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Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113Th Congress Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress Mark P. Sullivan Specialist in Latin American Affairs March 29, 2013 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R43024 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress Summary Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country’s political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. In February 2013, Castro was reappointed to a second five-year term as president (until 2018, when he would be 86 years old), and selected a 52-year old former Education Minister Miguel Díaz-Canel as his First Vice President, making him the official successor in the event that Castro cannot serve out his term. Raúl Castro has implemented a number of gradual economic policy changes over the past several years, including an expansion of self-employment. A party congress held in April 2011 laid out numerous economic goals that, if implemented, could significantly alter Cuba’s state-dominated economic model. Few observers, however, expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system. While the government reduced the number of political prisoners in 2010-2011, the number increased in 2012; moreover, short-term detentions and harassment have increased significantly. U.S. Policy Over the years, Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. While U.S. policy has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions, a second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting (Radio and TV Martí) and support for human rights and democracy projects. The Obama Administration has continued this similar dual-track approach. While the Administration has lifted all restrictions on family travel and remittances, eased restrictions on other types of purposeful travel, and moved to reengage Cuba on several bilateral issues, it has also maintained most U.S. economic sanctions in place. On human rights, the Administration welcomed the release of many political prisoners in 2010 and 2011, but it has also criticized Cuba’s continued harsh repression of political dissidents through thousands of short- term detentions and targeted violence. The Administration has continued to call for the release of U.S. government subcontractor Alan Gross, detained in 2009 and sentenced to 15 years in prison in March 2011. Gross’s continued detention has been a major impediment toward improved relations. Legislative Activity Strong interest on Cuba is expected to continue in the 113th Congress with attention focused on economic and political developments, especially the human rights situation, and U.S. policy toward the island nation. The continued imprisonment of Alan Gross remains a key concern for many Members. Now that Congress has completed action on FY2013 appropriations, it will soon be considering the Administration’s FY2014 request for the State Department and Foreign Operations, which includes funding for Cuba democracy programs and Cuba broadcasting. For many years, U.S. sanctions, particularly restrictions on travel, remittances, and agricultural exports to Cuba, have been topics of congressional debate, and this could be possible again in the 113th Congress. To date in the 113th Congress, seven initiatives on Cuba have been introduced. Several would lift or ease U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba: H.R. 214 and H.R. 872 (overall embargo); H.R. 871 (travel); and H.R. 873 (travel and agricultural exports). H.R. 215 would allow Cubans to play Congressional Research Service Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress organized professional baseball in the United States. H.R. 778 would modify a 1998 trademark sanction. H.Res. 121 would honor the work of Cuban blogger Yoani Sánchez in challenging the oppression of the Castro regime. This report will be updated periodically during the 113th Congress. For additional information, see CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. Congressional Research Service Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress Contents Recent Developments ...................................................................................................................... 1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 2 Cuba’s Political and Economic Situation ......................................................................................... 4 Brief Historical Background ...................................................................................................... 4 Political Conditions ................................................................................................................... 5 Human Rights Conditions ................................................................................................... 7 Economic Conditions and Reform Efforts .............................................................................. 10 Cuba’s Foreign Relations ........................................................................................................ 13 U.S. Policy toward Cuba................................................................................................................ 16 Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations ..................................................................................... 16 Clinton Administration’s Easing of Sanctions ................................................................... 17 Bush Administration’s Tightening of Sanctions ................................................................ 18 Obama Administration Policy ................................................................................................. 19 Debate on the Direction of U.S. Policy ................................................................................... 20 Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations ...................................................................................................... 21 U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances .......................................................................... 22 U.S. Agricultural Exports and Sanctions ................................................................................. 23 U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights ........................................................ 26 Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Cuba ............................................................ 29 Imprisonment of USAID Subcontractor since December 2009 ........................................ 29 Radio and TV Marti ................................................................................................................. 32 Funding for Cuba Broadcasting ........................................................................................ 32 Oversight of Radio and TV Martí ..................................................................................... 33 Terrorism Issues ....................................................................................................................... 35 Migration Issues ...................................................................................................................... 37 Cuba Alters Its Policy Regarding Exit Permits ................................................................. 39 Anti-Drug Cooperation ............................................................................................................ 40 Cuba’s Offshore Oil Development .......................................................................................... 42 Legislative Initiatives in the 113th Congress .................................................................................. 45 Figures Figure 1. Map of Cuba ..................................................................................................................... 3 Figure 2. Cuba: Real GDP Growth (percentage), 2004-2012 ........................................................ 12 Figure 3. Cuban Exports by Country of Destination, 2011............................................................ 14 Figure 4. Cuban Imports by Country of Origin, 2011 ................................................................... 15 Figure 5. U.S. Exports to Cuba, 2001-2012 ................................................................................... 24 Figure 6. Maritime Interdiction of Cubans, FY2002-FY2012 ....................................................... 38 Figure 7. Cuba’s Offshore Oil Blocks............................................................................................ 43 Congressional Research Service Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress Appendixes Appendix A. Selected Executive Branch Reports and Web Pages ................................................ 47 Contacts Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 48 Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 48 Congressional Research Service Cuba: U.S. Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress Recent Developments On March 28, 2013, the U.S. Department
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