Challenging Democracy: Latin American Attitudes on Presidential Term Limits

Home , 2013 protests in Brazil, Liberalism in Bolivia, Term limit

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

Alexandra Castillo, M.A.

Graduate Program in Political Science

The Ohio State University

2019

Dissertation Committee:

Sarah Brooks, Co-Advisor Irfan Nooruddin, Co-Advisor Amanda Robinson Thomas Nelson ⃝c Copyright by

Alexandra Castillo

2019 Abstract

In the early 1990s, scholars and pundits alike celebrated the advent of democracy as the end of the Cold War saw the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of authoritarian regimes throughout the world. Nearly three decades later, the optimism of the earlier era has all but disappeared. By the mid 2000s, scholars began to warn of the dangers of democratic decay, particularly in areas where democracy was relatively new. Latin America, with its tumultuous history of violent coups and repressive authoritarian regimes, was no exception. Rather than turning to overt instances of regime overthrow, however, leaders in the modern era used a more sophisticated, democratic toolkit of constitutional changes, referendum votes, and legislative and supreme court decisions to slowly dismantle traditional democratic checks and balances.

By 2018, presidential term limits, a traditional check on executive power, had been successfully removed in four countries (Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela), eliminated and later reinstated in two countries (Ecuador and Peru), and challenged in two countries (Argentina and Colombia). More dramatically, then-president Manuel

Zelaya in Honduras was physically removed from office in 2009 for suggesting that term limits be extended beyond a single term, while a similar proposal in Paraguay in 2017 almost led to a constitutional crisis. Rather than focusing on institutions or political leaders, this dissertation directs its attention to the role of citizens in these

ii processes of democratic degradation on the ground. In doing so, this dissertation asks: what explains citizens’ support for the removal of presidential term limits? Why are term limits contentious in some countries and not others? What explains why some challenges to remove term limits are successful while others fail? And ultimately, is support for the removal of term limits congruent with democratic attitudes?

This dissertation begins by situating the removal of presidential term limits in

Latin America within the larger literature of democratic decay and deconsolidation.

Next, it explores the literature on presidential term limits before laying the foundation for the theoretical contribution of the dissertation. I rely on two heuristics borrowed from the voting literature, economic evaluations and social identity, to shed light on opinion-formation in relation to term limits. Just as citizens rely on similar heuristics to make relatively informed decisions about their political candidate of choice, I argue that these shortcuts also are useful in helping citizens make decisions about referendum votes and more abstract political phenomena such as term limits.

Thereby, I expect that when citizens have positive evaluations of their personal or the national economic situation, they are more likely to support the removal of term limits. Social identity also can determine who the insiders or outsiders are under the current political arrangement, which similarly informs term limit opinion, while insiders are more likely to tolerate the removal of this traditional check on executive tenure than outsiders.

The first empirical chapter tackles opinion on term limits in Bolivia and Ecuador shortly after term limit legislation had undergone changes. In Ecuador, the Supreme

Court had eliminated term limits while a referendum to remove term limits in Bolivia had recently lost by a slim margin. Capitalizing on the saliency of these issues as well

iii as the differential outcomes, a survey was fielded in both countries, which shedlight on the proposed heuristics. As expected, positive evaluations of the national economy were predictive of support for the removal of presidential term limits under a variety of justifications. The analysis also revealed that identification as an outsider wasrelated to a higher likelihood of maintaining term limits under all conditions, although this finding was not as robust.

The next empirical chapter extends the analysis from the specific case studies to the entire region using Latinobarometer survey data from 1995-2016 across 18 countries in addition to two unique dependent variables. The first dependent variable records whether countries have removed constraints on presidential reelection, while the second dependent variable documents challenges to remove term limits, whether successes or failures. Using event history analysis, the findings for the absence of constraints on presidential reelection are at odds with the previous empirical chapter: positive evaluations of the national economic environment were related to the maintenance of term limits. Negative economic evaluations increased the hazard ratio of failure, or the removal of term limits. Moreover, the temporal indicator suggests that the survival function decreases over time, making countries more susceptible to the elimination of term limits in each successive year since 2009. None of the public opinion indicators were predictive of successful challenges to remove presidential term limits, and neither of the main heuristics explained failed challenges.

Overall, the results presented in this dissertation suggest another application for economic heuristics beyond the voting literature. Not only were economic heuristics predictive of support for the removal of term limits in a direct application, but they

iv also helped to reveal country-level patterns for institutional outcomes. A positive economic outlook was related to the removal of presidential term limits under a variety of justifications, and it also explained varying country-level risk for the elimination of constraints on presidential reelection. By focusing on citizens’ opinions, this dissertation helps to extend our understanding of processes of democratic decay from within.

v For my parents, who made every opportunity possible

vi Acknowledgments

To say that the (long overdue) completion of this dissertation was an individual endeavor would be a massive understatement. I owe countless thanks to my mentors, cohort, graduate school colleagues, friends, and family. I can only begin to express my gratitude and appreciation for each and every one of you, but I will attempt to do my best. All errors or omissions in these acknowledgements, as with the entirety of this dissertation, are of course my own.

To begin, I would not have made it this far without the fateful intervention of my co-advisor Irfan Nooruddin. I am confident that our unscheduled meeting on recruitment weekend altered the course of my life. His support, guidance, and frankness, not to mention his career and life advice, has been a constant beacon that I would have become lost without. I will forever consider him both a mentor and a friend. My other co-advisor, Sarah Brooks, has maintained endless patience with me throughout these last eight years. She read a seemingly infinite succession of drafts, and her feedback was invaluable in pushing me to be a better thinker, scholar, and writer. As a role model, Sarah has set the bar exceedingly high, and I can only hope to emulate the example she has set.

Tom Nelson provided continuous support and guidance, from puzzling through experimental frameworks to devoting hours each week to the political psychology workshop. Amanda Robinson defined the gold standard for an open-door policy, and

vii her willingness to always meet with me helped me overcome countless obstacles with my data, theoretical framework, and mentality. For my graduate school colleagues, thank you for reading far too many drafts and spending hours in various coffee shops around Columbus. My fellow comparativists Margaret Hanson, Gabriella Lloyd, Car- olyn Morgan, and Wei-Ting Yen made this difficult journey much more bearable. As for Julian Wamble and Lauren Elliott-Dorans, I never would have survived the first year (or beyond, quite frankly) without your irreplaceable friendship filled with gifs and continuous laughter.

I would be remiss not to mention the best roommates in the world—Paul DeBell,

Alex Lemmel, and Reggie DeBell. Not only did you provide motivation to stay fit, but you also gave me sage advice on my research, dissertation, and life, all the while providing delicious home-cooked meals. As for Sammy Usmani, he is the demented older brother that I never wanted. If it weren’t for Sammy, I never would have joined

Kicking It Old School, experienced the joys of Meister’s on a Thursday night, or made memories that will last a lifetime.

Best friendships are hard to come by and difficult to maintain, but I am grateful to have a couple. Even though we were hundreds of miles apart, Nicky McCue was a constant presence in my life. She was my confidante through thick and thin, andI knew she would always have my back (even when I was wrong). Carolina Foresman was the first person to welcome me to Columbus as a friend and my graduate school mentor. Much has changed since then, perhaps most importantly that I now enjoy

IPAs, but I am grateful that our friendship has persevered.

Ann and Doug Graham and Jessi and Dan Riffle welcomed me into their family in spectacular fashion—their instantaneous warmness is unparalleled. Without them,

viii I would not participate in nearly as many extracurricular activities around DC, nor would I consider myself an honorary Bobcat. I owe Ann an additional thanks for painstakingly copy-editing these pages. This dissertation would not have been as polished or stylistically consistent without her careful eye. Eric Graham pushed me toward the finish line of this dissertation when I nearly lost sight of it countless times.

He has shown me depths of love and support that one can only hope for in a partner and that I did not know were possible. Together, we have created a relationship built on a foundation of mutual respect and affection, and for this I am grateful.

As for my family, there are too many to name individually, but each and every one of you has shaped this journey. Papa was a constant presence in my mind and heart while completing this dissertation. Gigi is the glue that holds us all together, and she reminds us of the importance of family, even when the younger generations take over her traditions like tamale day. The Nash clan are more like siblings to me than cousins—I am so honored to feel included as one of you. My goddaughter Charlie and fraudulent goddaughter Sammie embody the spirit of the woman I strive to become with their headstrong and vivacious personalities. When I falter in this mission,

Aunt Sammy is always there to pick me up. She is my shoulder to cry on, closest confidante, and biggest champion. I look forward to celebrating this achievement together in December, where I hope we will agree that I get to keep all of my letters

(permanently).

My sisters, Danielle Bowman and Erica Concannon, have seen me through all of the ups and downs of life (and graduate school). I would not have had nearly enough to complain about in life without the two of them justifying my experiences as a middle child. While obtaining a Ph.D. will certainly define my life, becoming

ix an Auntie to Wyatt, Adelyn, and Emerson is my most memorable title and greatest source of joy. My objective is to always offer them a bottomless supply of love, hope, and encouragement, as was provided to me by my parents, Dawn and Joseph Castillo.

They are my inspiration, motivation, and benchmark for all that I strive to be—I hope that I have made them proud.

x Vita

2011 ...... B.A. in English, International Studies, and Spanish West Virginia University Morgantown, West Virginia 2012-2013 ...... Foreign Language and Areas Studies (FLAS) Fellow (Intermediate Quechua) U.S. Department of Education The Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio 2013-2014 ...... FLAS Fellow (Advanced Quechua) U.S. Department of Education The Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio 2014 ...... M.A. in Political Science The Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio 2014 ...... FLAS Fellow (Beginner Aymara) U.S. Department of Education The Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio 2014-2018 ...... Graduate Teaching Associate The Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio 2018-present ...... Research Associate Pew Research Center Washington, DC

xi Fields of Study

Major Field: Political Science

Studies in: Comparative Politics Political Psychology

xii Table of Contents

Page

Abstract ...... ii

Dedication ...... vi

Acknowledgments ...... vii

Vita...... xi

List of Tables ...... xvi

List of Figures ...... xx

1. Introduction ...... 1

1.1 Introduction ...... 1 1.2 The Puzzle: Continued Democratic Commitment Amidst Demo- cratic Erosion ...... 4 1.3 Theoretical Framework ...... 7 1.4 Organization of the Dissertation ...... 10

2. Theoretical Framework: Economic Evaluations and Social Identity as Heuristics ...... 14

2.1 Introduction ...... 14 2.2 Presidential Term Limits: A Necessity or an Artifact? ...... 18 2.2.1 Foundations of the Argument ...... 18 2.2.2 Presidential Term Limits: Reigniting the Debate ...... 19 2.2.3 Implications of Term Limits ...... 22 2.3 Theory ...... 25 2.3.1 Foundations ...... 25 2.3.2 The Role of Economic Evaluations ...... 28

xiii 2.3.3 Social Identity as a Heuristic ...... 29 2.3.4 General Theoretical Framework ...... 34 2.4 Expectations ...... 36 2.5 Conclusion ...... 39

3. Bolivia and Ecuador: A Tale of Two Removals ...... 41

3.1 Introduction ...... 41 3.2 Political Context ...... 44 3.2.1 Survey Design ...... 51 3.2.2 Dependent Variables ...... 52 3.3 Expectations and Hypotheses ...... 55 3.4 Descriptive Statistics ...... 57 3.4.1 Sample ...... 57 3.4.2 Dependent Variables ...... 60 3.4.3 Explanatory Variables ...... 61 3.5 Analyses ...... 65 3.5.1 Economic Heuristics ...... 68 3.5.2 Identity Heuristics ...... 73 3.5.3 Both Heuristics ...... 76 3.6 Discussion ...... 81 3.7 Experimental Manipulation ...... 84 3.7.1 Experimental Design ...... 85 3.7.2 Experimental Expectations and Hypotheses ...... 88 3.7.3 Analysis of Experimental Manipulations ...... 89 3.7.4 Discussion of the Experimental Manipulations ...... 90 3.8 Conclusion ...... 91

4. Where Are Term Limits Contentious? A Cross-National Analysis in Latin America ...... 93

4.1 Introduction ...... 93 4.2 Unit of Analysis: From the Individual to the Country ...... 97 4.3 Public Opinion: A Lens Into National-Level Phenomena ...... 98 4.4 Dependent Variables ...... 102 4.4.1 Term Limit Constraints ...... 103 4.4.2 Presidential Term Limit Challenges ...... 106 4.5 Explanatory Variables ...... 109 4.6 Unlimited Presidential Term Limits ...... 113 4.7 Term Limit Challenges ...... 121 4.7.1 Successful Challenges ...... 123 4.7.2 Failed Challenges ...... 126

xiv 4.8 Discussion ...... 126 4.9 Conclusion ...... 135

5. Conclusion ...... 138

5.1 Lessons From Latin America ...... 138 5.2 Limitations of the Empirical Strategy ...... 141 5.2.1 Survey ...... 142 5.2.2 Cross-National Analysis ...... 143 5.3 Future Research ...... 146

Bibliography ...... 148

Appendix A. Supplementary Material for Chapter 3 ...... 162

A.0.1 Supplementary Tables and Figures ...... 179

Appendix B. Supplementary Material for Chapter 4 ...... 181

xv List of Tables

Table Page

2.1 Presidential reelection in Latin America ...... 21

3.1 Demographic characteristics in Bolivia and Ecuador for the survey sample and population...... 58

3.2 Frequency distributions of dependent variables in Ecuador...... 61

3.3 Frequency distributions of dependent variables in Bolivia...... 61

3.4 Frequency distributions of current sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations. The questions read as follows: “Speaking of the economy, how would you describe (the country’s/your) economic situation?” . . . . 62

3.5 Frequency distributions of future sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations. The questions read as follows: “Do you think that in 12 months (the/your) economic situation of the country will be better, the same, or worse than it is now?” ...... 63

3.6 Summary statistics for identity heuristics in Ecuador...... 64

3.7 Summary statistics for identity heuristics in Bolivia...... 64

3.8 Support for term limits (economic rationale): economic heuristics . . 70

3.9 Support for term limits (identity rationale): identity heuristics . . . . 74

3.10 Support for term limits ...... 77

3.11 Experimental design ...... 87

xvi 3.12 Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the economic rationale by experimental conditions and national economic evaluations. 90

3.13 Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the identity rationale by experimental conditions and ethnic identification. . . . . 90

4.1 Challenges to remove term limits in selected Latin American countries from 1995-2018...... 107

4.2 Summary statistics: explanatory variables from Latinobarometer with imputed values ...... 113

4.3 Term limit constraints: economic heuristics ...... 118

4.4 Term limit constraints: identity heuristic ...... 120

4.5 Term limit constraints: all heuristics ...... 122

4.6 Successful term limit challenges: economic heuristics ...... 124

4.7 Failed term limit challenges: all heuristics ...... 127

A.1 Support for term limits (democratic rationale): economic heuristics . 168

A.2 Support for term limits (identity rationale): economic heuristics . . . 169

A.3 Support for term limits (any rationale): economic heuristics . . . . . 170

A.4 Support for term limits (democratic rationale): identity heuristics . . 171

A.5 Support for term limits (economic rationale): identity heuristics . . . 172

A.6 Support for term limits (any rationale): identity heuristics ...... 173

A.7 Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the democratic rationale by experimental conditions and national economic evaluations.174

A.8 Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the identity rationale by experimental conditions and national economic evaluations.174

xvii A.9 Proportion of respondents who support term limits for any rationale by experimental conditions and national economic evaluations. . . . . 174

A.10 Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the democratic rationale by experimental conditions and personal economic evaluations.175

A.11 Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the economic rationale by experimental conditions and personal economic evaluations.175

A.12 Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the identity rationale by experimental conditions and personal economic evaluations.175

A.13 Proportion of respondents who support term limits for any rationale by experimental conditions and personal economic evaluations. . . . . 176

A.14 Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the democratic rationale by experimental conditions and ethnic identification. . . . . 176

A.15 Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the economic rationale by experimental conditions and ethnic identification. . . . . 176

A.16 Proportion of respondents who support term limits for any rationale by experimental conditions and ethnic identification...... 177

A.17 Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the democratic rationale by experimental conditions and class identification...... 177

A.18 Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the economic rationale by experimental conditions and class identification...... 177

A.19 Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the identity rationale by experimental conditions and class identification...... 178

A.20 Proportion of respondents who support term limits for any rationale by experimental conditions and class identification...... 178

B.1 Main explanatory variables (no imputation): descriptive statistics . . 182

B.2 Main explanatory variables (no imputation): descriptive statistics . . 183

B.3 Main explanatory variables (imputation): descriptive statistics . . . 184

xviii B.4 Main explanatory variables (imputation): descriptive statistics values 185

B.5 Summary statistics (no imputation): explanatory variables from Lati- nobarometer ...... 186

B.6 Term limit constraints (no imputation): economic heuristics . . . . . 187

B.7 Term limit constraints (no imputation): identity heuristic ...... 188

B.8 Term limit constraints (no imputation): all heuristics ...... 189

B.9 Successful term limit challenges (imputation): identity heuristic . . . 190

B.10 Successful term limit challenges (imputation): all heuristics . . . . . 191

B.11 Successful term limit challenges (no imputation): economic heuristics 192

B.12 Successful term limit challenges (no imputation): identity heuristic . 193

B.13 Successful term limit challenges (no imputation): all heuristics . . . 194

B.14 Failed term limit challenges: economic heuristics (imputation) . . . . 195

B.15 Failed term limit challenges: identity heuristic ...... 196

B.16 Failed term limit challenges (no imputation): economic heuristics . . 197

B.17 Failed term limit challenges (no imputation): identity heuristic . . . 198

B.18 Failed term limit challenges (no imputation): all heuristics ...... 199

xix List of Figures

Figure Page

1.1 Churchillian measure of preference for democracy across 18 countries in Latin America from 1995-2016...... 5

2.1 General theoretical framework ...... 34

3.1 Frequency of ethnic self-identification in Ecuador: “Now, thinking about your identity, which ethnicity do you believe pertains to you?” . . . . 65

3.2 Frequency of ethnic self-identification in Bolivia “Now, thinking about your identity, which ethnicity do you believe pertains to you?” . . . . 66

3.3 Predicted probability of support for term limits with the economic rationale by country and sociotropic evaluations with 95% confidence intervals...... 72

3.4 Predicted probability of support for term limits with the identity rationale by country and ethnic identification with 95% confidence intervals. 76

3.5 Interactive effect of ethnic identification and sociotropic evaluations on predicted probability of support for term limits with 95% confidence intervals for the democratic rationale dependent variable by country. . 80

4.1 Variation of constraints on presidential reelection in Latin America from 1995-2018 in countries that have eliminated constraints...... 105

4.2 Duration of event, time to event, and reinstatement of constraints on presidential reelection in Latin America from 1995-2018...... 115

4.3 Nelson-Aelen cumulative hazard estimate for lack of constraints on presidential reelection in Latin America from 1995-2018...... 116

xx 4.4 Mixed effects gamma regression survival function at mean sociotropic evaluations in Mexico (-0.38) and Honduras (-0.49)...... 129

4.5 Mixed effects gamma regression survival function at mean Churchillian preference for democracy in Bolivia (0.49) and Venezuela (0.61). . . . 131

4.6 Mean preference for democracy in Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Venezuela from 1995-2016. Before country-level aggregation, Churchillian preference for democracy is coded as follows: (-1) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one; (0) For people like me it doesn’t matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic; and (1) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. Higher mean values correspond to a greater preference for democracy...... 132

4.7 Mixed effects gamma regression survival functions for fully specified constraint model with and without presidential evaluations...... 133

A.1 Self-identification with social class in Ecuador: “People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to a social class. Which social class would you describe yourself as belonging to?" ...... 162

A.2 Self-identification with social class in Bolivia: “People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to a social class. Which social class would you describe yourself as belonging to?" ...... 163

A.3 Perceived closeness to self-identified social class in Ecuador: “How close do you feel to your social class?" ...... 164

A.4 Perceived closeness to self-identified social class in Bolivia: “How close do you feel to your social class?" ...... 165

A.5 Perceived closeness to self-identified ethnic group in Ecuador: “How close do you feel to your ethnic group?" ...... 166

A.6 Perceived closeness to self-identified ethnic group in Bolivia: “How close do you feel to your ethnic group?" ...... 167

A.7 Frequency distribution of monthly income in Ecuador; figures presented in U.S. dollars...... 179

xxi A.8 Frequency distribution of monthly income in Bolivia; figures presented in Bolivianos...... 180

xxii Chapter 1: Introduction

Nothing is so dangerous as to permit a citizen to remain in power a long time.

Simón Bolívar

1.1 Introduction

Far removed from the hope and idealism of the advent of the third wave of democratization, the last two decades have cast doubt on the viability of democracy in new contexts. Rather than undergoing processes of institutionalization and democratic entrenchment, many new democracies have experienced a series of setbacks across the globe. From Latin America to Eastern Europe to Sub-Saharan Africa, the trend has slowly crept toward democratic degradation and decay (Diamond, 2008), a stark contrast to the optimism of the 1980s and early 1990s. As a wave of populist and extremist political candidates and parties have succeeded in winning elections near and far, from established to emerging democracies, fears about the viability of democracy in the modern era have arisen (Foa and Mounk, 2016, 2017).

As populist and extremist parties, candidates, rhetoric, and positions have become almost ubiquitous, no country is isolated from the threat of democratic decay. In Latin

1 America, a region already famous for authoritarianism, instability, and coups, authoritarianism has encroached slowly since the 1998 election of Hugo Chávez (Levitsky and Way, 2002, 2010). In the mid-2000s, leftist candidates began to win elections across various countries. With these electoral victories, and in a similar tradition as

Chávez, presidents began to consolidate power within the hands of the executive and dismantle democratic checks, often backed by popular support and referendum votes

(Weyland, 2013). While the fears that were once centered around the “dangerous”

Latin American left (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011b; Weyland, Madrid and Hunter,

2010) have largely subsided in the late 2010s, academics and pundits have once again started to pontificate about extremism, economic instability, and authoritarianism.

After Hugo Chávez’s death in 2013, his hand-picked predecessor Nicolás Maduro further consolidated power on the country’s slow trod toward outright authoritarianism. In one of his more autocratic demonstrations of power, the country’s Supreme

Court temporarily stripped the National Assembly of its powers for a few short days in spring 2017 (Romo, 2017). Far from the exception in the region, violent protests have become endemic: hundreds have died in protests in Nicaragua after anti-government protests erupted in late summer 2018. Corruption scandals also have tainted the integrity of democracy, most infamously through the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in

2016 and imprisonment of ex-president Luis Inácio Lula de Silva in Brazil. As a con- sequence of widespread corruption, the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections witnessed a far-right extremist political candidate winning executive office.

Amidst these seemingly more pressing, violent concerns, another battle has become ongoing in the region against democratic institutions. Presidential term limits,

2 once considered a hallmark, almost unquestionable, aspect of democracy in most regions outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, have come under fire in a variety of countries.

The removal of term limits raises immediate questions regarding both horizontal and vertical accountability. Most surprisingly, democratic institutions themselves have played a crucial role in the removal of term limits in many countries through referendum votes, legislative decisions, and supreme court votes. Not only has horizontal accountability been weakened through this process, but an unencumbered incumbent also raises serious doubts about the viability of vertical accountability to serve as a check on all-powerful incumbents, as cursory knowledge of the damaging precedent set by Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe reveals.

Considering that publics have played an important role in the current crises facing

Latin America through their decisions at the ballot box, this dissertation will begin to unpack the underlying motivators of individual public opinion and its impact on institutional-level outcomes. I will introduce two common heuristics borrowed from the voting behavior literature, economic evaluations and social identity, to help us better understand how individuals make complex political decisions. These heuristics will be applied to the removal of presidential term limits, which will inform our larger understanding of the public’s role in processes of democratic decay. After outlining the theoretical motivations and expectations, the heuristics will be tested in two countries where term limits were directly threatened. Next, the findings from the two-country case studies will be applied to a cross-national scale, using public opinion data to explain country-level institutional outcomes, addressing where and why term limits are challenged. Lastly, the dissertation will explore the generalizability of the findings and suggest fruitful questions for future research.

3 1.2 The Puzzle: Continued Democratic Commitment Amidst Democratic Erosion

In addition to the institutional degradations to democracy, the substantive quality of democracy has declined as well. Since 2007, Freedom House scores in Latin

America have declined. While the functioning of the government and rule of law have experienced notable increases, degradations have occurred in the following areas: the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, freedom of expression and belief, and associational and organizational rights (Puddington, 2012). Even though the

Freedom House measure and other measurements of the quality of democracy have widely acknowledged deficiencies (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010), it does provide further evidence to suggest that governments are “... either tolerating the erosion of democratic institutions or, more disturbingly, deliberately undermining freedom in order to marginalize potential sources of political opposition” (Puddington, 2012).

In addition to the declining quality of democracy in some cases, the region also is susceptible to other potentially destabilizing forces. According to Hagopian and

Mainwaring (2005), widespread poverty, disparate levels of inequality, and oftentimes poor economic performance are indicative of negative prospects for regime solidity and quality.

Despite these negative developments regarding the quality of democracy in Latin

America and current problems, public opinion surveys continue to record relatively high levels of support for democracy. Figure 1.1 plots mean levels of Churchillian support for democracy in Latin America. As the figure demonstrates, support for democracy over alternative forms of government has remained relatively stable since

1995. This is particularly striking considering that leaders such as Chávez rose to

4 power during this same time period. Over the 17-year period, a six percentage point decline was seen in regional preference for democracy. In 2016, 58% espoused support for democracy over other forms of government, while support for an authoritarian government remained consistently low (16%). It is noteworthy that slightly more than a quarter of the regional population (26%) say that it does not matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic, a position that has increased by eight percentage points since 1995. Taken at face value, however, democratic decay and the elimination of presidential term limits becomes even more surprising, particularly as support for democracy has remained relatively consistent over almost two decades.

Figure 1.1: Churchillian measure of preference for democracy across 18 countries in Latin America from 1995-2016.

While the survey measures are indicative of general levels of support for democracy, they fail to unpack the underlying components of respondents’ understanding of

5 democracy. Rather, these measures capture broad sentiment for big, abstract ideas, yet they do not explore the more complex, nuanced, and often contradictory nature of human opinion. Namely, definitions of what democracy means might vary across region, country, and even individual. Some might associate democracy with regular elections, while others might equate democracy with its promotion and pro- tection of human rights. Primary to the endeavors of this dissertation, it is also possible that these measures might reflect a fundamentally different understanding of democracy—one that is more akin to participatory or delegative democracy in its reliance on referendum votes and dependence on a strong leader.

Throughout the dissertation, I argue that the erosion of checks on presidential tenure, namely the removal of term limits, is highly consistent with the public’s understanding of democracy, and thereby its support for democracy. Since the third wave of democratization, democracy has become synonymous with elections, which gave rise to the fallacy of electoralism (Karl, 1990). Today, international forces even have pressured authoritarian regimes to adopt elections (e.g., see Gandhi and Lust-

Okar, 2009; Hyde, 2011). While some argue that the mere presence of elections can have positive democratizing effects (e.g., see Lindberg, 2009), others caution that structural conditions continue to matter (Flores and Nooruddin, 2016). This hyper- focus on elections has obscured other facets of democracy, such as the necessity for accountability mechanisms. O’Donnell’s (1994) early work on delegative democracy reveals that a sole focus on elections can lead to unintended consequences as leaders use their electoral mandate to rule in whatever manner they see fit, often leading to the erosion of horizontal accountability mechanisms.

6 In an even more concerning line of work, Foa and Mounk (2016) caution that the supposed high levels of support for democracy as witnessed in public opinion surveys may obscure larger, more important trends: “Even as democracy has come to be the only form of government widely viewed as legitimate, it has lost the trust of many citizens who no longer believe that democracy can deliver their most pressing needs and preferences” (p. 16). Consistent with these ideas, the authors argue that the rise of antisystem parties and movements, an openness to authoritarian alternatives, and public skepticism about the value and importance of democracy serve as key indicators of democratic deconsolidation (Foa and Mounk, 2017). Taken as a whole, then, these two lines of literature suggest that support for democracy understood primarily as elections can obfuscate other important aspects of democracy, such as checks and balances, while continuing to suggest that democracy remains consolidated. By focusing only on the relatively narrow definition of democracy provided by Linz and

Stepan (1996) as the “only game in town,” scholars may neglect to account for other, more subtle developments. Thus, it can seem highly consistent for citizens to profess continued high levels of support for democracy while undermining its central tenets on the ground.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

As a step toward unpacking the larger pattern of democratic decay and deconsolidation, this dissertation narrowly focuses on presidential term limits as one instance of the erosion of important checks on both horizontal and vertical accountability, two key dimensions of democratic consolidation. Rather than directly engaging with the arguments about democratic consolidation (or deconsolidation), the dissertation

7 focuses on the relationship between public opinion and the institutional removal of term limits. This dissertation contributes to the larger literature by addressing the relationship between individual-level public opinion and important country-level outcomes that are linked to the erosion of democratic institutions.

An important caveat from the previous discussion about democratic decay, degradation, and deconsolidation can be drawn from Linz’s (1990) foundational work on the perils of presidentialism. While democracy may indeed be in decay, it is worth- while to note that term limits are only applicable in presidential democracies. Nearly three decades ago, Linz (1990) observed that the most stable democracies at the time were all parliamentary, not presidential, democracies, going so far as to suggest that parliamentary regimes were more conducive to a stable outcome than presidential regimes. One of the explanations for this phenomena lies in the institutional design of parliamentary regimes, which by nature are more flexible thanks to the capability for a vote of no confidence or dissolution of parliament at any time. For presidential democracies, because there are no immediate mechanisms to change an unpopular leader, and in conjunction with the winner-takes-all, zero-sum nature of presidentialism, the institutional design in and of itself is rife with opportunities for the personalization of power.

Taking into consideration the arguments about the multitude of benefits of parliamentary regimes, from their more flexible design to the primacy of the political party over the individual, the removal of term limits in presidential regimes becomes even more concerning. While Linz (1990) docked presidential regimes for their disjointed, arbitrarily fixed terms for executive office, one of the main strengths of parliamentary regimes was found in the ability of parliament to easily remove an unpopular leader.

8 By eliminating term limits, one of the few mechanisms of accountability in presidential regimes, these democracies are essentially handicapping their accountability mechanisms and placing an undue burden on the legislative branch. Without the promise of the alteration of power, impeachment, or resignation, the next round of elections becomes the only hope of removing an unpopular leader. Even with elections, though, the well-documented incumbent advantage offers little hope of alteration of power

(Ginsburg, Melton and Elkins, 2010).

Thus, in order to better understand why citizens might support the removal of term limits despite the aforementioned dangers to accountability, I adopt two heuristics from the voting literature to help structure the role of individual public opinion.

I argue that citizens use economic and social identity heuristics to help them make decisions about a range of political phenomena, from candidate decisions to referendum votes. Regarding term limits, if citizens expect their personal or the national economic situation to improve, they should more likely support the removal of term limits. Rather than basing their decision around complex, abstract philosophical ideals about what democracy means, then, the immediate decision is influenced directly by an individuals’s economic outlook, just as voters use economic determinations in their calculations about candidates. When presented with a referendum vote on the removal of executive term limits, for example, the immediate decision becomes less about democracy and more about tangible economic considerations.

I argue that citizens make similar calculations regarding social identity, which is a proxy for in-groups and out-groups. Racial and ethnic identification, as well as class identification, allow individuals to make informed decisions about whether they expect to benefit under the removal of term limits. In line with the argument thata

9 lack of restrictions on term limits allows for better representation, as citizens are able to retain popular executives indefinitely (Linz, 1990; Carey, 2003; Ginsburg, Melton and Elkins, 2010), social identity shortcuts can help citizens to determine their future benefit from the institutional changes. These considerations might be particularly salient in Latin America where societies have long seen stratification by race and class (Van Cott, 2000, 2005b).

By focusing on these two primary heuristics, economic evaluations and social identity, we can begin to understand the removal of presidential term limits throughout

Latin America and beyond. The focus on public opinion forces us to acknowledge some of the inherent shortcomings with our measures of support for democracy (see

Canache, Mondak and Seligson, 2001; Linde and Ekman, 2003), especially when it is linked to non-democratic outcomes. Situated in the larger concern with the democratic recession, it is important to understand how and why citizens make decisions, particularly when those decisions can directly impact democratic institutions. More- over, this focus on public opinion can shed light on the current debate surrounding indicators for democratic deconsolidation by helping us to understand how citizens can seemingly remain committed to democracy on one hand while undermining its integrity on the other.

1.4 Organization of the Dissertation

The rest of the dissertation will proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, I will discuss the extant literature on presidential term limits in depth. Much of this literature has focused on the executive himself or on the institutions of governance. Instead, I propose a theory that is centered around the role of the public, asking why certain sectors

10 of the citizenry might become willing to remove existing constraints on the executive.

I build upon the long tradition in political science of heuristics to help address this gap in the literature, focusing on the role economic evaluations and social identity play. I hypothesize that if citizens have a positive evaluation of either the national or their personal economic situation, then they are more amenable to the removal of presidential term limits. Similarly, if individuals share an in-group identity with the current president, which I define as the intersection of ethnic and class identity, then they will have a higher likelihood of supporting the disintegration of executive checks.

Thus, Chapter 2 proposes a theory that explains the growing tendency across Latin

America and beyond regarding the erosion of long-standing institutional constraints in relatively new democracies. As direct and indirect participation of citizens is one of the key tenets of any democracy, the theory offers two potential explanations in an effort to move toward a more structured understanding of how citizens might interact with democratic institutions in practice.

Building upon the theory in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 tests the heuristics in a context where executives attempted to eliminate presidential term limits. A survey was fielded in Bolivia and Ecuador in June 2016 shortly after the Ecuadorian National

Assembly had removed limits on presidential tenure and Bolivians had just barely defeated a referendum to remove term limits. Taking advantage of the real-world implications on external validity, the survey linked respondents feelings about the economic situation and their social identity to opinion on presidential term limits. In this way, the survey was able to isolate the role of the heuristics proposed in Chapter

2, identifying their independent effect on attitudes toward term limits. The survey identified a clear link between economic evaluations and opinions toward term limits

11 in the expected direction. The analysis also revealed preliminary support for the social identity heuristic, although the results were not robust across different iterations of the dependent variable and should be taken as merely indicative of a larger pattern as a result of the relatively homogenous, non-representative nature of the sample.

Chapter 4 replicates the analysis from Chapter 3 in a cross-national format by drawing upon cross-national, temporal survey data. The chapter describes two original dependent variables that account for the constraints (or absence of constraints) on presidential tenure and attempts (both successes and failures) to eliminate presidential term limits in 18 Latin American countries from 1995-2018. Using the event history framework, the analysis finds that positive evaluations of the national economic situation are related to an increased survival function for constraints on presidential reelection. Unlike the previous chapter, the more positive a country’s mean economic outlook, the greater the likelihood of the maintenance of term limits. Weak support also exists for the idea that social identity as proxied through wealth also matters: preliminary evidence reveals that a country with a higher average level of asset wealth is less at risk for the removal of executive constraints on reelection than a country with a lower level of asset wealth. Surprisingly, the greater a country’s preference for democracy, the more likely the country is to lack constraints on presidential reelection. The most robust finding is in relation to temporal effects, which is suggestive of the potential for learning or demonstration effects. Over time, the survival function for all countries in the region decreased, meaning that all countries became more susceptible to the removal of presidential term limits. Neither of the primary heuristics were linked to term limit challenges, whether successful or not.

12 Chapter 5 concludes by summarizing the main findings from the dissertation and their implications for our understanding of public opinion and presidential term limits in Latin America. It also explores the generalizability of the findings, reflecting on shortcomings that were inherent in the methodological approach of the dissertation.

The chapter casts a wider lens, detailing how the findings might shed light on presidential term limits in Africa, a region that has experienced a similar erosion of vertical accountability. The dissertation concludes by raising questions for future research.

13 Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework: Economic Evaluations and Social Identity as Heuristics

Democracy is about inclusion and exclusions, about access to power, about the privileges that go with inclusion and the penalties that accompany exclusion.

Donald L. Horowitz

2.1 Introduction

The slogan of Bolivian opposition Senator Rafael Quispe proclaims “I also want to be king” (The Economist, 2015b). While one of the central tenets of democracy lies in checks and balances on the executive, recent onslaughts by political leaders in

Latin America are degrading democratic accountability and concentrating power in the hands of the executive. Nicaragua and Venezuela have unlimited presidential term limits. The Supreme Court in Honduras struck down an article prohibiting presidential reelection in the summer of 2015, Ecuador passed a constitutional amendment lifting the limits on presidential reelection in December 2015 (although a referendum in early 2018 reinstated term limits), and a referendum vote to remove presidential term limits was narrowly defeated in Bolivia in February 2016 before the Constitu- tional Court ruled that all term limits on elected officials are unconstitutional in late

14 2017.1 Notably, the concentration of power has largely occurred through democratic institutions and with incredibly high levels of public support. As an example, incumbent President Evo Morales in Bolivia enjoyed between 60%-75% popular support and majority support in the legislature at the time of the referendum vote (Reuters, 2015;

Dube, 2015). Recent attempts to change presidential term limits have heralded memories of the most overt instance of democratic backsliding in Latin America’s recent history. When democratically elected Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori instituted a self-coup in 1992, it also was met with public approval ratings of 80% (Tanaka,

2005). While some countries like Argentina are taking steps to arguably strengthen the quality of democracy,2 others are eroding traditional democratic institutions. At the individual level, citizens continue to indicate preference for democracy as a regime, and yet they are complacent or supportive of actual reductions to its quality. This chapter lays out the theoretical framework for the rest of the dissertation by asking:

Who supports the elimination of presidential term limits? And why?

1In 2009, Hugo Chávez of Venezuela eliminated term limits through constitutional referendum (Forero, 2009). Nicaragua followed suit in early 2014, allowing indefinite reelection for presidents (BBC News, 2014). While President Rafael Correa of Ecuador has publicly supported the elimination of term limits for all elected officials, he vowed not to run in the next round of presidential elections (The Associated Press, 2015), a verbal proclamation which was made moot by the 2018 referendum vote (Ayala and Rochabrún, 2018). Late in September 2015, the Bolivian parliament approved yet another bill to change the constitution, allowing for presidential re-election for up to three consecutive five-year terms, despite 2014 election campaign promises that indicated the contrary. This development followed on the heels of a popular referendum in 2009, which allowed Morales to run for two consecutive five-year terms and discounted his first term in office in2005 as falling under a different constitution (Dube, 2015). Although Morales narrowly lost the2016 referendum, this decision was reversed in November 2017 thanks to a Constitutional Court ruling that stated that any term limits for an elected official was a violation of “human rights” (BBC News, 2017). 2The election of Mauricio Macri in Argentina marks a rejection of leftist populism and attacks on the independence of the state from the Kirchner era. He is also the first president in almost a century who does not belong to either the Peronist or the Radical Civil Union party. Rather than manipulate the rules of the game, incumbent president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner stepped down peacefully (The Economist, 2015a).

15 While extensive research has looked at the extension of presidential term limits, most scholars focus on the motivations of the incumbent president (Mwenda, 2007;

Young and Posner, 2007; Prempeh, 2008; Baturo, 2010), the effectiveness of term limits (Maltz, 2007; Ginsburg, Melton and Elkins, 2010), or the conditions under which manipulation of presidential term limits is possible (Corrales and Penfold,

2014; Corrales, 2018). Focusing specifically on the subversion of presidential term limits in recent Latin American history, it is essential to note that presidents have worked through democratic institutions with constituent assemblies, judicial rulings, and referendums to extend their tenure (Corrales and Penfold, 2014; Corrales, 2018).

By concentrating mainly on elite-level factors, incumbent motivations, and normative and practical implications of term limits, the extant literature neglects to address a more interesting and nuanced question: because the majority of extensions or outright elimination of presidential term limits in Latin America have occurred within the context of democracy, what is the role of citizens? Why do citizens support, either directly through a referendum vote or indirectly through complacency, the removal of presidential term limits at the expense of the integrity of democracy?

In my dissertation, I propose two unique hypotheses to explain individual-level variation of opinion in respect to presidential term limits, and by extension, shed light on how citizens interact with democracy. In contrast to the current trends in the literature, I explore the role of citizens in regard to the debate surrounding the relaxation of executive constraint. The first framework builds upon the idea that economic conditions influence the way citizens relate to political outcomes, whether candidate preference, specific policies, or satisfaction with a regime (e.g., Markus,

1988; Booth and Seligson, 2009). Positive economic conditions may grant leeway

16 toward a laxer interpretation of the necessity of checks and balances in democracy, while negative economic conditions may have the adverse effect. In summary, citizens support the elimination of term limits with the expectation of continued economic benefit. The second framework argues that identity also influences the waycitizens relate to regimes.3 As with economic conditions, identity impacts a variety of political phenomena from civil society to political party preference (e.g., Green, Palmquist and

Schickler, 2004). In regard to identity, I suggest that it also can assert an effect on an individual’s willingness to alter constitutional arrangements. At a basic level, identity may breed feelings of close attachment to a regime or leader. In countries where marginalization has historically occurred based upon class and ethnicity, the salience of identity may become exacerbated as these appeals are frequently called upon by those seeking office. Thus, from an individual-level perspective, I have identified two conditions that may increase the probability of an effective assault on the restrictions of presidential tenure. If the economy is performing well, an individual may laud or tolerate democratic deficits in exchange for the continuation, or promise thereof, of economic fortunes. Alternatively, if citizens feel descriptively represented or appealed to by a leader, traditional limits on the longevity of the leader sometimes is viewed as a constraint rather than benefit of the political system. Finally, it is also possible that identity and economic interests intersect, thus reinforcing an individuals’ willingness to support democratic encroachments despite their alleged commitment to democracy.

This chapter details the frameworks that motivate citizen interactions with democracy through the lens of the debate surrounding presidential term limits. This chapter will proceed as follows: first, it will explore the arguments regarding the justifications

3In this dissertation identity will encompass two major components: socioeconomic status and ethnic identification.

17 for and against presidential term limits. Secondly, I will make the case that the two proposed frameworks, economic evaluations and social identity, operate as heuristics to inform citizen opinion formation on presidential term limits. Next, I will explain the theoretical framework, focusing on the role of two proposed mechanisms. I will delineate my expectations regarding how economic evaluations and social identity influence the way citizens think about presidential term limits and democracy. Lastly,

I will explore the implications for the theory regarding presidential term limits and its implications for the status of democracy post-third wave of democratization.

2.2 Presidential Term Limits: A Necessity or an Artifact?

2.2.1 Foundations of the Argument

Despite their position as one of the keystones of modern democracy, it is possible to trace the debate about the benefits and limitations of presidential term limits back to the founding fathers of the United States: Thomas Jefferson advocated in favor of term restrictions for fear of dictatorial takeover, while Alexander Hamilton argued against term limits in favor of policy continuity (Hamilton et al., 2008). The informal norm of serving no more than two terms was established by George Washington in 1796 upon his refusal to seek reelection, but the actual codification of this norm was not formally established in the United States Constitution until after Franklin

Delano Roosevelt’s terms in office. Rather than remaining isolated to the northern hemisphere, the debate over presidential term limits plagued many emerging democracies from their birth to well into the third wave of democratization.

At the advent of independence for many Latin American nations, the decision pertaining to optimal institutional design for the executive office was fraught with

18 arguments from both sides. In 1819, Simón Bolívar lauded the necessity of executive restraints, arguing: “Nothing is more perilous than to permit one citizen to retain power for an extended period. The people become accustomed to obeying him, and he forms the habit of commanding them; herein lie the origins of usurpation and tyranny...” (Cited in Carey, 2003, p. 121). Despite his original proclamations,

Bolívar recanted his stance a few years later, praising the merits of a lifelong president and citing similar motivations as Hamilton. Regardless of his changing stance on term limits, Bolívar’s vision of lifelong presidency was largely ignored. Most of

Latin America’s new democracies adopted tenure restrictions throughout the early to mid-nineteenth century in a backlash against strong man rule and caudillismo.

By the beginning of their democratic transitions during the third wave of democracy in the late 1970s, most Latin American countries had either banned reelection entirely or only permitted nonconsecutive reelection as a response to decades of harsh authoritarian rule (Corrales and Penfold, 2014).

2.2.2 Presidential Term Limits: Reigniting the Debate

Surprisingly, the strict provisions for presidential tenure that first characterized

Latin American democracies have changed drastically since democratization, with the most dramatic changes occurring since the late 2000s. Table 2.1 provides information on the state of current presidential tenure regulations in Latin America. Considering only countries that qualify as democracies in the region, in marked contrast to the late

1970s, four countries now allow indefinite, consecutive presidential reelections, while only four countries retain the most stringent regulations of prohibiting presidential

19 reelection under any circumstances. Most attempts to eliminate presidential term limits and the relaxing of reelection regulations were remarkably successful, as evidenced by Venezuela in 2009 under Hugo Chávez, Nicaragua in 2009 through Daniel Ortega,

Ecuador in 2015 by National Assembly vote (later reversed in 2018), and Honduras in

2015 by a ruling decided by the Supreme Court. As previously mentioned, Bolivia’s referendum vote on whether to extend presidential reelection was narrowly defeated in 2016, but the Constitutional Court reversed this edict in late 2017.

While restrictions on presidential reelection have changed in a variety of countries, a few countries have exhibited remarkable continuity. Mexico, Paraguay, and

Guatemala, three of the four countries that currently prohibit presidential reelection, also banned presidential reelection at the moment of democratic transition (Corrales and Penfold, 2014). Honduras remained a member of this exclusive group until as recently as the Supreme Court ruling in summer 2015. This represents a stark contrast from the proposed referendum for a constitutional amendment to eliminate the strict one-term limit on presidential reelection that was largely attributed as the justification for the opposition-led coup that forcibly removed sitting Honduran president José

Manuel Zelaya from office in 2009 (Ginsburg, Melton and Elkins, 2010). While the mere mention of eliminating term limits sparked a coup in 2009, term limit restrictions were removed entirely a short six years later. While many countries are moving toward laxer regulations, legislation in Colombia moved in the opposite direction by prohibiting presidential reelection entirely (El Tiempo, 2015; Reyes, 2015).

In those cases in which both formal and informal attempts to change reelection restrictions failed, Argentina under Menem in 1997 and Kirchner de Fernández in

2012, Panama under Balladares in 1998, Colombia under Uribe in 2004, Peru under

20 Table 2.1: Presidential reelection in Latin America

Removal Term Country Reelection Former Presidents Attempt Length

Can run again without Venezuela Indefinite Yes; 2009 6 years restriction Can run again without Nicaragua Indefinite Yes; 2009 4 years restriction Can run again without Honduras Indefinitea Yes; 2015 4 years restriction Can run again without Bolivia Indefiniteb Yes; 2016, 2017 5 years restriction Maximum of two Argentina Yes; 1997, 2012 Must sit out one term 4 years consecutive terms Maximum of two Brazil No Must sit out one term 4 years consecutive terms Dominican Two consecutive Yes; 1994, 2002, Are forbidden to run 4 years Republic terms 2008, 2015 again Maximum of two Are forbidden to run Ecuador Yes; 2015 4 years consecutive termsc again Only nonconsecutive Must wait at least one El Salvador No 5 years elections permitted year to be eligible Only nonconsecutive Panama Yes; 1998 Must sit out two terms 5 years elections permitted Only nonconsecutive Peru Yes; 2000d Must sit out one term 5 years elections permitted Only nonconsecutive Uruguay No Must sit out one term 5 years elections permitted Only nonconsecutive Chile No Must sit out one term 4 years elections permitted Only nonconsecutive Costa Rica No Must sit out two terms 4 years elections permitted Are forbidden to run Colombia Banned Yes; 2004; 2015 4 years again Mexico Banned No Cannot run again 6 years Paraguay Banned No Cannot run again 5 years Guatemala Banned No Cannot run again 4 years

Note. Table adopted from Corrales and Penfold (2014), supplemented from Glickhouse (2015). a The Supreme Court struck down the Constitutional Article prohibiting presidential reelection in 2015, but it did not specify limits on reelection. b In December 2017, the Bolivian Supreme Court ruled it a violation of human rights to prevent any elected representative from running for reelection. Thus, term limits are unlimited for any elected official. c In March 2018, Ecuadorians voted in favor of a referendum vote that reversed the 2015 constitutional amendment allowing for indefinite reelection, reinstating a maximum of two presidential terms in office. d Fujimori changed the Constitution for consecutive reelection in 1990, but the country’s 2000 electoral law reversed this decision and mandated nonconsecutive terms. 21 Fujimori in 2000, Honduras under Zelaya in 2009, and Bolivia under Morales in 2016, intraparty disputes, resistance from the courts, or a combination of both has largely stymied these efforts (Corrales and Penfold, 2014). Conversely, public support and majority control of the legislatures often receive credit for the widespread success in the adverse cases.

Beyond the extremes, four countries allow two consecutive terms in office, and six countries permit nonconsecutive presidential terms. Most countries allow former presidents to run for reelection after sitting out one to two terms. In addition to the three countries previously mentioned, only one other country prohibits former presidents from running for executive office after their maximum tenure of two terms.

Thus, in sharp contrast to the modern advent of democracy in Latin America, the norm is to allow reelection, oftentimes indefinitely.

2.2.3 Implications of Term Limits

While it is obvious that the prospects for the executive office have changed dramatically over the last few decades, what are the consequences of indefinite presidential reelection? What is at stake for democracy? In general, as was the case with Alexan- der Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and Bolívar, the literature also is divided in regard to the pros and cons of presidential term limits. One school of thought suggests that eligibility for reelection increases accountability, while another suggests that it creates a powerful incumbent advantage. Thus, the discussion over presidential term limits has the paradoxical nature of seeming antidemocratic by one camp and essential to the survival of democracy by the other (Ginsburg, Melton and Elkins, 2010).

22 At its most basic level, the argument in favor of unlimited restrictions on presidential reelection points toward the ability of voters to retain a popular incumbent, perhaps indefinitely if they desire, rather than artificially forcing them fromoffice based upon some predetermined, arbitrary period of time (Linz, 1990; Carey, 2003;

Ginsburg, Melton and Elkins, 2010). A corollary argument suggests that relaxed restrictions on presidential tenure actually increase democratic accountability and re- sponsiveness because the incentives of incumbent presidents are more closely aligned with the preferences of the citizens (Carey, 2003). In a similar vein, some argue that the prospects of reelection incentivize politicians to better serve their constituents.

From this point of view, the problem does not lie in term limits, per se, but rather a polemic issue of strong presidents presiding over weak and bloated states (Navia,

2009).

In contrast, arguments abound regarding the dangers of unencumbered presidential reelection. One of the primary fears circles around the idea that presidents will abuse their powers in office, and oftentimes the national coffers, in order toensure their continuation in office (Carey, 2003; Mwenda, 2007; Prempeh, 2008; Ginsburg,

Melton and Elkins, 2010), fulfilling the “tyranny” that Simón Bolívar envisioned. In one sense, then, voters are maybe more inclined to vote for the “devil you know” rather than an unknown opposition candidate (Carey, 2003; Ginsburg, Melton and

Elkins, 2010). Advocates of term limits argue that forced executive turnover deepens the processes of liberalization and democratization (Baturo, 2010), but its absence stymies both. Another detrimental feature of lax reelection laws are the manifest incumbency advantages, which can make it extremely difficult for a political leader to lose once in office (Maltz, 2007; Corrales and Penfold, 2014). While the premiseof

23 democratic accountability is predicated on the assumption that citizens can sanction governments if they are not acting in their best interest (Cheibub and Przeworski,

1999), recent evidence from Latin America suggests a “vicious cycle of increasing incumbent advantage” (Corrales and Penfold, 2014, p. 166). This draws into question the actual ability of citizens to sanction the executive, particularly when the incumbent has a manifest advantage and a proven track record of manipulating democratic institutions. Lastly, term limits may make political actors more likely to accept the rules of the game by creating a calculus that the opposition will have a chance of winning executive office in the near future, thus lowering the cost of becoming the opposition (Corrales and Penfold, 2014).

Most concerning for the current discussion, however, is the manner in which the extension of presidential term limits in Latin America are negotiated. According to

Carey (2003), when reforms to allow presidential reelection are secured via plebiscites rather than by negotiations with other political actors, the political leader in question does not need to make concessions to the opposition. As a result, the ability to sanction and provide checks and balances on the executive are inherently weakened.

By extension, when regimes are able to pass similar legislation by holding majorities in the legislative and judicial branches, horizontal checks become practically nonex- istent. While alteration in office may constrain the power of the president, unlimited presidential tenure may strengthen the powers of the executive (Maltz, 2007). In essence, then, citizens may find themselves trapped in a cycle where they are unable to “kick the rascal out.” Considering these potential disadvantages for citizens, why would they support the removal of presidential term limits in the first place?

24 2.3 Theory

2.3.1 Foundations

To begin, I argue that conceptualizations of what democracy means are not consistent across the region, country, or even individuals: citizens may have fundamentally different expectations for democracy depending upon a variety of internal and external factors. At the core of the matter, a mismatch between citizens’ expectations for democracy and the actual realization of democracy may exist. Moreover, the way people think about democracy sometimes is subject to dominant political paradigms and discourse. While citizens may expect democracy to spur economic growth, create a more egalitarian society, or protect individual economic interests, in practice, democracy is an institution, and perceptions of its capability are normatively driven.

As a result of the complex interplay between personal understanding, dialogue, and ever-changing circumstances, the very meaning of democracy is actively and individually derived.

Precisely because individual understanding of democracy is normative, I argue that its very meaning is perhaps variable. Elites and political discourse are able to shape definitions of democracy in important and tractable ways, such aslam- basting the inefficiency of presidential term limits as contrary to continued economic growth or as antagonistic to targeted social programs. When faced with a complex and constantly evolving political system and when continually bombarded with political messages, political behavior research suggests that citizens use “shortcuts” or heuristics to make decisions with minimal cognitive effort and at varying levels of political sophistication (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1991; Lau and Redlawsk,

2001). Heuristics are understood as problem-solving strategies, many of which are

25 automatic or unconscious, that represent cognitive shortcuts and allow individuals to make high-quality political decisions even with low levels of sophistication and information (Lau and Redlawsk, 2006). Some common heuristics include political parties

(Campbell et al., 1960), cues based upon a candidate’s demographics (Popkin, 1991), interest group leaders (Carmines and Kuklinski, 1990; Mondak, 1993; Lupia, 1994), and likability heuristics (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1991). While heuristics usually are studied as pertaining to political candidates or specific policies, I suggest that individuals also rely on similar “shortcuts” to make sense of complex, abstract, and normative political ideas. By extension, citizens may rely on these same heuristics to form their opinions regarding presidential term limits, and by extension, democracy.

Building upon the idea that citizens rely on heuristics for a multitude of political decision-making processes, what may seem puzzling at first glance is understood through this lens: citizens understanding of what democracy means for them and what it is expected to deliver may vary by context. For example, the high levels of support for democracy recorded in public opinion surveys and the erosion of democratic institutions on the ground in some areas suggests that a fundamental mismatch between normative and practical understandings of democracy is potentially at play.

In lieu of this, support for the elimination of term limits maybe is not at odds with the core tenets of democracy after all. Rather, support for the elimination of term limits may result from the interaction between political discourse and preexisting filters, such as identity, that are constantly relied on to make high-quality political decisions with relatively little cognitive effort.

When thinking about what drives opinions related to presidential term limits specifically, the political discourse is rife with explanations for or against the necessity

26 of this political tradition. I assume that individual decision making will inherently influence the political rhetoric surrounding the debate, and I have identified twoprimary conditions from which I then derive expectations based upon predisposed personal characteristics. In brief, I expect evaluations of the economy and social identity, both social class and ethnic or racial identity, as the primary heuristics that are drawn upon to make political decisions regarding the necessity of presidential term limits.4

I also expect that these two heuristic are linked intrinsically with conceptualizations of democracy (see Figure 2.1).

While partisan affiliations are a common heuristic in other contexts (e.g., see

Campbell et al., 1960), I do not expect them to be particularly relevant for the opinion- formation regarding presidential term limits in Latin America. As Madrid (2010) explains, low institutionalization and the eventual disintegration of party systems in some Latin American countries ushered in radical left movements in the 2000s.

Others suggest that low political party institutionalization is instead a byproduct of the interventionist left Weyland (2009). Regardless, there have been dramatic shifts in both the meaning and significance of political parties in the region, which prevents these parties from providing ideological signals on how to think about term limits to their constituents. Moreover, as a region, there are examples of both high and low levels of party system institutionalization, as well as four cases of party system collapse (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) (Mainwaring, 2018). All four of these extreme cases are countries in which term limit legislation has been removed at some point. As a result of this, partisan identification will not be considered asa meaningful heuristic for this dissertation.

4This is not to say that other heuristics will not influence the decision to support or reject term limit legislation. Rather, these are the primary heuristics identified and explored in this dissertation.

27 2.3.2 The Role of Economic Evaluations

In regard to economic evaluations, scholars have long extolled the virtues of economic growth in relation to democracy. Beginning with Lipset (1959), a large vein of the literature has centered on the relationship between positive economic growth, democratization, and democratic stability within the framework of modernization theory. Przeworski and colleagues suggested that economic development does not cause democracy, but rather sustains it (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Przeworski et al.,

2000), while Boix and Stokes (2003) found evidence for both theories of endogenous and exogenous democratization. Coinciding with the relationship between economic development and democracy, Inglehart identifies a corresponding shift in values that is theorized to occur concurrently with economic growth and modernization (Ingle- hart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, 2009). Moreover, individual perceptions of personal and national economic growth are positive indicators of support for institutions, satisfaction with democracy, and support for democracy (Booth and Seligson,

2009), although recent work has discovered that citizens are more reactive to negative personal and national economic conditions (Bergmann, Perry and Zhang, 2015).

Córdova and Seligson (2010) also found that low levels of economic development, low economic growth, and high income inequality negatively impacted the core attitudes necessary for a stable and healthy democracy.

In sum, the literature agrees that economic conditions invariably influence a variety of political circumstances, but it tends to focus on reactionary steps taken in response to poor economic conditions—as Coppedge explains, “A growing economy is a positive-sum game in which tolerance and compromise are easy; a shrinking economy is a zero-sum game in which resentment and intransigence are more likely”

28 (Coppedge, 2005, p. 296). As already explored in the literature, perceptions of general economic conditions influence the attitudes, perceptions, and behavior of a citizen in a democracy (see the general works of Inglehart). If economic conditions inform an individual’s attitudes and values, then it also should influence the way in which they interact with democratic institutions, particularly the conditions under which they form their opinions. Recent work corroborates this notion, as Singer (2018) found that citizens are more willing to tolerate degradations to horizontal and vertical accountability when they have positive economic evaluations. In regard to the elimination of presidential term limits, if the economy is doing well, an individual may tolerate, compromise, or even support the breakdown of political institutions, particularly if the expectation is of continued economic benefit. Alternatively, an individual with negative evaluations of the economic situation is maybe more inclined toward the reactionary, zero-sum game of institutional change. In this instance, I would expect citizens to rely on economic evaluations of the economy to inform their preferences regarding term limit legislation. Because presidential term limits are a relic of democratic institutions, it is theorized that this heuristic is used to inform the practical understanding of democracy.

2.3.3 Social Identity as a Heuristic

Political and social beliefs have roots in “the shared perceptions of social reality by large numbers of people and of the conditions leading to these shared perceptions”

(Tajfel, 1981, p. 15). Each individual has a social identity that is influenced by both ethnic and/or racial identity, as well as social class. In Latin America, political exclusion has historically centered on both class and racial/ethnic cleavages. Blumer

29 (1958) argued that prejudice operates as a “sense of group position,” where group relations are characterized by feelings of threat by other social groups and perceptions of where the in-group should stand relative to the out-group. These feelings of competition and hostility are a result of historical and collective judgments about the positions in the social order that in-group members should occupy in comparison to out-group members. Importantly, intergroup hostility is not a result of material conditions, but rather is based on four tenets: the belief of in-group superiority (ethnocentrism); perceptions that members of the out-group are alien and different; a sense that in-group members have a natural claim over certain rights; and lastly, an understanding that out-group members want a greater share of these “natural” rights and privileges that are understood to belong to the in-group (Blumer, 1958).

These group identities result from common ties to the group as a whole, such as a shared language or cultural customs, which further exacerbates the boundaries and differences between the in-group and the out-group (Brewer, 2001).

As a region, Latin America experienced a wave of peaceful democratic transitions from military regimes in mid-1970s to late 1980s that were characterized by processes of elite pacting (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 2013). As a legacy of the nature of these transitions, Latin American elites were successfully able to “bias” democracy in their favor (Albertus and Menaldo, 2013), which led to the effective political handicapping of the region’s population, namely the poor and indigenous populations, for most of the recent democratic history. More than just economic considerations, democracy in Latin America has centered on the exclusion of an economic and racial “other.”

As Lipset (1959) noted about the nature of democracy in Latin America: “...if a political system is not characterized by a value system allowing the peaceful ‘play’ of

30 power—the adherence by the ‘outs’ to decisions made by ‘ins’ and recognition by ‘ins’ of the rights of the ‘outs’—there can be no stable democracy” (Lipset, 1959, p. 71).

This history of systematic exclusion has given rise to the prevalence of social identity, where in-groups and out-groups are used to determine not only shared cultural beliefs or values, but also to calculate accessibility to political power.

In countries with large indigenous populations such as Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, the state has historically reinforced these power disparities by labeling indigenous people as “inferior, ignorant, and poor” (Bueno and Datta, 2010). These identities are significant when thinking about how democracy works in practice and howthese individuals might relate to the political system writ large. A few examples of the impact of social identity on politics include the distribution of material and nonma- terial goods, the prestige of the state, and the identity of the state as belonging to one group or another. As Horowitz (1993) famously stated, “Democracy is about inclusion and exclusions, about access to power, about the privileges that go with inclusion and the penalties that accompany exclusion. In severely divided societies, ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who will be excluded” (Horowitz, 1993, p. 18). For much of the region’s political history, the indigenous populations or ethnically “other” were systematically excluded from politics through legacies of rigid race-based class hierarchies from colonialism, which consolidated power in the hands of the small population of elites (Van Cott, 2000,

2005b). The rigid hierarchies of the political and social system have resulted in a situation where class and indigenous identities are intrinsically linked: “In Latin America, indigenous ethnicity is superimposed on structural economic inequality, reinforcing

31 class divisions” (Van Cott, 2000, pp. 160-161). Thus, social identity has historically reinforced power imbalances.

When groups are considered to possess similarities with intrinsically linked pro- jections of future outcomes, the perception of collective self-interest tends to influence ideological preferences as well. When group identification is relatively salient, members of low-status and low-power groups tend to lean slightly to the left (Jost, Federico and Napier, 2009). Similarly, ethnicity in and of itself provides an easily accessible heuristic that allows voters to bypass informational costs of similar policy preferences and political ideologies (Kuklinski, Quirk et al., 2000; Lau and Redlawsk, 2001), a heuristic which is particularly useful considering that these same populations are also more likely to have lower levels of education as well. In a U.S. context, these group- structured ideological considerations are most effective when racial cues play a direct role in candidate appeals (Valentino, Hutchings and White, 2002), a political tactic that has risen in prevalence across Latin America as well (Madrid, 2012). Relat- ing to the politicization of ethnic identities, scholars of U.S. politics have noted a phenomenon where candidate ethnicity is an explicit ethnic cue that alters the political choices through priming of their ethnic linked fate (McConnaughy et al., 2010).

More than just a campaign appeal, descriptive representation has the potential to provoke changes regarding the nature of political power: “Because these groups historically have been excluded from many aspects of the political process, descriptive representation may ‘empower’ them by conveying the message that politics is not an exclusionary domain” (Griffin and Keane, 2006, p. 999). In the context of achanging institutional environment, then, both ethnic and class identity provide a potential explanation for the growing prevalence of term limit threats.

32 While the literature on presidential term limits often couches the incumbent ad-

vantage as supporting the “devil you know” (Carey, 2003), the salience of identity

actually may provide an alternative explanation that reframes the desired longevity

of a leader as a strategic calculation for future benefits. Of particular importance,

identities of various kinds are associated with tangible political outcomes. For exam-

ple, ethnic affiliations are linked to pork politics (Fearon, 1999), the creation ofethnic

parties (Chandra, 2007), and the rise of ethnopopulist parties (Madrid, 2008, 2012).

Ethnic groups are theorized as a larger coalition that aims to receive scarce benefits

from the state (Bates, 1983), especially under conditions where the relative size of

ethnic groups are large enough to create viable bases of support (Posner, 2004), in or-

der to capitalize on the strong norms of reciprocity within these groups (Habyarimana

et al., 2009). In this way, then, these identities should intrinsically link and inform

the conceptualization of and interaction with democracy, particularly in regards to

Karl (1990) definition of democracy as who gets what, where, when, and how.

Extending this analysis a step further, social identity provides easily accessible clues for who is considered an “insider” or an “outsider” in a given regime. As previously mentioned, politicians are very effective at identifying and directly targeting these individuals. Thus, in the context of salient insider and outsider identities, I would expect insiders to have a less stringent interpretation of the necessary checks and balances required for democracy, particularly because of calculations of continued representation and constant political discourse that appeals to this identity.

Conversely, for outsiders, exclusion should remain equally salient. As a result, they will most likely become staunch interpreters of democracy, defending the necessity of term limits.

33 2.3.4 General Theoretical Framework

As previously described, individuals use heuristics to help them understand the complex political world. While a variety of heuristics are available, I have identified economic evaluations and social identity as two heuristics that exert an independent effect on opinion formation related to presidential term limits and larger conceptualizations of democracy. While these heuristics exist in an autonomous space, the crucial step in the causal pathway is the interaction between the aforementioned political heuristics and political discourse. In other words, evaluations of the economy and social identity exist independently from opinions related to term limits and democracy, but political discourse heightens the saliency of these particular decision- making shortcuts. In essence, political discourse triggers the link between economic evaluations and/or identity to political outcomes. In this way, elites, the media, and interest groups are able to provide easily digestible cues to citizens. These cues allow individuals to relate their perceptions, values, and situations to tangible political phenomena (see Iyengar (1990) for more on the impact of political discourse on the accessibility heuristic). This general relationship is presented in Figure 2.1.

Economic Evaluations

Opinion on Decision-Making Political Conceptualization Presidential Heuristics Discourse of Democracy Term Limits

Identity

Figure 2.1: General theoretical framework

34 In practical terms, the theoretical framework is based upon an understanding that political decisions are inherently difficult to make, and most citizens have low levels of political sophistication. In order to make a informed decisions under these circumstances, citizens use cognitive shortcuts to account for a lack of political knowledge and attention to political matters (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001). Through this, citizens are able to “match up” their values, ideals, and predispositions to their optimal political outcome. The way in which citizens identify the optimal political outcome is by filtering through the appropriate heuristics. While party identification, ideology, and descriptive representations are common heuristics, I am focusing instead on economic evaluations and social identity to account for the abstract relationship between presidential term limits and democracy. Because the debate surrounding presidential term limits does not have a clear ideological affiliation (Carmines and Stimson, 1980) and because party identification is decreasing across many democracies (Dalton and

Wattenberg, 2002), these heuristics are not useful in understanding the way people relate to democracy and its institutional outcomes on an individual level. Moreover, although a greater tendency to eliminate presidential term limits under leftist rulers in Latin America has existed, this is by no means an issue that has clear ideological or partisan affiliations. As such, economic evaluations and social identity are twoin- dependent shortcuts that citizens may use to better gauge how they should form their opinions related to this particular issue. Because debates around presidential term limits are fundamentally related to a discussion of the merits of democracy, I expect the use of the same cognitive heuristics to help citizens grapple with the concept of democracy.

35 2.4 Expectations

Focusing directly on identifying the conditions under which the elimination of presidential term limits may arise, two ways are seen in which political discourse may activate either economic evaluations or social identity, each of which have discrete implications for the opinion formation regarding presidential term limits.

I argue that economic evaluations drive expectations for democracy. As previously detailed, one can understand democracy based upon who gets what. In this sense, then, winners and losers always are present. When the economy is booming, for example, some citizens may benefit more than others. These citizens are possibly willing to exchange the checks and balances on executive power for the promise or expectations of economic fortunes, despite the negative impact changes to institutional arrangements may have on the integrity of the whole system. Thus, the recent natural resource windfalls in many Latin American countries, as well as the popular discourse surrounding them, may have activated this heuristic. As a result, positive economic conditions may pave the way for a compliant society in regard to the laxer presidential term limits, while negative economic conditions may have the adverse effect. Those who view economic circumstances in a negative light aresome- times seen as the current losers. As previously argued, economic downturns cause a “zero-sum” scenario, where the losers become much more risk-adverse, thereby becoming staunch supporters of the existing democratic framework. Thus, the general hypotheses relating economic evaluations to term limits are as follows:

H1a: Individuals with positive evaluations of the economy, or winners, are more likely to support the elimination of term limits than those with negative evaluations of the economy.

36 H1b: Individuals with negative evaluations of the economy, or losers, are more likely to support the maintenance of democratic term limits than individuals with positive evaluations of the economy. I also previously suggested the use of social identity as a heuristic to better understand a complex political environment. Democracy is understood as a competition over who gets what, and social identity provides easily interpretable signals about who is considered a beneficiary, or an insider in political bargains. Insiders and outsiders are defined broadly as those groups who directly benefit from a particular regime. While these identities exist as independent entities, the attachment to or saliency of social identity determines the usefulness of the heuristic on opinion formation. In other words, ethnic or racial identity is necessary but not sufficient for the heuristic to have use in the formation of political opinions. Rather, a strong attachment to the saliency of that identity also must exist. For example, I would not expect individuals who identify as ethnically indigenous, but who indicate a low level of attachment to this identity, to become particularly susceptible to signals of descriptive representation or targeted social programs that benefit their ethnic group. This leads me to the following relational hypotheses regarding identity:

H2a: If individuals have a salient insider identity, then they are more likely to support the elimination of term limits than those who do not have a salient insider identity.

H2b: If individuals have a salient outsider identity, then they are more like to support the maintenance of term limits than those who do not have a salient outsider identity. Extrapolating from the way in which economic evaluations and social identity influence opinion formation for presidential term limits, I also expect both of these heuristics to help in determining how conceptualizations of democracy vary from individual to individual. Somewhat counterintuitively, I expect individuals who have positive economic evaluations to have a much less stringent interpretation of democracy. These individuals maybe are willing to make democratic concessions to protect

37 their economic prospects. On the other hand, individuals with negative economic evaluations will operate in a zero-sum world, and they are much more risk averse. Rather than trying to revamp the entire system to suit their needs, they will want to preserve the status quo and minimize their losses. In sum, then, economic evaluations should condition support for and notions of democracy in practical terms. In a similar manner, social identity also will impact fundamental notions of democracy. By its sheer nature, particularly in presidential systems, democracy creates not just winners and losers, but also insiders and outsiders. For those on the inside in relatively new democracies, the rules of the game are much less entrenched, and thus are subject to reinterpretation. This problem is heightened in new democracies with large ethnic populations, many of which were historically outsiders. Thus, democracy becomes much less about the normative institutions, checks and balances, and accountability, and much more about very specific forms of representation, such as descriptive representation that promotes targeted social programs and multiethnic, cross-class coalitions. For insiders, then, democratic interpretation is lenient. When representation becomes a key heuristic, the other components of democracy wane in importance. Outsiders, however, may have a much stricter reading of democracy. For outsiders in a democratic system, the accountability and tenure restrictions offer the promise of regaining representation and flipping the balance of power. This then becomes an essential component of their democratic commitment. While I have detailed the manner in which economic evaluations and social identity function as heuristics for an understanding of presidential term limits specifically and the manifestation of democracy broadly, it is important to note a caveats regarding the theory. By definition, both of these heuristics are fluid categories. An economic loser may very easily become an economic winner during the tenure of a single president, depending on his or her personal economic fortunes and national economic outlooks.

38 Social insiders and outsiders are somewhat less flexible in that they do not change categories as readily, but rather require a more dramatic shift, such as executive or legislative reelection. As such, conceptualizations of democracy are also fluid in that they can receive interpretation and redefinement multiple times throughout an individual’s life. Individuals may become staunch, hardline supporters of democracy during a period of economic downturn, and yet the same individuals may become much less stricter in their interpretation of democracy during an economic boom. In other words, individuals may move in and out of categories (e.g., winners and losers, insiders and outsiders, etc.), but I expect the heuristics to operate in a consistent way. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I expect that winners and insiders will always have a tendency to bias the system in their favor in line with the findings of Singer (2018) and Albertus and Menaldo (2013). Even though I suspect the heuristics to remain relatively stable over time, both heuristics are susceptible to political discourse, and thus the way in which individuals are theorized to think about democracy is malleable rather than linked to their socio-demographic characteristics.

2.5 Conclusion

This dissertation asks why citizens continually express high levels of support for democracy in public opinion surveys and yet support the degradation of democracy in practice through the extension or elimination of presidential term limits. In an- swering this question, the dissertation explores what democracy might mean on the ground, and how economic orientations and social identities inform understandings of what is tolerable and expected from democracy itself. In exploring why citizens may support the extension of presidential term limits, I have proposed two possible mechanisms: economic evaluations and social identity. Both heuristics are theorized to aid citizens in complex opinion-formation processes. In exploring these questions,

39 the dissertation raises important questions about how definitions and understandings of democracy may differ from country to country, person to person, andeven throughout an individual’s lifetime. It also sheds light on the seemingly inconsistent preferences of citizens, and the ways in which to understand them instead as strategic choices.

40 Chapter 3: Bolivia and Ecuador: A Tale of Two Removals

My sincere position was always

against reelection, but after deep

reflection, and well aware that

sometimes our choices are between

the lesser of two evils, I’ve decided

to support this initiative.

Rafael Correa

3.1 Introduction

In Ecuador, presidential term limits were eliminated by a National Assembly vote in December 2015 in the face of massive protests. Barely three years later, Ecuadori- ans resoundingly voted to reinstate the two-term limits on presidents. In a similarly contentious environment, Bolivians narrowly defeated a referendum vote in February 2016 to allow Evo Morales to run for a fourth term. In December 2017, however, Bolivia’s Constitutional Tribunal reversed the referendum results by deciding that all elected officials could run for office indefinitely. This chapter asks: under whatcondi- tions do citizens support the elimination of presidential term limits? Building upon the logic outlined in the previous chapter, I argue that citizens support the removal

41 of tenure restrictions under two conditions. First, positive sociotropic and/or pocketbook evaluations of the economic situation should increase the propensity to support the removal of tenure restrictions. For citizens, economic fortune (or misfortune) serves as a heuristic for continuity. If citizens perceive that the economic situation under the current administration is benefitting them, and they connect this success to the incumbent, then they may decide that the prospect of continued economic success is more important than alteration of power or checks and balances. Secondly, social identity also informs opinion on term limits. Those who identify as outsiders5 are more likely to demand that term limits remain in place. I argue that social identity behaves as a shortcut that allows citizens to decide whether they expect to win or lose under the continuation of the current political arrangement. If individuals calculate that they are an outsider, then their expectation is that the policies of the incumbent will consistently disadvantage them, fulfilling prophesies of the tyranny of the majority. Outsiders, then, should more likely prefer the continuation of term restrictions under all scenarios. In order to test the causal mechanisms previously mentioned, I fielded an original survey in Bolivia and Ecuador in June 2016. The survey capitalizes on the preexisting saliency of economic evaluations and identity, both of which were theorized to function as cognitive shortcuts to help citizens process complex political phenomena. Recent natural resource windfalls, which created high levels of growth for most of the latter half of the 2000s, led to generous policies of social redistribution in both countries (Conaghan, 2011). Similarly, Bolivia and Ecuador have highly salient social hierarchies. While Bolivia has an indigenous national majority, Ecuador has a majority concentration of indigenous peoples (Van Cott, 2005a, 2010), both of which

5In Ecuador, an outsider is defined by self-categorization into the upper two social class tiers. In Bolivia, an outsider is defined in a two-fold manner: those who identify with the uppermost tiers of social class are considered outsiders, as well as those who identify as White.

42 were appealed to by the incumbents to varying degrees. Most importantly, both countries had undergone recent changes to their political dynamics and institutions, which culminated in efforts to eliminate presidential term limits. This provided a unique opportunity to measure citizens’ perspectives and rationale toward presidential term limits in a context where term limits were recently contested. Adding a layer of nuance and complexity to this chapter, however, is the fact that the survey is remarkably situated in between efforts to alter institutional constraints on executives in both countries. The survey was administered in Ecuador after the National Assembly lifted reelection restrictions on the president. Despite pressures for a referendum vote, citizens were not directly consulted (BBC News, 2015). In February 2018, voters were granted their wish; in a landslide decision, the two-term limit on a president was reinstated via referendum (The Guardian, 2018). In Bolivia, the tale is almost eerily the opposite. Bolstered by years of continually high popular support, Evo Morales was expected to easily win the referendum vote in February 2016, which would allow him to run for an unprecedented fourth consecutive term. However, in a shocking turn of events, his referendum was narrowly defeated by a very slim margin (Ramos and Machicao, 2016). As previously mentioned, Bolivia’s Constitutional Tribunal ruled that all term limits on elected officials were unconstitutional in late 2017, effectively reversing the referendum decision of 2016. Thus,in Bolivia, the survey data were collected before presidential term limits were successfully removed. In sum, while the data presented in this chapter sheds insights on attitudes toward term limits, it also provides some anecdotal food for thought regarding the mechanism of citizen consultation, whether court decision or referendum vote, as well as the potential pitfalls and unintended consequences of both. The main dependent variables of this chapter are dichotomous indicators of support for presidential term limits given a variety of rationales. Respondents were asked

43 to choose which of the statements (term limits vs. no term limits) was most in line with their perspective.6 The strongest finding was that positive sociotropic evaluations (favorable evaluations of the current state of the national economy) led to a greater propensity of rejecting the necessity of term limits under all specifications of the dependent variable. While negative sociotropic evaluations were linked to increased support for term limits, positive sociotropic evaluations yielded the largest effect on the dependent variables. Although the effect was not as robust, identifying as an ethnic outsider (White) in both countries was linked to an increased probability of supporting term limits. In addition, Bolivians had stronger support for term limits than Ecuadorians, a finding that merits further investigation considering the term limit reversals in both countries. The rest of this chapter will proceed as follows. First, I will contextualize the political environment leading up to the proposed changes to term limit legislation in each country. Next, I will describe the survey design, including the main explanatory variables, dependent variables, and implementation of the survey. Then, I will detail the theoretical expectations and hypotheses, describing the descriptive statistics of the sample before exploring the impact of the proposed heuristics. I will summarize the major findings and conclusions from the survey, later detailing an experimental manipulation that did not yield meaningful differences.

3.2 Political Context

Both Ecuador under president Rafael Correa and Bolivia through Evo Morales were broadly characterized as part of the “left turn” that spread throughout Latin America beginning in 1998 with the election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (e.g.,

6Respondents also were provided with a third category of “Don’t Know,” but these participants are dropped for the purposes of these analyses.

44 Castañeda, 2006; Weyland, Madrid and Hunter, 2010; Madrid, 2010; Levitsky and Roberts, 2011b). This turn to the left turn was set apart by its prioritization of a common commitment to redistribution and social welfare across the region. On top of this, both Correa and Morales strategically used their charisma in conjunction with populist appeals to increasingly personalize the nature of power in their respective countries (Levitsky and Roberts, 2011a). Often categorized as the “contestatory” left, these leaders shared a rejection of neoliberalism, a commitment to social change (at least rhetorically), and an emphasis on the participatory, majoritarian features of democracy, oftentimes at the expense of political pluralism and liberal protections (Weyland, 2010). This agenda included the introduction of new constitutions that extended the power of the executive, as well as laid the groundwork for the extension of presidential reelection, which both leaders took advantage of to prolong their tenure in office. Furthermore, Correa and Morales were largely successful in their efforts thanks to high levels of popularity. In 2008, a new constitution with a unicameral legislature was approved by 64% of Ecuadorians. This new constitution gave Correa control over monetary policy, powers to suspend the legislature, and the freedom to run for two additional consecutive terms (Conaghan, 2008, 2011, 2016). In a similar move in 2009, Bolivians approved a new constitution with 61% voter support. Even though the bicameral legislature remained intact, Morales succeeded in strengthening executive authority and undermining horizontal accountability (Madrid, 2011, 2012). In addition to introducing new, controversial constitutions, Correa and Morales relied upon the use of repeated elections, referenda, and social mobilization as a means to concentrate political power, further their policy agendas, and erode political institutions (Madrid, 2011; Ellner, 2012; Conaghan, 2011, 2016). This use of direct, un- mediated appeals to public opinion granted latitude for both leaders to govern “over

45 the heads” of other democratic institutions, such as the judiciary and the legislature. It harkens back to Lowi’s (1986) definition of plebiscitary presidencies, an idea that was central in O’Donnell’s (1994) conceptualization of delegative democracy.7 Luna and Vergara (2016) contend that the erosion of horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms largely is attributed to the surging economic windfalls from the mid- 2000s commodities boom that granted both leaders discretion over social spending and caused soaring approval ratings. Conaghan (2016) extends this logic by arguing that Ecuador resembles a delegative democracy because of its limited civil liberties, suppression of “participatory” rights, and erosion of both horizontal and civil liberties. Anria (2016), on the other hand, acknowledges that Bolivia possesses some characteristics of delegative democracy, such as the personalization of the presidency, weak horizontal accountability, and the manipulation of presidential term limits, but it has largely maintained, and perhaps even strengthened, its “incorporative” features. While economic fortune ingratiated both leaders to a majority of their populations, Morales relied upon explicit ethnic messages in his campaigns, activating symbolic appeals through the use of indigenous language, clothing, and symbols (Madrid, 2011, 2012). Correa also donned symbolic, ethnic clothing and used Kichwa sparingly, but his relationship with the indigenous was more complex. Unlike Morales, Correa did not have roots in indigenous social movements that granted him implicit legitimacy. Instead, he achieved electoral victory by positioning himself as a political outsider (Conaghan, 2008). Correa relied upon the mobilization of the poor and indigenous for electoral victories, such as the endorsement by the Confederation of Ecuadorian Indigenous Nationalities in his first election, while simultaneously rejecting their efforts for more direct influence on his policies (Conaghan, 2011; Ellner, 2012). Rather,

7Some scholars have referred to this reliance on referendums as “plebiscitary democracy” (Conaghan, 2008; Levitsky and Roberts, 2011a), while others refer to the reliance on a strong executive branch with direct popular participation in decision making as “radical democracy” (Ellner, 2012).

46 Correa’s attractiveness was derived largely from his social policies that shifted resources toward the poor and marginalized, mobilizing support from the unorganized and oft-ignored urban lower classes (Becker, 2013). Despite the fact that both leaders enjoyed remarkably high levels of public support throughout most of their presidencies, as Corrales (2016) warns, “Relaxing term limits beyond two terms has proven to be very difficult, even among popular presidents” (Corrales, 2016, p. 18). Indeed, the debate surrounding the extension of presidential term limits was well-publicized and hotly contested in both Ecuador and Bolivia. In Ecuador, Correa couched the debate about term limits in language regarding the democratic will. His rhetoric engaged the decision to indefinitely extend term limits as intrinsically related to his strategies for economic growth and his “political revolution.” Hearkening back to memories of Bolívar, this stance was in drastic opposition to his earlier position on eliminating term limits; in 2007, he characterized indefinite reelection as “absurd” while responding to Chávez’s loss in hisfirst referendum vote to remove term limits (Conaghan, 2008).8 His dramatic reversal of opinion is traced to declining support for his political movement. When the Alianza Pais (AP) lost midterm elections in major cities in 2014, he remarked, “My sincere position was always against reelection, but after deep reflection, and well aware that sometimes our choices are between the lesser of two evils, I’ve decided to support this initiative” (Alvaro, 2014). Up until this point, Correa had enjoyed high levels of popularity throughout most of his presidency, largely because of widespread social spending that resulted in declining poverty levels, lower levels of income and wealth inequality, and decreased unemployment (Conaghan, 2011). While he traditionally enjoyed popularity ratings between 60%-85%, the drop in oil prices forced him to cut back on spending and impose higher taxes (The Guardian, 2015a). Thus, Correa’s

8Original quotation from Conaghan (2008) on November 10, 2007, in El Universo: “Es absurda la reelección indefinida.”

47 decision to pursue indefinite reelection is framed in regard to his anticipation that other rivals were gaining control of the political arena. Considering his relatively high approval ratings, Correa had both the motivation and the capacity to change the rules of the game. Even with popular support, immediately following the National Assembly’s vote to repeal term limits, protests erupted. Facing prolonged unrest and an opposition that had organized hundreds of thousands of signatures in an attempt to force a referendum vote (The Economist, 2014), Correa9 vowed not to run in the next presidential election because of widespread dissension (Aljazeera, 2015). Even though half of the opposition legislators were not present for the National Assembly vote, symbolically abstaining to express their belief that the bill should have received a vote through ref-

2 10 erendum instead, the bill passed with the necessary 3 majority (Sonneland, 2016). Through tweets, Correa responded to the constitutional amendment with the following: “They [the opposition] want us to go back to the old country dominated by the usurpation of popular representation, immobilize us, impede us from governing” (The Guardian, 2015a). In what seemed to be a continuation of Correa’s legacy, his hand-picked successor and former vice president, Lenín Moreno, replaced him in office (Miroff, 2017). The victory for Correa was short-lived: Moreno introduced a constitutional referendum that would prevent Correa from running for office again, effectively nullifying the National Assembly decision. In response, Correa broke ties with the AP party

9While indefinite presidential reelection in Ecuador was passed in December 2015, a clause stipulates that the new amendment will not go into effect until after the country’s next president is sworn into office, effectively prohibiting Correa from running for reelection in the 2021 presidential elections (Sonneland, 2016). 10The constitutional amendments passed in the Constitutional Court via a 100-8 vote in the 137-seat National Assembly (The Guardian, 2015a).

48 that he had originally founded, creating a new political party named Citizens’ Revolu- tion (The Associated Press, 2018). Consistent with Acemoglu, Robinson and Torvik’s (2013) argument in regard to the elimination of checks and balances, Correa’s rhetoric was reminiscent of the notion that his rise to power and the consolidation of power within the presidency were in direct response to the dominant, corrupt, “other” elite who had historically controlled politics at all levels of government. In a similar move, Moreno described the 2018 referendum vote as a battle against corruption: “With this vote, we will be able to work on our fight against corruption” (Ayala and Rochabrún, 2018). On both sides of the battlefield, the Ecuadorian struggle over presidential term limits has relied upon similar justification and rhetoric. The political environment was equally as tense in Bolivia, including a massive “Yes” campaign, featuring a Star Wars parody starring Morales (Bolivian Wars: The “Yes” Awakens) and public Generation Evo demonstrations in the streets. An equally large Bolivia Says No campaign was orchestrated by a diverse opposition coalition (Achtenberg, 2016). As with Ecuador, Morales’ popularity declined as the economy slowed in 2014 (Anria, 2016). Even though the opposition in Bolivia has largely fragmented since Morales’ victory in 2005 (Madrid, 2005a,b), the Movimiento al So- cialismo (MAS) lost major mayoral races in large metropolitan cities and key guber- natorial seats in previous MAS-stronghold districts in the 2015 subnational elections (Anria, 2016). In general, opposition parties tend to react negatively toward easing term limits (Corrales, 2016), and with Morales’ lagging popularity, Bolivian political parties were no exception. In fact, the campaign to extend term limits sparked a uni- fying rallying cry throughout the opposition, allowing them to overcome preexisting fragmentation and momentarily overlook divisions between contesting leaders (Riedl, 2015).

49 In addition to political parties, civil society and public opinion also can mobilize collective action, particularly when the incumbent regime is accused of corruption (Riedl, 2015). Evidence in support of this theory is found in the allegations of corruption toward Morales that surfaced shortly before the 2016 referendum vote. Accusations of favoritism toward a former significant other and an unacknowledged illegitimate child were suspected to have tilted the vote in favor of “No” in the weeks preceding the Bolivian referendum (Collyns and Watts, 2016). After conceding a narrow defeat by a 51%–49% margin, Morales said: “We will respect the results. The important thing is to salute the Bolivian people for their democratic will” [emphasis mine] (Casey, 2016). Anria (2016) largely attributes Morales’ acceptance of the referendum loss as evidence that Bolivia qualifies as a democracy “with adjectives.” However, recent events have drawn this into question. In a stark reversal of his ini- tial acceptance of the referendum defeat, less than two years later on November 28, 2017, the Bolivian constitutional court overruled term limits for all elected officials, claiming that it violated office-holders’ human rights. Morales was quoted as saying that the ruling “guarantees democratic continuity” (The Economist, 2017). As previously evidenced, the debate around the elimination of presidential term limits had a long precedent both in the left turn and in the actions that the leaders had taken once elected, such as the introduction of new constitutions. Jorge Quiroga, a leading member of the Bolivian opposition, responded to the 2017 ruling on unlimited term limits by saying: “Evo Morales is ignoring the constitution that he himself asked us to vote for” (BBC News, 2017). The contentious nature of this debate was highly visible and directed at key sectors of the population as both leaders tried to mobilize their traditional bases of support. Both Correa and Morales orated arguments espousing the democratic will as they crafted subtle narrations that the

50 extension of unencumbered presidential reelection was intrinsically tied to their ver- sions of “radical,” “participatory,” and “plebiscitary” democracy. In one interpretation of this argument, presidential term limits are necessary in order to protect democracy. In another iteration, the one furthered by Correa and Morales, the removal of presidential term limits is an expression of continuity and an obvious manifestation of the will of the people. Responding to violent protests that erupted after Moreno’s narrow presidential victory in 2016, Correa said: “What they can’t accomplish at the polls, they’re trying to achieve by force... The revolution has triumphed again in Ecuador” (Miroff, 2017). From this point of view, democracy needs to eliminate term limitsin order to allow the people freedom of choice, even if that choice is continuity: “For so many years as a country we never moved forward, now we are really advancing and that’s thanks to Evo” [Felipa Aruquipa as quoted in Collyns and Watts (2016)].

3.2.1 Survey Design

Because most of the literature on presidential term limits focuses on the executive’s point of view, the goal of the larger dissertation and the survey was to better understand the term limit debate from the citizens’ perspective. As previously described, citizens played a critical role in term limit decisions in both countries—they protested, demonstrated, and voted on referenda. To capture their attitudes toward term limits, a survey was fielded in Bolivia and Ecuador to test the proposed heuristics outlined in Chapter 2. I posited two independent mechanisms—social identity and economic evaluations—that may drive opinion formation toward presidential term limits. This study ask respondents to think about the economic situation and their social identity to gauge the impact of these heuristics on preference for presidential term limits. Participants were advised that they were taking a survey about recent

51 political events, and after providing consent, they answered brief demographic questions. Two main blocks of questions were designed to measure either feelings toward the economy and feelings of closeness to the respondent’s social identity [adopted from Transue (2007)]. Each heuristic was comprised of four questions as follows:

Economic Heuristics: How would you describe the country’s economic situation? Do you think that in 12 months the economic situation of the country will be better, the same, or worse than it is now? How would you describe your overall economic situation? Do you think that in 12 months your economic situation will be better than, the same as, or worse than it is now?

Social Identity Heuristics: Now, thinking about your identity, which ethnicity do you believe pertains to you? How close do you feel to your ethnic group? People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to a social class. Which social class would you describe yourself as belonging to? How close do you feel to your social class?

All respondents were asked both of these main question blocks, but the order in which these questions were asked varied. The economic and identity treatments were immediately followed (or preceded) by the main dependent variable block.11 Next, respondents were asked a series of dependent variables dealing with conceptualization of democracy. Lastly, respondents were asked a series of political attitudes, political behaviors, and questions relating to their self-identification.

3.2.2 Dependent Variables

In order to capture the logic informing debates about attitudes toward presidential term limits, I constructed a series of dependent variables to tap into the prevailing language common in the political arena. Of the three dependent variables displayed, respondents were asked to read pairs of phrases while thinking about the actual situation in their country. They were then asked to choose which phrase they agreed

11See section 3.7 for a discussion of the experimental manipulation.

52 with most. Each pair of statements forced respondents to choose one of the positions or a third category of “Don’t Know.” The order in which the series of dependent variables was presented was randomized in order to prevent consistency bias. The first dependent variable gauges the “democratic will” argument as espoused byCorrea and Morales:

Term Limits–Democratic Rationale 1. It is important for democracy to allow the people to choose their president no matter how many terms he has already served.

2. It is important for democracy to limit the number of terms a president may serve.

In addition to the democratic rationale alluded to by both presidents, the next two dependent variables replicate the logic of the heuristics previously described. Both leaders shared high levels of economic success throughout their tenure that allowed them to divert large sums toward social spending. As a result, much of their success and popularity hinged on booming economies, which until recently were experiencing unprecedented levels of economic growth. Thus, the second dependent variable deals with economic explanations for eliminating presidential term limits:

Term Limits–Economic Rationale 3. It is important for economic stability that a president with a good economic record be allowed to serve unlimited terms.

4. It is important for economic stability to limit the number of terms a president may serve despite his good economic record.

Lastly, in the debate surrounding the necessity of term limits previously discussed, a common argument is that the elimination of limits on presidential tenure actually improves democratic representation because it allows a popular leader to remain in power without arbitrarily defined limits. In Bolivia and Ecuador, both of which have high levels of ethnic diversity and class consciousness, it is expected that issues of

53 representation are especially salient. The third dependent variable coincides with the social identity heuristic.

Term Limits–Identity Rationale

5. It is better for representation to allow the citizens to choose a leader who is like them no matter how many terms he has already served.

6. It is better for representation to limit the number of presidential term limits to make sure that a variety of people are represented.

The order in which these pairs of statements was presented was randomized in addition to each justification for or against term limits. Immediately following the three pairs of statements, respondents were asked to think about all of the arguments that were presented in favor and against presidential term limits. They were then given a list containing the six arguments previously described, and they were asked to identify which statement they agreed with most. The order in which these choices was presented was randomized. The fourth major dependent variable consists of the rationale for supporting each iteration of the previous three dependent variables as well as a general indicator of support for or against term limits. Lastly, respondents were asked whether or not they supported the elimination of presidential term limits in their country. In addition to the dependent variables measuring the respondents’ opinions toward presidential term limits, dependent variables that have both high external and internal validity considering the contested political environment, a variety of questions related to democracy also were asked. Immediately after the measurement of the dependent variables, respondents were asked questions relating to conceptualizations of democracy, such as an evaluation of certain characteristics as essential to democracy or not. Then respondents were asked a battery of political questions, such as their left-right identification, income bracket, and political affiliations. Lastly, respondents

54 were asked a range of questions that gauged their relative affiliation to the country, ethnic groups, and regional identities.

3.3 Expectations and Hypotheses

I have transformed the expectations for the impact of the heuristics described in

Chapter 2 in mathematical format, whereby ω0 denotes baseline support for term

limits and x0 represents the baseline support for the elimination of term limits. I assume that preference for the status quo, or support for the maintenance of presidential term limits, should rank higher than support for the elimination of term limits, ceteris paribus:

ω0 > x0

Extrapolating from this simple assumption, I derived expectations for the marginal impact of the primary heuristics—economic evaluations and social identity. These specific hypotheses are detailed in this section. Focusing first on the economic heuristics, respondents still will hold a preference concerning presidential term limits. These opinions are considered the baseline measurement for term-limit preference. Respon- dents who evaluate the economic situation positively are expected to have a baseline

preference of xecon; these respondents are more likely to prefer to remove term limit restrictions than respondents who view the economy negatively, as denoted by the

baseline preference ωecon. The opposite is expected as true for respondents who have negative economic evaluations.

H1: A respondent who has (positive/negative) economic evaluations should

prefer to (eliminate (xecon) / maintain (ωecon)) presidential term limits.

55 Turning our attention to the second heuristic, there are insiders and outsiders, or those who feel included by the current political system and those who feel excluded.12 I expect the baseline level of support to remain the maintenance of presidential term limits if a respondent identifies as an outsider (ωid). Individuals who identify as insiders should prefer the removal of term limits (xid). Here are the details of these hypotheses:

H2: A respondent who has an (insider/outsider) identity should prefer to

(eliminate (xid) / maintain (ωid)) presidential term limits.

In terms of relational hypotheses, I expect the economic evaluations to have a stronger impact than social identity. According to constructivists and proponents of social identity theory, individuals can hold multiple, overlapping social identities. Moreover, these identities exist on a continuum whereby a group identity can become more or less salient in regards to interpersonal identities (Tajfel et al., 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Economic circumstances, on the other hand, are more concrete. I also expect negative conditions (negative economic evaluations and a social identity as an outsider) to have the strongest impact on term limit opinions because previous research has demonstrated that people are more sensitive to losses rather than gains (Quattrone and Tversky, 1988). Assuming that preference for the maintenance of term limits is the norm (ω0 > x0), then:

ωecon > ωid

xecon > xid

Thus, respondents who have negative evaluations of the economic situation should have the strongest preference for the maintenance of term limits. Similarly, respondents who have positive economic evaluations should have the strongest preference

12As previously mentioned, however, simply possessing an ethnic or racial identity that is aligned with the included and excluded groups is necessary but not sufficient for the saliency of a social identity.

56 for the removal of presidential term limits. Conversely, respondents who identify as an outsider should have the weakest preference for the maintenance of term limits. Respondents who identify as an insider should have the weakest preference for the elimination of term limits. In sum, as previously mentioned, I expect stronger support for the maintenance of term limits than for the elimination of term limits.

3.4 Descriptive Statistics

3.4.1 Sample

The sample was composed of respondents from Bolivia and Ecuador drawn from the general adult population (>18 years old), and it was fielded by Qualtrics13 from June 14 to June 24, 2016.14 The sample was comprised of 749 participants (n=214 from Bolivia; n=535 from Ecuador), and the survey lasted approximately 15 minutes. The survey explored how citizens think about presidential term limits, tested how conceptualizations of democracy might depend on individual identities, and evaluated hypotheses related to the proposed heuristics on support for the extension of term limits. Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in Table 3.1. The median age of the Bolivian sample was slightly older (25-29 years) than the median age as recorded

13Qualtrics recruited participants through multiple methods, such as website intercept recruitment, member referrals, targeted e-mail lists, gaming sites, customer loyalty Web portals, permission- based networks, and social media. Using profile information provided by the participants, Qualtrics sent a unique email invitation to applicable participants. If they elected to participate, panelists received minor compensation upon completion of the survey. If they elected to stop before the survey was finished, participants were not compensated. Participants were verified through a double-opt-in process and agreed to take part in surveys for an incentive. 14Despite sacrifices in regard to internal and external validity, the survey was fielded online inorder to capitalize upon the timeliness of the debate over term limits in both countries. The survey was fielded ≈ 6 months after term limits were removed in Ecuador and ≈ 4 months after the failed referendum vote in Bolivia. It is also important to note that the survey was fielded before the constitutional court ruled that term limits were unconstitutional in Bolivia for elected officials and before the referendum in Ecuador that reinstated the two-term limit on presidents.

57 in the 2012 Census of 23.1 years. The median age in the Ecuadorian sample fell between the range of 35-39 years, while the median age from the 2010 census was 28.4 years. The Bolivian sample was less representative of females than the actual gender distribution of the country, while the Ecuadorian sample is fairly representative of the actual gender distribution in Ecuador. The sample in Bolivia is significantly more educated than the actual Bolivian population in terms of university matriculation. While 39.4% of Ecuadorians completed university, the most comparable statistic is that Ecuadorians spend about 9 years on scholarship (see the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos). Considering this, it is inferred that the Ecuadorian sample is more highly educated than the actual population.

Table 3.1: Demographic characteristics in Bolivia and Ecuador for the survey sample and population. Bolivia Ecuador Sample Census Sample Census Age (years) 25-29 23.1 35-39 28.4 % Female 33.0 49.9 48.2 50.0 % University 49.5 25.0 39.4 – % Indigenous 2.4 41.0 1.3 7.0 % Mestizo 73.6 – 84.3 71.9 % White 18.9 5.0 8.2 6.1 Income ≈$8,600 $2,800 ≈$6,300 $6,000 Notes: Age=Calculated by median age group; Female=Percent that identifies as female; Education=Percent of population that has grad- uated from college; Indigenous=Percent of the population that self- identifies as indigenous; Mestizo=Percent of the population that self- identifies as mestizo. This category was omitted in the 2012Boli- vian Census; Income=The census data is recorded as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in $USD. Sample incomes were calculated by dividing the mean monthly income by the current exchange rates and multiplying it by 12 months. Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística; Instituto Nacional de Es- tadística y Censos; World Development Indicators

58 In the 2012 Bolivian census, the racial identification categories were dramatically changed. The category of mestizo was eliminated in order to not mix a racial and cultural term. As a result, citizens were not given the choice to identify as mestizo (Calle, 2012). Only 2.4% of my sample identified as indigenous as compared to 41% from the census, 73.6% of respondents in the sample identified as mestizo, and 18.9% identified as White. Considering that 40.3% of the population self-identified as belonging to none of the country’s 36 indigenous groups in the 2012 census (Mallén, 2013), it is possible that those who identified with a particular group in the official census chose to identify as mestizo when given the opportunity. Because of that, the sample underrepresents indigenous groups and overrepresent Whites. The Ecuadorian sample also underrepresents indigenous people, although by a much smaller margin. The sample appears to overrepresent mestizos—84.3% as compared to 71.9% in the national census—while the sample is relatively close to the actual White population with 8.2% vs. 6.1%. Because both samples underrepresent indigenous populations, an important base of support for both leaders, those who identify as White serve as the reference group, which circumvents the cultural and ethnic mixing associated with the term mestizo in both countries. This outsider ethnic identity is broadly interpreted as functioning as a heuristic for making complex political decisions. Lastly, an approximation of median annual incomes as compared to GDP per capita shows that yearly income in the Bolivian sample is almost three times as large as the Bolivian GDP per capita. The mean income in the sample is slightly less than the median (≈$5,900), which is largely because of the fact that almost 25% of the sample is in the highest monthly income bracket (greater than 120.000 Bolivianos, or more than ≈$18,000 per year) as demonstrated in Figure A.8 (Appendix A.0.1). The median income of the Ecuadorian sample is slightly more than the GDP per capita. As with the Bolivian sample, the Ecuadorian sample has a high frequency of

59 respondents in the top third of the monthly income brackets (Figure A.7 in Appendix A.0.1), resulting in a mean yearly income of ≈$5,520. In sum, both samples have a high concentration of wealthy respondents. Because of relatively low Internet penetration rates15 in the countries of interest, however, it is not surprising that the samples overrepresent higher income levels and the White population in the case of Bolivia. The composition of the sample then presents a “hard test” for the social identity and economic hypotheses. Because those in the wealthiest income categories are typically classified as outsiders under both of the current political regimes, any difference in support for term limits based on the identity or economic heuristics will lend evidence that those considered insiders or outsiders significantly impact the way in which the heuristics influence opinion- formation on term limits.

3.4.2 Dependent Variables

Tables 3.2 and 3.3 display the percentage breakdown of support for term limits of the samples in each country for the three main dependent variables (economic rationale, identity rational, and democratic rationale) and the dichotomous indicator for the dependent variable that allowed respondents to choose the rationale that they found most convincing. All of the dependent variables are coded so that 1 denotes support for the status quo, or the necessity of maintaining presidential term limits. Respondents that chose the third option “Don’t Know” are removed. In Ecuador, preference for maintaining presidential term limits is approximately 56%, with the exception of Economic Rationale. Contrary to expectations, the economic rationale yields the most support for maintaining term limits (≈63%). For Bolivia, support

15According to the World Bank, Bolivia and Ecuador have 39 and 43 Internet users per 100 people respectively.

60 for the maintenance of term limits hovers at approximately 84% across all of the variations of the dependent variables. On average, the Ecuadorian sample was much more divided on the questions of whether term limits are necessary than respondents in the Bolivian sample.

Table 3.2: Frequency distributions of dependent variables in Ecuador. Variable Remove Term Limits (0) Maintain Term Limits (1) N Democratic Rationale 44.85% 55.15% 515 Economic Rationale 36.99% 63.01% 492 Identity Rationale 50.20% 49.80% 492 Any Rationale 43.03% 56.97% 488

Table 3.3: Frequency distributions of dependent variables in Bolivia. Variable Remove Term Limits (0) Maintain Term Limits (1) N Democratic Rationale 13.59% 86.41% 206 Economic Rationale 14.71% 85.29% 204 Identity Rationale 17.87% 82.13% 207 Any Rationale 16.50% 83.50% 200

3.4.3 Explanatory Variables

As for the main explanatory variables, the frequency distribution of respondents for the economic heuristics are displayed by country (Tables 3.4 and 3.5). Regard- ing the current economic situation, participants were asked to evaluate the state of the national economy and their personal economic circumstances. Sociotropic Eval- uations and Pocketbook Evaluations originally were coded on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from very bad to very good, but responses were collapsed to a 3-point scale to range from -1, which denotes negative evaluations, to +1, which signifies positive

61 evaluations; respondents who did not know or did not answer were dropped. Ecuado- rian respondents (54.6%) tended to have more pessimistic evaluations of the current national economic situation than Bolivians (35.7%). In line with this, Bolivians evaluated their national economy more favorably than Ecuadorians (19.5% vs. 12.9%). In terms of their personal economic situations, about one-third of Ecuadorian respondents had negative evaluations (33%), while ≈17% of Bolivian participants had poor evaluations of their personal economic circumstances. Approximately 27% of the Bolivian sample had good evaluations of their personal economic circumstances as compared to ≈18% of the Ecuadorian sample.

Table 3.4: Frequency distributions of current sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations. The questions read as follows: “Speaking of the economy, how would you describe (the country’s/your) economic situation?”

Variable Bad (-1) Neither Bad Good (1) N Nor Good (0)

Sociotropic Eval 54.6% 35.5% 12.9% 535

Ecuador Pocketbook Eval 33.0% 49.3% 17.6% 533

Sociotropic Eval 35.7% 44.8% 19.5% 210

Bolivia Pocketbook Eval 17.0% 55.7% 27.4% 212

Respondents also were asked to evaluate future sociotropic and pocketbook circumstances (Table 3.5). Sociotropic Future and Pocketbook Future range from -1 to 1 along the following scale: worse (-1), same (0), and better (1). Focusing first on sociotropic future evaluations, ≈38% of Ecuadorians thought that the national economy would perform worse in the next year, while almost half of Bolivians had negative expectations for the national economy. Even though Ecuadorians in the sample had

62 more negative evaluations of the current state of their national economy than Boli- vians, they were about twice as optimistic (≈17%) about its future than Bolivians (≈8%), although it is worth noting that optimism about the future of the national economic situation was incredibly low in both countries. Moving to expectations about their personal economic futures, both countries had relatively similar evaluations— ≈17% of Ecuadorians and ≈11% of Bolivians thought that their personal economic situations would get worse, while ≈37% and ≈33% respectively thought that their personal economic situations would improve.

Table 3.5: Frequency distributions of future sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations. The questions read as follows: “Do you think that in 12 months (the/your) economic situation of the country will be better, the same, or worse than it is now?”

Variable Worse (-1) Same (0) Better (1) N

Sociotropic Future 37.8% 45.4% 16.8% 535

Ecuador Pocketbook Future 16.5% 47.1% 36.5% 535

Sociotropic Future 49.5% 41.9% 8.5% 212

Bolivia Pocketbook Future 11.3% 55.7% 33.0% 212

Turning to the identity heuristics, summary statistics for class identification, class attachment, and ethnic attachment are presented in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7. As previously mentioned, Correa’s main base of support came from his successful mobilization of marginalized, urban working classes (Becker, 2013), while both class and ethnic identity were directly appealed to by Morales in Bolivia (Madrid, 2011, 2012). Respondents were asked to self-identify with a social class on a five-point scale ranging from lower to upper. Respondents then were asked to rate how close they felt to their social class and ethnic group on a five-point scale ranging from very distant to

63 very close. All respondents who answered that they did not know or did not want to answer were dropped. For both Ecuadorian and Bolivian respondents, the mean (and modal) self-identification was as middle class (n=300 and n=134, respectively). Both countries also have a similar strength of attachment to their class identity in the median category, which is neither close nor distant, and both distributions have a negative-skew (see Appendix A.0.1 Figure A.3 and Figure A.4).

Table 3.6: Summary statistics for identity heuristics in Ecuador. Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N Class ID 2.733 0.695 1 5 510 Class Attachment 0.692 0.878 -2 2 503 Ethnic Attachment 0.708 0.904 -2 2 535

Table 3.7: Summary statistics for identity heuristics in Bolivia. Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N Class ID 3.015 0.665 1 5 202 Class Attachment 0.606 0.745 -2 2 198 Ethnic Attachment 0.189 0.925 -2 2 212

Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show the distribution of self-identification by ethnicity in Ecuador and Bolivia. The most common self-identification in both countries is mestizo (n=451 and n=156), which is consistent with the changes to ethnic identification that were made in the most recent round of the Bolivian census previously mentioned (Calle, 2012). In order to draw clear distinctions between those who identify as insiders and outsiders, for the subsequent analyses, ethnic outsiders are coded as any respondents who self-identify as White, which most closely approximated the representative ethnic distribution in each country. The mean (and modal) response for

64 ethnic proximity in both countries was neither close nor distant, and the distribution of responses had a negative-skew (see Appendix A.0.1 Figure A.5 and Figure A.6).

Figure 3.1: Frequency of ethnic self-identification in Ecuador: “Now, thinking about your identity, which ethnicity do you believe pertains to you?”

3.5 Analyses

In order to better understand the relationship between the proposed heuristics and term limit attitudes, the next stage of the analysis relies on multivariate logistic regression. Logistic regression models allow me to predict term limit attitudes for each specific dependent variable (democratic, economic, and identity rationale along with the aggregated choice dependent variable), while modeling the nature of the

65 Figure 3.2: Frequency of ethnic self-identification in Bolivia “Now, thinking about your identity, which ethnicity do you believe pertains to you?”

heuristic mechanisms for each country. This exercise allows me to more fully test the proposed heuristic mechanisms of economic evaluations and identity, as well as discern which factors predict support for term limits. Along with a robust battery of control variables, the logistic regression models account for a variety of alternative explanations. For example, it is perhaps the case that feelings toward the current president at the time of the survey (Correa and Morales) are related to support for the removal or maintenance of term limits. Pos- itive evaluations of the current president is possibly associated with a willingness to remove term limits, while negative evaluations could explain the maintenance of term limits. This alternative explanation is captured by Pres_Eval, which is a 5-point scale

66 ranging from very bad to very good for evaluations of the job performance of the president in each country. Scholars also have argued that civic culture and social capital, particularly dense horizontal ties between citizens that boost interpersonal trust and cooperation, are essential for a well-functioning democracy (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1994; Putnam, 2000). Perhaps high levels of interpersonal trust are indicative of more democratic attitudes that would oppose the removal of constraints on the executive. Trust measures levels of interpersonal trust on a 4-point scale, ranging from evaluations that most people are untrustworthy to very trustworthy. In a similar vein, a rejection of presidential term limits could relate to implicit or explicit antidemocratic attitudes. In their attempt to explain anti-Semitism, Adorno et al. (1950) argue that certain personality pathologies lead to ethnocentrism and less tolerance toward out-groups. These individuals are possibly more predisposed to support authoritarianism and thus more likely to support the removal of term limits. To capture the potential for an authoritarian personality, I used an abbreviated version of the potential for fascism scale (the F-scale). Higher values are associated with a more authoritarian personality. On the other hand, participation in protest may signal a rejection of authoritarian tendencies, specifically because protests are associated with “contentious” politics and have had success in removing unpopular leaders throughout the world (Slater, 2010; Beaulieu, 2014; Boulding, 2014). Protest indicates whether a respondent has participated in a protest or demonstration within the last year. Lastly, another argument is also that individuals might support the removal of presidential term limits if they are not very satisfied with the way democracy is working or if they are not supportive of democracy. Dem_Sat records how satisfied respondents are with democracy on a 4-point scale from very dissatisfied to very satisfied, while Dem_Support captures agreement with the following statement

67 on a 7-point scale that ranges from strongly disagree to strongly agree: “Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government.” In addition, the logistic regression models include multiple control variables. Right measures ideology on a 10-point scale where higher values are associated with the ideological right. Vote is a dummy variable that signifies whether a respondent voted in the last election, and PID is a dichotomous indicator of whether a participant identifies with a political party. Gender accounts for sex, and males serve as the baseline. Age and Education both allow respondents to self-select into predefined buckets, and higher values are associated with older age and higher education levels respectively. Lastly, Income is self-reported and standardized on a 17-point scale for both countries.

3.5.1 Economic Heuristics

In order to evaluate the hypotheses in relation to the economic heuristics, I conducted logistic regressions for each of the four dependent variables. All of the models have relatively similar findings, with the exception of the Any Rationale model, where all of the economic heuristics fail to reach statistical significance in the full model with controls. For the sake of clarity, I only will discuss the regression results for the Eco- nomic Rationale dependent variable, which has the most robust effect in terms of the main explanatory variables.16 Beginning with Model 1 in Table 3.8, I evaluated the direct relationship between national sociotropic evaluations and support for term limits. As sociotropic evaluations change from bad, to neutral, to positive, the odds of supporting term limits decrease. In plain words, positive evaluations of the national economy are related to a greater propensity to think that presidential term limits are not necessary, although

16The remaining three regression tables are available in A.0.1 Table A.1, Table A.2, and Table A.3.

68 the positive coefficient for the Bolivia dummy variable suggests that this findingis moderated by country: Ecuadorians are more likely to view term limits as unnecessary if they evaluate the national economy positively or have positive future expectations for the economy. Both of these explanatory variables reach statistical significance in the restricted model. Model 2 presents the relationship between pocketbook evaluations and support for term limits. While the effect is in the same direction, pocketbook evaluations fail to reach standard levels of statistical significance. Similar to Model 1, positive evaluations of future personal economic status are related to a rejection of the idea that presidential term limits are necessary. Turning to Model 3, which accounts for both sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations, the effect of pocketbook evaluations is washed away. After sociotropic evaluations are included in a more fully specified model, pocketbook evaluations lose all explanatory power. As suggested by the size and statistical significance of the coefficients from Model 1, current and futureso- ciotropic evaluations have the most robust effect in determining support for term limits. The significance of the Bolivian variable in both Models 2 and 3 also indicates that the effect of both economic heuristics is larger in Ecuador than in Bolivia. Finally, turning to a fully specified model that includes the main explanatory variables, potential alternative explanations, and control variables,17 only sociotropic evaluations remain statistically significant. This finding is particularly notable considering the inclusion of alternative explanations. Sociotropic evaluations continue to have statistically significance, even after controlling for presidential evaluations, interpersonal trust, the authoritarian personality, and a host of political variables. While presidential evaluations have one of the largest coefficients in the fully specified model, it does not erase the effect of the sociotropic economic heuristic.

17See Table 3.8 for the full model with control variable coefficients.

69 Table 3.8: Support for term limits (economic rationale): economic heuristics (1) (2) (3) (4) Bolivia 1.575∗∗∗ 1.287∗∗∗ 1.530∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ (0.240) (0.220) (0.241) (0.273) Socio_Eval −1.050∗∗∗ −1.165∗∗∗ −0.708∗∗∗ (0.142) (0.163) (0.187) Socio_Future −0.387∗∗ −0.413∗∗ −0.144 (0.137) (0.157) (0.176) Pocket_Eval −0.254 0.296 0.199 (0.131) (0.162) (0.179) Pocket_Future −0.391∗∗ −0.005 0.067 (0.133) (0.166) (0.177) Pres_Eval −0.477∗∗∗ (0.122) Trust 0.222∗ (0.111) F-Scale −0.173∗ (0.085) Protest 0.498 (0.350) Dem_Sat −0.062 (0.164) Dem_Support 0.006 (0.060) Right 0.075 (0.047) Vote 0.012 (0.031) PID −0.182 (0.142) Gender 0.048 (0.212) Age 0.026 (0.049) Education 0.121 (0.076) Income 0.012 (0.029) Constant 0.072 0.610∗∗∗ 0.077 −0.061 (0.114) (0.105) (0.132) (0.901) Observations 694 694 692 676 Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

70 The other notable findings from the model include the statistically significant coefficients for the Bolivia variable, presidential evaluations, trust, and the authoritarian personality scale. Positive evaluations of the sitting president (Correa and Morales, respectively) are related to a rejection of the necessity of presidential term limits. Higher levels of interpersonal trust, on the other hand, predict support for the necessity of term limits as consistent with the literature previously detailed. Lastly, higher scores on the authoritarian personality scale (the F-Scale) also are related to the opinion that presidential term limits are maybe not necessary when considering economic rationale. Notably, participation in protest does not reach statistical significance. Neither satisfaction with democracy nor support for democracy are related to support for term limits. Both partisan variables, identification with the right and with a political party, explain support for term limits. In order to tease out the effect of the main economic heuristic on support forterm limits in each country, Figure 3.3 plots the predicted probabilities for sociotropic evaluations using the Economic Rationale dependent variable. As suggested by the logistic regression coefficients, Bolivians in general were much more supportive of presidential term limits. In the sample, Bolivians who evaluated the current national economic situation as bad or very bad had a 91% probability of supporting the necessity of presidential term limits despite a president’s positive economic record. As sociotropic evaluations changed to neutral, the predicted probability of supporting term limits dropped to 86%, further decreasing to 75% for those who had good or very good evaluations of the national economic situation. As sociotropic evaluations changed from bad to good in Bolivia, there was a 16-percentage point decrease was seen in the predicted probability of supporting term limits. The differences between levels of sociotropic evaluations were not statistically significant.

71 Figure 3.3: Predicted probability of support for term limits with the economic rationale by country and sociotropic evaluations with 95% confidence intervals.

The effect of sociotropic evaluations was much more dramatic in Ecuador. Ecuado- rians who evaluated the national economy poorly had a 70% probability of supporting term limits, which decreased to 60% and 43% for neutral and positive evaluations respectively. There was a 27-percentage point difference in the probability of supporting presidential term limits as sociotropic evaluations moved from negative to positive. The difference between the neutral category and negative evaluations was statistically significance at the p<0.01 significance level, while the difference between neutral and positive evaluations was significant at the p<0.10 significance level. In both countries, then, positive sociotropic evaluations were linked to the rationale that presidents could serve unlimited terms in the name of economic stability if the president had

72 a good economic record. While the general trend remained the same, the positive sociotropic effect was 32-percentage points higher in Ecuador than in Bolivia.

3.5.2 Identity Heuristics

Table 3.9 presents the results for the simple and full logistic regression models predicting support for term limits as a function of the identity heuristics using the Identity Rationale dependent variable. As with the economic heuristics, the remaining three models are included in the Appendix.18 All of the models show a positive effect associated with identifying as an ethnic outsider, although this effect fails to achieve statistical significance in the models for the Economic Rationale and Any Rationale dependent variables. Beginning with Model 1 in Table 3.9, a positive, statistically significant effect for the Bolivia dummy variable and ethnic outsider indicator, is seen which is a dummy variable for those who self-identify as White. Identifying as White is positively associated with support for term limits for the Identity Rationale, and this effect is stronger in Bolivia than in Ecuador. No effect in regard to the strength of this ethnic attachment is noted. In regard to the class heuristics, a strong, positive effect of identifying as a class outsider (upper-middle or upper class) is seen. Those who self- identify with the upper tier of social class are more likely to support term limits, despite explanations in favor of unlimited terms for the sake of representing someone like them. This effect is stronger for Bolivians than Ecuadorians, and no effect for class attachment is noted. Turning to Model 3, which includes both ethnic and class heuristics, only the relationship between ethnic outsiders and support for term limits

18The remaining models can be found in Table A.4, Table A.5, and Table A.6. All of the identity heuristics fail to reach statistical significance for the Economic Rationale and Any Rationale dependent variables.

73 Table 3.9: Support for term limits (identity rationale): identity heuristics (1) (2) (3) (4) Bolivia 1.490∗∗∗ 1.429∗∗∗ 1.430∗∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗ (0.208) (0.208) (0.216) (0.249) Ethnic Outsider 1.084∗∗∗ 0.972∗∗ 0.845∗ (0.316) (0.320) (0.351) Ethnic Attachment 0.052 0.120 0.207 (0.088) (0.101) (0.109) Class Outsider 0.599∗ 0.482 0.149 (0.281) (0.282) (0.328) Class Attachment −0.130 −0.166 −0.133 (0.097) (0.112) (0.120) Pres_Eval −0.685∗∗∗ (0.114) Trust 0.157 (0.088) F-Scale −0.196∗ (0.087) Protest 0.029 (0.289) Dem_Sat −0.204 (0.155) Dem_Support 0.038 (0.060) Right 0.076 (0.050) Vote −0.034 (0.031) Gender 0.244 (0.203) Age 0.136∗∗ (0.050) Education 0.149∗ (0.076) Income 0.049 (0.027) Constant −0.128 0.034 −0.092 −2.365∗∗ (0.113) (0.117) (0.127) (0.862) Observations 699 665 665 650 Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

74 remains. Once identification as White is accounted for, class identification nolonger reaches statistical significance. In the fully specified model in column 4, the positive effect of ethnic outsiders still remains, although the significance level has fallen to p<0.05. As noted with the economic heuristic models, as evaluations of the president increase in favorability, support for term limits decreases. Individuals with more authoritarian personalities are likely to reject the necessity of presidential term limits. Unlike the model with the economic heuristics, identifying with a political party is negatively associated with support for term limits. Again, many of the major alternative explanations, such as satisfaction with democracy, participation in protest, and identification with the right, are not significant in the fully specified model. Because of the significant coefficient for the Bolivian dummy variable, Figure3.5 plots the predicted probability of support for term limits with the identity rationale for both countries by identification as an ethnic outsider. Beginning with Ecuador, those who identify as non-White have a 49% predicted probability of supporting term limits, which increases by 16 percentage points to 65% for those who identify as White. This change is statistically significant at p=0.08. For Bolivian participants, the predicted probability of supporting term limits is 80% for those who self-identified as non-White, while this probability increased by 9 percentage points to 89% for those who identified as White. However, this difference in probabilities is not statistically significant. As noted from the regression coefficients, Bolivians on average havea higher probability of supporting term limits. For non-Whites, a 32 percentage point difference in predicted probabilities exists across countries, while this difference decreases to a 24 percentage point difference for Whites. In sum, those who identify as non-White tend to have a greater probability of rejecting the necessity of term limits,

75 while those who identify as White are more likely to support term limits, although this effect is attenuated by country-level differences.

Figure 3.4: Predicted probability of support for term limits with the identity rationale by country and ethnic identification with 95% confidence intervals.

3.5.3 Both Heuristics

In order to fully test the relational hypotheses outlined earlier, Table 3.10 includes all of the heuristics in a fully specified model for each of the four main dependent variables. Bolivian participants are consistently more supportive of term limits across all iterations of the dependent variables as signified by the positive, statistically significant coefficients for the Bolivia indicator variable. Considering the main predictive economic heuristic (sociotropic evaluations), this effect is negative and statistically

76 Table 3.10: Support for term limits Dem Econ ID Any Rationale Bolivia 1.130∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗ (0.288) (0.289) (0.259) (0.266) Socio_Eval −0.441∗ −0.655∗∗∗ −0.480∗ −0.328 (0.198) (0.194) (0.208) (0.190) Socio_Future −0.315 −0.128 −0.216 −0.340∗ (0.173) (0.176) (0.171) (0.171) Pocket_Eval 0.111 0.194 0.013 −0.036 (0.189) (0.187) (0.194) (0.182) Pocket_Future 0.034 0.076 −0.195 0.216 (0.184) (0.181) (0.175) (0.179) Ethnic Outsider 0.781∗ −0.072 0.892∗ 0.466 (0.364) (0.316) (0.346) (0.343) Ethnic Proximity −0.009 −0.001 0.028 −0.047 (0.090) (0.091) (0.084) (0.084) Class Outsider 0.218 0.022 0.312 −0.106 (0.375) (0.352) (0.335) (0.314) Class Proximity 0.014 0.061 −0.038 −0.069 (0.139) (0.131) (0.126) (0.134) Pres_Eval −0.770∗∗∗ −0.564∗∗∗ −0.529∗∗∗ −0.589∗∗∗ (0.135) (0.130) (0.119) (0.125) Trust 0.170 0.161 0.180∗ 0.101 (0.094) (0.091) (0.090) (0.089) F-Scale −0.320∗∗∗ −0.168 −0.199∗ −0.068 (0.085) (0.087) (0.089) (0.084) Protest 0.268 0.370 0.037 −0.194 (0.325) (0.353) (0.297) (0.306) Dem_Sat 0.043 −0.009 0.065 −0.076 (0.175) (0.167) (0.168) (0.174) Dem_Support 0.066 0.014 0.042 −0.040 (0.060) (0.061) (0.059) (0.058) Right 0.011 0.071 0.086 0.121∗ (0.052) (0.048) (0.052) (0.053) Vote −0.018 0.009 −0.035 −0.006 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) PID −0.194 −0.149 −0.279 −0.069 (0.146) (0.146) (0.147) (0.144) Gender 0.203 0.093 0.099 0.095 (0.222) (0.221) (0.208) (0.216) Age 0.115∗ 0.026 0.156∗∗ 0.106∗ (0.054) (0.050) (0.050) (0.054) Education 0.149 0.116 0.160∗ 0.168∗ (0.079) (0.078) (0.075) (0.077) Income 0.002 0.001 0.052 0.000 (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) Constant −1.702 −1.151 −3.012∗∗ −1.376 (1.018) (0.930) (0.930) (0.933) Observations 664 644 647 633 Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

77 significant across all four dependent variables, with the exception ofthe Any Ra- tionale dependent variable where it just fails to reach standard levels of statistical significance with p=0.08. In line with the limited models discussed earlier, none of the other economic heuristics (sociotropic future, pocketbook evaluations, or pocketbook future) have a statistically significant impact on term limits, except for future sociotropic evaluations, which are negative and statistically significant in the Any Ra- tionale model. When respondents are given the preference to choose which rationale for supporting (or rejecting) term limits best represents their perspective, positive future sociotropic evaluations are associated with a repudiation of term limits. For the identity heuristics, identification as an ethnic outsider has a positive, statistically significant effect for the Democratic Rationale and Identity Rationale dependent variables. For these two models, after controlling for the economic heuristics, potential alternative explanations, and demographic and political variables, self- identifying as White has a positive effect on support for term limits. In terms ofthe size of the coefficient, the effect of identity actually is stronger than economic evaluations, which is contrary to my expectations. However, sociotropic evaluations have a more consistent, robust effect on support for term limits across all iterations of thede- pendent variables. The remaining identity heuristics (ethnic proximity, class outsider, and class proximity) do not reach statistical significance in any of the models. The other consistent, negative effect comes from the presidential evaluation variable. As presidential ratings improve from bad to good, support for presidential term limits decreases. The authoritarian personality scale is negative and statistically significant for Democratic Rationale and Identity Rationale, while interpersonal trust is positive and statistically significant for the Identity Rationale. Identifying with the right is positive and statistically significant for the Any Rationale model. Moreover, these fully specified models confirm that other explanations, primarily participation

78 in protest, satisfaction with democracy, and support for democracy, are not associated with support for term limits. As an examination of the interactive effect of the joint heuristics, Figure 3.5 plots the marginal effect at the means for the predicted probability of support forterm limits as sociotropic evaluations and ethnic identification vary for each country. The general trends from the individual heuristics are replicated, but the effect is amplified in the fully specified model. For Ecuador, the predicted probability of supporting term limits starts at 67% for an individual who is White and evaluates the national economy poorly. This probability drops 12 percentage points to 55% as sociotropic evaluations improve. The effect is even stronger for non-Whites—the predicted probability changes from 59% to 52% to 40% for each unit increase in sociotropic evaluations. Holding all other variables at their means, ethnic identification and sociotropic evaluations exert a strong effect on the probability of supporting term limits. Bolivians in general are more likely to support presidential term limits, which is demonstrated by the higher predicted probabilities on the Bolivian graph as compared to the Ecuadorian graph. Despite the greater propensity to support presidential term limits in the Bolivian sample, the effect of the joint heuristics is again amplified. For White respondents, a 94% probability of support for term limits is seen when evaluations of the national economy are poor, which is larger than the predicted probability of supporting term limits for either Whites or sociotropic evaluations individually. Support for term limits drops slightly to 88% when respondents evaluate the national economy positively, although it is worth noting that the joint predicted probability of supporting term limits is higher than either of the individual heuristics. For respondents who do not identify as White, the change in the effect is even larger— from 89% probability of supporting term limits to a 79% predicted probability. While a 6-percentage point change was seen in the predicted probability of support for term

79 Figure 3.5: Interactive effect of ethnic identification and sociotropic evaluations on predicted probability of support for term limits with 95% confidence intervals for the democratic rationale dependent variable by country.

80 limits for White respondents as sociotropic evaluations varied, in comparison a 10- percentage point decrease in the predicted probability of non-White respondents was seen. By considering the joint effect of the main statistically significant heuristics, the general hypothesis and directionality that these heuristics are useful to inform opinion on presidential term limits is confirmed. Some evidence also shows that negative soctiotropic evaluations and identifying as an ethnic outsider are more closely linked with support for term limits in Bolivia than in Ecuador. Taken as a whole, the analyses substantiate my assumption that all things aside, support for the continuation of presidential term limits is higher than support for their removal. There is also support for H1, that respondents with positive economic evaluations should prefer to eliminate presidential term limits, although this effect was only apparent for national economic evaluations. The analyses also provided preliminary support for H2, that a respondent with an outsider identity should prefer to maintain presidential term limits, although this result only held for ethnic identity, and the results were not robust across all four dependent variables. At least in regard to sociotropic evaluations, the largest jumps in the predicted probability of support for term limits occurred between neutral and positive economic evaluations. As previously noted, although its impact was not consistent, identification as White had a stronger impact on term-limit opinions than economic evaluations, which was contrary to my hypothesis that economic evaluations were more concrete and thereby would exert more influence on term-limit opinion.

3.6 Discussion

In substantive terms, these results provide several interesting and relevant findings. First, the results shed insight into the underlying psychological mechanisms of

81 opinion formation in two countries where constraints on executive tenure have continually eroded. Unlike previous research on term limits, this analysis has incorporated individual citizens. The analysis has revealed that the main predictors of support for presidential term limits are evaluations of the national economic situation and evaluations of the current president. Perhaps not surprisingly, positive evaluations of the current president are linked to a propensity to favor the removal of term limits under a variety of specifications, which is highly consistent with literature that argues against term limits for the sake of continuity and the retention of a popular incumbent (Hamilton et al., 2008; Carey, 2003; Ginsburg, Melton and Elkins, 2010). In this effort, the results also provide another demonstration of the applicability of heuristics in allowing individuals to make relatively complex decisions with little cognitive effort (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001). Although the findings in relation to ethnic identification are not robust, they provide support for the representativeness heuristic by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) and the theory of in-group/out-group relational positioning by Blumer (1958). Giving respectful attention to the proposition by Horowitz (1993) that democracy is about a competition over scarce resources, racial identification in the Andes appears to provide an additional layer of distinction between winners and losers. While Morales’ racial appeals were much more direct, Correa made implicit appeals toward class, which often overlaps with racial identity (Horowitz, 1991; Van Cott, 2000). Thus, although the findings are not robust, race does seem to function as a useful heuristic for evaluations of future inclusion (or exclusion). This main conclusion of this chapter, however, draws into question key findings about the relationship between modernization and support for democracy (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Whereas Inglehart (1997, 2016) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 2009) have long extolled the virtues of economic security, arguing

82 that more economically secure individuals are more likely to support democracy and demand political institutions, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests the opposite. Rather than demanding democratic political institutions, this chapter reveals that individuals actually might support the erosion of said democratic institutions when they evaluate the national economic situation positively. This finding is even more remarkable considering that support for democracy was controlled for in all of the models, and it was not predictive of preference for term limits (arguably an institution of democracy) under any conditions. Thus, this chapter presents preliminary evidence that positive economic conditions actually may have a more adverse effect than previously theorized—positive national economic evaluations actually may pave the way for democratic degradation. As a final caveat, however, it is important to consider the unique timing ofthe survey in Bolivia and Ecuador, which fell in between the reversal of term limit legislation in both countries. By mid-2018, both countries had swapped their positions on term limits. The biggest implication of these sudden institutional changes could impact the findings in relation to differences in attitudes toward term limits bycountry, which presents an additional puzzle when considering the findings from this chapter. While it is by no means a definitive answer, the data presented here found that Boli- vians were more supportive of maintaining presidential term limits than Ecuadorians. Taken in conjunction with the narrow margin of defeat in the 2016 referendum, this finding has the potential to shed insight on the repercussions from the Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling. If Bolivians were more supportive of term limits than Ecuadorians writ large (although this claim is purely speculative because neither sample is considered nationally representative), and Ecuadorians resoundingly reinstated term limits in 2018 when given an opportunity, then it is possible that the removal of presidential term limits in Bolivia could result in extreme backlash if Morales is elected for a

83 fourth term. In sum, the analyses from this chapter should serve as merely a first step toward understanding the complex and ever-changing debate around term limits.

3.7 Experimental Manipulation

As mentioned earlier, an experimental manipulation was included in the survey. The manipulation aimed to test the effect of the two heuristics, economic evaluations and social identity, through the question-as-treatment design (Chong, Citrin and Conley, 2001; Transue, 2007; Bloom, Arikan and Courtemanche, 2015) where people are asked to evaluate their feelings about the economy and their self-identification toward a certain group to elicit thoughts and feelings toward either the economy or their social group. By bringing these considerations to the “top of their head” (Za- ller, 1992), or priming participants (Krosnick and Kinder, 1990), the experimental treatment aimed to increase the salience of perceptions of the economy and the respondents’ social identity. The rest of this section will provide background on the question-as-treatment design, describe how participants were primed to think about the proposed heuristics, explain the experimental design, outline the expectations and hypotheses, describe the findings, and discuss potential reasons for the lack ofa treatment effect. The question-as-treatment design has roots in the exploration of self-interest on policy decision-making processes. Scholars have long debated the differences between those who are highly engaged in politics vs. those who are not, with Converse (1964) and Zaller (1992) suggesting that those who are informed about politics, or attentive publics, are the most likely to pay attention to specific policy issues. Those in the attentive public thus know how certain policies will affect them. Most citizens, however, do not exhibit such high levels of political engagement and fluency, whether they are simply less interested or able to partake in the cognitively taxing work of

84 understanding the implications of complex policy. These individuals, who make up the majority of publics, are highly susceptible to targeted cues as they form their opinions on policy. Early work by Sears and Lau (1983) found evidence of this when examining candidate preference, where they found question order effects depending on whether they asked respondents about their economic situation before or after candidate preference. Chong, Citrin and Conley (2001) built upon the previous work by explicitly examining the role of question order, arguing that the timing of questions that prime self-interest matters when people have a stake in the outcome of a policy. The stakes are not always discernible, however, which causes people to rely on their general political orientations, like ideology or partisanship, to determine the impact the policy might have on them. Through the order of the priming questions, the authors were able to capture the relationship between objective characteristics of the respondents and their subjective beliefs about the personal impact that certain policies would have on them. Following in this tradition, Transue (2007) primed social identity with questions by asking respondents how close they felt to their ethnic or racial group to prime either their subgroup or superordinate identity, finding that priming respondents’ superordinate identity reduces intergroup bias toward certain policies. Similarly, Bloom, Arikan and Courtemanche (2015) primed different elements of reli- giosity to discern its effect on attitudes toward immigration. All of these researchers capitalized on question order effects to directly and subtly prime their independent variables of interest.

3.7.1 Experimental Design

Respondents were randomly assigned to receive either the social identity or the economic prime, immediately followed by the dependent variable, and subsequently

85 the alternative priming question: [1] Social ID + DV + Economic or [2] Economic + DV + Social ID. The other portion of the sample consists of each of the remaining four variations of question order: [3] Social ID + Economic + DV; [4] Economic + Social ID + DV; [5] DV + Social ID + Economic; or [6] DV + Economic + Social ID. The third and fourth conditions were considered as primes for the both social identity and economic evaluation primes because the main priming blocks are asked before the dependent variable. The fifth and sixth conditions serve as the control group, as the dependent variable is measured before either of the priming questions. Through this method, respondents were asked each of the main questions of interest, while randomization accounted for whether the main questions served as primes or not. The experimental design is presented in Table 3.11. Subjects were randomly assigned into one of six possible conditions, all of which utilized the questions-as-treatments design to manipulate the order in which participants are presented the main questions of interest

86 Table 3.11: Experimental design

Randomization Order Sample

Social Identity DV Economic Evaluations n=126 (16.9%)

Prime Economic Evaluations DV Social Identity n=107 (14.3%)

Social Identity Economic Evaluations DV n=129 (17.3%)

Economic Evaluations Social Identity DV n=125 (16.7%) Interaction

DV Social Identity Economic Evaluations n=148 (19.8%)

Control DV Economic Evaluations Social Identity n=112 (15.0%)

Total: N=747

Note: DV=dependent variable

87 3.7.2 Experimental Expectations and Hypotheses

It was expected that the experimental primes would amplify the effect of the main heuristics. ε0 represents the impact of the experimental manipulations. When respondents received the economic prime, I expected their preferences for term limits to become more extreme because this heuristic is brought to the forefront of their consciousness and is used to form an opinion. In plain words, respondents who received the economic prime were expected to display higher levels of support for or against term limits than those in the control conditions.

H1a: A respondent who receives the economic prime and has (positive/negative) economic evaluations should prefer to (eliminate/maintain) presidential term limits to a greater degree than the respondent who did

not receive the prime, or (xecon + εeconx / ωecon + εeconω ).

For individuals in the social prime conditions, I expected the experimental manipulation to increase the preference for term limits as the heuristic is brought to the “top of the head.” Thus, respondents who received the social identity prime were expected to yield higher levels of support for or against term limits than those in the control conditions.

H2a: A respondent who receives the social identity prime and has (insider/outsider) economic evaluations should prefer to (eliminate/maintain) presidential term limits to a greater degree than the respondent who did

not receive the prime, or (xid + εidx / ωid + εidω ).

Overall, the priming conditions were expected to magnify the impact of the heuristics so that:

ωecon + εeconω > ωecon > ωid + εidω > ωid

xecon + εeconx > xecon > xid + εidx > xid

88 Compared to the other conditions, it was expected that those who received the economic prime and had positive evaluations of the economic situation would have the strongest preference to eliminate term limits

3.7.3 Analysis of Experimental Manipulations

As previously mentioned, the experimental manipulations did not yield meaningful differences for term limit preference across conditions or heuristics. For thesake of brevity, I will discuss the results for two of the heuristics here as examples, and the remaining tables can be found in Appendix A.0.1. Table 3.12 displays the proportion of respondents who support term limits given the economic rationale by sociotropic evaluations and experimental conditions. Across all of the experimental conditions, both positive and negative sociotropic evaluations have a consistent effect despite experimental manipulations.19 This disproves H1a, which suggested that those in the economic priming conditions should have a greater preference for the maintenance of term limits if they had a pessimistic evaluation of the national economic situation, while the inverse was expected to be true for those with positive economic evaluations. There is no experimental effect across either economic heuristics for any ofthe iterations of the dependent variable. Table 3.13 displays the proportion of respondents who support term limits given the identity rationale by ethnic identification and experimental conditions. Both of the social identity heuristics suffered from the composition of the sample, which did not provide sufficient numbers of those who identified as ethnic outsiders (White) or those who identified as class outsiders (upper-middle or upper class) to properly test the experimental manipulations. As shown in the table, across both countries, only 66

19This was confirmed by logistic regressions that interacted the experimental condition withthe main heuristics. No effects for the experimental manipulations were found. See Tables A.7to A.13.

89 Table 3.12: Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the economic rationale by experimental conditions and national economic evaluations. Econ Prime ID Prime Econ+ID ID+Econ Control Total Bad 57.81% 58.62% 54.05% 59.52% 60.12% 58.51% 37 51 40 50 104 282 Good 42.19% 41.38% 45.95% 40.48% 39.88% 41.49% 27 36 34 34 69 200 Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 64 87 74 84 173 482 Note: Positive economic evaluations include responses that the economy is doing very good, good, and neither good nor bad. Negative economic evaluations include responses that the economy is doing bad and very bad.

Table 3.13: Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the identity rationale by experimental conditions and ethnic identification. Econ Prime ID Prime Econ+ID ID+Econ Control Total Not white 89.1% 88.7% 88.7% 75.6% 82.6% 84.1% 49 63 55 59 123 349 White 10.9% 11.3% 11.3% 24.4% 17.4% 15.9% 6 8 7 19 26 66 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 55 71 62 78 149 415 Note: Ethnic identification is based upon self-identification with an ethnic group.

respondents self-identified as White and answered the identity rationale dependent variable. Moreover, only 6 respondents in both Ecuador and Bolivia identified as White in the main economic prime condition. Due to the small sample sizes across experimental conditions, then, it is not possible to determine the presence of an effect for the social identity manipulations.20

3.7.4 Discussion of the Experimental Manipulations

No support was found for H1a, and it was not possible to fully evaluate the validity of H2a. I had theorized that the experimental manipulations would magnify

20This is true for both social identity heuristics. See Tables A.14 to A.20.

90 the impact of the heuristics, with negative conditions yielding the strongest impact on term limit preferences. Instead, the experimental manipulations did not have an effect on the relationship between the economic heuristic and preference forterm limits. Due to the ethnic and class homogeneity of the sample, it was not possible to fully evaluate the impact of the experimental manipulation on the social identity heuristic. Focusing on the null result for the economic manipulation, there are a few potential explanations. It is possible that the experimental manipulation was too subtle, meaning economic considerations were not fully brought to the forefront of the consciousness. Alternatively, the connection between economic conditions and term limits may have been too opaque as term limits are relatively disassociated from economic circumstances. Yet another explanation would suggest that the proposed economic heuristics are so salient that they could not be primed.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter tested the two main heuristics, economic and social identity, in relation to support for term limits through a survey in Bolivia and Ecuador. During the fielding of the survey, Ecuador had eliminated presidential term limits through legislation passed by the National Assembly, whereas Bolivians had freshly rejected a referendum to eliminate presidential reelection restrictions. Thus, the survey capitalized on the saliency of the issue of term limits to gain an understanding of how individuals formulated their decisions regarding the necessity of restraints on presidential terms in office. An experimental manipulation was incorporated in the survey design, but it did not yield meaningful differences in preference for term limits. While Bolivians had a stronger preference for the necessity of term limits under all specifications of the dependent variables, the strongest result was that positive sociotropic

91 evaluations are linked to the relaxation of support for term limits: as individuals rate the national economic situation positively, they are more likely to accept the notion that term limits are not always necessary provided a variety of justifications (democratic, economic, identity, and any of the aforementioned rationales). Positive sociotropic evaluations were consistently linked to a greater probability of rejecting term limits, even after controlling for individual characteristics and alternative explanations. The other finding, although not as robust, was that identification as an ethnic outsider (White) in both countries was related to greater support for the maintenance of term limits. Considering the surprising findings in relation to national economic evaluations, as well as the evolving state of term limits in Latin America and beyond, the next step is to expand these findings to a larger universe of cases. Are Bolivia and Ecuador unique? What explains the removal of presidential term limits in the region? Are positive sociotropic evaluations consistently predictive of laxer presidential term limits? The next chapter will expand the findings from this chapter by extending the analysis of the economic and identity heuristics to the removal of presidential term limits throughout the region.

92 Chapter 4: Where Are Term Limits Contentious? A Cross-National Analysis in Latin America

As individuals, ordinary people can

be democracy’s fickle friends...

Rather than being democracy’s

salvation, ordinary people can be

democracy’s undoing.

Nancy Bermeo

4.1 Introduction

While the previous chapter aimed at identifying the causal mechanisms linking individual opinions to preference for term limits in Bolivia and Ecuador, the motivation of this chapter is to systematically analyze the relationship between individual-level opinions and unlimited presidential reelection across Latin America. This chapter again tests the theorized relationship between the heuristics of social identity and economic evaluations in relation to the elimination of presidential term limits on a cross-national scale. By analyzing public opinion data and term limits at a regional level, this chapter will address the following questions: Where do presidential term limits become contentious? Why are they threatened in some countries and not others? What explains the timing and duration of the removal of term limits? In this

93 endeavor, the analyses will attempt to distinguish the conditions that may signal where presidential term limits may become endangered and why they are already threatened in some countries. This chapter will detail two original dependent variables that account for the constraints (or lack thereof) on presidential reelection prospects and attempts to eliminate presidential term limits at the country level. In this endeavor, it will analyze country-level aggregates of public opinion data aimed at capturing the causal mechanisms of economic evaluations and social identity that were explained in Chapter 2 and tested in Chapter 3. This chapter will generally replicate the models predicting support for term limits from the previous chapter. The previous chapter found that positive economic evaluations are linked to a greater likelihood of justifying the removal of term limits under a variety of specifications, and it found preliminary evidence that an outsider social identity was related to a greater preference for the maintenance of term limits. This chapter will take a similar strategy, evaluating the generalizability of the heuristics under the following scenarios: where term limits were removed, where term limits were successfully challenged, and where term limits were challenged but failed. The dependent variables were compiled by the researcher, and their methodological and theoretical motivations will follow. Because the removal of constraints on presidential reelection and challenges to remove constraints are related to country- level characteristics and timing, all models were estimated using event history analysis. The elimination of term limits is a rare event, so the event history approach allows us to model the failure of term limits over time. For the individual-level public opinion data, this analysis relies primarily on Latinobarometer survey data from 1995-2016, which provides the most consistent and comprehensive temporal measures

94 of public opinion in the region to date.21 A conservative imputation strategy was adopted for missing years in the public opinion data, but the analyses without imputation are available in Appendix B. Because of the limitations of the public opinion data aggregated from the individual-level to the country-level, this analysis is primarily exploratory, and further research should delve into its findings. That said, any evidence of a relationship should indicate a true relationship because of the relatively low variation and systematic missing data by years. Across 18 countries in Latin America, this analysis contrasts the findings from the survey in Bolivia and Peru in relation to the economic heuristic: positive evaluations of the national economic situation, particularly those geared toward a rosy economic outlook for the future, are related to the maintenance of constraints on executive reelection rather than the removal of restraints. Over time, negative economic evaluations decrease the survival function of term limits. Counterintuitively, preference for democracy also is linked to this outcome, suggesting that those countries with the greatest preference for democracy have a higher hazard function than those with lower preference for democracy. The most robust finding across all of the models was that the survival function decreased over time. At the beginning of the period of interest, the survival function was incredibly high, with all countries imposing term limits on their executives. By 2018, however, the survival function had steeply decreased. Over time, then, Latin American countries became more at risk for the removal of term limits. One interpretation of this finding points to a potential for demonstration effects or diffusion. As discussed in the democratization literature, for example, new electoral strategies

21It should be noted that the public opinion data is only available until 2016, which is before both Bolivia and Ecuador reversed the presidential reelection regulations in 2017 and 2018 respectively. The Latinobarometer survey does not systematically ask questions in relation to social identity. As such, I will use an asset measure of wealth as a proxy for class identity. No consistent measures of ethnic or racial identification exist.

95 helped to usher a wave of democratization throughout post-Communist Europe where “early risers” helped to create electoral toolkits that “late risers” could adopt in their attempted transitions (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006, 2011). In a similar vein, it is possible that the “first movers,” such as Chávez in Venezuela and Fujimori in Peru, helped to create a model that “late movers” could adopt in their efforts to consolidate power within the executive. This proposition requires further testing for confirmation. Turning to challenges to remove term limits, neither the economic heuristics nor the proxy for the social identity heuristics had explanatory power. Of the public opinion indicators, preference for democracy was related to a decrease in the hazard ratios for successful term limit challenges in a similar manner as the removal of constraints on executive reelection. For failed challenges, higher levels of interpersonal trust led to a decreased survival function, meaning those countries with lower interpersonal trust were more likely to experience an unsuccessful challenge to remove term limits. The chapter will proceed by situating the individual-level data with the country- level data before discussing the relationship between survey indicators and political behavior writ large, focusing specifically on the implications for democracy and presidential term limits in Latin America. Next, it will describe the construction of the variables of interest, including the methodological decisions that informed the creation of the primary dependent variables and the independent variables, which were formed as country-level means from existing cross-national public opinion data. After the description of the variables, the methodological approach, model specification, and analyses will follow. Finally, the chapter will conclude by discussing the substantive implications of the findings.

96 4.2 Unit of Analysis: From the Individual to the Country

The previous chapter took a micro-approach to understanding the removal of term limits through two specific cases. This chapter takes a step back and examines the same phenomena—the removal of term limits—from a country-level perspective, looking for larger patterns to explain the regional shift toward eliminating constraints on reelections. Thus, the level of analysis fundamentally changes. Before, we exam- ined the individual-level variation in opinion on the necessity of term limits, whereas this chapter focuses on country-level variation across an array of public opinion indicators, from feelings about the economy to satisfaction with democracy. Notably, then, the forthcoming analysis will not center on differences between individuals, but rather on differences across countries. Another fundamental difference lies in the unit of analysis for the dependent variable, which shifts from opinions on term limits to country-level outcomes regarding restraints on executive reelection and challenges to remove term limits. As noted in the last chapter, the survey in Bolivia and Ecuador took place in a unique moment in time as both countries later reversed their national legislation pertaining to presidential reelection. The analysis allows us to discern the general attitudes of individuals in both countries toward potential justifications for the removal of term limits, but it does not shed insight into crucial factors that influenced the eventual national-level outcomes. For example, the individual-level data does not tell us why term limits were threatened in the first place in these two countries, nor why the legislation eventually was overturned in Ecuador and furthered by the Con- stitutional Court in Bolivia. Although the data provides a snapshot of the changing political dynamics and opinions on the ground, it does not allow us to discern the

97 timing nor durability of term limit legislation. Rather, it provides insights into individual opinions shortly after term limits were challenged in both countries, suggesting the factors that matter at the moment of opinion formation. By shifting to the macro-level, this chapter simultaneously builds on the rich history of cross-national public opinion analysis while discerning generalizable patterns of risk across the region. Specifically, the analysis that follows begins to unpack the question of where term limits are challenged, why they are successful or not, and why this legislation is more stable in some countries than others. This chapter attempts to marry the disparate findings from the individual-level data analysis from aspe- cific moment in time to the larger patterns of country-level risk associated withthe removal of term limits in Latin America.

4.3 Public Opinion: A Lens Into National-Level Phenomena

Research in political science has long extolled the virtues of survey data for understanding country-level characteristics and political phenomena (e.g., see Almond and Verba, 2015). Of particular importance to the themes studied here, one sector of research has focused on the interrelationship between economic factors and political attitudes and behaviors as measured by surveys, focusing on the quality and strength of democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Booth and Seligson, 2009; Córdova and Seligson, 2010). The focus of this work seeks to draw explicit connections between citizens’ opinions, demographic characteristics, and political behavior, framing the findings in conversation with literature that highlights an endemic “democratic recession” (Diamond, 2008). While Diamond published his work in 2008, both Freedom House and the Economist’s Intelligence Unit have affirmed the continuation of this pattern, with the most recent Freedom House report identifying 2017 as a year marked

98 by a “democratic crisis” (e.g., see Freedom House, 2018; The Economist, 2018a). Re- search by Wike et al. (2017) at Pew Research Center adds a layer of nuance to the overall global pattern: in a survey of 38 countries, Latin Americans were the least satisfied with the way democracy works in their country and exhibited the lowest levels of trust in their government.22 In order to gain leverage on these larger trends, many scholars have turned to nationally representative public opinions surveys. Scholars in one vein of this tradition have taken steps to create democratic personas by clustering the public by their unique characteristics and attitudes about democracy. For example, scholars have documented the existence of “distrusting democrats” or “critical citizens” who believe in the aspirations, ideals, and principles of democracy. These individuals strongly adhere to the core values of democracy, yet they share a mutual distrust in hierar- chical political institutions (Norris, 1999; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). In established democracies, these distrusting democrats demand accountability and institutional reform (Norris, 1999), thereby serving as an important check on democratic overreach. While distrusting democrats are lauded as defenders of advanced democracies and are credited with enhancing its quality, their role is less optimistic in newer, developing democracies. In Chile, for example, Carlin (2011) found that distrusting democrats were more likely to engage in protests to express their dissatisfaction, but less likely to participate in elections. This crucial lack of participation undermined their positive impact on the quality of democracy. Complementary work found that citizens in Latin America who supported the president and had positive economic evaluations were more willing to reduce horizontal checks and balances on the executive than their counterparts (Carlin and Singer, 2011).

22Countries included in the analysis were: Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico.

99 Other work has focused on public opinion data for its potential predictive power, albeit in a post-hoc application. For example, Booth and Seligson (2009) found that citizens in Honduras had the lowest levels of citizen satisfaction across three dimensions of political support (support for democracy, support for national institutions, and evaluations of the government’s economic performance) before the 2009 Hon- duran coup as compared to seven other countries in Latin America. As cautioned by Bermeo (p. 4 2003), “As individuals, ordinary people can be democracy’s fickle friends... Rather than being democracy’s salvation, ordinary people can be democracy’s undoing.” In contrast to the distrusting democrats’ literature, this segment of the literature has revealed troubling cracks in citizens’ commitment to democratic value and institutions. Indeed, work by Boulding (2010) in Bolivia found that non-governmental orga- nizations’ (NGOs) presence and activity in weakly democratic areas is strongly associated with protests, especially in municipalities where democracy had the worst performance record.23 The presence of distrusting democrats in the region in conjunction with the tendency to resort to protest suggests that Latin America has a tenuous relationship with democracy. News in the region corroborates this observation: citizens have taken to the streets to express their dissatisfaction with democracy for a variety of reasons in recent years. Protests in 2013 in Brazil escalated because of an increase in bus fares (The Economist, 2013), protests have been a common occurrence in Venezuela for years because of soaring inflation, food shortages, and corruption accusations (The Guardian, 2015b), and protests regularly erupt in Bolivia for a range of grievances, including demands for more investment in public infrastructure and the endemic of extreme poverty (Smink, 2015), just to name a few.

23Furthermore, NGOs facilitate protests and contentious politics in almost every country in Latin America plus a range of other developing democracies (Boulding, 2014).

100 Further research has focused on the link between perceptions of citizens’ personal and the national economic situation, which are associated with political legitimacy and democratic values (e.g., Dalton, 2004). While Almond and Verba (2015) cautioned that citizens must become psychologically invested in the political system in order for democracy to remain stable, Easton (1975) argued that democracy itself is valued as a good because citizens expect tangible benefits to result from it. Consis- tent with this idea, Lipset (1981) warned those with the most economic insecurity are the most likely to possess negative attitudes toward democracy. Indeed, Córdova and Seligson (2010) found that the young and the poor are the most likely to turn their backs on democracy in a study of 18 Latin American countries. Building upon these ideas, a body of literature has focused on identifying which types of citizens have tenuous relationships with democracy. Scholars have long debated which groups are important for democratic stability, but conventional wisdom suggests placing a greater emphasis on the losers in democratic contests: “The continued existence of the [democratic] system depends to a larger extent on the consent of the losers than on the consent of the winners” (Anderson et al., 2005, p. 7). Recent contributions to the field have turned this idea on its head: Moehler (2009) found that electoral winners in Africa are less likely to oppose presidents’ attempts to suppress opposition from the public or other branches of government. Walker (2009) observed similar patterns in Central America: greater presidential approval is associated with a tendency for more autocracy and delegative governance. Carrión (2008) found that citizens were willing to support illiberal democracy and place few limits on a president they liked, while Carlin and Singer (2011) found that when citizens were supportive of the president, they had a preference for removing formal boundaries to executive power. Corrales (2018) linked presidential approval to a greater tendency to initiate constitutional change, and Singer (2018) argued that incumbent support in tandem

101 with positive economic evaluations were associated with support for the erosion of both vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms. Drawing upon the rich history of public opinion data and its connection to democratic outcomes, this chapter will further test the findings from the survey in Bolivia and Ecuador reported in the previous chapter that found that those with positive sociotropic evaluations are more supportive of the removal of presidential term limits under a variety of justifications. In the tradition of Singer, Carlin, and Corrales, the theory also focuses on the economic winners, drawing connections between individual- level preferences and country-level political outcomes. The chapter also will begin to test the argument about social identity, although it faces limitations in the data in that Latinobarometer does not consistently ask about respondent race or ethnicity. As such, an asset measure of wealth is used as a proxy for class identity. In conjunction with the findings from the previous chapter, this chapter will consist of a firstcut at the argument that social identity acts as a heuristic toward democratic outcomes, focusing specifically on presidential term limits, as a function of determining winners and losers. As with Singer (2018), I argue that positive economic evaluations and an insider social identity can lead to the erosion of vertical accountability mechanisms, namely the removal of presidential term limits. These heuristics should help to explain both where constraints on presidential reelection were removed, as well as where challenges succeeded or failed.

4.4 Dependent Variables

In order to test the questions posed above, I created two primary dependent variables related to presidential term limits for 18 countries in Latin America from 1995-2018. The first dependent variable accounts for constraints on presidential term limits, specifically whether a given country has limitations on presidential reelection

102 or not. For each year, a country falls into one of two primary categories relating to prospects for presidential reelection in Latin America: constraints on reelection or no constraints. While the first dependent variable will account for the extreme case of the elimination of presidential term limits across the region, it does not fully account for the variation of presidential term limit challenges. Over this same time period, some countries have proposed eliminating presidential term limits, but for one reason or another, these challenges were unsuccessful. The case of Bolivia is the most demonstrative of this phenomena: an exception to extend presidential reelection to Evo Morales for a third term was successfully passed in 2009, a referendum vote to eliminate term limits was narrowly defeated in 2016, and most recently, the Supreme Court removed all term limits on elected officials in November 2017 as violating “human rights” (BBC News, 2017). In order to fully account for the conditions that may make term limits contentious, this second dependent variable measures whether a country has ever attempted to eliminate term limits entirely and whether such efforts were successful or not.24

4.4.1 Term Limit Constraints

The first dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator that records constraints on presidential reelection in the region. Because expected theoretical differences do not exist for whether a given country allows reelection for zero, one, or two terms, these categories, while distinct, are coded as placing restrictions on reelection. The variable is reverse coded so that 0 denotes countries that have some form of presidential term limits where 1 signifies that a country does not have any barriers on reelection. In addition, a country is only coded as a 0 or a 1 for a given year if the country has either

24For a full, detailed version of the current state of presidential reelection in the region, including the type of reelection limits, in the region as well as a detailed explanation of challenges, see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2.

103 had constraints or removed constraints for at least 6 months. For example, Ecuador’s Supreme Court eliminated presidential term limits in December 2015, but the country is not coded as having unlimited presidential reelection until 2016. Similarly, with the case of Bolivia previously mentioned, the country is not coded as having unlimited presidential reelection until 2018.25 Across the 18 countries and 24 years accounted for in the dataset, the first dependent variable has a total of 432 unique country-year observations.26 A majority of the observations in the dataset (403 country-year observations) are instances where a given country has some form of constraint on presidential reelection. As previously mentioned, these constraints can take on a variety of forms, from a country that has banned reelection entirely (e.g., Mexico) to a country that has a set maximum number of terms allowed (e.g., Brazil) to a country that only permits nonconsecutive reelections (e.g., Chile). Regardless of the form of the restriction on presidential reelection, all of these observations are coded as zeros. The dataset had only 29 observations distributed across six countries where no constraints were in place on presidential reelection. Figure 4.1 shows the temporal variation of unlimited presidential reelection in selected Latin American countries from 1995-2018. Of the six countries that do not have constraints on presidential reelection throughout the time period considered in the dataset, three of these countries (Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) had not reinstated constraints on presidential reelection by the end of 2018. Nicaragua and Venezuela have the longest duration without constraints on reelection (10 years) as

25Because of this conservative coding strategy and the lack of public opinion data, this outcome is not included in the presented analyses. 26A country-year observation means that each country has an associated observation for a given year.

104 both countries eliminated presidential term limits in 2009. Honduras removed restrictions in 2015, and Bolivia followed suit in late 2017. Two countries, however, have experienced reversions. Fujimori obfuscated Peru’s term limit restrictions in 2000, but term limits were respected since 2002 after the collapse of Fujimori’s regime (Carey, 2003). Similarly, Ecuador removed presidential term limits in 2015 under Rafael Cor- rea by a Supreme Court decision, but this ruling was reversed by a referendum vote spearheaded by Lenín Moreno in February 2018 (Ayala and Rochabrún, 2018).

Figure 4.1: Variation of constraints on presidential reelection in Latin America from 1995-2018 in countries that have eliminated constraints.

105 4.4.2 Presidential Term Limit Challenges

The second dependent variable captures instances where countries have attempted to eliminate or extend presidential term limits beyond the U.S. model of two consecutive presidential terms, recording both the success and failure of these challenges. As with most concepts in political science, it often is impossible to know a president’s true intentions, and most events are characterized by high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity. Therefore, the coding of this variable builds off of the methodological precedent set by Corrales (2016), relying only on those cases where “...ambiguity was minimal—that is, where enough information existed in the press to convey that actual steps were being taken on behalf of expanding term limits” (p. 9). Because I am interested in explaining only the extreme cases, I take a more narrow definition than Corrales and consider only cases where a president has served (or attempted to serve) for three or more consecutive terms or has tried to remove restrictions on reelection entirely.27 Unlike the constraints dependent variable, the challenge dependent variable does not record the duration of term limit restraints (or lack thereof), but rather the presence of a challenge in order to capture where term limits become contentious. Table 4.1 shows the instances of both successful and unsuccessful challenges to eliminate presidential term limits. Similar to the previous dependent variable, challenges are an extremely rare event: there are 419 country-year observations where there were no challenges to the two-term model of presidential term limits.28 Throughout the

27This relatively narrow definition of a term limit challenge eliminates two notable and recent examples. The first notable example occurred in Honduras in 2009, where then-president JoséManuel Zelaya was removed from office via a coup for attempting to extend presidential term limits beyond a single allowable term. The second recent example occurred in Paraguay, where attempts to extend presidential reelection to two consecutive terms almost resulted in a constitutional crisis (The Economist, 2018b). 28These countries include Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic.

106 same time period, only five instances of failed attempts and eight successful efforts to remove restrictions on presidential reelection occurred.

Table 4.1: Challenges to remove term limits in selected Latin American countries from 1995-2018. Challenge Country Year Argentina 1998, 2013 Venezuela 2007 Failure Colombia 2010 Bolivia 2016

Peru 2000 Venezuela 2009 Nicaragua 2009, 2014 Success Bolivia 2009, 2017 Honduras 2015 Ecuador 2015

Beginning with examples of failed challenges, Argentina is the only country to have two failed attempts at extending term limits. Despite the fact that the country’s constitution did not allow reelection, Carlos Menem successfully amended the constitution in 1994 in order to serve a second consecutive term (Finkel, 2004). In 1998, he briefly attempted to run for his third term despite language in the1994 Constitution that explicitly prohibited him from running again. He initially gained the support of his Partido Justicialista (PJ) party, but he later recanted his desire to run for a third term after internal splits within the PJ party and resistance from his allies on the Supreme Court (Krauss, 1998). Nearly a decade later, even though she never openly stated that she wished to run for a third term, supporters and advi- sors of former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner had hopes of amending the

107 constitution to allow her to seek a third consecutive term (Rebossio, 2012). After losing ground in mid-term elections and rapidly declining popularity (Watts and Goni, 2013), Fernández denounced the existing constitutional constraints on reelection, but eventually officially declared that she did not intend to run for a third term (Mindez, 2013). In Colombia, Álvaro Uribe’s efforts to hold a referendum vote for athird consecutive term was deemed unconstitutional by the constitutional court (Reuters, 2010). In line with these trends, both Chávez and Morales lost their first attempts at referendum votes to eliminate term limits; Chávez easily won his second referendum vote in 2009, while Morales eliminated term limits through a Constitutional Tribunal ruling in late 2017, which will make him eligible for a fourth term in office in 2019 (Forero, 2009; Farthing, 2017). In addition to the failed challenges, a few successful models exist as well. In 1996, a pro-Fujimori legislature passed the Law of Authentic Interpretation, which declared that Fujimori’s first term in office did not count against the country’s two-term limit on presidential reelection because it was under a different constitution, paving the way for Fujimori’s third consecutive term in 2000 (Taft-Morales, 2001). In a similar ruling, Bolivia’s Constitutional Tribunal ruled that Morales’ first term in office was disqualified because the constitution was changed during his first term in office; thus, Morales was eligible to seek a third consecutive term as well (BBC News, 2013). In 2009, the Nicaraguan Supreme Court lifted a ban on presidential reelection limits, allowing Daniel Ortega to serve his third term.29 The National Assembly followed up this decision in 2014 by eliminating the two-term limit ban on consecutive reelection (Cherry, 2014). For the purposes of this dissertation, the 2009 Honduran coup of

29Ortega was elected for his second term in 2007, but he previously was elected president in 1984 after the Nicaraguan revolution in 1979. The Supreme Court ruling allowed Ortega to run again despite the ban on consecutive elections or serving more than two terms. The decision allowed 2 Ortega to circumvent changes to the constitution, which would have required 3 approval from the National Assembly where he did not have majority support (Reuters, 2009).

108 President Melaya does not qualify as a failure since Zelaya was not attempting to extend presidential term limits beyond two consecutive terms. The Supreme Court of Honduras later removed restrictions on reelection in 2015 as a “violation of essential rights” (Fasquelle, 2011; The Associated Press in Tegucigalpa, 2015).

4.5 Explanatory Variables

Because I am interested in testing the impact of the economic and social identity heuristics on country-level outcomes for the status and challenges to presidential term limits, country-level means are calculated from the individual-level public opinion data for each year, country, and explanatory variable of interest. Although this method sacrifices valuable individual-level variation, it avoids the ecological fallacy (Robinson, 1950) whereby one cannot draw conclusions about an individual from aggregate (e.g., country) observations. Latinobarometer data from 1995-2016 for 18 countries in Latin America is used to generate these country-level means. Thus, each country has an aggregate mean (or median where appropriate) score per year on relevant opinions, attitudes, and perceptions toward both the economy and democracy writ large.30 All respondents who provided a don’t know or who did not answer a given question were excluded from this analysis. When possible, all of the explanatory variables were coded in the same manner as in Chapter 3. The mean descriptive statistics for the main explanatory variables are summarized in Table 4.2. The main economic variables of interest were coded identically as the analysis of the unique survey data: Socio_Eval and Pocket_Eval were each coded on a 3-point scale from -1 to 1 for evaluations of the national and respondents’ personal economic situation before aggregation by country-year. The corresponding categories

30Table B.1 and Table B.2 in Appendix B display the raw descriptive statistics for each of the 18 countries by the main explanatory variables of interest.

109 are bad, about average, and good. Socio_Future and Pocket_Future were coded from negative to positive evaluations of the future national and personal economic situation on the following scale: worse (-1), same (0), better (1). As in the previous chapter, positive economic evaluations are expected to link to the successful removal of constraints on presidential term limits, while negative economic evaluations should explain failed challenges to remove term limits. As for social identity heuristics, one of the pitfalls of the Latinobarometer data is that it does not consistently ask about racial or ethnic identification or class identification. As a proxy for class consciousness, I calculated a measure of asset wealth, which is modified from Córdova (2009), who created a quintile measure of asset wealthwith the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) data. While Cordova’s measure accounted for differences between urban and rural assets based upon the number of household items, such as a television, running water, a computer, the internet, etc., the Latinobarometer measure takes the same approach, but does not account for urban and rural differences. Despite this, the logic of the asset measure of wealth still applies, and the measure better accounts for relative wealth because of both the high non-response rate for standard income-based measures and the over-reporting for these questions. Moreover, Latinobarometer does not explicitly ask about income, so the asset measure of wealth is the best approximation given the constraints of the data. Rather than making a subjective evaluation about what it means to fall in the poor or rich asset groups, I created a quintile measure based upon the asset variable. For this analysis, I have calculated the mean asset wealth across countries and years.31 While it is impossible to model identity in the same way as the previous chapter, the asset measure of wealth is indicative of differences across countries and general patterns related to potential factors that influence identity.

31As with other measures of wealth, the mean and median category in the asset measure of wealth is the middle class. Thus, the mean is used here to garner more variation across countries.

110 In the previous analysis, presidential evaluations were one of the primary predictors of term limit preference, and it continues as one of the main alternative explanations suggested by authors such as Corrales (2018) and Singer (2018), particularly for the successful removal of term limits under charismatic leaders like Chávez. Pres_Eval was coded on a 5-point scale ranging from very bad to very good for evaluations of the performance of the sitting president, but Latinobarometer asks about presidential approval as a dichotomous variable where 0 denotes disapprove and 1 stands for approval. Similarly, Trust was measured on a 4-point scale in the survey data, but it is dichotomous in the Latinobarometer data with the following labels: one can never be too careful (0) and most people can be trusted (1). Other variables that are not available or not consistently asked in the dataset include the measure of the authoritarian personality (F-Scale), an indicator for involvement in protest, an indicator for voting, or an indicator for party identification. For demographic characteristics of countries, gender is not included in the model because the variables are aggregated to the country level. Whereas age was combined into predefined age brackets in the previous chapter, the median age for respondents age 16 and older is calculated for each country-year observation to better capture potential differences across time and countries. Education was asked through predefined buckets in the previous chapter, but it is coded on a 17-point scale fromno education to completed university education in this analysis. As with Age, median values are computed for each country-year observation to best capture the general country-level characteristics. Dem_Sat, Dem_Pref, Right are coded in the same manner as the previous chapter. Both are included here to account for alternative explanations, such as dissatisfaction with democracy explaining a higher likelihood of removing term limits.

111 The main limitation of the data is the systematic patterns of missingness because of uneven coverage of countries and key variables. While the Latinobarometer data begins in 1995, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia were not surveyed until 1996, and the Dominican Re- public was not surveyed until 2004. Trust was first asked in 1996, and Pocket_Future was not asked in 2016. Pres_Eval, a key explanatory variable in the previous chapter, was not asked until 2004, which severely minimizes the power of this variable for the analysis in conjunction with its lower level of variation as previously described. Most problematic for the analytic goals of this chapter, however, is that Latinobarome- ter was not fielded in certain years—there is no data for 1999, 2012, 2014, 2017,or 2018. These gaps in the data are particularly important to account for considering that the dependent variable is a rare event, with presidents having no constraints on reelection in less than 7% of all cases and even fewer occurrences for term limit challenges. Where possible, data was imputed for missing values using a conservative strategy of taking the mean of the observations from the year before and the year after. For example, missing data for the variable Socio_Eval was calculated as the mean of Socio_Evalt−1 and Socio_Evalt+1. When it was not possible to calculate a mean for the missing variables, values were imputed from from the previous year or from the concurrent year. No values were imputed for a range of more than ±1 year. Because 2016 was the last year for which Latinobarometer data was available, no values were imputed for 2018. Table 4.2 displays the summary statistics for the main explanatory variables after imputation.32 For most of the variables, the imputation strategy helped to correct for missingness, but Pres_Eval continues to have a lower n than the rest of the explanatory variables because it was not possible to impute values before 2003. While the

32Table B.3 and Table B.4 provide the descriptive statistics for each of the 18 countries by the main explanatory variables of interest with imputed values.

112 imputation corrected for missing years, most of the explanatory variables have little variation because of the country-level aggregation of individual-level public opinion data. A first, conservative test of the validity of the theory will occur if any relationships are found.

Table 4.2: Summary statistics: explanatory variables from Latinobarometer with imputed values Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N Socio_Eval -0.297 0.267 -0.936 0.492 406 Socio_Future 0.027 0.249 -0.776 0.809 406 Pocket_Eval 0.07 0.188 -0.508 0.534 406 Pocket_Future 0.291 0.217 -0.583 0.820 404 Pres_Eval 0.523 0.18 0.081 0.918 270 Trust 0.192 0.071 0.024 0.441 406 Dem_Sat 2.271 0.303 1.474 3.61 406 Dem_Pref 0.436 0.174 -0.112 0.816 406 Right 5.394 0.598 4.018 8.096 406 Age 36.692 3.272 30 46 406 Education 10.151 2.488 4 15 406 Asset Wealth 2.949 0.05 2.661 2.998 406 Notes: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia were not included in the Latinobarometer sample until 1996; the Dominican Republic was not included until 2004. The following variables have limited or missing datapoints: Trust was not collected until 1996; Pres_Eval was not collected until 2004; and Pocket_Future was not asked in 2016. Source: Latinobarometer 1995-2016, www.latinobarometro.org

4.6 Unlimited Presidential Term Limits

As described previously, the first dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator that captures constraints on presidential reelection throughout the region, with “failure” denoting that a country has no constraints on presidential reelection within a given year. Because we are interested in understanding not only if term limits are

113 removed but also when they are removed, the dependent variable is transformed into the duration of time before a country experiences this event. Event history analysis allows the making of inferences regarding the impact of the main explanatory variables on both the length of duration and occurrence (or nonoccurence) of the event (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997, 2004). Figure 4.2 depicts the transformation of the constraints dependent variable into the event history framework with the timing and duration of the lack of constraints on presidential reelection. As noted in the figure, the data also have the possibility for repeated events, where a given unitcan experience multiple “failures.” Because data on term limits were collected for all years between 1995 and 2018, all of the countries not shown in the figure33 did not experience an event and are thus right censored in 2018 when the data collection period ended.

33Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay are all right censored.

114 Figure 4.2: Duration of event, time to event, and reinstatement of constraints on presidential reelection in Latin America from 1995-2018.

The event history framework also is congruent with the rare nature of this event.34 Figure 4.3 shows the cumulative hazard estimate for failure, or the removal of constraints on reelection, in Latin America from 1995 to 2018. For more than half of the time period considered here, the cumulative hazard estimate is almost zero, meaning that countries in the region were not highly susceptible to removal of executive term limits. Around 15 years into the period of observation, however, the hazards estimate begins to grow exponentially. By 2018 when the data collection ended, the cumulative

34The known proportion of failure in the model, or no restraints on presidential reelection, is 6%. Data on presidential term limit constraints for 2018 were excluded for the purposes of this calculation because no public opinion data were available for 2018. The conservative approach to imputation does not allow values beyond t ± 1.

115 hazard estimate had increased to above 0.5. Although this hazard estimate remains low, it does suggest that the propensity of a given country in the region to remove constraints has increased since the 1990s.

Figure 4.3: Nelson-Aelen cumulative hazard estimate for lack of constraints on presidential reelection in Latin America from 1995-2018.

Considering the nature of the event history dependent variables, all of the analyses are estimated using multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects and gamma frailty. The model was chosen based on the assumption of a natural sequence to the repeated events (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2002; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004), meaning that I am assuming dependence between the first and second event, for example. The random effects, or

116 frailty approach, allows for clustering the stochastic variation by country: “The frailty model takes into account the correlation between repeated event times by including a random effects term in the hazard” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004, pp.162- 3). Pertaining to country-level random effects, likelihood-ratio tests confirm that the more complex random-effects models are a better fit than the fixed-effects models. All of the analyses in this chapter will report coefficient estimates of hazard ratios for ease of interpretation. Table 4.3 shows the coefficient estimates of hazard ratios from the frailty survival model of term limit constraints for the main economic heuristics on reelection constraints. Focusing only on the economic heuristics, both sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations are positive and statistically significant in limited models (Model 1and Model 2). The effect is not present in the limited model (Model 3) that accounts for both economic heuristics. The higher a given country’s mean evaluation of the national economy or its citizens’ personal economic circumstances, the lower the hazard of a country having no constraints on executive reelection. Contrary to expectations, positive economic evaluations are related to the maintenance of term limits by decreasing the hazard ratios for the removal of constraints. This finding stands in contrast to the individual-level analysis in Bolivia and Ecuador where positive sociotropic evaluations were related to a greater willingness to support the removal of term limits given a variety of justifications. In Model 4, which includes a full battery of alternative explanations and control variables, evaluations of the national economic situation (Socio_Eval) regains its statistical significance. This suggests that as a country’s mean evaluation for thena- tional economic situation becomes rosier, the relative risk of removing constraints on an executive decreases, contrasting the findings from the previous chapter. However, the greater a country’s preference for democracy with the Churchillian measure, the

117 Table 4.3: Term limit constraints: economic heuristics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Socio_Eval 0.779∗ 0.267 0.725∗ 0.028 (0.323) (0.365) (0.293) (0.111) Socio_Future −0.557 −0.622 −0.442 −0.031 (0.393) (0.447) (0.359) (0.129) Pocket_Eval 0.971∗ 0.809 −0.067 0.169 (0.389) (0.461) (0.336) (0.126) Pocket_Future −0.408 0.126 0.363 −0.095 (0.470) (0.592) (0.471) (0.184) Pres_Eval −0.017 (0.145) Trust −0.122 −1.125∗∗∗ (1.018) (0.322) Dem_Sat −0.358 0.046 (0.335) (0.097) Dem_Pref −0.919∗ −1.059∗∗∗ (0.399) (0.129) Right −0.003 0.042 (0.070) (0.030) Age 0.184∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ (0.024) (0.011) Education −0.120∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ (0.033) (0.011) Variance of Random Effect 0.293 0.148 0.128 0.049 0.000 (0.284) (0.140) (0.123) (0.043) (0.000) Observations 389 388 388 388 270 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

118 higher the hazard ratio that a country has no constraints on presidential reelection. Education is also negative and statistically significant, meaning that the hazard ofa given country removing presidential term limits increases with median education levels. In other words, the coefficient suggests that the more education a given country’s population has, the more at risk the country becomes for the removal of constraints on reelections. On the other hand, the hazard ratio decreases as the median age of the population increases. The last model includes the mean of presidential evaluations for each country, although as previously mentioned, this variable was not included in the dataset until 2004, which severely limits its usefulness as a predictor. Moreover, the variable is dichotomous, which further limits potential country-level variation. While the coefficient for mean presidential evaluations is not statistically significant, the abilityto infer meaning from this lack of relationship is limited by the aforementioned factors. None of the economic heuristics meet standard levels of statistical significance in the model, but preference for democracy continues to decrease the survival function for term limits. Mean interpersonal trust is also negative and statistically significant in this model, which implies that higher levels of country-level trust are associated with a lack of constraints on executive reelection. The higher the median age and education levels of a country, the lower its hazard rates for removing term limits. Turning to the proxy for the identity heuristic, Table 4.4 displays the results from the frailty survival regression models. Across all three models, the proxy for class identity fails to reach statistical significance. Churchillian preference for democracy continues to increase the hazard of no executive constraints on reelection. In Model 3, which limits the time frame to the 14-year period between 2003 and 2017, higher levels of interpersonal trust are associated with a decreased rate of survival for term limits. The effect of education is mixed across models, with higher levels of education

119 leading to a higher hazard ratio in Model 2 and a lower hazard ratio in Model 3. Across both models with controls, the older the median population, the more likely that a country will retain term limits.

Table 4.4: Term limit constraints: identity heuristic (1) (2) (3) Asset Wealth −0.795 0.659 0.541 (1.718) (1.121) (0.384) Pres_Eval −0.012 (0.136) Trust −0.509 −1.320∗∗∗ (1.031) (0.283) Dem_Sat 0.080 0.081 (0.198) (0.083) Dem_Pref −1.651∗∗∗ −1.160∗∗∗ (0.367) (0.113) Right −0.076 0.029 (0.070) (0.027) Age 0.200∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ (0.028) (0.010) Education −0.100∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ (0.035) (0.010) Variance of Random Effect 0.316 0.042 0.000 (0.305) (0.034) (0.000) Observations 389 389 270 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Finally, Table 4.5 includes both the country-level economic and identity heuristics in fully specified models that control for alternative explanations and demographic characteristics. In Model 1, the variable that accounts for evaluations of the national economic situation (Socio_Eval) is positive and statistically significant. From 1995 to 2017, for the 18 Latin American countries included included in the model, positive

120 evaluations of the current economic situation decrease the hazard ratio of a country having no constraints on presidential tenure. In other words, if citizens have positive perceptions of the national economic situation, term limits are more likely to remain in place. As with the limited models, preference for democracy increases the likelihood of failure, or a lack of executive constraints for reelection. In Model 2, which covers a more limited time frame and includes presidential evaluations, mean evaluations of citizens’ personal economic situation are positive and statistically significant. In addition, the proxy for the class identity heuristic (Asset Wealth) is positive and significant. Countries that have higher mean evaluations of their citizens’ personal economic situation and higher mean values for asset wealth are more likely to maintain presidential term limits. Higher mean scores for interpersonal trust and preference for democracy decrease the likelihood of survival. The impact of education is mixed across Models 1 and 2, while the older the median age of the population, the less likely failure, or the removal of term limits, will occur. While the predictors just discussed are related to hazard ratios, the size of the coefficients are extremely small, suggesting that the removal of constraints on presidents is a rare event that remains very unlikely across time and space in Latin America.

4.7 Term Limit Challenges

The previous section presented models that were aimed at predicting the lack of constraints on presidential reelection in 18 Latin American countries since 1995, but as previously discussed, countries also challenged existing constraints on executive tenure. Notably, five instances occurred where a given country tried (and failed) to remove term limits, while there were eight cases where a country was successful in its challenge to remove constraints on executive reelection. Unlike the previous dependent variable, the indicator for a challenge to presidential reelection includes

121 Table 4.5: Term limit constraints: all heuristics (1) (2) Socio_Eval 0.706∗ 0.005 (0.290) (0.107) Socio_Future −0.439 −0.030 (0.350) (0.122) Pocket_Eval 0.017 0.286∗ (0.353) (0.140) Pocket_Future 0.272 −0.257 (0.482) (0.194) Asset Wealth 0.790 0.860∗ (1.007) (0.403) Pres_Eval 0.061 (0.145) Trust −0.049 −1.208∗∗∗ (1.024) (0.318) Dem_Sat −0.381 0.023 (0.332) (0.099) Dem_Pref −0.977∗ −1.029∗∗∗ (0.416) (0.124) Right 0.006 0.063∗ (0.071) (0.031) Age 0.181∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ (0.025) (0.009) Education −0.116∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ (0.033) (0.010) Variance of Random Effect 0.045 0.000 (0.040) (0.000) Observations 388 270 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

122 instances where an exception was made for a given president to extend his tenure in office, such as Peru’s Law of Authentic Interpretation in 2000 for Fujimori.35 Thus, the next set of analyses will try to distinguish if the same heuristics that were applied toward understanding the country-level removal of term limits through cross-national patterns in public opinion and country-level legislation surrounding term limits also will explain regional patterns of where term limits become contested. Because both successful and failed challenges are extremely rare events, separate analyses will examine the survival frailty models with country-level random effects as in the previous section. Both successful and failed challenges to term limit legislation beyond the two-term limits of the U.S. presidential system were present in less than 2% of cases in the dataset. Combined with the limited variation because of the aggregation procedures and imputation strategy adopted, it is necessary to consider the following analyses as merely exploratory rather than definitive.

4.7.1 Successful Challenges

Table 4.6 displays the coefficient estimates of hazard ratios for the parametric survival regression models for successful challenges to term limit legislation. The model will then predict when successful challenges occur, highlighting what makes a country susceptible to failure or a successful challenge to extend presidential tenure beyond two terms. Although the dependent variable is similar to the constraints dependent variable, it incorporates cases that were not coded as having removed constraints on executive reelection entirely. Most notably, a challenge to term limit legislation is not a prolonged event, which reduces the number of outcomes in the dependent variable. In all, eight successful cases exist where a country challenged

35Because an exception was made to allow Fujimori’s third term in office, no challenge was made to reinstate presidential term limits. The two-term limit on executives was not challenged since 2000.

123 the existing two-term limit on presidential tenure, covering six unique countries. The models will address the following question: do the country-level economic and social identity heuristics explain why challenges to extending presidential term limits are successful?

Table 4.6: Successful term limit challenges: economic heuristics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Socio_Eval 0.462 −0.359 −0.180 −0.159 (0.567) (0.650) (0.626) (0.295) Socio_Future −0.279 −0.741 −1.104 −0.073 (0.642) (0.834) (0.741) (0.348) Pocket_Eval 1.675∗ 1.915∗ 1.169 0.448 (0.713) (0.940) (0.824) (0.366) Pocket_Future −0.637 0.199 0.833 −0.094 (0.681) (1.011) (1.048) (0.491) Pres_Eval 0.234 (0.351) Trust −0.492 −1.099 (1.551) (0.713) Dem_Sat 0.165 −0.065 (0.475) (0.228) Dem_Pref −1.836∗ −1.170∗∗∗ (0.743) (0.298) Right −0.109 0.024 (0.156) (0.080) Age 0.160∗∗∗ 0.032 (0.043) (0.020) Education −0.108∗ 0.048∗ (0.046) (0.022) Variance of Random Effect 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Observations 389 388 388 388 270 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

124 Sociotropic economic evaluations do not achieve statistical significance in con- strained models, although pocketbook evaluations are positive and statistically significant in both the limited model and the economic heuristics only model. Without controlling for alternative explanations or country-level characteristics, the more positive pocketbook evaluations, the higher the survival rate of term limits. When evaluations of citizens’ personal economic situations are positive, challenges to remove term constraints on a president are likely to fail. After controlling for alternative explanations and country-level demographic characteristics, however, the effect dis- appears. In the fully specified model, as with the analyses for the removal of termcon- straints on the executive, Churchillian preference for democracy makes a country more susceptible to a successful challenge to extend or remove term limit constraints. Countries with an older median population have a higher survival rate than countries with younger median populations. Education has a mixed effect across the fully specified model and the post-2003 model including presidential evaluations. For the sake of brevity, the models for the identity heuristics and the full model with both heuristics appear in Appendix B. The proxy for the identity heuristics (see Table B.9), Asset Wealth, does not achieve statistical significance in any of the models. When both the economic and identity heuristics are included in a fully specified model (see Table B.10), none of the main explanatory predictors reach standard levels of statistical significance. Thus, no robust evidence is found that economic or social identity heuristics have explanatory power in explaining why term limits challenges are successful in some Latin American countries.

125 4.7.2 Failed Challenges

Failed challenges are defined as an attempt, whether overt or implied, of anexec- utive to extend his or her tenure in office beyond the U.S.-model of two consecutive terms. By this definition, for example, the Honduran coup of 2009 does not qualify because then-President Zelaya was not attempting to extend his term in office beyond two consecutive elections. As with successful challenges, failed challenges are extremely rare, and their intent often is inferred ex-post, such as then-President Menem of Argentina’s attempts to participate in the 2000 elections. Failed challenges only have occurred in around 1.2% of cases in the dataset. For the sake of brevity, only the fully specified model is discussed in the text, but the limited models foreach of the heuristics are included in Appendix B. In the limited models for both the economic and identity heuristics, none of the explanatory heuristics were statistically significant. Table 4.7 provides the results from the survival models for the fully specified models. In Model 2, which includes presidential evaluations, higher levels of interpersonal trust were related to a greater likelihood that a challenge would fail. In this instance, interpersonal trust actually increases the likelihood of a failed challenge since “failure” here is defined as a failed challenge.

4.8 Discussion

The analysis in this chapter revealed that different factors are related to a country’s hazard ratio for the “failure” of term limits and challenges to remove term limits (both successful and failures) for a president in Latin America to stay in office beyond two consecutive terms. For the lack of constraints on reelection outcome, economic heuristics helped to explain the survival of term limits in a given country. Specifically,

126 Table 4.7: Failed term limit challenges: all heuristics (1) (2) Socio_Eval −1.440 −0.615 (1.472) (0.651) Socio_Future 0.195 0.686 (2.068) (1.052) Pocket_Eval 2.331 0.733 (2.469) (0.958) Pocket_Future 1.267 −1.992 (2.985) (1.448) Asset Wealth 1.798 1.634 (2.959) (1.273) Pres_Eval −0.469 (0.765) Trust −2.023 −4.676∗ (3.987) (2.331) Dem_Sat −1.839 −0.634 (1.449) (0.751) Dem_Pref −0.898 −0.994 (2.131) (0.941) Right −0.714 −0.071 (0.367) (0.219) Age 0.061 0.102 (0.088) (0.064) Education −0.403 −0.128 (0.220) (0.085) Variance of Random Effect 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) Observations 388 270 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

127 positive evaluations of the national economic situation decreased the hazard of a country removing constraints on executive reelection. This finding is at odds with recent work by Singer (2018), who argued that positive economic evaluations were related to the erosion of horizontal and vertical accountability, although the effect is not present when controlling for presidential evaluations. Corrales (2018) also argued that support for the incumbent was related to a greater propensity for term limit changes, although this finding was not borne out by the public opinion data. Thisis perhaps a symptom of the data, however, which is limited in generalizability because of the fact that presidential evaluations were not asked in Latinobarometer until the early 2000s. As an illustration of the relationship between positive economic evaluations and the survival of term limits, Figure 4.4 plots the survival function for mean evaluations of the national economy at the equivalency of Mexico (mean=-0.38) and Honduras (mean=-0.49). While this graphical presentation is overly simplistic and eliminates variation in sociotropic evaluations within a country over time, it demonstrates the overall patterns and the role of time. As with the cumulative hazard estimate, both countries are not susceptible to “failure,” or the elimination of term limits, for more than half of the years in the dataset. After 15 years, or around 2010 in the dataset, the survival functions begin to diverge. Both countries begin to experience decreasing survival curves. A country with a mean sociotropic evaluation equal to that of Mexico has a greater probability of survival than a country with a mean sociotropic evaluation similar to Honduras. In this example, the survival curve for Honduras, which removed term limits in 2015, has a steeper, negative slope than Mexico. By 2018, Honduras has a greater chance of no term limits than Mexico. Unlike the previous findings in the literature, then, positive national economic evaluations, at least at the country level, help to prevent the removal of constraints on executive reelection.

128 Figure 4.4: Mixed effects gamma regression survival function at mean sociotropic evaluations in Mexico (-0.38) and Honduras (-0.49).

For the constraints dependent variable, weak evidence also showed that countries with higher levels of asset wealth had a greater likelihood of maintaining constraints on executive reelection, which is in line with Lipset’s (1981) theory of the effect of economic insecurity on negative attitudes toward democracy. Counter to Lipset’s historical argument, however, is the findings related to Churchillian preference for democracy, namely that democracy is preferable to any other form of governance. Preference for democracy was linked to higher hazard ratios for a lack of constraints on presidential reelection: the greater a country’s preference for democracy, the more likely that executive term limits are absent. Rather than turning their backs on democracy as suggested by Córdova and Seligson (2010), this finding might suggest

129 that political scientists’ conceptualization of democracy is perhaps at odds with citizens’ understanding on the ground. In fact, the findings suggest that the removal of constraints on reelection is highly consistent with support for democracy. Figure 4.5 shows the survival function for mean evaluations of Churchillian preference for democracy in Bolivia (mean=0.49) and Venezuela (mean=0.61). While both countries had decreasing survival functions after 2010, the survival function for a country with a mean preference for democracy equal to that of Venezuela had a steeper negative slope than a country with a mean preference for democracy equal to that of Bolivia. An alternative potential explanation for this surprising finding is that citizens may place greater importance on democracy precisely in those countries where it is absent. In Venezuela, for instance, scholars agree that the country has transitioned into an authoritarian country. At the same time, however, Venezue- lans have a mean preference for democracy in the Latinobarometer dataset that is third only behind Costa Rica and Uruguay. When analyzing the temporal trends for Churchillian preference for democracy as in Figure 4.6, some evidence suggests that this alternative explanation carries weight. Since 1995, preference for democracy in Venezuela has increased as the quality of democracy on the ground has steadily decreased (for a discussion of Venezuela’s authoritarian decline, see Corrales (2015) and Diamond (2015)).

130 Figure 4.5: Mixed effects gamma regression survival function at mean Churchillian preference for democracy in Bolivia (0.49) and Venezuela (0.61).

131 Figure 4.6: Mean preference for democracy in Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Venezuela from 1995-2016. Before country-level aggregation, Churchillian preference for democracy is coded as follows: (-1) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one; (0) For people like me it doesn’t matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic; and (1) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. Higher mean values correspond to a greater preference for democracy.

The most consistent, robust effect for evaluating the survival function that a given country would not have constraints on presidential reelection, however, was temporal. Figure 4.7 plots the survival function that a given country would not have constraints on presidential reelection for the fully specified model with and without presidential evaluations. Across both models, the survival function drastically decreased with time after 15 years (around 2010), suggesting that perhaps the early movers like Venezuela and Nicaragua helped their neighbors create a toolkit for removing constraints on

132 tenure. The model that includes presidential evaluations has a much steeper decreasing slope, which is most likely due to truncated time period (presidential evaluations are not available for analysis until 2004, almost a decade into the period of observation). As the survival functions demonstrate, the hazard rate for eliminating term limits will only continue to increase with time.

Figure 4.7: Mixed effects gamma regression survival functions for fully specified constraint model with and without presidential evaluations.

The consistent finding for temporal effects in the removal of term limit constraints on presidential tenure in Latin America suggests that time is an important factor in explaining the prevalence of this political outcome. One possible corollary of this finding that deserves to be explored is the relationship between the elimination of

133 term limits and diffusion or demonstration effects. Demonstration effects are linked to other political phenomena like democratization and the modern ubiquity of elections (Huntington, 1993; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2005; Bunce and Wolchik, 2006). As suggested by Bunce and Wolchik (2011), drivers of diffusion usually require a significant departure from previous practice, the spread of ideas withina limited period of time, and international processes that encourage these adoptions. While spatial dependence was not explicitly modeled in this analysis, the removal of constraints on presidential term limits in Latin America shares similarities with Bunce’s criteria: term limits were the norm until the late 2000s, six countries had at one point adopted the removal of term limits by 2018, and Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution could have helped to spur the adoption of similar institutional changes in other countries. Moreover, by 2009, it is possible that other countries adopted a toolkit of popular referendums, constitutional changes, and Supreme Court rulings to help usher in similar changes. All of this is purely speculative, however, and begs further investigation by researchers. While the economic heuristics aided in explaining what made countries more susceptible to the lack of constraints on executive tenure, neither of the proposed heuristics added to our understanding of why a particular country would engage in a successful or failed challenge to remove presidential term limits. For successful challenges to remove term limits, none of the public opinion variables were significantly related to the increased probability for a successful challenge. Democratic preference, however, led to an increased risk of failure. In the face of the dissatisfied democrats literature (Norris, 1999; Carlin, 2011), this analysis suggests that those countries that have higher levels of Churchillian preference for democracy are more likely susceptible to challenges to remove term limits. Whereby the aforementioned literature would predict that the most staunch defenders of democracy would come from the most

134 critical citizens, at least in regards to term limits, it appears that countries with relatively higher preference for democracy are more susceptible to the removal of checks on executive reelection. While I have suggested several interpretations of this finding, its true meaning remains unclear.

4.9 Conclusion

This chapter extended the analysis from the previous chapter from the individual to the country-level of analysis. The analysis built upon the theorized economic and social identity heuristics to explore where term limits become contentious, why they are challenged in some countries and not others, and what explains successful and failed challenges. Aggregated public opinion variables from Latinobarometer were analyzed in conjunction with unique dependent variables that accounted for country- level outcomes for the removal of constraints on executive reelection and challenges to remove presidential term limits. The analysis effectively covered a 23-year time period from 1995-2018 across 18 countries in Latin America. One of the economic heuristics, specifically evaluations of the national economic situation, led to a reduced hazard ratio for the removal of constraints of presidential reelection. The more positive a country’s mean outlook for the economic situation, the greater the likelihood that term limits would survive in a given country. This finding was at odds with individual-level analysis from the previous chapter, which found that individuals were more likely to support the removal of term limits under a variety of specifications when they had positive economic evaluations. Afew potential explanations can clarify this contradiction in the analysis. Primarily, the analyses were interested in explaining separate outcomes. While the individual-level analysis was geared toward explaining opinion on term limits, the cross-national analysis compared the survival functions of term limits across countries. Thus, while the

135 same underlying mechanisms were under consideration, the dependent variables were fundamentally different. Not only did the unit of analysis and dependent variables vary across chapters, but the analytical goals varied as well—the case study chapter is interested in capturing individual-level casual mechanisms, while the cross-national chapter seeks to uncover patterns of country-level removal of term limits across time and space. Another alternative explanation for the seemingly contradictory findings lies in the timing of the survey, which was uniquely situated in between changes to term limit legislation in Bolivia and Ecuador. Bolivia later removed term limits while Ecuador reinstated them through a referendum vote, a near perfect reversal of events from when the survey was fielded. It is possible that the survey actually captured opinion toward term limits as these opinions were undergoing processes of change. In addition, it also is possible that the findings are internally consistent: positive economic evaluations may predict support for the elimination of term limits on the individual level, while a country with higher overall economic evaluations is perhaps less susceptible to the removal of term limits. The temporal indicator and preference for democracy also were related to the survival of term limits, while greater asset wealth was weakly related to a decreased risk for a country to have an absence of constraints on presidential reelection. When presidential evaluations were added to the model to account for the possibility that the removal of limits on presidential reelection was contingent on presidential favorability, the economic and social identity heuristics lost their explanatory power. However, as mentioned previously, the model that includes presidential evaluations has nearly 130 fewer observations because of the limited availability of data on presidential evaluations in Latinobarometer. Churchillian preference for democracy remains significant for predicting the absence of term limits, while greater levels of interpersonal trust are

136 linked to an increased risk of a given country removing all constraints on executive tenure. While the analysis is not definitive, it does suggest that positive economic evaluations explain which varying hazard ratios across countries, and preference for democracy is counterintuitively related to the removal of presidential term limits. Neither economic evaluations nor social identity were meaningfully linked to challenges to remove presidential term limits, whether successful or not. None of the public opinion variables in either of the models evaluated explains successful term limit challenges. Higher levels of interpersonal trust explained a lower hazard ratio for failed challenges, meaning that countries with higher levels of interpersonal trust were more likely to experience a failed challenge to remove term limits. For all of the findings presented in this chapter, further research and longer time horizons are required to fully unpack the factors that make countries more at risk for the removal of term limits, although some of the presented evidence does explain differences in the survival function for term limits across time and countries in Latin America.

137 Chapter 5: Conclusion

If I say goodbye, the nation learns

how to move on; it outlives me

when I’m gone.

George Washington in Lin-Manuel

Miranda’s Hamilton: An American

Musical

5.1 Lessons From Latin America

This dissertation evaluated the role that citizens play in democratic degradation on the ground. My research has provided some evidence that the way in which citizens think about and relate to presidential term limits specifically, and by extension democracy, is influenced by both social and economic considerations. Rather than thinking about democracy in terms of theory and abstract values, citizens appear to rely on heuristics such as the economy and identity to make decisions regarding the preservation of traditionally democratic checks and balances. More importantly, perhaps, perceptions of positive economic developments and appeals to an in-group have allowed leaders to undermine the historical role and primacy of democratic institutions. The theoretical contribution of this dissertation draws upon two heuristics commonly employed in the voting literature—economic evaluations and social

138 identity—to suggest that the common finding that citizens make sophisticated political decisions based on heuristics extends to their support for policies that may undermine democracy itself. I proposed that citizens rely on familiar heuristics—evaluations of the economic situation and the in-groups and out-groups created through social identity—to make informed decisions about one of the central tenets of democracy—constraints on unlimited presidential reelection. While democracy is a more abstract, nuanced phenomena than political candidates, the analysis lends credence to the idea that similar shortcuts are employed when deciding whether the removal of presidential term limits is justifiable. Specifically, the individual-level analysis in Bolivia and Peru uncovered a positive relationship between evaluations of the national economy and favorability toward the removal of presidential term limits under a variety of specifications. Weak evidence also suggested that those who identified with the outgroup had a stronger preference for the maintenance of term limits, regardless of the justification provided. Subsequent analysis applied the same heuristics to a broader selection of 18 countries in Latin America. Using data from 1995-2016, it explored where term limits become contentious and why challenges fail in some countries but succeed in others. Applying the framework of event history analysis revealed that positive evaluations of the national economic situation were related to the survival, or maintenance, of term limits. In contrast to the individual-level analysis, negative sociotropic evaluations heightened the hazard of removing term limits. Also noted was a weak relationship between a country’s median asset wealth and the absence of constraints on presidential reelection: the higher the levels of wealth, the lower the risk. Counterintuitively, preference for democracy as measured through the Churchillian indicator was linked to an absence of term limits. One potential explanation suggests that citizens’ understanding of democracy is possibly at odds with its more theoretical definition.

139 Another interpretation is that this finding might indicate a renewed appreciation of the strengths of democracy. This is in line with those who say that high levels of support for democracy in Venezuela are suggestive that citizens might have more appreciation for democracy in its absence. While the main explanatory variables did not aid our understanding of successful or failed challenges to remove term limits, higher levels of interpersonal trust across countries were related to failed challenges. The most consistent finding from the cross-national analysis was related tothe role of time. Since 1995, the hazard ratio for the removal of term limits has increased, with the most significant change in the slope of the hazard ratio occurring around 2009, when two countries (Nicaragua and Venezuela) successfully removed term limits. While not explored in this dissertation, this finding points to the potential of demonstration or diffusion effects. Later-adopters may have engaged in processes of learning from the precedent set by early-movers for how to successfully challenge constraints on executive reelection. The research presented here links individual perceptions of the economic arena with the tendency of leaders to capitalize on positive economic trends, the power of descriptive representation ,and feelings of inclusiveness to strengthen the executive and erode democratic institutions. It also helps to explain why, when, and where term limits become contentious, pointing to larger patterns for negative economic evaluations of increasing the possibility of the removal of term limits. As the cross-national analysis suggested, the hazard ratio for the absence of constraints on executive reelection increased throughout time, with all countries in the region becoming more susceptible to their removal by 2018 when the data observation period ended. Through this, I have contributed to the political science literature that is con- cerned with how citizens engage with democracy on an individual level, how leaders

140 can profit from economic growth and dissatisfaction to eschew the benefits ofrepre- sentative institutions, and how susceptibility to democratic degradation is related to individual perceptions and demographic patterns. Focusing on the specific example of the removal of presidential term limits, I explored how citizens interact with institutions in these processes of deconsolidation, revealing surprising patterns related to evaluations of the economy and support for democracy.

5.2 Limitations of the Empirical Strategy

Before attempting to generalize from the findings presented in this dissertation, several limitations should be noted to its empirical strategy. All of the analyses re- volved around survey data, which has a variety of associated pitfalls. The survey faced significant challenges with regard to the non-representative nature of thesam- ple, which yielded undercoverage for key demographic groups that were crucial to the analysis. In order to capitalize on the saliency of recent changes to term limit legislation, the survey was fielded online in June 2016. Both countries later reversed course on term limits, positioning the findings from the survey after Ecuador had removed term limits and before Bolivia had removed term limits. This change represents both a strength and a weakness of the associated analyses. The cross-national analyses relied on Latinobarometer data from 1995-2016. While this dataset does have representative samples, it was not fielded in several years. Not only is there systematic missingness across time, but key indicators, such as evaluations of each country’s respective president, were not asked throughout the entire period of interest. Compared to its counterparts, namely LAPOP, Latinobarometer has not historically asked about racial or ethnic identification, which severely limits the ability of this analysis to account for the social identity hypotheses. Because

141 the dependent variables of interest were country-level outcomes, the main independent variables were aggregated to country-level means and medians, which obscured individual-level variation. The rare nature of the dependent variable also limited the available analytic strategies. All of this diminished the likelihood of any meaningful conclusions, thus making the empirical strategy a hard test of the proposed theory.

5.2.1 Survey

The survey fielded in Bolivia and Ecuador was conducted online through aconve- nience sample because of time and cost constraints, resulting in a non-representative sample. While efforts were made to clearly acknowledge how the sample differed from the population in each country, the non-probability self-selection nature of the sample yielded significant undercoverage, preventing claims of generalizability (Scherpenzeel and Bethlehem, 2011). As such, the results from the analyses are just a first step in testing the link between the theorized heuristics and opinion on presidential term limits. Focusing on the experimental component of the survey, the manipulation was too subtle to yield significant differences across treatment groups, thus failing totruly isolate the independent effect of priming. No relationship was found between the questions-as-treatments manipulation and preference for term limits for either of the economic heuristics. Due to the undercoverage mentioned previously, the analysis was not able to uncover the true impact of social identity on the favorability of removing presidential term limits. Future research should employ a stronger treatment through more explicit framing of the link between the heuristics and the removal of term limits (e.g., see Nelson, Oxley and Clawson (1997); Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997)). Regardless of the deficiencies with the online survey, the analysis yielded

142 a robust relationship between preference for the removal of term limits and the economic heuristic. In addition, because of the non-representative nature of the sample, not enough coverage was available for the ethnic groups that were of particular interest for analysis. Some evidence supported the theorized relationship between an outsider social identity and favorability for the maintenance of term limits, but because of the problems previously outlined, these findings are merely indicative of the actual relationship. In order for confirmation of these results, the analysis would require replication on representative samples in each country, with an oversample of key ethnic and racial groups as well as weighting to crucial demographic variables. In addition to the methodological issues, the survey was fielded between significant changes to term limit legislation in both countries. This presents a critical challenge to interpreting the data, particularly as respondents in the Bolivian sample were much more likely to prefer the maintenance of term limits under all specifications, even though the country’s Constitutional Tribunal would rule term limits for any elected official as unconstitutional in late 2017, less than two years after the referendum vote. I chose to interpret the data as a snapshot of a moment in time amongst a select set of respondents, rather than representative of the general tide of public opinion. While other researchers may have made different analytical decisions, the most robust finding from the survey—that positive sociotropic evaluations were related tothe opinion that term limits were not necessary under a variety of specifications—was corroborated across multiple iterations of the dependent variable.

5.2.2 Cross-National Analysis

The reliance on Latinobarometer data also had its weaknesses and associated methodological decisions. To begin, the survey was not fielded in 1999, 2012, and 2014, and at the time of writing, the latest wave of the survey ended in 2016. Data

143 was collected on only eight countries in 1995, with nine countries joining in 1996. The Dominican Republic was not surveyed until 2004, and one of the key alternative explanations—presidential evaluations—was not asked until the same year. As a result of these systematic patterns of missingness in conjunction with the rare occurrence of the dependent variables, I decided to impute values as averages between years. For those countries and years where averages were not possible, I imputed values from the previous or subsequent year. This method was only repeated ±1 year. The decision to impute allowed for more observations of the dependent variable for inclusion in the analysis, but it sacrificed valuable variation on the independent variables. The truncation of one of the primary alternative explanations, that the relationship between support for the removal of term limits was based purely upon sentiment toward the incumbent, limited the comparability of the cross-national analysis to the survey analysis. It also weakened the ability to fully test the proposed heuristics against competing explanations. Unlike the analyses conducted in the survey chapter, it was not possible to fully account for the social identity heuristic because of the structure of the data. As mentioned previously, Latinobarometer has not consistently asked about racial or ethnic identification across time. Thus, it was not possible to account for theracial and ethnic identification component of the social identity hypothesis. Even if these variables were available, it is not clear how to incorporate the individual-level variables into a country-level analysis. In addition, questions about social class identification and attachment were not asked in the survey. As such, I chose to use the mean score of an asset measure of wealth as a proxy for mean class identity across countries. This strategy was certainly imperfect in that it is disconnected from actual social identity, but it did suggest that countries with higher levels of asset wealth were less susceptible to the removal of term limits. Despite all of the deficiencies outlined here, I chose to

144 use the Latinobarometer data because its coverage across time and countries is much more consistent than either LAPOP or the World Values Survey. Another crucial difference between the survey and the cross-national chapter lies in the level of the dependent variable. In the survey, I was able to directly ask the respondents about their favorability toward removing term limits, but no such variable exists in nationally representative public opinion data now or across time. Because I was interested in explaining susceptibility to removing term limits, I constructed two dependent variables that recorded the status of term limits at the country level. As a result, the public opinion indicators were aggregated to country-level means and medians in order to avoid the classic ecological fallacy (Robinson, 1950). While this decision allowed me to make comparisons across countries, time, and outcomes on the dependent variable, it greatly reduced the richness of the individual-level data, obscuring any differences in opinion that might occur across demographic characteristics. Future work should explore the dependent variables proposed in the survey chapter in nationally representative surveys, allowing for differences across key cleavages to inform our understanding of why citizens might support the elimination of term limits. As noted, though, this strategy would not allow for analysis across time, which was one of the motivations of this dissertation in taking steps to understand patterns of susceptibility to remove term limits across time. Finally, another limitation in the empirical strategy is tied to the construction of the dependent variables for the cross-national analysis. Both dependent variables were extremely rare events, which limited the analytic strategies available. I chose to use event history analysis, which allowed me to account for the stochastic correlation of observations across countries, the possibility of repeated events, temporal variation, and the relatively few occurrences of events across time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997; Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2002; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). WhileI

145 conducted the analyses on both the imputed and non-imputed data (see Appendix B), the robust findings were present only in the imputed data. One explanation isthat the lack of significant findings in the non-imputed data is because of the lossofkey variation on the dependent variables, thanks to the patterns of missingness described earlier. Another explanation is that no effect exists of either the economic or social heuristics on the removal of term limits or challenges to term limits. Even though this is a possibility, the strategies described here all suggest that it is unlikely that any relationship would have been revealed if no relationship truly existed—values were imputed despite loss in variation across the explanatory variables. Future analysis should expand upon the universe of cases to overcome the small n problems inherent in the dependent variable. This will allow future researchers to overcome some of the problems outlined here and test the validity of the conclusions from this analysis.

5.3 Future Research

While the bulk of my research has focused on Latin America, it raises important questions related to both the democratic deficit and term limits. As a final note, executive term limits are a characteristic of presidential democracies, not all democracies.That being said, the analyses presented here are particularly well-suited for cross-national comparisons with Africa as the elimination of presidential term limits is becoming increasingly common in both regions [e.g., see Moehler (2009) and Riedl (2015)]. Future scholars need to explore the relationship between pre-existing economic and social inequalities, focusing on the prevalence of ethnic and class stratification in both Latin America and Africa, and the tendency to eliminate presidential term limits. A few questions for this future research agenda include: where do presidential term limits become a contentious issue? Do the same factors explain the

146 removal of term limits across both regions? Are presidential term limits vulnera- ble in both old and new democracies? Does the ethnic diversity or socioeconomic composition of a country change the way citizens think about democracy? This dissertation also has raised serious questions about scholars’ interpretation of public opinion measures of support for democracy. The analyses linked the Churchillian measure of democracy to a non-democratic outcome—the removal of presidential term limits, long a hallmark of democracy. Several explanations were suggested in the text, such as citizens having a fundamentally different understanding of what democracy means as compared to scholars. It is also possible that the removal of term limits does not seem to undermine democracy on the ground, particularly as citizens often play a role in these decisions through referendum votes. Future work should continue to delve into the underlying causes of these discrepan- cies, asking: do citizens have the same understanding of the meaning of democracy across time and space? Are levels of support for democracy as suggested by survey indicators at odds with the performance of democracy on the ground?

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161 Appendix A: Supplementary Material for Chapter 3

Figure A.1: Self-identification with social class in Ecuador: “People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to a social class. Which social class would you describe yourself as belonging to?"

162 Figure A.2: Self-identification with social class in Bolivia: “People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to a social class. Which social class would you describe yourself as belonging to?"

163 Figure A.3: Perceived closeness to self-identified social class in Ecuador: “How close do you feel to your social class?"

164 Figure A.4: Perceived closeness to self-identified social class in Bolivia: “How close do you feel to your social class?"

165 Figure A.5: Perceived closeness to self-identified ethnic group in Ecuador: “How close do you feel to your ethnic group?"

166 Figure A.6: Perceived closeness to self-identified ethnic group in Bolivia: “How close do you feel to your ethnic group?"

167 Table A.1: Support for term limits (democratic rationale): economic heuristics (1) (2) (3) (4) Bolivia 1.983∗∗∗ 1.727∗∗∗ 1.953∗∗∗ 1.303∗∗∗ (0.251) (0.229) (0.252) (0.276) Socio_Eval −0.907∗∗∗ −0.993∗∗∗ −0.444∗ (0.144) (0.157) (0.187) Socio_Future −0.616∗∗∗ −0.586∗∗∗ −0.275 (0.135) (0.151) (0.167) Pocket_Eval −0.212 0.271 0.137 (0.129) (0.154) (0.176) Pocket_Future −0.545∗∗∗ −0.135 0.001 (0.130) (0.157) (0.175) Pres_Eval −0.609∗∗∗ (0.125) Trust 0.281∗ (0.114) F-Scale −0.271∗∗∗ (0.081) Protest 0.361 (0.308) Dem_Sat −0.111 (0.163) Dem_Support 0.047 (0.058) Right 0.024 (0.048) Vote −0.005 (0.030) PID −0.210 (0.135) Gender 0.220 (0.212) Age 0.103∗ (0.050) Education 0.145 (0.075) Income 0.013 (0.028) Constant −0.294∗ 0.308∗∗ −0.243 −0.379 (0.118) (0.099) (0.130) (0.997) Observations 719 719 717 699 Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

168 Table A.2: Support for term limits (identity rationale): economic heuristics (1) (2) (3) (4) Bolivia 1.796∗∗∗ 1.610∗∗∗ 1.776∗∗∗ 1.223∗∗∗ (0.229) (0.211) (0.231) (0.247) Socio_Eval −0.784∗∗∗ −0.836∗∗∗ −0.473∗ (0.144) (0.157) (0.194) Socio_Future −0.569∗∗∗ −0.469∗∗ −0.224 (0.134) (0.148) (0.165) Pocket_Eval −0.131 0.239 0.011 (0.130) (0.152) (0.179) Pocket_Future −0.624∗∗∗ −0.288 −0.192 (0.132) (0.157) (0.168) Pres_Eval −0.418∗∗∗ (0.109) Trust 0.325∗∗ (0.113) F-Scale −0.159 (0.084) Protest 0.216 (0.295) Dem_Sat −0.036 (0.163) Dem_Support 0.029 (0.056) Right 0.085 (0.049) Vote −0.021 (0.031) PID −0.297∗ (0.134) Gender 0.147 (0.200) Age 0.156∗∗ (0.048) Education 0.170∗ (0.073) Income 0.062∗ (0.026) Constant −0.485∗∗∗ 0.109 −0.383∗∗ −2.679∗∗ (0.122) (0.101) (0.135) (0.969) Observations 697 697 695 679 Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

169 Table A.3: Support for term limits (any rationale): economic heuristics (1) (2) (3) (4) Bolivia 1.583∗∗∗ 1.424∗∗∗ 1.556∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ (0.228) (0.217) (0.229) (0.255) Socio_Eval −0.802∗∗∗ −0.852∗∗∗ −0.315 (0.140) (0.154) (0.185) Socio_Future −0.570∗∗∗ −0.628∗∗∗ −0.349∗ (0.137) (0.154) (0.169) Pocket_Eval −0.289∗ 0.113 −0.064 (0.131) (0.155) (0.176) Pocket_Future −0.342∗∗ 0.105 0.217 (0.132) (0.159) (0.173) Pres_Eval −0.514∗∗∗ (0.116) Trust 0.228∗ (0.109) F-Scale −0.051 (0.081) Protest −0.121 (0.295) Dem_Sat −0.172 (0.163) Dem_Support −0.052 (0.057) Right 0.118∗ (0.050) Vote 0.000 (0.031) PID −0.116 (0.135) Gender 0.118 (0.207) Age 0.097 (0.052) Education 0.173∗ (0.074) Income 0.008 (0.028) Constant −0.148 0.326∗∗ −0.178 −0.734 (0.117) (0.101) (0.132) (0.935) Observations 686 686 684 668 Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

170 Table A.4: Support for term limits (democratic rationale): identity heuristics (1) (2) (3) (4) Bolivia 1.537∗∗∗ 1.577∗∗∗ 1.505∗∗∗ 1.017∗∗∗ (0.228) (0.231) (0.239) (0.277) Ethnic Outsider 0.792∗∗ 0.657∗ 0.745∗ (0.305) (0.310) (0.357) Ethnic Attachment −0.092 −0.051 0.025 (0.091) (0.108) (0.128) Class Outsider 0.616∗ 0.526 0.181 (0.303) (0.309) (0.369) Class Attachment −0.113 −0.073 0.002 (0.099) (0.116) (0.139) Pres_Eval −0.880∗∗∗ (0.127) Trust 0.164 (0.091) F-Scale −0.324∗∗∗ (0.086) Protest 0.268 (0.321) Dem_Sat −0.130 (0.166) Dem_Support 0.067 (0.060) Right 0.012 (0.051) Vote −0.011 (0.031) PID −0.214 (0.142) Gender 0.302 (0.216) Age 0.100 (0.052) Education 0.141 (0.077) Income 0.009 (0.029) Constant 0.211 0.249∗ 0.212 −1.217 (0.113) (0.118) (0.126) (0.907) Observations 721 682 682 667 Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

171 Table A.5: Support for term limits (economic rationale): identity heuristics (1) (2) (3) (4) Bolivia 1.179∗∗∗ 1.174∗∗∗ 1.135∗∗∗ 0.695∗ (0.223) (0.228) (0.232) (0.270) Ethnic Outsider 0.112 0.003 −0.064 (0.282) (0.288) (0.313) Ethnic Attachment −0.070 −0.085 −0.029 (0.095) (0.111) (0.122) Class Outsider 0.431 0.434 0.073 (0.297) (0.307) (0.344) Class Attachment −0.031 0.008 0.087 (0.100) (0.113) (0.132) Pres_Eval −0.587∗∗∗ (0.122) Trust 0.203 (0.116) F-Scale −0.177∗ (0.086) Protest 0.445 (0.333) Dem_Sat −0.237 (0.162) Dem_Support 0.017 (0.059) Right 0.083 (0.048) Vote 0.016 (0.032) PID −0.175 (0.138) Gender 0.174 (0.212) Age −0.002 (0.048) Education 0.106 (0.074) Income 0.023 (0.029) Constant 0.573∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.724 (0.118) (0.121) (0.130) (0.881) Observations 696 661 661 647 Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

172 Table A.6: Support for term limits (any rationale): identity heuristics (1) (2) (3) (4) Bolivia 1.232∗∗∗ 1.298∗∗∗ 1.216∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗ (0.214) (0.221) (0.225) (0.257) Ethnic Outsider 0.634∗ 0.556 0.452 (0.310) (0.319) (0.327) Ethnic Attachment −0.100 −0.072 −0.028 (0.088) (0.103) (0.120) Class Outsider 0.277 0.206 −0.081 (0.275) (0.279) (0.307) Class Attachment −0.146 −0.097 −0.085 (0.099) (0.114) (0.133) Pres_Eval −0.586∗∗∗ (0.118) Trust 0.222∗ (0.112) F-Scale −0.078 (0.083) Protest −0.117 (0.299) Dem_Sat −0.289 (0.169) Dem_Support −0.040 (0.057) Right 0.125∗ (0.051) Vote 0.003 (0.032) PID −0.082 (0.137) Gender 0.150 (0.206) Age 0.080 (0.050) Education 0.152∗ (0.074) Income 0.010 (0.028) Constant 0.305∗∗ 0.354∗∗ 0.335∗∗ 0.099 (0.114) (0.119) (0.127) (0.897) Observations 688 650 650 636 Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

173 Table A.7: Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the democratic rationale by experimental conditions and national economic evaluations. Econ Prime ID Prime Econ+ID ID+Econ Control Total Bad 56.1% 63.0% 52.1% 63.5% 57.3% 58.5% 37 51 37 54 90 269 Good 43.9% 37.0% 47.9% 36.5% 42.7% 41.5% 29 30 34 31 67 191 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 66 81 71 85 157 460 Note: Positive economic evaluations include responses that the economy is doing very good, good and neither good nor bad. Negative economic evaluations include responses that the economy is doing bad and very bad.

Table A.8: Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the identity rationale by experimental conditions and national economic evaluations. Econ Prime ID Prime Econ+ID ID+Econ Control Total Bad 50.0% 59.2% 54.8% 62.8% 59.5% 58.1% 27 42 34 49 88 240 Good 50.0% 40.8% 45.2% 37.2% 40.5% 41.9% 27 29 28 29 60 173 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 54 71 62 78 148 413 Note: Positive economic evaluations include responses that the economy is doing very good, good and neither good nor bad. Negative economic evaluations include responses that the economy is doing bad and very bad.

Table A.9: Proportion of respondents who support term limits for any rationale by experimental conditions and national economic evaluations. Econ Prime ID Prime Econ+ID ID+Econ Control Total Bad 55.9% 61.0% 52.4% 57.1% 58.2% 57.3% 33 47 33 52 89 254 Good 44.1% 39.0% 47.6% 42.9% 41.8% 42.7% 26 30 30 39 64 189 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 59 77 63 91 153 443 Note: Positive economic evaluations include responses that the economy is doing very good, good, and neither good nor bad. Negative economic evaluations include responses that the economy is doing bad and very bad.

174 Table A.10: Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the democratic rationale by experimental conditions and personal economic evaluations. Econ Prime ID Prime Econ+ID ID+Econ Control Total Bad 28.4% 40.7% 25.4% 22.4% 31.0% 29.9% 19 33 18 19 49 138 Good 71.6% 59.3% 74.6% 77.6% 69.0% 70.1% 48 48 53 66 109 324 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 67 81 71 85 158 462 Note: Positive evaluations of respondents’ personal economic situation include responses that their personal economic situation is doing very good, good, and neither good nor bad. Negative evaluations include responses that their personal economic situation is doing bad and very bad.

Table A.11: Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the economic rationale by experimental conditions and personal economic evaluations. Econ Prime ID Prime Econ+ID ID+Econ Control Total Bad 21.5% 35.6% 24.3% 22.6% 31.6% 28.3% 14 31 18 19 55 137 Good 78.5% 64.4% 75.7% 77.4% 68.4% 71.7% 51 56 56 65 119 347 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 65 87 74 84 174 484 Note: Positive evaluations of respondents’ personal economic situation include responses that their personal economic situation is doing very good, good, and neither good nor bad. Negative evaluations include responses that their personal economic situation is doing bad and very bad.

Table A.12: Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the identity rationale by experimental conditions and personal economic evaluations. Econ Prime ID Prime Econ+ID ID+Econ Control Total Bad 27.3% 43.7% 21.0% 23.1% 31.5% 29.9% 15 31 13 18 47 124 Good 72.7% 56.3% 79.0% 76.9% 68.5% 70.1% 40 40 49 60 102 291 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 55 71 62 78 149 415 Note: Positive evaluations of respondents’ personal economic situation include responses that their personal economic situation is doing very good, good, and neither good nor bad. Negative evaluations include responses that their personal economic situation is doing bad and very bad.

175 Table A.13: Proportion of respondents who support term limits for any rationale by experimental conditions and personal economic evaluations. Econ Prime ID Prime Econ+ID ID+Econ Control Total Bad 30.0% 41.6% 23.8% 22.0% 31.2% 29.9% 18 32 15 20 48 133 Good 70.0% 58.4% 76.2% 78.0% 68.8% 70.1% 42 45 48 71 106 312 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 60 77 63 91 154 445 Note: Positive evaluations of respondents’ personal economic situation include responses that their personal economic situation is doing very good, good, and neither good nor bad. Negative evaluations include responses that their personal economic situation is doing bad and very bad.

Table A.14: Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the democratic rationale by experimental conditions and ethnic identification. Econ Prime ID Prime Econ+ID ID+Econ Control Total Not white 92.5% 87.7% 90.1% 76.5% 83.5% 85.3% 62 71 64 65 132 394 White 7.5% 12.3% 9.9% 23.5% 16.5% 14.7% 5 10 7 20 26 68 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 67 81 71 85 158 462 Note: Ethnic identification is based upon self-identification with an ethnic group.

Table A.15: Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the economic rationale by experimental conditions and ethnic identification. Econ Prime ID Prime Econ+ID ID+Econ Control Total Not white 92.3% 89.7% 91.9% 79.8% 86.2% 87.4% 60 78 68 67 150 423 White 7.7% 10.3% 8.1% 20.2% 13.8% 12.6% 5 9 6 17 24 61 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 65 87 74 84 174 484 Note: Ethnic identification is based upon self-identification with an ethnic group.

176 Table A.16: Proportion of respondents who support term limits for any rationale by experimental conditions and ethnic identification. Econ Prime ID Prime Econ+ID ID+Econ Control Total Not white 90.0% 85.7% 90.5% 81.3% 84.4% 85.6% 54 66 57 74 130 381 White 10.0% 14.3% 9.5% 18.7% 15.6% 14.4% 6 11 6 17 24 64 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 60 77 63 91 154 445 Note: Ethnic identification is based upon self-identification with an ethnic group.

Table A.17: Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the democratic rationale by experimental conditions and class identification. Econ Prime ID Prime Econ+ID ID+Econ Control Total Class insider 91.0% 82.7% 91.5% 81.2% 86.1% 86.1% 61 67 65 69 136 398 Class outsider 9.0% 17.3% 8.5% 18.8% 13.9% 13.9% 6 14 6 16 22 64 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 67 81 71 85 158 462 Note: Class insiders are defined as those who self-identity as lower, lower-middle, or middle class. Class outsiders are those who self-identify as upper-middle or upper class.

Table A.18: Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the economic rationale by experimental conditions and class identification. Econ Prime ID Prime Econ+ID ID+Econ Control Total Class insider 86.2% 86.2% 91.9% 82.1% 87.9% 87.0% 56 75 68 69 153 421 Class outsider 13.8% 13.8% 8.1% 17.9% 12.1% 13.0% 9 12 6 15 21 63 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 65 87 74 84 174 484 Note: Class insiders are defined as those who self-identity as lower, lower-middle, or middle class. Class outsiders are those who self-identify as upper-middle or upper class.

177 Table A.19: Proportion of respondents who support term limits for the identity rationale by experimental conditions and class identification. Econ Prime ID Prime Econ+ID ID+Econ Control Total Class insider 89.1% 85.9% 90.3% 79.5% 85.9% 85.8% 49 61 56 62 128 356 Class outsider 10.9% 14.1% 9.7% 20.5% 14.1% 14.2% 6 10 6 16 21 59 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 55 71 62 78 149 415 Note: Class insiders are defined as those who self-identity as lower, lower-middle, or middle class. Class outsiders are those who self-identify as upper-middle or upper class.

Table A.20: Proportion of respondents who support term limits for any rationale by experimental conditions and class identification. Econ Prime ID Prime Econ+ID ID+Econ Control Total Class insider 91.7% 85.7% 90.5% 82.4% 87.0% 87.0% 55 66 57 75 134 387 Class outsider 8.3% 14.3% 9.5% 17.6% 13.0% 13.0% 5 11 6 16 20 58 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 60 77 63 91 154 445 Note: Class insiders are defined as those who self-identity as lower, lower-middle, or middle class. Class outsiders are those who self-identify as upper-middle or upper class.

178 A.0.1 Supplementary Tables and Figures

Figure A.7: Frequency distribution of monthly income in Ecuador; figures presented in U.S. dollars.

179 Figure A.8: Frequency distribution of monthly income in Bolivia; figures presented in Bolivianos.

180 Appendix B: Supplementary Material for Chapter 4

181 Table B.1: Main explanatory variables (no imputation): descriptive statistics Mexico Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Costa Rica Panama Colombia Ecuador Socio_Eval -0.382 -0.457 -0.351 -0.436 -0.400 -0.209 -0.0390 -0.128 -0.0669 (0.105) (0.0866) (0.162) (0.144) (0.277) (0.111) (0.255) (0.0914) (0.333) Socio_Future -0.0604 -0.132 -0.123 -0.0580 0.0413 -0.0745 0.333 0.172 0.0738 (0.107) (0.128) (0.155) (0.184) (0.286) (0.197) (0.162) (0.105) (0.269) Pocket_Eval 0.0179 0.0114 -0.102 -0.00996 -0.0668 0.195 0.126 0.256 0.126 (0.0867) (0.0995) (0.101) (0.0898) (0.162) (0.0632) (0.151) (0.0637) (0.177) Pocket_Future 0.263 0.232 0.0371 0.291 0.238 0.292 0.510 0.562 0.226 (0.109) (0.135) (0.122) (0.119) (0.207) (0.146) (0.115) (0.0712) (0.207) Pres_Eval 0.528 0.482 0.638 0.473 0.471 0.506 0.557 0.720 0.519 (0.105) (0.0460) (0.141) (0.106) (0.168) (0.162) (0.194) (0.116) (0.225) Trust 0.225 0.218 0.240 0.214 0.178 0.167 0.200 0.183 0.220 (0.0471) (0.0696) (0.0563) (0.0691) (0.0437) (0.0507) (0.0303) (0.0284) (0.0689) 182 Dem_Sat 2.012 2.159 2.331 2.155 2.261 2.538 2.449 2.238 2.293 (0.115) (0.0830) (0.198) (0.152) (0.258) (0.176) (0.249) (0.137) (0.319) Dem_Pref 0.358 0.194 0.432 0.334 0.461 0.596 0.466 0.456 0.395 (0.0783) (0.0946) (0.142) (0.0948) (0.0926) (0.115) (0.0819) (0.0544) (0.144) Right 5.204 5.385 5.082 5.986 5.068 5.669 5.270 5.951 5.007 (0.221) (0.349) (0.653) (0.360) (0.399) (0.419) (0.726) (0.307) (0.329) Age 37.56 34.50 35.94 33.94 31.44 36.61 37.72 37.06 37.39 (2.506) (0.707) (1.740) (0.863) (1.014) (0.697) (1.202) (2.128) (0.601) Education 9.333 4.667 7.333 6.938 6.778 7 10.33 12.56 8.778 (1.323) (0.500) (0.500) (0.417) (0.441) (0) (1.323) (2.242) (2.728) Asset Wealth 2.964 2.979 2.975 2.961 2.931 2.932 2.965 2.968 2.959 (0.0627) (0.0186) (0.0230) (0.0264) (0.0897) (0.0547) (0.0373) (0.0197) (0.0459) Notes: Variable means are presented on the first line; standard deviations are displayed in parentheses. Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, and Ecuador were not included in the Latinobarometer sample until 1996. The following variables have limited or missing datapoints: Trust was not collected until 1996; Pres_Eval was not collected until 2004; and Pocket_Future was not asked in 2016. Source: Latinobarometer 1995-2016, www.latinobarometro.org Table B.2: Main explanatory variables (no imputation): descriptive statistics Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentina Dominican Republic Socio_Eval -0.177 -0.264 -0.304 -0.00907 0.0860 -0.0413 -0.0871 -0.140 -0.436 (0.263) (0.243) (0.199) (0.118) (0.339) (0.247) (0.238) (0.200) (0.195) Socio_Future 0.126 0.0881 0.297 0.283 0.363 0.293 0.172 0.173 0.0446 (0.153) (0.243) (0.285) (0.107) (0.102) (0.226) (0.214) (0.234) (0.321) Pocket_Eval 0.0828 -0.0148 0.269 0.0894 0.236 0.319 0.154 0.259 -0.217 (0.106) (0.105) (0.0747) (0.0665) (0.162) (0.104) (0.0934) (0.103) (0.162) Pocket_Future 0.351 0.318 0.531 0.388 0.410 0.633 0.390 0.353 0.246 (0.119) (0.166) (0.180) (0.101) (0.0966) (0.0939) (0.128) (0.135) (0.310) Pres_Eval 0.592 0.341 0.516 0.617 0.664 0.660 0.537 0.539 0.547 (0.103) (0.226) (0.209) (0.183) (0.213) (0.186) (0.118) (0.201) (0.193) Trust 0.201 0.167 0.148 0.157 0.277 0.0697 0.233 0.235 0.262 (0.0444) (0.0308) (0.0501) (0.0205) (0.0508) (0.0208) (0.0475) (0.0479) (0.0992) 183 Dem_Sat 2.272 2.044 1.984 2.404 2.919 2.173 2.497 2.415 2.456 (0.205) (0.189) (0.251) (0.114) (0.324) (0.182) (0.228) (0.173) (0.125) Dem_Pref 0.522 0.379 0.135 0.508 0.700 0.341 0.724 0.518 0.508 (0.121) (0.0948) (0.115) (0.0566) (0.0544) (0.0581) (0.0662) (0.0642) (0.0678) Right 4.754 5.036 5.458 4.760 4.587 5.190 5.036 5.465 6.007 (0.0725) (0.142) (0.366) (0.188) (0.140) (0.251) (0.315) (0.155) (0.516) Age 35.67 36.56 36.17 42.67 43.78 37.22 37.89 40.22 36.22 (0.866) (1.014) (0.612) (1.225) (0.667) (1.481) (1.537) (1.093) (0.667) Education 10.06 11.89 10.33 13 10.22 8.889 11.33 12.33 9 (1.286) (0.333) (1.581) (0) (0.441) (1.364) (1) (0.866) (0) Asset Wealth 2.981 2.956 2.949 2.901 2.960 2.972 2.967 2.916 2.976 (0.0128) (0.0282) (0.0489) (0.0891) (0.0178) (0.0296) (0.0217) (0.0862) (0.0142)

Notes: Variable means are presented on the first line; standard deviations are displayed in parentheses. Bolivia was not included inthe Latinobarometer sample until 1996; the Dominican Republic was not included until 2004. The following variables have limited or missing datapoints: Trust was not collected until 1996; Pres_Eval was not collected until 2004; and Pocket_Future was not asked in 2016. Source: Latinobarometer 1995-2016, www.latinobarometro.org Table B.3: Main explanatory variables (imputation): descriptive statistics Mexico Guatemala El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Costa Rica Panama Colombia Ecuador Socio_Eval -0.356 -0.438 -0.312 -0.435 -0.328 -0.181 0.00112 -0.102 0.0171 (0.127) (0.0990) (0.156) (0.166) (0.274) (0.121) (0.240) (0.0950) (0.326) Socio_Future -0.0696 -0.118 -0.128 -0.0582 0.0866 -0.0743 0.312 0.149 0.117 (0.0952) (0.117) (0.139) (0.159) (0.270) (0.173) (0.172) (0.111) (0.253) Pocket_Eval 0.0224 0.0242 -0.0943 -0.0268 -0.0371 0.198 0.150 0.269 0.162 (0.0749) (0.0892) (0.0992) (0.0944) (0.156) (0.0569) (0.150) (0.0600) (0.176) Pocket_Future 0.271 0.249 0.0519 0.295 0.281 0.318 0.498 0.566 0.272 (0.0967) (0.122) (0.111) (0.104) (0.195) (0.138) (0.124) (0.0632) (0.197) Pres_Eval 0.533 0.468 0.629 0.476 0.507 0.488 0.546 0.697 0.569 (0.0994) (0.0618) (0.125) (0.0942) (0.158) (0.155) (0.172) (0.114) (0.213) Trust 0.217 0.218 0.234 0.207 0.185 0.157 0.206 0.172 0.206 (0.0436) (0.0708) (0.0503) (0.0615) (0.0390) (0.0501) (0.0292) (0.0356) (0.0663)

184 Dem_Sat 2.007 2.155 2.305 2.129 2.321 2.512 2.448 2.218 2.341 (0.114) (0.0773) (0.176) (0.140) (0.249) (0.162) (0.217) (0.124) (0.304) Dem_Pref 0.346 0.180 0.398 0.330 0.452 0.589 0.460 0.449 0.424 (0.0742) (0.101) (0.139) (0.0987) (0.0934) (0.133) (0.0800) (0.0523) (0.136) Right 5.226 5.375 5.027 6.018 5.057 5.652 5.309 5.924 5.013 (0.195) (0.401) (0.574) (0.337) (0.369) (0.406) (0.637) (0.268) (0.287) Age 37.92 34.5 36.23 34.10 31.5 36.65 38.17 37.31 37.31 (2.234) (0.612) (1.628) (0.747) (0.842) (0.625) (1.264) (1.786) (0.522) Education 9.500 4.625 7.292 6.958 6.750 7 10.54 12.79 9.083 (1.168) (0.483) (0.450) (0.334) (0.452) (0) (1.305) (2.169) (2.712) Asset Wealth 2.969 2.978 2.976 2.965 2.940 2.935 2.965 2.971 2.962 (0.0544) (0.0166) (0.0212) (0.0238) (0.0789) (0.0483) (0.0327) (0.0175) (0.0424) Notes: Variable means are presented on the first line; standard deviations are displayed in parentheses. Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, and Ecuador were not included in the Latinobarometer sample until 1996; values for 1995 are imputed from 1996 data. The Dominican Republic was not included until 2004; values for 2003 are imputed from 2004 values. Trust was not collected until 1996; values for 1995 are imputed from 1996 values. Pres_Eval was not collected until 2004; values for 2003 are imputed from 2004 values. Pocket_Future was not asked in 2016; values for 2017 are imputed from 2016 values. All values also are imputed for the following years by taking the mean of the previous and subsequent year for 1999, 2012, 2014, and 2017. Source: Latinobarometer 1995-2016, www.latinobarometro.org Table B.4: Main explanatory variables (imputation): descriptive statistics values Bolivia Peru Paraguay Chile Uruguay Brazil Venezuela Argentina Dominican Rep. Socio_Eval -0.126 -0.217 -0.296 0.00576 0.130 -0.0399 -0.0744 -0.123 -0.397 (0.251) (0.233) (0.216) (0.108) (0.310) (0.219) (0.255) (0.176) (0.197) Socio_Future 0.129 0.0978 0.257 0.262 0.344 0.241 0.169 0.151 0.0580 (0.138) (0.247) (0.328) (0.122) (0.110) (0.219) (0.219) (0.210) (0.296) Pocket_Eval 0.0973 0.000684 0.279 0.0931 0.262 0.326 0.157 0.277 -0.204 (0.0977) (0.103) (0.0721) (0.0602) (0.156) (0.0914) (0.0909) (0.0939) (0.151) Pocket_Future 0.362 0.344 0.528 0.370 0.405 0.619 0.379 0.340 0.277 (0.106) (0.155) (0.165) (0.0959) (0.0893) (0.0860) (0.123) (0.119) (0.285) Pres_Eval 0.598 0.357 0.458 0.580 0.667 0.639 0.536 0.530 0.564 (0.0950) (0.204) (0.213) (0.179) (0.182) (0.170) (0.112) (0.174) (0.182) Trust 0.196 0.164 0.144 0.151 0.268 0.0678 0.233 0.231 0.249 (0.0409) (0.0271) (0.0506) (0.0254) (0.0499) (0.0182) (0.0446) (0.0505) (0.0917)

185 Dem_Sat 2.295 2.061 1.981 2.385 2.965 2.149 2.493 2.429 2.461 (0.184) (0.172) (0.254) (0.107) (0.307) (0.167) (0.232) (0.175) (0.113) Dem_Pref 0.527 0.383 0.133 0.495 0.690 0.340 0.716 0.521 0.500 (0.103) (0.0897) (0.112) (0.0887) (0.0503) (0.0525) (0.0756) (0.0652) (0.0604) Right 4.801 5.046 5.491 4.743 4.599 5.143 5.037 5.446 6.038 (0.147) (0.125) (0.362) (0.174) (0.133) (0.239) (0.288) (0.146) (0.459) Age 35.62 36.77 36.23 43 44.15 37.615 38.04 40.15 36.23 (0.768) (0.927) (0.633) (1.173) (0.875) (1.488) (1.298) (0.899) (0.563) Education 10.06 11.92 10.50 13 10.21 8.958 11.42 12.42 9 (1.197) (0.289) (1.446) (0) (0.396) (1.287) (0.900) (0.793) (0) Asset Wealth 2.978 2.955 2.945 2.882 2.965 2.972 2.964 2.906 2.978 (0.0186) (0.0256) (0.0431) (0.0878) (0.0190) (0.0253) (0.0206) (0.0882) (0.0124) Notes: Variable means are presented on the first line; standard deviations are displayed in parentheses. Bolivia was not included inthe Latinobarometer sample until 1996; values for 1995 are imputed from 1996 data. The Dominican Republic was not included until 2004; values for 2003 are imputed from 2004 values. Trust was not collected until 1996; values for 1995 are imputed from 1996 values. Pres_Eval was not collected until 2004; values for 2003 are imputed from 2004 values. Pocket_Future was not asked in 2016; values for 2017 are imputed from 2016 values. All values also are imputed for the following years by taking the mean of the previous and subsequent year for 1999, 2012, 2014, and 2017. Source: Latinobarometer 1995-2016, www.latinobarometro.org Table B.5: Summary statistics (no imputation): explanatory variables from Latino- barometer Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N Socio_Eval -0.307 0.265 -0.936 0.492 325 Socio_Future 0.024 0.253 -0.776 0.809 325 Pocket_Eval 0.052 0.185 -0.508 0.534 307 Pocket_Future 0.276 0.216 -0.583 0.820 306 Pres_Eval 0.538 0.181 0.081 0.918 197 Trust 0.193 0.075 0.024 0.441 317 Dem_Sat 2.268 0.304 1.474 3.61 325 Dem_Pref 0.435 0.179 -0.112 0.816 325 Right 5.404 0.607 4.018 8.096 325 Age 36.638 3.271 30 46 325 Education 10.012 2.495 4 15 325 Asset Wealth 2.949 0.051 2.661 2.998 325 Notes: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia were not included in the Latinobarometer sample until 1996; the Dominican Republic was not included until 2004. The following variables have limited or missing datapoints: Trust was not collected until 1996; Pres_Eval was not collected until 2004; and Pocket_Future was not asked in 2016. Source: Latinobarometer 1995-2016, www.latinobarometro.org

186 Table B.6: Term limit constraints (no imputation): economic heuristics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Socio_Eval −2.417 1.161 −3.264 −11.361 (1.824) (3.075) (3.646) (7.732) Socio_Future 1.671 9.787 16.438∗ −2.006 (2.242) (5.872) (7.349) (8.151) Pocket_Eval −17.187∗∗ −22.141∗ −8.439 −4.580 (5.807) (8.806) (4.965) (8.636) Pocket_Future 9.071∗ −0.379 −13.447 14.361 (3.868) (7.058) (8.997) (12.760) Pres_Eval −5.102 (5.641) Trust 1.190 23.350 (8.331) (14.667) Dem_Sat −1.815 5.572 (3.187) (5.771) Dem_Pref 14.239∗∗ 12.053∗ (4.671) (5.375) Right 0.591 −2.955 (1.117) (1.801) Age −1.198∗∗∗ −0.774∗ (0.321) (0.368) Education 1.226∗∗ −0.051 (0.423) (0.597) Variance of Random Effect 4.311 8.653 15.036 0.000 0.000 (3.843) (7.821) (14.406) (0.000) (0.000) Observations 317 280 280 280 161 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

187 Table B.7: Term limit constraints (no imputation): identity heuristic (1) (2) (3) Asset Wealth 3.130 −7.693 −9.441 (7.814) (7.243) (9.559) Pres_Eval −0.845 (3.791) Trust 6.246 23.598∗∗ (6.973) (8.692) Dem_Sat −1.808 −1.965 (1.395) (2.084) Dem_Pref 10.811∗∗∗ 19.133∗∗∗ (2.377) (3.811) Right 0.444 −0.220 (0.597) (0.802) Age −0.902∗∗∗ −0.793∗∗ (0.215) (0.244) Education 0.305 −0.619 (0.211) (0.317) Variance of Random Effect 5.156 0.000 0.000 (4.525) (0.000) (0.000) Observations 317 317 197 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

188 Table B.8: Term limit constraints (no imputation): all heuristics (1) (2) Socio_Eval −3.287 −11.549 (3.675) (7.529) Socio_Future 16.419∗ −1.841 (7.336) (8.273) Pocket_Eval −8.419 −4.954 (4.992) (7.492) Pocket_Future −13.441 14.721 (8.982) (12.533) Asset Wealth 0.699 −12.377 (13.894) (14.880) Pres_Eval −5.107 (5.425) Trust 1.176 23.841 (8.348) (14.225) Dem_Sat −1.824 5.940 (3.189) (5.782) Dem_Pref 14.253∗∗ 11.647∗ (4.677) (5.487) Right 0.583 −2.895 (1.127) (1.700) Age −1.200∗∗∗ −0.757∗ (0.323) (0.353) Education 1.227∗∗ −0.077 (0.424) (0.584) Variance of Random Effect 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) Observations 280 161 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

189 Table B.9: Successful term limit challenges (imputation): identity heuristic (1) (2) (3) Asset Wealth 4.622 1.837 8.469 (11.177) (14.784) (21.131) Pres_Eval −2.412 (4.858) Trust 9.565 23.007∗ (8.737) (10.199) Dem_Sat −0.361 0.332 (2.139) (3.060) Dem_Pref 10.960∗∗ 17.649∗∗ (4.080) (5.762) Right 0.716 −0.020 (0.885) (1.063) Age −1.049∗∗ −0.709∗ (0.349) (0.315) Education 0.477 −0.566 (0.320) (0.445) Variance of Random Effect 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Observations 389 389 270 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

190 Table B.10: Successful term limit challenges (imputation): all heuristics (1) (2) Socio_Eval −0.150 −0.152 (0.647) (0.300) Socio_Future −1.142 −0.075 (0.766) (0.351) Pocket_Eval 1.156 0.438 (0.838) (0.377) Pocket_Future 0.897 −0.071 (1.099) (0.521) Asset Wealth −0.651 −0.218 (3.179) (1.537) Pres_Eval 0.231 (0.355) Trust −0.406 −1.054 (1.614) (0.783) Dem_Sat 0.180 −0.064 (0.483) (0.227) Dem_Pref −1.842∗ −1.177∗∗∗ (0.747) (0.302) Right −0.104 0.023 (0.158) (0.081) Age 0.159∗∗∗ 0.032 (0.043) (0.020) Education −0.108∗ 0.048∗ (0.047) (0.022) Variance of Random Effect 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) Observations 388 270 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

191 Table B.11: Successful term limit challenges (no imputation): economic heuristics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Socio_Eval −1.415 −0.687 6.571 −3.089 (2.188) (3.603) (5.531) (5.814) Socio_Future −0.147 3.372 9.352 0.911 (2.534) (5.190) (9.709) (7.067) Pocket_Eval −6.327 −5.657 −13.942 −1.290 (3.362) (4.725) (8.598) (6.091) Pocket_Future 2.290 −1.166 −7.418 −2.097 (2.913) (5.905) (11.567) (7.324) Pres_Eval −1.630 (5.330) Trust −7.435 (10.586) Dem_Sat −5.027 3.532 (4.274) (3.173) Dem_Pref 16.838∗ (7.391) Right 0.720 (1.363) Age −0.476∗ −0.268 (0.228) (0.209) Variance of Random Effect 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Observations 317 280 280 280 161 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Trust, Dem_Pref, and Right excluded in Model 5 due to lack of convergence. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

192 Table B.12: Successful term limit challenges (no imputation): identity heuristic (1) (2) (3) Asset Wealth 0.824 −2.233 1.598 (9.579) (13.252) (19.790) Pres_Eval −2.150 (5.150) Trust 8.353 20.223∗ (9.415) (10.040) Dem_Sat −0.991 −0.387 (2.272) (3.159) Dem_Pref 10.419∗∗ 14.731∗∗ (4.037) (5.204) Right 0.491 −0.010 (0.911) (1.088) Age −0.915∗∗ −0.579 (0.342) (0.322) Education 0.497 −0.409 (0.313) (0.439) Variance of Random Effect 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Observations 317 317 197 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

193 Table B.13: Successful term limit challenges (no imputation): all heuristics (1) (2) Socio_Eval 6.586 −2.425 (5.560) (4.299) Socio_Future 9.167 3.614 (10.041) (7.087) Pocket_Eval −13.897 −2.242 (8.633) (5.487) Pocket_Future −7.182 −3.812 (12.040) (7.058) Asset Wealth −1.058 −1.992 (14.468) (12.589) Pres_Eval 0.959 (4.628) Trust −7.155 (11.232) Dem_Sat −5.002 (4.287) Dem_Pref 16.808∗ (7.401) Right 0.736 (1.381) Age −0.480∗ (0.233) Variance of Random Effect 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) Observations 280 161 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Trust, Dem_Sat, Dem_Pref, Right, and Age excluded in Model 2 due to lack of convergence. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

194 Table B.14: Failed term limit challenges: economic heuristics (imputation) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Socio_Eval −1.701 0.895 −3.234 −1.182 (1.815) (2.421) (2.028) (2.553) Socio_Future 1.279 3.062 5.767∗ 1.630 (2.385) (3.020) (2.754) (3.225) Pocket_Eval −1.685 −3.088 −0.115 −4.360 (1.871) (2.520) (2.639) (3.049) Pocket_Future −1.125 −4.466 −2.617 0.045 (2.527) (3.414) (4.384) (4.784) Pres_Eval 1.871 (3.726) Trust 10.748 24.909∗∗ (7.463) (9.541) Dem_Sat −2.823 −1.606 (1.864) (2.611) Dem_Pref 12.212∗∗∗ 22.970∗∗∗ (2.760) (3.949) Right 0.141 −1.018 (0.681) (0.829) Age −1.043∗∗∗ −0.780∗∗∗ (0.231) (0.234) Education 0.414 −0.881∗ (0.249) (0.388) Variance of Random Effect 7.362 5.971 5.449 0.000 0.000 (6.308) (5.321) (4.880) (0.000) (0.000) Observations 389 388 388 388 270 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

195 Table B.15: Failed term limit challenges: identity heuristic (1) (2) (3) Asset Wealth 9.262 −7.780 −7.583 (7.163) (6.663) (8.460) Pres_Eval −1.371 (3.717) Trust 11.581 28.611∗∗∗ (6.386) (8.040) Dem_Sat −2.314 −1.863 (1.239) (1.910) Dem_Pref 12.740∗∗∗ 23.376∗∗∗ (2.171) (3.730) Right 0.390 −0.247 (0.536) (0.708) Age −0.993∗∗∗ −0.966∗∗∗ (0.202) (0.230) Education 0.193 −0.753∗∗ (0.205) (0.291) Variance of Random Effect 9.116 0.000 0.000 (7.681) (0.000) (0.000) Observations 389 389 270 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

196 Table B.16: Failed term limit challenges (no imputation): economic heuristics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Socio_Eval 2.564 −5.918 −11.347 −85.754 (2.707) (3.914) (9.066) (46.602) Socio_Future −1.144 6.055 5.222 −13.475 (3.190) (5.793) (7.811) (10.045) Pocket_Eval 4.231 11.367 14.863 165.805 (6.466) (7.286) (10.148) (90.752) Pocket_Future −5.277 −11.379 −7.706 −73.306 (5.569) (8.808) (11.618) (39.927) Pres_Eval 102.468 (56.378) Trust 11.882 (14.927) Dem_Sat 1.052 (3.311) Dem_Pref 2.665 (6.108) Right 3.301∗ (1.490) Age 0.570 (0.432) Variance of Random Effect 0.471 1.359 0.193 0.000 0.000 (1.336) (3.632) (1.832) (0.000) (0.000) Observations 317 280 280 280 161 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Trust, Dem_Sat, Dem_Pref, Right, and Age excluded in Model 2 due to lack of convergence. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

197 Table B.17: Failed term limit challenges (no imputation): identity heuristic (1) (2) (3) Asset Wealth −8.360 −4.447 −9.102 (5.720) (5.982) (8.384) Pres_Eval 7.573 (4.838) Trust 9.409 20.158 (10.678) (18.457) Dem_Sat 3.529 2.576 (2.584) (4.214) Dem_Pref 3.779 6.036 (4.945) (8.167) Right 1.173 0.815 (0.919) (1.302) Age −0.274 −0.672 (0.281) (0.564) Education 0.760∗ 0.972 (0.354) (0.522) Variance of Random Effect 0.111 0.000 0.000 (1.015) (0.000) (0.000) Observations 317 317 197 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

198 Table B.18: Failed term limit challenges (no imputation): all heuristics (1) (2) Socio_Eval −11.013 −58.113 (8.848) (32.896) Socio_Future 4.032 −7.851 (7.610) (6.896) Pocket_Eval 11.468 88.051 (10.434) (55.554) Pocket_Future −4.120 −35.561 (11.967) (25.448) Asset Wealth −7.487 −34.434 (9.954) (27.441) Pres_Eval 79.647 (42.774) Trust 7.317 (14.292) Dem_Sat 1.317 (3.392) Dem_Pref 2.455 (6.531) Right 3.316∗ (1.574) Age 0.686 (0.493) Variance of Random Effect 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) Observations 280 161 All models are estimated as multilevel mixed-effects parametric survival models with country-level random effects. Coefficient estimates of hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. Trust, Dem_Sat, Dem_Pref, Right, and Age excluded in Model 2 due to lack of convergence. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

199