been Beijing’s had it which of order national internal crisis and would be unable to react to a change in the PRC’s the same time Beijing realised that the West was experiencing a serious a serious experiencing Westwas the that realised Beijing time same the sawUS,China whichthe of The attention cooperation. economic through successively be democratised could China convinced that firmly was time the CCPthatinfuturePRCwould have tochallenge thevery inter tional environment. At the remained same within time, a traditional belief theColdWar,that startedwiththeendof when thePRCwas abletobuild performance during the financial crisis of 2008. As a result of its fairly its of a result As of 2008. crisis financial the during performance up its economic power and international position without much resistance portunity’ for thePRCwas closing from the West, while at the same time benefiting from a stable interna a stable from benefiting time same the at West,while the from arose among Party analysts that the international ‘window of strategic op strategic arose amongParty analysts thattheinternational‘window of as itsmain opponent, was focused ontheMiddleEastand so-called short-sighted policy of stimulation, the country camethroughthatperiod stimulation,thecountry short-sighted policyof opportunities now open to PRC, which would be unlikely to last long. last to unlikely be wouldwhich PRC, to open now opportunities the of advantage full taking a profile, low the keeping of policy the end operandi Originally this term refers to Confucianism, but it was used by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 as the goal of of goal the as in 1979 Xiaoping Deng by used was it but Confucianism, to refers term this Originally , See www.gov.cn/xinwen; E.S. Medeiros, ‘China Reacts: Assessing Beijing’s Response to Trump’s New New Trump’s to Response Beijing’s Assessing Reacts: ‘China E.S. Medeiros, www.gov.cn/xinwen; China Strategy’, Strategy’, China East Asia and the Confucian Revival Confucian the and Asia East iu i sn u gace usi hnyn jnj gnzo uy jingshn huiyi gongzuo jingji zhongyang luoshi guanche lun san – jiyu the economic reforms and programme of modernisation. See N. Visocnik, J.S. Rosker, J.S. Rosker, N. Visocnik, See modernisation. of programme and reforms economic the xiaokang shehui xiaokang . The post-2008 period was also perceived as a good moment to moment a good as perceived also was period The post-2008 . ‘ Renmin ribao pinglun yuan: Zhengque renshe woguo fazhan de zhongyao zhanlue zhanlue zhongyao de fazhan woguo renshe Zhengque yuan: pinglun ribao Renmin of China Leadership Monitor Leadership China

strategic ) isto be completed liangge yibainian liangge opportunities’ ( Black Cat Black , Spring 2019, no. 59. Spring 2019, , 93 s ), Cambridge 2015, p. 153. 2015, Cambridge ), . This was a description of the period the of a description was This . ), i.e. the hundredth anniversary hundredth i.e. the ), 94 . This is intended to be the prel the be to intended is This . ’ , 24 December 2018, 2018, December 24 , Contemporary Contemporary modus - - - - - 75 OSW REPORT 4/2020 76 OSW REPORT 4/2020 This was seen as a sign of Beijing’s superpower ambitions, and a departure a departure and ambitions, superpower Beijing’s of a sign as seen was This 97 96 95 in October 2017, the[world] Xi saidthat“Chinaismoving closertothecentreof the rightmoment’ from the principle formulated by Deng Xiaoping of ‘hideyour strength,awaitfrom theprincipleformulated by DengXiaopingof stage and making a greater contribution to [the development of] humanity” developmentof] [the to contribution a greater making and stage

‑ Taiwan, in a state of diplomatic suspension, has a democratic political syspolitical suspension, diplomatic a democratic has Taiwan,of a state in on China of The Republic mainland. the from aggression against Taiwan whelming majority of which considers the PRC as the representative of which considersthePRCasrepresentative of whelming majorityof The Taiwan in the PRC, and it also possesses a relatively modern army.modern a relatively possesses also it and PRC, the in global a key is economy;it a developedmarket Taiwan has mainland. also forefront the at is States United the community; international the of ity force by theCCParedesiredby major thegreat useof nor thethreatof in 2005, it assumes the right to use force, for example in case Taiwan issues tem, but is significantly divided by concerns over its relations with the with relations its over concerns by divided significantly is but tem, the island,Washington hasatthesame timedeclaredthatitwilldefend principle the recognise formally Both Taiwan. on China of Republic the there have been tionalist Party ( provider of semiconductors and one of themostimportantdirectinvestors semiconductorsandoneof provider of longs to China. The CCP treats Taiwan’streats The CCP China. mainland, ‘reunification’to the longs with Since 1949, after the CCP’s victory in the civil war and the Chinese Na Chinese the and war civil the in victory CCP’s the after 1949, Since China. The matter is further complicated by the presence of strong pro­ strong of presence the by complicated further is The matter China. an element of the reunification of China after the period of colonial divi colonial of period the after China of reunification the of element an a formal declaration of independence, or if any prospect of reunification is any independence,prospect of or a formalif declaration of sion, as an issue of fundamental political importance. China is formally is China importance. political fundamental of issue an as sion, of this approach; although while rejecting calls for the independence of this approach; although while rejecting calls for the independence of of deemed permanently lost NPC the by passed a law reunification’, under ‘peaceful but to committed ciple is also widely accepted by the international community, the over prin China The One representative. legitimate the is them of overwhich is dispute their consensus): 1992 so-called (the China indivisible one of independence trends on Taiwan, which does not acknowledge that it be it that acknowledge not does which Taiwan, on trends independence ‘Fan fenlie Guojia fa’ Guojia fenlie ‘Fan Taoguangyanghui Xi Jinping, and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ a New for the 19 at Characteristics Chinese with Socialism of Success Great the for Strive and th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 18 October 2017, www.xinhuanet.com. 18 October 2017, China, of Party Communist the of Congress National ‘Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects Respects All in Society Prosperous a Moderately Building in Victory a Decisive ‘Secure question ; see R.C. Keith, R.C. Keith, see ; Kuomintang , 14 March 2005, www.npc.gov.cn. 14 March 2005, , 96 de factode . two Chinesestates: thePRConmainland,and 97 Deng Xiaoping and China’s Foreign Policy Foreign China’s and Xiaoping Deng . Neither Taiwan’s aspirations to independence ) government’s escape to the island of Taiwan,) government’s escapetotheislandof , New York 2018, p. 19. 2018, York New , , delivered delivered , ------95 . (AIIB). These new initiatives are mainly aimed at developingat whosecountries, aimed mainly(AIIB).initiatives neware These Although Xi’s rise to power was associated with a significant change in rheto in change a significant with associated waspower to rise Xi’s Although Trump presidency in the economic field, but has since also rapidly expanded rapidly also since has but field, economic the in presidency Trump time same the at and order, international current the change to The ambition 98 with Washington, something which became apparent at the beginning of the with Washington, something which of becameapparentatthebeginning primarily order, international existing the undermine to working are which provokedSeas,and the China East and China South the in neighbours its with Under Xi Jinping, China has also for the first time presented its own vision own its presented time first the for also has China Xi Jinping, Under Asia’ to ‘Pivot so-called the to presidency Obama the during States United Russia. Both countries have found common ground, not only in their opposi their in only not ground, common found have countries Both Russia. disputes territorial re-inflamed has This Straits. Malacca the and Peninsula nating the ‘first line of islands’ ( islands’ of line ‘first the nating domi of concept the to linked also is This blocked. being routes sea its of ity reformed thearmy, thenavy andtheexpeditionary including theexpansion of initiatedby thepoliticalprogrammes his ric, infactheiscontinuingmany of tural problems. The infrastructure projects are intended to be a prelude to a prelude be to intended are projects The infrastructure problems. tural 2000.As since rapidly very expanded has China with investment and trade areas. other to theWest, regime tion tothedominantroleof butalsointheirsharedfear of countries revisionist with relations closer towards Beijing pushed has tries, coun non-democratic of politics internal the on Westerninfluence counter to thus exposing China’s relative international isolation. This policy as formulated Japanese the Islands, Kuril the of sequence the and border maritime PRC’s the the army isprimarily intendedtoprotectmainlandChinaagainstthepossibil predecessors. This is particularly true of thesecuritysphere:Xi has thoroughly predecessors. Thisisparticularly trueof for Chineseheavy andconstructionindustry, which arestrugglingwithstruc forces, aspreparationtoprotectthePRC’sglobalinterests. The development of by Beijing has been one of the main areas of conflict with the US and Asian and US the with conflict of areas main the of one been has Beijing by China’s rapprochement with Moscow interests has widened its divergence of a continuation of the current Chinese involvement, the new initiatives are fo are initiativesnew involvement, the Chinese current the of a continuation Bank Investment Infrastructure Asian the and Initiative Road and Belt the as Malay the Borneo, Philippines, the Taiwan, islands, Ryukyu the archipelago, cused on the distribution of tradesurpluses andstimulatingforeigndemand cused onthedistribution of theglobaleconomic order, creating internationaleconomicinitiativesof such ’.However,‘colour so-called and outside’ from ‘inspired changes rule. Xi’s during countries

Chi Wang, Wang, Chi Obama’s Challenge to China: The Pivot to Asia to The Pivot China: to Challenge Obama’s diyi lian dao diyi ,Farnham 2015. ), i.e. the body of water between water of body i.e. the ), 98 ------, 77 OSW REPORT 4/2020 78 OSW REPORT 4/2020 Western corporations. However, Xi’s initial announcements on the liberalisa the on announcements initial However,corporations.WesternXi’s yearoverto in 2010 yearper €37 billion in 2016 This took on the unprecedented twenty-firstdimensions at the turn of century: reper significant have also policy industrial PRC’s the of The fundamentals 99 which was initially innature, regional hassinceemerged asthemainplatform United States, and some members of the EU have also expressed their concern their haveexpressed EU also the of members some and States,United its image as a defender of globalisation and economic openness. economic and globalisation of a defender as image its in protectionismhasbeenclearly observed inhigh-techbranches, whereas in the in fluctuations China, from outflows ital slowly, only implemented flows) being investmentcapital are and some in and ing demands for the Chinese market to be ‘symmetrically’ opened up further to acquisi the financing entities state Chinese including state, the by backed is nology fromdeveloped open countries. ThismeansChinaisenteringa stage of nomic agreements, China’s as well as a symbol aspirations of to become a global to stick to the course of liberalising foreign trade, to a movestick to the course of intended to reinforce theyuan,openingup foreigntrade(includingthefullconvertibility of tion of have that responses policy in resulting entities, economic affected most the per €2.1 billion around from rose EU the in investment Chinese of influx the foreign companies, and tions the of state’s involvement in stealing technologies. companies Chinese EU.the of and expansion US the The foreign with tensions trade, andconsequently enhancedculturalandpoliticalre the promotionof promoting a China-centric vision of globalisation, a forum to negotiate eco negotiate to a forum globalisation, of vision a China-centric promoting lations between China and the selected countries. The ,Road and The Belt countries. selected the and China between lations been negative from China’s point of view. The markets of developedcountries view. of The markets China’sof negativefrom point been about the increase in Chinese influence in Eurasia, Africa and Latin America. Latin and Africa Eurasia, in influence Chinese in increase the about freetrade. Foradvocate thisreason,itisfacinggrowing of oppositionfromthe zones, economic special of creation the investment, Chinese direct attracting and tensions in trade with foreign countries,and tensionsintradewithforeign which couldcausesudden cap elements among concerns to due is This evenincreasing. is control state areas and diplomaticpressure onChinafromdeveloped countrieshasrisen,includ are being increasingly closed (including limitations on Chinese investment), other specific sectors of the economy (suchother asspecific consumer sectors of goods) China is trying the Chinese financial sector the CCP’s leadership related to the instability of of economic competition with developed countries, something which is causing developing China’s capabilitiesinhigh-techsectors, aswell asonacquiring tech on things, other among based, are policy.These foreign Chinese for cussions

T. Hanemann, M. Huotari, A. Kratz, A. Kratz, M. Huotari, T. Hanemann, ing policies’ ing , MERICS , March 2019, www.merics.org. 2019, March , ‘Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 trends and impact of new screen new of impact and trends 2018 Europe: in FDI ‘Chinese yuan’s exchange rate, etc. A rise A rise rate, etc. exchange­yuan’s 99 . The EU and the US are among are US the and The EU . ------West, primarily the United States. The resulting shift in US policy, US in shift initiated by The resulting States.West, United the primarily Xi from the Party elders. Some Party elements have also criticised his havecriticised elements Partyalso Someelders. Party the from Xi At the same time, it seems that China’s diplomats were unable to warn the warn to unable were diplomats China’s that seems it time, same the At The EU is seeking to adopt a ‘wait and see position’see and al a ‘wait conflict, adopt US-China to the seeking in is The EU which raising concerns or a dissenting viewpoint is unacceptable because do because unacceptable is viewpoint a dissenting or concerns raising which US revealedUS several whichpotentiallyposition problems could Xi’s undermine US President , involves putting pressure on China in many fields However, the first months of the diplomatic conflict between China and the and China between conflict diplomatic the of months first However,the a complex such to respond to need Westthe the and from pressure Increasing in the CCP. The negotiations with Washington in 2018, which were marked were which in 2018, Washington with CCP.The negotiations the in CCP.the of Secretary General the to directly failure anyfor responsibility ring the with conflict long-running the of opening the to related challenges of ry interests), the diplomatic corps remains passive, and is focused to on trying by reinforced is This leadership. Party the criticising to tantamount is so ing in system, the of nature authoritarian the from results policy.This foreign in the state), China’s diplomatic service is relatively weak, both in terms of per of terms in both weak, relatively is service diplomatic China’sstate), the boththeCCPand thebureaucracy(thatof the factthatcomparedtorestof upon criticism of a wave brought reports some to have according conflict, the con been has process decision-making policy foreign the conflicts, those to still the of because Beijing on pressure diplomatic the raised has too it though pressure on China via its allies, in both developed and developing countries. developing and developed both in allies, its via China on pressure potential’. unresolved problem the of imbalance in market access, as well as European con large technology companies, through to ideology. The US has also increased also has ideology.The US to through companies, technology large by Trump’s sudden by Trump’s guess the expectations of thedecision-makers intheCCP’sCentral Committee. guess theexpectations of George W. Bush administrations were also active) and the competition between a hallmark stages, global and regional the involvementon increased China’s and perhaps premature – break with the previous strategy of ‘hiding your ‘hiding of strategy previous the with break premature – perhaps and sonnel and institutionally. Therefore, in contrast to other departments whose departments other to institutionally.contrast and in Therefore,sonnel simultaneously: from bilateral trade, through security (in which the Obama and officials are actively trying to shape policy (usually in their own particular own their in (usually policy shape to trying actively are officials change abrupt an such of consequences negative the against decision-makers transfer thus associates, closest his and Xi Jinping of hands the in centrated power,consolidate ‘conservativehis fuelling further turn’. respond to order In further to Xi Jinping for opportunity the created has challenges of catalogue cerns aboutChina’s activity inEurasia withintheBeltandRoad Initiative. catego new a completely with PRC the confronted has rule, of Xi Jinping’s volte-face and the unfavourable (for China) escalation of andtheunfavourable (for China)escalationof sudden – ­sudden – ------79 OSW REPORT 4/2020 80 OSW REPORT 4/2020 Xi’s position in the CCP is not so clear-cut (see section 2.2.2). The removal of of The removal section 2.2.2). (see clear-cut so not is CCP the in position Xi’s 102 101 100 Upon taking power, Xi Jinping received a mandate to conduct an internal rev internal an conduct to a mandate received power,Xi Jinping taking Upon During his rule Xi Jinping has concentrated a number of Party his in functions of During a number concentrated has Xi Jinping rule his view,From aninstitutionalpointof Xi’sgovernment isnotvery different from an In clans. key the and elders Party the on dependent still is he Party,and 2.2.1. The conservative 2.2. restrictions on how many terms the PRC’s Chairman can rule is rather a signal howon a signal restrictions rather is rule manycan Chairman PRC’s the terms power), real any bear themselves in not do positions (state insignificance mal institution aspluralistictheCCP, cen theParty’s support for Xi’sseriesof to society that Xi has the Party’s consent to complete his programme, but this Xi’sconsolidation this move theprocessof was thesymbolic culminationof amendment, a new was change significant The only predecessors. his of that com profound of a symptom as seen be should 2012 since activities tralising promise, a searchwithintheParty for a stronghandtopreserve theCCP’srule. for life. Many foreign observers saw the move as evidence that Xi had taken had Xi that evidence as move the saw observers foreign Many life. for on limit term the abolishing NPC, the by March 2018 in introduced formally hands PRC the of Chairman as serve can person a given long how the in power absolute have not Party. However,the Xi does of bodies highest the oneperson,changing hands of been developed in the 1990s. The number of offices held directly by Xi Jinping, Xi Jinping, directly by held offices of The number the 1990s.developed in been CCP, represents a partial departure from the idea of ‘collective leadership’of and idea the CCP,from departure a partial represents an abandonment of the principle of maintainingfactionalbalancewithinthe theprincipleof an abandonmentof the of organs key the in wields faction his influence of range the as well as absolute powerabsolute Party.the in change,the of symbolicdimension the despite Yet should not be read as unconditional agreement tohisruleforshould notbereadasunconditionalagreement life olution in the CCP through the unprecedented consolidation of power inthe olution intheCCPthroughunprecedentedconsolidationof of the Party apparatus and the public took this as Xi’s assumption of power of assumption Xi’s as this took public the and apparatus Party the of part A large (2012–16). office of term first his dedicated he which to power of

General Secretary of the CCP (which guarantees him a place on the Standing Committee of the Po the of Committee Standing the on a place him guarantees (which CCP the of positions. official any Secretary hold to General essential not is it Xiaoping, Deng of example implementation the the by demonstrated As regarding exist not do restrictions similar that is justification official The of Party duties, and that this requires uniformity. requires this that and duties, of Party litburo of the CC CCP); chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CC CCP; and chairman chairman and CC CCP; the of Commission Military Central the of chairman CC CCP); the of litburo the

102 A new leader for a new era a new forleader A new , giving him a dominant position in the Party bureaucracy, and thus bureaucracy,and Party the in position a dominant him giving , end of the collective turn in leadership? status quo the CCP: of thepoliticalsystem which had of

100 . Despite its for its Despite . 101 . - - - - - Xi’s authority in the PRC also has its roots in the leader’s personal popularity.personal leader’s the in roots its has also PRC the in authority Xi’s theimportantinformal leadinggroups Xi’s power liesinhisgainingcontrolof Xi has received a mandate from the Party elders to carry out a major recon a major out carry to elders Party the from a mandate received Xi has (2002–12), and to a degree even more than Jiang Zemin (1989–2002), and his and (1989–2002), Zemin Jiang than more even a degree to and (2002–12), Annex 3); (see people trusted through or personally either section 1.1.3), (see An ability to articulate the collective expectations and hopes of Chinesepeople An abilitytoarticulatethecollective expectations andhopesof However, Xi’s strength mainly derives from the fact that the ‘collectivelead the that fact the from derives mainly strength However,Xi’s is essential to the mastery of theCCP. of is essentialtothemastery Over theyears, Xi’scareerhas confirmed implement without breaking the resistance of local interest groups, which in which groups, interest local of resistance the breaking without implement trating power is to overcome the system’s deficiencies at a time when the CCP the when a time system’s at overcomethe deficiencies to poweris trating of expectations the dream’.personify Chinese to ‘the ability This of slogan the in expectations public’s the and mission of sense CCP’s the unite skilfully to tion 2.2.6). thepowers accumulatedby Due to thescopeof Xiandtheinfluence support the gaining section 2.2.5); (see campaign anti-corruption the through of The foundation (section 2.2.2). factions other of influence the of tralisation particularly the Secretariat of theCentralCommittee, aswell ashisskilfulneu particularly theSecretariat of pollution is the realisation of society’s expectations. Xi Jinping has provedpollution is therealisationof able threat. any under be to seem currently not does position his intuitive abilitytoreadthepublicmood,which hasallowed himtohave CCP itself. CCP environmental and corruption against fight the on The emphasis itself. CCP and the PRC have been facing serious domestic and international challenges. international and domestic serious facing been have PRC the and the within position society, his on strengthen influence to thus a personal and struction of the Party apparatus and to change the model of socio-economic theParty apparatusandto change themodelof struction of the‘mandate version is thecontemporary of society andtheParty inhimself Party factionsatthelocalandmiddlelevels skilfully breakingtheresistanceof his faction within the central bureaucracy, members of deploymentstrategic of development. Thesetwo projectsareinterdependent,andwillbeimpossible to concen of The aim hands. his into authority own its over given has ership’ heaven’,of enormousimportanceinXi’sholdover power andisof over the Hu Jintao than leader stronger a much clearly is CCP,he the in faction his of sec (see CCP the of statute the in included been have ideas whose a leader of the PLA’sof mid-level officer corps (see section 2.2.4); and creating a new image the from stems also position This PRC. the powersin wide-ranging extremely of at least eight small management groups on the CC CCP (see Annex 5). The position of president of president of The position Annex 5). (see CC CCP the on groups management small eight least at of foreign countries. foreign the PRC, the formal head of state, is symbolic, but it maintains diplomatic protocol in dealing with with dealing in protocol diplomatic it maintains but symbolic, is ofstate, head formal the PRC, the - - - - - 81 OSW REPORT 4/2020 82 OSW REPORT 4/2020 With regard to Xi’s accumulation influence by his personnel policy, personnel first his his influence by in accumulation Xi’s to regard With Xi has used – has so far not touched anyone associated with the Party clans Party the with associated anyone touched not far so has used – Xi has Although the current General Secretary holds such a strong position, then, it then, position, a strong such holds Secretary General current the Although 104 103 Party as Xi Jinping portrays Committee Central CCP’s the of Department Publicity work)Party do to Hu Haifeng 2.2.2. is nothing like that possessed by Mao Zedong during the . Cultural the during Zedong Mao by possessed that like nothing is Party the with agreement this violate may he that risk the runs hands Xi’s in powerNaturally, development.concentrating PRC’s the of paradigm the ing the within position Xi’s because important is This act. a revolutionary is itself tion for good, and has focused on building up his own clan, sending his son family, Xiaoping’s and Deng of clan influential the by led him, supported that the by demonstrated is position power.Their to him brought who groups the power apparatus will remain unchallenged only as long as the Party elders are power unity, has may stillbeongoing behindthecurtainof andXihimself five CCP, the within factions competing marginalising on focused he years and ‘purge’ Party’s the of tool main the campaign – anti-corruption the that fact by Hu Jintao (who seems to have abandoned the so-called Youth League Fac League Youth so-called the abandoned have to seems (who Hu Jintao by CCP has come to an end. Xi Jinping’s position still depends on the position of of position the on depends still position Xi Jinping’s end. an to come has CCP establishment. CCP’s as well as criticism of Xi’s position from the most influential members of the of members influential most the from position Xi’s of criticism as well as However,himself. for independence full assume and high still the considering a strong leader, from time to time there are signs that a fierce struggle for struggle a fierce that signs are there time to time from leader, a strong sometimes been subjected to criticism by the most influential elements in the in elements influential most the by criticism to subjected been sometimes a case, such in CCP the of top the at conflict of signs visible less or more see outthelong-term planfor theCCP’srecoverysure heiscarrying andchang ders of the consequences of unfettered ‘ruleby oneman’, theconsequencesof ders of onewould expect to pluralismintheParty, of degree aswell amongtheel astheliving memory on strengthening his personal power through informal channels. At the same the Atchannels. informal powerthrough personal his strengthening on a comparison, such of media the for attractiveness the despite Xi Jinping, of cannot besaidthatheholdsabsolutepower andthat pluralismwithinthe

According to media reports, in December 2018, some members of the CC’s Politburo had to make make to had Politburo CC’s the of members some December 2018, in reports, media to According north-western in city largest the Xi’an, in CCP the of secretary first the became he March , which will open up great opportunities to him. to opportunities great up open will which China, also means that he successfully managed to pacify his opponents. his pacify to managed successfully he that means also self-criticisms. This would confirm the speculation that Xi’s activity has met with resistance, but it but resistance, with met has activity Xi’s that speculation the confirm would This self-criticisms. 104

The expansion of Xi’s base and the erosion of Party factions Party oferosion the and base Xi’s of The expansion . Therefore, at present it can be argued that the power and position and power the that argued be can it present at Therefore, . 103 . Although the official narrative the official created by the Although . - - - corruption campaign and the small leading groups, Xi was able to expand to able Xi was groups, leading small the and campaign ‑corruption Xi’s consolidation of power canbedivided intotwoXi’s consolidationof majorstages, which de Politburo itself (see section 2.2.3).(see itself Politburo anti the including means, informal By representation. strong had still Party relative predominance on the Standing Committee of the Politburo,the the in and of Committee Standing relativethe on predominance within act to forced was Xi Jinping term first his five-year cycles. In in does it theChinesepoliticalsystem, functioningasrive directly fromthenatureof that the influence he had built up within the CCP allowed him to introduce to him allowed CCP the within up built had he influence the that the 19 during appointments personnel new the the and CCP the of organs highest the of in 2012) (established framework the the politicalstruggle Xi haswaged havetime, the scale andintensityof accel factions within the CCP, and the emergence of a new formula for the stratifi the for formula a new of emergence the CCP,and the within factions his trusted people into the key bodies of the Party and build up a position of of a position up build and Party the of bodies key the into people trusted his with 2017, until not It was factions. competing the marginalise and base his state structures, in which representatives of competingfactionswithinthe state structures, inwhich representatives of cation of the CCP’s elites based on family clans and sectoral interest groups. interest sectoral and clans family on based elites CCP’s the of cation thetraditional of thedisintegration erated theprocess(ongoing for decades)of Xi became the natural leader of the ‘princelings’, the descendants of the of descendants the ‘princelings’, the of leader natural the Xi became Xiaoping’s risetopower, hisstartwas madeeasierby theconnectionsof His present position, however, comes thanks to his own efforts, based efforts, own his to thanks however,comes position, present His attempts, 10 after admitted only was he but CCP, the joined he 1974 In the gained has (b. 1953) CCP,Xi Jinping the in career 40-year his During repressed during the Cultural Revolution. However, after 1978 and Deng and 1978 However,Revolution.after Cultural the during repressed per his up build skilfully to experience and knowledge skills, necessary the then Vice-Chairman of the CMC CC CCP and a former subordinate to subordinate a former and CMC CC CCP the of Vice-Chairman then the portant positions in the central authorities and was connected to Deng). to connected was and authorities central the in positions portant How founders of the PRC. In 1979–82 he served as secretary to Gen. , Geng Gen. to secretary as served he In 1979–82 PRC. the of founders his father, which allowed him to build up a very early base in the PLA. the in base early a very up build to him allowed which father, his im held in 1949–65 who war, civil the of (a hero father his Cultural Revolution and exile to the provinces to ‘learn from the people’.the from ‘learn to provinces the to exile and Revolution Cultural are tied to his. Xi has also systematically developed his own patron-client ownsystematicallydeveloped his also Xi has his. to tied are oa psto i te C. ie ay f i pes h eprecd the experienced he peers, his of many Like CCP. the in position sonal ciates, to whom he can delegate many tasks and whose personal careers personal whose and tasks many delegate can he whom to ciates, closeasso on bothallianceswithseveral factionsandhisown circleof hisfather, who hadbeen due toresistancefrompoliticalopponentsof Xi Jinping built up his position in the th National Congress of the CCP,the of Congress National Party - - - ­ - - - 83 OSW REPORT 4/2020 84 OSW REPORT 4/2020 whom he had worked during his career in local politics, especially in Zhejiang in especiallypolitics, local in career his workedduring had he whom position his up building While bodies. collective by filled are posts the when the law – by permitted extent the to orders, his out carry to ready are which 105 In the first years of Xi’s rule he also won the support of some of the factions the of some of support the won also he rule Xi’s of years first the In in Beijing, Xi started to bring people he trusted into Beijing, individuals with individuals Beijing, into trusted he people bring to Xi started Beijing, in positions. Xi’snaturalpoliticalbasewas theso-called‘princelings’, cadreswho Annex 3). (see province like Xi were children of influential Party elders, as well as the ‘Jiang Zemin ‘Jiang the as well as elders, Party influential of children were Xi like keyPartythe within apparatus.positions Importantly, takenot place does this which structures central the into factions own their bring first must leaders his bolster to both done was this process; decision-making the in places key ru’ rfrig o h Gnrl ertr o te 90 wo eand wide retained who 1990s the of Secretary General the to referring group’, One characteristic of Xi’s first term was his positioning of political allies in allies political of positioning his was term first Xi’s of characteristic One ally) when theleadertakes officehehasbureaucraticstructuresathisdisposal theoretic­ least (at where countries, other to contrast in China – In state. and spread influenceand supported Xi’smove for power intheCCP. Xi alsoskilfully operating in Beijing, while destroying others or removing them from important game intra-party a complicated during but process, nomination the during theirpower thusdependslargely ontheabilitytopositionloyalof peoplein enable themtocontroltheCCP, andthroughtheParty, thestate Party both managing in wheel the take to order in and position, political own

Xi Jinping’s personal popularity also depends on other factors. One should should One factors. other on depends also popularity personal Xi Jinping’s Fujian (1985–2002), Zhejiang (2002–7) and Shanghai (2007), from where from (2007), Shanghai and (2002–7) Zhejiang (1985–2002), Fujian ily as Peng’s husband. Peng’s as ily PLA’sthe from a singer Liyuan, Peng to marriage his underestimate not (1982–5), of provinces the in structures CCP’s the within up rising slowly and career, his in ranks Party the all through moving network, port meant that in 2007 he became a member of the Standing Committee Standing the of a member became he in 2007 that meant port fore Xi Jinping became Vice-Chairman of the PRC, he was known primar knownwas he PRC, the of Vice-Chairman became Xi Jinping fore he was brought to Beijing by Jiang Zemin and . Their sup Their Qinghong. Zeng and Zemin Jiang by Beijing to brought was he artistic ensemble who is popular among certain segments of society.Be of segments certain among popular is who ensemble artistic and of the Politburo of the CC CCP, and in 2008 Vice-Chairman of the PRC, the of Vice-Chairman in 2008 and CC CCP, the of Politburo the of 1992. See K.G. Lieberthal, D.M. Lampton (ed.), D.M. Lampton K.G. Lieberthal, See de facto de successor to Hu Jintao. to successor Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China Post-Mao in Making Decision and Politics, Bureaucracy, 105 . The scope The scope . - - - - , ‘oilactions,which their up,havebrokengroup’and completely been factions – An important tool in Xi’s factional policy was the anti-corruption campaign, anti-corruption the was policy factional Xi’s in tool important An verely punishthe‘populists’ and the‘oil group’, butalsotogainindependence The start of Xi’s rule coincided with the ongoing disintegration of the tradi the of disintegration ongoing the with coincided rule Xi’s of The start weakened the other forces in the CCP by putting people from different factions wellfactions,as competing the severalin at cadres struck high-ranking which elite CCP’s the united finally precedent, a dangerous haveset to deemed were Bo Xilai of The supporters figure. isolated a rather today is Li Premier why 108 107 106 in the same institutions, thus causing their internal paralysis; and as a result a result as and paralysis; internal their causing thus institutions, same the in se to only section 2.2.5)not (see campaign anti-corruption the Xi used in 2013, programme his into left’ ‘new the from ideas many incorporated new peopleintohispoliticalbase, over bringing many peoplefromotherfac tional factionalstructureswithintheCCP theseactivities weretions. in any None way of different fromhispredecessors’ the on a representative had League, Youth Communist the around built tion political landscape based on family and clan relationships (see section 1.1.3). (see relationships clan and family on based landscape political practices. from the support of the ‘princelings’ and the ‘Jiang Zemin group’. Xi skilfully group’.Xi skilfully Zemin ‘Jiang the and ‘princelings’ the of support the from he and his people, who had come to dominate(see the small leading groups Standing Committee of the Politburo in the person of Premier Li Keqiang. But Li Keqiang. Premier of person the in Politburo the of Committee Standing acknowledged that the that acknowledged decade’ ‘wasted the after as their support bases at the local level. After completing the transfer of poweras theirsupport basesatthelocallevel. After completingthetransfer of Xi Jinping. around the and ‘populist’ the in 2012 – attempt coup the behind were who those and section 1.1.4) became the became section 1.1.4) helpful. also was opposition the of The collapse section 2.1.3). thePLA by puttingforward a proposalfor theradicalmodernisation support of the won Xi also groups. interest sectoral alienate not to as a way such in so of the army, and also adopting many ‘hawks’ to his military programme (see programme military his to ‘hawks’ many adopting also army,and the of

Atrophy and Adaptation and Atrophy For more on the current internal politics of the CCP, see D.L. Shambaugh, D.L. Shambaugh, see CCP, the of politics internal current the on more For The thesis about the ‘lost decade’ (2002–12), during which the favourable economic and international minimise to CCP the on calling intellectuals among trend a popular represents left’ ‘new The term Demystifying the Chinese Economy Chinese the Demystifying ileged social groups. social ileged economic differences and pursue an active social policy, including increasing transfers to less priv less to transfers increasing including policy, social active an pursue and differences economic be found even among economists close to the regime, such as Justin Yifu Lin. See Justin Yifu Lin, Lin, Yifu Justin See Lin. Yifu Justin as such regime, the to close economists among even found be situation was not used to make the necessary changes to the developmental model of the PRC, can can PRC, the of model developmental the to changes necessary the make to used not was situation , Washington 2008. Washington , de facto de 107 , Cambridge 2011. Cambridge , of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the other factions other the Jiabao,Wen and Hu Jintao of people should step aside: this is also a reason a reason also is this aside: step should people decision-makers. At the same time he drew he time same the At decision-makers. 108 and the emergence of aninternal andtheemergence of China’s Communist Party: Party: Communist China’s Tuanpai 106 , butdid , a fac , - - - - - 85 OSW REPORT 4/2020 86 OSW REPORT 4/2020 Xi’s victory in the factional struggle of his first term opened up the way for way the up opened term first his of struggle factional the in victory Xi’s transformationsthe drivermain the thereforeneither Xi is of initiator the nor years within the Party allowed him to fill key positions with people loyal to loyal people with positions key fill to him allowed Party the within years The process of consolidating power intensified after the start of Xi’s second Xi’s of start the after intensified power consolidating of The process within theParty elite. He andskilfully recognised, exploited, thenew dynamic During the twilight of Hu Jintao’s rule, in the struggle to seize power, the po power,the seize to struggle the in rule, Hu Jintao’s of twilight the During 2.2.3. in the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CCP’s Central Committee Central CCP’s the of Politburo the of Committee Standing the in Standing its and Politburo CC’s the CCP: the of groupings major the of most in andbuildupa very broadbasefor himself.The Party,itself andwithitalsothe CCP the govern to elders Party the from mandate a strong obtain to order in predecessors. his by held beyond those influence they currently hold 16 of the 25 seats. the of 16 hold currently they theCCP.term asGeneralSecretary of The positionhehadbuiltupover several majorities form to came Xi with affiliated people time that in 2017.At CCP the the 19 during position his of consolidation formal the to began and development, PRC’s the of direction the on outlooks various the faction centred around Xi Jinping assumed a dominant position. a dominant assumed Xi Jinping around centred faction factions is disintegrating. The new internal structure, based on family clans, is themostpowerful clanswithintheCCP. theinterestsof follow thelinesof It is him during the CCP’s 19 CCP’s the during him favourhim. to continue will situation this long how largely dueprecisely totheresulting power vacuum, butitisdebatableasto and power of a level gain to disruption the of advantage took he much how division withinthecentralapparatusceasedtobeshapedby litical linesof Central Committee, two may be counted as Xi’s people (aside from himself): Central Committee, two may becountedas Xi’s people(asidefrom himself): theCCP’s the Politburoof theStandingCommittee of theseven membersof Of the way this In bureaucracy.Party the in bodies key as well as Committee, achieved clear dominance in the Politburo of theCCP’sCentral Committee: achieved cleardominance inthePolitburoof have circle Xi’s from However, people here. dominance complete achieved the 19 at state, finds itself ina period where the state, findsitself difficult to say how much Xi deliberately accelerated the whole process, and process, whole the accelerated deliberately Xi much how say to difficult competition. Xi’s strong position and his network of personal influence are influence personal of network his and position strong Xi’s competition. political of model now, a new right create shape to taking onlytime needs and

Consolidation of power top at CCP of the the th Party Congress (2017–22), although it cannot be said that he has he that said be cannot it although (2017–22), Congress Party th Congress in October 2017. Xi won a strong position a strong Xi won October 2017. in Congress status quo basedonthetraditionalParty th National Congress of of Congress National - , a Xi loyalist. The other secretaries are: , anoth Xuexiang, Ding are: secretaries The other loyalist. a Xi Huning, Wang The key body that allows Xi Jinping control of the CCP,the PRC, the it through and of control allowsXi Jinping that bodyThe key Tuanpai 109 Min’er, , Ding Xuexiang, , , , Li Qiang, Li Hongzhong, Kunming, Huang Xuexiang, Ding Xi, Chen Min’er, 1997 it has been made up of seven secretaries, butthemainroleisplayed1997 ithasbeenmadeupof by its First Secretary, who is always one of the members of the Standing Committee Standing the of members the Secretary,of alwaysFirst one is who Youxia. Zhang and Xiaodu Jiechi, Yang WangChen, He, Li Xi, the in roots their have members other Two Huning. Wang and is the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The secretariat is expected to serveis the Secretariat of theCentralCommissionfor Discipline Inspection, ZhaoLeji, is the new head of JiangZemin,and was alsoa former deputy mittee, HanZheng,isa confidantof the first institutions liquidated by Mao Zedong at the beginning of the Cultur the of beginning the at Zedong Mao by liquidated institutions first the of one was it that fact the by confirmed was Committee Central the of tariat thewhole the CCP’sCentralCommittee, butinrealityitshapestheagenda of today,the of As crisis. political a major of event the in loyal remain will they the top management to Xi Jinping in memberShanghai. of The most enigmatic people upon whose vote he can count are Li Zhanghu, , Qi, Chen Qi, Cai Leji, Zhao Li Zhanghu, are count can he vote whose upon people from Xi himself 15 people are affiliated with him, but the level of their depend their of the level but him, with affiliated are 15 people himself Xi from Central Committee and the General Secretary. At present this post is held by held is post this present Secretary.At General the and Committee Central Secre the of The importance information. of flow the controlling work, CC’s the CCP’s Central Committee itself, apart the Politburo of the 25 members of Of Com Standing the of member One Hu Jintao. Secretary General former CCP’s a representative of the ‘princelings’; there is no information as to which if any if which to as information no is ‘princelings’;there the a representativeof action. The Secretariat of the Central Committee was restored in 1980. Since in 1980. restored was Committee Central the of The Secretariat action. his block to able be would it that realised Mao because in 1966, Revolution al so he is not fully dependent on the General Secretary.General the on dependent fully not is he so Xi Jinping supported er confidant of Xi Jinping, who heads the General Office of the CCP’s Central CCP’s of the Office General the heads who Xi Jinping, of confidant er the of Secretariat the for staff of chief of a kind as acts He Politburo. the of whether sure be cannot he widely,and varies Secretary General the on ency has ‘princelings’,he the of most like 2012, Since to. ties has he factions the of

The fathers of Xi Jinping and Zhao Leji were allegedly friends, but it is not known how this may be be may this how known not is it but friends, allegedly were Leji Zhao and Xi Jinping of The fathers Central Commission for Discipline Inspection after Wang Qishan, a Xi loyalist, could also mean that that mean also could loyalist, a Xi Qishan, Wang after Inspection Discipline for Commission Central helped Xi to fill many positions with his people. However, Zhao’s occupation of the leadership of the the of leadership the of occupation Zhao’s However, people. his with positions many he fill to Committee Xi helped Central the of Department Organisational the of head as when, office, of term first his it to build up his own political base. This would be implied by the fact that representatives of other other of representatives that fact the by implied be would This base. political own his up build to it during Xi Jinping supported Leji Zhao Nevertheless, sons. the between relationship the in reflected factions have been given positions as vice-chairmen of the Commission. the of vice-chairmen as positions given been have factions a further purge of corrupt activists in the CCP will proceed, but it will not be so easy for Xi to use use to Xi for easy so be not will it but proceed, will CCP the in activists corrupt of purge a further group, Li Keqiang and ; they were previously linked to the Wangto previouslywerelinkedtheyand Yang; group,Li Keqiang 109 , buthehasanindependentpositionintheParty, and - - - - - 87 OSW REPORT 4/2020 88 OSW REPORT 4/2020 Winning the support of the PLA was essential to the reinforcement of Xi Jin of reinforcement the to essential was PLA the of support the Winning Xi’s apparent dominance in the highest bodies of the CCP has disturbed the Xi’s apparent dominance in the highest bodies of They are all connected personally with the General Secretary Xi Jinping or his or Xi Jinping Secretary General the with personally connected all are They was further strengthened by his announcement that the army would under section 2.1.2), (see Party the within dynamics political overall the to due was Pluralism at the highest levels of government state’s the policy,influences levels highest the of at Pluralism and Sheng Guo Department; Organisational CC’s the of Chairman and Politburo the of a member Xi, Chen section 2.2.5); (see Supervision of Council National jointly responsible for its consequences, and spreading the political respon 2.2.4. not been granted permission to wield total domination over the CCP’s centre. CCP’s the over domination total wield to permission granted been not Partyelders,Xi has the from mandate a strong receiving despite that, indicate may bodies collective key CCP’s the in Xi Jinping with associated directly not tary budget, as well as the army maintaining its influence on national security national on influence mili its armymaintaining the well as as budget, tary the in rises continued of army,a guarantee the of repoliticisation the power to which inXi’s hands and thedegree decisionsare the consolidation of Committee. Central the of work the and agenda the shape people seven these previous General Secretary. Nevertheless, a relative pluralism is still visible still is pluralism Secretary.Nevertheless,a relative General previous policy. ping’s power, asthe army sendsthelargest of andmostconsolidatedgroup factional balance of power which was visible during the reign of the CCP’s power which was of factional balance of visible during the reign head of the CC’s Publicity Department; and You , a member of the CC the of a member Quan, You and Department; Publicity CC’s the of head Le and Political CC’s the of head the and CC Politburo the of a member kun, go fundamental reforms. The price for the PLA’s support of Xi, however,wasXi, of PLA’ssupport the for The price reforms. fundamental go them making thus process – decision-making Partythe the into within groups the and Politburo the of a member Kunming, Huang Commission; Affairs gal Committee, the bureaucratic base of the Central Committee, and is a member a member is and Committee, Central the of base bureaucratic the Committee, at the highest levels of the Party leadership. While Hu Jintao’s weak position weak Hu Jintao’s While leadership. Party the of levels highest the at Together CC CCP. the of Department Work Front United the of head the and at this time it is necessary to seek other explanations for the current appar current the for explanations other seek to necessary is it time this at sibility for any possible mistakes. At the same time, the presence of people of presence the time, same the At mistakes. possible any for sibility of the CC Politburo; , a member of the CC Politburo, head of the of head CC Politburo, the of a member Xiaodu, Yang CC Politburo; the of delegates to both the National Congress of the CCP and the NPC. Xi’s position Xi’s NPC. the and CCP the of Congress National the both to delegates part 3). (see state governingthe sectors various the in varies centralised other incorporate to trying be may Xi Jinping hand, one the On pluralism. ent Committee. Central the of Secretariat the of creation the since existed not has which a situation circle –

Re-politicising army the ------owned enterprises. Service in the army also ceased to be the only career path career only the be to ceased also army the in Service enterprises.‑owned After coming to power, Xi took a series of steps to increase the importance of of importance the increase to steps of a series power, Xi took to coming After steadily politics domestic in PLA’s role power, the took Xiaoping Deng After The situation changed in the period leading up to Xi’s ascent to power. He re power.He to ascent Xi’s to up leading period the in changed The situation who had then lobbied the Party elders for his candidacy. Xi was able to skil to able candidacy.Xi was his for elders Party the lobbied then had who 112 111 110 the PLA’s outdated command structure, its tactical principles based on Soviet on based principles tactical its structure, command PLA’soutdated the high-level against fight the as well as section 3.2.2), (see 2014 since army the of reform The fundamental PLA’ssupport. the further army,gaining the thus influential more the of some among widespread was that army the reform to interests. military’s the in interfere to weak too was tre cen the (2002–2012) rule Hu Jintao’s of decade army,the the in with and do to the in army the on spending in increase a systematic granted was it which to training inimportance the studentprotests in Tiananmen Square, didnotchange this trend. The army powerParty.the within group interest another just to wasprocess This largely patterns, insufficient R&D facilities and so on. Also, Xi’s adoption of a more of adoption Xi’s Also, on. so and facilities R&D insufficient patterns, figures in the military (see section 3.2.2). (see military the in figures carry to a need power: gain to trends two those of synergy the exploit fully late 1990s (see section 1.1.6). Over time the PLA also obtained relative internal relative obtained also PLA the time Oversection 1.1.6). (see late 1990s assertive foreign policy favours the PLA’s special interests; it seems that the that seems it interests; PLA’sspecial the favours policy foreign assertive corps, officer the among changes these for support securing also army,while autonomy, which resulted largely fromthefactthatParty hadnoideawhat still played a large role in shaping China’s national security policy security national China’s shaping in role a large played still an corruption, underfunding, as such problems, of a number with struggled corruption a wish and elders; Party the among system the of reconfiguration a major out the in changes deep out carry to Partyelders the from mandate ceived a broad outdated structure, andthefactthatpoliticaltrainingstillsuperseded military suppressed brutally PLA the when 1989, of The events ambitious. the to open other sectoral groups, mainly state­ due to the emergence and rapid growth of theCCP’s declined, andthearmy was transformed frombeingthemainpropof

Vice-Chairman of the CMC, and his successor Caihou, both of whom were linked to Hu Jintao’s Hu Jintao’s to linked were whom of both Caihou, Xu successor his and CMC, the of Vice-Chairman Despite the removal of several high-level commanders (including Generals , the the Boxiong, Guo Generals (including commanders high-level several of removal the Despite Hwang, Byong-Moo M. Gurtov, See J.S. Bajwa, See Tuanpai level), and who considered the corrupt generals’ activities to have been detrimental to the army’s army’s the to detrimental been have to activities generals’ corrupt the considered who level), and modernisation. els, who did not themselves participate in corrupt schemes (at least, not at the multi-million dollar dollar multi-million the at not (at least, schemes corrupt in participate themselves not did who els, faction) this move has met with support from the officer corps at the middle and lower lev lower and middle the at corps officer the from support with met has move this faction) 112 , initiatedchanges inareascriticalfor themilitary. Thoseincluded Modernization of the Chinese PLA: From Massed Militia to Force Projection Force to Militia Massed From PLA: Chinese the of Modernization 110 . However, the military did retain one trump card: it card: trump one retain did However, military . the China’s Security: The New Roles of the Military the of Roles The New Security: China’s , London 1998. London , , Atlanta 2013. Atlanta , 111 , thanks , - - - - 89 OSW REPORT 4/2020 90 OSW REPORT 4/2020 Xi’s strong rule. This is not a new phenomenon in post-1949 China, but no but China, post-1949 in phenomenon a new not is This rule. strong Xi’s The anti-corruption campaign started by Xi Jinping, on a scale without prec without a scale on Xi Jinping, by started campaign The anti-corruption nationalism of stimulation the with army,along the of The repoliticisation ideological the in elements key the of one become also has army The modern In theperiodimmediately afterXi’s succession, the CCP’santi-corruptioncam 2.2.5. may force the Party and the PLA to undertake aggressive acts whose conse whose acts aggressive undertake to PLA the and Party the force may turn. neo-conservative Xi’s of manifestation for justification the become has Party,but the of a tool just longer no now is tionalised in the form of the National Supervisory Commission (NSC),Commission are NationalSupervisory and the of form the in tionalised However,public. Chinese the among this it of expectations high and army the great the resisting army,of capable legitimacy.A strong nationalist CCP’s the perspective, this scenario is unlikely.is scenario perspective,this basis the as role important an plays also States), United the (meaning powers paign was the case of Bo Xilai (see box in section 2.1.2), waspaign the case of the major high-ranking cam the lit that The fuse rotation. cadre accelerate and opponents political thenew servedpaign GeneralSecretary, toconsolidatethepower of isolatehis PRC. the of system political the in inscribed permanently political opponentsandtocreatemechanismsfor discipliningCCPcadresat political Party’s the restoring at aimed spectacle a national as well power,as for new sources of legitimacy for its authoritarian rule. As in the past, this past, the in As rule. authoritarian its for legitimacy of sources new for legitimacy. Around 2.7 million CCPmembershave beensubjected toarrestsand army,which the of repoliticisation the to leading is This state. prosperous ly binds thearmy totheCommunistParty, butalsobuildsuptheauthorityof CCP collapse, the army – despite its close ties with the Party – will become will Party – the with ties close its despite army – the collapse, CCP another is this a degree: such to it exploited has Zedong Mao since leader CCP among Chinesesociety, areshort-termactions, resulting fromtheCCP’ssearch section 2.1.3). (see army the by fuelled partially been has itself shift assertive a natural force that could be tempted to assume power.assume to tempted be However,could that force a natural today’sfrom aroused thus sentiments nationalist the First, risks. main two bears approach of a modernised (as understood by the CCP) society and a strong, economical a strong, and society CCP) the by understood (as a modernised of the Chinese nation’, forcampaign renewal the ‘great of aimed at strengthening central and local levels. In Xi’s second term these actions have been institu been have actions these term second Xi’s In levels. local and central measures.disciplinary has helped Xi bothto eliminate his major The campaign hispersonal thePRC,hasbecomefoundation of of edent inthehistory the of rule the Secondly,should predict. to able be not may CCP the quences

The anti-corruptioncampaign ------was to strengthen the CCP’s social legitimacy, and to increase Xi Jinping’s per Xi Jinping’s increase legitimacy,to social and CCP’s the strengthen to was 113 In this dimension, Xi’s actions can be compared to the tactics of two previous In thisdimension,Xi’sactionscanbecomparedtothetacticsof intensity and length, which has reached a scale unprecedented within the CCP the within unprecedented whicha scale length, reached and has intensity to politically subordinate the local Party structures to Beijing. The campaign The campaign Beijing. to structures Party local the subordinate politically to steamafterabouta year.their anti-corruptiondrives ranoutof InXi’scase, the political instrumentandbegantheirown anti-corruptioncampaigns. However, corruption. with charged being by of examples made were which in players previously consisted of a network of disciplinary committees subordinate to subordinate committees disciplinary of a network of consisted previously has alsogainedhuge mediacoverage, successive waves withthenamesof of Since taking power in 2012, Xi Jinping has also significantly reorganised the reorganised significantly also has Xi Jinping in 2012, power taking Since CCP General Secretaries, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who also used the same the used also who Hu Jintao, and Zemin Jiang Secretaries, CCP General anti-corruption campaign has proved to be a project of incomparably greater greater incomparably of a project be to proved has campaign anti-corruption system for fighting corruption within the framework of the CCP. This had This CCP. the of framework the within corruption fighting for system popularity.sonal to able been has Xi course its during Furthermore, Mao. of death the since detainees being broadly publicised, at both the local and central levels. The aim mechanism a permanent creating time same the at inefficiency, while its of source the at striking corruption, fighting for system the rebuild completely

were handed down to Zhou the Polit­ Yongkang, a former member of During Xi’s first term, the anti-corruption campaign – which covered a wide The anti-corruption range of problems consuming the CCP,range of from over-conspicuous consump reached beyond the borders of China: in 2014–17 around 2500 former offi 2500 former around in 2014–17 China: of borders beyondthe reached tary Commission, tary among others. It is estimated that around 100 CCP mem members, CCP 2.7 million around hit bribes – dollar multi-million to tion ures from the highest circles of the Party were also punished: convictionsures from the highest circles of Standing Committee, and , a Vice-Chairman of the Central Mili Standing Committee, and Xu Caihou, a Vice-Chairman of bers of ministerial or vice-ministerial rank and around 1000 managerial 1000 managerial around and rank vice-ministerial or ministerial of bers Of this number, Of around 60,000 people were criminally charged. In accord ance with Xi’s statement that he would fight both ‘tigers’ and ‘flies’, fig ‘flies’, and ‘tigers’ both fight would he that statement Xi’s with ance cials residing in 90 countries were extradited to China. to extraditedwere 90 countries in residing cials levelmunicipal the at cadres havealso has The campaign sentenced. been punishment disciplinary to subjectedwere 1.5 million around which of 2018, www.washingtonpost.com. 2018, G. Shih, G. Shih, ‘In China, investigations and purges become the new normal’ new the become purges and investigations China, ‘In campaign in numbers , WashingtonPost , 22 October 22 October , buro’s 113 ------. - 91 OSW REPORT 4/2020 92 OSW REPORT 4/2020 The aim of their activities was to detect and dismantle the extensive political extensive the dismantle and detect to was activities their of The aim which was subordinate totheCentralCommissionfor DisciplineInspection institu central largest provinces,the the several weeksto for sent werewhich enjoying Wang,Politburo. the of Committee Standing the of a member was 115 114 Initially, Xi carried out the campaign within the old system for fighting cor fighting for system old the within campaign the out carried Initially,Xi mem committee the procedures, anti-corruption the of part As Inspection. networks, and the local businessmen who cooperated with them. From 2013, From them. with cooperated who businessmen local the and networks, by led was in 2012 Inspection Discipline for Commission The Central ruption. source the at lay 1978, after decentralisation towards trend the from resulted on dependent financially and politically were corruption fighting institutions theCCP’sCentral Commit thePolitburoof investigations (withtheconsentof the In office. prosecutor’s the to forwarded discoveredwerewere regularities tions or the biggest state-owned enterprises during the campaign’s first months. groups, inspection several ‘flying’ created first at support, political highest the which situation, This supervise. to supposed were they cadres Party local the centralgovernment andthecentralstate-ownedtee) intotheinstitutionsof tral Commission for Discipline Inspection had the exclusive out right to carry the CCP’slocalstructures, aswell astheCentralCommissionfor Discipline prerogatives, including the detention of suspects),prerogatives, which in cases where including the detention of ir however, thedisciplinary Wang begantoaltertheinstitutional structureof iia oeain wr crid u a te ee o te rsctrs offices prosecutor’s the of level the at out carried were operations Similar bers first conducted an internal investigation within the CCP (they had broad had (they CCP the investigation within internal an conducted first bers at the local and central levels.central and local the at corruption structures’ dependency on the local cadre was broken, which broken, was cadre local anti­‑the on dependency structures’ corruption and thecourtsdealingwithcorruption local and businessnetworks,Party cadres, theirpatron­‑ oftenmadeupof client cells attheappropriatelevel (provincial, prefectural, municipal, etc.). The Cen Party to the dimensions) financial and personnel the (in subject were office old system, committee and the local prosecutor’s both the local disciplinary els in financial and personnel terms, and creating a hierarchical structure a hierarchical andcreating terms, personnel and financial in els committees, gradually subordinating thelocalcommitteestohigherlev time that at who Annex 3), (see Qishan Wang men, trusted most Xi’s of one of corruption flourishing the to contributed inefficiency,system’s and the of companies. Thissystem’s of interest: the inherentflaw was theobvious conflict

According to the principle of ‘one organisation, two nameplates’ ( nameplates’ two organisation, ‘one of principle the to According China’, in Anticorruption Model A New Commission: Supervision ‘The National Deng, Jinting Discipline Inspection, having a common management, personnel, finance, and even website. for even and Commission finance, personnel, Central management, the a common with having Inspection, personality Discipline legal its shares Commission Supervisory National national Journal of Law, Crime and Justice and Crime Law, of Journal national 2017. 115 . In the institutional dimension, the dimension, institutional the In . yi ge jigou, kuai paizi kuai liang jigou, ge yi ), the the ), Inter 114 ------. - Xi’s rule has clearly redefined the role which ideology plays in the structures the in plays ideology which role the redefined clearly has rule Xi’s The Party acknowledged that it was a mistake to abandon the large-scale ide large-scale the abandon to a mistake was it that acknowledged The Party the in culminated corruption against fight the in activities centralising These 119 118 117 116 March 2018. The NSC,asthemainbody fightingcorruption, was inscribedinto 2.2.6. made the network of disciplinary committees one of the most powerful tools powerful most the of one committees disciplinary of network the made o-cnmc lmns Te ut f personality of cult The elements. non-economic the National Supervisory Commission, Xi has managed to institutionalise the institutionalise to managed has Xi Commission, Supervisory National the theCCP ture of the ChineseConstitutionasa statebody equalinimportancetotheStateCoun people for fighting corruption; it has thus become the only institution permitted to permitted institution only the become thus has it corruption; fighting for Beijing. to elites local the subordinating for level which are hierarchically completely subordinate to Beijing to subordinatelevelcompletely hierarchically are which basic tool for control over the Party, the central bureaucracy bothat the level of the state, it has bedded in the structures of gained a special place in the new ideological offensive, even though it is rel is it though even offensive, ideological new the in place a special gained atively limited in scope, and differs from the image of the leader prevalent leader the of image the from differs and scope, in limited atively to system political the of legitimacy the linking campaign, anti-corruption frontareintendedtoenterintosynergyactions ontheideological withthe cadres. local the levelof the at and companies,powerfulstate-owned the and sion also absorbed all the branches of the public prosecutor’s office responsible sion also absorbed all the branches of ological campaigns aimed at shaping the mass consciousness of theChinese aimedatshapingthemassconsciousness of campaigns ological time. Zedong’s Mao during strategists, Party to society.According Chinese among as well CCP,as the of em being formally Despite PRC. the investigationsin anti-corruption conduct Commis Supervisory The National courts. the and office prosecutor’s the cil, in session NPC’s the during Commission Supervisory National the of creation

The last great ideological campaign took place in 1983, when under the slogan of ‘the purification of purification ‘the of slogan the under when in 1983, place took campaign ideological great The last form the create to campaign, propaganda a massive through seeking, of a process as Understood which apparatus), state (the Congress People’s local the by elected is membership their Formally weiyuanhui jiancha jilu zhongyang Zhonggong would suggest a horizontal structure. In reality, however, they are subordinate to the Central Com Central the to subordinate are they however, reality, In structure. a horizontal suggest would of the leader as the ‘providential man’, who is idealised and presented as an infallible, extremely extremely infallible, an as presented and idealised man’, is who ‘providential the as leader the of mission for Discipline Inspection. Discipline for mission talented individual. talented spreading within the PRC in connection with economic reforms. economic with connection in PRC the within spreading ( pollution’ spiritual

119 The ideological offensive and the cult of personality of cult the and offensive The ideological . This led to an ideological emptiness in society and the Party appara Party the and society in emptiness ideological an to led This . 116 . According to the newlaw,the Accordinglocal . to the at branches has NSC the qingchu jingshen wuran jingshen qingchu ), an attempt was made to fight the liberal ideas that were were that ideas liberal the fight to made was attempt ),an . de facto de 118 become an internal struc urudn X Jinping Xi surrounding 117 . In creating In . ------93 OSW REPORT 4/2020 94 OSW REPORT 4/2020 This ideological offensive also has an internal Party dimension. It is a tool for a tool It is dimension. Party internal an has also offensive ideological This 122 121 120 Marxism media, which is now intended to serve as a tool of mass social indoctrination, social mass of a tool as serve to intended now is which media, the ranks, but rather the fact that it is getting hard to find true Communists true find to hard getting is it that fact the rather but ranks, the the CCPtoday, secretdemocratshidingin thebigger problem isnotoneof ideologically updated an with space this block or of fill version to decided then consum and individualism like both ideas by Western filled void the with tus, universities andworkplaces. themass Tothishave beenaddedstrictcontrolof traininginschools, massideological propaganda activity andtherestorationof Chinese society as a whole are also present in the CCP in multiple forms. For forms. multiple in CCP the in present also are a whole as society Chinese and the use of new forms of communication (see box below).box (see communication of forms new of use the and secondary objectives.secondary The Party leadershiprealisesthattheproblemsaffecting erism, as well as reborn traditional beliefs and practices of magic erism, aswell asreborntraditionalbeliefsandpracticesof elements’ who do not share the Marxist vision of theworld. However,elements’ who donotsharetheMarxistvisionof theseare checking theloyalty and involvement cadres, or for unmaskingthose‘hostile of

‘Study ‘Study strong country!’ ( ‘Studycountry!’ strong The basic function of this application, however, is to study the thought the study to however,is application, this of function The basic translate into points gained. All CCP members are required to install the install to required are members CCP All gained. points into translate poor results are publicly shamed and lose their bonuses. their lose and shamed publicly are results poor good results with friends. Frequency of use and results from regular tests regular from results and use friends.goodof with resultsFrequency One can also pass a test of knowledge about Xi Jinping thought and share and thought Xi Jinping knowledgeabout of a test pass also can One as well as access to films about the Party and the revolutionary struggle. revolutionary the and Party the about films to access as well as adequate scores. People who avoid installing the application or who get who or application the installing avoid who People scores. adequate application, and some employers already require their employees to obtain sions of the speeches and most important sions publications of made by Xi Jinping. send money transfers, a calendar and a news aggregator from Party media, of the General Secretary of the CCP. The user has access to digital ver digital to access has CCP.The user the of Secretary General the of es equipped with several features such as a chat window and the ability to ( Xuexi must “We out: pointed Xi Secretary, General as his after ideology on speech first his In witchcraft. practising been had cadres CCP local some that revealed was it In 2017 Minister says some officials practice sorcery’ practice officials some says Minister have the strong strategic determination to firmly oppose the various false claims that [we are] giv are] [we that claims false various the oppose firmly to determination strategic strong the have no. 7, 2019, www.qstheory.cn. 2019, no. 7, transition.” of stage [current] the about misconceptions correct consciously to and socialism, up ing author’s translation). translation). ­author’s 121 the . In practice, this has meant the systematic intensification of purely . Inpractice, this has meant the systematic intensification of powerful , www.xuexi.cn., ‘ Guanyu jianchi he fazhan zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi de ge wenti ge ji de zhuyi shehui tese zhongguo fazhan he jianchi Guanyu country!’ Xuexi qiangguo Xuexi 122 , Reuters ) isanapplicationfor mobiledevic , 16 November 2017, www.reuters.com. 16 November 2017, , 120 . The Party. ‘Senior China China ‘Senior ’ , Qiushi - - - - , Xi hasadopted,butprimarily fromthechanges incultureandconsciousness cultural contemporary to adapted been has which a version in but Xi Jinping, The logic of these changes, as in the case of the changes within the Party,is the within changes the of case the in as changes, these of The logic thePRCasimplementedby Xi Jinpingincludesanimpor The reconstruction of of a cult of creation the by accompanied been has offensive The ideological which have taken place in the PRC since 1976. It is also unlikely that Xi and his his and Xi that unlikely also It is 1976. since PRC the in place havetaken which 124 123 2.3.1. Reconstruction 2.3. maintaining Xi’s personal popularity, which is useful in internal Party politics. Party internal in useful is popularity,which personal Xi’s maintaining of a question more is it that suspects One goals. such haveevenset circle inner it will never have a similar impact; force this of results not only from the profile menting the reforms more efficiently. Xi is using and developing methods and methods developing and efficiently. using more reforms Xi is the menting some between relationship provinces,the and Beijing wellas transferof the as alteration this of elements important CCP.The most the with relationship its tools which were leaders, used by such asthecreation previous generations of itsactions, and thestate, thephilosophy of tant alterationtothestructureof this sense, the Xi cult is of very different from the Mao, cult of and it seems that to be someone more worldly, who likes steamed dumplings, who ‘knows the ills careerists idea-free corrupt, with filled are ranks the there; powers from the structures of the state directly to those of the CCP.the of those to directly state the of structures the powersfrom patterns. Whereas Mao Zedong was a distant, unknowable leader, Xi Jinping has from the expectations of today’s leaders from theexpectations of generation a new attract to CCP. the necessary abandon is to it Therefore, first based on concentrating power in Xi Jinping’s hands by increasing his circle’s his increasing by hands Xi Jinping’s in power concentrating on based generation at an early stage of its development.its of stage early an at generation are the centralisation of power,are thecentralisationof bothinthecentraladministrationand state. These changes in the management of the state are also aimed at imple at aimed also are state the of management the in changes These state. such individuals can be good enough administrators, but in a crisis they are the direct control over the political processand the day-to-day the activities of country’, etc.the In of region a poor workin to ‘used he people’because the of differ ideals their that be may problem the Party,although the to idealists of

This was proved by the purge carried out in universities during 2018 among the Marxist student student Marxist the among 2018 during universities in out carried purge the by proved was This See associations that had supported the social and wage demands of striking workers. striking of demands wage and social the supported had that associations

The Chinese Communist Party’s Capacity to Rule: Ideology, Legitimacy and Party Cohesion Party and Legitimacy Ideology, Rule: to Capacity Party’s Communist The Chinese The concept of ‘top-down design’ ‘top-down of The concept of the state apparatus 124 ; hencetheattempttoshapethisnew 123 . In good times good In . , 2016. , - - 95 OSW REPORT 4/2020 96 OSW REPORT 4/2020 ‑downdesign’system. political Chinese In the permanently into it inscribe and ‑down design’ ( What is particularly important, this ‘brain of the state’ is locatedWhat within is particularly the important, this ‘brain of (see section 1.1.4), which have beenexpanded andinstitutionally strengthened, ( view of how the state functions. In 2018 this structure was raised to the rank the to raised was structure this In 2018 functions. state the how of view The most important consequence of this ‘top-down design’ is the ongoing cen ongoing the design’‘top-downis this of consequence important The most ‘top­ of concept the of implementation the is action revolutionary The most with a particularly complex structure, which has powers to assume direct con powersdirect has assumewhich structure, to complex a particularly with 125 Party structures directly subordinated to Xi Jinping and his inner circle. In or In circle. inner his and Xi Jinping to subordinated directly structures Party 2.3.2. recent years the role of other, pre-existing networks of small leading groups groups leading small of networks pre-existing other, of role the years recent localauthorities, as well theautonomyascentral of ily attheexpense of multidimensional long-term, undertake to state the order to need the means it practice, In in 2012. rule his of beginning the at presented Xi which reforms the members of thecentralbureaucracy the membersof and leadership CCP’s the of rest the of expense the at Xi Jinping, of hands the power in thestateandconcentrationof the management of tralisation of trol over allthereforms andlegislative changes relevant fromthepointof unprecedented centralisation of decision-making. This is conducted primar conducted is This decision-making. of centralisation unprecedented from the state institutions. state the from has also greatly increased. greatly also has lationship between Party andstate, theinstitutionalstructuresreinforce the bureaucracy which is responsible for the day-to-day management of the state. the day-to-daythe of managementfor responsible is which bureaucracy Group for the Comprehensive Deepening of Reform, a special steering group group steering a special Reform, of Deepening Comprehensive the for Group aging the state developed in China since 1978 (see section 1.3.1), this means an means section 1.3.1),this (see 1978 since China developedin state the aging the model for man and also to seek synergies in various areas. In the context of domination of the CCP’s bureaucracy,CCP’s the overtakeswhich competencies of core domination the re the In administration. the of reorganisations and groups leading small of of a Commission, which indicates a desire to further institutionalise the ‘top­ the institutionalise further to a desire indicates which a Commission, of der to implement this ‘top-down design’, in 2013 Xi appointed the Small Leading centre which isabletocoordinate, initiate, monitorandprioritisethechanges, cies. To implement these plans, it is essential to create a strong decision-making quanmian

This ‘top-down design’ also has very important consequences for the relationship between the cen the between relationship the for consequences important very has also design’ ‘top-down This tre and the provinces; for more see section 2.3.4. see more for provinces; the and tre

Centralisation of management and reforms Centralisation state of the ) andcomprehensive ( dingceng sheji dingceng ), a methodology for designing and implementing and designing for a methodology ), zhengti 125 ) planscombiningmany sectoralpoli . Thesechanges have primarily been ------mentioned Central Comprehensive Deepening of Reform Commission,the ‑mentioned CentralComprehensive Deepeningof Xi’s actions are thus part of the standard practice of using leading groups usingleadinggroups thestandardpracticeof Xi’s actionsarethuspartof t h bgnig f is eod em sm o te ot motn leading important most the of some term, second Xi’s of beginning the At Central the by held is structure decision-making new the in place A central The concentration of power has been carried out by expanding the network of of network the expanding by out carried been powerhas of The concentration which are hierarchically subordinate to it. Similar leading groups for deepen for groups leading Similar it. to subordinate hierarchically are which re subgroups has instead but specialisation, a particular have not does which Reform), which operates within the CCP’s Central Committee. Its structure Its Committee. Central CCP’s the within operates which Reform), reflects the multifaceted nature of the ‘top-down design’ which searches for searches which design’ ‘top-down the of nature multifaceted the reflects of sections key the in groups these creating in and formal, more them making the into section 1.1.4) (see groups leading small the turning by implemented missions ( thestate. The Chairman initiating thenew politicalprocessinselectedareasof ing reforms have beenestablishedintheCCPstructuresatprovincial level structures local has CCP.Importantly,it the of development the and issues; the main group has met around 40 times and published overmost published 300 papers, and 40 times around met has group main the effects. their aimed institutions into reforms of direction general the set and decisions take this meanstransformingfromactingasbodieswhich selectedleadinggroups process, legislative the of view of point the From chain. decision-making the outinternalcoordinationand strengthenpowerto carry attheexpense of political opponents (see section 1.1.3). Xi’s innovation lies in expanding them, expanding in lies innovation Xi’s section 1.1.3). (see opponents political competences. and structures complex particularly with supergroups parent from 2013 as the Small Leading Group for the Comprehensive Deepening of of Deepening Comprehensive the for Group Leading Small the as 2013 from key link in the ‘pipeline’ of the decision-making process. decision-making the of ‘pipeline’ the in link key groups on the CCP’s Central Committee weregroups transformed into so-called Com Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission. Their rise in rank from rank in rise Their Commission. Affairs Economic and Financial Central Reform Commission(establishedin 2018;knownComprehensive Deepeningof and in selected cities, as well as in some state-owned enterprises. Since 2013 Since enterprises. state-owned some in as well as cities, selected in and bureau respective the to tasks delegating targets, and objectives planning at space Affairs Commission, the Central Foreign Affairs Commission and the and Commission Affairs Foreign Central the Commission, Affairs space sponsible for economy andecology;democracy‘ruleby law’; culture;social group only the It is state. the of areas many of management the in synergies several of Xi by creation the as well as section 1.1.4), (see groups leading small existing small leading groups wereexisting smallleadinggroups alsotransformed intotheCentralCyber Li Keqiang. Premier the is deputy its and Xi Jinping, is group the of cratic organs, andsettingtheday-to-daychanges andmonitoring paceof weiyuanhui . s rsl o tee hne, pr fo te above­ the from apart changes, these of result a As ). - - - - - 97 OSW REPORT 4/2020 98 OSW REPORT 4/2020 The central bureaucracy thus held a relatively high degree of power, resulting of degree a relativelyhigh held thus bureaucracy The central on bodies CCP’s the haveThe changesintroduced Xi of influence the increased 126 Party bureaucracy’s competence, and therefore the influence wielded by the by wielded influence the therefore and competence, bureaucracy’s Party theCCP’sCentralCommittee. Thiswas particularly importantdur Politburo of istration. The expansion of the network of leading groups thus increased the increased thus groups leading of network the of The expansion istration. posts key the fill would who on influence great to exert able yet not he was when (2012–16), office of term first his ing to implementingthechanges by initiated, planned andsupervised theParty CCP’s the of Politburo the hitherto Although section 2.3.2). (see Premier the and Council State the of expense the at state, the of running day-to-day the PRC. the of structure permanent the into tures primarily meant the marginalisation of Premier Li Keqiang and the strength the and Li Keqiang Premier of marginalisation the meant primarily institutes the inscribing of vision a wider of part but term, first his in power from its role in designing and implementing the reforms. Under the ‘divisionthe Under reforms. the implementing and designing in role its from for theday-to-day thestatewhich were locatedintheParty struc runningof leading group to Commission probably means an increase in their staff and staff their in increase an means probably Commission to group leading leading groups. leading the of Committee Standing the of members other of expense the powerat his of scope the increasing thereby process, decision-making the in points key Secretariat of theCCP’sCentralCommittee. Thiswas conductedattheexpense Secretariat of at people trusted place to Xi allowed role groups’ leading the Strengthening government, the influence of the CCP’s leadership on the day-to-day running the on leadership CCP’s the of influence government,the Committee, the Premier had broad powers in the management of theadmin Committee, thePremierhadbroadpowers inthemanagement of the thepersonnelandmanagement of Central Committeehadcontrolof PRC).the of Chairman aging the state through leading groups was not just a way for Xi to consolidate a wayto just Xi wasnot for groups leading through state the aging man theircompetences. This indicates that themodelof a further extension of secretaries (who organise the committees’ work). On the personnel level,this personnel the work).On committees’ the organise (who secretaries of thecentralstate administration,whose roleinmany areashasbeenlimited of Central CCP’s the of Politburo the of Committee Standing the in duties’ of reforms. the of direction general the setting to limited often was state the of as simultaneously acting was (who Xi Jinping Secretary General the of ening or vice-presidents of posts the took faction Xi’s of members groups, key er oth in Annex 5): (see Committee Central CCP’s the on groups leading eight

The personnel policy of the NPC at that time (2013–18) resulted from the resolutions at the CCP con CCP the at resolutions the from resulted (2013–18) time that at NPC the of policy The personnel gress of 2012, when Xi Jinping did not yet hold such a strong position in the Party. the in position a strong such hold yet not did Xi Jinping when of 2012, gress 126 . Xi himself became chairman of of chairman became Xi himself . ------Although the leading groups have allowed Xi to consolidate power, the new power,the consolidate to Xi allowedhave groups leading the Although vision between Party andstatehasexisted inthePRC for years; thequalitative The fundamental change during the Xi tenure has been the use of key Party key of use the been has tenure Xi the during change The fundamental andthe theleadinggroups This ismainly due totheinformal structureof which has turned the State Council and the specialised groups into executive,into groups specialised the and Council State the turned has which which has caused delays and led to problems in giving the appropriate priority 128 127 26 are now part of the CCP’s Central Committee, and 57 are on the State Coun State the on 57 are and Committee, Central CCP’s the of part now 26 are not decision-making bodies. Of the more than 80 known bodies of this type, this of bodies known 80 than more the Of bodies. decision-making not above: described of the only key bodies number not affects total the groups ing industry, for organisingtheWinterOlympics andthegroup in 2022) the transfer of coordination, the delegation of tasks and the supervision of the tasks of andthesupervision coordination,thedelegationof the transfer of (atleastthosewhosethese groups existence hasbeenmadepublic)rosefrom tus tosabotage the reform projectsorreplacethemwithonesmorefavoura appara bureaucratic the for room up opened has This projects. individual to problems by increasing staff numbers. The expansion of the network of lead of network the of The expansion numbers. staff increasing by problems ary oet ueurtc eore te pses s rsl. u t staff to Due result. a as possess they resources bureaucratic modest ­fairly leading and commissions groups to initiate, plan and supervise the changes, haveleading groups documents, had problems with processing the necessary State Council to new commissions and groups on the CC. the on groups and commissions new to Council State ble toitself,asthestatebureaucracyenjoys muchbroaderfacilitiesandmore as the group for reformingas thegroup state-owned enterprises, for advanced thegroup with dealing groups includes Council The State operations. anti-corruption and propaganda, Macau, and Kong Hong cyber-security,Tibet, reform, army with dealing policy. domestic groups external),and include and foreign These of 2017. end the at over83 to in 2015 40 around access to information short­ change associatedwiththe‘top-down planning’conceptprimarily concerns (such groups task specialised are which of most issues, social and economic (internal security for responsible groups the of most manages The Party cil. these resolve to intended is in 2018 committees into groups leading small of reforms. implementing for a tool as limitations has structure decision-making

The main role in the management of economic reforms, however, is played by two commissions on on commissions two by played is however, reforms, economic of management the in role The main J. Jakóbowski the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission. Affairs Economic and Financial Central the and Commission ofReform Deepening Comprehensive Central the Committee: Central CCP’s the ages andtheirrelatively smallsecretariats, themostheavily burdened , The drifting of China’s reforms China’s of The drifting 127 . The institutionalisation and transformation of some of transformation and The institutionalisation . …, op. cit. op. 128 . Thisdi - - - - - 99 OSW REPORT 4/2020 100 OSW REPORT 4/2020 129 November 2017 CCP congress, the start of the NPC’s new term in March 2018 March 2018 in term new NPC’s the of start the congress, CCP November 2017 and government of centralisation the (2012–17), term first Xi Jinping’s During 2.3.3. ing groups. After the final consolidation of his power in the Party during the during Party the in power his of consolidation final the After groups. ing thebureaucracytochallenges facingthePRCand ing thestructureof the changes inParty-state relations were mainly limitedtoinformal activities, adapt of practice long-used the with line in were moves these of Most term. gave Xi the opportunity to implement institutional changes. In addition to in to addition In changes. institutional implement to opportunity the Xi gave One element of Xi’s reform of the state apparatus was the restructuring of the of restructuring wasthe apparatus state the of reform Xi’s of element One Chart 5. sential small leading groups, as well as abolishing the term limit on the office the on limit term the abolishing as well as groups, leading small sential es the and section 2.2.5) (see campaign anti-corruption the stitutionalising rule. Xi’s of a characteristic been has which something thestate’s competences, Party structuresattheexpense of strengthening of of the CCP and on the State Council on the and CCP of the one example of which was the development of the networks of small lead small of networks the of development the was which of example one involvesthe CCP.The restructuring the within dynamics political in changes hissecond central administrationwhich of hecarried outatthebeginning Source: 10 20 30 15 25 0 5

17 October 2017, www.csis.org. 17 October 2017, C. Johnson, S. Kennedy, S. Kennedy, C. Johnson,

CSIS The restructuring of the central bureaucracy bureaucracy central the of The restructuring and the strengthening of the CCP’s of the structures strengthening the and General The proportion of small leading groups on the Central Committee Committee Central on groups the leading of The proportion small 129 Central Committee of the CCP State Council (government) . 1 External Affairs and Security Xi’s Signature Governance Innovation: The Rise of Leading Small Groups Small Leading of The Rise Innovation: Governance Signature Xi’s 4 9 Domestic Politics 4 11 19 Economy

1 30 Society 4 , CSIS - - - - , The new structure is intended to strengthen those institutional bodies within bodies institutional those strengthen to intended is structure The new was broadpowers granted toreduceemissionsandregulatepollutionthe wereusually blocked by governmentother bodies which were intended to streamline the government’s operations andadaptthe this type, the previous the major overallreorganisations of of logic was part of 130 During the NPC’s session in March 2018, changes were also made to the rela the to made also were changes March 2018, in session NPC’s the During This out. carried was Council State the of restructuring a thorough In 2018 in the government. However, its weak institutional grounding and its minis its and grounding institutional weakHowever, government.its the in thisinstitution’sronment. The appointmentin 2008 predecessor, of theMinis Envi the and Ecology of Ministry super-ministry,the a new of March 2018 in thecentralinstitutionssubordinated istries was reducedfrom36to 20;someof min ministries’ structurestothemainchallenges facingChina.The numberof reorganised, inordertostreamlinethereforms andincreasetheimportance tionship between Party and state, conveying theday-to-day management of tries’ overlapping portfolios meantthatthereforms andsolutionsitproposed bureaucratic a strong create to Environmentalwasintended Protection, of try the centralbureaucracywhich areresponsiblefor resolving thekey challenges tween institutionswere carriedout.Thesechanges were toeliminate designed be powers of transfers of a number and abolished, were Council State the to use of chemical fertilisers in production. The key to the new ministry’s ministry’s new the to The key production. in fertilisers of chemical use forced, including those responsible for environmental protection, the stability rein been have agencies and ministries government Selected PRC. the facing lay in the appointment of Xi’s trusted subordinate , the youngestper the Li Ganjie, subordinate trusted Xi’s of appointment the lay in bureaucracy.the within competition limit Supervision; this body institutionalised the anti-corruption campaign which campaign anti-corruption the institutionalised body this Supervision; actor which could promote and implement environmentally friendly policies significant change of this type was the creation of the National Bureau of of Bureau National the of creation the was type this of change significant sensitive politicalissues directly totheCCP’s bureaucraticstructures. The most a ministry.head to (b. 1964) PRC the of history the in son of the financial markets, and rural affairs. One example of this is the creation the is this of example One affairs. rural and markets, financial the of and institutions, the between coordination improve jurisdiction, of conflicts structures. Party the of also was bureaucracy central the section 2.2.1), (see PRC the of Chairman of

As the former of Environmental Protection Minister described it in 2013, this posi this in 2013, it described Shengxian Zhou Minister Protection Environmental of former the As ministries and government agencies in environmental policy. See See policy. environmental in agencies government and ministries da ganga bumen han zhongguo huanbao bu huanbao zhongguo han bumen ganga da tion was one of the most ‘humiliating’ in the Chinese government, due to the intervention of other ofother intervention the to due government, Chinese the in ‘humiliating’ most ofthe one was tion ’ , Beijing Daily Beijing , 10 July 2013, news.sohu.com. 10 July 2013, , 130 . In 2018,. newthe ministry ‘ Huanbao buzhang: ting shuo si si shuo ting buzhang: Huanbao ­power ------101 OSW REPORT 4/2020 102 OSW REPORT 4/2020 ­Table 1). During this reorganisation process, state institutions’ various models of 132 131 Table 1. subordi were areas important politically other March 2018, in session NPC’s nated to the cells of theCCP’sCentralCommitteealongsimilarlines nated tothecellsof relevant departments the as (such corruption against fight the for responsible bodies state the linked it bodies, anti-corruption institutional the reinforcing finance, secretariats and staff and secretariats finance, full absorption); in practice the state institutions for these areas are directly had hitherto been conducted within the Partythe within section 2.2.5).conducted (see been hitherto had to addition In give the Party leaders direct influence on day-to-day activities in these areas. these in activities day-to-day on influence direct leaders Party the give as control of the media, censorship, cyber-security and religious affairs (see affairs religious and cyber-security censorship, media, the of control as subordination were introduced (retaining their separate names and offices, or and names separate their were(retaining subordination introduced of the prosecutor’s office) directly to the structures of the CCP. During the CCP. During the of structures the to directly office) prosecutor’s the of control over these areas, the changes shorten the decision-making chain and chain decision-making the shorten changes the areas, these over control controlled by their Party counterparts, withwhom they share management,

Area Taiwan affairs Media and Religion Government Cyber-security Chinese diaspora information policy censorship 20 June 2013, www.people.com.cn. 20 June 2013, See Yang Xiaojun, Xiaojun, Yang See ( nameplates’ two organisation, ‘one description: Chinese official the reflects The situation liang kuai paizi kuai liang Areas of the state managed directly by the CCP in 2018 CCP by the directly managed state of the Areas ). ‘ haja id dn zogag u hnf xaga io mnpi tedian mingpai jigou xuangua zhengfu yu zhongyang dang jiedu Zhuanjia Television Publication, Radio, Filmand Overseas Chinese Affairs Office Cyberspace Administration State CouncilInformation Office State Administration Press, State Administration of of China for Religious Affairs State institution 132 . Although the CCP already held full political full held already CCP the Although . Publicity Department theCC CCP Front of theUnited Department of theCC CCP Department of Publicity Department Group for Taiwan Affairs United FrontWork Security Committee of theCC CCP of theCC CCP of theCC CCP of theCC CCP of Party cell

131 yi ge jigou ge yi , such

’ - , , An important element in the process of Xi Jinping’s reconstruction of the PRC the of reconstruction Xi Jinping’s of process the in element important An 2.3.4. represents a partial change of the of change a partial represents This authorities. local of supervision and control central the in increase the is ing, Beijing is responsible for setting more detailed guidelines for the changes,the for guidelines detailed more setting for responsible is Beijing ing, implement is Xi model the In authorities. local the of hands the in remained since applied model the from departure a partial is This changes. regulatory and legitimacy social CCP’s the increase to is objective ultimate Xi’s reforms. tions for reform. Although Beijing set the general trends, their precise nature precise their trends, general the set Beijing Although reform. for tions local encouraging the ‘reform andopening-up’ period,of of the beginning de ‘top-down the of part As reform. conducting and initiating of process the incentives for localcadresandlimittheirdiscretion to remodelitssystem of thePRC’seconomicmodel. At thesametime, Beijingistrying to therevision of local reforms, aswell astheformal subordination of the implementationof grass-roots initiativesgrass-roots andexperiments inordertodevelop innovative solu One of the most important dimensions of Xi’s centralisation plans relates to relates plans centralisation Xi’s of dimensions important most the of One among others, the Central Comprehensive Deepening of Reformamong others, Commission theCentral Comprehensive Deepeningof purpose, this For implementation. local their supervises continuously it and power,ary minimisingabusesand helping implementthe withtheaimsof should now demarcate the precise direction of sectoralpolicies, aswellshould now asthe demarcatetheprecisedirectionof which Beijing in centre political the is it section 2.3.1), (see philosophy sign’ power.its strengthen bureaucracy,central the to structures were opposition local breaking at aimed centre and the provinces as devised after 1978. The centralising measures in measures The centralising 1978. after devised as provinces the and centre Area Training Management flow andarchives Civil service management of information of information of officials Strengthening control over local authorities local overcontrol Strengthening Administration National Administration Chinese Academy Secrets andStateCryptography Service Civil State Administration of for the Protection of State for the Protectionof Science of Management State institution status quo intherelationshipbetween the Main Department Party School of theCC CCP Party School of Organisation Department of theCC CCP of theCC CCP of Party cell

- - - - 103 OSW REPORT 4/2020 104 OSW REPORT 4/2020 (such as the bodies responsible for environmental protection) are subordinate (see section 2.3.1) has been created; this body has its own local structures at the Another toolfor expanding Beijing’scontrolover stategovernance key areasof The local governments’ behaviour is also affected by personnel policy with policy personnel by affected also is behaviour governments’ The local which iscurrently beingimplementedatthelocallevel by meansincluding 135 134 133 influence the behaviour of the local cadres and subordinate them to guidelines influence the behaviour of mechanisms for promotionwithintheParty. has Xi’santi-corruptioncampaign in theCCP, andthechanges relatedtotheanti-corruptioncampaign inthe localbudgets, aswellnow requiredtoreport moreinformation on thestateof local government are authorities local finance; of field the in control increased structures state of integration The vertical spheres. selected in ministration ( a horizontal from system’sinterdependencies the changing is ties between thelocal political-economicstructuresandthecourtswhich are the breaking at aimed judiciary,is the which of reform include measures tant their on impact real Beijing’s makes which cadres, local and Beijing both to tical ( present leadership. Apart from the anti-corruption efforts, the most impor most the efforts, anti-corruption the from Apart leadership. present position intheCCPtosubordinate thelocalstatestructurestocentralad strong his used Xi system. political current the on dependent performance provincial andcitylevels from Beijing (see section 1.3.2) (see Beijing from also has Beijing observe. must authorities local the which them reducing for has primarily taken place in sectors of particular importance for the CCP’s the for importance particular of sectors in place taken primarily has allowed Beijing to conduct a mass replacement of personnel below the provin the below personnel of replacement a mass conduct to allowedBeijing incurred. werethey how and debts their of size the on as a centralised system bindingtargets for monitoringemissions, anda system of supposed to monitor them cial level. This exerts a strong psychological effect, which allows the centre to centre the allows which effect, psychological a strong exerts level.This cial

(2016). See S. Heilmann, S. Heilmann, (2016). See One of the major side effects of this policy, however, was to limit the activity and initiative of local local of initiative and activity the limit to was however, policy, this of effects side major the of One given any of courts the Hitherto funding. in change the was in 2015–17 reform judicial of The essence 100 annually than less to (2010) 500 annually from projects: pilot of number the in The decrease cadres, afraid of attracting suspicions of corrupt activity. corrupt of suspicions attracting of afraid cadres, Quarterly level had been funded by local authorities at the appropriate level; now they are to receive funds funds receive to are they now level; appropriate the at authorities local by funded been had level relations’ jurisprudence of the courts, and such activities have been considered as a serious breach of Party Party of breach a serious as considered been have activities such and courts, the of jurisprudence from the provincial government under the supervision of two regional (inter-provincial) chambers chambers (inter-provincial) regional oftwo supervision the under government provincial the from discipline. tion has declared that even its local counterparts have no right to interfere in the procedures and and procedures the in interfere to right no have counterparts local its even that declared has tion subject to the Supreme People’s Court. Additionally, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspec Discipline for Commission Central the Additionally, Court. People’s Supreme the to subject tiao ) plane. In many areas of state management, the local institutions local the management, state of areas many In plane. ) , no. 20 (4), December 2016, www.merics.org; L. Wedell, , Basilinna , 7 November 2017, www.basilinna.com. 7 November 2017, , ‘Leninism Upgraded:‘Leninism Xi Jinping’s Authoritarian Innovations’ 133 134 . . Another important area is environmentalpolicy,is area important Another . 135 . One dimension of Xi’s ideological campaign campaign ideological Xi’s of dimension One . ‘Xi Jinping tackles center-provincial kuai , China Economic ) to a ver to ) ------40% of the permits necessary to conduct business and around 70% of the pro the of 70% around and business conduct to necessary permits the of 40% (see section 2.2.6) was the replacement of the established rules for promoting for rules established the of replacement the was section 2.2.6) (see Another tool for the increased supervision of local cadres is the idea imple idea the is cadres local of supervision increased the for tool Another 137 136 In additiontothecentralisationmeasures by andincreasedsupervision Beijing, involve barrierstobusinesses, eliminatingregulatory includingthereduction bureaucracy.The reforms local the of operation the and process rulemaking measures have alsobeencarriedout during Xi’srule to reducethediscretion bylaw’‘rule of byXi Jinping mented regularly present simplifications to existing regulations (which often vary be vary often (which regulations existing to simplifications present regularly obligatory applicableadministrative fees andthelistof ing thepublicationof tween territorial units).territorial tween the CCP’stotalpower over thejudiciary, while atthesametime makingitmore the courts;thisinvolves education,and replacingpersonnel,raisingthelevel of of operation involvesthe improving programme Xi’s of CCP.element the One promotions are to be more dependent on taking action for sustainable growth,sustainable for action taking on dependent more be to are promotions personnel, which had previously been based primarily on their performance in permits. Governments at the provincial and lower levels are also required to required also are levelslower and provincial the at Governments permits. fessional certificates have been abolished. The list of sectors that do not require sectorsthatdonotrequire fessional certificateshave beenabolished.The list of local andcentrallevel arealsorequiredtoensure transparency, greater includ ation and enforcement of a legalenvironment thatwould allowation andenforcement of thesupervision ary power of local officials, including by increasing the transparency of the of transparency the increasing by including officials, local of power ary retain to is essence The programme’s processes. judicial improving all above against thecorruptionandfraudwhich of underminesthepoliticallegitimacy stimulating economic growth. In the new vision for the Party promoted by Xi, by promoted Party the for vision new the In growth. economic stimulating consent when making investments has also been expanded. The authorities at The authorities expanded. investmentsbeen making also when has consent licenses, permitsandregulationsfor entrepreneurs of level.local the at particularly courts, certain, limited opportunities for citizens to sue officials andseek justiceinthe create to system legal the for is The intention competent. more and efficient fight the aid thus power, and their limit state, the of level every at officials of community.local the for care and protection environmental

The deregulation of the administration (limiting the number of permits, licenses, etc.) is one of the the of one is licenses, etc.) permits, of number the (limiting administration the of The deregulation increase and state the of management the improve to law the of use instrumental the on based is This flagship projects of Premier Li Keqiang, which has been conducted since 2013. In the spirit of dereg of spirit the In 2013. since conducted been has which Li Keqiang, Premier of projects flagship mean that the law is able to limit the rule of the CCP in China. in CCP the of rule the limit to able is law the that mean to the economic slowdown, has also been set in motion. in set been also has slowdown, economic the to not does law’ by ‘rule sense, Western the in law’ of ‘rule to contrast In officials. local of control the ulation, the so-called supply-side reform ( reform supply-side so-called the ulation, gonggei cegaige gonggei 136 . Activities in this area focus on the cre the on focus area this Activities. in ), initiated by Xi Jinping in 2015 in response response in in 2015 Xi Jinping by ),initiated 137 . Since 2013 more than . Since2013morethan ------105 OSW REPORT 4/2020 106 OSW REPORT 4/2020 making process in shaping macroeconomic policy in China is still character still is China in policy macroeconomic shaping in process ‑making The changes inthePRC’sdecision-makingstructureshave alsomeantthatChi in power,visible of consolidation the and competences of The centralisation Despite the concentration of power in the hands of Xi Jinping, the decision­ the Xi Jinping, of hands the in power of concentration the Despite 3.1.1. Economic 3.1. ised by a relatively large degree of pluralism; this has been a source of tension of a source been has this pluralism; byised a relativelyof degree large in a change forcing by example, for relations, international China’s of nature CCP.The importance the of structures the within embedded frequently most na’s foreign partnershave found themselves ina new situation. First,therehas Xi’s‘conservativeimpact of various turn’ onthecontrolandmanagement of the at both state, the and Party the of staffing the in visible is as nature, istic the channels of dialogue. of channels the the economy. the Premier’s position in the field of the marginalisation of At the from evident is as such policies, sectoral specific for responsible traditionally the challenges facing the PRC: economic policy, security and foreign policy, and Howev China. facing challenges international and political economic, the to to achieve internalcoordination,resulting greater ina moreeffective response Xi Jin of foundation the become have state, and Party both of structures the provinces. At the same time, considering the size and complexity of the PRC, the of complexity and size the considering time, same the Atprovinces. these of premises main the of One degrees. unequal to policies sectoral ual individ the ‘conservativeturn’.affected haveping’s However, processes these low position in the hierarchies of the state or the Party. This has altered the altered has Party.This the or state the of hierarchies the in position low the and Beijing between relationship the in and structures central the levelof been a reduction in the role of some of the institutions and posts which were which posts and institutions the of some of role the in a reduction been . CONTROL 3. as well as the scale of thechallenges, centralisationhasprovedas well asthescale of exceptionally activitieswas overcontrol regain to structures,decision-making the wellas as same time, the decision-making process has been moved to informal groups, informal to moved been has process decision-making the time, same regarding areas key three in evident is as varied, been has state the of sectors of persons directly linked to Xi has also increased, often despite their relativelyof Party.the and society of control the a result, view. As of points procedural and institutional the from difficult plural its retained has CCP the evenly.position, strong extremely Xi’s Despite governance state of areas all affected not have centralisation at efforts the er,

Macroeconomic policy and financial stability financial and policy Macroeconomic policy AND MANAGEMENT OF SECTORAL POLICIES ------Premiers for economic affairs: Han (who has a strong political position political a strong has (who Zheng Han affairs: economic for ‑Premiers The central bank – which in China holds ministerial rank – carries out the in the out carries rank – ministerial holds China in which bank – The central 139 138 Monetary and fiscal policy has traditionally been of particular importance in importance particular of been traditionally has policy fiscal and Monetary Li Keqiang, who supports stimulation, and , a supporter of austeritywho Li Keqiang, who supports stimulation,andLiuHe, a supporter of Despite Xi’s actionscentralisingpower over economicpolicy, inrecentyears macroeconomic policy has been the object of visible disputes at the top of the visibledisputesatthetopof macroeconomic policyhasbeentheobjectof issues (such aschanges ininterestratesandminimumreserve requirements), instability sector’s financial Chinese the of face the in significantly increased institutions. in relation to his membership of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of of Politburo the of Committee Standing the of membership his to relation in Vice­ two nominating by policies macroeconomic on influence their increased is Xi’sclosesteconomicadviser the CC CCP) is responsible for macroeconomic planning; and Liu He has been has He Liu and planning; macroeconomic for responsible is CCP) CC the wealth the Chinesepoliticalsystem, becauseitdeterminesthedistributionof the financialmarkets, which have beenconcentratedinnew, highly integrated of regulation the to changes significant of form the in come has economy the political system. This lack of consensus is indicated by the presence of this of presence the by indicated is consensus of lack This system. political kind of debate in the state media, which are used to mobilise public opinion public mobilise to used are which media, state the in debate of kind set. is policy macroeconomic how on influence important havean chang the process,although decision-making the of logic this changed not has Committee. Standing its and Politburo the of meetings during level, highest CCP, especially during Xi’s first term – a situation relatively rare in the Chinese among the different factions of the CCP and the Chinese regions Chinese the and CCP the of factions different the among of instability the to response years.The Party’s recent in CCP the of top the at and gain an advantage over competing factions within the CCP. According to CCP.According the within factions competing overadvantage an gain and although itdoesplay andtechnicalrole. animportantadvisory Xi’sgovernment thosesectors and rapidly risinginternaldebt,aswell astheuncertainfateof some of the speculation, there has been a personal conflict between Premier between conflict a personal been has there speculation, the of some theStateCouncilonkey theCCPandrequiresauthorisationof structions of es in political dynamics at the top of theCCPconnectedwithXi’sactivities do es inpoliticaldynamics atthetopof the at taken are field this in decisions reason, Forthis section 2.1.1). (see crisis 2008 the after investmentstimulus on dependent were which economy the of er hand,thepoliticalcontroversy surrounding themacroeconomicpolicieshas

In 2016 the the In 2016 V. Shih, See personage’ (according to most commentators this was Xi’s advisor Liu He). Liu advisor Xi’s was this commentators most to (according personage’ quanwei renshi dangqian zhongguo jingji zhongguo dangqian tan renshi quanwei ‘authoritative anonymous an by signed was which debt, in increase the to due policy monetary en People’sDaily Factions and Finance in China in Finance and Factions ( Renmin Ribao Renmin 139 ) published an article which focused on the need to tight to need the on focused which article an ) published …, . In Xi’s second term, he and his circle have circle his and he term, second Xi’s In . op. cit. op. ’ , Renmin Ribao Renmin , 9 May 2016, www.people.com.cn. 9 May 2016, , ‘ Kaiju shou ji wen dashi – dashi – wen ji shou Kaiju 138 . On the oth the On . - - - - 107 OSW REPORT 4/2020 108 OSW REPORT 4/2020 , director of thecentralbank inthestatestructure, isprimarily respon Yi Gang,directorof Xi’s rule has also brought about significant centralisation regarding the regu the regarding centralisation significant about brought also has rule Xi’s Xi’s rule has helped to resolve of a number of short-term problems related to related problems short-term of a number of resolve to helped has rule Xi’s (where he is a vice-director), thereby exercising real power in both institutions. The concentration of power in the management of the financial markets power during in themanagement of The concentration of state level markets the financial at of managementthe of of The centralisation synergies for looking monitoring, increasing include this combat to The plans 141 140 Party bureaucracy. financialmarket regulation,a centralposition Intheareaof Bank The People’s (CBIRC). Commission Regulatory Insurance and Banking regulat agencies separate The previously in 2018. Congress People’s National is exercised by Liu He, who heads the coordinating financial agencies of the of agencies financial coordinating the heads who He, Liu by exercised is China in boththeCBIRC(where heisalsoa director)andthePeople’s Bankof cells Party the of secretary the as serves currently He Shuqing. Guo by held is the in powers of centralisation a significant by accompanied was institutions regulators. among communication improving and regulations, the in with associated schemes Ponzi and fraud, widespread trading, inside of non phenome the as such markets, financial Chinese of pathologies the of many curtailing at aimed are risks).The changes systemic sector’s the reducing ing body,one China into mergedwerethe markets insurance and banking the ing the existence of an extensivean (a.k.a. shadowsector informalbanking banking). existenceof the Central parent the as as well Commission, Affairs Economic and Financial tral theCC’sCen Xi’scirclehasalsobeenstrengthenedby thecreationof tion of financial markets in the years 2015–16, administrations regulating bond mar bond regulating administrations 2015–16, years the in markets financial kets, insurance and banking underwent a thorough reconstruction during the during reconstruction a thorough underwent banking kets,and insurance Chinese on reigned which chaos the of a result markets. As financial of lation Central Financial Stability and Development Commission in the State Council. State the in DevelopmentCommission and Stability Financial Central theCCCCP Reform Commissionof Comprehensive Deepeningof and stabilising the financial system. In the institutional dimension, the posi the dimension, institutional the In system. financial the stabilising and sible for operational matters. Political control of the entire sector on Xi’s behalf theentiresectoronXi’sbehalf sible for operationalmatters. Politicalcontrolof charged, among other things, with tasks related to deleveraging the economy the deleveraging to related tasks with things, other among charged, of China was also granted more power to regulate the banking sector (includ sector banking the regulate to power more granted also was China of

Affairs, and the CC’s Small Leading Group for Comprehensive Deepening of Reform. of Deepening Comprehensive for Group Leading Small CC’s the and Affairs, In the last few years of the long rule of (2002–18), who held the positions of both the the both of positions the held (2002–18), who Xiaochuan Zhou of rule long the of years few last the In former the from personnel with reinforcement and transformation the it meant cases, both In of economic liberalisation in China. The recent appointment of one of Zhou’s close associates, Yi Gang, Gang, Yi associates, Zhou’sclose of one of appointment The recent China. in liberalisation economic of incumbent Governer and the Party Secretary of the central bank, he was one of the main promoters promoters main the of one was he bank, central the of Secretary Party the and Governer incumbent as the bank’s new Governor indicates the continuation of the reformist course. reformist the of continuation the indicates Governor new bank’s the as small working groups with similar names: the Small Leading Group for Financial and Economic Economic and Financial for Group Leading Small the names: similar with groups working small 140 . 141 ------

Xiaochuan. Although the dispute is partly technical in nature, the outcome is of Xiaochuan. Although thedisputeispartly technicalinnature, theoutcomeisof years, which will be critical for a Chinese economy which is heavily indebted heavily is which economy a Chinese for critical be will which years, The top of the Party most likely believes that a decline in GDP growth below growth GDP in a decline that believes likely most Party the of The top the limited has supervision increased the and action disciplinary of The use within individual institutions and levels of thebureaucracy within individual institutionsandlevels of 143 142 Party members, such as the long-serving former head of the central bank Zhou thecentralbankZhou Party members, former such headof asthelong-serving the over tensions the eliminate not did power of consolidation However,Xi’s my (including the debts of companies and local authorities).my Onthe other hand, (includingthedebts of tion, although this may deepen the structural problems of theChineseecono tion, althoughthismay deepenthestructuralproblemsof China. of Bank People’s the the frameworkmanaging for a new of creation the to led structures,Party the thestate’s institutions, regulatory aswellthe reform asthenominationsin of the turmoil onthefinancial markets, ofcapital. trade conflicts, andtheoutflow possible bankruptciesanddebtreductiontopoliticalcontrol. At thesametime for the long-term economic stability of the PRC. the of stability economic long-term the for fundamental importancefor theCCP. The macroeconomic policyinthecoming nowformula the closely-coordinated a dual by and markets in CBIRC financial lack of consensus within the CCP’s leadership regarding the course of macro of course the regarding leadership CCP’s the within consensus of lack bate – although it was limited in 2018 limited was it although bate – abuses in the financial sector and also temporarily increased its stability, by its increased temporarily also and sector financial the in abuses and the accompanying painful structural adjustments. The intense media de media The intense adjustments. structural painful accompanying the and of risk the carries annum) per around 6% (probably point arbitrary a certain of allocation the for only not responsible be will war, a trade involvedin and such a policy would be short-sighted, citing instead a need to reduce growth reduce to a need instead citing short-sighted, be would a policy such theCCP’smoreeconomically conservative membershavesome of suggested stimula fiscal or monetary require will a situation such unrest: social serious theParty inXi’s secondterm,they arestillvisible tensionatthetopof of signs reported rarely has media the Although debt. rising of face the in stimulation sheltering itfromthedirectfactionalstruggleandsubjecting theprocessesof economic policy.economic capital betweengroups inthe thedifferent andsectoral regional Party, butalso retired influential by joined been has stimulation continuing of merits the of macroeconomicpolicy, optimal courseof especially regardingthepolicyof

In the second half of 2018, in response to the market volatility associated with China’s falling GDP falling China’s with associated volatility market the to response in of 2018, half second the In formula the on debate a further hosted media financial Chinese the term – second Xi’s i.e. in In 2018 – of how to continue stimulating the economy, between the Ministry of Finance, which suggested easing easing suggested which Finance, of Ministry the economy,between the stimulating continue to how of growth rate and the trade war with the United States, the Chinese government decided to restrict restrict to decided government Chinese the States, United the with war trade the and rate growth monetary policy, and officials associated thewith bank,central who were in favour expansion. of fiscal the freedom of discussion in the financial media. financial the in discussion of freedom the 143 – should be treated as an effect of the of effect an as treated be should – 142 . The discussion The discussion . - - - - 109 OSW REPORT 4/2020 110 OSW REPORT 4/2020 ‘brain of thestate’, Reform‘brain of locatedintheCentralComprehensive Deepeningof (close associates of Xi), the Commission has been formed as a body which can which a body as formed been has Commission Xi),the of associates (close vious reorganisations of theadministration,aswell asadditionalpersonnel vious reorganisationsof The crowning achievement of the changes which led to the concentration of of concentration the to led which changes the of achievement The crowning by possible made also was policy sectoral and structural affect to The power the on based is reforms structural implementing on focus The government’s with the NPC at the turn of 2018. It introduced the formalisation of the pre the of formalisation the It introduced of 2018. turn the at NPC the with Party structures – which had hitherto performed the decision-making role – in 3.1.2. moves. An important aspect of the changes was the increase in the role of the of role the in increase the was changes the of aspect moves.important An reforms. sectoral the of implementation the monitor and coordinate initiate, reforms, while is aimedatcentralisingandcoordinatingtheimplementationof restructuring heavy industry, andconsumption supporting sec theservices enterprises,state-owned of reform the including reforms – structural of issue Xi Jinping. to linked individualsoverseen by is it bureaucracy.central the of policy,coordination Industrial the in the including the campaign of personnel rotation, which since 2012 has mainly been con been mainly has 2012 since which rotation, personnel of campaign the Central the venture, centralisation flagship Xi’s by introduced been has tors – although Council, State bythe out carried is matter,and a technical as treated premise that there is a need to combat the ‘vested interests’ nested within the within nested interests’ ‘vested the combat to a need is there that premise power in Xi’s hands was the 19 was hands powerXi’s in sectors. various in markets regulating offices the as well as (SASAC), panies Development National the including positions, key to appointed were people fields of technological development and modernising production methods, is production modernising and development technological of fields have hitherto enjoyed great freedom (see section 1.3.1). Under the leadership the Under section 1.3.1). (see freedom great enjoyed hitherto have thecentralbureaucracyandlocalauthorities, which limiting therolesof because the decision-making process in this area has been moved to the new the to moved been has area this in process decision-making the because Comprehensive Deepening of Reform Commission of theCCCCP. Reform Commissionof Comprehensive Deepeningof Inprincipleit the Thus, section 2.1.1). (see changes the to opposed allegedly are which CCP CCP.CC implementing frameworkthe for centralised The new of Commission agenda, Xi Jinping’s of item a key is structure economic PRC’s the Changing authorities; however, they have revealed the institutional defects and problems and Reform Commission (NDRC), the office supervising the state-owned com state-owned the supervising office the (NDRC), Commission Reform and structural reforms have tools available to influence local expanded the range of overseeing theday-to-day thecurrentpolicy, implementation of including by new in 2013–14 Thus, campaign. anti-corruption the of basis the on ducted Zheng Han Wangand Vice-ChairmenHuning for roles key with Xi Jinping, of

Structural and industrial policy industrial and Structural th National Congress of the CCP (2017),CCP together the of Congress National - - - - Xi Jinping; the groups dealing with lower-priority areas are led by the heads the by led are areas lower-priority with dealing groups the Xi Jinping; Nation the by supervised is policy industrial and Technological Xi Jinping. The development of industry and new industry has technologies clearlyThe development moved of down the which isresponsiblefor the controversial ‘Made (see inChina 2025’programme However, the new architecture for implementing the structural reforms has reforms structural the implementing for architecture new However,the increasing theParty cells’roleinstatebusinesses, aswell asinsomeprivate institutions, things which were particularly evident during Xi’s first term. first Xi’s during evident particularly were which things institutions, revealed thecen several of problemswith thecoordinationandsupervision tral bureaucracy. These problems are related to limited information about the about information limited to related bureaucracy.are tral problems These oversightHowever, political Council. State the in bureaucracy central the to political agenda, and everyday management in this area has been given over limited by the NPC in 2018. NPC the by limited box below). arethePolitburomembersHanZheng thesegroups The leadersof State the of structures the In He. Liu deputy his and Li Keqiang Premier by Council, there are also several other special-task small leading groups, which groups, leading small special-task other several also are there Council, al Science and Technology Leading Group within the State Council, chaired Council, State the within Group Leading Technology and Science al and Reform Commission (NDRC)maintainsitstraditionally strong rolein of behalf on process the over supervision political exercise who He, Liu and AdvancedManufacturing, on Group Leading the as well as materials,new and everyday operation of the state and a lack of human resources for the new the for resources human of a lack and state the of operation everyday dustrial policy, directintervention intheeconomy althoughitspowers were of Development The National Annex 5). (see ministries sectoral relevant the of semiconductors of field the in capacity developing as such matters with deal thePolitburoassociatedwith over theprocessstillrestswithmembersof companies. ‘Made This is the PRC’s flagship industrial policy strategy, promulgated in 2015 in 2015 strategy, promulgated policy industrial flagship PRC’s the is This includes mechanismsfor technology(includingthrough acquiringforeign The programme current 40%). the (from to 70% rise to expected is nents the participation of Chinese companies in the production of key compo key of production the in companies Chinese of participation the high-tech sectors(such asrenewable energy, moderntransportation,ro botics), aswell asimportsubstitution for the mostadvanced components: in achievePRC to the for position It aims by a leading Li Keqiang. Premier countries (especially the EU and the US).the and EU the (especially countries developed controversyin much raised has it takeovers);hence company in China 2025’ - - - - - 111 OSW REPORT 4/2020 112 OSW REPORT 4/2020 Xi’s flagship project is now the so-called supply-side reform, which includes which reform, supply-side so-called the now is project flagship Xi’s The Central Comprehensive Deepening of Reform Commission (which was (which Commission Reform of Deepening Comprehensive The Central with the interventionist participation of the administration. The supply-side The supply-side administration. the of participation interventionist the with 18 Despite the concentration of authority over structuralandindustrial policyin Despite theconcentration of In additiontosomecontradictionsbetween Xi’spoliticalandeconomicagen icy of Xi’s first term, the so-called supply-side reform, which was initiated was which reform, supply-side so-called the term, first Xi’s of icy the most important structural pol is illustrated by the implementation of governments.This local of responsibility the still is and areas, many in ised of theeconomy.restructuring theinefficientsectors These activities aremerely of cost the at GDP in growth temporary for looking model, stimulation ment reform included, among others, new vertical channels for implementing re excessforbusinesses),and costs debt reducing ing and production, often most the in positions key the and resources), human its expanded (which mission the hands of Xi Jinping and his circle, its implementation remains decentral remains implementation its circle, his and Xi Jinping of hands the is leadership Chinese economy, the the transform to efforts its Despite tion. group), leading a small as operating resources, limited with cell a Party then priority over longer-term solutions. The ambitious agenda of the pro-market the of agenda The ambitious solutions. longer-term over priority postponing deeperandmoredifficultreforms, whichwillincreasethepolitical forms toreducetheexcess capacityinheavy andhousingconstruc industry handed over to the institutions of thecentralbureaucracy,handed over totheinstitutionsof which were more was solutions detailed devising of process powers,the appropriate the lacked groups leading small the Because system. the within arising blockages to led So far, the new centralised structure has primarily been used to undertake to used been primarily has structure centralised new the far, So bureaucracy were assigned to people linked to Xi. to linked people to assigned were bureaucracy groups, and as a result they were either implemented in different forms, or forms, different in implemented either were they a result as and groups, and during the NPC of 2018, when the group was raised to the rank of a Com of rank the to raised was group the when of 2018, NPC the during and and social cost of implementing them in future. in them implementing of cost social and changes aimedatrestructuringtheeconomy (theseincludereduc a number of structural reforms passed during the Third Plenum of theCentralCommittee’s structural reforms passedduringtheThirdPlenumof short-term activities andinterventions intheeconomy, which have beengiven reforms and legislative proposals, which started implementing hundreds of own authority. This led to ‘the capture of the reforms’ by internal interest internal by reforms’ the of capture ‘the to led This authority.own the maintaining in interested often continuing to apply economic policy based on the old invest an expansionary China’s economicreforms. reasons of themostsignificant for thestagnation of one are constraints institutional above-mentioned the section 2.1.1), (see das even blocked altogether. Thesedefects were partially solved in Xi’s secondterm th National Congress of theCCPhasbeenimplementedtoonly a smallextent. National of Congress status quo or enlarging the scope of their the scope of or enlarging ------The formal decision-making structure in the field of foreign economic policy economic foreign of field the in structure decision-making The formal were usedastheconveyor beltfor thechanges andthetooltomobilisehuman 144 In the field of foreign economic policy, economic activforeign centralising and coordinating the of field the In 3.1.3. innovation was the establishment of the Small Leading Group for Advancing for Group Leading Small the of establishment the was innovation through out carried been primarily havegovernment Xi Jinping’s under ities governments.local A similar the by determined was regulations) new the ing, to excesswhich degree the reform (including the resources. of shape The final Reform Commissionandcarried in theCentralComprehensive Deepeningof internal conditions. internal industrial policy po internal of a consequence primarily is position Liu’s that noted be must related toChina’s internalpolicies(such asChina’s industrialpolicy, opening macroeconomic andstructuralpolicies. Focusing somany powers inthehands as well policy, as industrial markets, financial of regulation the including na, ex He Liu adviser economic closest Xi Jinping’s concentrated. highly now is trade issues. This is particularly relevant in negotiations with foreign partners co to was function whose a body Road, One Belt One the of Development the pattern can be observed in industrial policy: the governments at the provincial thecompaniestoundergo restructur production would bereduced,thelistof up Chinese financial markets, and intellectual property issues). However, issues). it property intellectual and markets, financial Chinese up the in prerogatives relevant the all focusing bynamely, policy – personnel from developed countries, the US and the EU, which cover a range of issues of a range cover which EU, the and US the countries, developed from litical motives, above alltheneedtostabiliseeconomy andimplementthe important an dimension, institutional the In He. Liu Vice-Premier of hands level have beengiven relatively broadfreedomtosupport themodernsectors been very widely dispersed in their activity.their in dispersed widely very been Central Comprehensive Deepening of Reform Commission of theCCCCP(see Reform Commissionof Central Comprehensive Deepeningof section 2.3.1). The Commission’s sub-units created in provincial Party bodies Party provincial in created sub-units The Commission’s section 2.3.1). of one person predestines Liu for the role of chief negotiator oninternational chief oneperson predestines Liufor theroleof of Chi in policies sectoral internal of a number over supervision direct ercises ordinate the actors involved in the project within the PRC, who had hitherto investmentfunds. managed locally of use economy,the bythe including of the in established were points main Its governments.provincial the by out

For example, after 2017 Chinese direct investment abroad was limited, as part of the plan to stabilise stabilise to plan the of part as limited, was abroad investment direct Chinese after 2017 example, For the financial markets and combat capital outflows which was run by the leading groups for finance. finance. for groups leading the by run was which outflows capital combat and markets financial the

Foreign economic policy economic Foreign 144 , withChina’s economicpolicysubordinated foreign tothose ------113 OSW REPORT 4/2020 114 OSW REPORT 4/2020 (to both positions) Zhu Jizhe. Zhu positions) (to both After abouttwo years thecentral government, throughtheSmallLeadingGroup developing at targeted principally is whichInitiative, Road and Belt the for As The Chairman of the Small Leading Group for Advancing the Development of of Development the Advancing for Group Leading Small the of The Chairman 145 During Xi Jinping’s rule, China has implemented two models for coordinating for models two implemented has China rule, Xi Jinping’s During (see director NDRC’s the by managed is group the side, operational the From ing economic affairs in the hands of one person (Vice-Premier Liu He) has He) Liu (Vice-Premier person one of hands the in affairs economic ing Concentrat institutional. one and personal one policy, economic foreign its thegroup’s bureau, aswellin Xiamencity)actingdirectorof ashisdeputy ners andstartedbusinessoperationsthroughstate-owned transportcompanies. devised are plans these of implementation and form The exact in Beijing. ings group, this of help the With Zheng). Hang by headed and Council State the in (located Road One Belt One the of Development the Advancing for Group ing together with , who is also responsible for regional development. regional for responsible also is who Hu Chunhua, with together Committee Standing the of a member Zheng, Han is Road One Belt One the Group Leading Small the of aid the with Beijing, Next, guidelines. the general the leadershipsetsoutgeneral plansfor operationduringregularmeet provincial andmunicipalauthorities, who initiateddialoguewithforeign part Roadand Belt Initiativethe of part for Advancing the Development of the One Belt One Road, appointed a central a central appointed Road, One Belt One the Developmentof Advancingthe for keythe bringsRoad,which One Belt One the Advancingfor Developmentthe of by individual stateinstitutionsandlocalgovernments, toimplement which try and sets the new courses of activity. This was evident in the case of the flag the of case the in evident was activity.This of courses new the sets and Lead Small the for role a key with concept, design’ ‘top-down Xi’s to adheres are: the main person responsible for diplomacy in the Politburo, , Yang Politburo, the in diplomacy for responsible person main the are: section 1.2.3) (Xi’s longtime associate since they worked together worked they since associate longtime (Xi’s Lifeng He section 1.2.3) as out carried being is EU,which and China between links rail for project ship them mould to initiatives,tries existing the coordinates together,stakeholders which a model implementing be to appears Beijing in government the states, of the Politburo of the CC CCP, who is associated with Xi Jinping. His deputies His Xi Jinping. CCP,with CC associated the is who of Politburo of the work. authorities’ local the of control and regulation coordination, coordinating institution(ChinaRailway), andwithitssupport proceededtothe implementation fell to the Chinese outlined by Xi Jinping in 2013, the process of

For more information see see information more For who were dealing with them. with dealing were who On the other hand, the list of sectors preferred for foreign takeovers by Chinese companies was was companies Chinese by takeovers foreign for preferred sectors of list the hand, other the On created on the basis of industrial policies developed by the specialised leading groups and the NDRC NDRC the and groups leading specialised the by developed policies ofindustrial basis the on created rail connections: background, actors, interests actors, background, connections: rail J. Jakóbowski, K. Popławski, M. Kaczmarski K. Popławski, J. Jakóbowski, 145 , OSW, Warsaw 2018, www.osw.waw.pl. 2018, Warsaw OSW, , . After the initiation of frameworkgeneral of . initiation the After , The Silk Railroad. The EU-China The EU-China Railroad. The Silk - - - - - When Xi took charge of the CCP, the Party moved away from the system in system the from awaymoved Party CCP,the the of charge took Xi When Xi’s rule has seen a major change in the management of the security services. security the of management the in change a major seen has rule Xi’s year after the Commission’s creation, Xi proposed a ‘comprehensive national a ‘comprehensive proposed Xi creation, Commission’s the after year The methods by have which theservices theseniorleadershipsupervises been which a selected member of the Politburo’s Standing Committee oversawthe Committee Standing Politburo’s the of member a selected which 3.2.1. Foreign 3.2. many of the existing intelligence practices, without limiting their activities. their limiting without practices, intelligence existing the of many institutionalised also services intelligence the on law The new apparatus. rity reformed, giving Xianopportunitytogainfullpersonalcontrolover thesecu with. reckoned be must China – in in the wider sense, and not just on the domestic level. These changes are most are changeslevel. These domestic the on just not and sense, wider the in tion of the new Commission, which treats security issues as a whole, has also has a whole, as issues security treats which Commission, new the of tion The crea leadership. Party the of succession the over influence gain to them threat posedby Zhou Yongkang andBo Xilai(seesection 2.1.2), when a member security for responsible thus It is cyberspace, etc. terrorism, against fight the China’sfor responsible se services all of supervision the concentrate to is task China’s global the local conditions encountered during the implementation of to adapt to ability and flexibility a certain assumes themselves,initiative the coor the as acts CCP the which in Initiative, Road and Belt the of case the facilitated comprehensive negotiations trade, involving investment issues of lenges and the complex nature of non-traditional security threats. In 2014,lenges one and the complex nature of the to response in tem pro introduced were and nature, in temporary likely become part of a wider strategy for facing China’s internal and external chal external and internal China’s facing for strategy a wider of part become Commission of the CC CCP, established in 2013. Currently, the Commission’sCurrently, the in 2013. CCP,established CC the of Commission and industrial policy. The ‘top-down design’ model which has been used in used been has which model design’ The ‘top-down policy. industrial and security concept’ ( Security National new the to transferred were powers His services. security of the Standing Committee supervising the intelligence services tried to use to tried services intelligence the supervising Committee Standing the of affairs, interestsincludesforeign intelligence, internaland external security,of the CCP. the General Secretary of curity in the The committee’s hands of range actors internal numerous of insubordination the decision­‑as well as making, of centralised inefficiency the activities – centralisation Xi Jinping’s all to cific policy, China’s spe economic are foreign which challenges effectiveness the of the increased have approaches However,both agenda. though eveneconomic take can who actors Chinese internal numerous of activities the for dinator

Managing the security services security the Managing and zongti guojia anquan guan anquan guojia zongti security policy ). This involves the integration of of integration involvesthe This ). ------115 OSW REPORT 4/2020 116 OSW REPORT 4/2020 Within the services themselves,Within theservices atthecentrallevel Xi Jinpingcanrely onWang Xiaohong, Vice-Minister of the MPS, who is responsible for the daily work of of work daily the for responsible is who MPS, the of Vice-Minister Xiaohong, years climbing the ladder of the security apparatus in his native years province climbing the ladder of of The new National Intelligence Law sanctioned the practice of encouraging cit encouraging of practice the sanctioned LawIntelligence National The new re the and Commission Security National CC’s the between The relationship Secretary,General the by trusted person another is ministry the of The head the CC CCP The Nationalconcentrates power Security Commission of regarding with security services. Article 14 obliges every Chinese citizen to provide the provide to citizen Chinese every obliges Article 14 services. security with Wenqing,bytwentypreviousChen directed the is spent whoMSS the workof Xi’s term, second his In Xi Jinping. of associate a close Xuexiang, Ding was 149 148 147 146 Bureau in Beijing; in 2017 he was also accepted onto the Central Committee. Central the onto accepted also was he in 2017 Beijing; in Bureau Law Security National , who replaced Jiang Zemin’s man . Meanwhile, the Meanwhile, Shengkun. Guo man Zemin’s Jiang replaced who Kezhi, Zhao izens and institutions, including public and private companies, to cooperate to companies, private and public including institutions, and izens domestic problems, through both ing external threats and the complexity of the latter headed the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in the key the in Inspection Discipline for Commission Central the headed latter the SecurityPublic Municipal the of head the time same the at is and Ministry the the committeeresponsiblefor itsday-to-day operationandsettingitsagenda socialcontrol traditionalandnon-traditionalmethodsof the useof grow activitiesthe services’ andincreasingtheircontrollabilityinfaceof phase of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. anti-corruption Xi’s of phase position hasbeenstrengthenedthroughnew appointmentsatministeriallevel. forward recommendations. However, its ability toinfluencetheiractions is still local Partylocal structures. regularly The Commission worktheir assesses puts and ; for two years healsoserved asa trusteddeputytoWang Qishanwhen gional securitybodiesisstillproblematic,asthelatterarereportingto gional and theNational Intelligence Law services with the “necessary support, assistance and cooperation”. Article 16 cooperation”.Article 16 and assistance support, “necessary the with services Xi Jinping.The executive directorof security inthebroadsensehandsof concept has been implemented in the form of threelaws: thelaw onthePRC’s concept hasbeenimplementedintheform of dependent on the political relationship between the centre and the regions. the and centre the between relationship political the on dependent

Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia qingbao fa qingbao guojia gongheguo renmin Zhonghua fa anquan wangluo gongheguo renmin Zhonghua fa anquan guojia gongheguo renmin Zhonghua ideological the PRC, the in practice accepted the with accordance in that, remembered be It should they granted legal sanction. legal granted they underpinning often appears after specific practices are established, and only at the last stage are stage last the at only and established, are practices specific after appears often underpinning 147 from 2015, the PRC Cybersecurity Law Cybersecurity PRC the from 2015, 149 . . from 2017. . 148 146 from 2016, from 2016, . The new - - - vidual components of the armed forces. The reform effectively increased the increased effectively The reform forces. armed the of components vidual The PLA entered the twenty-first century as a highly politicised structure politicised a highly as century twenty-first the entered PLA The whose combat abilities had been called into question 151 150 PLA’s operational capabilities; and was also the second – after the changes to changes the after second – the also was and capabilities; PLA’soperational thePLA since During hisfirsttermXi Jinpingundertookthedeepestreform of 3.2.2. intelligence services have been significantly expanded. significantly havebeen services intelligence Cyberse PRC the with conjunction In them. for responsible is who no matter the General Secretary.General the the on influence personal his increased Xi which by instrument CMC – the indi of size the and structure command the to changes including the 1980s, their databasesonChineseterritory, theoperationalpossibilities opentothe policy, as the military ‘hawks’ found themselves in the immediate vicinity of of vicinity immediate the in themselves found ‘hawks’ military the policy,as also guarantees the services access to all databases, libraries, archives, etc., archives, etc., libraries, databases, all to access services the guarantees also army. At the same time, it deepened the army’s impact on making security making on impact army’s the deepened it time, same the army.At curity Law, which requirescompaniesoperatinginthePRCtophysically locate

The existence of this unit of the PLA was revealed in 2014 when the US the when in 2014 revealed was PLA the of unit this of The existence US companies. 61 398 is one of the most important PLA units dedicated units PLA important most the of one is 61 398 companies. US Department of ofJustice industrial espionage accused andits theft Department officersof nical, which can already be counted in thousands of terabytes nical, which can already be counted in thousands of the only one. According to media reports, the branch has at its disposal its at has branch the reports, media to According one. only the to invasive electronicintelligence andITwarfare, butisfar frombeing PLA have fallen victim to it, losing sensitive data, especially economic and tech Cautious estimates say that around a thousand organisations worldwide organisations a thousand around that say estimates Cautious a 12-storey building in the city,2000 officer-hackers.the employs around in and building a 12-storey in located is headquarters its Shanghai; in deployed 1000 servers around of intellectual property, and of installing malware on the computers of intellectualproperty, installingmalware onthecomputersof of andof See D. Shambaugh, D. Shambaugh, See Subrahma V.S. Shakarian, P. Jajodia, S. see uses, it techniques the and 398 61 Unit on more For www.justice.gov. RAND Report: M.S. Chase, J. Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, K.A. Gunness, S.W. Harold, S. Puska, S. Puska, S.W. Harold, K.A. Gunness, Cheung, Ming Tai J. Engstrom, M.S. Chase, Report: RAND in V Sau, . ag (ed.), Wang C. Swarup, V. nian, n a ao Ognzto fr omril Advantage’ Commercial for Organization Labor a and also

‘U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations U.S. Corporations Against Espionage Cyber for Hackers Military Chinese Five ‘U.S. Charges Reform command army of the Unit 61 398 Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects and Problems, Progress, Military: China’s Modernizing Cyber Warfare. Building the Scientific Foundation Scientific the Building Warfare. Cyber , U.S. Department of Justice, 19 May 2014, 2014, May 19 Justice, of Department U.S. , 151 . Blighted by corruption, 150 , Cham 2015. See See 2015. Cham , , Berkeley 2002; 2002; Berkeley , . - - - - 117 OSW REPORT 4/2020 118 OSW REPORT 4/2020 155 154 153 152 it responding to the growing importance of thePRC it respondingtothegrowing importanceof undertake to unable was PLA the positions, buying of practice the including the operations in East Asia, or on the global scale which the CCP had assigned assigned had CCP the which scale global the on or Asia, East in operations the programme of thoroughly reforming thearmy andeliminatingcorruptionhas of programme has targeted 13,000 officers. targeted has break the resistance of some of the generalsthe of some of resistance the break gained popularity among much of the officer corps. At the same time the fight the time same corps. the officer At the of much among popularity gained among the lower ranks of the officer corps.among the lower In all, the anti-corruption campaign ranks of armythe in corruption against allowed linkedofficers to promote him, to to Xi

‘political education’, the other four-fifths purely military training. The ob training. education’, military purely ‘political four-fifths other the Vietnam in 1978). The four-tier territorial division territorial in 1978). ­VietnamThe four-tier The reforms have also visibly improved the PLA’simprovedvisiblythe have also capabilities. The reforms operational one-fifth training: military of ratios the setting by started The reforms which, for the first time in the PLA’s history, set out military training military out set PLA’s history, the in time first the for which, PLA commander with combat experience (gained during the war with war the during (gained experience combat with commander PLA a Joint of creation the with reorganised, been has structure command Its jectives of military trainingwere military alsochanged, emphasisinginteraction jectives of ment to being able to destroy enemy satellites.enemydestroy to able being to ment modernising equipment has been initiated, from soldiers’ personal equip recon been has education military of The system out. carried regularly ual units. Various types of large-scale joint-operation military drills are drills military joint-operation large-scale of types Various units. ual Reform Staff Department of the CMC (the equivalent to the Chairman of the the Joint of Chairman the equivalent to (the CMC the of Department Staff between different types of troops. In January 2019, Xi issued an order an issued Xi January 2019, In troops. of types different between Chiefs of Staff in the United States), headed Staff by Gen. , the only Chiefs of a degree of independence in various conditions. A broad programme for programme A broad conditions. various in independence of a degree structed, focusing on the education of officers who will be able to act with structed, focusing on the education of standards aswell monitoring theirimplementationinindivid as ways of i.e. (1) five theatres of operations, (2) seven regions, (3) sub-regions roughly corresponding to the the to corresponding roughly (3) sub-regions regions, (2) seven operations, of theatres i.e. (1) five (ed.), J. Char dur R.A. Bitzinger, generals See of nominations traditional the of absence the was friction this of manifestation One (ed.), S.W. Harold P.C. Saunders, A.S. Ding, A. Scobell, See Xi Jinping Era Xi Jinping Liberation Army ­Liberation S.K. Berkowitz, S.K. Berkowitz, provinces, and (4) military corps. (4) military and provinces, ing the PLA’s annual commemorations in August 2018. August in commemorations annual PLA’s the ing gency Planning in China in Planning gency of , Oxon 2019. Oxon ,

the ( China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s the of Weaknesses the Assessing Transformation: Military Incomplete China’s PLA PLA ), Santa Monica 2015; You Ji, Ji, You 2015; Monica Santa ), , Washington 2015. Washington ,

under Reshaping the Chinese Military: The PLA’s Roles and Missions in the the in Missions and Roles The PLA’s Military: Chinese the Reshaping Xi Jinping The Armed Forces of China of Forces The Armed 154 153 , andtowinpersonalpopularity The People’s Liberation Army and Contin and Army Liberation The People’s 155 152 hasbeenreplacedby . For this reason, Xi’s reason, this For . , New York 1999. York New , ------Xi’s reforms have not eliminated the fundamental subordination of thearmyXi’s reforms have noteliminatedthefundamentalsubordination of was appointed:thiswas usually someonewho would benominatedassucces 157 156 Upon assuming the posts of General Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the theCCPandChairmanof GeneralSecretary of Upon assuming thepostsof PLA. The group’s second Vice-Chairman is Gen. , who has also been also has who Qiliang, Xu Gen. is The group’sVice-Chairman second PLA. is and in 2014 created was CCP,which CC the of Reform Troop and Defence member of the CMC. In 2016, a new Equipment DevelopmentwasEquipment Department a new In 2016, CMC. the of member the interests of the PLA establishment in the leadership, but his presence also presence his leadership,but the in establishment PLA the of interests the itsmembersfrom 11to 7.the numberof Inaddition,nocivilian Vice-Chairman points to the conviction that there is a community of interests between the between interests of a community is there that conviction the to points 1992 since uously has been on the Party’s Central Committee the longest, having served contin great majority of the military elite and Xi Jinping. and elite military the of majority great CMC. Zhang is also Vice-Chairman of the Small Leading Group for National for Group Leading Small the of Vice-Chairman also is Zhang CMC. reduced He structure. CMC’s the to changes introduced Xi Jinping CMC, CC’s a member of the Politburo of the CC CCP. the Politburo of It can be a memberconcluded that of he represents second Vice-Chairman of the CMC since 2012. Of the current leadership, Xu leadership, current the Of 2012. since CMC the of Vice-Chairman second civilian only the became way,Xi Jinping this Secretary.In General the to sor control by the Party’s CMC directly totheParty, norhave thearmy’s direct they changed thepatternof the in change of driver a major become has The group Xi Jinping. by chaired the to Youxia, Zhang Gen. man, trusted his add to Xi allowed which created,

Under Xi Jinping, the desire to modernise the military was confirmed was military the modernise to desire the Xi Jinping, Under nuclear weapons by the PLA, which shows how seriously the Party takes Party the seriously howshows which PLA, the by weapons nuclear a separate with forces armed of kind a new of creation the with in 2015 the Strategic Support Force.Support Strategic the had who Jin, Gao Gen. as named was commander Force’s Support tegic previously served in the Second Corps; Artillery responsible for the use of provinces, and 84 military corps. Moreover, the army’s numbers have been a three-tier system: five theatres of activity, the to corresponding regions of system:five theatres a three-tier assumed that they will also take part in information warfare. The Stra warfare. information in part take also will they that assumed eration aretobespace, cyberspace andelectronicwarfare, butitcanbe op of theatres troops’ new These Force.Support Strategic the command: 300,000 soldiers.about by cut Although one could also speak of it as a re-politicisation (see section 2.2.4). (see a re-politicisation as it of speak also could one Although member. a full as 2002 since and member, alternate an as First 156 . Since the 18 Since . 157 . The CMC is the main channel of the control over . The CMC is the main channel of th National Congress of the CCP he has been has he CCP the of Congress National - - - - 119 OSW REPORT 4/2020 120 OSW REPORT 4/2020 Xi’s rapprochement with the military could potentially translate into a more a more into translate potentially could military the with rapprochement Xi’s The reform of the PLA – alongside Xi Jinping’s political alliance with part of of part with alliance political Xi Jinping’s alongside PLA – the of The reform was taken by Gen. , and Gen. became the main polit main the became YuZhongfu Gen. and Laihang, Ding Gen. by taken was In such a situation, the inevitable question is to what extent the confronta the extent what to is question inevitable the a situation, such In retired general Liu Yuan (the son of ), a former political commissar political Shaoqi),a former Liu of son YuanLiu (the general retired when in 2012, CCP in the Xi took power after quickly rose four officer. All ical to what extent it helps to stimulate a sense of threat in order to raise funds raise to order in threat of a sense stimulate to helps it extent what to how theinternationalsituation isdeveloping;their genuine perception of and tional perspective presentedby leadershipreally theCCP’smilitary expresses school. military main PRC’s the by capacities PRC’s the up building on focused mainly are They affairs. tional policy,beyondinternal goes Secretary General the with relationship their that power,seems for it struggle but his in Xi supported generals.They retired tial external security the army – hasstrengthenedthearmy’s roleinthecreationof ladder.promotion usual the past fast-tracked werethey theCommission,andineverydaythe army wieldedby Xi;heisChairmanof policy (see the box on the Taiwan Strait crisis in section 1.1.6). Military intelli section 1.1.6).Military in crisis TaiwanStrait the on box the (see policy Beijing, of forces, air of the defence the for branch key officer.political Control petitive struggle for resources, characterised by the belief that it is a zero-sum is it that petitiveforresources,struggle bycharacterised belief the for the millitary.the for had a great influence on the attitudes of several generations of graduates from several generations of influenceontheattitudesof had a great general Liu Yazhou, formerly the chief political officer of the PLA’s the of officer Airpolitical Forces; chief formerlythe Yazhou, Liu general retired like soldiers conservative includes circle inner Xi’s Currently game. developinggence’s and analysing traditional role of intelligence data has been Gen. became the commander of the Central Theatre Command of the Central Theatre Command of Gen. Yi Xiaoguang became the commander of affairs he is supported by , who since the 19 since who Youxia, Zhang supported by is he affairs analysts profess a conservative, nationalist paradigm of thinking on interna on thinking of paradigm nationalist a conservative, profess analysts security. Traditionally, of PLA’sfield the the and in planners aggressivepolicy and risks CCP’s the of assessment their on views of a community is there and supplemented by the close ties between the General Secretary and the influen the and Secretary General betweenthe ties byclose supplemented the operations, which covers Beijing, and Gen. Yin Fanglong was named the main the named wasFanglong Yin Gen. and coversBeijing, which operations, the Politburo. the CMC and a member of the CCP has been Vice-Chairman of of orist from the Academy of Military Science. The latter two in particular have particular in two The latter Science. Military of Academythe from orist the a popular Yuan,Luo Adm. and Science; Military PLA’sof the Academy of thecom development,economic andtechnological which areseenintermsof security.international of sphere the in objectives th National Congress Congress National ------Xi is currently manifested primarily in the acceleration of the streamlining the of acceleration the in primarily manifested currently Xi is the testing carefully,methodically yet of strategy his continuing is Xi Jinping h rognsto bgn ih h riig f h C’ Sal edn Group Leading Small CC’s the of raising the with began reorganisation The The PRC’s increasinginternationalengagement hasbeenaccompaniedby a ma way the basic demands of thearmy’s supporters arebeingmet,thusensuringway thebasicdemandsof 159 158 160 3.2.3. jor reorganisation, carried out by Xi Jinping, of the decision-making process decision-making the of Xi Jinping, by out carried reorganisation, jor icy has also increased. These measures have streamlined the decision-making the havestreamlined measures These increased. also has icy CC the of structures the of policy. role foreign The coordination of field the in deadline the completed, is army the of modernisation the after change may to increasetheCentralCommittee’s over directsupervision thestate’s dip they have not solved the structural problems facing China’s diplomacy – and in granted been has PLA the that seems it where Sea, China South the in tivities process andincreasedthecentre’s abilitytoimplementthedecisionstaken; but fairs of the State Council State the of fairs Commission, Affairs Central Foreign CC’s the of rank the to ForeignAffairs for year 2035 the is which for lomatic activity andimprove internalcoordination,butalsotoshortenthe boundaries of China’s assertive foreign policy. In particular this applies to ac to applies this particular policy.In foreign assertiveChina’s of boundaries great freedom of action while so far conducting a more restrained policy in policy restrained a more conducting far so while action of freedom great CCP has been greatly strengthened, and Xi’s personal influence on foreign pol foreign on influence personal Xi’s and strengthened, greatly been has CCP a slow and consistent build-up of realpowera slow for thePLA. At andconsistentbuild-upof present,thePRC’s some ways have even deepenedthem continuation,butthesituation security policycanbedescribedintermsof eign Affairs was previously located in the building of Ministry of Foreign Af Foreign of Ministry of building the in located previously was Affairs eign For for Group Leading Small CC’s the of decision­‑The office process. making intended is group the of strengthening The institutional Xi Jinping. by chaired this In training. on emphasis increased the and modernisation its PLA, the of and military nationalist a clearly between The rapprochement fields. other

The locations of the small leading groups’ offices are not disclosed, and they are the subject of much much of subject the are they and disclosed, not are offices groups’ leading small the of The locations d’Hooghe, I. See but by 2049, achieved be would objectives its all that assumed plan modernisation the Originally Xi Jinping announced the new date in 2017 during the 19 during in 2017 date new the announced Xi Jinping cil, and when the independent office of the Group was founded, it may be assumed that it still it that assumed be may it founded, was Group the of office independent the when and cil, Small Leading Group for Foreign Affairs was played by the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Coun State the of Office Affairs Foreign the by played was Affairs Foreign for Group Leading Small ping, ping, functioned within the structures of the state administration, in either the Foreign Ministry or the the or Ministry Foreign the either in administration, state the of structures the within functioned speculation. From the available information, it appears that initially the role of the office of the of office the of role the initially that appears it information, available the From speculation.

Foreign policyForeign Secure and Decisive and Secure China’s Public Diplomacy Public China’s …, op. cit. op. 160 158 , butnow, onemay assume, ithasbeentransferred . , Leiden 2015. Leiden , 159 . th National Congress of the CCP. See Xi Jin See CCP. the of Congress National ------121 OSW REPORT 4/2020 122 OSW REPORT 4/2020 The CCP’s central control over foreign policy and the work of the ForeignMin the workof the and overpolicy control foreign central The CCP’s of the CC’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission,The office which also prepares 161 Inspection, was appointed head of the Commission for Discipline Inspection of theCommission for DisciplineInspectionof Inspection, was appointedheadof Wangby played is policy foreign of formation the in role A special Politburo. istry has also increased, thanks to the appointments of Party cadres who are who cadres Party of appointments the to thanks increased, also has istry in relationtootherministrieshasbeenstrengthenedby hisappointmentas ambas PRC’s the Foreignand as Minister served also has (he diplomat rienced directly coming Decisions disregarded. were decisions ForeignAffairs’ of istry years For state. the not Party, the of structures the within functions it now trol over the ministry’s work. The ministry’s independence was also limited also was independence The ministry’s work. ministry’s the over trol leadership, senior ministry’s the to belongs he ForeignAffairs: of Ministry the a Vice-Chairman As Xi Jinping. with relationship personal his of because tial interests, contradictory had often Party the within groups participating the policy; foreign of conduct the in decentralisation a significant been has there conse serious had has change small seemingly This Committee. Central the to particular emphasisonrelationswiththeUS. Foreign MinisterWang Yi, who is policies, as well as the Chinese provinces from the CC, however, cannot be ignored. be however,cannot CC, the from but his political influence is weak, and his primary task on the committee is to is committee the on task is primary influence his political and his weak, but Qishan, who after the 19 and itcanbeconcludedthathisappointmentallows Xitoexert directcon associated withXi Jinping,butarenotcareerdiplomats. Backin 2012Xie Hang ( counsellor a state the CC CCP,a career diplomat, sits on the Central Foreign Affairs Commission of sheng, a member of the Central Committee and its Commission for Discipline for Commission its and Committee Central the of a member sheng, the of a member and Xi of associate a close being also whileUS), the to sador especially thelarge statecompanieswhich conductedtheirown independent because dramatically, increased has effectively act to decisions, committees’ the of implementation the monitors which office, this of The ability quences. ensure the quick translation of decisions into actions. However, his position However,actions.his into decisions of translation quick the ensure Xi,with of foreign policyonbehalf thePRC,heoversees theentiretyof of influen extremely remains still who but age, his of because CCP the of organs expe exceptionally an Jiechi, byYang managed is orders, and opinions expert

See Hongyi, Hongyi, Lai See Reform, Reform, cess State Council. See D.M. Lampton (ed.), D.M. Lampton See Council. State man (ed.), man , Oxon 2010; Lu Ning, Ning, Lu 2010; Oxon , 1978–2000 China’s Foreign Policy. Who Makes It, and How Is It Made? Is How and It, Makes Who Policy. Foreign China’s The Domestic Sources of China’s Foreign Policy: Regimes, Leadership, priorities and pro and priorities Leadership, Regimes, Policy: Foreign China’s of Sources The Domestic , Stanford 2001, p. 46. 2001, Stanford , guowu weiyuanguowu The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China in Decisionmaking Policy Foreign of The Dynamics th National Congress of the CCP lost his place in the key National of Congress The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of of Era the in Policy Security and Foreign Chinese of The Making ). 161 . This meant that many of the Min the of many that meant This . , New York 2013. York New , , Boulder 1997; G. Roz 1997; Boulder , ------(Wang Qishan, Wang(WangYi).Qishan, viewpoints and interpreting the motivations of other international actors. This viewpoints and interpreting the motivations of was especially evident during the trade negotiations with the US, which were which US, the with negotiations trade the during evident especially was guidelines the to stick must freely,but discuss cannot experts Chinese which issues of list a whole is There leadership. CCP’s the of line current the with con political the is problem Another elite. Chinese the among world wider 162 However, these changes have not resolved certain restrictions on Chinese di Chinese on restrictions certain resolved not have changes However,these Sec General the and Committee Central CCP’s the of influence the Increasing .. Control 3.3. istration. Importantly, those responsible for diplomacy have received relatively im of method effective an be to proved has policy foreign on himself retary experience. matic the of head a previous and activist a proven Yu, Qi of ministry the in mittee Com Central CCP’s the of secretary first as nomination the by January 2019 in en ta te R i sol bcmn ugvral, ted ht s being is that trend a ungovernable, becoming slowly is PRC the that means the that mean all people, of millions of hundreds involving flows migration to these concerns, Xi Jinping proposed to the Party elites the construction of of construction the elites Party the to proposed Xi Jinping concerns, these to It also conflicts. international growing and problems economic expected the given dominance, CCP’s to threat a major constitutes this elites, Party the to tors, andimprove diplomacyandadmin theirimplementationatthelevels of proving the decision-making process in foreign policy. The changes introduced plomacy, which are mainly due to the limited expertise and knowledge of the of knowledge and expertise limited the to due mainly plomacy,are which high positions both politically (Yang Jiechi) and within the administration the within and Jiechi) (Yang politically both positions high broken off by Donald Trump, even though the Chinese leadership were appar were leadership Chinese the Trump, though even Donald by off broken CCP’s traditional methods of social control are no longer effective. effective. According longer no are control social of methods traditional CCP’s communicationandthe newChina’s meansof modernisation,thespreadof diplo any lacks who but Committee, Central the of Department Organisation straints intheexpert discourse, inwhich eachinstancemustbeconsistent exacerbated by a slackening of discipline within the Party itself. In response In itself. Party the within discipline of a slackening by exacerbated success ently informed thattherewere chancesof great the evaluating in ‘deficiencies’ serious leaves This topics. same the on ducted the CCP,of even though privately very lively and open discussions are con could potentially improve internal coordination among the various internal ac

22 October 2018, www.scmp.com. 22 October 2018, J. Cai, J. Cai, ‘Chinese experts ‘filtered’ trade war advice to Beijing policymakers’ Beijing to advice war trade ‘filtered’ experts ‘Chinese of society and the Party 162 , . South China Morning Post Morning China South ------, 123 OSW REPORT 4/2020 124 OSW REPORT 4/2020 ( The SCS will supposedly be supported by other programmes such as internet as such programmes other by supported be supposedly will The SCS society,Chinese surveillancemass of the forintroduced technology of The use 164 163 Under Xi’s leadership, the CCP plans to build a social management system management a social build to plans CCP the leadership, Xi’s Under 3.3.1. ments, the technical bases of the whole system are not yet precisely known. precisely yet not are system whole the of bases technical the ments, supposed is SCS the by 2020 and programs, pilot of a number for up signed ily havenew-technologypeople millions companies. So voluntarfar, of hundreds competing by and state the by run system the of parts with a beta-version, in citizens and businesses by using the latest technology (big theactivity of ing of to compulsorily cover all citizens of thePRC. However,to compulsorily cover allcitizensof despitetheseannounce tem ( work.verifyingtheir and cadres Party the managing for element an become to to conduct dynamic and immediate policy transformations, for which tighter this hinders their ability to counteract economic crises. The universal monitor alternativemethod developan to had has Li Keqiang Premier current the that the Party elites not only to maintain power within society during the period of portunities offered by new technologies with state coercion. This should allow should This coercion. state with technologies new by offered portunities forces, the monitoring of public opinion, and propaganda to shape appropriate public opinion,andpropagandatoshapeappropriate forces, themonitoringof behaviour in the public space. The axis of this system is the Social Credit Sys Credit Social the is system this of The axis space. public the in behaviour by reliabledata Xi Jinping andtheCCP’selites, isa way toaddressthedeficitof a serious obstacle to economic planning, and the Party’s planners believethat planners Party’s the and planning, economic to obstacle a serious op the combines which management and control of system a comprehensive als on a massive scale will also be necessary essential economic reforms, but also to regain control of the Party apparatus. Party the of control regain to also but reforms, economic essential cooperation between thestateandtechnology companies, andothermeasures. censorship, media(traditionalandonline), restrictedaccessto foreign close control over individu the population andtheability to shapethebehaviour of CCP the for possible it make will This time. real economyin the and society of image an receive government to the allow will intelligence) artificial and data GDP country’s the estimating of data by localauthoritiesatalllevels. thepracticeissogreat The universality of the PRC,resulting from the falsification of concerning the actual functioning of shehui guanli tixi guanli shehui

The so-called ‘Li Keqiang’ index is based on the analysis of freight railway transport, electricity D. Fu, electricity See transport, railway freight of analysis the on based is index ‘Li Keqiang’ The so-called consumption and total bank loans granted. See ‘Keqiang ker-ching’, ker-ching’, ‘Keqiang See granted. loans bank total and consumption Shehui Xinyong Xitong Xinyong Shehui

New technologies in the service of the Party ofNew the service technologies the in Mobilizing Without the Masses. Control and Contention in China in Contention and Control Masses. the Without Mobilizing ) in the PRC which will integrate the activity of thesecurity ) inthePRCwhich theactivity willintegrate of ), announced in 2014, which is currently operating currently is which in 2014, announced ), 163 . This lack of reliable information has been has information reliable of lack This . 164 . The new system is also intended Economist , Cambridge 2018. Cambridge , , 9 December 2010. , ------Achieving the assumed operational capabilities and impact will take at least at take will impact and capabilities operational assumed the Achieving necessary for the SCS to achievenecessary the desired capabilities do not yet exist, or are a decade, especially since some of the technologies (e.g. artificial intelligence) (e.g. artificial technologies the of some since especially a decade, still at an early stage of development. of stage early an at still When the system becomes compulsory, absence digital will not be an op At present the system is only operating on a beta-test basis. In 2015 the au the basis. In 2015 a beta-test on Atsystemonlyoperating the is present The CCP is determined to create a system for the comprehensive supervi comprehensive the for a system create to determined is The CCP the paymentsthrough non-cash and purchases online check will The SCS dy and citizen each of activity daily the monitor to supposed is The SCS what interactions they enterinto;how muchtimeisspentonsocialmedia, voluntarilyparticipat are citizens Chinese of millions of hundreds which Everything will be evaluated and reduced to a single number which will which number a single to reduced and evaluated be will Everything re its of basis the on decide will others public, be will SCS the Because The SCS’s namically award or subtract ‘social credibility’ points in response. The bal in 2020. introduction mass but known, are activity SCS’s the of principles basic the present, At ing. tion, andin accordance withestablishedregulationsthegeneral principle to big data the technology PRC’s and citizens the continuous monitoring of concept. the citizen’, a good ‘being is understands criterion CCP the The main as them. doubt is it efficiency, and operational full its from far still is system the in programs, SCS’s the test to licenses companies eight granted thorities ports whether keeping in touch with the person concerned is beneficial for use of smartphones and geolocation, as well as street monitoring with use of face recognition andlocation;itwillrecordwhoface recognition isfriendswithwhom and its after parameters expected the within operate to able be will it that ful by local social media such as Baidu, WeChat, Renren, Weibo etc., which Weibo etc., WeChat,Renren, Baidu, as such media social local by assessments from employers, the local CCP committee and the tax office. tax the and committee CCP local employers,the from assessments bysupplemented be will This published. comments all of content the and life. daily user’s the of quality the determine will points these of ance sion of thoughts and behaviour.and thoughts of sion either belong to state-owned companies or are fully dependent on the state. thanks possible is This person. averageChinese the of life the determine assumptions ------125 OSW REPORT 4/2020 126 OSW REPORT 4/2020 will employ subtle behavioural control at the individual level through a system 165 PRC, which is one of theobstaclesto developing thecountry.PRC, which isoneof The system’s mod SCS CCP,however,the the within decision-makers the of intentions the In needs to be something more than just an element of domestic security poli needs to be something more than just an element of the State Council, the SCS’s first priority is to resolve ‘problems’ in areas such areas in resolve ‘problems’ to is priority first SCS’s the Council, State the the Chinesepeople’s accesstobankloans. The elementsenablingmediationare planned aspects of the SCS have no connection with internal security.com internal In with connection haveno SCS the of aspects planned ular formula will allow new features to be added in the future. In fact, this is this fact, In future. the in added be to features new allow will formula ular bination with the system of credit reliability, the SCS is intended to facilitate to intended is SCS reliability,the credit of system the with bination a semi-automated system for managing society on the macro scale, but which but scale, macro the on society managing for system a semi-automated the in trust social levellowof very the to a response as serve to supposed also supposed tohappenthanks tobig-datatechnologyandartificialintelligence in of gradable incentives and discouragements. According to the guidelines of of guidelines the to According discouragements. and incentives gradable of repression and control of system a simple being beyond go cy,and

‘making friends with’ someone with a low SCS will negatively affect their negativelyaffect will SCS a low with with’someone friends ‘making will go to better schools, they will get better jobs, and so on. so and jobs, better get will theyschools, better to go will will be‘encouragements’ toreceive ‘therapy’ tocombatone’s antisocialten which limitedinternetspeed,bansfromrestaurantsand willbegradated: People with low scores will be unable not only to take out loans or hire or loans out take to only not unable be will scores low with People rates, benefit from simplified security checks at airports, their children their airports, at checks security simplified from benefit rates, insurance, bans from working in certain professions (lawyers, journalists), night one’sclubs, the passport loss or of a ban on air travel, restrictions on that indicate or it, improve to how on advice give also will but ranking, bans on sending one’s children to high-level schools, etc. The final stage The final schools, etc. high-level to children one’s sending on bans a car, but even to find work. There will also be minor inconveniences minor be also will There work. find to even but a car, their in decline the about user the inform only not will apply.The SCS own score.own ‘credibility lost in one place will haveof consequences everywhere’ will dencies. People with positive scores will receive loans at attractive interest consumption health (prohibitionsonbuying certainproducts), thelossof (Xinjiang), where allegedly up to 10% of the ethnic minority population have undergone ‘re-education ‘re-education undergone have population minority ethnic the of to 10% up allegedly where (Xinjiang), At the same time as building up the SCS, the CCP has been gradually abandoning (at least formally) formally) least (at abandoning gradually been has CCP the SCS, the up building as time same the At of up to three years. However the system of system the However years. three to up of rehabilitation of drug addicts’, but the police still send ‘politically suspicious’ persons to them. to persons suspicious’ ‘politically send still police the but addicts’, drug of rehabilitation administrative decisions to send any person to camps for ‘re-education through labour’ for period period for labour’ through ‘re-education for camps to person any send to decisions administrative the traditional system of repression. 2013 saw the end of end the saw 2013 repression. of system traditional the through labour’. In other regions, regions, other In labour’. through been retained. According to hard-to-verify reports, the the reports, hard-to-verify to According retained. been laojia camps have been formally transformed into ‘centres for the the for ‘centres into transformed formally been have camps laogai , ‘re-education through labour’ of convicts has has ofconvicts labour’ through , ‘re-education laojia laojia system operates still in East Turkestan , the system allowing the police to use use to police the allowing system , the 165 . Many . - - - - The general legal basis for the SCS is the 2017 Act on Digital Security, and its Security,and Digital on Act 2017 the is SCS the for basis legal The general lack the to a response be to intended also is management social of The system 167 166 Management and Comprehensive Governance, which is chaired by one of Xi’s of one by chaired is Governance,Comprehensivewhich and Management Internet censorship is the joint responsibility of the MPS and the National In National the and MPS the of responsibility joint the is censorship Internet react ahead of time to upcoming economic or social problems. social or economic upcoming to time of ahead react ternet Information Office, headed by Zhuang Rongwen Zhuang by headed Office, Information ternet CC’s the of head Politburo, the of a member Shengkun, Guo people, trusted a dynamic, government the give to supposed is system the mood: public the tralising socialtensionswhich canserve asanalternative totheWestern style the courts’ ( live-action image of the entire PRC. The CCP hopes that this will enable it to it enable will this that hopes The CCP PRC. entire the of image live-action lect dataoneconomic,culturalandsocialactivity fromtheentirepopulation Committee’s Secretariat. He was also the Minister of Public Security in 2012–17.Security Public of Minister the also wasHe Committee’sSecretariat. Central the of secretary and Commission Affairs Legal and Political Central as ‘honestyingovernment’ ( construction has been supervised by the Small Leading Group for the Social the for Group Leading Small the by supervised been has construction on information collecting simplybeyond reach goals The ultimate PRC. the of col will The SCS China. in statistics social and data macroeconomic reliable of system. political authoritarian the democracy,maintaining while chengxin

‘Smart we may expect this programme to be integrated into the SCS as a whole. SCS the into integrated be to programme this expect maywe In addition to social control, the modern technologies arebeingusedto In additiontosocialcontrol,themoderntechnologies must not only participate in the SCS, but the CCP is also experimenting (in of hotbed the often are actions whose apparatus, Party local the monitor ment in political activity and their activity on social media. In the future the In media. social on activity their and activity political in ment regulartests)andmonitors correctness(throughtheanalysisideological of their presence at important events in the life of theParty,their presenceatimportantevents inthelife of their involve cadres Party public. the antagonise most which and conflicts social the Sichuan) with the further use of artificial intelligence to control the Party the control to intelligence artificial of use further the with Sichuan) apparatus. A programme called the ‘smart red cloud’ validates the cadres’ the validates cloud’ red ‘smart the called A programme apparatus. He is also office head of Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission of the CC CCP, whose tasks include include tasks whose CC CCP, the of Commission Affairs Cyberspace Central of head office also is He Liping, Zhang www.sixthtone.com. supervising the censorship of the internet. the of censorship the supervising ), ‘honestyinthecommunity’( Red sifa gongxin sifa ‘‘Smart Red Cloud’ Tracks Party Cadres’ Ideological Correctness’ Ideological Cadres’ Party Tracks Cloud’ Red ‘‘Smart Cloud’ 166 ). In this way, the CCP wants to create a model for neu for a model create to wants way,CCP this the ).In zhengwu chengxin zhengwu shehui chengxin shehui ), ‘honestyinbusiness’( ) and ‘the credibility of ) and‘thecredibilityof 167 . The Office reports The Office . , Sixth Tone Sixth shangwu , 3 July 2017, 3 July 2017, , - - - - 127 OSW REPORT 4/2020 128 OSW REPORT 4/2020 Xi has extended the arsenal of instruments available to supervise the minori the supervise to available instruments of arsenal the extended Xi has Although theCCPhasformally proclaimedthatethnicminorities have theright vision of a perfectly organised and managed society, lacking any cyclical eco cyclical any society,lacking managed and organised a perfectly of vision The State Council has identified one objective of the SCS as ‘improving the as ‘improving SCS the of objective one identified has Council State The after SCS the implement effectively to be will CCP the for challenge The real will retain its efficacy, and whether, in combination with the other social pro social other the with combination in whether, efficacy, and its retain will it long how of remains The question online. coordinated been have to were view areessentialfor maintainingsocialsta which fromtheParty’s pointof 168 2020, even in its most basic form, and the full development of the system will system the developmentof full the and form, basic most its 2020,evenin 3.3.2. its utopian character. utopian its the to alternative a developmental as serve will which crises, social or nomic ties, includinganunprecedentedincreasein theirsurveillance andtheexpan linguistic their seeks PRC the practice identity,in cultural their preserve to Leninist the of fulfilment the as intended is SCS the that saying risk thus between vary will use its of level the that assume also mayWe decades. take CCP,led CC the of Informatisation) and Cybersecurity for Group Leading tral urban andruralareas, andwillhave itsdeepestreachinlarge urbancentres, liberal West. This shows that despite decades of reforms, the CCP has retained retained has CCP the reforms, of decades despite that showsWest. This liberal bility. The programme to monitor the internet with the use of artificial intelli artificial of use the with internet the monitor bility.to The programme technologies new to related projects Party’s the all which in Xi Jinping, by grammes, it will give the CCP an artificial sense of security. of sense artificial an CCP the give will it grammes, gence hasalready provedof protests which itsefficiency byblockinga number One of the CCP’s basic mechanisms of governance theimitation isencouraging theCCP’sbasicmechanismsof One of and cultural assimilation. Representatives of ethnic minorities are treated with ethnicminoritiesaretreatedwith and culturalassimilation.Representatives of sion of the network of re-education camps. Tibet and Xinjiang have become have Xinjiang and Tibet camps. re-education of network the of sion separatism discontentareconsideredactsof suspicion, andany of signs ( economy’ market socialist converge. Cen the (formerly Commission Affairs Cyberspace Central the to directly experimental areas where the CCP tests new means of mass social control. social mass of means new tests CCP the where areas experimental policy.minorities ethnic the of issue the by illustrated as examples, model of

See ‘Racial Sinicisation: Han Power and Racial and Ethnic Domination in China’, [in:] I. Law, I. Law, [in:] China’, in Domination Ethnic and Racial and Power Han Sinicisation: ‘Racial See Racisms. Racism in Communist and Post-Communist Contexts Post-Communist and Communist in Racism Racisms.

Neutralisation of the ethnic minorities ethnic the of Neutralisation wanshan shehui zhuyi shichang jingji tizhi jingji shichang zhuyi shehui wanshan , 2012. , ). Wemay). Red Red 168 ------. Xinjiang, and to a lesser extent in Inner Mongolia (Nei Menggu). It seems that Menggu). (NeiMongolia It seems Inner in extent a lesser to and Xinjiang, The struggle for territorial integrity and the fight against separatist move separatist against fight the and integrity territorial for struggle The 172 171 170 169 Under Xi Jinping’s rule, the process of social securitisation has not only con only not has securitisation social of process the rule, Xi Jinping’s Under In the cities, a police station is located every 300 to 500 metres. At the same the At 500 metres. to 300 every located is station a police cities, the In run security checks reminiscent of those at airports, and a network of check of a network and airports, at those of reminiscent checks security run on focusing role, active an take now services The security in 2008. Tibet in sincethevery theCCP’slegitimacy be ments have beenimportantelementsof time, since 2016 the authorities have installed the most technically advanced technically most the installed have authorities the 2016 since time, protests massive the after adopted approach the on down doubled but tinued, bureaucracy’s Party the of a part is securitisation social of programme the leader­ alwaysBeijing byis the appreciated separatism against struggle the points examines identity cards, verifying them with facial recognition. Also, recognition. facial with them verifying cards, identity examines points pres a strong up build to decided was it purpose this For unrest. preventing general monitoring systems operate full-time today.is threat anyhowsuch real Therefore,irrespective PRC, of the of ginning and thishasbeenthepoliticalspringboardfor many cadres ated which uses artificial intelligence to identify potential criminals potential identify to intelligence artificial uses which ated systems for the surveillance of the population in the cities. All transport hubs transport cities.All the in population the of surveillance the forsystems network. electronic a high-speed to connected and digitised fully each up, set same logic ence within local communities. Over a thousand new police stations havestations been police new Overcommunities. local a thousand within ence and Tibet in PRC, the of periphery havethe whoworked at those to especially

‘Safe ae iy s n plcto b Hae wih s aal o processing of capable is which Huawei by application an is City Safe and storing hundreds of petabytes (1 petabyte = 1 = (1 petabyte petabytes of hundreds storing and aa mil fo ubn uvilne B 21 te R hd deployed had PRC the 2017 By surveillance. urban from mainly data, N. Gan, N. Gan, D. Chaudhuri, internal the reducing in consists which politicisation of case extreme an is securitisation Social Tibet in protests the suppressing bloodily after eye Xiaoping’s Deng caught Hu Jintao example, For China Morning Post Morning China the of causes real the ignore to a government allows also Securitisation problem. a major as creates Heir Apparent, Hu Jintao’ Apparent, Heir problem, while creating the appearance of effectively addressing burning social issues by the use of use the by issues policesocial measures. burning addressing effectively of appearance the creating while problem, in the region. Even today there are suspicions that the riots of 5 March were largely provoked by by provoked largely were 5 March of riots the that officer suspicions political are chief PLA’sthere the today and Even region. Secretary the in First of role dual the served he when March 1989, in are not at relevant all to the security of the state, but are rather issues that the state actor effectively socio-economic problems of a society to security issues. In the context of securitisation, such issues issues such securitisation, of context the In issues. security to a society of problems socio-economic M. Kivlehan, J. Fewsmith, J. Tkacik, See Hu. to subordinate services City’ ‘China’s security chief calls for greater use of AI to predict terrorism, social unrest’ social terrorism, predict to AI of use greater for calls chief security ‘China’s 170 . Xinjiang and the Chinese State: Violence in the Reform Era Reform the in Violence State: Chinese the and Xinjiang , 21 September 2017, www.scmp.com. 21 September 2017, , , Heritage Foundation Heritage , 19 April 2002, www.heritage.org. 19 April 2002, , 171 . A programme has been cre been has A programme . million gigabytes) of of gigabytes) million , Oxon 2018. Oxon , ‘Who’s Hu? Assessing China’s China’s Assessing Hu? ‘Who’s 169 . This applies This . 172 . , ship, South ------129 OSW REPORT 4/2020 130 OSW REPORT 4/2020 (2011–16). Although Chenhadlinks tothecurrentPremierLi Keqiang,hiswork Tibet for and Xinjiangwill be used in the nationalprogramme social securi ChenQuanguo, who isthework hasbeentheCCP’s The Xinjiang programme of was appreciated by Xi Jinping. Securitisation has become an element of Xi’s of element an become has Securitisation Xi Jinping. by appreciated was It is also difficult at present to assess which parts of the system being built in built being system the of parts which assess to present at difficult also It is moderntechnology,In additiontotheuseof inordertocontrolXinjiangtheCCP ines the suspects’ activity from various viewpoints (see section 3.3.1). Interna section 3.3.1). (see viewpoints various from activity suspects’ the ines re­‑ directrepressionby buildinga network of resorted tomethodsof education tisation: this will more likely aim to coordinate local activities and integrate integrate and activities local coordinate to aim likely more will this tisation: governance,typical mechanisms of when thecentresetsvery general goals, al of haveout things gotknows that Beijing although that means criticism tional head in the region since 2016, and who conducted a similar project in Tibet in project a similar conducted who and 2016, since region the in head centre. the by accepted havebeen praise lowing localstructurestoimplementthemfreely; butthen,by meansof being sent on the basis of choices made by artificial intelligence, which exam which intelligence, artificial by made choices of basis the on sent being give the impression that it is bowing to pressure from abroad. This encourag This abroad. from pressure to bowing is it that impression the give authoritarian plan for the reconstruction of thesocialmanagement system (see authoritarian planfor thereconstructionof To proceed. to regions other the expects it which in way the is this that and thatthisisthereferenceand criticism,itindicatestotheotherregions point, section 3.3.1), but its implementation remains in the hands of local structures. local of hands the in remains implementation its section 3.3.1),but databases. els follow fromTibet theprogrammes andXinjiang becausethey seethat they lev different at authorities local as spontaneous, become has day,process this CCP’s the of one of a distortion is actions.This similar take to regions other es control, itwillnotceaseitsrepressioninXinjiangbecausedoeswant to are people which to camps, new of a number opened also have They camps. 176 million street cameras, and a further 626 million will be installed by installed be will 626 million a further and cameras, street 176 million 2020. The technologies and procedures developed and tested in Xinjiang in tested and developed procedures and The technologies 2020. in the PRC than in the next two countries combined (Japan and the United the and (Japan combined twocountries in the next than PRC the in have been raised as to whether the technology installed abroad will also will abroad installed technology the to whether as raised been have States). The export of software and hardware associated with public se public with associated hardware and software of The export States). be used by the Chinese intelligence services. intelligence Chinese the by used be and innovation. As a result, twice as many patents related to the technol the to related patents many as twice a result, As innovation. and not is The aim PRC. the of parts other in introduced being currently are only surveillance in and of itself, but also the stimulation of theeconomy itself,but also thestimulationof only surveillance inandof curity is intended to boost the Chinese economy in the future. Concerns future. the in economy Chinese the boost to intended is curity 2015 since registered been have data big and intelligence artificial of ogy ------educated population. However, the CCP eventually lost control over this pro this over control lost eventually CCP However,the population. ‑educated ‘agrarian question’ thepopulationintoactive andmove par partof thegreater visages the transfer of a quarter of a billion people from the countryside to countryside the from people a billion of a quarter of transfer the visages The process of urbanisation has not so far been accompanied by the abolition the by accompanied been far so not has urbanisation of The process (see economy PRC’s the of fundaments the change to plans to linked is This en in 2013 Xi Jinping by initiated programme urbanisation The twelve-year reform economic and modernisation for programme the of in 1978 The launch 176 175 174 173 However, this process of urbanisation has been accompanied by the Party’s the by accompanied been has urbanisation of process However,this 3.3.3. remain inthecountryside. In 197817.92% thepopulationlived intowns, of com mostly by illiterates ment and modernisation. and ment ticipation in the economy, no longer as cheap labour, but also as consumers. as also but labour, cheap as longer economy,no the in ticipation will population the of 30% than more no by 2025 that is The plan cities. the pared to 53.73% in 2013; the increase in the urban population grew by 559 mil by grew population urban the in increase the in 2013; to 53.73% pared has been a drag on the Chinese economy in recent years. In the cities it will it cities the In years. recent in economy Chinese the on a drag been has lion urbanisation in has been the government’s project to complete the process of populated country agricultural poor, a from transformation China’s to led but a reform has been introduced making it easier to change one’s place of of place one’s change to easier it making introduced been has a reform but be easiertoprovide basicsocialservices, especially healthcareanduniversal China. It aims to bring about the social stabilisation of the PRC the of stabilisation social the about bring to It aims China. anticipated period of economic problems, and allow the process of bringing economic problems, and allow the process of anticipated period of section 3.1.1) and is intended to revive the slowing real estate market, which market, estate real slowing the revive to intended is and section 3.1.1) continue. to poverty extreme of out society Chinese of segments successive of the internal passport system ( of for which China’s isnecessary education, thedevelopment furtherdevelop of migration. internal of processes overthe control continued programmes flagship Xi Jinping’s of one sphere, social the in Therefore, cess.

See Chuanglin Fang, Danlin Yu, Danlin Fang, Chuanglin See p. vii. Ibid, , Houkai see perceived, is PRC the in urbanisation how about more For see almost 100%: reached had China in literacy of level the in 2016 UNESCO, to According The Path to Prosperity and Harmony and Prosperity to The Path eAtlas of Literacy in South China, China, in South to have stood at between 15% and 25%. See G. Peterson, G. Peterson, See and 25%. 15% between at stood have to terns ­people

Control of urbanisation migration and , Beijing 2016. Beijing , 175 . The government’s new programme new The government’s . 1949–95 . It is very hard to assess the level of literacy in the PRC in 1949, but it can be assumed 173 , Vancouver 1997, pp. 3–11. 1997, Vancouver , toanurbanindustrialpower withanincreasingly well­ China’s New Urbanization. Developmental Paths, Blueprints and Pat and Blueprints Paths, Developmental Urbanization. China’sNew , Beijing 2019. Beijing , ), which has been in place since 1958, since place in been has which ), The Power of Words. Literacy and Revolution Revolution and Literacy Words. of The Power 176 aimstoliquidateChina’s Urbanization in China. China. in Urbanization 174 during the UNESCO UNESCO ------131 OSW REPORT 4/2020 132 OSW REPORT 4/2020 velopment, led by Wang the Central Menghui under the general supervisionof There is broad consensus within the Party with regard to the policy of urbani There isbroadconsensus withintheParty withregardtothepolicyof groups successive help to intended also is programme urbanisation The mass the of reform the and programme The urbanisation where residence, they andhave donothave noaccesstoeduca therightof processes. migration overthe control maximum retain to way,wishes CCP the 180 179 178 177 274 million people (2016) who are ‘village residents’ ‘village are who (2016) people 274 million 500 million) have emerged from extreme poverty.extreme from haveemerged 500 million) residence from the country to the city in medium-sized urban centres (which centres urban medium-sized in city the to country the from residence to the government structures, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural De Urban-Rural and Housing of Ministry the structures,government the to data statistical specific the about be may there poverty. questions Whatever extreme of out lifted be to as cohesion their up break and places new into assimilation their facilitate to them tosmallercentresandgiving themtherighttosettlethereisintended Dispersing downturn. economic an of event the in protests of source tential a po represent security.They social or care medical children, their for tion around of group i.e. the workers, migrant so-called the is authorities the to a source be will countryside the that fears still leadership city’.The Party the to betheresponseage-old questioninChina agrarian ular deportations of illegal migrants from overpopulated metropolises. In this overpopulatedIn from metropolises. migrants illegal of deportations ular himself saidthatduringthecivil war, ‘thevillagehimself surrounded andconquered Comprehensive Deepening of Reform Commission of theCCCCP(formerly the Reform Commissionof Comprehensive Deepeningof allows the management of population flows to selected cities), as well as reg as well as cities), selected to flows population of management the allows a social group. sation, becauseitsimplementationwas already putintomotionandentrusted thereforms, several hundredmillionpeople(theofficialfigureisabout start of strong associationwithmaintainingsocialstability countryside as such. Another group which threatens social stability according stability social threatens which group Another such. as countryside preventing themby problems, hencetheideaof largely eliminatingthe of

According to official figures, China has recorded a spectacular drop in the population living below below living population the in drop a spectacular recorded has China figures, official to According (ed.), Tang Zongli A source of the rebellions recurring in Chinese history has always been question, the agrarian which J.L. Wallace, see CCP, the of survival the for a condition as urbanisation on more For was characterised by sudden rises in overpopulation in the countryside, accompanied by the massive massive the by accompanied countryside, the in overpopulation in rises sudden by characterised was oretical and Empirical Study Empirical and oretical mining the official poverty line is open to challenge. See Kun Yan, Yan, Kun See challenge. to open is line poverty official the mining displacement of peasants from the land by groups associated with the ruling class. ruling the with associated groups by land the from peasants of displacement the poverty line, from 63% of the population in 1981 to 7.2% in 2015. However, the method of deter of method the However, in 2015. 7.2% to in 1981 population the of 63% from line, poverty the bility: Urbanization, Redistribution, and Regime Survival in China in Survival Regime and Redistribution, Urbanization, bility: China’s Urbanization and Socioeconomic Impact Socioeconomic China’sand Urbanization , Berlin 2016. Berlin , 180 , thereisnodoubtthatintheperiodsince , Oxford 2014. Oxford , , Montgomery 2017, p. v. 2017, Montgomery , 177 179 hukou Poverty alleviation in China. A The China. in alleviation Poverty . The reform is intended is The reform . , but who work in cities in work who but , system have a very havea very system 178 . Mao Zedong Mao . Cities and Sta and Cities ------Wang Huning, a Vice-Premier and a member of the SC PB of the CC CCP,CC the the of is PB SC the Wangof a member a Vice-Premierand Huning, The CCP is aware that mass urbanisation is associated with the emergence of of emergence the with associated is urbanisation mass that aware is The CCP 183 182 181 nities toaccesshighereducation nation of the SCS with control of the migration and urbanisation processes, urbanisation and migration the of control with SCS the of nation 37 million reached already had figure this by 2015 but PRC, the in the synergy of which isintendedtoallow theCCPtomaintainpowerthe synergy of inthe combi the Hence communication. of a means as internet the of spread the theinformation revolution, thegrowththe CCPisafraidthat,ineraof of to socialpromotionforisassociatedwithincreasingtheiropportu thisgroup the Small Leading Group for the CC CCP,Agriculture and Rural Areas of chaired period of China’s coming transformation. As the Party predicts, this will be will this predicts, Party the As transformation. coming China’s of period Small Leading Group for the Comprehensive Deepening of Reform), which is Reform),which of Deepening Comprehensive the for Group Leading Small by Hu Chuanhua, whose Vice-Chairman and head of office is . Han is office of head and Vice-Chairman whose Hu Chuanhua, by general supervisor of the programme. the of supervisor general group and in society as a whole, something which will also be facilitated by facilitated be also will which something a whole, as society in and group accompanied by economically-motivated social unrestandtheemergence of path the up Opening status. material their regarding expectations more and aspirations havenew will children their but positions,working simple accept centrifugal forces. centrifugal education will be accompanied by political activity greater both among this to inclined more be will residents urban new The 250 million problems. other chaired by Xi Jinping. At thesametime, policyfor ruralareasiscoordinatedby

The process of urbanisation is compulsory. Authorities raze entire villag entire compulsory.raze Authoritiesis urbanisation of The process reasons for social protests in these areas. these in protests social for reasons Resistance and the confiscation of land from the rural residents, which is a source a source is which residents, rural the from land of confiscation the and corruption to linked is process The whole expanded. are agglomerations of the towns, among other things. This is also one of the most common most the of one also is This things. other among towns, the of construction the revenuefinances budget also authorities,but local for of es andreplacethemwithtowns builtfromscratch; inaddition,existing York 2011; Hong Zhu, Shiyan Lou, Lou, Shiyan Zhu, Hong 2011; York See Zhao Xinying, Xinying, Zhao See education higher of reform the of a result is years recent in students of number the in The increase T. Wright, www.chinadaily.com.cn. in 2000. See W.J. Morgan, Bin (ed.),Wu Bin W.J. Morgan, See in 2000. Handbook of Protest and Resistance in China in Resistance and Protest of Handbook to resettlement ‘China has 1 in 5 of all college students in the world’ the in students college all of 5 in 1 has ‘China Development and Reform of Higher Education in China in Education Higher of Reform and Development 181 Higher Education Reform in China. Beyond the expansion the Beyond China. in Reform Education Higher 182 : in 1949 there were only 117,000students only were there in 1949 : , Cheltenham 2019, pp. 184 pp. 184 2019, Cheltenham , , China et seq et 183 , 4 August 2016, 4 August 2016, , . . However. , Oxford 2011. Oxford , , New , New - - - 133 OSW REPORT 4/2020 134 OSW REPORT 4/2020 After solidifying his position during his first term, Xi Jinping is in the process the in is Xi Jinping term, first his during position his solidifying After The system currently built by CCP is intended to be a Chinese socio-political a Chinese be to intended is CCP by built currently The system funda the of a sign is turn’‘conservative Xi Jinping’s of in 2012 The launch well as China’s escalating conflict with the West. Xi now has new instruments new has now the Xi with West. conflict China’sescalating as well model which can serve as an alternative to Western democracy. This is not is This democracy.Western to alternative an as serve can which model theLeninistconceptof new willleadtotheimplementationof technologies taken be should PRC the of Chairman the of office of term the on restrictions the with place taking is Communist Party the within forces of reconfiguration century,twenty-first the of turn the at took CCP the which decision mental ternal affairs of othercountries. However,ternal affairs of theCCP’smay return to thepractice people. of behaviour individual the influence to resourcesarebeingusedtosystematicallytechnological introduceanddevel instabilityandimbalancesintheslowing Chineseeconomy,the periodof as with coincide activities These dynamic. political new the to state the of tures China. powerin retain to goal – supreme CCP’s the the fundamentalchallenges facingthePRCandprospectsfor thecollapse an economic modelwhich contains market elements but the implementationof a programme elders Party the offered Xi has PRC. the of system political the potentially in China’s competition with the West. After beginning the process the beginning West.After the with China’scompetition in potentially for revitalising the Leninist model of theParty-state, the for aninternal‘purge’ revitalising theLeninistmodelof of CCP, Party andsocietycontrolusingmoderntechnology, themethodsof and CONCLUSIONS and considers the path suggested by Xi to be the best guarantee of achieving and considersthepathsuggested by Xitobethebestguaranteeof of face economy.the the In and society in position Party’s the safeguards also as a mandatetoXi Jinpingpermanently inscribethis‘conservative turn’ into decades. The current coming the in PRC the of shape the affect will which and about the uniqueness of theChinesemodel anditsnon-interference inthe about theuniquenessof discontent,aswell astheability any sourcesof anticipation andpredictionof the to thanks stable kept be can society,which controlled and a well-planned copious country’s the time, same the Atpredecessors. his to unknown a scale consent of the majority of the Party elites. The symbolic decision to abolish to decision The symbolic elites. Party the of majority the of consent of ‘reform and opening-up’ in the late 1970s, the Party stuck to its rhetoric its to stuck Party the late 1970s, the in opening-up’ and ‘reform of only animportantelement inbuildingtheParty’s internallegitimacy, butalso these of use mass the term, long the In control. social of mechanisms new op governance athis disposal; however,of heis also faced with challenges on institutionalisingthenew orderintheParty, adaptingthestruc of andof politicalliberalisation, theexisting system, theParty hasrejectedtheideaof of - - - - which will create a global alternative domination to the political and ideological 1. However, this vision for reconstructing the PRC must confront three main three confront must PRC the reconstructing for vision However,this 2. obstacles: West.the of a way in experience’ ‘Chinese the export to strive and time, Zedong’s Mao of ‘breakthrough’ in Chinese reforms; and in some areas, indeed, the influence Xi Jinping and the move away from the informal rules of governance raises moveof the rules awayinformaland the from Xi Jinping which since the start of the ‘reform andopening-up’which period has been one since thestart of which as a result expands the state sector. The lack of significant market significant of The lack sector. state the expands a result as which The stability flexibility,system’sinherent the of liquidation the means Recentralisation The concentration reforms factors, can also beattributedtoideological as well ascontradic still are mechanisms, market with linked inherently nested within the Party, but also in the fear among the CCP’s leaders that my, tostimulatecompetitionandinnovation, withanimportantrolefor the tions between the idea of absoluteruleby theParty andthe developmenttions between theidea of they may losecontrolover theeconomy, andover thesocialprotestswhich econo the of transformation market the continue to wishes CCP the that Party. the and between Xi conflict is there if rule one-man of chaos the thePRC: the threatwhich inthepasthasledtodestabilisationof problem of who will succeed Xi Jinping, as well as the vision of a return to a return of vision the as well as Xi Jinping, succeed will who of problem private sector. However, Xi Jinping has not so far brought about a serious a serious about brought far so not has However,sector. private Xi Jinping between and taking control over the markets. This is done using state resources, state using done is This markets. the over control taking and as inselectedsectoralreforms implementedby Xi’sgovernment, itisclear a systemic congestionfailure, in the the emergencedecision-making pro of powers a wide range in a singleof decision-making centre raises the risk of sons for this may be sought in the resistance of powerfulsons for this may interest groups be sought in the resistance of to powers broad such granting dimension, personal the In changes. social could arise. The Party’s most common reactions to the instability,the is whichto reactions common most The Party’s arise. could The rea increased. actually has economy the on state the and Party the of challenges posed by the country’s significant internal diversity and dynamic China’s success, themainsourcesof anditsfundamentalresponsetothe of conditions. changing to devised solutions the apply to failure the and cess, a challenges modern the economy of vision of

an

the institutional of based of PRC

power

deep may on Party market in also the and control be hands personal forces. undermined over of In the official rhetoric, as well

Xi Jinping nature. society by ad hoc ad the Centralisingsuch and carries contradiction interventions the model political of - - - -

135 OSW REPORT 4/2020 136 OSW REPORT 4/2020 3. up of theeconomy,‑up of outfor which internalreasonstoo, Chinaplanstocarry ‘conservative turn’, increasedassertiveness thecountry’s anditsincreasing which can mobilise enormous resources, has become a hotbed of structural whichresources,enormous mobilise can of a hotbed become has po long-term to lead will cooperation its that West’s belief the firm as well by for compensate to try may Party the power – losing of fear for which – The PRC increasing its control overcontrol society.its increasing mean deepening instabilityinthe Chinese economy over the coming years, rary litical liberalisation in China. The scale, level of developmentambition and level The scale, of China. in liberalisation litical been based on the decades-long favourable economic symbiosis between the globalised world – weakening the foundation of China’s development in re China’sin development of world –foundation globalised the weakening and open an in China include to West’sdesire the be will weaker the goes, ambitions, are creating a new level of competition, not only political, but political, only not competition, of level a new creating are ambitions, also cultural, ideological or even civilisational. The further Xi’s ‘revolution’Xi’s The further evencivilisational. or ideological cultural, also of an innovative society based on private enterprise. Failure to reform will reform Failureto enterprise.private on innovativebased an society of cent decades. cent could greatly alleviate this conflict. However, Xi’s the political dimension of opening­ further the and marketreforms of countries. The implementation developed other and EU the US, the and China between conflict economic played a state role by significant economy,Chinese the with the coupled of developed which countries and the China ‘global has factory’ become, as compatibility world may order. also of

the The PRC’s participation in the globalised economy has economy globalised the in participation The PRC’s encounter China MICHAŁ of external

Xi Jinping’s BOGUSZ, obstacles vision JAKUB resulting with JAKÓBOWSKI the from contempo the in - - - - ‑administered ANNEXES At the At five are Additionally,there Atthe ANNEX 1. The PRC is structured on the basis of a of basis the on structured is The PRC Kong and Macau. and Kong , Zhejiang, Jiangsu, , , , , Hebei, inx, hnog Hnn Hbi Hnn Gagog Hia, Sichuan, , Guangdong, Hunan, , , Shandong, , 30 management, and report directly to the provincial authorities. There are also are There authorities. provincial the to directly report and management, many unitsatthethird(oreven fourth) levels areexcluded fromprefectural territorialunitsat the secondlevel isgreater,number of duetothefactthat the impression that these groups’ rights are being respected. These regions regions These respected. being are rights groups’ these that impression the units.administrativeindividual between relationships formal the pact groups of ethnic minorities. This distinction of status is intended to give to intended is status of distinction This minorities. ethnic of groups pact , , , Gansu and . There are also four also are There Qinghai. and Gansu Shaanxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, influence often hierarchy Party the within differences the and structure, CCP facto and .Inaddition,therearetwo Uighur Xinjiang (Xizang), Tibet Menggu),(Nei Mongolia Inner , are thecentralgovernment:agement Beijing,, of Shanghai andChongqing. or economic nature. Each territorial division is paralleled by a corresponding a corresponding by paralleled is division territorial Each nature. economic or dition therearemany exceptions regional dictatedby thearea’s specificethnic Fifteen selected metropolitan regions have a special status as cities with cities as status a special have regions metropolitan selected Fifteen The sub-provincial tres which are crucial for the economic development of theprovince,tres which arecrucialfor theeconomicdevelopment and of primarily on an economic basis. They represent the large industrial cen industrial large the represent They basis. economic an on primarily rights.prefectural Administrative sub-provincialthe levelat units un are are often also designated as special economic zones. economic special as designated also often are der the direct management of the provincial authorities, and are defined are and authorities, provincial the of management direct the der autonomous no different from those of the provinces, but they are inhabited by com by inhabited are they but provinces, the of those from different no first second

level The territorial division PRC ofThe territorial the level municipalities there are 33 territorial units, including 22 including units, 33 territorial are there prefectures there are 334 (as of 2017) of 2017) (as 334 are there level autonomous ( zizhizhou ( zhixiashi special administrative regions four-level ), which aredominatedby national regions ) which areunderthedirectman prefectures ( territorial zizhiqu ( ) whose statusis diji provinces ), buttheactual division ( direct­ sheng . In ad In . ­Fujian, , Hong - - de ): - - - 137 OSW REPORT 4/2020 138 OSW REPORT 4/2020 ( At the At The in the PRC. Of these, typical these, Of PRC. in the called are prefectures the Mongolia, Inner In minorities. rural large metropolitan areas, and land districts in rural areas. At this level, there level, this At areas. rural in districts land and areas, metropolitan large reasons. historical golia; theothersare are 47,034 administrative units, including 29,502 including units, 47,034 administrative are of large metropolitan cities. metropolitan large of 120 of consist xianjishi (around 20% of the PRC’s territory). Although this level is informal and informal is level this Although territory). PRC’s the of 20% (around The fifth, informal level consists of small territorial units with clearly de clearly with units territorial small of consists level informal The fifth, status special the from results and informal, is level The sub-prefectural were initiated (although only in rural communities). This was possible was This communities). rural in only (although initiated were were inhabited by 500 million people and occupied 2 million square meters In 1998 experiments with democracy at the level of villages and towns and villages of level the at democracy with experiments In 1998 is exercised by local neighbourhood committees dominated by the CCP.the by dominated committees neighbourhood local by exercised is levellowest this at power structures, state official any to subordinate not need to be a CCP member, and the committees’ members are elected in elected are members committees’ the and member, a CCP be to need tryside, villages. the Attwenty-first the beginning of century such villages Local fined boundaries: in the cities, these are streets or quarters; in the coun the in quarters; or streets are these cities, the in boundaries: fined level). At the same time the sub-prefectures have rights a broader scope of Some territorial units at the third level act as act level third the at units territorial Some because theoretically, in order to be elected to a committee, one does not does one a committee, to elected be to order theoretically,in because and obligations than the equivalent counties. Many of them are not even not are them of Many counties. equivalent the than obligations and subject to the prefectural authorities, but rather directly to the provinces.the to directly rather but authorities,prefectural the to subject one rank higher (prefectural) than the position they formally hold (county theParty secretaries who manage them;intheParty hierarchyof they are Sub-prefectures fourth municipalities third committees ),49 level level banners autonomous , the municipal level, includes both townships, districts in , the county level, there are 2862 such administrative units administrative 2862 such are there level, county the , urban ( ( qi xiang ) and 3 and ) districts ) and 17,532 and ) districts counties autonomous ( shixiaqu ( ( zizhixian subdistricts xianji ) in large metropolitan cities. metropolitan large in ) banners ) number 1464, the remainder the number 1464, ) de facto de , 363 ), municipalities ( ( jiedao second-level units.second-level county-level zizhiqi leagues ) inurbanareas ) inInnerMon ( ( zhen meng towns ) and ) for - - -

Map. The territorial division of the People’s Republic of China Jilin Harbin Taipei Heilongjiang Shanghai Taiwan Liaoning Nanjing Zhejiang Jiangsu Fujian Anhui Jinan Tianjin Beijing Inner Shandong Hong Kong Hong Hebei Mongolia Nanchang Jiangxi Guangzhou Guangdong Henan Macau Haikou Hubei Taiyuan Shanxi Hunan Changsha Hainan Xi'an Nanning Guangxi Shaanxi Chongqing Chongqing Guiyang Ningxia Guizhou Lanzhou Sichuan Chengdu Xining Kunming Yunnan Gansu Qinghai Urumqi Lhasa Tibet Xinjiang autonomous regions autonomous municipalities regions administrative special 4/2020

T REPOR W OS

139 140 OSW REPORT 4/2020 184

indicates that a decision has been taken to halt the experiment. May 2019 May 2019 experiment. the halt to taken been has a decision that indicates this ‘opinion’ is formalised by the state structures. state ‘opinion’the bythis formalised is CCP local and committee local the of head of functions the of 2019 end the put forward by the CCP, and in the last decade only a few places in the in places a few only decade last the in CCP,and the by forward put State Council on the establishment and improvementthe system, mech of anism andpolicyfor urbanandruralintegration’ secretary would be merged. It seems that it is just a matter of time before time of a matter just is it that It seems merged. wouldbe secretary and Committee Central CCP’s the of ‘Opinion an of publication the saw countryside have seen candidates putting themselves forward. Everything still are candidates cases of majority the in practice, In elections. direct Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu jianli jianquan chengxiang ronghe fazhan tizhi jizhi he he jizhi tizhi fazhan ronghe chengxiang jianquan jianli guanyu guowuyuan zhongyang Zhonggong zhengce tixi de yijian de tixi zhengce , 5 May 2019, www.gov.cn. 5 May 2019, , 184 which assumed thatby - ANNEX 2. These are his closest associates, whom he met while working in the provinces,the in workingwhile met he whom associates, closest his are These Tuanpai Tuanpai with them, such as Zeng Qinghong, Vice-Chairman of the PRC in 2003–8. He in 2003–8. PRC the of Vice-Chairman Qinghong, Zeng as such them, with ways the common tried to present themselves as ‘leaning into the problems of 150–350 families), the CCP cadres who built modern who are the descendants of The ‘Zhejiang The ‘princelings’ The ‘Jiang Zemin to support Xi. support to Zemin inated by Jiang’s colleagues from the days when he ruled that city.However,that ruled he when days the from colleagues Jiang’s by inated manoeuvres. man’.The CCP.The the of wing youth the League, Youth munist is considered to have been Xi Jinping’s patron, and allegedly convinced Jiang convinced allegedly and patron, Xi Jinping’s been have to considered is the ‘princelings’ way of thinking. of way‘princelings’ the their privileges, andby extension inmaintainingtheconstitutional loss the to due disintegration substantial undergone has clique’‘Shanghai the the years recent In Premier. became and Secretary, General of position the Com the of cadres former of association a close by formed CCP.It was the personally anointed by Jiang Zemin, to which another member of the ‘Shanghaipersonally anointed by Jiang Zemin, to which another member of former General Secretary Jiang Zemin. In the past, they were part of a loose a loose of part were they past, the In Zemin. Jiang Secretary General former lection of Xi Jinping for the position of General Secretary, who allegedly was allegedly Secretary,who General of position the for Xi Jinping of lection had theirrootsinthisgroup), themostpowerful andconsistent factionwithin be assumed that the vast majority of theCCP’smid-level cadreshavebe assumed thatthevast majorityof adopted preserving in interested primarily is group involvedThis business.become in China inthe 1940s and 1950s. According totheunwritten rules, eachgeneration especially in Zhejiangprovince (hencethename); butthetermalsocovers the It may group. this in roots their have Bo Xilai and Xi Jinping Both PRC. the of rest the while apparatus, Party the in work to representative one send can JiangZeminandthoseassociated effectively theresourcebase for thefamily of is group the that assumed be can it Today objected. Yongkang, clique’,Zhou se the with associated conflict the as well as influence, economic direct its of clique’,‘Shanghaidom the called groups interest sectoral various of coalition group has begun to disintegrate as it became the subject of political as it became the subject has begun to disintegrate group of was, during the rule of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao (both of whom of (both Jiabao Wen and Hu Jintao of rule the during was, Tuanpai

Zemin during the period of period Xi Jinping’s the during ascent to power Factions and internal groups within the CCP the groups within internal Factions and new are a loose coalition of Party clans (variously estimated at estimated (variously clans Party of coalition a loose are candidate Li Keqiang lost in his rivalry with Xi Jinping for Xi Jinping with rivalry his in lost Li Keqiang candidate

group’ army’ is a group of retired cadres gathered around the around gathered cadres retired of a group is are the direct political support base for Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping. for base support political direct the are Tuanpai

group have group al status quo - - - -

141 OSW REPORT 4/2020 142 OSW REPORT 4/2020 (the group’s name comes from reversing the order of the characters making characters the of order the reversing from comes name group’s (the The group was decimated when, in alliance with the ‘populists’, it tried to op to tried ‘populists’,it the with alliance in when, decimated was The group The ‘Xishan The ‘oil (see CCP the of Secretary General of post the assume to ambitions Bo Xilai’s The ‘populists’ of CCP.Elements the throughout support of deal a great won have and PRC, The ‘New internal cohesion,butthisdoesnotmeanthattheexpectations which itraised rhetoric andtheresentmentsassociatedwitheconomicstratification,their today.occupythey positions the neverhavereached would they support his without and Xi Jinping, on dependent are members Its state. and Party of bodies various the of functioning ongoing the influence tor headed by Zhou Yongkang, who until 2012 headed the special services on services special the headed 2012 until who Yongkang, Zhou by headed tor are ‘newleft’ the of proposals the eventhat if a consensus is there factions the his and Xi Jinping both by programmes in included been have criticism their the of policy socio-economic the on interests sectoral of influence rising the incomesand excessivetheir views inequalityof arefocused ontheproblemof However,apparatus. Party the within faction a formal than CCP,rather the to effectively to able is Xi Jinping that apparatus, Party the in positions key to assigns he whom members, its with bond personal his through years.It is the promise to introduce socio-economic programmes to improve the quality of topromise improve tointroduce socio-economic programmes the quality of the central apparatus who havepeople of become associated with him over up the province’s name). They stuck close to each other and offered mutual offered and other each to close stuck They name). province’s the up Xi Jinping. of election the pose fact thattogether they lenttheirsupport to stronger factionsinexchange for litical ambitions. It is a loose-knit group of CCP cadres from Shanxi province Shanxi from cadres CCP of group a loose-knit It is ambitions. litical havedisappeared. behalf of the Politburo, but not before an important career in the fuel sector. fuel the in career important an before not but Politburo, the of behalf abandoned, its assessment of the problems of contemporary Chinaisgenerally contemporary theproblemsof abandoned, itsassessmentof anachronistic, drawing uponconceptsby MaoZedongwhich theCCPhasnow assistance indealingwith particularissues, buttheirstrengthwas duetothe accurate. services and social security. After Bo’s fall, the group lost virtually all of its of all virtually lost group the fall, Bo’s security.After social and services section 1.1.2). this is group their references to A characteristic feature of opponents fromthe‘populist’and group’ Left’ group’ is more an ‘archipelago’ of like-minded intellectuals belonging belonging intellectuals like-minded‘archipelago’ an more is of is a branch of the ‘’ linked to the energy sec energy the to linked clique’ ‘Shanghai the of a branch is appear to be a group of opportunistic cadres who supported who cadres opportunistic of a group be to appear is an example of a regional group which had no great po great no had which group a regional of example an is Tuanpai factions. It seems that within all within that It seems factions. ­Maoist - - - ut ae ae msae bcue n 04 l ter nw mmes were members known their all 2014 in because mistake, a made have must oiia ad cnmc ocsin. uig h ls pltcl adot they hand-out political last the During concessions. economic and political long prison terms. prison long successively accused of corruption,expelled fromthePartysuccessively andsentencedto accusedof 143 OSW REPORT 4/2020 144 OSW REPORT 4/2020 (Vice-Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection on the on Inspection Discipline for Commission Central the of (Vice-Secretary Municipal the of head and Security Public of Ministry the at (Vice-Minister School), Party Central the of Vice-Chairman (executive ANNEX 3. Politburo), Public Security the Bureau Central in Committee),Beijing, member of Committee), Standing Politburo’s the of member NPC, The ‘Zhejiang responsible for theeconomy, the Politburo), memberof mittee), the CC CCP).CC the tative Conference), are: Theysystem. the Lou Bayanqolu Huang his service in the provinces, whom he has assigned to key positions within positions key to assigned has he whom provinces, the in service his Gen. CC CCP), theCCCCP, the Politburo),Organisational Department of member of men’include: ‘Xi’s well-knownas people Other Colonel Chen Min’er and Xi Jinping’s former mentor former Xi Jinping’s and of thePolitburo), of Yangsheng Zhang Kunming Zhong Xia Li Xi He Lifeng (Party head of Jilin Province, member of the Central Committee), Central the of member Province, Jilin of head (Party

Youxia Baolong The Xi Jinping faction (Party headinChongqing), (Party head of Guangdong province, member of the Politburo),the of member province,Guangdong of head (Party new Shaojun (Party head of Shanxi province, member of the Central Com Central the of member province, Shanxi of head (Party (head of the Publicity Department of the CCCCP, thePublicityDepartmentof member (headof Chen Li Qiang (Vice-Chairman of theCMConCCCCP, the (Vice-Chairman of memberof army’ (Vice-Chairman of theChinesePeople’s PoliticalConsul (Vice-Chairman of (head of the NDRC, member of theCentralCommittee) theNDRC,memberof (headof Derong (Vice-Director of the General Office of the CMC on CMC the of Office General the of (Vice-Director includes colleagues of Xi Jinping from the time of of time the from Xi Jinping of colleagues includes (Partythe Politburo),head in Shanghai, member of (Party head in Beijing, member of the Politburo),the of member Beijing, in head (Party (head of the Baowu state steel conglomerate) steel state Baowu the of (head Wang Qishan Yong Li Zhanshu (Vice-Chairman of the PRC). the of (Vice-Chairman (mayor of Shanghai) and Shanghai) (mayorof Liu Chen Xi (Chairman of the (Chairmanof He Wang (Vice-Premier (head of the of (head Xiaohong He ­Yiting - -

ANNEX 4. CCP’s Committee of the Central Departments Affairs Commission Taiwan Work Policy Research Office Political andLegal Department International Liaison Department Publicity Department Department Commission of theFinancial Office Communication Office forInternational Committee Organisation General Office Commission United FrontWork for Discipline Inspection Department and Economic Affairs **

Organs of the CCP’s of the Committee Organs Central * Administrative andexpertise basefor theSteeringCommittee (also known asUnit 57 001 ortheCentralGuardRegiment), Monitors socialorganisationsthroughtheUnitedFront, Monitoring discipline amongCCPmembers, anti-corruption International propaganda Developing policyonTaiwan policy decisions, Issues concerning theimplementationof Relations withotherCommunistpartiesorwhich work,Ideological propaganda CCP members Central Security Bureau, towhich unit 8341issubordinate CC’s administrative base;alsooversees the thework of Staffing, staff rotation,collectingpersonaldataconcerning Staffing, staff issues etc. ChinesepeopleoutsideChina including organisationsof measures for FinanceandEconomy develops recommendationsonpolitical,social,economic force (police) control over civil institutionsof Responsibilities accept similar‘principles’totheCCP a PLA specialunit responsiblefor protectingCCPleaders 145 OSW REPORT 4/2020 146 OSW REPORT 4/2020 *** ** * of the aforementioned principle of ‘one organisation, two nameplates’. two organisation, ‘one of principle aforementioned of the the Centre for the Study of Literature, and the Department of Party History Research. History Party of Department the and Literature, of Study the for the Centre

Currently, this office is identical with the Leading Committee for Deepening Reforms. An example example An Reforms. Deepening for Committee Leading the with identical is office this Currently, Affairs Commission which hasthestatus Periodicals directly Research Institute for History Council Committee for theWork Central Committee Committee for theWork Guidelines of theCommittee Office of the Foreign Office Central Party School Supervision of theState of Supervision theCCP’s of Supervision the CC CCP, eachof of a division of the CC of a division OrgansunderDirect of OrgansunderDirect of for Institutional subordinate to Department

and Literature Not to be confused with the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC State Council. State PRC the of Office Affairs Taiwan the with confused be to Not This division was established in 2018 by merging the Offices of Compilation and Translation, Translation, and Compilation of Offices the merging by in 2018 established was division This *** Administrative andexpertise basefor theCommittee Administrative andexpertise basefor theSteeringCommittee (Enlightenment Journal), theCCP’sCentralCommittee’s daily Party School devoted issues; toideological Located inBeijing,itisengaged intrainingcadresfor work theCCP, politicallyResearch of onthehistory publicationof Central Committee; Renmin Ribao Supervision on behalf of the Central Committee of thework theCentralCommitteeof of onbehalf Supervision stateorgansdirectly under theworkSupervising of the Central Committee paper, targeted attheintellectualelite published by theCCP’sCentralCommitteeand theCentral leadership structuresattheprovincial level in the central organs of theParty andstatestructures, orin in thecentralorgansof worksmovement, by theorists translationintoChineseof of Marxism, compilations of ideological studies ideological compilationsof of Marxism, stateorgansdirectly undertheStateCouncil of for Institutional Guidelines on Foreign Affairs sanctioned version of the history of theCommunist of thehistory sanctioned version of Responsibilities (thePeople’s Daily), theCCP’s themain organof Qiushi

(Seeking Truth), a bi-monthly Guangming Ribao Guangming

ANNEX 5. Xi Jinping Xi Jinping Xi Jinping Xi Jinping Xi Jinping Xi Jinping Xi Jinping Xi Jinping Chunhua Chairman Hu

on the CCP’son the Committee Central Commissions and small leading groups small Commissions and Yang Jiechi Wang Yang Wang Huning Xu Qiliang Xu Qiliang Han Changfu Han Zheng Li Keqiang Li Keqiang Li Keqiang Zhang Youxia Zhang Youxia no data no data ‑Chairman Vice­ Yang Yang Wang Han Rongwen Huning Liu He Changfu Zhuang Jiechi Jiechi no data no data no data no data Office head Affairs Commission Affairs Commission Affairs Commission Taiwanese Affairs Reform Defense andTroop Reform Commission Deepening of National Security Kong andMacau Central Cyberspace Group for National Comprehensive Central Commission Central Foreign Central Financial Commission Central Military Group for Tibet Group for Hong Group for and Economic Name

Economy Domestic Foreign Foreign Economy Foreign Foreign Security Security Security policy policy policy domestic domestic security affairs, affairs, affairs, affairs responsi­ Area of bilities

created* (1980) (1925) (2014) (2013) (1981) before Date 1954 1954 1978 2012 2014 2018 2018 2018 2018 2013 147 OSW REPORT 4/2020 148 OSW REPORT 4/2020 * of the original body. original of the

Wang Wang Wang Xi Jinping Xuexiang Dates refer to the establishment of the body’s present form, and in brackets the date of creation creation of date the brackets in and form, present body’s the of establishment the to refer Dates Chunhua Guo Guo Chairman no data Zhao Leji Hu Lou Ding Huning Huning Shengkun Shengkun Shugang

Yang Wang Huning Han Zheng Li Keqiang Han Changfu Li Qun Chen Xi no data no data no data no data no data no data no data ‑Chairman Vice­ Han Changfu Shi Jun no data no data no data no data no data no data no data no data no data Office head ‑Line Education Agriculture Thought Work Management and Development Propaganda and Building Integration Reform Governance Comprehensive Group for Social Group for Group for Secrets Group for Central Group for Mass­ Group for Group for Party Group for Xinjiang Civil ­‑Military Group for Group for Group for Legal Supervision WorkSupervision the Reform and of Culture and Security and Rural Areas Name Party policy Party policy Domestic Domestic Domestic Domestic Domestic Party policy, Party policy, Party policy Social policy policy policy policy policy policy security security responsi­ Area of bilities

created* before Date 1988 1993 1929 2012 2000 1991 2003 2003 2013 2009 2017