Li-wen Tung
Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us
Prospect Foundation
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Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us
Author: Li-wen Tung（董立文） First Published: March 2018
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I. Xi Jinping’s Centralization of Power ……………………………… 3
II. The 19th Party Congress’ Political Report ………………………… 8
III. The Implications of Leadership Changes ………………………… 16
IV. What Comes Next? ………………………………………………… 28
V. Implications on Cross-Strait Relations …………………………… 31
Contributor ………………………………………………………………… 35 List of Figures
Figure 1: The Party’s Nerve Center: Xi’s Inner Circle of Political Advisors and New Party Leading Small Groups …………… 7 Figure 2: Fan of Power: The Politburo Brings Together the Key Figures of Party, State, and Military in China ……………… 9 Figure 3: The Headlines of a Report Delivered by Xi Jinping to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China…………………………………………………… 12 Figure 4: A Two-Stage Development Plan for the Period from 2020 to the Middle of the 21st Century ……………………… 14
Figure 5: China’s Most Powerful ………………………………………… 21 Figure 6: How the CCP Rules: China’s Leadership after the 19th Party Congress ………………………………………………… 29 Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads – What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us 1
Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us
Li-wen Tung
Professor Department of Public Security Central Police University
Abstract Chinese politics have a high degree of uncertainty. Although it is impossible to know for sure what the future will be, some important signals of the 19th Party Congress have already been sent. Already the most powerful Chinese leader in over three decades, Xi Jinping has built a political foundation solid enough to defy convention. The centralization of power around Xi undoubtedly has increased his authority but it also has reversed much of the institutionalization of rules and procedures generally regarded as essential to party and administration normalization. Xi Jinping now has an institutional guarantee of support. With more personal authority than anyone since Mao Zedong, and having transferred power from ministries and technocrats to party officials and committees, he has the opportunity at the 19th Party Congress to consolidate his position and stamp his authority on the government. The characteristics of this new leadership lineup are “the elderly do not stay; the young men do not enter.” The highlight of the 19th CPC National Congress was that “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” is now written into the newly revised CPC Constitution, marking a significant breakthrough in the sinicization of Marxism.
Keywords: Centralization of Power, Policy Adjustments, Theoretical/Ideological Innovation, A Third Term, The Chinese Dream
The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), an event every five years to set the party’s national policy goals and elect its top leadership, was held at the Great Hall of the People, Beijing, between 18 and 24 October 2017. Many people reasonably have focused on the drama of personnel shuffles. Since the 2 Prospect Policy Studies Series trajectory of President Xi Jinping’s second term will depend largely on his support within the political establishment, the size and shape of leadership turnover at this event demand close attention.
In fact, every China’s Communist Party (CCP) National Congress contains leadership changes, policy adjustments, and theory/ideology innovation. The composition of leaders – across the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), Politburo, and Central Committee – not only serves as a barometer of Xi’s power, but also suggests his plausible policy priorities. Understanding the new leadership lineup and its dynamics will be critical to Cross-Strait relations moving forward.
Unfortunately, Chinese politics have a high degree of uncertainty. Indeed, before Xi’s administration began in earnest, some speculated that he might take a gentler line on Tibet. Instead, the past few years have seen the government’s merciless pursuit of Tibetan self-immolators and their families while expanding the “grid” surveillance system.
Just as Christopher K. Johnson said: “Chinese politics has no rules.”1 The prototypical example of which is that Xi Jinping swiftly centralized political power shortly after the 18th CCP National Congress in 2012, differing from the prediction of many experts when he was elected General Secretary. Although it is impossible to know for sure what the future will be, some important signals of the 19th Party Congress already have been sent, and an analysis of recent political trends suggests that observers should learn to expect the unexpected.
Before the 19th Party Congress, the question concerning most people was, “will Xi consolidate his power?” During the congress, however, the question most frequently asked by foreign media was, “Is Xi planning on a third term?” Already the most powerful Chinese leader in over three decades, Xi has built a political foundation solid enough to defy convention. Speculation is rife that he will probably hang on to power after his two terms as the CCP’s General Secretary end in 2022 – meaning he
Christopher K. Johnson, “Chinese Politics Has No Rules, But It May Be Good if Xi Jinping Breaks Them,” August 9, 2017, CSIS,
At a time when the United States is retreating from its global leadership responsibilities and China is attempting to assert itself as a global leader, changes to the political agenda of China’s governing party and its top leadership are of increasing importance to the rest of the world. What impact will Xi Jinping have on China and the world as China rises as a totalitarian state under this powerful dictator? The world needs a robust China. Its huge market has become a key growth driver for global companies. No problem, from climate change to globalization, can be solved without Beijing’s involvement. To ensure that China can play a positive role as a major global power, however, the country needs free discussion and open criticism. This is in both China’s and the world’s interest. In this regard, Xi Jinping stands at the crossroads.
As such, we will discuss the way Xi Jinping centralized power, the policy- ideology signals of the 19th Party Congress’ political report, the implications of leadership changes, and the implication on the Cross-Strait relations.
I. Xi Jinping’s Centralization of Power
Ten years ago, when Xi Jinping was elected as successor, few people knew him and the reason for his qualifying was that he had no factions, no political achievements, and no threats to anyone. Five years ago, Xi Jinping’s path to the Chinese presidency at the 18th Communist Party Congress was shrouded in political intrigue. Yet, as president, Xi has succeeded in a Maoist crusade to reshape and gain control of the party, military, and internal security apparatus. Xi has consolidated his position. At the heart of this has been the anti-corruption campaign. To Xi’s supporters, this represents the General Secretary’s earnest desire to rid the party of impure elements that undermine the party’s legitimacy.
When Xi assumed office, his top priority was to ensure that the whole Party would obey the Central Committee and uphold its authority and its centralized, unified leadership. The Party had to face up to its lack of drive, incompetence, disengagement from the people, inaction, and corruption. Of those failings, corruption became the biggest challenge. In Xi’s opinion, if corruption became any worse, it would cause the collapse of the Party and the fall of the state. Achieving any target in the new era 4 Prospect Policy Studies Series would be impossible.
The anti-corruption campaign was like no other in the 96-year CPC history, and it remains as far-reaching and relentless as any such campaign anywhere in the world. Over the past five years, a number of officials with “iron hats” – those who were considered powerful and not easily removed–have been felled for corruption. Besides Zhou Yongkang, there were Bo Xilai, Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, Sun Zhengcai, and Ling Jihua. A total of 43 members and alternate members of the 18th CPC Central Committee, as well as nine members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), have been investigated. The party police have punished more than one million cadres for corruption offences.
Xi does not only rely on taking out “tigers” and swatting “flies” (low-level corrupt officials) to gain power. The CPC has run a campaign of “staying true to our founding mission”toencourageallthePartymemberstoobeyXi’swillwithnewPartytheories. The Party has revised its regulations on disciplinary punishments and code according to Xi’s new explanation. Those keen on officialdom are losing power and influence. Over the past five years, more than 5,000 “naked officials”– those whose spouses and children are overseas – have been removed from their posts. More than 22,000 officials at or above county-level had their posts rearranged on the basis of their performance.
One of Mao’s most famous dictums back then was that “political power comes from the barrel of a gun.” For Xi, the top priority remains the same as it was eight decades ago – putting the entire military under unified and absolute command and ensuring that the armed forces follow the orders of Xi.
Xi has emerged as the most powerful leader in China since Deng Xiaoping. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, more than 100 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers at or above the corps level, including two former CMC vice chairmen, have been investigated and punished. The number is greater than that of army generals who died on the battlefield during revolutionary times.
A new disciplinary commission and a commission for political and legal affairs weresetupundertheCMContheordersofXi,andmorethan40militarystatutes and regulations were adopted in a bid to preserve exemplary PLA conduct, strict Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads – What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us 5 discipline, and high morale. The huge turnover of military members of the Central Committee will help Xi put his stamp of authority over the PLA.
At the same time, the cadres’ adherence to party ideology has become a decisive criterion. Today, the anti-corruption campaign has become a crushing tide, is being consolidated, and continues to develop. Political suppression and censorship, an emphasis on ideology in academia and in companies, and a stalled or diluted reform program do not inspire confidence that he will suddenly change tack to implement an agenda of liberalization and openness.
Critics say that this campaign is a front to remove opponents and to consolidate his power. The main reason is that anti-corruption methods rely on the rule of people (to be precise, Xi Jinping), not on the rule of law. Among the purified party members and cadres, the two most important factions within the Party, Jiang’s Shanghai faction and the Communist Youth League of Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, have been considerably weakened by Xi’s anti-corruption-cum-political-purge campaign.
The centralization of power around Xi Jinping undoubtedly has increased his authority but it also has reversed much of the institutionalization of rules and procedures generally regarded as essential to party and administration normalization. There is a division of work between the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and political advisors. A special feature in the structures of the CPC are the leading small groups (LSG). While temporary bodies by default – most of them exist for several weeks or months and meet in irregular intervals – others, such as the Central Leading Group Finance and Economy, have existed for several decades and exert major influence on policy-making. The groups allow the party to deal with novel and important issues in a timely manner.
Since his ascension to power, Xi Jinping has formed three important leading groups, including the National Security Commission, the Comprehensive Deepening of Reform, and a leading group on the United Front Work. One of Xi’s most significant creations was the National Security Commission, which Jiang Zemin unsuccessfully tried to establish. The creation of these groups has further strengthened Xi’s clout.
Like Cary Huang observed: “National leaders including Mao Zedong have used 6 Prospect Policy Studies Series leading small groups to bypass opposition and assert control; Xi Jinping is just the latest.” These leading small groups, which rarely announce their meetings or disclose their full membership, comprise the country’s most powerful and influential leaders. Leading small groups cover everything from economics to propaganda to Hong Kong and Macau affairs. They thrash out policy details long before measures are presented to the party, let alone the public. In terms of input to the most important policy matters, they are much more important and powerful than the ministries.2
Who heads the groups is one of the main indicators for determining their importance. Matthias Stepan identified 15 groups that are likely headed by a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, as shown in Figure 1. The activities of these groups show that our focus should not be on the person of Xi Jinping alone when we observe China’s political system. It is critical to analyze the structures of the CPC, as well as the actions and speeches of other Politburo members and political advisors.
TosaythatXihasestablishedhisownbigandstrongfactionmaybean exaggeration. If he is at the center of one, it is the amorphous group known as princelings, which has considerable overlap with other groups. So, Xi has rapidly consolidated power since assuming party leadership in late 2012 and the presidency the following year.
In fact, in the five years since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese CCP, China’s political system has experienced profound changes. These include triggers of institutional change, ideas and norms being introduced to change informal institutions, and the actual transformation of formal institutions. Xi has taken advantage of social demand for reform coordination and some top elites’ serious political misbehavior to commence institutional change for the centralization of political power. To be precise, Xi has acquired power through non-institutional ways.
To do so, Xi has introduced new reform ideas–systemic thinking and top-down design, originating from complex systems theory – in the name of coordinating and
Cary Huang, “How leading small groups help Xi Jinping and other party leaders exert power,” The South China Morning Post, January 20, 2014,
Figure 2 shows China’s center of power. The Politburo brings together the key figures of party, state, and military under the strong leadership of the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core.
The members of the PSC not only make decisions that impact how the party of 89 million members is governed, but also have the final word on the macro strategies for the country of 1.3 billion people. Different from Western political systems, in which the inner cabinet of the executive branch is the platform for strategic decision- making and compromise, the PSC is a more exclusive club that brings together the people with those portfolios that are considered the most vital to keep the country on an even keel. The 25-person strong Politburo is comprised of the key personnel in party and state organs, as well as the military.3
Xi Jinping now has an institutional guarantee of support. He can be emperor for life － staying in power as long as his health allows. With more personal authority than anyone since Mao Zedong, and having transferred power from ministries and technocrats to party officials and committees, he has the opportunity at the 19th Party Congress to consolidate his position and stamp his authority on the government.
II. The 19th Party Congress’ Political Report
The work report Xi Jinping delivered is the most authoritative of its kind on all major issues in China, ranging from economic reform to foreign policy. It presents
Mercator Institute for China Studies, “China’s center of power: The Politburo brings together the key figures of party, state and military.” Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads – What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us 9
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Party Secretary Chiefs Chiefs Provincial Mercator Institute for China Studies August 23, 2017, Figure 2. Fan of Power: The Politburo Brings Together the Key Figures of Party, State, and Military in China Party State Military CCDI: Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Political Consultative Conference CPPCC: Chinese People’s Congress NPC: National People’s Source: Mercator Institute for China Studies, “China’s center of power: The Politburo brings together the key figures of party, state and military,” 10 Prospect Policy Studies Series an accounting of the Committee’s work over the preceding five years since the last party congress and sets forth guidelines for future work in all sectors. The key questions for the outside world are about China’s policy direction for the next five years and if Xi put himself on par with Mao and Deng.
The General Secretary’s political report to a National Party Congress is delivered on behalf of the outgoing Central Committee. Every top Chinese leader has his own signature political theory, which is written into the Party constitution as a way to sum up his legacy. For Mao Zedong, it was “Mao Zedong Thought.” For reformer Deng Xiaoping, it was “Deng Xiaoping Theory.” For Xi’s two immediate predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, it was “Three Represents” and “Scientific View of Development.” In other words, Jiang had his “Three Represents” embracing private entrepreneurs written in, while Hu, Xi’s immediate predecessor, had his economic doctrine of “scientific development” included.
These political theories are evidently not equal in stature. If Xi attaches his name to his signature theory in the Party constitution – which will be amended during the congress – it will be official recognition that he belongs in the same league as Mao and Deng. Observers will scrutinize every word choice of the report and compare it with previous reports to detect even the slightest shifts in thinking.
As we can see, China’s ruling Communist Party enshrined President Xi Jinping’s political thought into its constitution, putting him in the same company as the founder of modern China, Mao Zedong, and cementing his power ahead of a new top leadership line-up. The party unanimously passed the amendment to include “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” as one of its guiding principles at the end of its week-long congress. Xi Jinping has become the ‘Most Powerful Chinese Leader since Mao’ after changes in the Communist Constitution.
In recent decades, political reports to Party Congresses have followed a similar format and laid out the same basic sequence of topics. The achievements, challenges, situation judgments, conceptual formulations, and policy guidelines that Party Congress reports put forth are always general – sometimes abstruse to the point of bafflement – and their implications usually are implicit. Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads – What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us 11
Political reports to National Party Congresses are long—Hu Jintao’s report to the 18th Party Congress in 2012 ran to nearly 30,000 characters in Chinese. In his 32,000-character report, Xi said socialism with Chinese characteristics had crossed the threshold into a new era. They are also cast in the CCP’s finest ideological jargon andinformulationscraftedofsufficientgeneralityastoconfoundclarity.Figure3 shows headlines of a report delivered by Xi Jinping to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 18, 2017.
During the Congress, a new guiding ideology, labeled Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, was written into the Party’s constitution. This marked the first time since Mao Zedong Thought that a living Party leader has been enshrined into the Party constitution with an ideology named after himself. No other leader since Mao has had an eponymous ideology included in the document while in office. Deng’s name was added after his death in 1997. Xi’s more recent predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, both had the Party constitution amended to include their guiding thoughts, but without their names directly attached.
The Congress also emphasized strengthening socialism with Chinese characteristics; Party-building; socialist rule of law; the Chinese path of building strong armed forces; a community with a shared future for mankind; and setting concrete timelines for achieving development goals, such as building a moderately prosperous society and achieving “socialist modernization.” It also was noted for rallying China to play a more assertive role internationally.
Comparison of Xi’s report to the 19th Party Congress with Hu’s to the 18th will reveal important continuities in concept and Party policy. One area of continuity is foundinthesectionofHuJintao’s2012reportontheParty’soverarchinggoalsfor the next five years, which called for “comprehensively deepening reforms and opening” in pursuit of the Party’s goal of establishing a “moderately prosperous society” by 2020. On this basis, this continuity in policy framework is represented in that Xi Jinping’s report at the 19th Congress reaffirmed the goal of attaining “moderate pros- perity” by 2020 and authorized a new push for reform in the final stage of pursuing it.
In addition to continuities, comparison of Xi’s political report with previous congress reports also revealed important new differences. With this political report 12 Prospect Policy Studies Series
The Communist Party of China Opens 19th National Congress
Xi Jinping delivered a report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on behalf of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC.
Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era
The theme of the Congress
Remain true to our original aspiration and keep our mission firmly in mind, hold high the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, secure a decisive victory in building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, strive for the great success of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, and work tirelessly to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.
The report includes 13 parts:
1 The Past Five Years: Our Work and Historic Change 2 The New Era: The Historic Mission of the Communist Party of China 3 The Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and the Basic Policy 4 Securing a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Embarking on a Journey to Fully Build a Modern Socialist China
Applying a New Vision of Development and Developing 5 a Modernized Economy
Improving the System of Institutions through Which 6 the People Run the Country and Developing Socialist Democracy
Building Stronger Cultural Confidence and Helping 7 Socialist Culture to Flourish
8 Growing Better at Ensuring and Improving People’s Wellbeing and Strengthening and Developing New Approaches to Social Governance
Speeding up Reform of the System for Developing an 9 Ecological Civilization, and Building a Beautiful China
Staying Committed to the Chinese Path of Building 10 Strong Armed Forces and Fully Advancing the Modernization of National Defense and the Military
Upholding “One Country, Two Systems” and Moving 11 toward National Reunification
Following a Path of Peaceful Development and Working 12 to Build a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind
Exercising Strict Governance over the Party and 13 Improving the Party’s Ability to Govern and Lead
Figure 3. The Headlines of a Report Delivered by Xi Jinping to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China
Source: “Xi’s report to 19th CPC National Congress,” Xinhua, October 19, 2017,
Figure 4 shows a two-stage development plan for the period from 2020 to the middle of the 21st century mentioned in a report delivered by Xi Jinping to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on October 18, 2017.
The highlight of the 19th CPC National Congress was “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” now written into the newly revised CPC Constitution, and a significant breakthrough of the sinicization of Marxism.
“Since the Party’s 18th National Congress, Chinese Communists, with Comrade Xi Jinping as their chief representative, in response to contemporary developments and by integrating theory with practice, have systematically addressed the major question of our times: what kind of socialism with Chinese characteristics the new era requires us to uphold and develop, and how we should uphold and develop it, thus giving shape to Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” reads the revised Constitution.
“Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era” refers largely to a grand plan to develop China into a “great modern socialist country” by mid-century. Thus, China will realize overall socialist modernization during the 2020 to 2035 period. Then, in the ensuing 15 years, China will develop into a “great modern socialist country,” like a superpower that is capable of challenging the United States.
As socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era, Xi said the principal contradiction facing Chinese society has evolved into one “between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life.”
Interestingly, Xi then emphasized “We must recognize that the evolution of the principal contradiction facing Chinese society does not change our assessment of the present stage of socialism in China. The basic dimension of the Chinese context – that our country is still and will long remain in the primary stage of socialism – has 14 Prospect Policy Studies Series
Securing a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Embarking on a Journey to Fully Build a Modern Socialist China
The period between now and 2020 will be decisive in finishing the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects We must follow the requirements on building this society set out at our 16th, 17th, and 18th National Congresses, act in response to the evolution of the principle contradiction in Chinese society, and promote coordinated economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological advancement. We must show firm resolve in implementing the strategy for invigorating China through science and education, the strategy on developing a quality workforce, the innovation-driven development strategy, the rural vitalization strategy, the coordinated regional development strategy, the sustainable development strategy, and the military-civilian integration strategy. We must focus on priorities, address inadequacies, and shore up points of weakness. In this regard, I want to stress that we must take tough steps to forestall and defuse major risks, carry out targeted poverty alleviation, and prevent and control pollution, so that the moderately prosperous society we build earns the people’s approval and stands the test of time.
The period between the 19th and the 20th National Congress is the period in which the timeframes of the two centenary goals converge In this period, not only must we finish building a moderately prosperous society in all respects and achieve the first centenary goal; we must also build on this achievement to embark on a new journey toward the second centenary goal of fully building a modern socialist country.
Based on a comprehensive analysis of the international and domestic environments and the conditions for China’s development, we have drawn up a two-stage development plan for the period from 2020 to the middle of this century. In the first stage from 2020 to 2035 We will build on the foundation created by the moderately prosperous society with a further 15 years of hard work to see that socialist modernization is basically realized.
In the second stage from 2035 to the middle of the 21st century We will, building on having basically achieved modernization, work hard for a further 15 years and develop China into a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful.
Figure 4. A Two-Stage Development Plan for the Period from 2020 to the Middle of the 21st Century
Source: “Xi’s report to 19th CPC National Congress.” Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads – What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us 15 not changed. China’s international status as the world’s largest developing country has not changed. The whole Party must be completely clear about this fundamental dimension of our national context, and must base our work on this most important reality—the primary stage of socialism.”
Indeed, for the past 20 years, while some people have said that China is rising, CCP’s political reports always have reminded China that it is still a developing country. Now, Xi has said, “What remain after decades of economic miracles are the most obstinate barriers, such as outdated mentality, deeply-embedded institutional flaws and strong vested interests. Many who questioned the country’s future cobbled together a series of scenarios on China’s outlook, ranging from an economic hard-landing to total collapse.”
Then, a string of reform projects were undertaken, touching on the most difficult and tangled areas, from state-owned enterprises, household registration, fiscal management, and rural land to public hospitals, and so on. Some of these programs used to be considered sensitive enough as to be almost impossible.
Like Alice Miller’s comment, “whichever revision emerges at the party congress will have import both for power and policy. If the party’s “guiding ideology” incorporates a new element with Xi’s name attached, it would signal Xi’s political strength beyond that of Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao, whose names were not explicitly linked to the additions to the party ideology made under their auspices.”4
Alice Miller’s analysis underscores the conclusion relevant to projecting how the 19th Congress may revise the Party constitution with regard to ideology: there is more than one way to incorporate Xi Jinping leadership’s innovations into Party ideology. Adding to the string of elements that compose the Party’s “guiding ideology” is one possibility; adding to the now standard narrative of the Party ideology by successive Central Committee leaderships without modifying the Party’s “guiding ideology” is another.5
Alice L. Miller, “Xi Jinping and the Party’s ‘Guiding Ideology,’” China Leadership Monitor, Issue 54, September 11, 2017, Hoover Institution,
Finally, Xi was able to have his name “crowned” in the Party constitution, which has been seen as a key measure of his power, elevating him to the level of previous leaders, exemplified by Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory. “The congress holds that the leadership of the Communist Party of China is the most essential attribute of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the greatest strength of this system,” the Party said in a statement. “The party exercises overall leadership over all areas of endeavour in every part of the country,” it said.
III. The Implications of Leadership Changes
One of the most important outcomes of the 19th Party Congress will be the new lineups in the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee. Elected by the 19th Central Committee, members of these most powerful decision-making bodies will preside over implementing the Party’s political, economic, and social agenda.
There is no doubt that Xi Jinping will be confirmed in his second five-year term as CCP General Secretary and as President. The real question is who will join him on the PSC. Will Xi fill key positions with his own men? How many allies he can install in key Party posts will indicate how much power he has consolidated. The greatest attention will be on any younger additions, as tradition dictates that, at this “mid-term” Congress, two or three candidates capable of remaining in the PSC for the next three Congresses – so in their early-50s – are blooded.
The Party’s “rulebook”–the CCP Constitution–has very few hard rules to follow and almost none that meaningfully constrain the real activities of the Party’s top leaders. These rules state that the General Secretary of the Central Committee must be a member of the PSC, the Party’s top decision-making body, and that Party cadres are not entitled to lifetime tenure. In the meantime, much has been said and written about the trajectory of China’s political evolution over the last few decades.
CCP authorities further have explained that the sitting top leader of the Party shall serve no more than two five-year terms as CCP General Secretary before handing over the post to a successor. Candidates for the Politburo will have demonstrated their
Alice L. Miller, “Xi Jinping and the Party’s ‘Guiding Ideology.’” Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads – What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us 17 suitability for promotion to the Party’s highest ranks through an often decades-long series of stepwise promotions from the lowest rungs of the CCP bureaucracy, frequently having served in some combination of increasingly senior positions within the central Party apparatus, the state ministries or state machinery, and in the localities.
With a few exceptions, this body of work can be summarized by the general notion that, starting with deceased paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the aftermath of the ruinous Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the succeeding generations of Chinese leaders have, despite a few ups and downs, mainly stuck to a consensus approach whereby the mechanics of leadership interactions and the handover from one leadership cohort to another has become orderly, rules-based, and predictable.
Some analysts have even described this evolution as the institutionalization of Chinese politics where, despite the paucity of hard rules governing Chinese elite politics, the leadership nonetheless has followed a discrete series of identifiable political practices regarding senior leadership promotion and succession with very little variation going back at least two decades. Although not an exhaustive list, these customs generally are described by proponents of this analytic construct as “norms.”
Some scholars have argued, however, that Chinese politics has no rules, given the lack of transparency in China’s political system and the fact that, at each Party Congress, who gets what post is only one of the pieces (even if a very important piece) on the chessboard.6 If recent history is any guide, we are unlikely to learn much by parsing particular leaders’ résumés for hints of their underlying policy preferences.7 In fact, it seems fair to argue that there has been entirely too much complacency in the China-watching community when it comes to thinking about the prospects for the 19th Party Congress.
In the past, China experts relied on unwritten rules and conventions to identify
Christopher K. Johnson, “Chinese Politics Has No Rules, But It May Be Good if Xi Jinping Breaks Them.” Jessica Batke, “A Cadre by Any Other Name Would Smell as Sweet? Domestic Policy Trajectory after the 19th Party Congress,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 54, September 11, 2017, Hoover Institution,
The convention of age restrictions for the Politburo was first introduced at the 15th Party Congress in 1997, where the age limit for Politburo membership was set at 70 (with the then top leader Jiang Zemin being given a critical exemption). Five years later, at the 16th Party Congress, the age limit was reduced to 68 –with no exceptions being granted – so called “seven up, eight down.” This same convention seems to have been applied again at both the 17th and 18th Party Congresses, lending seeming credibility to its standing as a “norm.”8
According to the age-limit convention, five of the seven PSC members are due to be replaced at the 19th Party Congress. Although the written rules governing the CCP’s distribution of power are loose, there are various conventions. Nevertheless, Xi’s key ally, Wang Qishan, who heads the government’s sweeping anti-corruption purge, is 69. Xi might break with the age protocol to keep Wang on the PSC.
In the Xi era, perhaps in all the time, making predictions on who exactly will become member of the Politburo and its Standing Committee is nigh impossible. China watchers around the globe are debating the political future of Premier Li Keqiang or whether Xi will keep anti-corruption tsar Wang Qishan in place. In any case, Xi will try to place as many trusted allies in influential Politburo positions as possible. Success or failure will be an important indicator of how tight his grip on power really is in today’s China.
The Party Constitution states that new representatives for Party and government
Christopher K. Johnson, “Chinese Politics Has No Rules, But It May Be Good if Xi Jinping Breaks Them.” Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads – What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us 19 leadership positions are selected through committee-organized elections. In practice, however, appointments are a top-down process that involve both retired and current senior Party leaders. Before the last minute, even those eligible members themselves are not sure of the results.
Xi seems determined to change at least some of the rules of the game. For example, the appointment of his close associate Cai Qi as Beijing’s Party Secretary is a case in point. Although Cai is not even an alternate member of the 18th Central Committee, most observers speculate it is very likely that he will be appointed to the Politburo at the 19th Party Congress, as Beijing’s Party Secretary has always been elected to the decision-making body.
The other example is that Politburo member and Chongqing CCP Secretary Sun Zhengcai is suddenly under investigation for “suspected serious violations of party discipline,” and Chongqing has not done enough to rid itself of the “toxic” influence of Bo Xilai – regime code for corruption. Sun had been marked as a possible future top leader. Implicit in such treatments is the underlying analytic assumption that Sun should have been heading for higher office – perhaps the PSC – as the “norms” of signaling the succession and stepwise promotion to higher office would dictate.
In choosing Chen Miner as the new leader of Chongqing, Xi has sent a broad hint to both the Party and the outside world. The Communist Party does not hold press conferences to announce successors; it uses signals like this. Like Cai Qi, observers speculate it is very likely that Chen Miner will be appointed to the Politburo before the 19th Party Congress.
Sun’s sudden tumble from the ladder up to the PBSC has been interpreted as yet another move by Xi Jinping to consolidate his power in advance of the Party Congress, buck tacit leadership promotion norms, and put his own people in place for the next five years.
At its First Plenum on October 25, 2017, the 19th Central Committee of the CCP elected members of the PSC. As norms dictate, among the seven members of the 18th PSC, five (Wang Qishan, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, and Zhang Gaoli) retired due to their age and two (Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang) were re-elected. 20 Prospect Policy Studies Series
Figure 5 shows China Communist Party’s new leadership with no clear successor to Xi Jinping.
Xi Jinping spoke to the press at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on October 25, 2017. Xi Jinping and the other newly elected members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 19th Communist Party of China Central Committee, Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji, and Han Zheng, met the press on October 25.
Figure 5 shows that China Communist Party unveiled new leadership with no clear successor to Xi Jinping. The following is the new line-up of the 19th Politburo Standing Committee members.9
No. 1: Xi Jinping
Xi Jinping, 64, Party General Secretary and President of China, was re-elected as General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee and No. 1 ranking member of the 19th Politburo Standing Committee, as well as Chairman of the Central Military Committee. The core of the CCP and Commander-in-Chief of the People’s Liberation Army, Xi has further consolidated his power over the Party at the 19th Party Congress after his thought, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” was enshrined in the CCP Constitution as a “long-term guide to action that the Party must adhere to and develop” along with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents (Jiang Zemin’s contribution), and the Scientific Outlook on Development (Hu Jintao’s).
During the Party Congress, Xi was hailed as a “great leader,” “helmsman,” and the general architect of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era. The CCP under Xi’s leadership has pledged to lead China into a new era of making the country strong again over the next three decades.
Zheping Huang, “The 19th party congress leadership: A guide to China’s new Men in Black,” October 25, 2017, Quartz,
No. 2: Li Keqiang
Li Keqiang, 62, Party #2 and Premier of China, was also re-elected as the No. 2 ranking member of the Politburo Standing Committee. A political leader with strong ties to the Chinese Communist Youth League, Li has collaborated with Xi very well over the past five years and has been a strong supporter of Xi’s domestic and foreign policy initiatives.
With academic training in both law and economics, Li gained substantial experience as a provincial leader and a national leader. He is likely to continue as premier of the State Council for another five years.
No. 3: Li Zhanshu
Li Zhanshu has been director of the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since August 2012. Before that, he was Communist Party Secretary of Guizhou (2010-2012) and Governor of Heilongjiang (2007-2010). He was born in August 1950 and is 67 years old. Director of the General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP since September 2012, Li has earned his seat at the Politburo Standing Committee as Xi’s strongest ally. A native of Hebei, Li worked with Xi as the Party Secretary of a neighboring county in his home province in the 1980s. Li also worked in Shaanxi Province, Xi’s home province, from 1998 to 2003 in various capacities.
Li worked as governor of Heilongjiang from 2008 to 2010 and as Party Secretary of Guizhou from 2010 to 2012. Due to the downfall of Ling Jihua, director of the General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP under Hu Jintao, Li was transferred to Beijing as the executive deputy director of the General Office in August 2012.
Li has been working with Xi very closely and has accompanied Xi on all of his domestic inspection tours and foreign visits. He also has visited foreign countries on behalf of Xi. Li is likely to take over the portfolio of Zhang Dejiang as chairman of the next National People’s Congress Standing Committee in March 2018. Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads – What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us 23
No. 4: Wang Yang
Wang Yang has been a vice premier of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since March 2013. Before that, he was Communist Party Secretary of Guangdong (2007-2012) and Party Secretary of Chongqing (2005-2007). He was born in March 1955 and is 62 years old. Vice Premier of the State Council since March 2013 and a Politburo member since October 2007, Wang finally has been elevated to the Politburo Standing Committee. A native of Anhui Province, Wang has been a major contender for a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee since 2012.
With a humble family background, Wang has been rising in Chinese politics mostly because of his capabilities. As mayor of Tongling in Anhui at the age of 33 in 1988, Wang earned his reputation as a reformer with bold reform initiatives in various sectors. He has accumulated extensive administrative experience as both a provincial leader and a national leader. He was Vice Governor of Anhui, Party Secretary of Chongqing, and Party Secretary of Guangdong. He also served as Deputy Secretary General of the State Council and has been Vice Premier of the State Council. He is likely to take over the portfolio of Yu Zhengsheng as Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in March 2018.
No. 5: Wang Huning
Wang Huning has been director of the Party’s Central Policy Research Office since November 2002, and has served as a key advisor to Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping over the past two decades. He was born in October 1955 and is 62 years old. Director of the Central Policy Research Office since October 2002 and a Politburo member since November 2012, Wang also has been made a member of the 19th Politburo Standing Committee.
An academic-cum-politician, Wang has been a major contributor to the ideological development of the CCP since the 1980s. The author of “new authoritarianism,” which espoused political centralism for developing countries, such as China, Wang has assisted three General Secretaries – Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping – in their ideological innovations. He also has accompanied President Jiang Zemin, President Hu Jintao, and President Xi Jinping in their foreign visits since the late 1990s. 24 Prospect Policy Studies Series
He is likely to take over the portfolio of Liu Yunshan as President of the Central Party School and as the Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCP, especially in propaganda and personnel issues. Due to the departure of Li Yuanchao, Wang is one of contenders for the position of Vice President of the PRC when state positions are reshuffled in March 2018.
No. 6: Zhao Leji
Zhao Leji has been head of the CCP’s Organization Department since November 2012. Before that, he was Communist Party Secretary of Shaanxi (2007-2012) and Party Secretary of Qinghai (2003-2007). He was born in March 1957 and is 60 years old. Director of the Central Organization Department since 2012, Zhao was elected as a new member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Although his parents were from Xi’an, Shaanxi Province, Zhao was born and grew up in Qinghai Province. He joined the CCP in 1975 at the age of 18 and was enrolled in the Department of Philosophy at Peking University in 1977 as a worker-peasant-soldier student.
Zhao takes over the portfolio of Wang Qishan as head the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission. He also is likely to serve as the head of a new National Supervisory Commission that should be established in March 2018.
No. 7: Han Zheng
Han Zheng has been the Communist Party Secretary of Shanghai since November 2012. Before that, he was mayor of Shanghai (2003-2012). From September 2006 to March 2007, he also served a short stint as Shanghai’s acting Party Secretary. He was born in April 1954 and is 63 years old.
Party Secretary of Shanghai since 2012, Han has been elevated to be a member of the 19th Politburo Standing Committee. He is the seventh Party Secretary of Shanghai since 1989 to have entered the Politburo Standing Committee, after Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, Wu Bangguo, Huang Ju, Xi Jinping, and Yu Zhengsheng. With Cixi, Zhejiang Province as his ancestral home, Han was born and grew up in Shanghai. Without formal academic training, Han went through the ranks in Shanghai initially through the Chinese Communist Youth League system. He worked directly under Wu Bangguo, Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads – What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us 25
Huang Ju, Xu Kuangdi, and Chen Liangyu. He is the only person in the history of Shanghai since 1949 to serve as mayor of Shanghai for 10 years. In his capacity as mayor, he collaborated with Party Bosses Chen Liangyu, Xi Jinping, and Yu Zhengsheng. Due to his extensive administrative experience in Shanghai, Han is likely to be appointed as Executive Vice Premier of the State Council in March 2018.
The characteristics of this new leadership lineup are “the elderly do not stay, the young man does not enter.” Contrary to the speculation that Wang Qishan might stay on, he stepped down possibly because of his age. Additionally, the lineup breaks with tradition by not including a clear successor to President Xi Jinping, and it raises questions over whether Mr. Xi, 64, intends to rule beyond 2022.
Clearly, the results go beyond what can be understood by institutional norms alone. Whether the results are more indicative of political horse trading and compromise or a triumphant and unconstrained Xi is less clear. On the one hand, the elevation of Wang Yang and retirement of Wang Qishan appear to be evidence of there being some constraints on Xi’s power. The failure to promote any younger potential successors to Xi and Li Yuanchao’s retirement, however, speak to Xi’s ability to go beyond convention.10 Another explanation can be that the elevation of Wang Yang and retirement of Wang Qishan assure Xi’s power will not be shared by anyone.
At the conclusion of this Party Congress, the concentration of power in the person of Xi Jinping is only comparable to that of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Anyway, we can be sure that Xi can abolish the system of collective leadership or defy the unseen hand of rival factions thwarting his ambitions. At almost every turn in his initial stint as Party leader, Xi has sought to demonstrate his supremacy by accomplishing things much earlier in his tenure than his immediate predecessors did or by making a pioneering move that simply eluded them entirely. Indeed, the notion of Xi’s determination to defy the Party’s recent conventions to demonstrate his unrivaled leadership position likely has substantial explanatory power when assessing which of these “norms” he is most likely to violate.
Jonathan Brookfield, “China Has New Leaders. What Now? A look at the implications of China’s new Politburo Standing Committee,” October 31, 2017, The Diplomat,
If the CCP follows the “rule of 68” at the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping, Li Zhanshu, and Han Zheng will have to retire but Li Keqiang, Wang Yang, Zhao Leji, and Wang Huning could stay for another five-year term. Nevertheless, as General Secretary, Xi could very well be exempt from this rule. Notably, none of the newly appointed Politburo Standing Committee members are young enough to make them likely successors to Xi at the 20th Party Congress. Maybe, the biggest error came in assuming the new PSC would include younger potential successors to Xi Jinping. As evidence of the failure of conventional expectations, the lack of successors is clearly newsworthy.
Another surprise is that fifteen of the twenty-five 19th Politburo members were new to the Politburo. Three 18th Politburo members either retired in full (like Li Yuanchao) or lost their Politburo seats while retaining membership on the 19th CCP- CC (such as Liu Qibao and Zhang Chunxian) despite being under the retirement age of 68. This is again the manifestation of Xi’s will.
The members of the Politburo show that Xi is not yet willing to hand over that post to a successor. In a clear break with Party conventions, not a single one of his potential heirs has joined the leadership circle. Guangdong Party Secretary Hu Chunhua and Chongqing Party Boss Chen Miner had been seen as prominent contenders to succeed Xi among the Party’s so-called sixth generation of leaders, but they were not included in the Standing Committee. Instead, both were named to the wider 25-member Politburo, a rung below the Standing Committee.
Only three of the new members of the CCP’s top decision-making body are less than 60 years old. This will fuel speculation that Xi plans to remain in power beyond the next Party Congress in 2022.
Zhao Leji is the youngest member in the Politburo Standing Committee and is poised to replace Wang Qishan as the leader of the anti-corruption campaign, Xi’s instrument to enforce Party discipline and loyalty. Zhao climbed the ladder of success very quickly and became the youngest governor in China in 1999 when he was appointed Governor of Qinghai at the age of 42. He was also the youngest provincial Party boss in 2003 when he became Party Secretary of Qinghai at the age of 46. A politician with no clear factional orientations, Zhao has worked faithfully with Xi and Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads – What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us 27 his classmate, Chen Xi, the Executive Deputy Director of the Central Organization Department, to place Xi’s supporters in various strategic positions over the past five years. As one of the younger members of the new leadership at age 60, he has the best chance to play a key role in Chinese politics beyond the next Party Congress in 2022.
Li Qiang, 58, a close Xi ally from Zhejiang–one of the president’s main power bases – is one of three newcomers in the Politburo. He could rise to the position of Vice Premier, where he would assume an important role in economic policy-making. As the number three in the State Council, he was named as the Party Secretary of Shanghai, days after he secured a seat in China’s 25-member Politburo. Almost every Shanghai Party Secretary since the early 1990s has gone on to the Politburo Standing Committee.
Chen Miner, born in 1960, another close Xi ally, previously worked under Xi in Zhejiang province, where Xi was then provincial Party leader, and has since ridden the coat-tails of his former boss, climbing rapidly through the Party ranks. Chen Miner – unlike Xi’s other prominent allies, who are older – will be able to serve out a double term from 2022, when he will be 62.
Apart from supporting Xi, the overriding characteristics of the new standing committee, however, are experience and competence. These are people who know how to run large operations as well as operate at the highest levels of the Party.11 Perhaps most important, Xi’s allies now control all the key provinces and provincial- level municipalities that matter – Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Chongqing, and Tianjin – and those where there could be unrest, notably Xinjiang.
If one were to try to capture in a phrase the essence of Xi’s tenure thus far as China’s top ruler, it could fairly be characterized as “political shock and awe.” Whether it be his withering anticorruption drive that has felled both retired and active senior leaders, his radical restructuring of the world’s largest fighting force in the PLA, or his notable success in bolstering his personal stature within the leadership as the CCP’s new “core” leader, it is incontrovertible that Xi has emerged as the most
“No Change At The Top,” China bystander, October 25, 2017,
Now, in the Politburo, there are three people, Li Zhanshu, Wang Huning, and Zhao Leji, who are Xi’s allies, and below the standing committee, the 25-member Politburo is broadly pro-Xi. The same can be said for the 200-member Central Committee beneath them. A new Central Military Commission also was announced. Xu Qiliang stayed on as one of its two Vice Chairmen, while Zhang Youxia, who is close to Xi, was named its other Vice Chairman. Figure 6 presents an updated visual guide of China’s new leaders of Party and state after the 19th Party Congress.
IV. What Comes Next?
Whether Xi Jinping might seek to rule beyond 2022 is far too speculative and distant to predict with any accuracy at this juncture. Nevertheless, how the 19th Congress plays out will influence how far Xi can break the CCP’s norms. What is certain is that, if Xi does not signal the succession at the Party Congress, outside observers automatically will conclude that this means he wishes to stay on, with comparisons to Russian President Vladimir Putin likely to abound.
The track record of the last five years gives little indication that a more powerful Xi would be willing to alter the trends of political dictatorship and assertiveness on the world that have roiled many in the West and in the democratic polities in Asia. On the contrary, we see Xi refusing to accept the value of Western democracy and freedom with a Leninist system that is already struggling to keep pace with the demands of a rising global power.
There are three potential scenarios of future prospects for the development of China’s politics, which depend on Xi’s choices. The first scenario is built purely on institutional norms. To obey the convention, after his ten-year term ends, Xi hands over his posts to a successor who would perform the role as a ceremonial head of state. The question, however, is who can take over this power highly centralized system? Also, who believes Xi will follow the convention?
Christopher K. Johnson, “Chinese Politics Has No Rules, But It May Be Good if Xi Jinping Breaks Them.” Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads – What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us 29
HOW THE CCP RULES: MILITARY ANTI-CORRUPTION PARTY AFFAIRS CHINA’S LEADERSHIP AFTER THE 19TH PARTY
Zhang Chunxian MASS ORGANIZA CONGRESS Current position unclear 64 NOTE: ONLY 19TH CCP-CC MEMBERS DISPLAYED Liu Qibao KEY: Current position unlcear 64 Huang Kunming S “The Core” of the Leadership Director, CCP-CC Wei Fenghe Propaganda Member, CMC; Department Members of the CCP-CC Politburo Standing State Councilor, Minister 61 of National Defense? Yang Xiaodu S Committee (PSC) (National rank) 63 1st Ranked Vice Secretary, CCDI Chen Xi S Ding Xuexiang S Shen Yueyue Members of the CCP-CC Politburo (PB) 64 Director, CCP- Director, CCP-CC (Vice Chair, NPC-SC; (Vice-National rank) CC Organization General Office Chair, All-China Women’s Xu Qiliang Department 55 Federation) TIONS Vice Chair, CMC 64 60 Other Leaders of Party and State (non-PSC or PB 67 leaders ranked Vice-National or above) Zhang Youxia (Non-CCP heads of Mass Vice Chair, CMC Org. not individually listed) Name 67 Position Name, position, and age of leader 6 Age
FOREIGN POLICY Zhao Leji Yang Jiechi Secretary, 5 Wang Huning (State Councillor in charge 1st Ranked Secretary, 1 Official order of PSC Members CCDI S of Foreign, Taiwan, Hong 60 CCP-CC Secretariat Kong, and Macau Affairs) (Director, CCP-CC S Secretary, CCP-CC Secretariat (Vice-National rank) 67 Policy Research Office) 62 ( ) Current position from pre-19th Party Congress 1
|| 1st Ranked Vice Chair,
PRC People’s Republic of China XI JINPING LEGISL 3 NPC-SC || General Secretary, CCP-CC Li Zhanshu Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (President, PRC) CCP-CC || Chair, NPC-SC? || (Eleven other Vice Chairs Chairman, CMC 67 Wang Chen of the NPC-SC, includes Central Military Commission (Vice Chair, Secretary CMC 64 2 non-CCP vice chairs, POLICY ADVISO RY General, NPC-SC) Li Keqiang 67 some will retire in March A NPC-SC National People’s Congress Standing Committee State Councilor, Minister of (Premier, State 2018) S Council) TURE Public Security Guo Shengkun 62 CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Zhao Kezhi Secretary, CCP-CC Political Appointed as Minister of Public Legal Commission Han Zheng 7 Security, expected to become 63 4 Liu He State Councilor in March 2018. Wang Yang || 1st ranked Vice- CCDI CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Premier? || || ??Vice Premier?? || || Chair, CPPCC? || 63 (Director, Office of the CCP-CC Cai Qi (Vice Premier) Leading Group on Finance and Zhou Qiang (PS Beijing) 62 PS CCP Party Secretary Economics) (President, Supreme 62 65 People’s Court) Li Qiang Li Hongzhong ? Implied new position, awaiting formal appointment 57 PS Shanghai (PS Tianjin) Sun Chunlan 58 61 || State Councilor, Secretary || ??Vice Premier?? || General of the State Council || ?? ?? Speculated position, not yet confirmed Cao Jianming 67 Xiao Jie? (Procurator General, Li Xi Chen Quanguo PS Guangdong Currently (Minister of Finance), Supreme People’s (PS Xijiang) Hu Chunhua Name New to the Politburo 61 62 Vice Secretary General of the State Procuratorate) || ??Vice Premier?? || Council, appointed to party position
Y AND 62 54 usually held by the Secretary || || Position currently occupied by non-19th CCP-CC Chen Min’er (PS Chongqing) General of the State Council members;members; new appointmentappointment to be made.made. 57
Wang Yong (State Councillor in charge of State Owned Enterprises, Industry and Commerce, and Production Safety) You Quan S 62 Director, CCP-CC United Front
JUDICIAR DOMESTIC SECURITY Work Department 63
(Twenty other Vice Chairs of the CPPCC, includes non-CCP vice chairs, some will retire in March 2018) ECONOMY AND GOV. KEY LOCALITIES UNITED FRONT INFOGRAPHICNFOGRAPHIC BBYYY YUUANZHUOANZHUO WANG AND JAMESJAMESE EVVANS ADMINISTRATION SOURCES: XINHUA NEWS AGENCY AND OTHER NEWS SOUTRCES
Figure 6. How the CCP Rules: China’s Leadership after the 19th Party Congress Source: Yuan Wang & James Evans, “Updated Infographic: A Post-19th Party Congress Guide to China’s New Leadership,” November 4, 2017, The Fairbank Center,
The second scenario is that Xi, as the CCP’s most powerful “core” leader with the current system, restores the system of the Chairman of the Party in name of the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation, and breaks the General Secretary of the term.
The third scenario is the “Putin model” which totally breaks the CCP’s Institutions through democratic elections. Xi could amend the national constitution to allow himself to continue as President for a third term, to extend his time in power. It means China democratization, and will completely overthrow CCP’s commitment of forever leading China, always govern China.
Apparently, the three scenarios are very difficult and all present great obstacles for Xi Jinping. The most important challenge for Xi is that, in the absence of practical political and military merit, can he really reach beyond Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping’s political heights and influence?
No matter which option Xi chooses, it would be a massive departure from the gradual opening and self-improving system toward outright dictatorship with an emperor for life, and it would damage China’s real democratization, as well as the CPP’s claims of institutionalization. If Xi can implement democratic reform and open social control, however, it might be sufficient to put China solidly on the path toward realizing Xi’s clarion call for achieving the “China Dream” and “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
V. Implications on Cross-Strait Relations
Xi’s Taiwan section in the 19th Party Congress’ political report has many familiar notes. This section, titled “Upholding One Country, Two Systems and Moving toward National Reunification,” which came immediately after Hong Kong and Macao, mentioned the “1992 consensus” four times while reflecting on the CCP’s efforts over the past five years toward unification, insisting on the “one China” principle as the basis for Cross-Strait relations and expressing determination in seeking “peaceful unification.” Xi also reiterated his “six anys,” which he first described last year as meaning that “[China] will not permit any person, any organization or any political party at any time, using any means to tear any part of Chinese territory away from the country.” The “six anys” are China’s “bottom line” on moves toward Taiwanese 32 Prospect Policy Studies Series independence. In the meantime, in mentioning “peace” seven times, Xi’s repeated calls for the peaceful development of Cross-Strait relations and peaceful unification means the CCP is hoping to avoid armed conflict with Taiwan.
Xi’s speech in the Taiwan section was much milder than previously expected and released goodwill in some places. For example, Xi did not specify a timeline for unification (but the CCP is most likely aiming to achieve its goal by 2049, the People’s Republic of China 100-year anniversary). Xi also stressed “Guided by the conviction that we are all of the same family, we respect the current social system and way of life in Taiwan and are ready to share the development opportunities on the mainland with our Taiwan compatriots first,” and acknowledged the so-called “1992 consensus” as “historical fact.”
The way of Taiwanese life is underpinned and pledged by Xi. What makes Taiwan, ROC different in all aspects is that ROC in Taiwan is ruled by laws and that people have the freedom to express their minds without the fear of suppression (for which China is widely upbraided due to its lack of this principle).
It is noteworthy that, while China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Minister Zhang Zijun and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chairman Yu Zhengsheng, who control China’s Taiwan policy, have repeated ad nauseam that “the two sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China” and “China is firmly against Taiwanese independence,” and have taken swipes at President Tsai Ing-wen and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Wu Den-yih over their refusal to back unification with China, Xi apparently has refrained from criticizing Tsai or Wu.
Zhang’s and Yu’s combative attitude reportedly has drawn criticism from CCP members, who have said their handling of Cross-Strait affairs has failed to serve Beijing’s interests and their inability to outline plans for development in Cross-Strait relations signals that there is an obstacle in China’s Taiwan policy. Zhang and Yu are to be replaced after the Congress, which could mean that Cross-Strait relations will change for the better.
It must be noticed that Xi’s first five years in power have coincided with a relatively tranquil international environment and world economy. China is facing Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads – What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us 33 tumultuous situations in the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait.
China-Japan relations are unlikely to improve due to the sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands since 2010, while Beijing’s attempts at expanding its military presence have prompted Southeast Asian nations to prime their armed forces for a possible confrontation since 2012. Meanwhile, North Korea has incessantly conducted nuclear and missile tests over the last two years, and China’s recent border dispute with India could have deep implications long term for the global arena.
The unstable configuration of the region has invited newcomers to join the power struggle in the Asia-Pacific, for example the UK and India, which have participated in two military drills with Japan and the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region. The tensions on the Korean Peninsula are likely to escalate, and a meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in July has presented new challenges for China.
For Xi, achieving “the Chinese Dream” requires a peaceful and stable international environment, reducing tension as much as possible, and improving relations with neighboring countries. In the same way, it is also necessary to ease Cross-Strait relations.
Just days after the CCP revealed its new generation of top leaders, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen made a public speech on Cross-Strait relations, calling for a breakthrough with China. In a direct message to the CCP, Tsai said:
The Chinese mainland’s ruling party has just completed the Party Congress and entered a new stage...... Right now is a turning point for change. I once again call on leaders of both sides to...... seek a breakthrough in Cross-Straits relations and to benefit the long-term welfare of people on both sides and to forever eliminate hostilities and conflict.
Comparing the speeches of Xi and Tsai, one sees Xi’s remarks are only slightly different from President Tsai’s inaugural address, in which she acknowledged that a Cross-Strait meeting took place in 1992, at which both sides reached some mutual understanding, as “1992 historical fact.” Although the governments on both sides use 34 Prospect Policy Studies Series different words, the spirit of what they are saying is almost the same.
Xi expressed respect for Taiwan’s social system and the Taiwanese way of life, which is consistent with Tsai’s repeated calls for Cross-Strait relations to be based on the public will. Tsai has been complying with the public will in her approach to Cross-Strait relations, adding that Xi’s remarks give the sense that he is conforming with this approach.
As long as both governments have more and more interaction, there could be some changes in Cross-Strait relations after 19th Party Congress. The CCP might look for more opportunities for contact with the Democratic Progressive Party in the future. Contributor 35
Contributor
Dr. Li-wen Tung is Professor, the Department of Public Security, Central Police University, Taiwan. He earned his Ph. D. in the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, National Chengchi University, Taiwan. His research interests cover China Studies, International Relations, National Security, Homeland Security.