Xi Jinping and the 'Other' China by Peter Wood

Home , Cai Qi, He Lifeng, Hu Heping, Li Hongzhong, Li Shulei, Ma Ning

Volume 17, Issue 8 June 9, 2017

In a Fortnight: Xi Jinping and the 'Other' China By Peter Wood

Xi Jinping Promotes Protégés to Top Positions in Run-Up to 19th Party Congress By Willy Lam

The Southern Theater Command and China’s Maritime Strategy By Nan Li

Recent Developments in the Chinese Army’s Helicopter Force By Dennis J. Blasko

Waiting in the Wings: PLAAF General Yi Xiaoguang By Kenneth Allen and Jana Allen

Xi Jinping and the 'Other' constitutes an important pillar of its domestic legitimacy. Not surprisingly, the CCP has launched China a propaganda push in state media to highlight its progress.

At the end of May, China held its annual Chi- At the center of much of the attention is the nese Poverty Alleviation International Forum (中 “core” of the Party, Xi Jinping, whose experi- 国扶贫国际论坛), which serves to draw attention ences in the countryside as a young man, and to Chinese achievements in this area (Xinhua, major policies have been offered up as proof of May 26). Poverty alleviation is likely to remain a the Party’s continuing ties to regular people and key theme in state media as China prepares for its commitment to China’s urban and rural poor. the 19th Party Congress later this year. The Chi- nese Communist Party (CCP) has set for itself the Xi Jinping, in particular, is being lauded as a ma- ambitious goal of largely eradicating poverty by jor driver of these efforts. Xi has made sweeping 2020. Its previous success in moving large num- economic reform and the expansion of the bers of Chinese out of poverty—largely due to “moderately prosperous” class ( 小康) core Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening policies— planks of his policies, particularly as embodied ChinaBrief June 9, 2017 in the “Four Comprehensives” (China Brief, Feb- ordinary Chinese, inequality is rising, and the ruary 23). Though he is well-known as a prince- disparity between urban areas and the “other” ling—Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, held a number of China—rural areas—is increasing. high positions—state media has played up his connection to China’s rural areas and farmers An annual survey from Peking University and the (Xinhua, May 22). His early experiences as a Chinese Academy of Social Sciences reports that “sent-down youth” in rural Shaanxi province China has a high level of economic inequality at during the Cultural Revolution, then later as a the national level. The Gini coefficient—a statis- village cadre, in particular, have been a focus of tical measure of inequality—for 2015 was .5. This the reporting. [1] has risen over the past 30 years from .3 in the early 1980s to .45 and above (BBC Chinese, Jan- In March, People’s Daily published a short video uary 16, 2016). More troubling, however, is that called “People’s Representative Xi Jinping” (人民 the level of inequality is rising faster in the coun- 代表习近平) about these experiences. The doc- tryside. The report “China Family Panel Studies umentary emphasizes that “As a youth, Xi (中国民生发展报告, 2016), found that while in- Jinping experienced life and endured hardships comes increased faster in rural households than as a member of a country-side production in urban areas, inequality between incomes in team...spent several years undergoing challeng- the countryside and urban areas increased ing experiences with the masses …[and] never (Sohu, March 21). put on any official airs..” (CPCNews.cn, March 2). China’s demographic distribution exacerbates Xi’s focus on land reform is grounded in security this problem. Its population, and wealth, are dis- and economic objectives. He has tied food secu- proportionately concentrated on its east coast, rity—bolstered by more efficient, larger farms— mostly clustered around a few cities, a fact made directly to his larger view of national security, clear by the accompanying cartogram. More which he terms the “Comprehensive Security granular data further reveals that even within Outlook” (总体安全观) (People’s Forum, June 4, China’s interior the population is densely clus- 2014). Land reforms can be credited with help- tered in just a few cities and prefectures. [3] ing shift millions out of poverty. [2] Particularly as China shifts from export-based economy to a service economy that relies more on domestic consumption to drive growth, increasing the number of educated workers and raising productivity all become more important. Ac- cording to Xinhua, the size of China’s economy is expected to exceed $13 trillion by 2020. And its middle class is expected to expand to include 400 million of its citizens (Xinhua, March 13).

In Beijing, the view is that China has successfully modernized, and that policies are working. But despite major progress in improving the lives of

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The most important driver of China’s political behavior will continue to be its ongoing economic transition. With the pressure on to deliver clear progress ahead of the 19th Party Congress, the focus will likely continue to be the CCP’s success in moving people out of poverty and generally improving living conditions. The economic transition is likely to hit China’s rural areas the hardest, posing new challenges to the governments’ legitimacy.

Peter Wood is a Program Associate for China at The Jamestown Foundation and also serves as the Editor of China Brief. You can follow him on Moreover, the countryside is emptying, aging, Twitter @PeterWood_PDW and falling behind. Although in 2015 44 percent of Chinese still lived in rural areas that number is Notes expected to fall to 30 percent by 2030 (World 1. Urban youth who were forced or volun- Bank, 2015; World Bank, March 25, 2014). teered to work in the countryside, and experience life as a peasant. The impacts of negative medium-and long-term 2. Kroeber, Arthur R. China's Economy: What trends fall disproportionally on the country-side. Everyone Needs to Know?, Oxford Univer- China’s government debt-to-GDP recently sity Press, 2016. Kindle edition. Locations reached 277 percent at the end of 2016, mean- 655-657. ing that many county-level governments are 3. Population data drawn from the 6th Pop- deeply in debt just as economic opportunities in ulation Census (2010). The author used those regions are drying up (SCMP, January 26). this data, despite its age because it is Longer term, population aging will sap re- more consistently available across pro- sources from the state and leave many farms vincial and prefectural lines. GADM GIS without workers, since the average age of Chi- Data used for boundaries. In one in- nese farmers is over 60. As exports decline as a stance—Chaohu Prefecture, Anhui—no source of growth and the price of living in urban longer exists and has been broken up areas increase, jobs that once waited in the cities among the surrounding Prefectures. This are now harder to find and remittances back to is not represented in the GIS data but an families in rural areas decline. Rural govern- attempt to approximate the correct den- ments are left with less revenue to provide ser- sity by identifying the relevant county- vices, such as pensions and law enforcement. level populations and recalculating. This latter effect has resulted in a rise in crimi- nality and drug-related gang activity (China *** Brief, September 4, 2015; China Brief, March 24, 2016).

3 ChinaBrief June 9, 2017 Xi Jinping Promotes Protégés Executive Vice-Governor of Zhejiang, then Vice Director of the General Office of the Central Na- to Top Positions in Run-Up to tional Security Commission (CNSC); then Execu- 19th Party Congress tive Vice-Director of the General Office of the CNSC; then Acting Mayor of Beijing, Mayor of By Willy Lam Beijing, and PS of Beijing. It took him just eight

months to be elevated from acting mayor of Bei- Much attention has been paid to how, in the jing to PS of the capital city. At the 19th Party wake of the seemingly isolationist tendencies of Congress scheduled for this autumn, he is due President Donald Trump, President Xi Jinping is to be inducted to the Politburo as an ordinary highlighting Beijing’s readiness to provide member. (The PSs of all four directly adminis- global leadership in areas ranging from boost- tered cities are usually Politburo members as ing international trade to fighting climate well.) Cai, who is not even an alternate member change. Yet, for China’s supreme leader, the top of the Central Committee, will also be a rare ex- priority for the rest of the year is domestic poli- ample of a cadre getting into the Politburo with- tics: ensuring that enough members of his in- out first becoming a member of the Central choate Xi Jinping Faction (XJPF) will be inducted Committee (Radio Free Asia, May 29; Ming Pao into the Central Committee and the Politburo at [Hong Kong], May 28). the upcoming 19th Party Congress, which will endorse a wholesale reshuffle of top-level posi- The other example of Xi’s proclivity for tions. Since late 2016 “core leader” Xi, who is yongrenweiqin (用人为亲; “hiring officials based also General Secretary of the Chinese Com- on favoritism”) is Beijing police chief Wang munist Party (CCP), has been able to promote a Xiaohong (1957), who has also leapfrogged up large number of his protégés to strategic slots in the bureaucratic ladder. Just four years ago, the Party and government testifies to his tight Wang was a Vice-Mayor of Xiamen in Fujian grip on power (See China Brief, November 11, Province, the same post held by Xi from 1985 to 2016). However, his acolytes rise—despite an 1987. Wang has been promoted five times since apparent lack of laudable track records—has 2013. He went from Assistant Governor of He- opened Xi to criticism for violating Party rules nan to Vice-Governor of Henan, to Vice-Mayor about thwarting factionalism and upholding of Beijing and head of the Beijing Public Security meritocratic norms for cadre selection. Bureau (PSB) until his appointment last month

as concurrently Vice-Minister at the Ministry of Two recent appointments demonstrate Xi’s use Public Affairs, Vice-Mayor of Beijing, and Head of personnel appointments to “stack the deck” of the Beijing PSB. It is possible that Wang may with those loyal to him. The CCP Organization become Minister of Public Security soon after Department announced in May that Cai Qi (蔡奇; the 19th Party Congress. Like Cai Qi, his party born 1953), who served under Xi in both Fujian rank has failed to reflect his fast-growing role in and Zhejiang provinces, appointed to be the the government. Wang is expected to become a Party Secretary (PS) of the Beijing municipality. Central Committee member of the Congress Cai’s rise has few precedents in Party history. (MPS website, March 2; People’s Daily, March 30, From 2013, when Cai was Head of the Organiza- 2015) tion Department of Zhejiang Province, he has been promoted every year: firstly, Cai was made

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As Xi has reiterated, there are “careerists and know Xi in 2012 when the former was Di- conspirators” within the party who might form rector of the General Office of the Shang- cliques that are prejudicial to the interest of the hai Party Committee. Ding will likely suc- supreme leader. Xi has apparently attempted to ceed Xi protégé Li Zhanshu as Director of insulate himself from these cliques by installing the Central Committee General Office. loyal cadres as Party Secretary of Beijing, as well  Li Shulei ( 李书磊; b. 1964), who was as its police chief. At the same time and with ex- named a Deputy Secretary of the Central traordinary speed and efficiency has Xi has Commission for Disciplinary Inspection placed 20 members of his own faction in posi- (CCDI) earlier this year. Li worked closely tions to join the Politburo at the 19th Party Con- with Xi when the latter was President of gress or at least gaining significant advance- the Central Party School from 2007 to ment in Party and governmental ranks. 2012.

Within the upper echelons of the Party, the po- While Xi has channeled economic and social pol- litical fortunes of a number of Xi followers are icy-making to a number of central leading set to rise considerably. All of them served under groups and central commissions at the apex of Xi when he was a regional administrator in Fujian, the CCP since 2013, the powers of the State Zhejiang, and Shanghai between 1985–2007, or Council or central government have corre- when he was Head of the Central Committee spondingly been truncated. Xi, not Premier Li Secretariat and President of the Central Party Keqiang, runs the economy. While this goes School from 2007–2012 (Yazhou Zhoukan against late patriarch Deng Xiaoping’s dictums [Hong Kong], May 7; Radio Free Asia, April 30; about “separation of party and government,” Xi Ming Pao, January 9; RFI Chinese Service, Octo- has taken steps to ensure that his close followers ber 23, 2016; Apple Daily [Hong Kong], October will occupy key positions within the government 23, 2016). cabinet (United Daily News [Taipei], May 9;  Huang Kunming (黄坤明, b. 1956), Exec- HK01.com, February 23; RFI Chinese Service, utive Deputy Director of the Propaganda February 24; Ta Kung Pao [Hong Kong] Decem- Department. Huang worked for Xi in Fu- ber 31, 2014). The following four cadres are jian and Zhejiang and is tipped to be- tipped for promotion in the State Council: come Director of the Propaganda De- partment at the 19th Party Congress.  Liu He (刘鹤; b. 1952) a principal eco-  Chen Xi (陈希, b. 1953), Executive Deputy nomic adviser to Xi in his capacity as Di- Director of the Organization Department rector of the General Office of the Central who will likely be promoted Director of Leading Group for Finance and Econom- the same department at the congress. ics (CLGFE), Liu may become a Vice- Chen was Xi’s classmate at Tsinghua Premier in charge of Finance (as well as University from 1975 to 1979. an ordinary Politburo member). The U.S.-  Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥; b. 1962), Execu- educated Liu went to the same high tive Deputy Director of the General Office school in Beijing as Xi. His power over of the CCP Central Committee and Direc- economic policy-making is said to be tor of the Xi Jinping Office. Ding got to even bigger than that of Premier Li.

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 He Lifeng (何立峰; b. 1955) was a close Chen has been speculated upon as a associate of Xi’s when the latter served in “shoo-in” for a position at the Politburo – Fujian. He was named Deputy Minister at and even a possible inductee to the Pol- the National Development and Reform itburo Standing Committee. Commission (NDRC) in 2014 – and then  Ying Yong (应勇; b. 1957), is Mayor of Minister in 2017. Given that the NDRC is Shanghai and likely the next PS of the one of the most powerful units of the metropolis. Ying spent the bulk of his ca- State Council, He Lifeng may at the Party reer in Zhejiang, where he gained the Congress also become a Vice-Premier trust of Xi. with the party rank of Politburo member.  Li Hongzhong (李鸿忠; b. 1956), Party  Zhong Shan (钟山; b. 1955), Minister of Secretary of Tianjin. The former PS of Hu- Commerce. A former Vice-Governor of bei has never worked with Xi. However, Li Zhejiang, Zhong also has experience as a has become a trusted aide because he state entrepreneur and trade negotiator. has gone out of his way to promote Mao-  Shu Guozeng (1956), a former Deputy ist-era veneration for core leader Xi. Secretary-General of the Zhejiang Provin-  Li Qiang (李强; b. 1959), Jiangsu Party cial Party Committee, is now Deputy Di- Secretary (and former governor of rector of the General Office of LGFE. If Liu Zhejiang). Throughout much of Xi’s ten- He earns a promotion at the Party Con- ure as Party Secretary of Zhejiang Prov- gress, Shu may take his place as Director ince, Li served as Xi’s right-hand man in of the General Office of the CLGFE, which his capacity as Secretary-General of the is China’s highest-level decision-making Zhejiang Party Committee. body on financial and economic issues.  Gong Zheng (龚正; b. 1960), Governor of Shandong (former vice-governor of One of the key measures taken by ex-President Zhejiang and party boss of Hangzhou). Hu Jintao to bolster and consolidate the power  Lou Yangsheng (楼阳生; b. 1959), Gover- of his Communist Youth League Faction (CYLF) nor of Shanxi (former head of the United was through appointing trusted CYLF affiliates Front Department of the Zhejiang Party to senior positions in the country’s 31 major ad- Committee) ministrative districts. Apparently taking a leaf  Hu Heping (胡和平; b. 1962), Governor from Hu’s playbook, Xi has named a considera- of Shaanxi (former Head of the Organiza- ble number of his protégés to positions of party tion Department of the Zhejiang Party secretaries or governors and mayors in the re- committee). gions (Ming Pao, March 7; Reuters, March 2;  Chen Yixin (陈一新; b. 1959), a former China Times [Taipei], February 28; Radio Free member of the Standing Committee of Asia, February 27; HK01.com, September 28, the Zhejiang Party Committee and PS of 2016). Those with the most potential for eleva- Wenzhou, Chen was promoted Deputy tion at the 19th Party Congress include: Party Secretary of Hubei Province in 2016.  Liu Qi (刘奇; b. 1957), a former mayor of  Chen Min’er (陈敏尔; b. 1960), Party Sec- the Zhejiang city of Wenzhou and PS of retary of Guizhou (former vice-governor Ningbo, Liu became Governor of Jiangxi of Zhejiang). A trusted protégé of Xi’s, Province in 2016.

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the number of votes [the candidates get in pub- “Core leader” Xi and his colleagues seem to have lic appraisals], the number of [assessment] bent long-standing rules and conventions of the marks, the GDP [of jurisdictions under the con- party so as to come up with cadre-promotion trol of the candidates] and the age [of candi- norms that favor members of the XJPF. Since dates]’” (People’s Daily, September 2, 2014). 1949, the best-known criterion for promotion is that the candidate under consideration must be It is indicative of President Xi’s formidable sway “both red and expert” (又红又专). After the Cul- that members of other factions who want to stay tural Revolution, this has been changed to “hav- in power—or who look forward to promotions ing moral rectitude as well as ability and profes- at the 19th Party Congress have gone to inordi- sional competence” (德才兼备). Moreover, the nate lengths in extolling the virtues and wisdom Hu Jintao administration (2002–2012) experi- of the core leader. Take the case of two senior mented with “public recommendation and pub- members of the Communist Youth League Fac- lic election” regarding the appointment of tion, Premier Li and Guangdong PS and Polit- grassroots administrators. Candidates vying for buro member Hu Chunhua. In his Government a post must secure enough support—often in Work Report to the NPC last March, Li paid hom- the forms of the casting of “votes”—from com- age to “the party central leadership with munity leaders such as local members of the Comrade Xi Jinping as its core” nine times. Hu (b. People’s Congress or Chinese People’s Political 1963) went even further in his address to the Consultative Conference (CPPCC). [1] Guangdong Party Congress held last month. The rising star cited Xi’s name 26 times and praised Particularly since Xi gained the status of “core Xi’s exemplary role as “core leader” seven times leader” in late 2016, the most important criterion (South China Morning Post, June 3; Southcn.com, for promotion has become subservience to the May 23). will of the supreme leader. Thus, it was empha- sized that cadres must “maintain a high level of If, as a senior cadre running the party organs of unison in thoughts, politics, and action with the units directly under the party-state apparatus Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi said, “the foremost political task is upholding the Jinping as its core.” In addition, officials must core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping,” the have a “four-fold consciousness”: “political con- personality cult being built around Xi has dealt a sciousness, consciousness about the overall na- big blow to not only the Party’s ingrained organ- tional condition; consciousness about [obeying] izational principles but also the future of the the core [leader]; and consciousness about be- country. Cadres who take the helicopter ride to ing in unison [with the core leader]” (People’s the top merely due to the fealty they have pro- Daily, November 29, 2016; People’s Daily, April 5, fessed the supreme leader do not have a track 2016). Indeed, as early as 2014, the CCP Organi- record of conceiving and implementing innova- zation Department pointed out in a circular that tive and reformist policies. seemed to put top priority on loyalty rather than solid achievements. “In deepening the reform of Dr. Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a Senior Fellow at The the system of selecting and promoting cadres as Jamestown Foundation. He is an Adjunct Profes- well as the system of assessment, we must solve sor at the Center for China Studies, the History the problem of picking officials ‘based solely on Department and the Program of Master’s in

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Global Political Economy at the Chinese Univer- military posture from continental defense to sity of Hong Kong. He is the author of five books maritime security, and the importance of the on China, including “Chinese Politics in the Hu Southern Theater as a predominantly maritime Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges.” arena for PLA operations (China Brief, July 22, 2016). Notes Evolving Maritime Strategy 1. For a discussion of the implications of the “public recommendation, public election” A major rationale for appointing a naval officer of local-level officials, see, for example, to command the PLA’s Southern Theater has to Kevin J. O’Brien and Suizheng Zhao, do with the evolution of China’s maritime strat- Grassroots Elections in China, Routledge, egy. From the late 1960s to mid-1980s, the PLA New York, 2011, pp. 196–197. Also see was required to prepare for an “early, total, and Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Cheng Li, and Yu nuclear war” against a possible Soviet invasion Keping, China’s Political Development, from the North (China Brief, May 15). In this con- New York, Brookings Institution Press, tinental defense-centered military strategy, the 2014, pp. 297–299. role of the PLAN, with its limited capabilities, was relegated to supporting a land-based war *** through coastal defense operations to slow down a Soviet invasion. The Southern Theater In 1985, as China’s relations with the Soviet Un- Command and China’s ion began to improve, Deng Xiaoping tasked the Maritime Strategy PLA with making the “strategic transition” from preparing for a major war against Soviet inva- By Nan Li sion to preparing for a “local war” over contin-

gencies on the China’s borders. As a result, the In January 2017, a long-anticipated reshuffle of notion of “near-coast defense” (“近岸防御”) was the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army replaced by a “near-seas active defense” (“近海 Navy (PLAN) took place. The PLAN and its three 积极防御”) strategy. Rather than primarily sup- fleets each received new commanders. Less no- porting land operations, the PLAN is required by ticed, but more significant, was the replacement the new strategy to build itself into a “strategic of General Wang Jiaocheng with Vice Admiral service” that can operate independently and ef- Yuan Yubai (袁誉柏), former commander of the fectively in its own maritime space, the three PLAN’s North Sea Fleet, as commander of the seas near China, namely, the South China Sea, Southern Theater Command of the People’s Lib- East China Sea and the Yellow Sea. [1] eration Army (PLA) (Global Times, January 22;

Global Times, January 22). This is the first time in Since the early 2000s, China’s maritime strategy PLA history that a naval officer has been ap- has integrated the concept of “far seas protec- pointed to command the multi-service forces of tion” (“远海护卫”) that requires the PLAN to de- one of its regional combatant headquarters velop capabilities that can safeguard the security (China Brief, March 31). Most importantly, his appointment is indicative of the shift in China’s

8 ChinaBrief June 9, 2017 of expanding Chinese interests overseas, includ- Why the Southern Theater Command? ing “security of overseas energy and resources, strategic sea lanes, overseas Chinese invest- A major objective of reorganizing the PLA re- ment, and overseas Chinese citizens and legal gional combatant headquarters from seven MRs entities.” While “near-seas active defense” and to five theater commands is to reduce the over- “far-seas protection” underlie the expansion of lap of missions among these headquarters. With China’s naval capabilities, near-seas security is this reorganization, “safeguarding sovereignty considered the priority in the near term largely and interests in the South China Sea has become because of their proximity and centrality to the the most important mission that the Southern physical security of China. [2] Theater shoulders” (“维护南海权益是战区肩负的最重要使命”) (People’s Daily , February 28, The reorganization of the PLA that began in late 2016). 2015 is largely an attempt to change the army- centric nature of the PLA, the result of the dom- There are several major reasons why the South- inance of a military strategy centered on conti- ern Theater became the first PLA regional com- nental defense. The changes accommodate the batant headquarters with a naval officer ap- expanding PLA naval and air capabilities to pro- pointed to be its commander. Frist, the South vide security to China’s newly defined maritime China Sea straddles the vital sea lanes that con- domain and interests, particularly in the near nect East Asia with the Indian Ocean, on which seas. A PLA Army (PLAA) headquarters, for in- major East Asian economies, including China’s, stance, was established to take over the respon- depend heavily on shipping energy, raw sibility of running army units from the PLA’s re- materials, and traded products. The security and gional combatant headquarters, so that the lat- control of these sea lanes are not only indispen- ter can become genuinely joint by integrating sable for the normal functioning of these econ- more officers from the non-army services. [3] omies in times of peace, but also of great importance to “gaining initiative” in times of crisis Unlike the abolished military region (MR) system and war. [5] Although the Yellow and East China which was dominated by army officers, the com- Seas constitute the maritime operational space manding officers of the three newly established of the PLA’s Northern and Eastern Theaters re- PLA theaters with a maritime strategic orienta- spectively and have important sea lanes, they tion (the Southern, Eastern and Northern Thea- are not comparable to those of the South China ters), are more balanced in service backgrounds, Sea in strategic vitality. with PLAA, PLAN and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) each occupying one third of these positions. As the Second, Chinese analysts also regard the South pool for selecting future PLA senior officers be- China Sea as the ideal site to deploy China’s stra- comes more mixed in service backgrounds, so tegic ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). In com- will the senior officer corps of the PLA, to the ex- parison with the land-based nuclear deterrent, tent that positions for theater chiefs may be held its sea-based counterpart is believed to be more by non-army service officers. [4] The appoint- credible because it is more concealed and more ment of Yuan to command the Southern Theater likely to survive the first nuclear strike. The has cemented this trend. deeper these “boomers” dive in the ocean within their safe limit, the more concealed they are

9 ChinaBrief June 9, 2017 against the opponent’s anti-submarine warfare to the Western Pacific, for instance, are closely (ASW) capabilities. monitored by the robust ISR capabilities of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) in The average depth of the Yellow Sea is only 40 peace time and can be effectively blocked by meters—too shallow to conceal China’s SSBNs. JMSDF in times of crisis and war. The average depth of the East China Sea is 350 meters, and it can be as deep as 2,000 meters New thinking in the PLA about how to conduct near the Okinawa Trough. Such a depth is quite operations may also shed light on why the PLAN appropriate for SSBN deployment. The numer- regards South China Sea as an ideal site for its ous shore-based air and naval bases of the PLA’s operations. PLA operations, for instance, are Eastern Theater can also offer protection for now guided by the new concept of “information SSBNs. However, the Yellow Sea’s proximity to system-based system of systems operations” (“ Japanese and U.S. bases and their effective ASW 基于信息系统的体系作战”), which highlights the capabilities make the area unsuitable for SSBN integration of various service forces into a PLA patrols. These capabilities, for instance, can di- “system of systems” capable of multi-spatial and minish the credibility of China’s SSBNs by keep- variable distance deployment and presence. [7] ing them exposed and vulnerable. In compari- Latterly networked and enhanced by a common son, the average depth of the South China Sea information system or C4ISR architecture, this is 1,200 meters. The countries that form the first operations system should achieve battlefield island chain are relatively weak and do not pos- transparency-based “information superiority,” sess highly capable ASW platforms against Chi- which allows for synchronized, parallel opera- nese submarines. In comparison with the Yellow tions by multi-service forces, thus enabling “bat- and East China Seas, South China Sea is clearly a tlefield initiative” against the opponent. [8] more secure site to deploy China’s sea-based, retaliatory nuclear capabilities (The Paper, July Reflected in the maritime domain, this concept 21, 2016). may explain the PLA’s ambitious effort to develop its maritime operations system of systems Chinese analysts also believe that South China (海上作战体系) by constructing and deploying a Sea is deep, wide and open enough to accom- large number of major surface ships, including modate PLAN’s heavy surface warships. Besides aircraft carriers. PLA analysts believe that a car- its relative depth, South China Sea encompasses rier-based battle group is an ideal maritime op- an area of around 3.56 million square kilometers. erations system of systems. With escorts such as The sea is also quite open to transit into and out guided missile destroyers, frigates, and nuclear of the Western Pacific because the countries that attack submarines, this system of systems is ca- constitute the first island chain lack effective in- pable of air operations, surface strikes, subma- telligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) rine and ASW warfare, air and missile defense, and naval blockade capabilities over the transit and electronic and cyber warfare. If well inte- straits. [6] In comparison, the Yellow and East grated by a common information system, all in- China Seas are much smaller in scope, covering dividual weapons platforms together can not 380,000 square kilometers and 770,000 square only constitute operational synergy against the kilometers respectively. These seas are generally opponent but also offer support and protection narrow and partially enclosed. The transit straits to reduce each other’s vulnerabilities. [9]

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An isolated surface ship or submarine, for in- the South China Sea situation unpredictable and stance, may be vulnerable to air, missile and volatile. In comparison, the Yellow and East submarine attacks. However, if integrated into a China Seas are relatively close to China’s main- carrier-based system of systems, this vulnerabil- land. When there are tensions over Taiwan and ity may be reduced. An aircraft carrier, for in- Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, stance, provides air capabilities that can com- the “red lines” against major escalations also re- pete for air superiority and provide air cover for main relatively clear, making these tensions surface operations. These air capabilities can more predictable and manageable. also be deployed against the opponent’s air ASW capabilities, thus protecting one’s own These reasons may explain why when meeting submarine operations. Moreover, a carrier’s air U.S. Chief of Naval Operations John Richardson ASW capabilities can be deployed against the in July 2016, then PLAN commander ADM Wu opponent’s submarines, thus providing protec- Shengli stated that “we will never sacrifice our tion for one’s own surface ships and submarines. sovereignty and interests in the South China Sea. In the meantime, the surface and subsurface es- It is China's ‘core interest’ and concerns the corts of the battle group can work to reduce the foundation of the party’s governance, the coun- vulnerability of the carrier itself. The deep, wide try's security and stability, and the Chinese na- and open South China Sea, with its vast strategic tion’s basic interests … We will never stop our depth, is a desirable location for conducting construction on the Nansha Islands halfway” such “maritime system of systems operations.” (Xinhuanet, July 18, 2016).

Finally, for the past few years, China has under- Similar reasons may explain why ADM Yuan taken extensive dredging and building of artifi- Yubai, a nuclear submariner who also has exten- cial islands on the reefs that China controls in the sive experience in commanding PLAN’s surface Spratlys, and construction and upgrading of air- combatant flotillas, replaced an army officer to fields, helipads, ports, radar and communica- command the PLA’s Southern Theater, a strate- tions facilities in the Spratlys and Paracels. At the gic and operational arena that is predominantly same time, China’s claims in the South China Sea maritime in nature and has become more con- remain opaque. The seeming change of status tentious with maritime issues. [10] quo due to these activities has already triggered countermeasures from the U.S. Navy such as Major Challenges freedom of navigation and overflight operations near China-controlled islands and reefs in the Appointing a naval officer to command the South China Sea. The Spratlys are about 1,000 Southern Theater has also presented major chal- km away from the southern tip of Hainan Island, lenges. The appointment is clearly based on the and Paracels are about 340 km. To provide se- institutional lens of the PLA, which regards curity for these so far-flung maritime frontier South China Sea as a maritime arena of strategic outposts and facilities that face major challenges and military competition for “gaining control from the U.S. Navy clearly requires substantial and initiative,” particularly in the worst case sce- naval and air power projection and sustainability narios of crisis and war. Such a narrow institu- capabilities. The long distance, U.S. challenges tional lens may be a major driver for activities and lack of clarity of Chinese claims have made

11 ChinaBrief June 9, 2017 such as the building of artificial islands in Sprat- the strategic level, this deployment can generate lys and construction and upgrading of facilities pressure or diversion from the land flank if in Spratlys and Paracels. These activities have al- China’s dispute with Vietnam over reefs in the ready caused alarm among China’s maritime South China Sea escalates. Integrating the neighbors in Southeast Asia and triggered U.S. theater army forces at the operational level may countermeasures such as freedom of navigation prove to be a major challenge for the Theater operations. The increased tension clearly contra- Command’s commanding officers. dicts China’s foreign policy goal of creating a be- nign external environment for the continued de- Conclusion velopment of China’s economy. Mitigating the narrow institutional perspective of the military Appointing a naval officer to command a theater by strengthening civilian control of foreign pol- in unprecedented in PLA history, further con- icy has apparently become a major challenge for firming the shift of China’s military posture from China’s leadership. continental defense to maritime security. More- over, ADM Yuan’s position as commander of the Finally, the dominance of a theater command by Southern Theater Command indicates the rela- naval officers is unprecedented in PLA history tive importance of South China Sea in the eyes (The Paper, March 27). In addition to ADM Yuan, of the PLA, particularly as a suitable bastion for other senior theater commands from the navy its growing SSBN force and as an ideal opera- include South Sea Fleet Commander Wang Hai tional space for its expanding surface fleet. who also serves as deputy commander of the Theater, and Rear Admiral Dong Jun, deputy Nan Li is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at East commander who possibly acts as chief of staff of Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. the Southern Theater Command. This may cause discontent among PLAAF and PLAA officers, and Notes heighten inter-service rivalry. There is therefore 1. See Nan Li “The Evolution of China's Na- a need to integrate these services into the pri- val Strategy and Capabilities: From “Near mary missions of the Theater Command to alle- Coast” and “Near Seas” to “Far Seas,” viate the prospect of such a rivalry. Asian Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 2009). 2. See Nan Li, “China’s Evolving Naval Strat- PLAAF has already been conducting long-range egy and Capabilities in the Hu Jintao Era,” patrols of Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal with in Roy Kamphausen, et al., eds., Assessing H-6K bombers, Su-30 fighter-bombers, air-refu- the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu eling tankers and early-warning and reconnais- Jintao Era (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War sance aircraft (Xinhuanet, August 6, 2016). How- College Press, 2014). ever, integrating PLAA into primary missions of 3. See Nan Li, “Xi Jinping and PLA Restruc- the Southern Theater may be more difficult. turing,” East Asian Policy, Vol. 8, No. 4 Southern Theater Army headquarters is located (October & December 2016). in Nanning, the capital of Guangxi province, in- 4. Ibid. dicating that the theater’s army forces are pri- 5. Conversations with Chinese naval ana- marily deployed to handle contingencies on the lysts in Beijing in August 2016 land borders with Vietnam and Burma. [11] At 6. Ibid.

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7. For an in-depth study of “System of Sys- forces” given priority for development. The in- tems,” see Kevin N. McCauley, “PLA Sys- crease in the number of Army helicopters ac- tem of Systems Operations: Enabling companies expansion of the force in the latest Joint Operations,” The Jamestown Foun- round of reforms. [1] In roughly a month’s time, dation, January 2017, available here: half of all Army Aviation units have experienced https://jamestown.org/wp-content/up- some sort of organizational change. However, loads/2017/01/System-of-Systems-Ena- even as the numbers of helicopters rise, the size bling-Joint-Operations.pdf of the Army Aviation force is still small for a 8. See Li, “China’s Evolving Naval Strategy ground force that will probably number around and Capabilities in the Hu Jintao Era.” a million personnel by 2020. [2] The recent 9. Chinese analysts cited in Li, “China’s changes are an attempt to improve and expand Evolving Naval Strategy and Capabilities a force that underpins a number of important in the Hu Jintao Era.” capabilities from tactical mobility and special 10. For Yuan’s nuclear submarine back- operations to logistics support. ground, see citation of Yuan in “Chinese Nuclear Submarines Sets Sail from Here” Background (“中国核潜艇从这里起航”), Xinhuanet, October 27, 2013. The PLA’s Army Aviation Corps was established 11. For an exercise by Southern Theater’s in 1986 by inheriting helicopters from the Air army forces on Sino-Burmese border, see Force (ChinaMil, September 8, 2016). It began “PLA Conducts Live Fire Exercise on Sino- with a single regiment and by the middle of the Burmese Border” (“解放军在中缅边境实 following decade had expanded to seven oper- 弹演习”), Global Times, March 29, 2017. ational regiments (and a few training units), composed of about 135 helicopters and some Y- *** 5 biplanes. [3] By early 2017 (prior to changes in the structure of PLA operational units), opera- Recent Developments in the tional helicopter units had grown to 12 operational units, including five regiments and seven Chinese Army’s Helicopter brigades, and a few training units. Force The first Army Aviation brigade was formed in Dennis J. Blasko the former Lanzhou Military Region in 2009 by

expanding an existing regiment (Sina, May 19, In November 2016, Chinese internet sources 2009). This trend continues into the current showed photos of a ceremony in the (former) round of reform with one exception. Over the 13th Group Army of the People’s Liberation past eight years, along with expanding regi- Army (PLA) Army accepting the 1,000th helicop- ments into brigades, a new regiment was ter into the force (NetEase, May 23). This nice formed in the former 41st Group Army in mid- round number demonstrates the growth of the 2016 (ChinaMil, July 26, 2016). Army Aviation Corps over the past decade. Along with Special Operations Forces (SOF), According to an unofficial source, an Army Avi- Army Aviation is one of the “new-type combat ation regiment has four to six flight groups (大

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队), with 12 helicopters in each group; a brigade armies and the two Military Districts mentioned has six to eight groups (Sina, August 12, 2016). had both an Army Aviation unit and a SOF unit. The variation in size among both regiments and brigades allows for the units to expand as new aircraft and pilots become available. Each unit is composed of a variety of helicopters types.

According to The Military Balance 2017, the entire force is composed of nine varieties of light, medium, heavy, and attack helicopters, with some produced in China and others im- ported from, or jointly developed with, foreign sources. Approximately Army Aviation units support both conventional 300 Russian-produced Mi17-series and Mi-8s and SOF units, probably spending more time comprise the largest proportion of the force, fol- training with the SOF than with conventional lowed by some 255 Chinese-produced Z-9s units, with one exception: the 3rd Motorized In- (armed and transport versions), 85 locally man- fantry Brigade in the former 1st Group Army ap- ufactured Z-8s, plus 53 AS350 Ecureuil and 8 pears to receive more training with helicopters SA342L Gazelles from France, 15 Eurocopter than other infantry units and eventually may be H120 Colibri (jointly developed with China), and designated the Army’s first airmobile brigade. It less than 20 S-70C Blackhawks purchased from is noteworthy that the 1st Group Army did not the U.S. in the early 1980s. Two types of dedi- have an organic SOF unit, which may explain the cated attack helicopters are new to the force, 3rd Motorized Infantry Brigade’s experimenta- with the first WZ-10 being introduced in 2011, tion in helicopter operations. An operational air- followed by the WZ-19; currently there are ap- mobile unit, operating from forward bases near proximately 120 of each type. the coast, would be extremely useful in any op-

eration against Taiwan (China Brief, March 6, Prior to current structural changes when the PLA 2015). However, the Army Aviation Corps has had 18 group armies and 12 Army Aviation units, only begun experimenting with using forward only nine group armies had an Army Aviation operating bases for arming and refueling. unit assigned. One Army Aviation brigade was subordinate to the former General Staff Depart- Despite the growth in the number and size of ment (GSD) and a brigade was assigned to the units and in the total number of helicopters, the Xinjiang Military District and a regiment to the lack sufficient aircraft to perform all the tasks Tibet Military District. However, only six group necessary to conduct modern campaigns is a

14 ChinaBrief June 9, 2017 known shortcoming. As a result, continued The former GSD Army Aviation brigade now ap- growth in the Army Aviation Corps is necessary pears to be “an army aviation brigade of the PLA and expected. 81st Group Army in Beijing” (ChinaMil, May 19). At the same time, the Army Aviation regiment in Recent Developments the former 31st Group Army/current 73rd Group Army was reported to be an “army aviation bri- In the month since the April 2017 announce- gade under the PLA Eastern Theater Command” ment of changes to the PLA’s “84 corps-level (ChinaMil, May 19). units,” Army Aviation units have undergone some of the most visible observed changes. Of Additionally, Chinese television reported the the 18 former group armies that were reduced former regiment in the old 41st Group Army (the to 13, significantly none of the five disbanded regiment most recently created) is now a bri- group armies were assigned either an Army Avi- gade in the 74th Group Army (CCTV, May 27). ation or SOF unit (China Brief, May 11). In the The same news broadcast reported on an Army few weeks since the reduction of group armies Aviation brigade of the 76th Group Army in the was announced, multiple changes in Army Avia- Western Theater Command. The 76th is the for- tion units have been publicized. mer 21st Group Army, which previously did not have an Army Aviation unit. This change could Prior to April, there were seven Army Aviation be the result of either the transfer of the com- brigades and five regiments. In late May, the plete Army Aviation brigade in the Xinjiang Mil- count of Army Aviation units is 11 brigades and itary District to 76th Group Army command or one regiment. The before and after numbers of elements of that brigade have been transferred Army Aviation and SOF units (so far unchanged) to the 76th to become a seed organization even- is summarized in the table below. tually to grow into a full brigade.

All four of the former Army Aviation regiments The Near Future by 2020 in group armies have been reported as expanded to brigades and it appears that the for- It seems likely that the new reforms will seek to mer GSD Army Aviation brigade and the brigade assign both an Army Aviation brigade and a SOF assigned to the Xinjiang Military District have brigade to each of the 13 group armies at the been transferred to group armies. very least. With the exception of two group armies, this has already been accomplished by ex- Specifically, in mid-May 2017, the former regi- panding four regiments to brigades and the re- ment in the 26th Group Army has been de- assignment of units (such as appears to have oc- scribed as an “army aviation brigade under the curred with the former GSD Army Aviation bri- PLA 80th Group Army” and a week later the for- gade and the Xinjiang Military District Army Avi- mer regiment in the 54th Group Army was de- ation brigade). scribed as an “army aviation brigade under the PLA 83rd Group Army” (ChinaMil, May 18; CCTV, New units will need to be established for the May 26). 71st and 78th Group Armies. This process might entail transferring elements from existing units

15 ChinaBrief June 9, 2017 to establish “starter” brigades in the group ar- be found in the 72nd, 74th, 79th (an expansion mies (or other organizations) that currently do from the current regiment), 81st, and 83rd not have helicopter assets, unless the civilian de- Group Armies and smaller SOF battalions or fense industries and foreign helicopter pur- companies added to divisions and brigades. [4] chases can come up with relatively large num- These new SOF units are likely to be converted bers of airframes to outfit a complete unit at one from former infantry units and personnel. time. Since Army Aviation assets are increasingly im- But developing mature, experienced pilots and portant to modern joint and combined arms op- crews, especially in complex night and low-level erations, the PLA could augment additional or- operations, takes longer than building a helicop- ganizations with helicopters of all types. For ex- ter. If existing Army Aviation brigades do not ample, the five joint Theater Commands and the have the full complement of the reported eight five Theater Command Army headquarters each subordinate groups, it is likely the smaller bri- could probably use organic helicopter units, per- gades will add additional aircraft as they (and pi- haps smaller in size than a full brigade (such as lots and aircrew) become available. For SOF a regiment or group) for a variety of purposes, units, existing regiments likely will be expanded including command and control, attack, to brigades and the two group armies without transport, electronic warfare, medical evacua- SOF units likely will convert conventional infan- tion, logistics, and reconnaissance tasks. The try units to SOF brigades (some of which might three major garrison cities of Beijing, Tianjin, and come from existing infantry units in disbanded Shanghai and other important cities also could group armies). Like helicopter pilots, developing probably use smaller helicopter units for similar proficient SOF personnel and units also takes purposes, as well as during disaster relief mis- years. Both Army Aviation and Special Opera- sions. Border and coastal defense units would tions Forces Academies (or Colleges) have been likely find helicopter units very useful in moni- established to meet increasing demands for toring their border regions as well as for logis- properly trained and educated officers and tics. The newly formed Joint Logistics Support NCOs in these specialties. Force would benefit from having helicopters available to directly support the Wuhan Joint Lo- Thus, in the near future we are likely to see re- gistics Support Base and five Joint Logistics Sup- ports of Army Aviation brigades in the 71st and port Centers. 78th Group Armies. The Army Aviation regiment in Tibet could also be expanded, though geo- Though it has been suggested for years, the cur- graphic conditions make air operations at that rent round of reform could also establish one or altitude more difficult than in lower regions (so more airmobile units that integrate infantry and it may remain a regiment). If the Army Aviation helicopter units, with the necessary support, into brigade in Xinjiang has not been transferred in one (or more) organic unit, perhaps at the group full to the 76th Group Army, it will likely be re- army or corps-organizational level. stored to full strength, or a new unit created, since the size of the Western Theater Command is so large additional helicopter assets would be logical. Likewise, new SOF brigades are likely to

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Conclusions SOF assets assigned to them. For example, the PLA media routinely reports that some com- The more the PLA Army trains and operates us- manders do not know how to employ “new-type ing helicopter and SOF units, the more it will un- combat forces” or do not dare or are unwilling derstand how vital they are to modern opera- to do so (81.cn, July 31, 2016). Part of the reason tions. They will constantly be reminded of the for this problem likely is, that in the past there lesson from the 2008 Sichuan earthquake relief were so few Army Aviation and SOF units avail- effort of the need for even more helicopters for able, commanders up to battalion level, who effective and efficient operations. The Army, were trained almost exclusively in their own however, is constrained by the ability of the ci- branch functions, had little opportunity to inter- vilian Chinese aviation industry to produce act with Army Aviation and SOF personnel or enough aircraft and develop new models to rec- units. As the PLA Army grows smaller, “new-type tify shortcomings in medium- and heavy-lift hel- combat forces” will become a larger percentage icopters. The addition of attack helicopters in re- of the force and more commonly seen in train- cent years greatly increases the lethality of the ing. Nonetheless, changing commanders’ mind- force but also complicates tactics and logistics. sets on the integration of Army Aviation and The distances and speed at which Army Aviation SOF into traditional operations will not magically and SOF units can move adds new capabilities occur overnight. to the PLA. It has taken roughly 20 years for the Army Avia- On the other hand, more and larger Army Avia- tion Corps to expand from seven units with 135 tion and SOF units will be much more expensive mostly transport helicopters to 12 operational to man, organize, equip, and maintain than for- units with over 1,000 helicopters of all types in- mer infantry units. Realistic training for these cluding dedicated attack helicopters. It seems units will also demand a larger slice of the de- likely that the force will grow faster in the com- fense budget at the same time the other services ing years than over the first two decades of the are training more and further from China’s bor- Army Aviation Corps’ existence. Because they ders. So as the PLA draws down to 2 million peo- are among the “new-type combat forces,” Army ple and its responsibilities extend to distances Aviation and Special Operations Forces units will farther from China, we should not expect to see be in the news frequently as they train and op- decreases in future defense budgets. erate together. However, by the time this article is published, there will probably be new devel- Properly organized, trained, and equipped Army opments announced, which will require constant Aviation and SOF units will be able to contribute attention by foreign analysts. to joint maritime or land campaigns beyond China’s borders. While doctrine allows for such Dennis J. Blasko, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army operations, additional modifications based on (Retired), is a former U.S. army attaché to Beijing new capabilities and technologies likely will be and Hong Kong and author of The Chinese Army required. However, exercises over the past few Today (Routledge, 2006). years have determined that many tactical and operational commanders are not yet properly trained and ready to employ the helicopter and

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Notes sition of the top PLAAF leadership may be be- 1. The PLA Navy and Air Force also have hel- coming more predictable. Ma’s most likely suc- icopter units; The Military Balance 2017, cessor is General Yi Xiaoguang (乙晓光), who London: International Institute for Strate- currently serves as a Deputy Chief of the Joint gic Studies, pp. 283–285, estimates the Staff (formerly General Staff) Department. If ap- total Navy helicopter force to be about 94, pointed, Yi would become the 12th Commander with about 79 in total Air Force. PLA Navy of the PLAAF since it was created in November Marine units reportedly will also receive 1949. If recent precedent is followed, he would helicopters in the current batch of re- likely also receive a grade promotion from The- forms. An aviation transport brigade has ater Command Leader to CMC Member and been added to the Air Force’s 15th Air- serve concurrently as the Deputy Secretary of borne Corps, probably increasing the the PLAAF’s Party Standing Committee. [1] number of helicopters in the force. See “Paratroopers jump out of Y-8 transport A review of his background and career progres- aircraft,” http://eng- sion in comparison with previous PLAAF com- lish.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017- manders strongly suggests that Yi is the most 05/25/content_7617895.htm. logical successor to Ma. Yi has extensive opera- 2. For comparison, the approximately tional and leadership experience and profes- 475,000-strong U.S. Army, according to sional military education. He has rapidly risen in The Military Balance 2017, p. 48, has ap- grade and rank since 2001 and since 2014 has proximately 4,000 helicopters. held key positions that qualify him to serve at 3. The Military Balance 1996/97, p. 179. the next higher grade. Since 2012, he has also 4. Some infantry and armored divisions been an alternate member of the Chinese Com- and brigades already have small SOF munist Party (CCP) 18th Party Congress. Addi- units. tionally, it has already been established that top PLAAF leadership are expected to represent the *** service to foreign counterparts. [2] Yi is well prepared to fill this role. He is a strategic thinker Waiting in the Wings: who has published on a range of technology-related issues, and in contrast with most of his PLAAF General Yi Xiaoguang peers, he has broad experience representing the Kenneth Allen and Jana Allen PLAAF overseas as well as hosting foreign military delegations in China. While his career has followed a similar trajectory to other top PLAAF Central Military Commission (CMC) Member leaders, Yi is representative of the generational and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force and educational change that is occurring within 马晓 (PLAAF) Commander, General Ma Xiaotian ( the PLAAF and being pushed to help build a 天 ), will reach his mandatory retirement age later “strategic air force”. this year and will likely retire in conjunction with the 19th Party Congress. While much of the PLA’s promotion process remains opaque, tran-

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A Rising Star coming the Commandant of the Air Force Com- mand College. He has also served as Deputy Born in June 1958 in Jiangsu Province, Yi joined Chief of Staff for the PLAAF, one of the assistants the PLAAF at age 15. He began his career as a to the Chief of the General Staff, and is currently pilot and has been stationed in four different one of the Deputy Chiefs of the Joint Staff (for- Military Region Air Forces (MRAFs)—Shenyang, merly General Staff). Based on his travel abroad Chengdu, Guangzhou, and Nanjing—as well as as well as his participation in meetings held in PLAAF Headquarters. [3] Yi is a highly experi- Beijing, it appears that Yi’s portfolio includes enced fighter pilot and is qualified in multiple United Nations peacekeeping and certain rela- aircraft. Over the years, Yi has flown the PLAAF's tions with NATO (Baidu Baike [accessed May 30]; Mig-15, J-5, J-6, J-7, Su-27, and Su-30. He is a MOD, November 16, 2015; ECNS, April 23, 2015). special-grade pilot (特级飞行员), an all-weather As with Ma, Yi’s experience on the Joint Staff qualified flight instructor (全天候飞行教员), and likely gives him important insight into the mili- is qualified as a flight controller in the tower (飞 tary’s overall situation, foreign relations, joint 行指挥员). [4] It is clear that Yi was identified as military training, and inter-service coordination. a promising officer early in his career, although [6] the reasons are less apparent. He has extensive leadership experience, having commanded a Yi was twice selected for professional military flight squadron, flight group, air regiment, air di- education (PME). He was chosen for a two-year vision, and command post. Additionally, Yi par- program at the PLAAF Command College in ticipated in Peace Mission 2005 (和平-2005) with 1984, and he later obtained a master’s degree Russia on the Shandong Peninsula, which af- from the PLA NDU. [7] Typically senior PLAAF forded him the opportunity to help manage and officers have only a senior technical degree oversee a combined exercise with a foreign mil- (equivalent to an American associate’s degree) itary. [5] In September 2015, Yi was the senior or possibly a bachelor’s degree and receive only officer in charge of the first Sino-Malaysian com- a certificate while attending PME institutions for bined military exercise in Malaysia, identified as less than one year. Yi’s military education distin- Friendship 2015 (和平使命-2015), which lasted guishes him from most other senior PLAAF of- six days and involved a PLA Navy destroyer, a ficers, as do his publications. Yi has been a fre- frigate, a hospital ship, four transport aircraft quent writer during his career. For example, be- and three helicopters and 1,160 PLA personnel tween 1992 and 1995, he wrote a 100,000-word (Straits Times, September 19, 2015). Air Force Pilot’s Common-use Chinese to English Small Dictionary (空军飞行员常用汉英小词典). In addition to wide-ranging command experi- He also authored Stealth Aircraft and Their Nem- ence, Yi has held important positions as a staff esis (隐形飞机及其克星) and Armed Helicopters officer throughout his career, likely to prepare and Their Nemesis (武装直升机及其克星), and him for leadership at the next level. He served as co-authored a series of publications called 21st a Deputy Chief of Staff in Chengdu MRAF prior Century High-technology Main Weapons Neme- to becoming the commander of Wuhan sis Series (21 世纪高技术主战兵器克星系列丛书 Base/Command Post. Yi then served as a Deputy ). [8] Yi’s academic credentials likely contributed Chief of Staff in Guangzhou MRAF before be- to his selection as the Commandant of the

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PLAAF Command College during 2004-2008. In- to one to three countries. [10] From 1979-2012, deed, it appears that his long-term portfolio has PLAAF commanders visited over 35 different involved military education and training issues. countries, including several countries more than Earlier in his career, in 1989, Yi was the Director once. Ma Xiaotian diverged from this precedent of the newly created Chengdu MRAF’s Flight while serving as PLAAF Commander. Upon as- Transition Training Base, and from 1996–2001 suming the commander’s position, he publicly he served as the Director of the Military Training announced that he was not going to travel Department in the PLAAF HQ’s Headquarters abroad because he had traveled frequently Department. when he was the Deputy Chief of the General Staff and was responsible for foreign relations, Yi has been on the fast track for several years, as and, as such, he wanted to spend his time focus- evidenced by the timing of his grade and rank ing on key PLAAF issues. Although Ma has not promotions since the early 2000s. [9] Regarding traveled abroad, he has hosted an average of promotions in grade, Yi became a Corps Deputy eight foreign air force leaders per year in Beijing. Leader-grade officer in January 2002, which [11] made him the second youngest officer in that grade in PLAAF Headquarters. He then pro- Senior PLAAF leaders benefit from international gressed to Corps Leader-grade in March 2004, exposure earlier in their careers, and participa- to Military Region Deputy Leader-grade in De- tion in multiple official PLAAF delegations, par- cember 2010, and Theater Command Leader- ticularly if they accompany senior leaders, can grade (renamed from Military Region Leader in be an indicator that an officer is being consid- Sep 2016) in August 2014. At the same time, Yi ered for a more senior leadership role. In con- was also advancing in rank. He received his first trast to most PLAAF officers, who rarely travel star in July 2001, when he was promoted to Ma- abroad in an official capacity, Yi has traveled jor General as a Division Leader-grade officer. In overseas at least seven times, and in some in- July 2012 Yi was promoted to Lieutenant Gen- stances was the lead officer for the delegation. eral (2 star), at which time he was a Military Re- In 1997, Yi was part of a delegation led by then gion Deputy Leader-grade officer and was the Chief of the General Staff, General Fu Quanyou, youngest 2-star general on active duty. Finally, who visited the Pentagon, West Point in New in July 2016, when he was a Theater Command York, Fort Bragg in North Carolina, Norfolk Naval Leader-grade officer, Yi was promoted to Gen- Base and Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, and eral (3 star), at which time he was the youngest Pacific Command in Hawaii (RAF, November 16, 3-star general on active duty. 2010). [12] While in Hawaii, he flew in an F-15. In 2000, he was part of a delegation that visited Interactions with Foreign Counterparts Greece and Turkey, where he flew in a Mirage 2000, a Mirage F1 simulator, and an F-16 simu- The PLAAF commander plays an important role lator. In November 2010, Yi led a PLAAF delega- in military diplomacy, promoting the service’s tion to England, where they visited Royal Air relations with foreign counterparts, typically Force (RAF) Cosford. The delegation specifically through traveling abroad and hosting foreign asked for permission to visit RAF training estab- delegations in China. Historically, the PLAAF lishments and gain a broad overview of the aca- commander has traveled abroad once per year

20 ChinaBrief June 9, 2017 demic organization of the RAF air training sys- relations with foreign militaries. tem. In October 2011, Yi accompanied then- CMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong, then-Deputy The Road to the Top Chief of the General Staff Wei Fenghe and others on a visit to Cuba, Columbia, and Peru (Chi- In order to understand why Yi is the most likely naNews, October 23, 2011). candidate to serve as the next PLAAF commander, it is useful to examine the career pro- More recently, in May 2014, Yi was part of a five- gression and general qualifications needed for member delegation led by CMC Member and the position, as established by a review of the Chief of the General Staff, General Fang Fenghui, current and past PLAAF Commanders’ career which visited the United States as guests of then paths. While there is no one size fits all formula Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General for promotion to PLAAF commander, a review Martin Dempsey (ChinaMil, May 14, 2014). The reveals commonalities and milestones along the delegation visited San Diego, Washington DC, road to the top. All PLA officers work their way Fort Bragg, and New York. In November 2015, up the 15-grade career path until they reach he was part of a five-member delegation to Rus- their mandatory retirement age based on their sia that was led by CMC Vice Chairman Xu Qi- grade (China Brief, February 4 and 23, 2016). liang, where a contract was signed for the pur- Promising officers are typically identified early in chase of 24 Su-35 fighters (Chinamil, November their careers and then given opportunities to 16, 2015; Global Times, November 15, 2015; prove themselves, further hone their leadership MOD, November 16, 2015; DefenseWorld, No- abilities, and obtain the breadth of operational vember 19, 2015). Finally, in September 2016, he and staff experience needed to be successful at led a delegation to Belarus to observe personnel the highest level. Additionally, loyalty to the training (Belta, September 22, 2016). Party and to the leader of the CMC are considered core criteria when selecting top military During 2015–2016, Yi also hosted at least two leaders (SCMP, December 30, 2015). foreign delegations in China. In June 2016, he hosted a meeting in Beijing with the United Na- All previous PLAAF commanders joined the PLA tions Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeep- relatively young, between the ages of 15 and 19 ing Operations (Chinamil, June 7, 2016). In April years old. [13] Of the first 11 commanders, the 2015, he hosted a meeting with visiting Director third commander (Ma Ning – 1973-1977) was General of the NATO International Military Staff the first aviator, while the fourth commander Air Marshal Sir Christopher Harper (ECNS, April (Zhang Tingfa – 1977-1985) was a career politi- 23, 2015). Additionally, in late 2016, he attended cal officer. All of the commanders either initially meetings in Beijing for Russia’s and Brunei’s De- served a few years as enlisted members until re- fense Ministers, which were respectively hosted ceiving a direct promotion to become officers, by Defense Minister General Chang Wanquan or those who became aviators began their ca- and CMC Vice Chairman General Xu Qiliang reers as aviation cadets. The latter group at- (MOD, November 24, 2016; October 13, 2016). tended flight training for one to three years, Given his experience interacting with foreign then became officers and were assigned to op- counterparts at home and abroad, Yi is well pre- erational units as pilots (PLAAF 2010, NASIC; pared to fill the role of promoting the PLAAF’s

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Chinese Communist Party Previous Central Com- Table 1: Commanders’ Career Path For Corps mittee Member Dictionary 1921-2003). Once and Above Billets they became pilots, they moved up the career ladder as flight squadron (company), flight group (battalion), air regiment / independent flight group, and air division deputy commanders and commanders. After that, they served in various corps deputy leader- or leader-grade billets, and then Mili- tary Region deputy leader-grade billets, including deputy chief or chief of staff (e.g., leaders of the Headquarters Department), deputy commander, or commander billets in bases, MRAFs, PLAAF Headquarters, or academic institutions. Starting Although Liu Yalou and Zhang Tingfa were CMC with Wang Hai, all commanders served as an members, the PLA did not regularize the ap- MRAF commander and/or a PLAAF deputy com- pointment of PLAAF, PLAN, and Second Artillery mander, which are both MR deputy leader- (now Rocket Force) commanders as CMC mem- grade billets. Holding two different billets in the bers until 2004. Since that time, as the PLAAF same grade helped broaden their experience. Commander, both Xu Qiliang and Ma Xiaotian [14] received grade promotions from Military Region (now Theater Command) Leader to CMC Mem- As shown in the following bullets and Table 1, ber. If this precedent is to continue, then the there is no single path to becoming the PLAAF next PLAAF commander needs to be qualified to commander. [15] There are, however, patterns serve in this higher grade. In Xu and Ma’s case, in terms of grade and rank promotions to reach they both served in Theater Command leader- the commander’s position. For example, of the grade billets for at least two years before be- 11 commanders: coming the commander. Specifically, both Xu  Three served as political officers and as and Ma served as a Deputy Chief of the General the PLAAF political commissar (PC) Staff (now Joint Staff). Ma also served as the  Five served as a concurrent CMC member Commandant of the NDU. In addition, they both  Two served as a Deputy Chief of the Gen- received promotions in rank to general prior to eral Staff (Joint Staff) Department assuming the commander’s billet.  One served as the commandant of the National Defense University (NDU) Importantly, Yi meets the requirements for pro-  Six served as a PLAAF deputy commander motion to the next higher grade. He has served  Six served as an MRAF commander as a Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff, which is a  Three served as a base commander Theater Command leader-grade billet, since Au-

22 ChinaBrief June 9, 2017 gust 2014. He was promoted to the rank of gen- case in January when Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong eral in July 2016, at which time he became the became the PLAN commander but outgoing youngest 3-star general on active duty. Finally, commander Admiral Wu Shengli remained on he has been an alternate member of the CCP the CMC (China Brief, March 2 and 16, 2017). It 18th Party Congress (中共第十八届中央委员会 is difficult to predict the composition of the CMC 候补委员) since October 2012. Although Yi has after the Party Congress, but if Yi is the sitting not served as a PLAAF deputy commander, he PLAAF commander and recent precedent is fol- appears fully qualified to assume the com- lowed, he will likely be among its new members mander’s billet, receive a grade promotion from (China Brief, February 4 and 23, 2016). This Theater Command Leader to CMC Member, and would require a grade promotion from Theater replace Ma on the CMC. Command Leader to CMC Member and he would serve as the deputy secretary of the Conclusion PLAAF standing committee.

General Ma Xiaotian will reach his mandatory re- Yi would assume command at a very interesting tirement age and likely retire later this year in time, when the PLA at large is undergoing his- conjunction with the 19th Party Congress. Alt- toric organizational reforms aimed at improving hough his successor cannot be predicted with the military’s warfighting capability. Chinese complete certainty—as evidenced by the PLA President and CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has Navy leadership transition earlier this year— communicated his expectations for the PLAAF to General Yi Xiaoguang appears to be the most accelerate its modernization, strengthen exer- likely candidate. His career path has followed a cises, and be prepared for combat—while main- similar trajectory to that of past commanders, taining absolute loyalty to Party leadership. Xi and he has held key positions that would pre- has described the PLAAF as a strategic military pare him to serve in a top leadership billet. Yi is service that plays a vital role in safeguarding na- already a 3-star general, an alternate member of tional security, and has urged the service to the CCP 18th Party Congress, and is qualified to speed up air-space integration and sharpen its be promoted in grade to CMC Member. He offensive and defensive capabilities (Xinhua, stands out from other senior officers because of April 14, 2014; April 15, 2014). To date the re- his operational expertise and leadership experi- forms have primarily focused on headquarters ence, rapid advancement, professional military above the corps level, including reorganizing the education, and his multiple opportunities to rep- former seven Military Regions into five Theater resent the PLAAF with foreign counterparts at Commands and establishing 15 organs directly home and abroad. subordinate to the CMC. Yi would lead the PLAAF through the next phase of reforms and While Yi’s elevation to PLAAF commander is would likely also be called upon to further insti- widely anticipated (SCMP, December 30, 2015), tutionalize the new PLA organizational con- the timing of the transition remains unclear. Ma struct, which calls for service chiefs to focus pri- will reach his mandatory retirement age in Au- marily on training and equipping the force, em- gust, likely before the 19th Party Congress has powering theater commanders to focus on war- convened. Yi may become the PLAAF Com- time missions. Importantly, Yi would have the mander before Ma officially retires, as was the opportunity to shape the PLAAF’s organizational

23 ChinaBrief June 9, 2017 culture and further solidify the PLAAF’s vision of 5. Concerning Peace Mission 2005, see itself as an independent warfighting service, ca- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_Mis- pable of playing a decisive role in protecting sion_2005. Peace Mission 2005 was the China’s national interests as a “Strategic Air first ever joint military exercise between Force”. China and Russia. The exercise started on August 19, 2005, and consisted of com- Kenneth W. Allen is the Research Director for the bined land, sea, and air elements simulat- USAF's China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI). ing an intervention in a state besieged by He is a retired U.S. Air Force officer, whose exten- terrorists or political turmoil. It concluded sive service abroad includes a tour in China as the on August 25, 2005. The force practiced Assistant Air Attaché. He has written numerous air and naval blockades, an amphibious articles on Chinese military affairs. assault, and occupying a region. Approx- imately 8,000 Chinese troops took part Jana Allen is an Independent Research Analyst along with 2,000 Russians troops. China and a Lt. Colonel in the U.S. Air Force Reserve. A initially wanted to hold the exercise near Chinese linguist, she has a B.S. from the U.S. Air the Taiwan Strait, Russia wanted to hold Force Academy and an M.A. in National Security the exercise in Northwestern China near Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School. central Asia, but instead settlement was made on the Shandong Peninsula. Notes: 6. You Ji, “Meeting the Challenge of the Up- 1. The PLA has 10 ranks and 15 grades; coming PLAAF Leadership Reshuffle” in grades are more important than ranks; The Chinese Air Force - Evolving Concepts, rank and grade promotions are separate; Roles, and Capabilities, 2012. each grade has 2 ranks—a primary and 7. Although Yi Xiaoguang was selected for a secondary rank. two-year program of study at the PLAAF 2. Kenneth Allen, “China’s Air Force Foreign Command College in 1984, the PLA did Relations Program and Implications for not offer master’s degrees programs until Interaction with the U.S. Air Force,” For- 1986, so Yi likely received a master’s eign Area Officer Association Journal of equivalent certificate for this period. International Affairs, Mar 2015. 8. Kenneth Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and 3. Yi’s family has a history of military ser- John Chen, Chinese Military Diplomacy, vice; his paternal grandfather and uncle 2003-2016: Trends and Implications, Na- fought in the "War of Resistance against tional Defense University, Institute for Japanese Aggression" (抗日战争) and National Strategic Studies, China Strate- the "War of Liberation" (解放战争) gic Perspectives 11, June 2017. http://china.caixin.com/2016-07- 9. For example, after Liu Shunyao accompa- 29/100972472.html nied Minister of Defense and CMC Vice 4. An all-weather qualified pilot is one who Chairman Chi Haotian to the United can fly during day and night under IFR States in November 1996, he was pro- and VFR conditions. It does not relate to moted from deputy commander of the actual weather conditions. PLAAF to commander the following

24 ChinaBrief June 9, 2017

month. In September 1998, PLAAF Dep- China Brief is a bi-weekly journal of information uty Political Commissar Qiao Qingchen and analysis covering Greater China in Eurasia. accompanied CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Wannian to the United States and then China Brief is a publication of The Jamestown became the political commissar three Foundation, a private non-profit organization months later. He later became the PLAAF based in Washington D.C. and is edited by Peter commander. See Kenneth W. Allen and Wood. John F. Corbett, “Predicting PLA Leader The opinions expressed in China Brief are solely Promotions,” in Andrew Scobell and Larry those of the authors, and do not necessarily re- Wortzel, eds., Civil-Military Change in China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas After the flect the views of The Jamestown Foundation. 16th Party Congress, (Carlisle, PA: Strate- For comments and questions about China Brief, gic Studies Institute, September 2004). please contact us at [email protected] 10. These are not official English titles but are translated titles. Interested in contributing to China Brief? Read 11. Kenneth Allen, “China’s Air Force Foreign our author guidelines here first. Relations Program and Implications for Interaction with the U.S. Air Force,” For- eign Area Officer Association Journal of International Affairs, Mar 2015. PLA For- eign Relations under Xi Jinping: Continuity and/or Change?, with Phillip C. Saunders and John Chen, Washington, DC: Na- tional Defense University Strategic Per- spectives Series, to be published in early 2017. 12. Shirley A. Kan, U.S.-China Military Con- tacts: Issues for Congress, January 5, 2015. 13. Dictionary of China’s Communist Party Central Committee Members for 1921- 2003, (中国共产党历届中央委员大辞典), Beijing: Chinese Communist Party History Press, 2004. 14. In the PLA chief of staff and deputy commander billets are equal in grade. 15. PLAAF 2010, NASIC; Chinese Communist Party Previous Central Committee Mem- ber Dictionary 1921-2003 (中国共产党历届中央委员大辞典 1921–2003).

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