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The 70th Anniversary of the Founding of The People’s Republic of China Contents Page No. Editor’s Note i The belt and road – The beacon for a new era 1 Abul Hasan Chowdhury Strategic partnership between Dhaka and Beijing gains momentum 3 Muhammad Zamir The Emergence of a Matured Power: China and International Order 5 Dr. Lailufar Yasmin Concept of One Belt One Grid Initiative (BGI) Emerged from Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 7 Engr. Mohammad Hossain Brooks No Further Delay 9 Dr. M Enamul Huq Cooperation on the Joint Development of the Belt and Road Opportunities for Bangladesh 10 Dr. Liu Jinqian Challenge and opportunity of Bangladesh-China FTA 13 M S Siddiqui China-Bangladesh Cultural Exchange: A “Belt and Road” Success Story 15 Kishore Biswas Belt and Road Initiative can help ease regional tension 17 Prof. Sarwar Md. Saifullah Khaled China's Defense Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP 18 10 Chinese officers promoted to rank of general Xinhua 19 evsjv‡`k-Pxb m¤úK© 20 †gvkvwn` Avn‡g` AvšÍR©vwZK ivRbxwZi KvjZvgvgx- Pxb I `w¶Y Gwkqv 22 Bgivb †PŠayix wewmAvBGg-BwmÕi gva¨‡g m¤¢vebvi `yqvi D‡b¥vPb 24 i椧b DwÏb Avn‡g` we`y¨r weZi‡Yi Dbœq‡b Px‡bi m‡½ FY Pyw³ 25 wiqvRyj evkvi Editor’s Note It has been 70 years since Mao Zedong stood in the Tiananmen Square in Bei - jing to declare the beginning of the People's Republic of China. To the outside world, China's transformation from an agrarian society into one of the World's most powerful economies is nothing short of miraculous. China re-established itself as an almost unified country under a strong leadership 70 years ago. Chi - nese society has been moving forward since then, and the country launched reformations and opened up its borders about 40 years ago. This has been one of the most impressive developments in the world. We are astonished to see how much China has contributed to global improvement. China’s economy has accelerated over the past seven decades, with gross domestic product rising at an average annual rate of 8.1 percent according to a report from the National Bureau of Statistics. China’s GDP hit 90.03 trillion Yuan (about 13.14 trillion US Dollar) in 2018, accounting for 16 percent of the world's total. This posed a sharp contrast to the country's economy in 1952 when its GDP was only 67.9 billion yuan. Gross National Income per person reached 9732 US dollars in 2018, higher than the level seen in middle-income countries. At present, the Chinese economy is contributing about 30% to the world's economic growth. Amidst eco - nomic globalization, China’s economic stability will help reduce risks for the world economy whenever eco - nomic problems such as the 1997 Asian Financial crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis emerge. The next 70 years of China's development are going to be quite dramatic for the world. China is now con - nected with every corner of the world. We see the next 70 years as a time when China will continue to develop and change, but that change will have an ever-stronger impact on the world as a whole. The world will obviously pay close attention to Chinese projects and initiatives to adjust its development for a peaceful and harmonious future. We think the most immediate task for China is to go forward with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on full steam. At present, the BRI is the most important development initiative in the world. Countries will have to figure out how to connect themselves to the BRI. We believe this is an important opportunity for the world as a whole. We hope China's economy and society will continue to develop steadily and sustainably and more Chinese people will be able to enjoy a better life and interact with different cultures, thus contributing more to the development of humankind. Nasim Mahmmud Chief Editor The Belt and Road Bangladesh, Dhaka. i The belt and road – The beacon for a new era Abul Hasan Chowdhury Within the matrix of an evolv - ment programmes. ing global order the Belt and President Xi visited Bangladesh in 2016. He not only of - Road Initiative (BRI) project fered US $ 40 billion in investment but wished to acceler - launched in 2013 by President ate the work on BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India and Xi Jinping is in effect the mod - Myanmar) economic corridor. ern day reincarnation of the Silk Road. Travels, Trade and During the recent visit of our Honourable Prime Minister Commerce and whiff of ro - in July not only was grave Rohigya issue discussed, a num - manticism brought by many ber of investment and trade related deals were signed. We writers of the past and particu - note with a degree of optimism China’s shift in favour of larly Marco Polo is simply hallucinatory. Culled from that Bangladesh on the Rohingya issues. Honourable Prime vintage history the new initiative is refreshingly a mega Minister succeeded in conveying that a grand project such dream of cooperation and progress. as BRI cannot be imagined with the shrill cries of distress emanating at the doorsteps of BRI. In its sweep the BRI brings in its fold more than 65 coun - tries. While the Marshall plan was limited to Western Eu - China has emerged as Bangladesh’s number one trading rope as it then was the One Belt One Road (OBOR) or partner. Our manufacturing sector, particularly RMG is BRI as it now stands is on a cosmic scale. expanding its niche in China as indeed our business houses are increasing their volume of purchase from As a citizen of Bangladesh it is of utmost satisfaction to China. It makes commercial sense to have transport con - find that our Honourable Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina nectivity. In the region India is also the biggest trading is an ardent advocate of the BRI scheme. Clearly reflecting partner of China. the cherished vision of her father, the greatest Bengali of all times, Father of the Nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mu - The above scenario testifies to advancing trade through jibur Rahman. As Leader of the opposition Sheikh Hasina BCIM corridor. We have to recognize that ultimately con - travelled to China in 1993 and was received with great sumers and producers, exporters and importers will im - warmth and honour by the youngest member of the Polit - mensely benefit from connectivity. Bangladesh also a buro at that time. Mr. Hu Jin Tao was soon to be President founding member of BIMSTEC remains committed to of China. Possibly in fact most definitely this meeting was enhancing tourism, trade, transport and commerce. As a organized keeping an eye on the crystal ball of both gateway between Asia and South ASIA we have a cardinal Bangladesh and China. interest in the Xi Jinping inspired BRI project. Awami League returned to power in 1996 long 21 years Bangladesh has broken out of the aid bondage and is an after the gruesome killing of Bangabandhu and most attractive destination for investment. Such a possibility members of his immediate family except the two daugh - has now been created by offering dedicated special eco - ters Sheikh Hasina and Sheikh Rehana both of whom nomic zones to Chinese companies. This would not only were in Europe at that time. After being sworn in as Prime generate employment but create the scope for transferring Minister Sheikh Hasina chose to first go for religious visit. some of China’s sunset industries. Not to mention Having performed Umrah at Mecca Sharif and ziarat at thereby leading also to transfer of technology. Madina Munawara, It is to be noted the first official visit BRI primarily Chinese initiative should and could be in - of Sheikh Hasina as Prime Minister was to China. Since strumental in reshaping the architecture of the global then the bilateral relations have been multifaceted and order. Mankind is living under the threat of climate China has participated in many infrastructural develop - change, environmental degradation, shadow of nuclear 1 annihilation as Tagore famously remarked “organized self - India it offers unique scope to collaborate on the blue ishness of nations as opposed to the higher ideals of hu - economy. manity.” Bangladesh can also provide ocean access to land locked The collaborative venture envisions a peaceful environ - countries like Nepal and Bhutan as well as Chinas West - ment without which the BRI objectives cannot be sus - ern provinces. Economist intelligence unit has projected tained. The economic scale is the largest ever under taken Bangladesh as the fastest growing economy. These dimen - by any nation. It is expected to range from US $ 1 Trillion sions add value to Bangladesh as a significant player in to US $ 8 Trillion. In its ideal form BRI hopes to have a the BRI scheme. coordinated policy approach to facilitate trade, usher in BRI is above all a human project. It cannot merely be seen connectivity, create financial integration and enhance peo - as an economic or transport accelerator. The scale and di - ple to people contact. versity is indeed so enormous that if taken to its lofty and It is for the first time that the Asian Infrastructure Invest - idealistic conclusion it should be a world reshaping phe - ment Bank (AIIB) has not been overwhelmed by the Bre - nomenon. The seven hundred year Muslim rule in Spain ton Woods institutions. In fact it has taken an and North Africa lead to the European Enlightenment independent financial approach. which in turn created the industrial revolution. Likewise BRI is also destined to re invent the dynamics of a new Bangladesh is by no means a “small” nation.
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