Hawliyat is the official peer-reviewed journal of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the University of Balamand. It publishes articles from the field of Humanities.

Journal Name: Hawliyat

ISSN: 1684-6605

Title: The Turkish Conquest of Anatolia in the Eleventh Century

Authors: S P O'Sullivan

To cite this document:

O’Sullivan, S. (2019). The Turkish Conquest of Anatolia in the Eleventh Century. Hawliyat, 8, 41-93. https://doi.org/10.31377/haw.v8i0.335

Permanent link to this document: DOI: https://doi.org/10.31377/haw.v8i0.335

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The Turkish Conquest of Anatolia in the Eleventh Century S.P. O'Sullivan

Many historical events are part of common knowledge yet are understood only superficially even by specialists. Usually this is because the historical records are insufficient, something we would expect for remote and inconse­ quential events. But an event, neither remote nor at all unimportant. which remains obscure even in its broadest outlines would be cause for surprise. Such is the case for the conquest of Anatolia by the Turks. which took place during the late II th century. specially between 1071 and 1085. The Turkish con­ quest was important mainly because it spelt the end of the Greek presence in Asia. The Hellenic movement to the East eventually reached the borders of India and then slowly fell back in stages, each territorial loss inevitably followed by the extinguishing of Greek culture. In this way. the Iranians retook Iran and Mesopotamia before the time of Christ. Incorporated into the Roman Empire. the Asian Greek lands resisted further pressure from the East until the Arab inva­ sions of the seventh century suddenly wrested away Syria and Egypt. Only Anatolia remained; the Roman Empire in the East, transformed into Byzantium, held it successfully against the Arabs for several centuries and even began to advance again. But a third Asian people. the Turks. broke down this last barrier. conquering Anatolia up to the Aegean Sea in the late II th century. This was not yet the end of the long story of the Greeks in Asia. Following the counter-attack of the First Crusade. the Byzantines were able to reconquer part of Anatolia and hold it for two centuries longer; even afterwards. Greek settlement remained in parts of what was now Turkey until all Greeks were expelled from the peninsula in 1922. But all this was only a very long death rattle; after the initial Turkish conquest of the late 11 th century. the end. if long in coming. was always in sight. The importance of the II th-century conquest of Anatolia needs no 42 The Turkish Conquest 0/ Anatolia in the EJevenJh CenJlJry emphasis. What is curious is that it should have been largely passed over. "The decade after 1071, one of the most momentous intervals in Byzantine history, has been unwarrantably neglected by modern scholars"(I) is the reproach made in a recent work. This study is an attempt to fill the gap in pan. Its principal aim is to reconstruct a coherent narrative for the central years of the Turkish conquest, 1071-85, and so it deals mainly with political and military events in Anatolia during those years.

Problems of the Sources Naturally the main reason for the neglect of this subject is the lack of ade­ quate sources. To begin with, the conquest left no contemporary Turkish records. Epic poems on the origins and early history of the Turks in RUm were compiled in the 14th century from oral traditions"), but they provide almost no reliable information about the conquest from the Turkish side. It is true that Arab histo­ rians of the 12th century wrote much about the arrival of the Turks into the his­ torical arena. Yet these historians mention the Turks only in connection with events in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. After the Battle of Manziken in 1071, there is practically no mention of the conquest of Anatolia by Arab writers, whose out­ look was overshadowed by the First Crusade and the subsequent Byzantine reconquest'''. Armenian, Syrian and Latin writers, for their pan, have very little to say about Greek Anatolia. We must therefore rely on Greek sources, and particularly on the histories of Michael Attaliates, Nicephorus Bryennius, and Anna Comoena. On the posi­ tive side, these writers, taken together, provide a sizeable amount of information on the subject. All three occupied imponant positions in the Byzantine state and were well-placed to record events. Anna Comnena, daughter of the Emperor Alexius I Comoenus (1081-11\8), and her husband, Nicephorus Bryennius, wrote in the 1\30s and 114Os, when memories were still vivid. Michael Attaliates, on the other hand, had the priceless advantage of being a direct wit­ ness himself. He accompanied the Emperor Romanus IV on the Anatolian cam-

(1) Treadgold. Warren. A HislOa' of me BYzantine State and Society ; Stanford 1997, p. 914. (2) Vryonis, Speros, The Decline of MedieYal Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Isiamis8tiQQ From the Eleyenth Throuib the fifteenth Century; Berkeley 1971 , p. 511 (index ­ Danishmendnamc!) (3) eahen, Claude, "La premiere ¢n~tration turque en Asie Mineure" , Thrcobyz.antina et Driens Christiana, London 1914, pp. 5-7. 5.p. O'Sullivan 43 paigns of 1068 and 1069 and on the third campaign of 1071, which ended in the disastrous battle of Manzikert. After being evacuated by sea to Constantinople, Attaliates seems to have spent tbe rest of the 1070s in the capital. By late 1080, the closing date of his history, he had reached a high position in the civil hie­ rarchy. In addition, there are other contemporary sources of less direct relevance. Michael Psellus wrote his Chrono~hia. a collected biography of the 11 th cen­ tury emperors, not long before his death in early 1078, and the chronicles of Zonaras, Glycas, and Manasses were all written before 1150. There is no dearth of historical writing during this most critical period of Byzantium's long and erratic history. Yet the Greek sources do not give a satisfactory account of the fall of Anatolia. In the first place, they are too biased. Bryennius and, especially, Anna Comnena portray Alexius Comnenus as the saviour and restorer of an empire which was on the verge of collapse after the disastrous reigns of his two prede­ cessors, Michael vn (107\-1078) and Nicephorus III Botaniates (l078-108\). This interpretation is too simple, because Alexius restored the collapsed Empire on very weak foundations; the new edifice stood up imposingly for two genera­ tions but then rapidly crumbled away. Whether Alexius could have achieved more is another question; nonetheless, Anna Comnena's Alexiad is very biased, to the extent that events in Anatolia which are detrimental to her father's repu­ tation have been firmly suppressed. Attaliates' History is chiefly characterised by unrestrained praise for Alexius' predecessor, Nicephorus Botaniates. Attaliates wrote his history while holding a high position in Botaniates' administration, so he could hardly have criticised the emperor. Yet Attaliates probably regarded his master with genuine admiration and loyalty, seeing him as the saviour of Anatolia, which was both his and the emperor's homeland. To dismiss Attaliates as a mere sycophant would be a mistake. Although too superstitious for modem tastes, he comes across as a person of integrity and compassion. A final example is Michael Psellus, who was Michael VII's chief minister for a short time. After his dismissal, PseHus wrote the ChronoEraphia, in which he praises Michael's personal qualities, while blaming the previous emperor, Romanus IV, for the collapse in Anatolia. Yet Psenus is condemned by his own writings as a scheming and unscrupulous politician. His positive description of Michael is mere flattery. That emperor has gone down in history, irredeemably, as one of the most incompetent rulers in Byzantine history. Contemporary Byzantine sources on this subject were not written - how 44 TM Turkish COnqlUst of AlUJlolia in 1M Elewnlh Century

could they be? - with the purpose of giving an impartial account of events. On the contrary, their primary aim was to exculpate the reigning emperor, the pro­ tagonist of all Byzantine historiography, from responsibility for the sudden loss of Anatolia, the backbone of the Empire. Previous emperors, courtiers, generals, mercenaries, and allies - each and all played the role of scapegoat in these ten­ dentious histories. Such bias from sources so close to the event is inevitable and can be dis­ counted; indeed, opposing biases helpfully cancel out. What is left, however, is still not satisfactory. For in the second place the sources are remarkably unin­ formative - and this is their more serious fault. None of them properly attempts to describe how the Turks conquered Anatolia. The first impression is that the conquest happened quicldy and almost without resistance, "when the fortune of the Turks overcame that of the Romans, and when the latter were driven back like sand underfoot'''>' But plain reason and the information we have oblige us to reject such a simple conclusion. As we shall see, the conquest proceeded in stages for almost fifteen years, not a short time; it certainly met with determined, and in some cases successful, resis~ce. It was not an easy affair. Why were Byzantine writers so reticent on Anatolia, compared with what they tell us about events elsewhere? If they had wished to find information, they could certainly have done so. But Anatolia was the mainstay of the Empire, without which it could not survive for long. Its loss was such a disaster as to be met with incredulity. There was a natural desire to forget rather than to record for posterity, and this is revealed in a tendency to gloss over the whole event, subsuming particular episodes into vague generalities. For Attaliates, an Anatolian himself, writing when the conquest was still continuing, it was impos­ sible to face with equanimity, and his. history is permeated with outbursts of anguish and indignation. For writers of the following generation, the outlook was more hopeful: western Anatolia had been reconquered, and it was hoped that the Empire would presently erase what was left of Thrkish power in the peninsula. Thankfully, it seemed unnecessary to describe in painful detail the Thrkish conquest of the previous generation. By the end of the 12th century, however, the unwelcome truth had become plain: the Thrks were too strong to be destroyed, and it was only a matter of time before they would resume their advance. If the need to record the original conquest more accurately was then

(4) Comnena. Anna, Ale'l,jad , 4 vols .. tr. Leib. Bernard, Paris 1937. vol. I. p. 10. S.P. O'Sullivan 45 realised, it was unfortunately too late: that event, now a century old, had passed out of living memory. Sources for the Turkish conquest of Anatolia leave much to be desired, con­ sidering the obvious importance of the event. It is frustrating that the same writers who have have practised a kind of self-censorship on Anatolia have gene erously supplied hundreds of details on persons and events in Constantinople and the Balkans. Our perception of the past is shaped by such imbalances. Yet at least the bare outlines of this discoloured and fragmentary picture can be restored.

Geography and the Arab War The geography of Anatolia influenced the Turkish conquest in three impor­ tant ways. First, the peninsula is the natural prolongation of Armenia, whose mountains and plateaus run west into Anatolia without any noticeable break, so that it is difficult to mark a precise border between the two countries. It is fairly easy for an invader to penetrate Anatolia from Armenia, for there are no major obstacles to cross his way. Once the Turks had conquered Armenia, they were able to move west quite easily. Secondly, Anatolia's chief feature is the inland plateau, largely arid and empty, which covers over three quarters of the country; whoever controlled it would tend to dominate the rest. The fortified cities which lay at strategic inter­ vals around the rim of the plateau were the keys to Anatolia. Almost from the start, the Turks were able to take control of most of the plateau and, throughout the vicissitudes of the conflict, they never lost it. Lastly, the coastal regions, geographically dominated by the plateau, were the most fertile and densely populated parts of Anatolia. The richest region was the ancient Roman province of Asia in the west, with the river valleys of the Herrous and the Maeander. Next carne Bithynia and Mysia in the northwest, bordering the Sea of Marmara. Also important were the areas around Trebizond, Sinope, and Attalia - and the plain of Cilicia, which was not strictly part of Anatolia. These coastal regions contained almost half of the population of the Byzantine Empire - that is, at least six of the eight million'" or so inhabitants of Anatolia on the eve of the Turkish invasion. Even after the Byzantines had lost most of the plateau, they would still try to hold the coast, difficult though that

(5) Treadgold, op. cit., pp. 403, 700. Vryonis, op. cit .. p. 25. 46 Th~ Turkish Conquest ofAtult olia in the Eleventh Century would be. Later they would expend much more effort in regaining distant coastal regions like Cilicia and even Antioch than in trying to drive the Turks from the nearby plateau. The Romans had gained full control of Anatolia and Syria just before the time of Christ. Blocked by Persian power from advancing into the hinterland, the Romans tried at least to protect their Asian provinces by securing buffer wnes to the east. In this they were generally successful. Armenia and Mesopotamia were either neutralised or partitioned, with the result that Anatolia was sheltered from eastern invasion for many centuries. The position changed completely with the Arab invasions in the seventh century. The Arabs conquered both Cilicia and Armenia, forcing the Byzantines to withdraw to the line of the Taurus mountains. Their strategic position was now precarious. Not only were the Arabs far more aggressive than the Persians had been; they were also based much farther to the west. The result was that Anatolia was subject to incessant raids, interspersed with full-scale invasions, for the next three hundred years. Even when the caliphate was incapacitated (as it frequently was) by civil war, the Arab frontier emirates did not let up the pres­ sure. It was fortunate for Byzantium that the Arabs were never able to subdue Armenia fully, so that the relatively easy northern invasion route was not exploited as much as it might have becn. Instead, most of the Arab attacks had to come through the Taurus mountain barrier to the south. Nevertheless, the pro­ longed and successful defence of Anatolia against the Arabs was a great achievement against the odds. To meet the Arab threat, the Empire developed a system of mobile defence in depth. Throughout Anatolia the civil provinces were replaced by military regions or themes. The territory of each theme was the recruiting and deploy­ ment ground for a territorial army of 5-1 O,OOO'~ men, cavalry and infantry. In addition to the theme armies, the emperor possessed elite guard regiments or tagmata based around Constantinople; these could be deployed anywhere in Anatolia in conjunction with local theme forces to form a mobile field army which typically numbered 20-30,OOO<7J in the eighth century. During the ninth century, the army's total size was strengthened from about 50,000 to 70,()()()<"

(6) Trudgold. op. cit., p. 373. Whitlow, Mark ~ The Makioa of Orthodox BYzantium; Macmillan 1996, p. 184. (7) "Anonymous Book on Tactics", Three Byzantine Military Treatises, tr. Dennis, George, Washington 1995, p. 275. Whittow, op. cit., pp. 188. 191. (8) Treadgold, op. cit., pp. 442-443, 467, 483. Whittow, op. cit., pp. 183, 188. The size of the S.P. O'Sullivan 47 effectives, even though the Empire was not expanding. The increased military burden was made possible by the extreme centralisation of the State, which channelled the Empire's reduced resources into the task of containing the Arab advance. A professional army, an efficient system of tax collection, and a stable gold coinage, all inherited with little change from the late Roman Empire, were the foundations of the Byzantine State; possession of these institutions distin­ guished it from its contemporaries and enabled it to survive. In the face of Arab attacks, Byzantine strategy usually avoided direct engagements. The enemy would be shadowed and harassed; ideally, the aim was to ambush the Arabs as they were returning home through the Taurus passes laden with booty and prisoners. It was a harsh strategy, dictated by necessity, whose primaty aim was to secure the land at all costs; the lives and property of the inhabitants were of lesser importance. Needless to say, large parts of the Anatolian countryside were depopulated during the Arab wars. Trade and cities shrank everywhere and disappeared in some areas. In frontier Cappadocia the inhabitants spent much of their time in caves dug from the soft rock of the regIOn. The unrelenting seasonal raids of the Arabs were intended to gain booty, devastate the rural economy, and spread fear and despair. Subsequently, the caliph's regular armies would take the enemy's strongholds and complete the conquest of territory. But the Arabs were never able to achieve this. In 717, grown too confident after almost a century of victories, they launched a huge and over-ambitious expedition to take Constantinople outright; it was repelled with very heavy losses. After that, Arab raids were gradually fought to a standstill by the vigilant and mobile Byzantine defences. Major invasions were unable to make any permanent conquests. The last such invasion came in 838, when the caliph al-Mu ' ta~im defeated the Byzantine army and took Amorium, one of the most important cities in the peninsula") . However, news of a revolution at home forced the caliph to retreat, abandoning his conquest. Thereafter, the flow of slaves and booty from Anatolia slowed to a trickle. By the early tenth century, the Byzantines had passed over to the offensive. Their first main success was the reconquest of Melitene, the most active of the Arab frontier emirates, in 934. Progress was slowed by Arab counter-attacks

Byzantine anny is a matter of controversy because of the lack of firm evidence. Treadgold and Whittow make respectively high and low estimates. The figures given above are a rough median. (9) Treadgold, op. cit., p. 441. 48 1M Turkish Conq"~$r ofAna/olia in the Eleventh Century and the difficulty of adapting Byzantine forces to the unaccustomed task of con­ quering enemy territory. But after 960 supreme power was in the hands of the Anatolian generals Nicephorus Phocas and John Tzimisces, and the advance gathered pace. The fall of Tarsus and Theodosiopolis opened the way for a two­ pronged advance into Armenia and Syria. At the same time, naval forces retook Crete and Cyprus. This offensive ended the hard struggle against the Arabs in Anatolia. With Cilicia, northern Syria, and western Armenia finnly under Byzantine control, the zone of conflict now moved far to the east. For Anatolia, it seemed the war was finally over. The opening lines of the anonymous military manual On Tactics. written about 990, expresses the triumphant yet still vigilant spirit of the Byzantines at this time:

Although it is our intention to set down instructions about skirmishing, we must bear in mind that they might not find much application in the eastern regions at the present time. For Christ, our true God, has greatly cut back the power and strength of the offspring of Ishmael and has repelled their onslaught. Nonetheless, in order that time, which leads us to forget what we once knew, might not completely blot out this useful knowledge, we think we ought to commit it to writing. Tf in the future, then, some situation should arise in which Christians need this knowledge, it will be readily available to assist those who have the responsibility of using it, as well as the entire

commonwealth. (10)

Between the Arab War and the Thrklsh Invasion The death of the emperor John Tzimisces in 976 brought the eastern offen­ sive, and with it the whole Anatolian war, to an end. The new age which fol­ lowed was the most crucial and fateful in Byzantine history. It divides naturally into two: the reign of Basil II (976-1025), and the troubled years up to the end of the Macedonian dynasty in 1057, which coincided with the first large Thrkish attacks. In the first decade of his adult reign, Basil faced two dangerous rebellions by the Anatolian magnates. The emperor was only able to crush these outbreaks with foreign, Russian, support. But the rebellions had deeply marked Basil's character. He continued to regard the eastern magnates with mistrust, and took successful but fateful measures to ensure that Anatolia would not challenge

(10) "Anonymous Book on Tactics", op. cit. S,P, O'Sullivan 49

Constantinople again. The offensive against the Arabs was halted, and the eastern anny was reduced. Conversely, the western anny in the Balkans was greatly expanded as Basil embarked on the conquest of Bulgaria. Basil's reign continued and intensified the autocratic mould of Byzantine society. By the end of Basil's reign, the anny numbered well over 100,000'11'­ larger than it had been since late Roman times. To the local Anatolian theme troops, now becoming redundant, and elite tagmata based around the capital - were added two new elements. First, the eastern frontier zone (which was extended far to the east by the annexation of most of the remaining Annenian principalities) was reinforced by largely Annenian border forces"". Secondly, foreign mercenaries were enlisted for the first time in large numbers since the sixth century. At this time, the famous Varangian Guard was formed, at first mainly from Russian contingents; English and Scandinavian soldiers of fortune would later make up its greater part. The state's fiscal exactions grew even more than did the anny. By the end of Basil's reign, the treasury had accumulated a hoard of 200,000 pounds of gold'''', and on his death bed Basil cancelled land taxes for two years - a good measure of the State's iron grip over society. Basil's fifty-year reign, the longest in Byzantine history, was the extension and culmination of a centralised autocracy which had originally developed to meet the Arab threat. But that threat was now a thing of the past, and the system which had defeated it became an unnecessary and irksome burden. It was inevitable that in the generation after Basil's death, the coils that had bound the Empire so tightly would loosen. What could not be foreseen was that the pendulum would swing to the opposite extreme. The power of the State would shrink so quickly and uncon­ trollably that it ceased to be respected and became the prey of competing fac­ tions. Basil had never married and his brother Constantine had no male heir; for a generation, the Byzantine autocracy fell into the unworthy hands of Constantine'S elder daughter zoe, a frivolous, middle-aged spinster, and her upstart consorts. Meanwhile, the aristocratic class rapidly expanded its land­ holdings and influence in the provinces, where security and prosperity had become the rule. The craft guilds of the capital assumed growing political influ­ ence''''. The Church emerged as a distinct body with material and political inter-

(11) Treadgold, op. cit., p. 537. (12) Whinow, op. cit., pp. 324-325. (13) Angold. Michael, The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204; Longman J984, p. 7. (14) Ibid., pp. 68-73. Tht TUrkish Conqllest of Anatolia i1l flu! Eleventh Cenrury

ests often quite opposed to those of the State. By the 1050s a determined patri­ arch could challenge and overcome a weak emperor"". This rapid and manifold decentralisation had noxious consequences. The grasping fiscal engine of Basil's reign was thrown into reverse as gifts. offices and immunities were dispensed by weak regimes to buy political support and oil the wheels of administration. The inevitable result was a chronic and deepening financial crisis, the real gravity of which was demonstrated in 1050, when the gold coinage was debased for the first time since the third century''''. To the imperial court, dominated by the civilian aristocracy of Constantinople, military cuts seemed the obvious way out of the difficulty. Consequently, the middle decades of the centuty saw the demobilisation of the maiuly Armenian frontier forces in the east"", a measure which bad the additional advantage of weakening the military magnates. Moreover, the Anatolian themes had long since ceased to provide effective forces"", even if the government was still paying their stipends in debased coinage. They could only be kept in being by the exigencies of con­ tinuous warfare, something that no longer existed in Anatolia. The author of the manual On Tactics describes a situation that was still unusual in his time, but had become the rule in the east by the mid-eleventh century:

But for soldiers to stay at home and do nothing, to get no exercise, not to go on campaign each year at the proper time: this is to reduce them to the ranks ofmerchants and common farmers. For, selling their combat gear and their best horses and buying cows and the other things one would expect of a farmer, alld gradually becoming accustomed to leisure, they embrace il. It illvolves 110 fatigue or danger, and they prefer it to the struggles and labours on behalf of Christians. If, in the event of all enemy advance, it should be necessary for tilt< army to march out (. .. j , nobody will be found who can do the work of a soldier. Idleness and the lack of practice make them com­ pletely unmanly and incompetent'''.

Such territorial forces had formed the greater part of the army during the war against the Arabs; now a smalier and more professional army was consid-

(15) Ibid., pp. 28-30, 47-52. (16) Treadgold. op. cit., p. 595. (17) Attaliates. Michael, "Historia", CQrpus SC[jptorum Historiae BYzantinae; ed. Bekker; Bonn J 853, pp. 44~45. Angold, op. cit., p. 40. Treadgold,op. cit., p. 595 . (18) Treadgold, op. cit., pp. 548, 596. (19) "Anonymous Book on Tactics", op. cil. S.P. O'Sullivan 51 ered sufficient for defence. It is ironic that the emperor Constantine IX began the military cutbacks after 1050, when large Turkish raids were just starting to dev­ astate the frontier zone. The cutbacks were seen by many at the time and since as the main reason for the fall of Anatolia. In the opinion of the 12th century chronicler Zonaras, "that man [Constantine IX] will be judged responsible by the impartially minded for the subjugation of the eastern parts of the Empire to the barbarian spear"m,. Yet Basil had increased the size of the army far beyond what was necessary, and some retrenchment was desirable. In fact, the careless­ ness of these weak governments in military matters was only one symptom of a deeper failure. The Empire had already taken a fatal tum in losing sight of its ftrst priority - the need to hold Anatolia.

The Beginnings of the Conquest: Thrkish Raids, The Campaigns of Romanus, and the Battle of Manzikerl- 1045-1071 For centuries, non-Muslim Turkic-speaking nomads in the northern steppes, such as the Khazars and Pechenegs, had been known to the Empire. These peo­ ples were usually on friendly terms with Byzantium and often served her as allies. But the appearance of migrating tribes of Muslim Turks on the eastern frontier was a novelty. For it was not until the late tenth century that Turks in their Central Asian homeland converted to Islam in large nuinbers. Much later, about 1025, a large tribal confederation named after its leader Seljuk migrated south across the Oxus River into Khuriisan. Under the leadership of Tughrul and Chaghri, grandsons of Seljuk, the Turks defeated the Ghaznavid rulers of eastern Iran at the Battle of Dandanqan in 1040. This victory marked their entry into the political arena. While Chaghri looked after affairs in the east, Thghrul conquered western Iran and Azerbaijan; the latter region was heavily settled by the Thrks and became their base. Turkish raids under subordinate chiefs were launched into Armenia, most of which was now under Byzantine rule, while Tughrul him­ self undertook the conquest of Iraq. The latter objective was completed between 1055 and 1059; Tughrul was granted the title of sultan by the Abbasid caliph and made Baghdad the capital of what was now a Turkish empire in Iran and Iraq~ ) ' . Meanwhile, Tughrul's lieutenants had been active on the Byzantine frontier. In 1045 the ftrst major Turkish raid took place against the easternmost province

(20) Zonaras. John; Epitomae Historiarum Libri XIII-XVUI, nI; Bonn 1897, p. 647 (quoted in Angold. op. cit.• p. 36). (21) Caben, op. cit. , pp. 18-20. 52 TM Turkish Conquest of Anoto/in in the Eleventh Century

of Vaspurakan; the local governor was defeated and killed. Later raids in 1048 and 1049 were repelled with difficulty by the border forces, aided by Georgian allies, but not before the Turks were able to penetrate deep into the frontier zone and sack the prosperous and unwalled town of Artze (Ef2urum)"2). From this time until 1071, the preliminaries to the conquest took place with increasing frequency and intensity. In 1053, the Turks attacked Kars, the last independent Armenian principality. In 1054, an army, equipped with siege engines and led by Tughrul himself, attacked the key stronghold of Manzikert north of Lake Van but was repulsed. In 1057 the Turks sacked Melitene; in 1059 Sebastea was the fIrst city behind the Taurus barrier to suffer destruction. Both places were unfortifIed and poorly-defended"3). In 1063 Alp Arslan, son of Chaghri, succeeded his uncle Tughrul. The following year he attacked and took the well fortifIed but weakly garrisoned city of Ani in Armenia"'); this was the fIrst important conquest made by the Turks inside the Empire. Meanwhile, the Turks had also begun to raid Anatolia itself in force. The Turkish campaigns against the Empire presupposed an active chain of command between the sultan in Iraq and the tribal forces along the frontier. The conquest began with relentiess raids against villages and small towns in the countryside; settlement on the land and the reduction of isolated strongpoints completed the conquest of territory. This process was almost complete in Armenia by 1070 after about twenty years of war. By then it had begun in Anatolia too. Tentatively from 1059, and boldly from 1067, the raiders ventured to invade the peninsula in spring and return in autumn, usually by the routes of Theodosiopolis-Sebastea in the north or Melitene-Caesarea in the centre. The Turks relied on their supreme mobility. Once inside Anatolia, they would scatter far and wide to sack and plunder but could be quickly regrouped. In battle, they were masters of the powerful steppe bow and the tactics of ambush and feigned retreat. All their warriors were mounted and spare animals were in good supply. Since all fIt adult males took part in fIghting, the Turks could muster numerous forces (certainly in the tens of thousands) when the occasion demanded, although usually their raiders numbered from a few hundred to a few thou­ sand"". Finally, the Turks were a people in migration, whose conquests were

(22) Vryonis, op. cit. , pp. 85·96. (23) Ibid.. pp. 85·96. (24) Attaliates, op. cit., pp. 8(}'82. (25) Vryonis, op. cit., p. 262, gives examples from other periods suggesting that Turkish nomad annies of Iran and Anatolia could number 30-40.000. The anny which confronted the S,P, O'Sullivan 53 accompanied by occupation and settlement. In short, the Thrkish threat was formidable from the start. Byzantium was ill-prepared to meet a danger on the scale of what was impending. Yet energy was not wanting. The death of the Empress Theodora, Zoe's sister, in late 1056 had brought the 200-year old Macedonian dynasty to an end. Soon afterwards the eastern generals formed a conspiracy to set one of their number, Isaac Cornnenus, on the throne. Their aim was to overthrow the civilian clique which had ruled since 1025, restore the army, and repel the Turks. The revolution succeeded, but only after a bloody battle fought at Nicaea"" against the western army and the emperor's elite troops. Meanwhile the Thrks took advantage of the weakened frontier defences. Once in power, Isaac found that the task of restoring the State's finances and confronting the powerful Patriarch Cerularius consumed all his energy; within less than two years, sick and weary, he was persuaded by his chief minister Psellus to abdicate. The mil­ itary reforming regime ended before it had come to grips with the urgent prob­ lems that faced it. The Byzantine position worsened during the reign of Isaac's successor, Constantine X Oucas, another of the conspirators of 1057, who lacked Isaac's determination and was more influenced by the short-sighted civilian outlook of the capital. Constantine occupied the throne for over seven years (1059-1067), a reign sumtned up succinctly by Psellus: "He wished to settle our differences with the barbarian peoples not by war at all, but by sending gifts and other favours. He did this for two reasons: to avoid spending the greater part of the treasury on military expenses, and to secure for himself an existence free of troubles. "'" The dismantling of the territorial theme forces in the east was pursued to its conclusion during these years. ·By the end of the reign, the Byzantine army in Anatolia was much reduced in numbers and concentrated on the frontier. Frankish mercenaries were now serving there in strength beside Byzantine troops, many of whom were Armenian. Even these forces were starved of equip­ ment and supplies"". The emperor's failure to take personal command, the State's penny-pinching measures, and the very unwise policy, adopted from

Crusaders at Dorylaeum in June 1097 was of this size. Nomad armies of the Asian steppes were even larger, since the area of pasrurage for horses was much greater than in the more arid lands to the south. (26) Attaliates, op. cir., p. 55 . (27) Psellus. Michael, Chrono2raphia, 2 vols.. ed. Renaud; Paris 1926, vol. II, pp. 146· 147. (28) AttaIiates. op. cit.. p. 79. 54 The Turkish Conquest 0/ Anura/in in the Eleventh Century

1063, of trying to force the Annenian and Syrian Churches into union with Constantinople - all combined to provoke defections and uprisings among units of the eastern army<"', even as the defensive belt in Armenia was collapsing, and Turkish raids were reaching the centre of Anatotia . Constantine X died, none too soon, in 1067. For a few months, his wife Eudocia ruled as regent for their young son Michael, having solemnly sworn not to remarry. However, this arrangement was quickly upset when news arrived that the Thrks had sacked Caesarea, the capital of Cappadocia. Amid an outcry of indignation and calls for a strong hand at the helm, Eudocia was released from her oath by the Patriarch. She married Romanus Diogenes, a native of Cappadocia and commander of the western army, a military man who had dis­ tinguished himself in a recent war against the Pechenegs in the Balkans'''''. Romanus became emperor and quickly drew to himself the reins of power with Eudocia's willing compliance. But be earned the deadly enmity of the Ducas family, whose leader John, Constantine's brother, was determined to retain his nephew Michael as emperor. Romanus spent most of 1068 and 1069 in the east. The historian Michael Allaliates was on service with the emperor in both campaigns and describes them in detail. At the start of 1068 Romanus restored the moribund theme system in Anatolia, recruiting young men from the whole region; the troops called up were untrained, ill-equipped, and demoralised; undaunted, the emperor filled the ranks, appointing veteran officers from the western army"". The sultan Alp Arslan had sent two separate raiding forces into Anatotia; the Byzantine army advanced to its forward base at Sebastea and attempted to drive back both of them. The northern force was able to sack Neocaesarea., although on its return it was caught and defeated by the Byzantine cavalry. Romanus now decided to go onto the offensive. Leaving a strong force at Melitene to guard the eastern front, he moved the bulk of his army south into Syria; there in November the Byzantines besieged and took the important city of Hierapolis on the Euphrates and the nearby fortress of Artach. Leaving Syria in December, Romanus led the army back onto the plateau where he learned that Thrkish raiders ·had just sacked Arnorium and returned unscathed without any opposition from the Byzantine army at Melitene"".

(29) Vryonis, op. cit., pp. 91 , 93. (3~) Attaliates, op. Ci/., p. 98. (31) Attaliates, op. cit., p. 102. (32) Ibid., pp. 102-124. S.P. O'Sllllivan 55

After spending winter and spring in Constantinople, the emperor opened the campaign of 1069. Dealing peacefully with a revolt of the Frankish mercenaries under their leader Robert Crispin"", Romanus moved to Caesarea and then to Larissa near MeHtene. There he fought and routed a large Turkish army, although the Turks were able to retreat unhindered. After this uplifting success, he wanted to return to the capital, where his enemies were already active against him. Yet he was encouraged by his officers, including Attaliates, to advance and take Chliat, blocking the main Turkish invasion route. For the defence of Anatolia, part of the army was given to Philaretus, an Armenian officer who was to play an important role in following years; with the remainder Romanus crossed the Euphrates. But the campaign was suddenly broken off. Advancing with astonishing speed, a Turkish raiding force defeated Philaretus, invaded Anatolia and threatened Iconium. Romanus withdrew rapidly, hoping to draw off the Turks, but he was too late. Iconium was sacked and the Turks were on their way back, taking the shortest but most dangerous route through the passes of the CiJician Taurus. Philaretus was given orders to ambush them; however, the trap was not sprung and theTurks reached Aleppo safely with all their booty. Disappointed, the emperor returned to Constantinople, where he remained throughout 1070, quashing a court conspiracy hatched by the Dueas family<"'. The ringleader, John Ducas, narrowly escaped execution. The situation, already worrying, began to threaten disaster. Romanus handed over the eastern campaign to Manuel Comoenus, nephew of the previous emperor Isaac. "From that time", states the chronicler Glycas, "many disasters befell the Romans"" ". After some initial successes, Manuel sent part of his army to Syria. Soon afterwards he and his remaining forces were defeated by the Turks near Sebastea with heavy losses; Manuel himself was captured. That same year, a separate Turkish force penetrated farther into Anatolia than ever before. The raiders sacked the great pilgrimage centre of Chonai, dedicated to St Michael the Archangel"", only two or three days' ride from the Aegean coast before returning, once again, unopposed. During the same year, the Turks reduced by siege the fortress-city of Manzikert, which had defied them sixteen

(33) Ibid., pp. 122-123. (34) Ibid., pp. 124-138. (35) Gtycas, Michael. "Annales", CQ[pus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae, ed. Bekker, Bonn 1836, p. 609. (36) Angold, op. cit., p. 21. 1'he Turkish Conquest of Ana/olia in tM Eleveruh CenTUry years before"". The sultan concluded a successful year by granting the Emperor a truce which sealed the Turkish conquest of Armenia"". Many of its surviving inhabitants had fled southwest to the Euphrates and the Cilician Taurus, where Armenians had been settling in large numbers since the tenth century. Armenia was the threshold to Anatolia; its conquest by 1070 signalled that, truce or no truce, the war in the peninsula was about to resume after a century of quiet. The Turkish attacks were still only raids, limited to the central plateau and over before winter. Nevertheless, several important Anatolian cities had been sacked during those early years. Certainly, the fast-moving raiders could not transport cumbersome siege trains with them. Yet those cities were not reduced by siege; they were all surprised and taken by storm because they were in no fit state to defend themselves. There are some clues as to how this happened in Attaliates' history. Along with a vivid description of Halley's comet of May 1066 - a highly visible portent of the disaster about to fall- the writer mentions a series of earthquakes in Anatolia for two years beginning in September 1065. The tremors were severe, "unheard of by everybody and indeed not even recorded in history. " Attaliates compares them with the cataclysmic submarine earthquake of 551 , described in the history of Agathias. He goes on to mention the "complete ovenhrow" of Nicaea, especially its cathedral, scene of the great council of 325"9). Bryennius corroborates this in part: relating the Byzantine army's defeat at Caesarea in 1073, he stales that the walls of the sacked city had been destroyed in an earthquake and that the Byzantine army had established its camp inside the ruins''''. It seems that severe earthquakes throughout Anatolia between 1065 and 1067 had destroyed or damaged many city fortifications which were already in bad repair because of the long peace and the military reductions. This supposition would explain why the mobile Thrkish raiders were able to sack Caesarea and other important cities on the plateau after 1067 (much later, the Turks were similarly able to gain their first foothold in Europe, when they occupied the city of Callipolis (modem Gallipoli) in 1354 after its walls had been levelled in an earthquake). Gloom and foreboding were spread by the coin­ cidence of the great comet, traditionally an omen of disaster, and a series of strong earthquakes with the beginning of a new attack from the east.

(37) Vryonis, op. cit., p. % . (38) Treadgold. op. cit., p. 603. (39) Attaliates, op. cit., pp. 89-91. (40) Byennius, Nicephorus, "Commentarii", CO!;pus Scriptorum Hjstoriae BYzantjnae, ed. Meineke, Bonn J836, p. 58. S.P. O'Sullivan 57

Only one event late in 1070 had somewhat relieved the tale of defeat. This was the sudden reappearance of Manuel Comnenus, who had been given up for lost after his defeat in battle. With him was a Turkish escort led by the chief who had taken him prisoner. Now seeking refuge from Alp Arslan, he was well­ treated by the Emperor. In his negotiations with the sultan, Romanus had not been able to regain Manzikert in exchange for Hierapolis. Spurning a truce made with the infidel, he spent that winter creating a field army of unprecedented size for the following year. The first three years of Romanus' reign had been indecisive. Certainly, the Byzantine army had been rapidly restored into a powerful fighting force, capable of winning battles and capturing towns. Yet the Turks were shown to be a fonnidable foe, numerous, mobile, and relentless. Above all, they were still a new enemy, and consequently all the more terrifying. Attaliates recalls the mood of the Byzantine forces as they crossed the Euphrates in 1069: "The Greeks were weighed down in their hearts by fear of the Turks''''''. The Empire's resources were still great, but they would have to be fully mustered in order to have a good chance of victory. Indeed, the army which Romanus led out in the summer of 1071 was one of the largest ever assembled, numbering close to 40,OO()<'" men, mainly Greek and Annenian, but including many Frankish and Pecheneg mercenaries. Some of Romanus' officers had urged him to give up Annenia for lost and stay on the defensive in eastern Anatolia - in fact, to return to the strategy and tactics of the war against the Arabs. But Romanus chose to repeat his strategy of 1069 - to take the initiative and recapture the Armenian fortresses, blocking the main routes into Anatolia and perhaps drawing the Turks into a decisive battle. He was inclined to this choice personally by his energetic and impatient temperament, and impelled to it by the need to fulfil the hopes raised by his accession. In ret­ rospect it was a rash decision. The emperor counted too much on the size of his army, ignoring its weaknesses and underestimating the Turks. The Byzantine army marched across northern Anatolia, its morale lowered

(41) Attaliates, op. cil., p. 133. (42) Angold, op. cit., p. 22. Caben, Claude, "La campagne de Manzikert d'apres les sources musulmanes", Turcobyzaotina et Driens Christiana, London 1974, p. 629. Treadgold, op. cit .• p. 603. Arab and Armenian sources give wildly exaggerated figures. Yet the anny was unusually large - 40,000 seems a reasonable maximum, based on the figures given in the Byzantine military treatise quoted elsewhere, which assumes that an army led by the emperor would number about 24,000. 58 The Turkish Conquest ofAlUllOlia in the Eleventh Century by a series of bad omens, particularly the sight of the skeleton-strewn battlefield near Sebastea, where Manuel Comnenus had been badly defeated the previous year"', After resting at the border stronghold of Theodosiopolis, the Byzantines invaded Armenia, now an almost deserted land, and divided into two: one part advanced on Chliat, while Romanus with the rest of the army besieged Manzikert, quickly taking it after only a token resistance from the weak Turkish garrison"" (in dividing his forces, Romanus was following a time-honoured Byzantine practice for campaigning in dangerous country; the division of forces reduced the risk of total disaster - provided that each part of the army was ready to come rapidly to the assistance of the other''''). As the Byzantines occupied the town, an ominous incident occurred: a soldier was cruelly punished by Romanus for breach of discipline (he had stolen a donkey belonging to a Turk) in spite of his supplications to the icon of the Virgin of Blachernae, which was often car­ ried on campaign. Attaliates recalls: "It was then that I felt God~ vengeance would fall upon us'''' ". The sultan AJp Arslan, counting on the truce made with the Empire, was warring against the Egyptians in Syria. On the news of Romanus' advance, he hurried back to Mesopotamia, gathered forces, and marched north"". Hearing of the sultan's approach, the large and heavily armed Byzantine force near Chliat inexplicably withdrew and fell back as far as Melitene. Meanwhile, Turkish raiders built up around the main army at Manzikert, cutting communications with the outside and harassing the Byzantine camp for two days and nights. Inside the camp there was "great fear, unfortunate rumour, confused shouting, and uncertain milling arouru!''''''. During this time, a group of Pecheneg merce­ naries went over in a body to the Turks"", and Turkish peace envoys were rejected by the emperor. On Friday 26 August"'», Romanus drew up the army, expecting in vain the arrival of the second army from Chlia!. The battle began, with each side numbering about 20,()()()<"'. The Byzantines advanced, driving

(43) Attaliates. op. cit., p. 145. (44) Ibid., p. 152. (45) "Anonymous Book on Tacti cs", op. cil., p. 273. (46) Attaliates, ()p. cit., p. 152. (47) Cahen. op. cir., pp. 628-629. (48) Attaliates, op. cit. , p. 156. (49) Ibid., p. 157. (50) Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edjtion, vol. VI, Leiden, 1990. p. 227. (5 1) Cahen, op. Cil., p. 629. Arab writers give 14,000 for Alp Arslan's army - 4{)(X) of his own soldiers, and 10,000 Kunfish auxiliaries recruited on the way. This figure seems too low, S.P. O'Sullivan 59 back the Thrkish army in disorder with losses for much of the day. In the late afternoon, Romanus, fearing to be drawn into an ambush, signalled a retreat, a difficult order to execute in the circumstances. Most of the army began to with­ draw slowly and uncertainly, but the rearguard, commanded by Andronicus Ducas, son of John Ducas, left the field in haste, spreading confusion"~. The Turks counter-attacked, managing to cut off the emperor's forces in the centre from the wings of the army, which retreated or fled. The emperor's elite troops fought on courageously, but finally broke up at the onset of darkness, leaving many dead or captured, including Romanus himself. The remnants of the army, which were certainly the greater part, made their way back to Manzikert and then piecemeal to Byzantine territory, though some were destroyed on the way. Such was the Battle of Manzikert, which marked the real beginning of the Turkish conquest of Anatolia. Muslim sources give it exaggerated importance and the battle is recounted by several Arab historians. Yet the battle in itself was not a terrible catastrophe for the Empire, since most of the army had survived. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, the sultan treated Romanus with magna­ nimity, releasing him after little more than a week in return for an alliance, a heavy tribute, and territorial concessions which certainly included Armenia and perhaps &lessa, HierapoHs, and Antioch too,53,. Most explanations for the defeat refer to the action of Andronicus Ducas in leading the rearguard off the field too quiclcly'''>' but it is not certain that deliberate treachery was involved here. More important was the fear that had dogged the Byzantine troops from the start of the campaign, and reduced them by its end to a state of panic and confusion. This inordinate fear of the TUrks was apparent from the first years of the invasions and is emphasised by Attaliates, who was present on all of Romanus' cam­ paigns: "The Greeks were fearful, thinking the enemy terrible, and could not even bear their voices, while they, on the other hand, were boastful and proud, attacking with confidence, as if waging war on men who had often been beaten(~ ~) " .

considering that Alp Arslan had just been campaigning in Syria. and that he had some idea of the size of the Byzantine anny. (52) Vryonis, op. cit., pp. J00 - IO I. (53) AngoJd, op. cit., p. 23. TreadgoJd. op. cit. , p. 603. (54) Angold. op. cit .. p. 22-23. Vryonis. op. cit .. p. 96. (55) Attaliates. op. cit., p. 79. 60 The Turkish Conquest of Anatolia in the Eleventh Century

Civil War, Mercenary Revolt, and Thrkish Conquest of the Centre and North -1071-1077 After the battle of Manzikert, the sources on Anatolia become steadily less informative and coherent, reaching a low point in the early 1080s and improving thereafter. During the earlier pari of this sombre period, the way is lighted well enough, although the view revealed is dismal. For the immediate consequence of the emperor's capture was a palace revolution which led directly to a bitter civil war. Michael Ducas, the young son of Constantine X, was crowned sale emperor in Constantinople at the instigation of John Ducas and Psellus; Romanus and Eudocia were deposed. Once news arrived that Romanus had been released and was in northern Anatolia gathering and refitting his forces, an army was swiftly despatched to deal with him. Surprised by its sudden advance, Romanus gave battle at Docea in the autumn of 1071; after a fierce struggle, his forces were defeated and he narrowly escaped. During the winter, he found shelter and support from the Armenian governor of Antioch, .who brought him to Cilicia and helped him to raise new forces. The new regime again showed remarkable energy. Andronicus Ducas led an army through Anatolia, raising extra contingents along the way. He forced the Cilician passes by surprise and defeated Romanus a second rime; yet again the latter escaped but was soon betrayed and captured. Andronicus treated his prisoner well at first, but orders to the contrary arrived, after some hesitation, from Constantinople; they originated with Andronicus' father, John Ducas, who defended his family's interests ruth­ lessly. Romanus was blinded, but the operation was badly performed and he died only a few weeks later, miserably unfortunate as emperor''''. Romanus' death in late 1072 triggered the next blow in the unfolding Anatolian tragedy. Respecting the peace made after Manzikert, the Turks had not yet taken advantage of the civil war. But Alp Arslan died in the same year as Romanus, and hi s son and successor Malik Shah decided to attack. After his second defeat, Romanus had tried to gain Turkish support, and the cruelty of his death, compared with the mercy shown by Alp Arslan, had damaged the new regime's standing. It was almost with a pretext that the Turkish invasion was about to begin(S7). Raids were already under way in early 1073 when the government sent an army to eastern Cappadocia. Manzikert, and the bloodshed and chaos of the civil

(56) Ibid,. pp. 169·183 passim. Bryennius, op. cit., pp. 46-55 passim. (57) Cahen, op. cit., p. 641. S.P. O'SulliV(UI 61 war, had completely undone Romanus' painstaking restoration of the Anatolian army. Byzantium's military power in the east was fast waning; its strongest asset now was the force of Frankish heavy cavalry, several thousand in number. But Robert Crispin, their commander, was dead. On the evidence of an intriguing line in Psellus' ChroD02raphia - "I write these words on the day of his [Crispin's] death"8)", it is likely that he was executed by the government at the beginuing of the year, risky and illogical as that was. The weak Ducas regime had reason to fear and distrust Crispin, whom Romanus, before his death, had attempted to suborn"" . Alienating the Franks at this critical moment was fatal for the campaign, which was the last chance of keeping the Thrks out of Anatolia. The new mer­ cenary commander. the Norman Roussel de Bailleul, deserted Isaac's camp at Caesarea with some forty'·" men and headed for Amasea in northern Anatolia, the scene of Crispin's revolt in 1069. Before Isaac could react, news arrived that a large Thrkish army was approaching. A pitched battle was fought not far from the ruined walls ofCaesarea; the Byzantine army was routed and Isaac captured. This was the third crushing defeat suffered against the Thrks since 1070; the empire's military reputation was shattered and Byzantium would not dare to challenge the enemy again on the battlefield for a full generation. The victors reaped the benefits: the Thrks took the deserted city of Caesarea "". Sebastea, behind them, would certainly have fallen along with it. Possession of these two centres gave the invaders control of the eastern half of the plateau, over and beyond which they now spread, raiding in all directions. With secure bases and no enemy army to challenge them, they had no need to return home for the winter; instead, they brought over their families and flocks and wintered for the first time inside Anatolia. Conquest and colonisation proceeded together''''. It is clear that the Thrks had gained a firm foothold in the centre of the peninsula. How much of it they would be able to conquer was still in question.

(58) PseUus, op. cit., vol. U, p. 169. (59) Attaliates, op. cit., pp. 170-171. Crispin had already been ex.iled to Abydos before being recalled to lead his men with decisive effect against Romanus. (60) AnalialeS, op. cit. . p. 183 . According to Bryennius, op. cit., p. 54, he left with the Frankish contingent (phalanx). (61) Attaliates, op. cit. , p. 183. Bryennius, op. cit., pp. 60-61. (62) Vryonis, op. cit., pp. 184-185. 62 The Turkish Conquest of Analolia in the Eleventh Century

Raiding and devastating the countryside far and wide was not in itself sufficient; conquest of the land could only be achieved by the capture of cities and fortresses. During the war against the Arabs, the Byzantines had turned Anatolia into a network of fortified strongpoints. In spite of disrepair and earthquake damage, this network still existed and was being strengthened before the new invasions began(63). In the early years of the conquest, therefore, the Turks were still hemmed in on the central and eastern plateau, surrounded by a ring of strong Byzantine fortresses - !conium, Ancyra, Philomelium, Dorylaeum, Gangra, Euchaita, Amasea, Neocaesarea, and Colonea. Whether this ring could be held depended on Byzantine forces remaining in the field, keeping open communications with their strongholds, and harassing the enemy, who still lacked the weaponry and expertise necessary for siege warfare. The military manual On Tactics describes the kind of fighting that was to predominate'in Anatolia after the early 1070s:

Those who want to take walled cities by storm and thus bring the enemy country completely to its knees should conduct frequent raids against their country [ ... ]. By this constant damage and by unceasingly making captives of the enemy themselves and of their allies, and by not allowing them the freedom of working their own land, but putting pressure on them in every way, they become easy to overcome. Unless their vines and fruit-bearing trees are first chopped down and their animals taken away, so hunger will compel them to become wandering fugitives, it is extremely difficult to have any success in besieging strong cities, well stocked with supplies and with a multitude offighting men [ ... ]. The commander who wants an easy way to tum the enemy's strong places into spoils of war will launch his attack against them in vain(64 ).

The principal events of the next three years would decide the fate of almost all the Byzantine strongholds mentioned above, and with them the greater part of the peninsula. Those events occurred in northern AnatoJia and centred around the revolt of the Frankish mercenaries. Their leader Roussel raised his standard at Amasea in late 1073 and quickly gathered a force. It seems that the revolt had the support of much of the Anatolian population; terrified by the Turks and losing hope in the government's ability to protect them, they willingly gave their

(63) Attaliates, op. cit., p. 148. Bryennius, op. cit., p. 64. (64) "Anonymous Book on Tactics", op. cit., p. 303. S.P. O'Sullivan 63 allegiance to the mercenaries. In addition, the Anatolians, having strongly sup­ ported Romanus, one of their own, were not well disposed towards the Ducas regime. It is difficult otherwise to explain the very rapid spread of the revolt. By spring 1074, all of northern and much of central Anatolia had fallen under the control of the mercenaries, who drove out government officials and Thrkish raiders alike''''. The sources disagree sharply in their view of Roussel. Bryennius and Anna Comnena, writing a generation later, have nothing good to say of him; whereas Attaliates, a contemporary, admires both Roussel and his predecessor Crispin and excuses their unruly actions. For example, referring to Crispin's earlier revolt of 1069, he says that Crispin robbed tax-collectors but did not ki1l any Greek, that a large Byzantine army, gathered to put down his revolt, attacked him on Easter Day, and that Crispin, after defeating this force, later submitted to Romanus peacefuUy"". Attaliates' picture of the mercenaries appears more cred­ ible; he saw the Franks at first hand and, like most Anatolians. did not have that venomous dislike of the Latins which had become widespread in Cons­ tantinople. The Normans under Robert Guiscard had just founded a state in south Italy, baving taken Bari. the last Byzantine possession. in 1071. Following this recent example, Roussel too intended to carve out a separate state in Anatolia. That is why Bryennius and Anna Comnena regard him with the utmost hos­ tility"~. Attaliates, however. writing almost in the midst of events. sees the mer­ cenaries as a welcome bulwark against the Thrks. In spring 1074 the Caesar John Ducas and his son Andronicus led a large army into Anatolia to confront Roussel in what was now a second civil war. A battle was fought by the bridge of Zompus at the great bend of the Sangarius River in Phrygia. John Ducas himself commanded the centre with the elite Varangian Guard and Andronicus the left wing with the Greek tagmata. Frankish mercenary cavalry under Papa held the right wing. and Nicephorus Botaniates held the rearguard with Anatolian infantry"". The presence of Anatolian troops in strength shows that the Anatolian population was by no means defenceless

(65) Bryennius, op. cit., p. 73, states that Roussel subjugated the towns of Galatia and Lycaonia. Added to northern Anatolia. this would mean that the revolt had spread within a few months over about half of the peninsula. (66) Attaliates, op. cit .• p. 122. (67) Bryennius. op. cit .• pp. 73 .83. Comnena, op. cit., vol. I, p. 10. (68) Bryennius, op. cit., pp. 74-77. Attaliates, op. cit., p. 188. states that John Ducas unwi­ sely crossed the river with only part of his forces in the face of the opposing anny. 64 The Turkish Conquest of Anatolia in the Eievt!tUh Century against the Turks. Roussel's army presumably also included many local troops''''. The battle was hard fought and very bloody; Papa's mercenaries went over to their compatriots, Andronicus was mortaIly wounded, John Ducas cap­ tured, and the Byzantine army routed. The government would not send another army into Anatolia for six years. Roussel advanced as far as Chrysopolis, facing the capital. To his standard were now joined all the Frankish mercenaries in Anatolia, three thousand armoured cavalry according to Attaliates, who described their camp on the Bosphorus as "a memorable sighf""". Roussel now proclaimed his prisoner John Ducas emperor with the latter's ready assent. The mercenary leader was playing for the highest stakes; he prob­ ably intended to have John crowned emperor in exchange for the recognition of his own territorial power in northern Anatolia. In this he nearly succeeded, for the unpopular regime no longer had confidence in its own forces° O). The weak emperor and his able minister Nicephoritzes resorted to calling in the Turks of Anatolia, who intervened for the first time in Byzantium's internal conflicts. The Turks, who were still concentrated in Cappadocia, invaded Byzantine territory with their whole strength. His plan foiled, Roussel withdrew to the region of Mount Sophon, east of Nicomedia. The Franks defeated the Turkish vanguard, about five thousand strong. Then the main Turkish army, much more numerous, approached; the mercenaries retreated into their fortified camp. Surrounding them on three sides, the Turks attacked, capturing both Roussel and John Ducas after heavy fighting, although most of the Franks escaped to the nearby fortress of Metabole. Roussel was soon ransomed by his wife, but the Turkish leader kept John Ducas for the time being and withdrew south into Phrygia. Large num­ bers of Turks remained behind to devastate northern Anatolia, but the govern­ ment turned a blind eye, unwilling to risk its forces. Some time later, John was ransomed; on his return, fearful of his nephew's wrath, he became a monk°". The threat to Michael VII's regime had been averted, but the revolt con­ tinued. Early in 1075 Roussel left Metabole with the remaining mercenaries. Amid increasing confusion, the Franks made their way back east to their base at Amasea. They quickly retook control of the region, driving out the Turks once

(69) AttaJiates. op. cit .. p. 189. states that after the battle, Roussel med to attract Greeks into his anny by proclaiming John Ducas as emperor. but it seems unlikely that his anny at Zompus was composed of Franks only. (70) Ibid., p. 188. Bryennius makes no mention of the advance on Chrysopolis. (7l) Bryennius, op. cit.. p. 81. (72) Attaliates. op. cit., pp. 189-192. Bryennius, op. cit .. pp. 79·82. S.P. O'Sullivan 65 more and launching counter-raids. As before, Roussel's authority expanded rapidly<'''. The government half-heartedly prepared an expedition for 1075 but abandoned it when its designated commander - Constantine Ducas, John's younger son - suddenly died. Reluctant to calIon the Turks, a double-edged weapon, the emperor sent his general Nicephorus Palaeologus to Georgia with orders to raise an army against Roussel (Byzantium's relations with Georgia were particularly close at this time because of Michael's marriage to the Georgian princess Maria of Alania). Nicephorus lacked funds, but he raised an army of six thousand on promise of payment after victory. Not surprisingly, the expedition was a fiasco - most of the Georgians deserted before joining battIe, and the remainder were easily dispersed by the Franks"" . The mercenary revolt entered its third year undiminished, with all efforts to crush it having come to naught. Yet its sudden and unexpected collapse was imminent. Early in 1076 the regime sent the nineteen-year-old Alexius Comnenus, third and youngest of the Comneni brothers, into Roussel's territory with orders to defeat the revolt"". With very little money and only a small force, A1exius' mission looked hopeless; nonetheless, he added a few hundred of the remaining Georgian soldiers and began to harass the Franks. At the same time, a new Turkish army led by Tutush, possibly Malik Shah's brother, had been despatched by the sultan into Anatolia to estabHsh his authority among the Turks and attack the incipient Frankish state. In Anna Comnena's words: "The bar­ barian Tutush came down from the depths of the East with an overwhelming army to pillage Roman territory. Continuously harassed by the stratopedarch {Alexius] and losing his strongholds one after the other, despite the numerous forces which he commanded, all wonderfully and strongly equipped, Roussel was completely beaten thanks to the cunning oj my father Alexius""". After inconclusive fighting, Roussel negotiated with the Turks. Striking up personal relations with the Turkish leader, he rashly visited their camp without adequate escort. He was captured and handed over to Alexius in exchange for the promise of a large ransom, vouchsafed by the immediate delivery of many hostages. After his capture, his followers surrendered their fortresses and the whole region returned to Constantinople's precarious authority<"'. But the Turks were now

(73) ADaliates, op. cil., pp. 198-199. (74) Bryennius, op. dt., pp. 83-84. (75) Ibid., pp. 84-85. Cornnena, op. cil., vol. t, pp. IO-Il. (76) Comnena. op. dt., vol. It p. II . (77) Ibid., vol. t, p. 15. 66 The Turkish Conquest ofAnatofia in lhe Eleventh Century

overrunning the north; as in 1074 large numbers of them remained in the region after the departure of their leader Tutush. Alexius tried to raise the ransom for his prisoner from the citizens of Amasea, but they rose in desperate riot, infuri­ ated by the betrayal of their only hope of survival. With difficulty. A1exius extri­ cated himself and his men, and they set off with their prisoner on a journey fraught with danger. On the way Alexius made a detour to visit his ancestral estate at Castamon. The place was completely deserted and he had to leave quickly for fear of Turks in the vicinity. At the coast they received an escort of "strong and experienced soldiers'''''' from Heraclea who deterred an attack from a large band of Turks hovering on the flank. There Alexius received orders to take ship for Constantinople, so risky was the overland journeY"". Presumably the hostages given to the Turks were never released. As for the end of the episode, the sources differ widely. According to Bryennius, Roussel was treated well by the emperor; Attaliates, more credibly, says that appeals to Michael that Roussel be treated well because of his valour and usefulness were ignored. He was tortured "like afugitive slave" and imprisoned in chains; over a year later he was released to fight for Michael in ThraceC" I. Leaderless, the mercenaries aban­ doned the region, most of them joining Philaretus and his Armenians in the southeast<8l), So ended the mercenary revolt, with dire consequences for the Greeks in the whole of northern Anatolia. During the rest of 1076, the Turks conquered almost the whole vast region; late in the year they appeared in strength at Chrysopolis and Chalcedon''''. The main inland strongholds in the north - Amasea, Neocaesarea, Docea, Euchaita, Gangra, and Castamon - probably fell by early 1077, leaving the Byzantines clinging to the coastal cities. It is not likely that any of the conquered places held out to the bitter end; cut off from the outside and despairing of any relief, their only rational course was to surrender. The government had caused the debacle; it could not escape the conse­ quenees. Many refugees fled the Turkish advance, arriving in Constantinople by boat. By the winter of 1076-77, famine gripped the capital, corpses lay in the streets, and the dead were being buried in mass graves"". With breathtaking

(78) Bryennius, op. cit., p. 94. (79) Ibid .• p. 95. (80) Attalia[es. op. cit .. pp. 207, 269. Bryennius, op. cit., p. 95. (81) Vryonis. op. cit., p. 108. (82) Attaliates, op. cit., p. 200. (83) Ibid .• p. 211. S.P. O·Sullivart. 67 shortsightedness, the Ducas regime had grievously wounded the Empire. AtraJiates was in Constantinople during those years and his writings probably reflect the general mood: "the emperor preferred that the Turks should conquer the /and of the Greeks rather than that this man [Roussell, a Latin, should be welcomed in one place and halt the Turkish invasion""", and later, "Completely dominated by his own wrath, he, unwittingly deprived the empire of its strongest bulwark [Roussell, as subsequent events revealetl'''''.

Temporary Slowing of the Conquest, The Empire Paralysed by MiliIary Revolts - 1077-1081 By the middle of 1077, the war in Anatolia saw a temporary stabilisation along a wide frontier zone through which Turkish raids would frequently pene­ trate. For fOUl years, mid-1077 to mid-I081 , the front ran from the lower Sangarius River through Phrygia west of Dorylaeum and Philomelium to Iconium, southern Cappadocia and the Taurus. The linchpin of the Byzantine defence was eastern Phrygia, the native home of Botaniates, Melissenus, and Burtzes, the last leaders of Anatolia during the years of the conquest. All western and southern Anatolia remained in Byzantine hands, in addition to the Black Sea ports of Heraclea, Amastris, Sinope, and Amisus. Farther east, the local Greeks led by Theodore Gabras had taken advantage of the mountainous terrain and Georgian support to establish lasting control over Trebizond and its hinterland, including Colonea and Paipert, and even Theodosiopolis, which held out until 1080"". Meanwhile the Armenian leader Pbilaretus, with Frankish mercenary support, had extended his rule over a wide area from Melitene in the north to the Cilician coast in the south and was about to take Antioch. But Philarerus and Gabras were only nominally subordinate to Constantinople"". The Turks for their part had occupied the entire plateau except for its western and southern edges, and almost all of northern Anatolia. The Byzantines had lost half of the peninsula by default, but they still held the richest part of Anatolia and would strive to retain it. Indeed, once the mercenary revolt was over, the government in Constantinople took some active measures to defend its remaining territory in

(84) Ibid. p. 199. (85) Ibid. p. 206. (86) Comoena, op. cir.. vol . II, p.151. Treadgold, op. cir., p. 610. (87) Treadgold, op. cir., pp. 609·610. Vryonis, op. cir., pp. 109-110. 68 The Turlcish Conquest of Anatolia in the Eleventh Century

the east. Overall command in Anatolia was given to Nicephorus Botaniates, a veteran general of distinguished Anatolian ancestry. New Anatolian units, infantry and cavalry, were recruited, trained, and equipped by Nicephoritzes, Michael's able chief minister. There is evidence that from the mid-1070s the Byzantine defences were becoming better motivated and more professional(88). The main deficiency was the lack of Frankish heavy cavalry, hard to control but invaluable for their striking power. After Roussel's revolt, the government pru­ dently kept its mercenaries on the European side of the Bosphorus. From early on, the war in Anatolia had repercussions in western Europe. Soon after the Turkish invasion began in 1073, Michael sent an embassy to Pope Gregory vn, requesting military assistance. In response the pope wrote several exhortatory letters to various nobles and princes in 1074. One written in September to William, Count of Aquitaine is guardedly optimistic: "the report is that the Christians beyond the seas have, by God's help, driven back the fierce assault of the pagans [probably a reference to Roussel's rallying of Anatolian resistance in early 1074], and we are waiting for the counsel of divine provi­ dence as to our future course"" ". Three months later, a letter to Henry IV, King of Germany, states: "/ call to your attention that the Christians beyond the seas, a great part of whom are being destroyed by the heathen with unheard-oj slaughter and are daily being slain like so many sheep, have humbly sent to beg me to succour these our brethren in whatever way / can, that the religion of Christ may not utterly perish in our times - which God forbid""". Continuing, the pope states that he intends to organise an expedition of 50,000 men, but the following year open conflict broke out between Pope Gregory and Henry IV, and the plan was shelved, as it turned out, for twenty years. Yet these letters show that the importance of the war was clearly understood abroad. The suddenness of the collapse had aroused a strong reaction in western Europe, and the idea of a Latin counter-attack was already in the air. With the slowing of the Turkish advance, there was at least a glimmer of hope by 1077 that the worst was over and that a large part of Anatolia could be salvaged. A passage at the end ofPsellus' Chronographia which can be dated to

(88) Bryennius, op. cit. , pp. 94,119, describes the territorial soldiers ofHeraclea on the Black Sea coast and those of Choma in Phrygia as well-ltained and in good spirits. (89) DuncaJf, Frederick; "The Councils of Piacenza and Clennont". A History of the Crusades, 2 vols., eds. Setton, K. M. and M. W. Baldwin, Philadelphia 1955, vol. I, (90) Ibid. s.f. O 'Sullivan 69 that year reveals a certain optimism (the flattering portrayal of Michael vn is best ignored):

the main beam of the empire had broken, the roofhadfallen in with a crash, and the foundations had completely collapsed; but the calmness of his [Michael's] spirit was such, and such was his confident frame of mind, that he halted the slide in our affairs, and, if we have not yet reached harbour and are still out at sea buffeted by the waves, at least we have not yet been driven out On/O the deep""".

Such hopes were not justified. The Byzantine generals in Anatolia, chief of whom were Alexander, Cabasilas, and Botaniates, had already agreed to launch a revolution"" similar to that of 1057 which had put Isaac Comnenus in power. One of their number, Nicephorus Botaniates, was chosen as leader. In July 1077 he was proclaimed emperor at Choma, his base in eastern Pluygia")). Only two of the Anatolian generals, Nicephorus Melissenus and George Palaeologus, both courageous and capable soldiers, refused to join the revolt''''. The region of Bithynia, which guarded the eastern approach to Constantinople, also remained under government control for the time being. Botaniates had long been one of the most important men in Anatolia. Descended from the Phocas family, the greatest of the eastern magnate clans, he had been a soldier from his youth''''. In 1067, when a military emperor was sought to defend Anatolia from the Turks, he had been the obvious candidate""; Romanus Diogenes was chosen instead because of his younger years. But if age had been a stumbling block then, it was even more so ten years later. Now Botaniates was seventy-six and on the edge of senility, although this would not become apparent for some time''''. Meanwhile the revolt was enthusiastically welcomed, not only in Anatolia but also in the capital. Many supporters made the journey to Pluygia to pledge allegiance to Botaniates - a dangerous journey

(91) Psellus, op. cit., vol. II, p. 176. (92) Glyeas, op. cit., p. 615. (93) Attaliates, op. cit., p. 215. (94) Bryennius, op. cit., pp. 11 7- 118. (95) Attaliates, op. cit., pp. 215-236 passim. Manasses, Constantine; "Compendium Chronicon". Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantiuae. ed. Bekker, Bonn 1837 . p. 283. (96) Attaliates. op. cil. , p. 98. (97) Bryennius, op.cit., p. 126. Treadgold, op. cit., p. 607. 70 Tht Thrkish Conquest of ATUllolia in the EJeve11lh Century now because of Turkish raiders. Much of the senate and clergy, including the Patriarch Cosmas, sympathised with the rebel. Botaniates was regarded as a saviour-98), At the very end of his Chrono&raphia, Psellus includes a letter written by Michael to Botaniates, reminding the general of all the favours that had been shown to him and bitterly reproaching him for his disloyalty. The tone of the letter reveals Michael's effete and self-centred character'''. Wilfully clinging to power, he appealed to the Turks, who attacked Botaniates' forces along the fron­ tier1OO). The leaders of the Turks along the frontier at this time were two brothers, Sulayman and Mansur"", the sons of Qutlumush, who had been the cousin of Tughrul, the first Turkish sultan. On the latter's death in 1063, Qutlumush had tried to win the succession, but was defeated and killed by Tughrul's nephew, Alp Arslan, in 1064. Sulayman and Mansur made their way as fugitives to Anatolia in 1075 or 1076(102). By 1077 the brothers had made their base at Dorylaeum on the western edge of the plateau, far from the sultan's reach and close to Byzantine territory. It was an excellent strategic position, threatening all western Anatolia. By their ability and prestige, the brothers quickly gained the leadership of the Turks along the frontier, who were constantly being reinforced by warriors from the east, eager to seize the richest part of the peninsula and bring the con­ quest to a victorious conclusion. From this time we can detect the beginnings of a lasting political division among the Turkish invaders: those in the emptier and poorer north and east retained a nominal loyalty to the sultan along with much of their primitive nomadic way of life; while those who had gravitated to the west of the peninsula pledged their allegiance to Sulayman and Mansur, whose ambitions would soon lead to the creation of an independent and rival sultanate in Anatolia(IOl>, Several months went by before Botaniates left his base at Choma. During

(98) Allalial.s. op, cit., pp. 238-239. Glycas, op. cit., p. 616. (99) Psellus, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 182-184. (100) Analial.s, op. cit" p', 240. (101) Bryennius, op. cit., pp. 118,130. (102) Cahen, Claude, "La premiere .,eneuation turque en Asie Mineure", Turcobyzantina et Griens Christiana, London 1974, p. 35. "Qutlumush et ses fils avant (' Asie Mineure", ibid" p. 26. The first mention of the brothers is in Byzantine sources for 1078. (103) Encyclopaedia of Islam. New Edition. vol. IX; Leiden 1998. p. 860. S.P. O'Sullivan 71 this time he repelled the Turkish attacks and reduced all the fortresses held by his loyalist opponents, Melissenus and Palaeologus(lO<'. In October 1077 another revolt began at Dyrrhachium in Albania; Nicephorus Bryennius, commander of the western army and probably grandfather of the historian, was proclaimed emperor. But Botaniates was in no hurry to leave Phrygia until the military posi­ tion in Anatolia had been secured''''''. Late in the year he fmally marched north with a personal bodyguard of three hundred elite troops, all that could be spared - the danger of withdrawing large forces from the frontier was obvious. The suc­ cess of Botaniates' revolt depended on the tide of public acclaim that was raising him up as the man who could save Anatolia. He could not act like his rival Bryennius, who had just then advanced on the capital with almost the entire western army. In the event, the rebellion carried all before it. Botaniates ad vanced along the frontier zone towards Bithynia, repelling Turkish attacks and marching part of the way by night. At Cotyaeum, halfway, Turks in the emperor's pay joined him. Reaching Nicaea with only two hundred of his guard left, he found the large city garrison drawn up in battle order outside the city; a moment of trepidation was followed by relief as, with one voice, all the soldiers acclaimed him emperor"o". He remained in Nicaea during the winter of 1077-78, awaiting the outcome of Bryennius' revolt on the other side of the Straits and strengthening his own position. Nicomedia and the other Bithynian cities submitted to his Anatolian troops without resistance, leaving Botaniates in complete control of Byzantine Anatolia(107). At this time, Botaniates made a peace and alliance with SUlayman and Mansur, the fIrst of its kind since the death of Romanus. The Turkish leaders came to Nicaea, swore allegiance, brought most of the raiding to a halt, and con­ tributed a strong contingent to the Byzantine army. With rhetorical exaggeration, Attaliates describes this accord as the fulfIlment of the Biblical prophecy "the wolf shall lie down with the lamb and the leopard with the kid [Isaiah 11 :6)'''''''. It was certainly useful for Botaniates to pacify the enemy for the time being, while the addition of a Turkish contingent would improve his chances of victory in case, as he feared, he could not come to an agreement with Bryennius. Yet ·

(104) Attaliates, op. cit., p. 240. (105) Ibid. , p. 263. (106) Bryennius, op. cit.. pp. 119-120. (107) Attaliates, op. cir., p. 268. (108) Ibid., p. 267. \\\'l. 01 ~ltllfllt ~,t 4'4 i!{' Libraries '" 12 ~~fo.l.\ J The TUrkish Conquest of Anatolia in lhe Elevenlh Century ~-./ Botaniates had a finn basis of support, military and civil, in Anatolia; he was by no means beholden to the Turks and certainly did not hand over towns or terri­ tory to them in exchange for their support. Only later would the Turks be able to exact such a price. Now, however, they took advantage of the peace to camp in large numbers throughout the half deserted Bithynian countryside'''·'. Meanwhile, Bryennius' bid for the empire had partly misfired; his army had been repelled before the walls of Constantinople by Michael's best general, Alexius Comnenus, after it had nullified its popular support by brutally sacking the suburbs'"". The way was open for Botaniates to seize power peacefully, and in March 1078 he sent his army to Chrysopolis. Michael's reign was in its last days'"". A stream of well-wishers journeyed to Nicaea, unharmed by the Turks encamped along the way. Panicking, Michael tried to hand over power to his brother Constantine, who prudently refused the offer. Shortly afterwards, Botaniates and his entourage entered the capital triumphantly on ships of the imperial fleet, to be welcomed by Constantine, Alexius Comnenus, and John Ducas, now out of his monastery. Michael, unharmed, replaced his uncle in the monastic life. Nicephoritzes fled to Roussel, now commanding forces in Thrace, and tried to persuade him to join Bryennius; however, he was handed over to the new emperor, sent to an island in the Sea of Marmara, and brutally put to death, a scapegoat for the disasters of Michael'S reign""'. No more either is heard of the intrepid mercenary. To its credit, the revolution had succeeded almost without bloodshed, and Botaniates, in spite of his age, was a more capable emperor than Michael. Above all, he represented the Anatolians, whose hope now was that an imperial army might cross into Asia for the first time in four years and drive back the Turks. Yet Botaniates had nearly reached the end of his good fortune; once installed as emperor, he faced increasing frustration. He did his best to reach an accord with Bryennius, sending three embassies and offering him the second position of Caesar. But Bryennius was chagrined at the other's easy success, coming so soon after his own narrow failure to seize power. He refused to nego­ tiate, and war between the rival usurpers became inevitable""'. Defeating the contender would not be an easy matter. Bryennius held the

(109) Ibid.. pp. 269. 272. ( ll 0) Angold, op. cit., p. 101. (Ill) Attaliates, op. cit., p. 267. Bryennius, op. cit., pp. 124·125. (112) Aualiates, op. cit., p. 272. Bryennius,op. cit., pp. 127-128. (113 ) Ibid., pp. 284-285. Bryenniu" op. cit., pp. 131-133. S.P. O'Sullivan 73

European provinces with a strong army; besides, it was too risky to strip Anatolia of large numbers of troops. Botaniates had no choice but to call again on his Turkish allies; they responded promptly, sending two thousand men at once, with more on the way"". Command of the imperial army was given to Alexius Comnenus. In the summer of 1078, events moved quickly to a decisive battle at Calobrya in Thrace, in which Bryennius' army, composed of European Greeks, Franks, and Pechenegs, faced Alexius with the Varangian Guard, Anatolian Greeks, and Turks. Both armies numbered about 15,000. The battle was hard fought and Alexius' victory only secured by the timely arrival of the promised Turkish reinforcements""'. Bryennius was captured, sent to Constantinople and, too dangerous to spare, blinded"'''. Later that year his ally Basilacius was defeated by Alexius at Berrhoea in Macedonia'''''. It was very ominous that the Turks had entered Europe in strength for the first time, and as arbiters in a Byzantine civil war. Botaniates enjoyed little more than a year of unchallenged rule. By nature generous and trusting, he tried to secure his position by lavish gifts and clemency. as far as it was possible, towards his opponents. Thus, for example, the deposed Michael was appointed metropolitan of Ephesus, still one of the most prosperous cities of Anatolia""'. Generous donatives, including grants of public land in Bithynia, were made to the Turks""'. But although the Bithynian cities were sli11 firmly in Byzantine hands and the Turks quiet for the moment, the situation was worrying. 10 fact, Botaniates' rebellion, begun with high hopes and good intentions, had weakened the Empire. The precedent of military revolt had been established, and the Turks drawn into, and become familiar with, the Empire's internal conflicts. A successful expedition into Anatolia was the only remedy, but Botaniates was now too old to lead it himself. Moreover, his rise to power had had a detrimental effect on his moral character; leaving political affairs to sycophantic courtiers, he tended to relapse into indolence and extrava­ gance'I>'». Worst of all, his bigamous marriage to the empress Maria of Alania,

(1 14) 8ryennius, op. cit., p. 130. (lIS) Ibid., pp. 140- 141. A conflict of loyalties, to his father-in-law Alexius and to his grand- father Nicephorus Bryennius, is apparent in 8ryennius' account (116) Altaliates, op. cit .• p. 293. (117) Ibid., pp. 297-300. Btyennius, op. cit., pp. 149-156. (11S) Attaliates, op. cit., p. 303. Manasses. op. cit., p. 284. According to the latter, this pro­ motion was made against Michael's will. (119) Attaliates, op. cit., p. 319. (120) Glycas, op. cit., p. 61S. Manasses, op. cit. . p. 284. 74 The Turkish Conquest of Anatolia in the Eleventh Century

probably fifty years his junior. not long after her husband Michael had become a monk, was a scandal that badly tarnished the old emperor's reputation. The patriarch was most reluctant to agree to the marriage, until persuaded by, of all people, Michael himself'''''. The reasons behind this extraordinary affair can only be guessed - for her part, the empress probably saw in it a chance to pre­ serve the succession for Constantine, her young son by Michael. The Byzantine position in Anatolia rapidly worsened. It is unlikely that the peace lasted beyond 1078. The treasury could no longer afford to pay stipends to the Turkish federates, who were anyway tiring of their unaccustomed new role. About this time Sulayman emerged as their sole leader following the death of Mansur, probably after conflict between the brothers. The Turks resumed their attacks in force in 1079, with even greater ferocity after the eighteen-month lull. Now they devastated almost all the remaining Byzantine territory, especially the southeast and the Aegean coast, which had previously been less affected(I22). The Turks did not take territory, but the rich agricultural lands of western Anatolia suffered badly. Revenues from this region, still the richest part of the Empire, shrank suddenly and drastically, plunging the State into the most severe finan­ cial crisis it had yet faced" "). The gold coinage was debased to a mere eight carats, only one third of purity""). As recently as 1050, it had been a full twenty­ four carats. Botaniates, nearly eighty, failed to react with sufficient energy. In this, he gravely disappointed the Anatolians, who naturally expected that he, their own countryman, would use the Empire's resources to drive back the Turks. But the emperor had a new concern: Robert Quiscard, the formidable Norman leader who had conquered all the Byzantine lands in Italy between 1059 and 1071, was preparing to involve himself in the affairs of the stricken Empire. Robert had betrothed his infant daughter Helen to Michael VII's son Constantine in 1074. From 1078, he had at his court a man who claimed to be, and just possibly was, Michael Ducas, the deposed emperor"'''. Robert could certainly claim the right

(121) Bryenniu" op. cit., pp. 126-127. (122) Vryonis, op. cit., p. 113. In J079 the Turks sacked the coastal towns of Melanoudion and StrobiJus, and the monasteries of Mount Latmus. Vryonis also states that by this date the Turks had occupied most of coastal Ionia. This was not yet the case. (J23) Bryennius, op. cit., p. 129. (124) Tre.dgold, op. cit., p. 610. (125) Comnena, op. cit., vol. I. pp. 44-46. Lupi Protosparii Chronicon, Patrologia Latina, vol. CLV; ed. Mignc, Paris, 1854, col. 138. Treadgold, op. cir., p. 614. Anna Comnena's vehement 5.p. O'Sullivan 75 to intervene against the usurper Botaniates. The threat of a Nonnan invasion of Greece and the Balkans began to hang heavily over the court at Constantinople. Prudence urged keeping strong forces in the west; but the resulting neglect of the east would bring swift retribution. Nicephorus Metissenus was one of the few Anatotian generals who had resisted Botaniates' revolt in 1077; since then he had stayed at Cos in the Aegean, presumably in exile. Early in 1080 he returned to his native Anatotia and raised a revolt against the emperor. We know very little about this, the last of the Anatolian magnate revolts. It probably began on the coast and spread inland into Phrygia, Melissenus' native country""). It had widespread support among a population lacerated by the devastating raids of the previous year and, as in 1077, despairing of the emperor's ability or willingness to help. At any rate, the revolt seems to have gained most of Byzantine Anatolia within a few months, leaving only Bithynia under government control"m Like Botaniates in 1077, Metissenus made an agreement with the Turks of the frontier, now led by Sulayman alone. As a result, the latter probably under­ took to keep his warriors from raiding the southern regions which had gone over to Melissenus and to concentrate their attacks against Bithynia. The situation was similar to that in 1077, but the Turks were stronger now. With increasing reinforcements from the east and a unified command, they could hope to achieve what had been denied them two years before - the conquest of territory. By the spring of 1080, Botaniates could delay no longer. The situation in Anatolia was so perilous that any worries about Guiscard had to be put aside. A strong army was rapidly despatched to deliver Bithynia from the Thrkish attack. It advanced successfully to Nicaea, the most important city in the province and also the most exposed, for it lay inland less than twenty kilometres from the Sangarius River frontier. It was still early in the year; the Byzantines had gained a limited victory by driving the Turks from most of Bithynia, and for the moment they held the initiative. There could be no question of engaging in a fratricidal war with the rebels to the south so long as the Thrks were hanging dangerously on the flank. To march directly on Sulayman's capital of Dorylaeum and take it, beating the Turks in battle if possible, would be a resounding success that would

denials that the man was really Michael - she takes up several pages explaining how the impos­ Wre was arranged - raise a slight suspicion that Michael could in fact have fled to Italy, as the chronicle of Lupus states. (126) Bryennius, op. cit., p. 117. Comnena, op. cit .. vo1.lII, p. 200. (127) Bryellllius, op. cit., p. 158. 76 The Turkish Conquest of AM/olia in the Eleventh Century restore the emperor's reputation and undennine or end the rebellion. Anything less than a victory over the Thrks would not suffice; but for the last six years, a Byzantine army had not been sent into Anatolia even to defend the Empire's ter­ ritory and population, let alone to attack the enemy. An advance on Dorylaeum, which lay on the plateau 150 kilometres from Nicaea, would need careful prepa­ ration. With a Nonnan invasion that year looking unlikely, preparations went ahead for the expected offensive. A second army was gathered; it was largely com­ posed of the new Anatolian units, many of which had remained in the Balkans since the defeat of Bryennius in 1078. In the summer of 1080, this army, com­ manded by Constantine Ducas, Michael VII's brother, crossed into Asia with orders to join the forces waiting at Nicaea. A decisive battle was expected later in the year. The campaign was a grim fiasco. The reinforcements were in poor spirits, in spite of the emperor's exhortations and generous donatives. But worse, no sooner had the army disembarked at Chrysopolis than Constantine, true to his family's record of blind ambition, proclaimed another revolt against the ingen­ uous old emperor. This time Botaniates reacted with energy. The uprising was swiftly put down by soldiers of the imperial fleet and the entire army brought back over the Bosphorus in disgrace. Constantine certainly did not deserve any magnanimous treatment but received it nonetheless; he was sent to a monastery. There was no disguising the extent of the disaster. The hoped-for counterattack was over in ruins before it had even started('28). The next act in the drama was imminent. Melissenus seized the opportunity to advance from the south and appeared before Nicaea. He and Sulayman were cooperating closely, for the Thrks had at once resumed their attacks in Bithynia, capturing almost all the Byzantine positions in the countryside around Nicaea, so that the city was now completely cut off with no hope of relief. The demor­ alised defenders surrendered to Melissenus in October 1080. "Compared to all previous disasters and loss oj territory, this was the worst - the Jatal end, the final blow, the abandonment oj the east""", laments Altaliates. Although he does not mention the capture of Nicaea by name, he is almost certainly referring to it in this passage, which comes shortly after the consecutive mention of

(128) Attaliates, op. eiL, pp. 306-309. (129) Ibid., p. 310. October 1080 ("October of the third indiction") is mentioned as the month during which lightning struck the column in the forum of Constantinople. at about the same time as Constantine's revolt. S.P. O'Sullivan 77

Constantine's revolt, renewed Turkish and rebel attacks, and the fall of unnamed strongholds. On the same note of bitter despair, Attaliates' history comes to an end a little later'''''. In fact, the fall of Nicaea to his rival had not daunted Botaniates, who was showing some of his old spirit. A third expedition to Asia, including troops reha­ bilitated from the previous one, was probably being prepared when the bad news arrived; the emperor ordered it to go ahead anyway. He wished to appoint his best general, A1exius Comnenus, to lead the enterprise, with the mission of defeating the Turks in Bithynia and retaking Nicaea. Alexius refused the com­ mand. According to the historian Bryennius''''', he was unwilling to fight Melissenus, his brother-in-law; it is more likely that he was reluctant to lead what he saw as a forlorn hope. The command was given to the emperor's cham­ berlain, the eunuch John, who had little experience or authority - he was jeered by the soldiers on the parade ground before marching'''''. Nonetheless, the army reached the vicinity of Nicaea without opposition. John's officers advised against a siege of the well defended city so late in the year. The best course was an immediate advance on Dorylaeum, with the hope of forcing Sulayman to fight. The Turks, not Melissenus, were the real enemy, and matters had slid so far that a battle, perilous as it was, seemed the best option. But John insisted on trying to take Nicaea. The army advanced to the walls and appealed to the inhab­ itants to return to the emperor's allegiance. Parleying went on for some days; according to Bryennius, the Nicaeans prolonged the talks, knowing that their Turkish allies were approaching. As the Turks drew close, the Byzantines retreated, unwilling in the event to risk battle. They were repeatedly attacked but fought their way through to the coast. John was narrowly rescued from capture by George Palaeaologus, whose courage and ability saved the army. So ended the last of the three expeditions that Botaniates sent to Bithynia in 1080<"".

The Revolt of Alexius, the Norman War, and the Fall of Anatolia - 1081-1084 The year 1081 was to seal the fate of Anatolia. This could not have been foreseen at its start. At that time the alliance of Melissenus and Sulayman, which

(130) It was left unfinished as Botaniates' fall became imminent. It was incorporated into the chronicle of Scylitzes and was only belatedly recognised as a separate work (see the preface to the Bonn edition). (131) Bryenniu,. op. cit. , pp. 158-159. (132) Ibid .• p. 159. (133) Ibid., pp. 160-165. 78 The Turkish Conquest of Anal0lia in the Eleventh Century had been in operation for the whole of the previous year, had largely succeeded in its aim. Only the Asian coast of the Sea of Marmara, including the cities of Nicomedia, Cyzicus, and Abydos, remained in government hands. The Turks had not yet conquered any important cities for themselves; in the southern regions, where Melissenus had his base, they had taken no part in the revolt. Indeed, for. the time being, they had largely ceased their raids and withdrawn, obedient to the strategic designs of their leader. For it was in Bithynia to the north that Sulayman intended to reap the rewards of his involvement in the latest civil war. Taking to heart the lesson of his own rise to power in 1077-78, Botaniates had fully realised the importance of holding Bithynia, so that Melissenus had no prospect of advancing into this region without strong Turkish support. For this Sulayman exacted a real price. Although Nicaea itself had surrendered to Melissenus and was under his control, his allies, acting in his naroe, had extended their control over the surrounding area. The Turks were also spear­ heading the rebellion's advance into the rest of Bithynia, where they were now the preponderant force. In early February 1081 the city of Cyzicus was taken, probably by surprise, by a mainly Turkish force""'. Cyzicus had been one of the most important cen­ tres left to the government in Bithynia and its fall was a severe blow. Alexius Comnenus, general of the western army but out of favour at court since his refusal to fight Melissenus the previous year, was summoned by the old emperor. He reassured Botaniates that Cyzicus could be easily retaken (the force which had taken it was probably not substantial) and began to gather forces around the capital, apparently in preparation for an expedition(I3S). But Alexius was now himself planning to seize the throne. A few weeks later, he was proclaimed emperor by his troops in Thrace and prepared to advance to the walls of Constantinople. Almost simultaneously caroe news that Melissenus had advanced from Nicaea to the Bosphorus with an army which had l36 a strong Turkish contingenr ). The emperor now only wanted a safe exit from the desperately tangled crisis of which he was at the centre. Melissenus was intriguing to take over the imperial fleet, without which he could not cross the mile-wide Bosphorus, and simultaneously trying to come to an agreement with Alexius. He offered his rival a division of the spoils, in which both of them

(134) Comnena, op. cit., vol. I, p. 69. (135) Ibid., vol. I, pp. 71 -72. (136) Ibid., vol. I, p. 87. S.P. O'Sullivan 79 would rule as equal co-emperors, Alexius taking responsibility for the west and he, Metissenus, for Anatotia,m,. This offer reveals much about both Melissenus' motives and the actual situation on the ground. Clearly, a great deal was still at stake in Anatolia, where Metissenus was a powerful force in his own right. In spite of the Turkish alliance, Melissenus was aware that a decisive conflict with Sulayman was imminent; the Turks had to be driven from Bithynia and, if pos­ sible, their menacing base at Dorylaeum taken. There could be no question of warfare between the rivals, as had happened two years before when Botaniates had been reluctantly obliged to fight Bryennius. An agreement of some kind was necessary and negotiations went on even as each was trying to gain the upper hand by breaking into the capital. The race was won by Alexius. German mercenaries manning the walls admitted his undisciplined forces, who at once began to sack several quarters of the city. Shortly afterwards, the fleet, about to bring over Melissenus, was per­ suaded to join his rival. The emperor still had the firm loyalty of the Varangians and his Phrygian bodyguard. Drawn up in battle order around the imperial palace, they were ready to defeat and expel Alexius' scattered and undisciplined troops. But Botaniates had no wish for further bloodshed. He immediately abdi­ cated, retiring to a monastery. Alexius, twenty-four, was crowned emperor on Easter Day, April 2nd 1081""'. The knot was beginning to loosen; the manner of its untangling would prove to be of immense consequence to the Empire. The first step that Alexius took was to come to terms with his rival. Seeing that Alexius had won the race for power, Melissenus quickly accepted the second-ranking title of Caesar'''''. The civil war was over without further bloodshed. But the agreement between the two rivals at once revealed the external threat. Sulayman had supponed Melissenus in order to make further gains in those parts of Bithynia still loyal to Botaniates. Now that the latter was gone and Melissenus had become the Empire's deputy in Anatotia, Sulayman at once turned on him. For three years he had been steadily tightening his grip on much of Bithynia. The moment had arrived for Sulayman to crown his advance by the capture of Nicaea. The Turks, well-equipped for the purpose""" , began a full-scale siege of the city.

(137) Ibid., vol. I, p. 88. (138 ) Ibid., vol. I, p. 109. (139) Ibid., vol. I, p. 89. (140) Manasses, op. cit., p. 286, is the only source which makes a reference, vague though it is. to Turkish siege machinery used against cities during the conquest. Siege engines were surely 80 The Turkish Conquest of Anatolia in the Eleventh Cem"ry

Meanwhile, the long threatened invasion from the west had already begun. In the winter of 10S0-IOSI, Robert Guiscard's son Bohemond had landed at Avlona on the coast of Epirus and seized the surrounding region""'. Guiscard himself followed in Mayor June lOS I and was to begin the siege of Dyrrhachium, the key to Albania, in mid-July. The crucial dilemma which faced Alexius immediately upon his seizure of power was whether to meet the twin threats to the Empire at the same time, or one after the other. The former would mean leaving Melissenus with his Anatolians to relieve Nicaea, while he himself with all remaining forces marched west against the Normans. Such a division of the Empire's waning mil­ itary strength could have fatal consequences. The latter alternative required that all available forces be concentrated either against the Normans or the Turks, a strategy that would inevitably cripple one front while the issue was being decided on the other. This policy would in fact entail the certain loss for the time being of either Nicaea or Dyrrhachium. Any strategic choice that Alexius might have enjoyed at the start of his reign was removed by the rapid fall of Nicaea to Sulayman's forces in late April or early May. In any case, Alexius had probably already decided to concentrate as strong an army as possible against the Normans, who were certainly the greater threat to his personal position. After a short and limited campaign to drive the Turks from the Bosphorus and relieve Nicomedia, still in Byzantine hands, he came to an agreement with Sulayman in the summer of lOS I. The Dracon River, south of Nicomedia, was set as the new frontier in Bithynia''''', and Sulayman promised to send a large Turkish contingent to Europe""'. Alexius also ordered the withdrawal of most of the Byzantine forces in Anatolia, and with them the Caesar Melissenus, to join the expedition against Guiscard. He himself left Constantinople for Albania in August'''''. Sulayman's capture of Nicaea marked a decisive tum in the struggle for Anatolia. He immediately made the city his capital and proclaimed himself

available to Sulayman by this time. Only a few years later [he Turks, using captive expertise and labour, would launch large fleets onto the Aegean and the Sea of Marmara. (141) Comnena, op. cit., vol. I, p. 53. ( 142) Ibid., vol. I, p. 138. (43) Ibid., vol. I. p. 162. She only mentions that the Turks fled from the battlefield at DYTThachium. but this is enough to suppose that a Turkish contingent had been contributed by Sulayman. (144) Ibid., vol. I, p. 120. S.P. O'Sullivan 81

Sultan of Rum, thereby becoming the titular equal of his cousin and rival, the Sultan Malik Shah in Baghdad. Until then, the Turks in Anatolia were still organised as a loose tribal confederation owing a nominal allegiance to Baghdad. In the north and east, they remained so for over a century. But in the west, Sulayman had founded the fIrst Turkish state in the peninsula. For Alexius, the loss of Nicaea was a regrettable necessity. The Normans had won themselves a fearsome reputation in south Italy and Sicily, and Guiscard's expedition was large and well-equippedo,,,. There was little doubt that he intended to conquer Constantinople outright. The expedition even had a good claim to legitimacy, for it was supposedly undertaken in answer to the appeals of Michael vn and had gained the approval of the pope. He, Alexius, was still but another military usurper; to keep the throne he had seized, he needed the Turks, whose support had given him victory over Bryennius three years earlier. Nicaea, and most of Bithynia with it, therefore had to be sacrifIced. The rest of Byzantine Al)atolia was still holding; if Guiscard were beaten quickly, it could be reinforced and Bithynia possibly retaken. Such was the logic by which Alexius convinced Melissenus, the chief man in Anatolia, to accept, not only the loss of Nicaea, but also the decision to throw everything against the Normans. It was of course a hazardous gamble. for the entire Byzantine position in Anatolia now depended upon success against the Normans. Unfortunately. Attaliates and Bryennius both fall silent before the end of 1080; for the crucial events of April-July 1081. there is no record but Anna Comnena's Alexiad. She is profuse on the Norman invasion but reticent and vague on events in Anatolia. Of Nicaea, there is no word. An alternative view to the reconstruction given above would suppose that the Turks took not only Nicaea and most of Bithynia but almost all the rest of Anatolia during the course of Melissenus' rebellion in 1080 and early 1081. that is, before Alexius seized power. This view is based on a passage at the end of Bryennius' Commentaries:

Nicephorus Metissenus made an agreement with the Turkish leaders and attracted Turkish forces into his service. He went around the cities of Asia, wearing the red boots [a symbol of imperial office]. Everywhere the citizens pledged themselves and their cities to him as if he were the emperor. Bul he,

(145) Ibid., vol. I, p. 56. Up to 30,()(X) men. Latin sources give a lower figure: Orderic Viral YD. vol. m. p.170 gives 10.000; Peter !he Deacon UI 49. p. 738. 15.000; Malaterr. III 24. 1300 for the Nonnans alone. 82 Tiu Turkish Conquest of Anarolia in the Eleventh Century

perhaps unwillingly, handed over those cities to the Turks. In this way it happened that in a short time all the cities ofAsia, Phrygia, and Galatiafell into the hands of the Turks. Moreoever, with a great army he occupied Nicaea in Bithynia, from where he threatened the Empire '''6).

Yet this passage has little credibility: it is vague (none of the important cities which supposedly fell is named); inaccurate (Galatia was too far east to have remained in Byzantine hands at this date - Sulayman's base at Dorylaeum lay directly west of Galatia); and inherently implausible (Melissenus, an Anatolian himself and a courageous and capable soldier, would hardly have betrayed Anatolia to the Thrks in such a way; besides, his position must have been stronger than the passage suggests, for in March 1081 he was able to offer Alexius a division of the Empire). Above all, it cannot be reconciled with the fol­ lowing passage in the Alexiad, which refers to Alexius' withdrawal of forces from Anatolia in spring 1081:

He [Alexius) thought it necessary to recall as quickly as possible all the toparchs ofAnatolia who were in command offortresses and cities, and who were valiantly resisting the Turks. Consequently he sent letters as soon as possible to each of them, to Dabatenus, who was then topoteretes of Pontic Heraclea and Paphlagonia, to Burtzes, toparch of Cappadocia and Choma, and to other leaders. He informed them first ofall that had happened to him [ ... ). Then he ordered them to take necessary precautions to assure the secu­ rity of their provinces, leaving enough soldiers to this effect. With the rest of their forces, they should come to Constantinople, bringing with them all the strong recruits they could find ' ''~.

From the rest of his work, we know that Bryennius wished to present Alexius' reign as favourably as possible. At the time of writing, Melissenus was certainly dead, and the writer may have seen here an opportunity to cast the blame on him for what happened in the east after 1081. The battle which sealed the fate of Anatolia was, ironically, fought far away at Dyrrhachium in Albania. Here, in October 1081, Alexius brought his army to battle against the Normans. The Byzantine army was the largest since Manzikert

(146) Bryennius, op. cit., p. 158. (147) Comn~na, op. cit., vol. I. p. 131. S.P. O'Sullivan 83

ten years earlier"8) and included Greek tagmata and troops from the European themes, the Varangian Guard, Frankish and Pecheneg mercenaries, and the Turkish contingent" "'. Yet although Melissenus himself was present, the Anatolian forces which Alexius had ordered to be withdrawn were not; probably his command was substantially ignored. In any event, the battle was,a disaster. Alexius' army, which had been labo­ riously assembled throughout the summer, was destroyed, leaving six thousand dead"'" on the field. Losses among the Empire's best soldiers, particularly the Varangians, were very heavy; the Thrkish contingent, for its part, deserted. The Normans swiftly overran much of northern Greece. "Weakness and misery together crushed the Roman Empire '""", relates Anna Comnena of the time after Dyrrbachium. With great luck and a supreme effort, Alexius was able to prevent the Norman conquest of the Empire. The King of Germany, Henry IV, was induced by a vast payment to invade Guiscard's lands in southern Italy; wide trading con­ cessions were granted to Venice to gain the support of her fleet in the Adriatic;the Turks were approached once again and contributed a force of seven thousand; all available forces were scraped together; and Church treasure, hith­ erto immune, was confiscated and melted down(Ul). Yet the Normans were only repelled with the greatest difficulty. Even after Guiscard was forced to return to Italy to deal with Henry IV and later to crush a domestic revolt, his son Bohemond remained in Greece with a large army; he inflicted three more defeats on Alexius in \OS2, before he was checked in late \oS3 and forced to retreat. The following year, Guiscard himself, relentless and unswerving, launched a new invasion. It was just beginning to gain momentum when the Norman leader sud­ denly died of fever in July 10S5""'. For the time being, the threat was lifted. Four years had passed since the events of spring 10SI - Alex ius' seizure of power and agreement with Melissenus; Sulayman's capture of Nicaea and estab­ lishment of the Sultanate of Riim; the truce between Alexius and Sulayman and the promise of Turkish help against the Normans; and Alexius' order to with­ draw Byzantine forces from Anatolia. During those years, our only source, Anna

(148) Lupus Protosparii Chronicon, op. cir., col. 139. The chronicler gives the exaggerated estimate of 70,000. (149) Comnena. op. cit., vol. I, p. 151. (150) Lupus Protosparii Chronicon, op. cir., col. 139. (l51) Comnena, op. cit. , volll, p. 9. (152) Treadgold. op. cit., p. 615. (153) Angold, op. cit. , p. 109. Comnena, op. cit., vol. II, p. 56. 84 The TUrkish Conquest of Anatolia in the Eleventh Century

Comnena's Alexiad, is completely mute on events in the east. Books IV,V, and VI of her history, which deal with this period, mention only the Battle of Dyrrhachium (covering the whole of Book IV) and subsequent events in the Norman war, along with domestic events like the seizure of Church property and the persecution of heretics (Books V and the start of Book VI). In the middle of Book VI, Anna Comnena finally turns her attention to Anatolia, but the events are clearly dated after Guiscard' s death in 1085. It is strange that Anna Comnena should have passed by four years without a single mention of Anatolia, especially since the rest of the Alexiad, Books VI to XIV, is mostly devoted to it. There are only two possible reasons for this striking lacuna. The first is that nothing of importance to her took place in Anatolia between 1081 and 1085, because almost all of it had been conquered by the Turks before Alexius seized power in April 1081. This view is suggested by the passage in Bryennius quoted above. Yet we have seen that this passage, as it stands, is implausible. The other possible reason for the gap in the Alexiad is that the final conquest took place precisely during those years, and that Anna Comnena deliberately ignored it in an attempt to safeguard her father's reputa­ tion for posterity. Only the latter alternative fits the evidence. From the passage in Book ill of the Alexiad quoted above, (page 42) and from the fact that Melissenus offered to divide the Empire, we can be certain that in spring 1081 and afterwards the Byzantines still held fortresses and cities over a large part of Anatolia. In partic­ ular the passage mentions Burtzes as toparch (denoting a military commander of a territory of varying size) in Cappadocia and Choma. The latter place lies deep inland, in the upper Maeander region of eastern Phrygia. As for Cappadocia, most of it, including the capital Caesarea, had fallen to the Turks as early as 1073-1074; however, it is likely that the Byzantines still held the southernmost parts of the province, around Tyana and Heraclea, perhaps with assistance from the Armenians of nearby Cilicia. Cappadocia and Choma are about 400 kilome­ tres apart, yet it is quite plausible that Burtzes (closely related to Melissenus and one of the most important men in Anatolia at this time"''') was responsible for the entire front from southern Cappadocia to eastern Phrygia; it follows that the whole of southern and western Anatolia was still in Byzantine hands in spring 1081 , when Nicaea fell to the Turks and Alexius' order was despatched"'''.

(154) Bryennius, op. cit. , p. 117. Comnena, op. cit. , vol. Ill, p. 200. (J 55) This deduction would be much more reasonable than to suppose from the passage that Burtzes commanded only scattered garrisons in Cappadocia and Phrygia. isolated by the Turks S.P. O'Sullivan 85

Turning now to Book VI of the Alexiad, we learn that Sulayman left Nicaea for the east in late 1084 to attack the Armenian leader Philaretus, duke of Antioch and nominally loyal to the Empire. Sulayman quickly conquered the Cilician coastal plain; early in 1085 he took Antioch by surprise. But in July 1086 he was defeated and killed near Aleppo by Tutush, brother of the sultan Malik Shah"'''. It seems clear that the missing years of Anna's narrative, late 1081 to mid- 1084, were those during which Sulayman conquered almost all the remainder of Byzantine Anatolia, so that by the summer of 1084 he felt strong enough to march east. We know absolutely nothing about how this happened. Yet this final phase in the Anatolian war was the most important, considering the resources and population of the remaining territory. We have seen that the Byzantine com­ manders probably di sobeyed Alexius' order to evacuate most of their forces to Europe, for those forces were not present at the Battle of Dyrrhachium, where they would have been most needed. The Anatolians must have resisted the Turkisb advance to their utmost for over three years. During this time it is cer­ tain that no help carne to Anatolia from Alexius, who was preoccupied with the Norman war; besides, the emperor was beholden to Sulayman, who had sent him substantial Turkish help in 108 I and 1082. In fact after the Battle of Dyrrhachium, Alexius had practically abandoned Anatolia and was now devoting al\ his energy to protecting Byzantium's European territory. The Caesar Melissenus was personally compensated - according to Anna, as early as April 1081 '''''- by the granting of Thessalonica, the Empire's second city, as a kind of fief.

both from each other and from the coast. The fact that Alexius ordered Burtzes to see to the defence of the region and then to come to his aid in Europe strongly indicates that the Empire still controlled most of the south and west of Anatolia with substantial forces, probably all raised locally. (156) Angold, op. cit., p. 112. Treadgold. op. cit., p. 616. Edessa and Melitene also feU to subordinates of Malik Shah in 1085 and 1086. During those two years, Philaretus' state, which had covered an impressive extent of tenitory. was suddenly reduced to the region around Gennanicea and the mountains of the Cilician Taurus. (157) Comnena, op. cit.. vol. I. p. 89. She state.'ii that Melissenus asked for Thessalonica , along with the title of Caesar, after his proposal to divide the Empire was rejected by Alexius. Yet why would he have asked for a city in the Balkans when he was still in control of Byzantine ter­ ritory in Anatolia? Surely he saw himself as leader of the Anatolian defence against the Turks, as is suggested by the plan to divide the Empire. It is more probable that Alexius gave Thessalonica to Melissenus as compensation for the loss of Anatolia during the years after 1081. In that case, Anna Comnena has, perhaps intentionally. made a chronological error. 86 The TUrkish Conquest of Ana/olia in Ihe Eleventh Century

By 1085 the last Byzantine provinces in Anatolia - southern Mysia, Phrygia, Lydia, Ionia, Caria, Lycia, southern Lycaonia, and southern Cappadocia - still home to millions of people and containing more than a dozen well-known cities, had been conquered by the Thrks. Their leader Sulayman had risen in less than ten years from a mere fugitive to a frontier chieftain, and finally to a terri­ torial despot who rivalled the Thrkish sultan in Baghdad and threatened to make himself ruler of the Byzantine Empire, for such was the implication of his title, Sultan of ROm. The inhabitants of the newly conquered lands suffered flight, pillage, slavery, and slaughter on a vast scale, if we can trust the witness of Anna Comoena. In the following passage, which comes almost at the end of the Alexiad, she describes the experience of the conquest in a general way:

[" .J until the reign of my father, the power of the barbarians was not con­ tained, but their swords and spears were sharpened against the Christians, and it was a time offighting, war, and massacre. The cities were destroyed, the provinces pillaged, and all the Roman territories stained with Christian blood. Some perished miserably under arrows and spears, others were tom from their homes and led away captive to the cities of Persia. All lived in terror and, in order to find refuge from the menacing danger, they rail to hide in the caves and forests, the hills and mountains. No one then was shel­

tered/rom tears and groaning. (JS8)

More particularly, she describes the "pillage and complete devastation of the coastal towns and regions''''''' which Alexius saw when he reconquered westem Anatolia fourteen years later. The Thrldsh emirs of the Aegean coast, subordinates of Sulayman, "treated the Christialls like slaves and pillaged every­ where'''·'''. As late as 1108, ten years after the reconquest, the coastal region of Adsarnyttium was virtually deserted, for "when Tzachas [Chaka, Sulayman's emir in Smyrna) was ravaging the region of Smyrna, he completely devastated and destroyed it too" , so that Alexius' governor, Eumathius, "recalled those of its original inhabitants who had been able to save themselves and brought in numbers of colonists from other areas''''' ''. Finally, a gruesome detail from the

( 158) Ibid., vol. III, at end. (159) Ibid" vol. III. p. 23. (160) Ibid" vol. III, p. 23. (161) Ibid., vol. III, p. 143. S.P. O'Sullivan 87 same section gives some inkling of the nature of the war in Anatolia: after attacking and defeating the Turks at Lampe in Phrygia, Eumathius' men "treated the Turks so cruelly that they even threw their newborn babies into pots of boiling water" "'''.

Aftermath and Conclusion The Alexiad starts to become very informative on Anatolia from 1085. But most of what Anna Comnena relates until the arrival of the Crusading army in 1097 is not of great importance. For the Turkish conquest was practically com­ plete by 1085. By then only a few coastal regions were left to the Empire: Attalia on the south coast, distant Trebizond in the northeast, the northern ports of Sinope, Arnisus, Amastris, and Heraclea, and most of the Asian coastline of the Sea of Marmara, including Nicomedia, Cyzicus (retaken at some point before 1085), and Abydos, which guarded the Dardanelles. Until the First Crusade, there was much fighting but hardly any territorial change: the Byzantines lost and retook Sinope, Cyzicus, Nicomedia and other less important places'''''. More important was the Turkish invasion of the Aegean islands led by Chaka, emir of Smyrna, who had gained much knowledge of the Empire after his capture by the Byzantines many years before (he had been promoted by Botaniates, ingenuous as ever). Beginning in 1088, Chaka launched his fleet, newly-built by a Greek Smyrniote, into the conquest of the main islands of the eastern Aegean - Chios, Lesbos, Sarnos, and Rhodes. He and Sulayman made an alliance with the Pechenegs in the Balkans, aiming to take Constantinople by land and sea(l64). This lethal combination brought the Empire to the edge of destruction. An embassy was despatched by Alexius to Robert, Count of Flanders, with an urgent request for military aid which had been promised by Robert in 1087. The embassy bore a farnous letter from the emperor which survives, although, it is claimed, partly falsified; however, the following section is probably original:

Greece [the word, as used here, includes Anatolial with its farther regions of Greater and Lesser Cappadocill. Greater Phrygia. Bithynia. Lesser Phrygia (that is. Troas). Pontus. Galatia. Libya [probably Lydial.

(162) Ibid .• vol. Ill. p. 143. (163) Ibid.• vol. n. pp. 63-81 passim. (164) Ibid. • vol. n. pp. 110-116. 156-162. 164--166. 88 TM Turki:rh Conqutst ofAnatolia in the Eleventh Century

Pamphylia, [sauria, Lycia, and the main islands of Chios and Mitylene [Lesbos], and many other regions and islands [ .. . ] as far as Thrace, have been conquered by them, and almost nothing now remains except Constantinople, which they are threatening to take from us very soon, unless God and the Latin Christians come quickly to our aid. For they have even invaded the Propontis [the Sea of Marmara], also called Abydos, with two hundred ships, which they forced Greek prisoners of theirs to build and row. And as we have said, they are threatening to take Constantinople quickly, by land and by the Propontis'M,.

The count of Flanders kept his promise, sending five hundred heavy cavalry, but the threat hung over the Empire for two years longer until Alexius, by luck and skill, managed to destroy the Pechenegs completely at the Battle of Lebunion in April 1091 '''''. This particular crisis was past, but pressure from the Turks hardly relented. By now, in any case, the Turkish conquest of Anatolia was afait accompli. In 1095 Alexius oversaw the building of a fortified trench connecting the Gulf of Nicomedia with Lake Sophon and the Sangarius River. At great expense, "the emperor was trying 10 cut short the barbarian raids and invasions, and above all to protect Nicomedia ". He gave the workers generous donatives "to make sure that the walls would be very solid and impregnable'''" ''. This construction of defences is the last event recorded before the unexpected arrival of the Crusade in 1097; and it shows that Alexius was preparing, not for any reconquest, but for a Turkish assault on Nicomedia. The Turks were not permitted to achieve their conquest of Anatolia so quickly. The coming of the First Crusade early in 1097 suddenly reversed the course of events. For the Crusaders proceeded immediately to tasks which had come to seem daunting to the Byzantines. The Latin army, accompanied by a Byzantine force, advanced on and laid siege to Nicaea. After a strong relieving force was beaten off, the Turkish garrison surrendered the city to the Byzantines. The siege had lasted seven weeks. Meanwhile, the sultan Kilij Arslan, Sulayman's son, was gathering the whole Turkish strength in the peninsula to put a stop to this new challenge. The decisive battle was fought on 30 June 1097 at Dorylaeum, the old Turkish capital. Kilij Arslan's army was crushed in a

(165) "Imperatoris Constantinopolitani Epistola", PatrQ!oaia Latina, vol. CXV; ed. Migne. Paris t854, cols. 465470. (166) Ibid., vol. II, pp. 139-144. (167) Ibid., vol. II, pp. 205-206. S.P. O'Sullivan 89 defeat far worse in losses than the Byzantines had suffered at Manzikert. The Crusaders drove through Anatolia virtually unopposed and passed on into Syria, leaving the Thrks temporarily shattered. Alexius seized the opportunity without delay. With a wholly new spirit of confidence, the Byzantines advanced south from their bases on the Sea of Marmara in early 1098. That year was for them an annus mirabilis. The regions of western Anatolia which had been lost in 1081-85 were reconquered by June 1098 after only a few months of cam­ paigning against feeble resistance, accompanied by widespread massacre. Ten thousand Thrks are said to have perished after the recapture of Smyrna"'''. Yet the Thrks began to recover once the Crusaders were well out of the way. They had already been in Anatolia for a full generation and their numbers were growing fast. Already, "Turkey" was the name given by the Crusaders to the land through which they passed'''''. The Byzantine reconquest drove many Thrks back onto the plateau, where their resistance quickly stiffened. In June \098 Alexius' forces reached as far east as Philomelium and then turned back, taking with them thousands of Greek inhabitants of the surrounding regions"w,. Within a few years the Thrks had begun to raid the reconquered lands in force. The Byzantines, familiar now with the enemy and their methods of warfare, launched counter­ attacks and sought to push the frontier forward along the northern and southern coasts. The scene was set for a partition of Anatolia and a ceaseless, bitter frontier war, in which Byzantium at first more than held its own. But gradually the bal­ ance began to tip in favour of the Turks. From about 1260 they began to advance again, slowly but inexorably. By 13 \0 they had driven the Byzantines back to Bithynia. By 1340 this province too had fallen, and in 1354 the Thrks crossed the Straits into Europe. By that date the Crusades in the Holy Land had long since ended in defeat. In retrospect, the great victory at Dorylaeum had not stopped, but only delayed the Turkish conquest of Anatolia. Yet the delay was long - long enough to have decisive consequences for the future of the Balkans and eastern Europe. Returning to consider the initial Thrkish conquest up to \085, the inescapable conclusion is that Greek Anatolia was the victim of an intellectual

(168) Ibid .. vol. III. p. 25. This high figure , along with other references to large numbers of Turks massacred or expelled. is an indication that Turkish colonisation, even along the Aegean coast, was proceeding very rapidly. (169) Angold, op. cit., p. 97. (170) Comnena, op. cit., vol. UI, p. 24. 90 The Turkish Conquest of Anatofia in the Eleventh Century

and moral failure which had been long in the making. For the victory against the Arabs had reinforced the wishful hope that a modus vivendi had become possible between the Empire and its Muslim neighbours"'''. The eastward advance, which had been so much promoted by the Anatolian military aristocracy, was brought to an end by Basil II and stable relations established with border vassal states and with Fatimid Egypt. Even the destruction of churches throughout Fatimid terri­ tory, including the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem in 1009, provoked no reaction from the Empire. Basil's military activities in the east were limited to wars against Georgia and the Armenian principalities, which were no threat to the Empire. Even though founded on a grave misconception, this defensive stance in Asia might have been justified on grounds of caution. No such excuse could be made for Byzantium's aggressive policy in the west. Basil launched a war of conquest against the Bulgarians, an affiliated nation with whom agree­ ment should have been desirable and possible, principally with the purpose of advancing to the Danube and rounding out the frontier of the Empire in the west. The war lasted for decades and was waged with great cruelty against bitter resis­ tance. The Bulgarians were crushed but never accepted their subjugation. The Danube frontier was reached, yet on the other side of the river were fierce nomad tribes whom the Empire had previously employed as a useful counterweight against Bulgaria but who now became her enemies in turn. Basil's western policy was driven by the ideal of Constantinople as the New Rome, radiating her civilisation to the outer barbarians of east and west""'. This ideal, so far removed from the reality of Byzantium's strategic position as Christendom's eastern bulwark, never ceased to entrance, even after the fall of Anatolia. It is perfectly expressed in this passage from the Alexiad: "Pushing back [ ... J the barbarians who pressed on it from each side and turning around Byzantium like a hub, the emperor Ale.xius enlarged the circle of the Empire"" '''. The consequence of this mistaken world view was that Anatolia ceased to be regarded as vitally important and was progressively sacrificed to the imme­ diate interests of Constantinople. Only Romanus and Nicephorus Botaniates, Anatolians themselves, seriously attempted to stop the Turks; each reigned for only a few years and was destroyed from within by palace coup or military

(171) Ducellier, Alain; "La chretiente orthodox.e face a ]'jsJam ~ l'epoque des croisades", Ttineraire de Cultures Croisees; Balamand 1997; pp. 61-63. (172) Ducellier, op. cit., pp. 52-53. (173) Comnena, op. cit.. vol. 1. S.P. O'Sullivan 91

revolt. The Ducas emperors, Constantine X and Michael VII, worried little about the Turkish threat. Neither led an army in the east, and Constantine greatly reduced Byzantine forces there. Michael was blindly preoccupied with the chal­ lenges to his power which arose in Anatolia - from the previous emperor Romanus and from the mercenary leader Roussel, both of whom had widespread support. The Turkish advance into the peninsula hardly concerned him; indeed he facilitated it by his appeal to the Turks to attack Roussel. Yet Alexius Comnenus, though far more capable and vigorous than the Ducas emperors, must bear the greatest share of responsibility. For he took the decision to defeat the Norman threat at whatever cost, practically giving up Nicaea in 1081 and most of the remaining Anatolian lands in the following years. This fact has been largely concealed because of the obfuscations of Byzantine historians, chief among them his own daughter. Of course, it may be argued that the Normans Roussel and Guiscard each posed a challenge which left the emperors, first Michael and then Alexius, no choice but to defend themselves as best as they could, even if that meant appealing to the Turks and abandoning Anatolia. Such a reply ignores the real issues that were at stake. The Turkish conquest would lead inevitably and rapidly to the destruction of Hellenism and the Church in Anatolia. It would also prepare the way for the subsequent invasion of Europe. Against this, the per­ sonal and dynastic interests of the Constantinopolitan regimes were of small consequence. As most Anatolians realised, the military and political ability of the Latins was needed to stem the collapse in the East. To that end, Roussel's project of a separate state, or even Guiscard's ambition to conquer the Empire itself, were preferable to the Greeks in Anatolia than the actual outcome. The outlook of Constantinople, a curious mixture of worldly calculation and ethereal abstraction, prevailed over the welfare of the Empire and led to the fall of Anatolia. The inadequacy of the records and the passage of centuries have made it difficult for us to regard this event with much understanding and sym­ pathy. Nonetheless, who could fail to observe in it the pattern of hubris and nemesis which, strangely, makes it a historical counterpart to the classical Greek tragedy? It is fitting to leave the last words, bitter as they are, to Michael Aualiates, historian and judge at Constantinople, a native of Anatolia and a wit­ ness to its fall:

Lest anyone should blame me for the way I have described what happened, I did not lie about the sheer disgrace of it; I wrote with the intention of casting reproach, so that perhaps shame and the fear of God might come 92 Th~ Turkish Conquesr of Anato{jo in the Elevenlh Century

upon the emperor, his ministers and the people themselves. Maybe then, with chastened spirits, they might regain the divine mercy and favour that was theirs before and so restore the dreadful situation. For the pangs of death had gripped us - throughout the east and in the west too, the most wicked barbarian peoples were oppressing us and spreading everywhere because of our stupidity, our negligence, or, to give it its true name, our mental insanity. For we raged and fought violently against ourselves and our allies, even despising death; but in the war against the enemy, we were cowardly and weak, appearing like those who would run away even before the fighting begins''''.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"Anonymous Book on Tactics", Three Byzantine Military Treatises; tr. Dennis, George; Washington, 1995. Attaliates, Michael; "Historia", Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzaotinae; ed. Bekker; Bonn, 1853. Bryennius, Nicephorus; "Conunentarii", Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae; ed . Meineke; Bonn, 1836. Comnena, Anna; Alexiaa, 4 vols.; te. Leib, Bernard; Paris, 1937. Glycas, Michael; "Annates", Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae; ed. Bekker; Bonn, 1836. "Imperatoris ConstantinopoJitani Epistola", Patro)Qgia Latina, vol. eLY; ed. Mjgne; Paris, 1854. "Lupi Protosparii Chronicon", Pateologia Latina, vol. CLY, ed. Migne, Paris 1854. Manasses. Constantine; "Compeodiurp. Chronicoo". Comus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae; ed. Bekker; Bonn, 1837. Psellus, Michael; Chronographia, 2 vols. ; te. Renauld, Emile; Paris, 1928.

Angold, Michael; The Byzantine EmDire 1025-1204; London, 1984. Caben, Claude; TurcQbyzantina et Oriens Christiana; London, 1974. Duncalf, Frederick; "The Crusades of Piacenza and Clermont", A History of the Crusades, 2 vols.; eds. Setton, K.M. and M.W. Baldwin; Philadelphia, 1955. Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, Leiden 1954 - . Treadgold, Warren; A Histol)' oflhe Byzanl;n. State and Society; Stanford, 1997. Vryonis, Speros Jr.: The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamisation From the Eleventh ThrQugh the Fifteenth Century; Berkeley, 1971 . Whitlow, Mark; The Makin~ of Orthodox Byzantium; London, 1996.

(174) AUaliates, op. cit. , p. 197. Castamon • Gangra ~ Clau;opoli s • Neocarsarca Pontus Paipert cjO R. Sangarius Aneyra o/Adram.Yttiul}1 • Do•ry lacum

•Caesarca Melitene Smyrna • ' cappa • = Ephesus • • • Tyana O~. Miletus -. 'LycaOnia • Heraclea .- . R. Tigris Cilicia c:> ,,~ • • }Eciessa o 0 0 0..'0 Euphrates ~ Rhodes (7 Laodicea