DND photo ZK-1926-2

An Honest John nuclear-armed surface-to-surface missile on its wheeled transporter in Germany. Do We Want “Buckets of Instant Sunshine”? – and Nuclear Weapons 1945-1984 by Matthew Trudgen

Introduction Throughout this period, Canada faced difficult choices. It was problematic, not only because of the resources that he idea that Canada was once armed with nuclear were dedicated to the program, but because many Canadian weapons is a fact that would be a surprise to politicians, officials, and military officers had strong posi- many , who think of their country as a tions with respect to whether Canada should have nuclear nation best known for its tradition of peacekeep- weapons. As a result, these weapons became key elements in ing, and for its work in the . the debates over what kind of foreign policy the governments NuclearT weapons are something that Canadians associate with of the period wanted for the nation. For example, should superpowers like the , or dictators such as Kim Canada have strong ties with its alliance partners, or should it Jong-il of North Korea. Nevertheless, from 1945 to 1984, try to have a more independent foreign policy? Moreover, Canada faced the issue of whether it should have nuclear should Canada attempt to strengthen its military, or work to weapons. In fact, in 1963, Canada decided to acquire these further the cause of nuclear disarmament? Faced with these weapons to fulfil commitments that it had made to its allies, problematic issues, each of these governments pursued poli- including the United States. However, in the late 1960s, the government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau decided that it was no longer in Canada’s best interests to be a nuclear-armed Matthew Trudgen is a PhD student in history at Queen’s University in nation. As a result, in July 1984, the last nuclear warheads Kingston, . His thesis examines the interplay of different con- ceptions of the Canadian national interest, and the Canadian-American available for use by the Canadian military were returned to relationship in the development of the North American air defence sys- the United States. tem from 1949 to 1956.

46 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009 cies that they thought were in the best of expand again in the future if the need arose. interests of the nation. Thus, Canada’s expe- “In 1945, Canada was Also, Dr. O.M. Solandt, who was appointed rience with nuclear weapons offers an excel- in a unique position the Director General of Defence Research in lent opportunity to learn lessons about the with respect to nuclear 1946, argued that Canada needed to focus development of Canadian defence policy weapons.” upon a few selective military projects, and during the . should leave the delivery of atomic weapons to the United States.5 This article will argue that Canada’s policy with respect to nuclear weapons was very inconsistent, and it was largely Finally, some Canadian leaders were troubled by the influenced by personalities and perceptions of what kind of destructive power of the atomic bomb. Prime Minister foreign and defence policy Canada should have. It will also Mackenzie King noted that the bomb was like a ‘Frankenstein demonstrate that Canada’s experience with nuclear weapons monster’ that could wreak havoc upon the world.6 Lester illustrates that it was only when Canadian politicians and offi- Pearson, then Canadian Ambassador to the United States, was cials asserted themselves in the policy process that difficult equally disturbed by the threat of a war with atomic weapons, MILITARY HISTORY decisions were taken. and he became interested in international controls as a way to prevent a potential . These perceptions did play a Canada’s First Encounter role in Canada not constructing an atomic bomb during this with Atomic Weapons: 1945 period; nevertheless, it should be noted that at no time was there ever any serious interest in stopping Canada’s support of n 1945, Canada was in a unique position with respect to the US nuclear weapons program.7 Moreover, most of Canada’s Inuclear weapons. Because of its role in the Manhattan work on arms control in the late 1940s and the 1950s was Project and a robust economy, Canada had the potential to done as part of an effort to support the Western Alliance and develop its own atomic bomb. However, it chose not to do so. the North Treaty Organization (NATO) against the The decision came without any real debate within the bureau- . cracy and the Cabinet, but emerged in 1945, as the political scientist Jon McLin noted, as “…not so much by deliberate Reconsideration: 1953 – 1959 choice as by unconscious assumption.”1 Nevertheless, there were several reasons why Canada did not develop an atomic herefore, for the time being, Canada had decided that it bomb at this time. Twas not in its best interest to be a nuclear power. Instead, for variety of reasons, the Canadian government decided to First, Canada had no overriding reason to develop atomic rely upon the protection of the American nuclear deterrent. weapons. Unlike Great Britain, Canada had no desire to be a Nonetheless, beginning in the mid-1950s, the Canadian gov- great power. Therefore, while the decision for Britain to ernment began to rethink its position. Ironically again, there develop an independent nuclear deterrent in the late 1940s was was no real debate over whether Canada should acquire nuclear natural, it was equally true that Canada, a burgeoning middle weapons. There were also no attempts to formulate a White power, should not wish to develop these weapons. Moreover, Paper on the subject.8 In fact, political scientist Andrew Richter the Canadian government realized that it was under the protec- noted that the government did not even ask basic questions, tive umbrella provided by the American monopoly with respect such as, “…how Canada’s security interests would be affected to atomic weapons. Therefore, instead of producing an atomic by the acquisition.”9 bomb of its own, the government concluded that the best way to strengthen Canadian security was to continue to support the One of the most important reasons for Canada’s interest American atomic weapons program through exports of nuclear was the evolution in technology that had materials, such as uranium.2 occurred by the mid 1950s. During this period, nuclear weap- ons had evolved from being large, unwieldy bombs that could During the period from 1945 to 1950, the Canadian gov- be carried only by long-range bombers and used against cities, ernment was also much more interested in spending money on to smaller weapons that could be deployed both on the battle- the creation of the welfare state than on its armed forces. This field and for air defence. Furthermore, this was the period attitude was reflected in a comment made by Prime Minister when the idea of limited nuclear war emerged, and how ‘low William Lyon Mackenzie King at the end of the Second World yield’ tactical nuclear weapons could be used to stop Soviet War that it was time: “…[for] the old liberal principles of aggression against Western Europe and around the world. These economy, reduction in taxation and anti-militarism.”3 As a developments did not go unnoticed by Canada’s uniformed result, the defence budget faced drastic cuts, and there were services and the Department of National Defence (DND). For few resources available for a project such as an atomic bomb.4 example, Solandt argued in 1954, “…[that] it becomes increas- This fact was recognized by the Canadian military and the ingly obvious that that should there be another total war it will new Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton, who be predominantly atomic. It will not be many years before no believed that his mission was to ensure that the core capabili- first class armed force, no matter how small, will be able to ties of the armed forces would be maintained, so that it could engage in battle unless it has atomic weapons.”10

Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009 • Canadian Military Journal 47 In particular, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) rec- ble anti-aircraft missiles, surface-to-surface missiles for ognized the implications of these changes. Beginning in the Europe, and even nuclear torpedoes and depth charges for late 1940s, Canada had begun to build up its air defences to Canada’s maritime forces.14 counter the threat of Soviet intercontinental-range nuclear bombers. In addition, the RCAF had developed close ties with Another reason for the shift in the Canadian position was the United States Air Force (USAF) while constructing a con- the adoption of nuclear weapons by NATO in the 1950s. The tinental air defence system to help protect North America. By NATO alliance had been established out of a fear that the the end of the 1950s, supporting this commitment increasingly Soviets were planning to invade Western Europe. However, it meant acquiring nuclear-tipped air-to-air missiles and the quickly became apparent, particularly after the failure to meet surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that were entering service in the conventional force goals of the Lisbon conference of the United States.11 Moreover, the RCAF had concluded dur- 1952, that nuclear weapons were needed to defend Western ing this period that the air defence role of the Canadian Air Europe.15 Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson Division in Europe would have to be changed in order for it to agreed, and he argued that the only way to prevent a Soviet maintain its effectiveness. In 1956, Air Marshal C.R. Slemon, invasion of Western Europe was through deterrence. And, then Chief of the Air Staff, suggested that one option would given the relative weakness of conventional arms in NATO, be to have Canadian aircraft carry small nuclear weapons in a deterrence had to be achieved through nuclear weapons. He ‘nuclear strike’ role. This comment foreshadowed Canada’s added: “…we must … not lag behind in the development of acceptance of the NATO nuclear strike/reconnaissance role in knowledge and skill in the field of atomic energy,” and that the late 1950s.12 “atomic retaliation from the air” was vital for the security of the West.16 In December 1954, Pearson, along with the rest of the NATO Council, supported Directive MC 4817 that autho- rized NATO forces to use nuclear weapons.18

Canada continued to support these policies under . In December 1957, the new prime minister attended the NATO Council meeting when Directive MC 14/2 was approved. It called for use of tactical nuclear weapons to stop the Soviet advance as far forward as possible in an effort to prevent too much NATO territory from being lost to the Soviets.19 Furthermore, the meeting approved Directive MC 48/2, which authorized NATO to plan for the use of nuclear weapons from the onset of a conflict. Consequently, by sup- porting these directives, Canada had become part of a de facto nuclear alliance. Indeed, Andrew Richter has speculated, many Canadian policymakers in the 1950s believed that NATO, by deciding to accept nuclear weapons, had made the decision for Canada.20 This belief was strengthened when, later in 1957, NATO recommended to Canada that its forces in Europe should be armed with nuclear weapons.21

The final reason for the change was that the Department of External Affairs did not actively oppose the acquisition of nuclear weapons in this period. This decision was due to the fact that the department believed these weapons encouraged stability in the world by deterring Soviet aggression. Therefore, DND photo ZK-1926-3 until 1959, none of the Secretaries of State for External This Honest John has been erected into the launch position. Affairs, including Pearson and Sydney Smith, opposed the idea that Canada should be armed with nuclear weapons.22 Consequently, the Canadian military signed an agreement with the United States that allowed, “…[for the] training of Thus, the decision to acquire nuclear weapons appeared personnel in the employment of and defence against atomic inevitable. In late 1958, the Cabinet authorized the armed weapons.”13 Furthermore, in December 1956, the issue of forces to begin negotiations with the United States, and in acquiring nuclear weapons was discussed at a meeting of the February 1959, Prime Minister Diefenbaker made a speech Cabinet Defence Committee, which was informed that it was that appeared to indicate that Canada would soon obtain almost certain that the Americans would supply nuclear nuclear weapons. This was the address in which he announced weapon systems to Canada. By March 1957, there were both the cancellation of the Avro Arrow interceptor aircraft, increasingly detailed discussions with respect to nuclear capa- and the purchase of the Boeing IM-99B Bomarc anti-bomber

48 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009 guided missile for air defence. He argued: “The final reason for A Renewed Debate and Then “…[that] the full potential of these defen- Acceptance: 1959 – 1968 sive weapons is achieved only when they the change was that are armed with nuclear weapons,” and he the Department of hus, for a number of reasons, primarily closed the speech with a remark that chal- External Affairs did Tdue to its defence ties to the United lenged the members of the government, “… not actively oppose States and to NATO, by the late 1950s [to] recognize the gravity of the decisions Canada had committed to being armed with that we are called upon to make.”23 The the acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, just when Minister of National Defence, George nuclear weapons in Canada was prepared to obtain the war- Pearkes, VC, added in the House of this period.” heads from the United States, the consensus Commons in July 1959 that the Canadian on their acquisition began to break down. government had begun negotiations to acquire nuclear war- The reason was that the new Secretary of State for External heads from the United States.24 Affairs, Howard Green, and his under-secretary, , began to raise objections to this policy direction. MILITARY HISTORY DND photo 395-IMG0086

Prime Minister John Diefenbaker (centre right) and Minister of National Defence George Pearkes VC at the Royal Military College of Canada, 1959.

Furthermore, in May 1959, when the Chairman of Green was horrified by the prospect of nuclear war, and, from NATO’s Military Committee, General Lauris Norstad, recom- the moment he took over External Affairs, he began a crusade mended that Canada should support the alliance’s strike/ for global nuclear disarmament. He had no faith that deter- reconnaissance mission, the government accepted the assign- rence would prevent a conflict between the superpowers, and ment and purchased the CF-104 Starfighter for the role. As asserted to the Cabinet: “…[that] a nuclear war would be this mission involved nuclear weapons, it was another indica- quite unlike any wars previously known, it would destroy tion to Canada’s allies that it was ready to acquire these civilization.”27 Robertson also believed that the policy of weapons, even if the government publicly did not state so at deterrence “was a sad comment on our generation to envisage that time.25 Finally, by 1961, Canada had purchased an exten- the possibility of global suicide.”28 sive armoury of weapons that used nuclear warheads that not only included the Bomarc and the Starfighter, but also the Under Green’s and Robertson’s leadership, External Honest John surface-to-surface missile, and the CF-101 Affairs developed its case against acquiring nuclear weapons. Voodoo fighter/interceptor.26 Their most important argument related to the effectiveness of

Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009 • Canadian Military Journal 49 nuclear weapons in preserving stability between East and of consultation with Canada by the Kennedy Administration West. Whereas, in the 1950s, External Affairs had argued that during the in 1962.34 they were a source of stability, by the early 1960s it stressed that these weapons caused instability because of the “virtual Thus, Diefenbaker increasingly looked for ways out of certainty of their use.” The department argued that, for the his predicament. One possible direction that appealed to him sake of the world, Canada needed to take a principled stand was that Canada would not make a final decision while disar- against nuclear weapons, despite the commitments that it had mament talks at the United Nations continued. Moreover, he made to its allies. Therefore, Canada would set a good exam- looked for a compromise that would allow him to meet ple for the rest of the world to follow, and would improve the Canada’s commitments to its allies, without actually having to prospects for nuclear disarmament.29 accept the weapons on Canadian soil. One example was an External Affairs proposal that the warheads would be kept in Faced with this challenge, the Department of National the United States and would only be transported to Canada Defence scrambled to formulate its own case for acquiring during a crisis.35 The Department of National Defence warned nuclear weapons. DND contended that Canada needed to ful- Diefenbaker that such plans were not practical; nonetheless, fil its international commitments, since Canada had supported the PM would not be swayed. He also refused to make a final NATO directives that “…presume a Canadian policy to decision, even when some of the weapons systems – notably acquire nuclear weapons, and the absence of a decision to the Bomarc – were fitted with only ballast for warheads implement such a policy is becoming increasingly difficult to thereby making them useless. However, while Diefenbaker justify.” The department later stated that the “…neglect of struggled to make up his mind, his indecision began to frus- our NATO and NORAD commitments in this context almost trate the Kennedy Administration. amount to Canadian unilateral disarmament.”30 The Canadian strategist R.J. Sutherland wrote the definitive statement of DND’s position in 1963. First, he argued that if Canada did not acquire nuclear weapons, it would be breaking commit- ments that it had made to its allies, and would thus lose influ- ence with them. He also questioned the point of Canada renouncing nuclear weapons while remaining in an alliance that would continue to be nuclear armed, because nuclear weapons were considered the cornerstone for the defence of Western Europe. He added that all this direction from Canada would achieve would be to complicate planning for the alli- ance, and he concluded by asking: “Can we combine full membership in a nuclear alliance with a policy of extreme nuclear squeamishness?”31

Caught in the middle of this debate was Prime Minister Diefenbaker. At first, in the late 1950s, he was in favour of Canada being armed with nuclear weapons, and he was sup- portive of Canada fulfilling the commitments it had made to its allies. However, over time, his position began to shift. One reason was the influence that Green had upon Diefenbaker’s thinking, since Green was a long-time sup- porter of Diefenbaker, and he used his regular weekend meetings with the prime minister to impress upon him the dangers of nuclear war. Diefenbaker also increasingly embodied the anti-American feelings that had risen up in Canada during the early 1960s. In particular, his strong resentment of President John F. Kennedy had contributed to these beliefs. Consequently, as the Kennedy administration DND photo 895-IMG0056 was pressuring Canada to accept the weapons, these percep- tions encouraged Diefenbaker to reconsider his options.32 A Boeing IM99B Bomarc nuclear-armed anti-bomber surface-to-air Furthermore, the issue of who would control the weapons missile. based in Canada troubled him. He was convinced of the need This rift was not over the military value of the nuclear air to ensure that the Americans would not fire the weapons defence weapons that the Canadians had acquired, since these without the consent of the Canadian government in order to weapons were no longer considered very important in prevent rash decisions with respect to their employment.33 American defence planning, due to the onset of the age of the These feelings were reinforced by his perception of the lack Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The issue for the

50 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009 Americans was that the Canadian govern- would lose influence in NATO and face the ment was failing to meet the commitments “However, while reduction or termination of defence-sharing that it had made to help protect the American Diefenbaker struggled agreements with the United States. nuclear deterrent. The administration’s frus- to make up his mind, Nonetheless, Pearson was torn between tration was compounded by Green’s rhetoric his indecision began Canada’s responsibilities to collective with respect to disarmament, by Kennedy’s defence and the obligation to help stop the dislike of Diefenbaker, and, most impor- to frustrate the proliferation of nuclear weapons.38 tantly, by Diefenbaker’s refusal to place Kennedy Canadian forces on alert for a 48-hour period Administration.” Ultimately, Pearson decided to accept during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October the weapons. After due deliberation, he had 1962. As a result, by December 1962, negotiations on this been convinced by Hellyer that the Liberal Party would ben- issue between the American and Canadian governments had efit politically if it changed its position on the issue.39 reached a deadlock.36 Furthermore, he realized that Canada would have to fulfil its nuclear weapon commitments if its influence with its allies MILITARY HISTORY Diefenbaker did not just have to worry about the Kennedy was to be maintained. Indeed, Pearson was particularly focused administration, because he had other problems. For example, upon the need to repair Canada’s relations with the United in early 1963, General Norstad, the former Chairman of States. Therefore, on 12 January 1963, without consulting his NATO’s Military Committee, stated at a press conference in caucus, he issued a statement in which he asserted, “…[that] that Canada was not living up to its NATO commit- as a Canadian I am ashamed if we accept commitments and ments, since it had not yet armed its forces with nuclear weap- then refuse to discharge them.”40 He added that Canada would, ons.37 Moreover, it was at this moment that Lester Pearson however, negotiate with its allies in due course to end its made his dramatic entry onto the scene. He had previously nuclear role. Diefenbaker responded to Pearson with a highly echoed the position of the Liberal Policy Conference of 1961 convoluted address in the House of Commons on 25 January that Canada would not accept nuclear weapons for its NORAD 1963 that referred to a communiqué produced after his meet- forces, and would only accept these weapons for its NATO ing with Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold contingent if they were under NATO control. However, despite Macmillan in Nassau in December 1962.41 However, on 30 this public stance, he had privately begun to reconsider his January, Diefenbaker’s position was directly contradicted by a options. For example, in 1962, the Liberal Defence critic, Paul press release by the US State Department that severely dam- Hellyer, wrote a memorandum to Pearson after his visit to aged his credibility. Diefenbaker’s position was further under- Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). mined when then Minister of National Defence, Douglas Hellyer argued that Canada needed to accept the weapons or it Harkness, resigned in protest of Diefenbaker’s indecision. The result was that the govern- ment lost a confidence vote in the House of Commons on 5 February 1963. During the election that followed, Diefenbaker openly opposed Canada’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, but, despite his best efforts, Pearson emerged with a minority government.42

After the election, Pearson ventured down to Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, to meet with John F. Kennedy. Pearson’s decision to accept the weapons had already made a difference, as Kennedy had sent a mes- sage “…[that] the early establishment of close rela- tions between your adminis- DND photo 852-IMG0042 tration and ours is a matter 43 RCAF Chief of the Air Staff Air Marshal Hugh Campbell, USAF General Curtis LeMay, and Prime Milister John of great importance to me.” Diefenbaker in conference. At the meeting, Canada’s

Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009 • Canadian Military Journal 51 Ambassador to the United States, Charles Ritchie, noted that defence forces under the control of NORAD.48 However, the the atmosphere “…was tinged with euphoria. The atmosphere nuclear issue had not been permanently settled by Pearson’s was that of clearing skies after a storm – the clouds of suspi- decision. One factor was that public support for Canada hav- cion covering Canada-U.S. Relations had parted, the sunshine ing nuclear weapons had dropped from 54.4 percent in of friendship shone.”44 Historian John English stated in his November 1962 to 34.4 percent by June 1966.49 Within biography of Pearson that at the meeting “…there were jokes; Pearson’s Cabinet there were also opponents of Canada’s but there was also much business … Officials began to talk nuclear commitment, including Pierre Trudeau and the former again, confident of their superiors’ support, and several agree- Minister of Finance, Walter Gordon. However, it was not until ments began to take form dealing with the Colombia River, the election of Trudeau as prime minister in 1968 that Canadian automobile trade and production.”45 Following the meeting, on policy on nuclear weapons was seriously reconsidered. Trudeau 20 May 1963, the House of Commons narrowly voted to had not only opposed Canada’s acquisition of nuclear weapons approve the acquisition of nuclear warheads.46 With this move, in 1963, but he believed that Canada’s entire foreign policy Pearson had achieved his primary goal of getting the nuclear needed to be re-examined. During his campaign for the Liberal weapons issue off the table, and, with this issue settled, Party leadership, he stated that Canadian foreign policy “… Canada and the United States could move on to other matters, [was based on] pre-war premises or immediate post-war prem- such as the creation of the Auto Pact in 1965.47 ises … [and that a] complete reassessment is needed.”50 Therefore, as soon as he became prime minister, he ordered full reviews of both defence policy and foreign policy, including Canada’s possession of nuclear weapons.51

Trudeau would later claim that he was trying to conduct an honest reassessment of Canadian foreign policy. As he asserted in a interview in January 1969: “Look, go back to first questions – we don’t want to know first if aircraft A is better than aircraft B, we want to know if we should have aircraft, and if neutrality isn’t better than entanglement in a defence alliance and so on.”52 Nevertheless, despite this claim, Trudeau came into office with his own set of preconceived notions with respect to Canadian foreign and defence policy, and those were not favourable to Canada having nuclear weapons.

Trudeau’s position was further DND photo 1031-IMG0017 influenced by advice he received

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau inspects cadets at the 25th anniversary of the Collège Militaire Royal from one of his foreign policy advi- du Canada in 1977. sors, , a former diplomat and professor who had first met Trudeau and the End of the Trudeau in discussions over constitutional matters. Head was Nuclear Role: 1968 - 1984 particularly scornful of the ‘conventional’ or ‘establishment’ thinking he felt existed within the Departments of External n the wake of Pearson’s decision, it seemed that the nuclear Affairs and National Defence, and he considered himself an Iissue had been settled for many years. For example, the iconoclast on subjects such as NATO. He also believed that 1964 Defence White Paper commissioned under the new the stockpiling of armaments had never led to peace.53 Minister of National Defence, , stated that because However, Robert Ford, a Canadian diplomat, later noted that NATO was armed with nuclear weapons, Canada had to “… Head was overly pro-Soviet for his time, and that he had share in that responsibility [as] a necessary commitment of sought to downplay the Soviet threat.54 Therefore, when the Canada’s membership” in the alliance. The White Paper added Canadian Special Task Force on Europe (STAFEUR)55 and the that nuclear weapons were a necessary component of the air defence policy review failed, in Trudeau's mind, to provide

52 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009 sufficient grounds to reconsider Canadian by arguing that the security of Western “Trudeau would later policy, the prime minister turned to Head for Europe should be the responsibility of the a critical response. Head’s report called for claim that he was Europeans, and that Canada should focus the elimination of nuclear weapons from trying to conduct an upon defending the American deterrent and Canada’s forces in Europe. In particular, he honest reassessment Canadian internal security. He added that stressed that Canada’s force of CF-104 Canada should ensure the defence of of Canadian foreign Starfighters was destabilizing to the strate- Canadian territory before considering other gic balance between East and West because policy.” international commitments. Bolstered by this these aircraft were a soft target vulnerable to meeting, and Head’s briefing paper, Trudeau Soviet attack, and they were only credible to the Soviets as a was successful in creating conditions under which Canadian first strike system. As a result, it was the duty of the Canadian policy would be vigorously debated and questioned. As Paul government to withdraw its aircraft from this role. While this Hellyer later noted, Head’s policy paper was really “advice” report officially was disavowed by Trudeau, under pressure from Trudeau for the Cabinet, and that Trudeau was leading from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell the discussion so that the Cabinet would reach a conclusion MILITARY HISTORY Sharp, and the Minister of National Defence, Leo Cadieux, it that was satisfactory to him. This meant that Canada’s conven- reflected the thinking of Trudeau and many of his ministers.56 tional contribution to NATO was seriously questioned, and that the nuclear commitment was a ‘non-starter.’57

The result of this process was the announce- ment that along with a unilateral reduction of its conventional forces from Europe, Canada would now have a non-nuclear role in the alli- ance. The Honest John nuclear artillery weap- ons systems were retired, and the Starfighters were withdrawn from the nuclear strike/recon- naissance role and placed in a conventional ground attack role in 1972.58 While Trudeau and his supporters were pleased with this out- come, Canada’s European NATO allies were disquieted, since they relied upon Canadian nuclear weapons to help counter a Soviet attack. For example, in 1969, Canada’s Starfighters had made up 20 percent of the nuclear capable aircraft available to the alliance.59 As a result of this action, many Canadian diplomats and poli- ticians have argued that Canada had done long- term damage to its influence in the alliance, and in Europe generally. For instance, , a Canadian NATO official argued “…[that] the throwing away of the nuclear responsibility, unilaterally, not in concert with our allies has severely undermined our voice in NATO.” 60 also noted that the decision had weakened Canada’s influence with its European allies, and was still being felt even during Trudeau’s peace initiative of the 1980s.61 Moreover, it should be noted that Canada’s decision to withdraw its nuclear weapons from

DND photo 674-IMG0038 NATO did little, if anything, to change the nuclear balance between East and West. NATO Chief of the Defence Staff General Jacques Dextrase (left) and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in a relaxed setting. continued to rely upon nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet invasion of Western Europe because The stage was set for the Cabinet meeting of 29-30 April Europeans believed that these weapons represented the best 1969, where it quickly became apparent to the ministers who and most cost-effective way to accomplish such deterrence. believed in a more traditional policy, such as Sharp and Thus, despite Canada’s decision, tactical nuclear weapons Cadieux, that the status quo in Canadian foreign and defence delivery systems such as the Starfighter would remain in policy was under attack. Trudeau set the tone for the meeting Europe, albeit for Canada in a conventional attack role.

Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009 • Canadian Military Journal 53 DND photo

A CF-104 Starfighter heading off to work, this one in the photo-reconnaissance role.

After Trudeau’s government had switched to a non-nuclear dependent upon the perceptions of Canada’s role in the world role in NATO, it still faced the question of what to do with as held by different personalities within these governments, Canada’s two home-based nuclear weapons, the Bomarc SAM and as these personalities and governments changed, so did and the Genie air-to-air missile, which armed the interceptor the policies. Nevertheless, the question must still be asked as forces. In 1972, it was decided to scrap the to what the Canadian Forces can draw from Bomarc because of doubts with respect to its “Nevertheless, this experience. This author believes that effectiveness and as part of the effort to the ultimate lesson is that, in a fluid and reduce defence costs. 62 However, Canada the question must changing world, most Canadian govern- kept its other nuclear system, the Genie, until be asked as to what ments will be reluctant to take hard posi- 1984, because the 1971 Defence White Paper the Canadian Forces tions on Canadian defence issues. Instead, noted “…[that] there is at present no alterna- can draw from this they will generally choose to let policy drift tive to equipping the CF-101s with nuclear until a given situation clarifies itself. The weapons … Only with such weapons would experience.” only exceptions have been incidences, such they have a reasonable prospect of destroy- as with Pearson in 1963 and Trudeau in ing attacking bombers.”63 In fact, it was only after the replace- 1969, when individual Canadian personalities asserted them- ment of the CF-101s with CF-18 Hornets in 1984 that Canada selves, given that they held particularly strong positions on the finally returned its last nuclear warheads to the United States. issues at hand. However, as it has been advanced in this arti- cle, even those periods of assertiveness were followed by Conclusion periods of drift. Thus, if the past holds any lessons, it is likely that in the future, the Canadian Forces will face a complicated rom the mid 1940s to the early 1980s, successive Canadian policy environment littered with questions that have no clear Fgovernments dealt with the issue of whether Canada or easy answers. should have nuclear weapons, and the results were anything but consistent. This held true because these policies were

54 Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009 NOTES

1. Jon McLin, Canada’s Changing Defense Policy, Defenders Confront Critics ( & Kingston: call into question Canada’s NATO or NORAD 1957-1963 The Problems of a Middle Power in McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), p. 26. commitments. It added that the Canadians had not Alliance (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967), 8. Eayrs, pp. 264-265; Levitt, pp. 69-70. Pearson proposed anything that would improve the defence p. 125. from time to time questioned this approach, and, of North America. Simpson, pp. 123-124; Hillmer 2. Brian Buckley, Canada’s Early Nuclear Policy in particular, its application by the Americans and Granatstein, p. 262. Fate, Chance, and Character (Montreal & through a strategy of “Massive Retaliation.” 43. Quoted in Hillmer and Granatstein, p. 266. Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, However, he recognized that there was no real 44. Charles Ritchie, Storm Signals: More 2000), p. 131; Joseph Levitt, Pearson and alternative if a Soviet invasion of Western Europe Undiplomatic Diaries, 1962-1971 (: Canada’s Role in Nuclear Disarmament and was to be prevented. Macmillan of Canada, 1983). Arms Control Negotiations, 1945-1957 (Montreal 9. Simpson, p. 102; McLin, p. 134. MC 14/2 was 45. English, p. 270. & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, titled “The Overall Strategic Concept for the 46. Hillmer and Granatstein, p. 266. 1993), p. 76; James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada Defence of the NATO Area.” Richter, pp. 80-81. 47. Greg Donaghy, Tolerant Allies: Canada and the Growing Up Allied (Toronto: University of 20. Simpson, pp. 102-103; Denis Smith, Rogue Tory: United States (Montreal & Kingston: McGill- Toronto Press, 1980), p. 234. The Life and Legend of John G. Diefenbaker Queen’s University Press, 2002), pps. 11-113, 3. Quoted in Joseph Jockel, No Boundaries (Toronto: McFarlane Walter & Ross, 1995), p. 177. MILITARY HISTORY Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the 302. MC 48/2 was titled “Minimum Force 48. White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, Origins of North American Air Defence Requirements for 1958-1963.” Richter, pp. 1964), p. 13. (Vancouver: University of British Colombia 81-82. 49. Donaghy, p. 114. Press, 1987), p. 14. 21. Simpson, p. 134; McLin, p. 213. 50. Quoted in Ibid., p. 121. 4. Buckley, p. 136. 22. Richter, p. 99. 51. John G.H. Halstead, “Canada and European 5. Ibid., pp. 65-67. In the late 1940s, the RCAF gave 23. Diefenbaker cited in McLin, p. 135. Security, 1950-1990,” in Fifty Years of Canada- up the strategic bombing role in order to concen- 24. Conant, p. 103. United States Defense Cooperation: The Road trate its resources in air defence and reconnais- 25. Simpson, pp. 105-107; Richter, p. 87. From Ogdensburg, Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. sance. Andrew Richter, Avoiding Armageddon: 26. Simpson, pp. 105-110. Jockel (eds.) (Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 27. Quoted in Simpson, pps. 175, 179. Mellen Press, 1993), p. 132. 1950-63 (Toronto: UBC Press, 2002), pp. 16-17. 28. Quoted in and Jack Granatstein, 52. Quoted in Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 12. 6. Richter, pps. 36, 53, 139. Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 53. Simpson, p. 216. 7. Ibid., pps. 47, 53-54; James Eayrs, In Defence of 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman Ltd, 1994), 54. Granatstein and Bothwell, p. 20. Canada Volume II: Peacemaking and Deterrence pp. 247-248. 55. STAFEUR was headed by the Canadian (Toronto, Press, 1972), p. 29. Richter, pp. 99-100, pp. 103-104. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Robert Ford, 278. 30. Quoted in Ibid., pps. 89, 91. and Paul Tremblay, the Canadian Ambassador to 8. There was not to be a Canadian Defence White 31. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 94-95. Belgium. The report argued that Canada should Paper until 1964. The only policy statements that 32. Simpson, pp. 115-118. remain a member of NATO and continue to have were released were “…simple pronouncements of 33. Ibid., p. 161. Ironically, the American ‘two key forces stationed in Europe. Granatstein and the status quo.” Canada’s National Defence control method’ would have done this, since a Bothwell, pp. 14-19; Hillmer and Granatstein, p. Volume 1 Defence Policy. Douglas Bland (ed.) Canadian officer would have to turn a key along 287. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University with his American counterpart in order for the 56. Granatstein and Bothwell, pp. 86-87. Press, 1993), p. XI. weapon to be fired. McLin, pp. 141-142. 57. Ibid., pp. 23-24. 9. Richter, p. 150. 34. Simpson, p. 140. 58. This was done as soon as it could be agreed upon 10. Quoted in Buckley, pp. 112-113. 35. Ibid., p. 169. with Canada’s NATO partners. It should be noted 11. Melvin Conant, The Long Polar Watch: Canada 36. Richter, p. 101. that Canadian commanders could still call upon and the Defence of North America (New York: 37. McLin, p. 159. fire support in the form of nuclear weapons, as Council on Foreign Relations, 1962), p. 96; David 38. John Clearwater, Canadian Nuclear Weapons: long as those weapons were fired by other NATO Cox, Canada and NORAD 1958-1978: A The Untold Story of Canada’s Nuclear Arsenal allies. Granatstein and Bothwell, pps. 29, 93. Cautionary Retrospective (Toronto: The Canadian (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1998), p. 29; John 59. Roy Rempel, Counterweights: The Failure of Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1985), English, The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Canada’s German and European Policy, 1955- p. 42. Pearson Volume II: 1949-1972 (Toronto: Random 1995 (Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 12. Richter, p. 84. House, 1992), p. 249. University Press, 1996), p. 130. 13. Buckley, p. 128. 39. Simpson, p. 19. 60. Ibid., p. 138; Simpson, p. 188. 14. Ibid. 40. Quoted in Ibid., p. 50. 61. Rempel, p. 55. 15. Richter, pp. 82-84. 41. Diefenbaker concluded from the communiqué 62. The American Bomarc batteries were also decom- 16. Pearson quoted in Levitt, 68. that Canada’s nuclear role in Europe was placed missioned during this period. Clearwater, p. 58. 17. MC 48 was titled “‘The Most Effective Pattern of in doubt by discussions over a new NATO 63. Defence in the 1970s. (Ottawa: Information NATO Military Strength in the Next Few Years.’” Multinational Nuclear Force. Hillmer and Canada, 1971), p. 30. Richter, p. 80. MC stands for Military Committee. Granatstein, pp. 261-262; Richter, pps. 101, 186- Erika Simpson, NATO and the Bomb: Canadian 187. It stated that the Nassau Conference did not

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