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Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads What the 19Th Party Congress Tells Us

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Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads What the 19Th Party Congress Tells Us Li-wen Tung Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us Prospect Foundation 2018 PROSPECT FOUNDATION Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us Author: Li-wen Tung（董立文） First Published: March 2018 Prospect Foundation Chairman: Tan-sun Chen, Ph.D.（陳唐山） President: I-chung Lai, Ph.D.（賴怡忠） Publishing Department Chief Editor: Chung-cheng Chen, Ph.D.（陳重成） Executive Editor: Julia Chu（朱春梅） Wei-min Liu（劉維民） Editor: Yu-chih Chen（陳昱誌） Published by PROSPECT FOUNDATION No. 1, Lane 60, Sec. 3, Tingzhou Rd., Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C. Tel: 886-2-23654366 This article is also available online at http://www.pf.org.tw All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. ISBN: 978-986-89374-6-8 Prospect Foundation The Prospect Foundation (hereafter as the Foundation), a private, non-profit research organization, was founded on the third of March 1997 in Taipei in the Republic of China on Taiwan. Strictly non-partisan, the Foundation enjoys academic and administrative independence. The Foundation is dedicated to providing her clients government agencies, private enterprises and academic institutions with pragmatic and comprehensive policy analysis on current crucial issues in the areas of Cross-Strait relations, foreign policy, national security, international relations, strategic studies, and international business. The Foundation seeks to serve as a research center linking government agencies, private enterprises and academic institutions in terms of information integration and policy analysis. The Foundation also seeks to establish contact and strengthen cooperation with think tanks throughout the world, including those based in Mainland China, in order to exchange information, publications and research fellows, and to compare results of consultant services. To accomplish the above-mentioned objectives, the Foundation is engaged in the following activities: － To conduct client-oriented policy analysis relevant to Cross-Strait relations, foreign policy, national security, international relations, strategic studies and international business. － To sponsor or cosponsor domestic, Cross-Strait and international conferences. － To invite eminent scholars and distinguished guests to visit the Republic of China. － To assist local scholars and experts to visit internationally renowned universities, research centers and think tanks. － To publish Prospect Quarterly, Prospect Series, other academic papers and policy reports on current crucial issues in the research areas mentioned above. － To sponsor academic institutions, scholars and experts specializing in the above-mentioned research areas. For more updated information, please go to our web-site at: http://www.pf.org.tw Contents I. Xi Jinping’s Centralization of Power ……………………………… 3 II. The 19th Party Congress’ Political Report ………………………… 8 III. The Implications of Leadership Changes ………………………… 16 IV. What Comes Next? ………………………………………………… 28 V. Implications on Cross-Strait Relations …………………………… 31 Contributor ………………………………………………………………… 35 List of Figures Figure 1: The Party’s Nerve Center: Xi’s Inner Circle of Political Advisors and New Party Leading Small Groups …………… 7 Figure 2: Fan of Power: The Politburo Brings Together the Key Figures of Party, State, and Military in China ……………… 9 Figure 3: The Headlines of a Report Delivered by Xi Jinping to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China…………………………………………………… 12 Figure 4: A Two-Stage Development Plan for the Period from 2020 to the Middle of the 21st Century ……………………… 14 Figure 5: China’s Most Powerful ………………………………………… 21 Figure 6: How the CCP Rules: China’s Leadership after the 19th Party Congress ………………………………………………… 29 Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads – What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us 1 Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us Li-wen Tung Professor Department of Public Security Central Police University Abstract Chinese politics have a high degree of uncertainty. Although it is impossible to know for sure what the future will be, some important signals of the 19th Party Congress have already been sent. Already the most powerful Chinese leader in over three decades, Xi Jinping has built a political foundation solid enough to defy convention. The centralization of power around Xi undoubtedly has increased his authority but it also has reversed much of the institutionalization of rules and procedures generally regarded as essential to party and administration normalization. Xi Jinping now has an institutional guarantee of support. With more personal authority than anyone since Mao Zedong, and having transferred power from ministries and technocrats to party officials and committees, he has the opportunity at the 19th Party Congress to consolidate his position and stamp his authority on the government. The characteristics of this new leadership lineup are “the elderly do not stay; the young men do not enter.” The highlight of the 19th CPC National Congress was that “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” is now written into the newly revised CPC Constitution, marking a significant breakthrough in the sinicization of Marxism. Keywords: Centralization of Power, Policy Adjustments, Theoretical/Ideological Innovation, A Third Term, The Chinese Dream The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), an event every five years to set the party’s national policy goals and elect its top leadership, was held at the Great Hall of the People, Beijing, between 18 and 24 October 2017. Many people reasonably have focused on the drama of personnel shuffles. Since the 2 Prospect Policy Studies Series trajectory of President Xi Jinping’s second term will depend largely on his support within the political establishment, the size and shape of leadership turnover at this event demand close attention. In fact, every China’s Communist Party (CCP) National Congress contains leadership changes, policy adjustments, and theory/ideology innovation. The composition of leaders – across the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), Politburo, and Central Committee – not only serves as a barometer of Xi’s power, but also suggests his plausible policy priorities. Understanding the new leadership lineup and its dynamics will be critical to Cross-Strait relations moving forward. Unfortunately, Chinese politics have a high degree of uncertainty. Indeed, before Xi’s administration began in earnest, some speculated that he might take a gentler line on Tibet. Instead, the past few years have seen the government’s merciless pursuit of Tibetan self-immolators and their families while expanding the “grid” surveillance system. Just as Christopher K. Johnson said: “Chinese politics has no rules.”1 The prototypical example of which is that Xi Jinping swiftly centralized political power shortly after the 18th CCP National Congress in 2012, differing from the prediction of many experts when he was elected General Secretary. Although it is impossible to know for sure what the future will be, some important signals of the 19th Party Congress already have been sent, and an analysis of recent political trends suggests that observers should learn to expect the unexpected. Before the 19th Party Congress, the question concerning most people was, “will Xi consolidate his power?” During the congress, however, the question most frequently asked by foreign media was, “Is Xi planning on a third term?” Already the most powerful Chinese leader in over three decades, Xi has built a political foundation solid enough to defy convention. Speculation is rife that he will probably hang on to power after his two terms as the CCP’s General Secretary end in 2022 – meaning he Christopher K. Johnson, “Chinese Politics Has No Rules, But It May Be Good if Xi Jinping Breaks Them,” August 9, 2017, CSIS, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinese-politics-has-no- rules-it-may-be-good-if-xi-jinping-breaks-them>. Xi Jinping Stands at the Crossroads – What the 19th Party Congress Tells Us 3 theoretically could be in power until at least 2027. At a time when the United States is retreating from its global leadership responsibilities and China is attempting to assert itself as a global leader, changes to the political agenda of China’s governing party and its top leadership are of increasing importance to the rest of the world. What impact will Xi Jinping have on China and the world as China rises as a totalitarian state under this powerful dictator? The world needs a robust China. Its huge market has become a key growth driver for global companies. No problem, from climate change to globalization, can be solved without Beijing’s involvement. To ensure that China can play a positive role as a major global power, however, the country needs free discussion and open criticism. This is in both China’s and the world’s interest. In this regard, Xi Jinping stands at the crossroads. As such, we will discuss the way Xi Jinping centralized power, the policy- ideology signals of the 19th Party Congress’ political report, the implications of leadership changes, and the implication on the Cross-Strait relations. I. Xi Jinping’s Centralization of Power Ten years ago, when Xi Jinping was elected as successor, few people knew him and the reason for his qualifying was that he had no factions, no political achievements, and no threats to anyone. Five years ago, Xi Jinping’s path to the Chinese presidency at the 18th Communist Party Congress was shrouded in political intrigue. Yet, as president, Xi has succeeded in a Maoist crusade to reshape and gain control of the party, military, and internal security apparatus. Xi has consolidated his position. At the heart of this has been the anti-corruption campaign. To Xi’s supporters, this represents the General Secretary’s earnest desire to rid the party of impure elements that undermine the party’s legitimacy.
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