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China's Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy After the 19Th Party Congress

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China's Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy After the 19Th Party Congress China's Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy after the 19th Party Congress Paper presented to Japanese Views on China and Taiwan: Implications for U.S.-Japan Alliance March 1, 2018 Center for Strategic & International Studies Washington, D.C. Akio Takahara Professor of Contemporary Chinese Politics The Graduate School of Law and Politics, The University of Tokyo Abstract At the 19th Party Congress Xi Jinping proclaimed the advent of a new era. With the new line-up of the politburo and a new orthodox ideology enshrined under his name, he has successfully strengthened further his power and authority and virtually put an end to collective leadership. However, the essence of his new “thought” seems only to be an emphasis of party leadership and his authority, which is unlikely to deliver and meet the desires of the people and solve the contradiction in society that Xi himself acknowledged. Under Xi’s “one-man rule”, China’s external policy could become “soft” and “hard” at the same time. This is because he does not have to worry about internal criticisms for being weak-kneed and also because his assertive personality will hold sway. Introduction October 2017 marked the beginning of the second term of Xi Jinping's party leadership, following the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the First Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP. Although the formal election of the state organ members must wait until the National People's Congress to be held in March 2018, the appointees of major posts would already have been decided internally by the CCP. General Secretary Xi proclaimed the dawn of a new era and had the new "thought" crowned with his name enshrined in the official ideology of the CPC. In the address at the 19th Party Congress, he put himself on a par with his celebrated predecessors by claiming that Ma Zedong founded China, Deng Xiaoping made it richer, and now Xi himself is making it stronger. Deng Xiaoping led the effort to abolish party chairmanship in 1982 in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. He and his followers instituted in its place a collective leadership structure. The 19th Congress is historic in that this institution practically ceased to function in favor of the resurrection of leadership by a strong man. This paper studies the process of the re-emergence of “one-man rule” by Xi Jinping and discusses its implications for China’s domestic politics and foreign policy. 1. The centralization of power under Xi Jinping in the first term 1 It now sounds hard to believe, but Xi was believed to be a weak leader when compared to his immediate predecessors, namely Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. This prediction came from the differences in political upbringing. Jiang and Hu each had built a solid foundation rooted in their career in powerful departments or localities before climbing to the top job. For instance, Jiang worked for the First Machine-Building Industry Ministry and also worked in Shanghai; Hu cultivated a network during his tenure at the Communist Youth League. By contrast, Xi never had such a base among the central party or government departments to which he could turn and, instead, spent many years in the politically insignificant localities. However, once in the office of General Secretary Xi managed to amass power and authority in his hands within the first few years, whose extent surpasses both that of Jiang and of Hu. I argue that four factors contributed to Xi's rise. First, Xi's political support has been rooted in groups of individuals known as the "Second Red Generation" or the "Princelings." These groupings denote the descendants of the leaders from the revolutionary era. The word “Princelings” has a connotation that this group of people work together in pursuit of their own political and economic gains. By contrast, the “Second Red Generation” implies they are the heirs of the revolutionaries that carry on the revolutionary spirit. Members of this group include Xi Jinping, whose father is Xi Zhongxun, former vice premier; Wang Qishan, Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection, who is the son-in-law of Yao Yilin, formerly a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. In addition, there are officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), including Liu Yuan, a son of Liu Shaoqi, the former state president. These individuals identify themselves as members of the “founding families” and have a strong sense of ownership over the ruling system of the CCP. They are determined to support Xi Jinping and revamp the existing institutions, a task that they regard impossible to be accomplished by "employees" such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Second, the Second Red Generation used the anti-corruption campaign as an effective leverage. This group had a strong resolve to topple corrupt, influential figures of the previous leadership, including Zhou Yongkang, who was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee on public security and had strong ties with Jiang, Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, who each served as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Ling Jihua, who served Hu closely. There was no doubt that the anti-corruption campaign was also a tool in the power struggle. Third, since the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee in 2013 Xi Jinping effectively tightened his grip on power by creating new organizations over which he presides. The theme of this plenary was to accelerate reform on every front. It was decided then that new organizations, such as the Central Leading Small Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms and the National Security Commission (later renamed the Central National Security Commission), were to be installed as umbrella organizations designed to oversee various departments. Xi appointed himself as the leader of these organizations. This reform allowed him to directly order and render decisions to some areas, for example public security and social management, which were nominally governed by other members of the Standing Committee. Fourth and finally, Xi's centralization of authority became possible due in part to the lessons from the recent past. For instance, when Hu Jintao came to power, Jiang Zemin did not vacate the position of the chairman of the Central Military Commission. Jiang insisted that Hu benefit from someone like him who can take charge and manage, and that he could help Hu transition smoothly.1 As a result, there was confusion about who was in charge as the governing body had 1 Robert Lawrence Kuhn, The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin (Chinese Edition), Shanghai, Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2005, p. 436. 2 two centers of power. Moreover, collective leadership allowed the stovepiping of bureaucracies, in which the responsible member of the Standing Committee reigned as the "king" of the assigned bureaucracy. This structure gave strong incentives for corrupt behavior. Hu probably was aware of these weaknesses, which explains why he gave up the post of the chairman of the Central Military Commission to Xi Jinping when he stepped down as general-secretary. Taken together, these four factors account for the centralization of power under Xi Jinping, which proceeded in a generally tense atmosphere. The process of centralization had several major obstacles, to which I now turn. 2. 2016 -- the year of upheaval: challenges to Xi Jinping's power and authority Xi Jinping made an announcement at the end of 2015 about the transformation of the PLA. The news almost coincided with the emergence of provincial leaders around January 2016 calling Xi the “core of the party center”. In the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, Deng Xiaoping called Jiang Zemin the "core" of the third-generation central leadership to give credence to Jiang's authority. By contrast, Jiang himself refused to let his successor, Hu Jingtao, be called the same. Senior cadres understood Xi’s attempt at consolidating power by gaining the "core" label. Whether to invoke this label became, in effect, a litmus test among the senior provincial leaders across the country. By the end of February, approximately two-thirds publicly declared Xi as the core. Yet this attempt failed to win unanimous support, which gave Xi's authority a huge blow according to party cadres in Beijing.2 Critics of Xi's struggle for greater authority also came from the private sector. In February, real estate mogul Ren Zhiqiang wrote on his popular blog his view against Xi’s order to the mass media to follow the party line more strictly. He had his blog shut down after some official media accused him of constituting an "anti-party element." Curiously, accusations against him quickly dissipated. On March 1, the Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection posted an article on its website titled, "Blind obeisance by a thousand people does not amount to a direct comment by a single person." Some interpreted it as having an underlying message reproaching Xi.3 Furthermore, an open letter was posted on the internet on the early morning of March 4 that urged Xi to resign. That website could be classified as a medium in the "official domain." The letter offered a litany of charges against Xi's failed policies, including the centralization of authority, the interference with the economy, diplomatic isolation, mismanagement on Hong Kong and Taiwan, excessive press regulations, lethargy among bureaucrats caused by the anti- corruption campaign.4 A dissenting voice also came from inside the party. The National People's Congress started the day after the infamous letter. In a press conference he held during the Congress, Zhang Chunxian, party secretary of the Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region, when 2 Interview in Beijing, February 2016.
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