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DEFENDING THE AND , IN NORTH AMERICA AND ABROAD

John J. Noble

From Franklin Roosevelt’s Queen’s University address of 1938, the mutual defence of Canada and the United States has been the central tenet of Canadian foreign and defence policies. With rare exceptions, notably ’s reneging on accepting nuclear Bomarc missiles in 1963, the policy of mutual defence has been adhered to by every Canadian government since Mackenzie King’s in the 1940s. ’s decision not to participate in ballistic missile defence can be seen as a break with that tradition. John Noble, both a student and practitioner of Canada-US relations, looks back at Canada-US defence policy, from the end of the Second World War and the creation of NATO and NORAD, to the end of the and the present realities of the post 9/11 world. While he regards BMD “as a high-tech Maginot Line,” he also writes that once the US “decided to proceed with BMD we should have supported it.”

Depuis le discours de Franklin Roosevelt prononcé en 1938 à Queen’s University, le principe de défense mutuelle du Canada et des États-Unis est au cœur de notre politique étrangère et de défense. À de rares exceptions près, notamment lorsque John Diefenbaker a manqué à sa promesse d’accepter les missiles nucléaires Bomarc en 1963, ce principe a été reconduit par tous les gouvernements depuis celui de Mackenzie King dans les années 1940. Aussi peut-on considérer que Paul Martin a rompu avec la tradition en refusant sa participation à la défense antimissile balistique (DMB). À la fois observateur et acteur des relations canado-américaines, John Noble examine la politique de défense de nos deux pays depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale jusqu’à la création de l’OTAN et de NORAD, en passant par les derniers feux de la guerre froide et les réalités de l’après-11 septembre. S’il considère la DMB comme « une ligne Maginot de haute technologie », il n’en estime pas moins que « nous aurions dû l’appuyer après que les États-Unis eurent décidé de la mettre en œuvre ».

he recent debates in Canada as to whether or not wrongdoing in the Western Hemisphere. This so-called there should be a North American perimeter strike Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine contained a T me as increasingly sterile and miss the point that a great irony: whereas the Monroe Doctrine had been sought perimeter has existed for many years in the defence field. to prevent European intervention in the Western That perimeter is steadily being strengthened in other fields Hemisphere, the Roosevelt Corollary justified American in light of the changing nature of the security threats to intervention throughout the Western Hemisphere. One North America. could argue, therefore, that those aspects of President Proposals for a North American security perimeter have George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy of September been around for some time, and can be traced back to 1823 2002 that deal with pre-emptive action and unilateralism and President Monroe’s unilateral declaration that “the are merely a modification of the Roosevelt Corollary by American continents…are henceforth not to be considered expanding it from the Western Hemisphere to the entire as subjects for future colonization by any European pow- world, i.e., the new Bush Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. ers.” In 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt stated that the United States was justified in exercising “international n August 1938, on the eve of the Second World War, police power” to put an end to chronic unrest or I President Franklin Roosevelt’s acceptance speech for an

POLICY OPTIONS 23 MAY 2005 John J. Noble

honorary doctorate at Queen’s much Canadian uranium made its way the threat from space and missiles, and University included the following com- into the American nuclear weapons was renamed the North American mitment: “The of Canada is program up until the mid-1960s, when Aerospace Defence Command. part of the sisterhood of the British it was stopped by Lester Pearson. At the time of the Cuban missile cri- Empire. I give to you assurance that the At the start of the Cold War, Canada sis, Prime Minister Diefenbaker refused people of the United States will not and the United States worked closely to put the Canadian Forces on alert, and stand idly by if domination of together to create NATO, where an discovered to his astonishment that the Canadian soil is threatened by any attack on one member was considered Canadian military had already done so. other Empire.” Prime Minister an attack on all. The Canadian Forces Diefenbaker got into even bigger trouble Mackenzie King, in response to deployed in Europe from the early 1950s with the US government and military Roosevelt’s pledge to protect Canada, until 1994 were not there as peacekeep- when he refused to arm the Bomarc anti- aircraft missiles, which he At the time of the , Prime Minister had chosen as a replacement Diefenbaker refused to put Canadian forces on alert and for the cancelled Avro Arrow, with the nuclear weapons for discovered to his astonishment that the Canadian military had which the Bomarc was already done so. Diefenbaker got into even bigger trouble designed. His government with the US government and military when he refused to arm imploded with several minis- the Bomarc anti-aircraft missiles, which he had chosen as a ters, including Douglas Harkness, the minister of replacement for the cancelled Avro Arrow, with the nuclear national defence, resigning weapons for which the Bomarc was designed. on the issue. Pearson reversed the Liberal Party’s said “we too have obligations as a good ers. It was a fighting force of army and air stance on nuclear weapons, and won a and friendly neighbour and that enemy units to help deter the Soviet threat. minority government in the 1963 elec- forces should not be able to pursue their tion in which anti-Americanism played way either by land, sea or air to the anadian and American forces a key part. Pearson not only armed the United States across Canadian territo- C fought together in the UN- Bomarcs with nuclear weapons, he also ry.” That two-way commitment has authorized peace-making operation in gave our forces in Europe nuclear- tipped been the essence of Canada-US defence Korea. Lester Pearson worked closely short-range Honest John missiles and co-operation ever since, and Mackenzie with the United States during the Suez nuclear bombs on CF-104 Starfighters King’s commitment, which no subse- crisis, and he notes in his memoirs for offensive use. Pearson’s reversal of quent Canadian prime minister has that it was an American that he used to Liberal policy on nuclear weapons ever renounced, is even more relevant obtain the General Assembly’s agree- earned him the title “the defrocked in the post 9/11 era. Dwight Mason, a ment for the creation of United Prince of Peace” from Pierre Elliott former deputy head of mission at the Nations Emergency Force, for which Trudeau, and was not popular inside US embassy in , and subsequent- he was subsequently awarded the parts of the Liberal Party. ly US co-chair of the bilateral Nobel Peace Prize. Permanent Joint Board of Defence NORAD was created in 1958 as a ierre Trudeau started off his gov- (PJBD), has suggested that Paul Martin’s joint command to deal with the Soviet P ernment in 1968 with a review of decision not to be part of ballistic mis- manned bomber threat. The DEW line our commitment to NATO and a very sile defence (BMD) is an opting out of agreement had been signed in 1955, public debate among ministers. Ross one aspect of North American defence creating a line of radar across Northern Campbell, our ambassador to NATO at in the knowledge that the United States Canada, built and maintained mainly the time, tells a wonderful story about would have welcomed such co- by Americans. Just before NORAD Trudeau, and NATO in 1968. operation, and that it is therefore a came into being, the world witnessed He says both believed that if Canada backing away from Mackenzie King’s Sputnik, the first Soviet satellite in withdrew from NATO, the Czechs commitment in 1938. space and a new threat from intercon- would leave the ! What In 1940 Roosevelt and Mackenzie tinental ballistic missiles against happened, of course, is that we King went on to create the PJBD and which there was no direct defence. announced a cut of 50 percent of our the 1941 Hyde Park Agreement co- NORAD created a formal defence troops stationed in Europe, and the ordinated economic war mobilization perimeter around the United States Russians then invaded Czechoslovakia. of the two countries. Canada was and Canada that had existed informal- The Europeans at the time feared that involved in Project Manhattan, which ly since the Roosevelt-King exchange such a reduction might encourage a developed the atomic bomb, and of 1938. It was expanded to include similar move by the United States.

24 OPTIONS POLITIQUES MAI 2005 Defending the United States and Canada, in North America and abroad

CP Photo Prime Minister Mackenzie King and President Franklin Roosevelt in City in 1936. FDR’s Queen’s University speech in 1938, where he pledged the mutual defence of the United States and Canada, was the template for the bilateral relationship on continental security.

I understand that Foreign Affairs In 1979, Canada, along with all Trudeau faced the same sort of Canada recently planned a conference other NATO countries, adopted a two- majority public opinion against testing on Diefenbaker’s foreign policy, but track decision in response to the Soviet the cruise missile back in 1983 that somewhere at the political level it was deployment of intermediate range mis- Prime Minister Martin faces today, felt best to postpone it for fear of analo- siles to target cities in Western Europe. except the threat of a nuclear conflagra- gies being drawn between Diefenbaker The first track was to counter this tion with the USSR has receded and and the Bomarc and Paul Martin and deployment with a NATO deployment BMD is not aimed at Russia, whereas BMD. My original reaction to this was if the Soviets did not dismantle their one of the prime targets of the Cruise that there was no real analogy between INF forces. The second track was to seek was to have been the . In the Diefenbaker indecision on arming ways to get the Soviets to dismantle the run-up to his decision to ignore the Bomarcs and the Martin dithering those weapons. Crunch time came in majority public opinion and the views and finally saying “no” to BMD. 1983 when, in the absence of any of some of his caucus and cabinet (Lloyd Rather, I thought, the real analogies are Soviet pull-back, NATO decided to Axworthy mentions this in his recent with Pierre Trudeau and his highly deploy Pershing and cruise missiles in book), Trudeau published an open letter unpopular decision to test the cruise Europe. At the same time the US gov- to in May 1983 in which he missile in 1983 and ’s ernment asked Canada for permission said: “Canadians want to benefit from decision to say “no” to President to test its air- launched Cruise missile in the American nuclear umbrella, but Reagan’s invitation to participate in the Canada’s northern terrain, which close- they don’t want to hold onto the Strategic Defence Initiative in 1985. ly resembles that of the Soviet Union. umbrella’s handle. To that extent, the

POLICY OPTIONS 25 MAY 2005 John J. Noble

knee jerk anti-Americanism of some from his representatives in Brussels director general of the International Canadians verges on hypocrisy.” about the event. Mulroney handled the Security and Arms Control Bureau was That is not the type of statement invitation by asking a special parlia- to ensure that ’s commitment that most Canadians associate with mentary committee to look at it along was honoured. The fact that there were Pierre Trudeau, but he issued the letter. with issues related to trade liberaliza- only 12 protestors out to denounce the Trudeau’s public letter to Canadians tion with the United States. decision must have made Americans has stood the test of time, and the Mulroney also appointed a special wonder why Mulroney had been so hypocrisy he saw in parts of his cabi- adviser, Arthur Kroeger, to report to sensitive. But times were changing. Secretary of State James In the run-up to his decision to ignore majority public opinion A. Baker accompanied and the views of some of his caucus and cabinet (Lloyd George Bush to Ottawa and was told by Joe Clark that Axworthy mentions this in his recent book), Trudeau there had to be some published an open letter to Canadians in May 1983 in which progress on the issue of he said: “Canadians want to benefit from the American short range nuclear nuclear umbrella, but they don’t want to hold onto the weapons, an issue that was dividing NATO between the umbrella’s handle. To that extent, the knee jerk anti- US and most of the Americanism of some Canadians verges on hypocrisy.” Europeans (except ). That debate con- net and caucus is still there today, in him on whether or not we should join. tinued through the spring of 1989 on even greater quantity. The key point is While some of us had predicted that the front pages of the New York Times that Trudeau was not only prepared to Mulroney’s decision might cause prob- and European newspapers. At the same exercise leadership, he was prepared to lems for us in Washington, that did not time the Bush administration made try to sell the decision to Canadians happen, in large part because Mulroney known it was looking for initiatives before it was announced. had already established good relations with respect to the Soviet Union. My with President Reagan and he hadn’t team in the International Security and rian Mulroney promised to dithered on the issue. Nor had the Arms Control Bureau had been devel- B increase defence spending, which American ambassador in Ottawa made oping a proposal to revive Eisenhower’s in fact started in Trudeau’s last year in this a touchstone of the relationship, as 1954 “Open Skies” proposal for aerial office. Mulroney did increase the size Paul Celluci did over BMD. surveillance of Warsaw Pact territory by of the forces, but ran into stiff opposi- NATO and vice-versa. The CFE negotia- tion from the US Navy when he decid- ulroney worked closely with the tions had started in Vienna and would ed to acquire some nuclear powered M first President George Bush on require some strict verification meth- submarines. Mulroney got Reagan to many issues, as outlined in the mem- ods. Satellites have certain limitations. overrule the US Navy’s objections, but oirs Bush and Brent Scowcroft pub- I went to Washington in late April to he was forced to cancel the project in lished several years ago. On President speak to my American counterpart in the 1990 budget, along with a large Bush’s first trip to Ottawa in January State and also people at the NSC and icebreaker, which was also known as 1989, the Mulroney government the Pentagon. We were knocking on an the world’s largest flag pole. announced a decision to permit the open door. Prime Minister Mulroney Mulroney had earlier said “no” to testing over Canadian territory of the subsequently sent a letter to President Reagan’s invitation to join the Strategic advanced “stealth” cruise missile. Bush recommending this proposal, and Defence Initiative. The initial invita- Mulroney had delayed a decision on he and Joe Clark discussed it with the tion had been conveyed to NATO this matter for over 18 months. In president in early May when he went defence ministers in Brussels by Casper January 1988, at the Winter to Washington to open the new Weinberger, and Defence Minister Eric Olympics, Joe Clark told President Canadian embassy. The telling argu- Neilsen ordered our ambassador not to Reagan’s chief of staff, Ken Duberstein, ment used by Mulroney was that if report this back to Ottawa, because he that the government could not make a Bush didn’t suggest it, Gorbachev wanted to report directly to the PM. decision on the issue until after the free might propose it himself. Three days Neilsen didn’t realize that Weinberger trade issue was resolved. The American later Bush made a major speech on had left the NATO ministerial meeting administration accepted that at face East/West relations, which included to tell the press about the invitation. value and did not make it a public the Open Skies proposal. There was no Astute members of the opposition in issue. The Free Trade Agreement was great enthusiasm for it in the American Ottawa had a field day embarrassing secured in the November 1988 general media, which prompted Joe Clark to Joe Clark, who had no information election. One of the first jobs I had as write an op-ed for the New York Times

26 OPTIONS POLITIQUES MAI 2005 Defending the United States and Canada, in North America and abroad saying “don’t dismiss the Open Skies aides, Dennis Ross, came over to Joe short term. As long as the United proposal.” In late May the NATO Clark and asked that he put forward States didn’t have any troops on the Summit endorsed the idea and I went some of the ideas for bridging the gap ground, Canada and other NATO allies off to Eastern Europe to try to sell it to that Mulroney and Clark had first dis- resisted American efforts to have the Hungarians, Czechoslovaks, Poles cussed with Bush and Baker in NATO bomb the Serbs and their and Russians. Washington. The eventual compro- Bosnian allies. We feared having our By late summer the Russians and mise did include some of our ideas and soldiers getting taken hostage, and Americans had agreed, and official invi- Mulroney gave credit to Joe Clark’s that was exactly what happened after tations were sent out for the first minis- “deft pen.” the first American bombings, when terial meeting between NATO and East The Mulroney government also Canadian soldiers were handcuffed to Bloc foreign ministers in Ottawa in Feb- participated in the first in telephone poles as human shields. ruary 1990. For a ministerial meeting to light of the clear violation of interna- Gradually the Clinton administration be held less than a year after a proposal tional by Iraq in its invasion of realized that the only way to extricate is first made was most unusual. The Kuwait. The Chrétien Liberal UNPROFOR (which had a large num- Ottawa Conference was most remem- Opposition, with the sole exception of ber of NATO troops) was to get bered because we witnessed first hand former leader , voted involved itself. Hence the Dayton the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty against Canadian involvement in an accords and the replacement of Organization, when the foreign minis- operation authorized by the UN UNPRFOR by NATO’s SFOR and, ulti- ters of the Pact took issue with the posi- Security Council. Canada was on the mately, the NATO intervention in tion of Soviet foreign minister Kosovo, where Canadian CF- Eduard Shevardnadze on almost 18s flew 10 percent of the mis- every issue. The Ottawa confer- NORAD’s longstanding detection sions without authorization by ence also saw the announce- and tracking capability and the the UN Security Council. ment of the 2+4 exercise on American retaliatory capacity German unification, and an (conventional or nuclear) are all that n BMD there are lots of infamous NATO ministerial O things one could say. For meeting where much angst was is required to deter any state, rogue over 15 years I have regarded spilled over the “Berlin four” or otherwise, from using a missile to BMD as a high-tech Maginot leaving the other NATO allies attack the United States. We learned Line, because anyone wanting out of the process. to attack the United States The Open Skies Treaty took from 9/11 that low-tech means can with a would several more negotiating con- wreak havoc in North America. not resort to delivering it by a ferences to be completed, and missile, which is the most its relevance declined significantly readily detectible and identifiable after the demise of both the Warsaw Security Council at the time and sup- means. It would be the equivalent of Pact and the Soviet Union. But up ported the authorizing resolution. waving a red flag in front of the most until the Ottawa Convention on Anti- powerful bull in the world. NORAD’s personnel Land Mines, it was the only hroughout the 1990s, the Balkans longstanding detection and tracking major arms control treaty driven large- T Wars resulted in some tension and capability and the American retaliato- ly by Canada, with close cooperation ultimately close cooperation between ry capacity (conventional or nuclear) from the United States. Canada and the United States. After are all that is required to deter any At the 1989 NATO Summit, the Mulroney ensured that Canada had state, rogue or otherwise, from using a debate on SNF reached the boil and an the second largest contingent in missile to attack the United States. We impasse, and the leaders sent off their UNPROFOR in the summer of 1992, learned from 9/11 that low-tech foreign ministers to try to resolve it at there ensued a debate between the means can wreak havoc in North a midnight meeting. Before doing so Canadian and American chiefs of America. BMD does not provide Prime Minister Mulroney turned to defence (Generals John de Chastelain defence from a nuclear attack on President Bush across the NATO table and Colin Powell) about how many North America, only from a nuclear and publicly reminded him (in the troops Canada needed to secure the attack by missile. We would better words of US Supreme Court Justice airport at Sarajevo. General Powell, serve the objective of protecting Learned Hand) that “leadership to be using traditional American war fight- North America from nuclear attack by effective has to take into account the ing strategies, suggested 6,000, while concentrating a lot more effort and views of others.” Bush 41 and Jim General de Chastelain, using Canadian money on the dangers of nuclear pro- Baker did a lot of listening, and during peacekeeping experience, suggested liferation and the hordes of existing the late night session, one of Baker’s 600, and he was right, at least in the nuclear weapons rather than on the

POLICY OPTIONS 27 MAY 2005 John J. Noble

one delivery system least likely to be comforted by their belief that we are o here are some of the lessons I used. That being said, when the not threatened by a nuclear attack on S want to suggest: United States decided to proceed with the United States, without realizing 1) Canada-US defence relations BMD, we should have supported it. the horrible consequences to many have a long history of co- NORAD’s early warning and Canadians of a nuclear attack on operation. There have been tracking information is an essential many centres in the United States. times when that cooperation element to any BMD system. By They, and the government that is has been strained, mainly by agreeing that the NORAD informa- supposed to lead us, are either sleep- political actions on either side tion could be provided to the BMD walking through history or living in of the border. The decision on system last August, Canada became cloud cuckoo land. BMD is not the first and cer- part of BMD, whatever the minister The BMD decision shows there tainly not the worst example of defence or the PM may claim. If is no taste in the Martin government on the Canadian side of the they really didn’t want to have any for leadership in the face of public border. The relationship has part in BMD, they should have opinion, in contrast to Lester withstood the test of time denied use of the NORAD informa- Pearson in arming the Bomarcs and because we are both part of tion. That wouldn’t have stopped Trudeau with respect to cruise mis- North America and neither of BMD, since the Americans could cer- sile testing in Canada. I have come us can defend the continent tainly replicate NORAD’s capacity to the opinion that the analogy without the active support elsewhere. What it would have done between BMD and the Bomarc is per- and cooperation of the other. is make NORAD totally redundant, haps the right one, but in that case, We have a border with 15 smart points and 5,000 The BMD decision shows there is no taste in the Martin miles of primeval for- government for leadership in the face of public opinion, in est. Experience has shown that the United contrast to Lester Pearson in arming the Bomarcs and Trudeau States is unable to pre- with respect to cruise missile testing in Canada. I have come to vent massive illegal the opinion that the analogy between BMD and the Bomarc is penetration across its perhaps the right one, but in that case, Diefenbaker’s defence southern border, which has 10 times as many minister had the courage to resign, whereas Bill Graham would Americans officers have us believe we are not part of a system that can’t work patrolling it as do our without the information provided by NORAD. much more vast and remote land and water and clearly the Canadian govern- Diefenbaker’s defence minister had frontiers. ment of last August didn’t want to do the courage to resign, whereas Bill 2) Two of Canada’s cherished that. The government is claiming it Graham would have us believe we Liberal leaders, Lester Pearson has said “no” to BMD, when in fact it are not part of a system that can’t and Pierre Trudeau, didn’t has said “yes” to the only thing that work without the information pro- shy away from taking deci- the United States needs from Canada vided by NORAD. sions on defence issues that from a technical viewpoint. While lost a golden were politically unpopular the American administration would opportunity for statesmanship by not with their caucus and public have liked to have political support standing up in the House some time with opinion. Even for a project designed to provide ago and assuring the PM that his party Mackenzie King, the original defence for North Americans, they would support BMD, even if members Mr. Dithers, promised that no don’t need that for the system to of the Liberal Party would not. The one would be allowed to become operational. stance he has taken on BMD since last attack the US from Canadian I don’t believe that the US sys- July is not one of leadership. territory. Similarly, Brian tem will be capable of differentiating But I am not a Cassandra, predict- Mulroney wasn’t afraid to say between missiles aimed at Buffalo or ing the end of NORAD or dire conse- “no” to President Reagan on , or Detroit and Windsor, or quences for the Martin government in SDI, because he had estab- Vancouver or Seattle, or Washington as a result of the BMD lished a clear working rela- and New York, and that the vast decision. The relationship is too deep, tionship with Reagan and majority of Canadians will be pro- too diversified, and too important to had increased defence spend- tected by the system just as much as the national interests of both countries ing and addressed other Americans. Many Canadians seem for that. American preoccupations.

28 OPTIONS POLITIQUES MAI 2005 Defending the United States and Canada, in North America and abroad

3) Interpersonal relations constructive manner. But 7) Don’t count the welcome between Canadian and Canadian governments also commitments in the February American leaders are impor- need to avoid falling for the 23 budget on increased tant as they establish the knee-jerk anti-Americanism defence spending as money basis on which differences that pervades our culture in the bank. Most of it won’t can be better understood and and political process. come until after another fed- accepted. Martin wants to be 5) Our new ambassador to eral election. seen in Washington as being different Interpersonal relations between Canadian and American leaders from Jean Chrétien, are important as they establish the basis on which differences but his BMD deci- can be better understood and accepted. Martin wants to be sion casts him in the same light. seen in Washington as being different from Jean Chrétien, but 4) The US will never his BMD decision casts him in the same light. be satisfied with the level of defence spending by Washington, Frank McKenna, 8) NORAD remains in the strate- Canada, which is only ever may have precipitated the gic interest of both countries. taken seriously in Canada in announcement of the BMD Indeed, the extension of times of real crisis. If the US decision by his honesty. In NORAD-type arrangements really wants Canada to do future he may have to be for our land and sea forces, something involving diffi- more careful in his public which also have a long histo- cult domestic political deci- statements, unless he is ry of cooperation, would sions, it is perhaps best to absolutely certain what the clearly be in our strategic do it behind closed doors real intentions of his political national interest. rather than through public masters are. admonishments from their 6) Sometimes Canadian objec- John J. Noble, a retired ambassador ambassador in Ottawa. tives can best be achieved by who spent many years on Canada/US Public diplomacy has a role privately urging the US presi- relations in Canada’s foreign affairs to play in both Ottawa and dent to make proposals rather ministry, is a fellow of the Washington, but so does than have them come from Weatherhead Center for International quiet diplomacy. The US the . Affairs at , a for- needs an ally like Canada Pearson used to say you can mer Fulbright Fellow, and an associ- that doesn’t always see get a lot more done if you ate of the Centre for Trade Policy and issues through the same give someone else the credit, Law of and the prism and isn’t afraid to and Mulroney proved that . make its views known in a with the Open Skies proposal. [email protected]

POLICY OPTIONS 29 MAY 2005