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2018-12-10 Post- Reform in the : Leadership, Education, and Professional Development

Domansky, Katie

Domansky, K. (2018). Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces: Leadership, Education, and Professional Development (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/34926 http://hdl.handle.net/1880/109304 doctoral thesis

University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces:

Leadership, Education, and Professional Development

by

Katie Domansky

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

CALGARY, ALBERTA

DECEMBER, 2018

© Katie Domansky 2018 ABSTRACT

After the “” of the early 1990s, a government investigation concluded that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) had become dysfunctional as a professional military force and needed to be comprehensively reformed. It was perceived to be a deeply flawed institution whose soldiers were ill prepared, without discipline, and lacking leadership, leading to systemic breakdown and pointing clearly to an inappropriate organizational culture. The subsequent reform movement initiated by the government in 1997 to address these perceived problems covered a range of issues, but a critical focus was the need to redress the failure of military leadership, alter the way in which the Canadian military perceives of itself as a professional organization, and to inculcate an ethos appropriate to the CAF.

This dissertation analyzes that reform process, applying concepts of military innovation and change, organizational culture, and organizational learning to determine which factors had the greatest influence on the introduction and process of change in the post-Somalia context. It assesses the degree to which the reforms specifically dedicated to training, education, and professional development have been implemented and the impact they have had on the CAF as an institution. Ultimately, it concludes that the CAF is a fundamentally different institution today than it was when the post-Somalia reform program was first launched. This is undoubtedly a result of its engagement with the reforms and efforts made to introduce new concepts, values, narratives, and behaviours into CAF practices, procedures, and expectations. While it is still not clear that the CAF has completely institutionalized all of the intended changes, a shift in culture has occurred, improvements can be identified, and the process of change and introspection remains ongoing.

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

That old adage, “it took a village,” could not be more true than for the raising of this dissertation. I may have shouldered the burden of producing the paper myself, but without the network of support, encouragement, and love holding my mind and body together over these last (too many) years, this project would never have reached its conclusion.

I am incredibly grateful for the financial support provided to me throughout my time at the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies (CMSS). This project would not have come to fruition without the contributions made by CMSS, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of (SSHRC), and the governments of Alberta and Canada. I am also grateful for the gift of many extra hours away from work granted by my WNA team in those last crucial months. Juggling full time work with the dissertation was not easy.

To my supervisor, Dr. Bercuson: I blame you entirely for this. Until I took your Canadian military history undergrad class, I never had any fits of grandeur involving grad school or any of the other academic accomplishments I have since achieved. This dissertation is a testament to your skill and dedication as a teacher. You inspired me to think big and challenge the status quo, and I will be forever grateful for your unwavering support. Thank you for serving as my teacher, my mentor, and my friend.

Dr. Herwig, you also share the blame. You too have inspired me since undergrad to expand my intellectual horizons and your words of encouragement, winks, and quiet nods have pushed me throughout my academic journey to work towards excellence, but to have fun while doing it. Your support – particularly during my comps – was invaluable.

And to all the other professors at CMSS who offered their time and expertise, thank you. Particularly Dr. Keeley, for serving on my supervisory committee and offering your support whenever I crossed your path. I may not have always understood what you were trying to tell me, but I knew it was important! And Dr. Hiebert, for providing counsel and words of encouragement during the darkest of my dissertation days. Finding a female mentor in my field was an unexpected and invaluable gift.

iii

Thank you Donna, Jamie, Shelley, and Nancy – the administrative dream team that has kept CMSS afloat over the years. Your answers to my constant questions, daily chats, and cheerleading in my life have been so very appreciated. Donna and Jamie especially, thank you for all the laughs.

To my fellow CMSS students, you have helped make this journey worthwhile. I have formed lifelong friendships and am so grateful to have shared this journey with so many interesting, intelligent, and dedicated people. Thank you for sharing in my panic and occasional despair, keeping me sane, and celebrating our many victories over such good scotch. A special shout out to all the members of my original cohort, and to Steve, Bill, and Ruth for providing support that has lasted far beyond the confines of my PhD journey. And Amara: I never would have made it without you.

To my family and friends, near and far, your steadfast support and encouragement are behind everything I do. Without it this dissertation would have been impossible. A special thanks to my Mom and Dad, who provided a safe haven during many dark days. Thank you for your unwavering love and encouragement. And Libby… your exuberance and zest for life have always precluded you from official therapy dog status, but the best decision we ever made was bringing you home with us. You have provided more love and therapy than I could have ever hoped for, and your constant perch by my side as I finished this paper was exactly what I needed. Thanks for being my sounding board.

And finally, to my husband Jeroen. You make everything, all of this, worth it. Your strength, words of encouragement, wicked sense of humour, and selflessness in taking care of me during this journey meant everything. Thank you for your unending dedication to my health and happiness. I never would have made it without you.

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... ii Acknowledgements ...... iii Table of Contents ...... v List of Abbreviations ...... vi List of Figures ...... viii Preface ...... ix Introduction ...... 1 CHAPTER 1 - The Processes of Military Change ...... 7 1.1 The Sources of Military Innovation ...... 9 1.2 Leading Change ...... 25 1.3 Institutionalizing Change ...... 30 CHAPTER 2 - Military Leadership, Professionalism, and Education ...... 39 2.1 Leading Professionalism ...... 47 2.2 Professional Military Education ...... 49 CHAPTER 3 - Educating Canada's Military: A Battle Against Cultural Norms ...... 72 3.1 The Origins of the Problem: Myths, Apathy, and Tactical Fixations ...... 73 3.2 The Cold War and a New Strategic Environment: Professionalism of a New Kind ...... 86 CHAPTER 4 - At the Heart of the Problem: A Failure of Leadership and Professionalism ...... 116 4.2 Identifying the Problem: The Somalia Affair and its Aftermath ...... 121 CHAPTER 5 - The Reform Movement ...... 140 5.1 Driving Reform ...... 141 5.2 Shaping the Reform Program ...... 165 CHAPTER 6 - Implementation ...... 174 CHAPTER 7 - Institutionalization? ...... 216 Conclusion ...... 237 Bibliography ...... 240

v LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AETHRP Awareness Education and Training for Harassment and Racism Prevention AFC Armed Forces Council AMSC Advanced Military Studies Course BOTC Basic Officer Training Course CAF Canadian Armed Forces CAR Canadian Airborne Regiment CARBG Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group CCPME College of Military Professional Education CDA Canadian Defence Academy CDC Canadian Defence College CDEC Canadian Defence Education Centre CDEE Canadian Defence Education Establishments CDS Chief of the Defence CEF Canadian Expeditionary Force CEOTP Continuing Education Officer Training Plan CF Canadian Forces CFR Commissioning from the Ranks Plan CFCSC Canadian Forces Command and Staff College CFHQ Canadian Forces Headquarters CFLI Canadian Forces Leadership Institute CFRETS Canadian Forces Recruiting, Education, and Training System CFTS Canadian Forces Training System CLFCSC Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College CMC Canadian Military College CMR Collège Militaire Royal COIN Counter-insurgency CSC Command and Staff Course DEM Daily Executive Meeting DEO Direct Entry Officers DEP Defence Ethics Program DFAIT Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade DLM Directorate of Learning Management DM Deputy Minister DMC Defence Management Committee DND Department of National Defence DPD Directorate of Professional Development DPED Directorate of Professional Education and Development EAB Education Advisory Board ELM Enhanced Leadership Model GM Manager IFOR Implementation Force JAG Judge Advocate General JCSC (L) Junior Command and Staff Course – Land

vi JSC Junior Staff Course LFRR Land Force Reserve Restructuring MMC Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the Canadian Armed Forces MMC2 Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change MND Minister of National Defence MOC Military Occupation Classification MP Military Police NDC National Defence College NATO North Treaty Organization NSSC National Security Studies Course OCTP Officer Candidate Training Plan ODRB Officer Development Review Board OGS Officer General Specification OPD Officer Professional Development OPI Office of Primary Interest OPDC Officer Professional Development Council OPDWG Officer Professional Development Working Group PAS Performance Appraisal System PCO Privy Council Office PDOC Professional Development Oversight Council RAF RCAN RCN RN Royal Navy ROTP Regular Officer Training Program RMC Royal Military College SCR Somalia Commission Report SIP Strategic Intake Plan SOPD Senior Officer Professional Development TES Trained Effective Strength UN UNITAF United Task Force US of America UTP University Training Plan VCDS Vice Chief of the Defence Staff YR Young Report

vii LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: The Four Pillars of Officer Professional Development …………………………… 154 Figure 2: The Officer’s Professional Development Handbook ……………………………… 157

viii PREFACE

The 1990s have often been labeled a “Decade of Darkness” within the Canadian defence community. Former Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General was the first to use this term when he described the impact of sizeable budget cuts to defence expenditures by the Liberal government in 1994. He lamented these reductions and what he perceived to be the lasting, negative legacy that they brought into effect.1 The term has since been used to represent the entire experience of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) during the 1990s. 2 This experience was characterised by serious budget cuts, an increased operational tempo, a series of military scandals, followed by investigations into military affairs and an externally imposed reform program to right perceived problems.3 It was undeniably a period of breakdown in civil-military relations in Canada and represented a crisis of professionalism within the CAF itself.

Residing at the heart of this decade of darkness was the “Somalia Affair”, which served as catalyst for both recognizing the problems inherent within the military by this time and for forming and implementing the reforms that tried to push a fundamentally different institution into the new millennium. The Affair evolved from a number of violent incidents involving civilians during the

CAF deployment to Somalia. The most serious of these incidents was the fatal torture of a Somali teenager at the hands of Canadian soldiers, often remembered as one of the darkest moments in

1 Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Land Staff, quoted during the Combat Development Board, 12 May 2003, Historica Canada, accessed on 17 December 2015, https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/ general-rick-hillier-retires/ 2 The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) was the definitive name of Canada’s military after the navy, army, and air force were unified into one common force in 1968. While the designation Canadian Forces (CF) was used for a time, the CAF designation was restored in 2013 under the Harper government and will be used throughout this paper to refer to Canada’s military in any era. 3 Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley, “The Road to Transformation: Ascending from the Decade of Darkness,” Canadian Military History 16:4 (Autumn 2007).

ix Canadian military history.4 The victim, 16-year-old Shidane Arone, was arrested and detained by members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) on deployment to Somalia as part of a United

Nations (UN) sanctioned humanitarian intervention. 5 Arone was caught on the Canadian compound ostensibly trying to loot goods for sale on the black market. Within earshot of other members of the Regiment, Master Corporal Clayton Matchee and Private Kyle Brown blindfolded, handcuffed, and bound Arone by ropes, before subjecting him to a brutal beating. Severe blows to the head with a wooden riot baton, periodic burning, and suffocation all eventually killed him. He was pronounced dead upon arrival at the unit medical section later that night. At least sixteen

Canadian soldiers, including officers, heard Arone’s cries or witnessed firsthand the assaults against him, but no one attempted to stop the unfolding tragedy.6

News of the murder didn’t reach the Canadian public until several weeks later, when a military police investigation finally commenced. It began on the same day that Master Corporal

Matchee attempted to take his own life while being held in connection with the event. 7

Unfortunately, as the investigation continued, the murder of Arone was compounded in horror for the Canadian people by further revelations. First, other civilian deaths had occurred at the hands of Canadian soldiers in Somalia. There were four violent incidents in total, and while two ended without indictments when investigations determined involved soldiers were operating in accordance with Canadian rules of engagement, the other two resulted in serious charges against

4 John A. English, Lament for an Army, The Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism (, ON: Irwin Publishing, 1998). 5 For a complete overview of the Canadian mission in Somalia see: Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, 5 vols (: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997). 6 David Bercuson, Significant Incident, Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1996). 7 CBC, “Canadian soldiers under investigation,” CBC Digital Archives, accessed on 13 March 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/war-conflict/peacekeeping/the-somalia-affair/canadian-soldiers-under- investigation.html

x members of the CAF.8 Second, serious racist and inappropriate behaviour had been documented within the Airborne long before it was chosen for deployment. The military had recorded incidents of CAR elements defying superiors, flying rebel flags in military quarters, setting an officer’s car on fire, among other activities inconsistent with Canadian values. 9 Public outrage reached a fevered pitch in January 1995 when video evidence was leaked to several media outlets. The first aired on 16 January and depicted brutally racist remarks by Canadian soldiers while on base in

Somalia. Taken in February and March 1993 as a memento of the mission, this video depicted soldiers wearing black face, brandishing riot batons for “breaking arms, legs, and limbs,” and calling the Somali people “lazy”, “slobs”, and “stinky”, among other derogatory racist terms.10 A second video was leaked on 18 January showing Airborne members taking part in wild and disgusting hazing rituals that were violent, brutal, and racist in nature.11

Finally, accusations of a cover-up, not only in Somalia, but also at National Defence

Headquarters in Ottawa consolidated public disappointment.12 Allegations surfaced that senior military officers asked soldiers to destroy images and other evidence showing abuse of Somali civilians, that they were slow to respond to the incidents of violence, and that their response was a direct result of public discontent rather than a sincere desire to right unacceptable wrongs.13 Others alleged that the cover-up concerned the Progressive Conservative leadership campaign of then

8 Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Information Legacy: A Compendium of Source Material from the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, CD-ROM (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997), Document No. DND288515, “Briefing Note Prepared by MGen Boyle for the Minister of National Defence,” 29 October 1993. 9 Ibid., Document No. DND011769, “Canadian Airborne Regiment – Past Incidents,” 5 October 1993. 10 Ibid., Control No. 802400, “Airborne Home Video Renews Calls for Inquiry.” 11 Ibid., Document No. DND060129, “Military Police Investigation Report, CDO, Canadian Airborne Regiment Miscellaneous, Negligent Performance of Duty CAFB Petawawa,” 22 January 1995. 12 , Somalia Cover-Up, A Commissioner’s Journal (Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1997), 1-6. 13 Canada, Information Legacy, Control No. 001526, Document No. DND017735, “Memorandum, Ruth Cardinal to Assoc. ADM, Media Relations: Somalia,” 21 November 1994.

xi Defence Minister ; they suggested that there was an attempt to hide or downplay the killings to protect Campbell’s career and allow front-line soldiers to take the fall.14

As each of these disturbing revelations surfaced, the civil-military relationship in Canada was put under increasing strain. Civil-military relations describes the complicated relationship between civil society and the military institution established to protect it. At the core of this relationship lies the concept of control: the civil authority must determine the best way in which to control the institution they have invested with a monopoly over coercive power. The civil- military challenge is to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to do, with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do.15 Another important element of this relationship concerns the premise that a military force should always reflect the norms and values of its parent society.16 Outside of simply operating under government control, the military has a responsibility to reflect and represent – at all times – evolving societal values. Achieving this normative parity yields dividends in the form of enhanced operational efficiency and favourable public opinion, both core subjects of political concern.

Ultimately, the Somalia Affair demonstrated that the Canadian civil-military relationship had become dysfunctional. The military was perceived to be out of control, pursuing its own agenda, and no longer operating in accordance with civilian expectations. Further, the racist, violent, and occasionally dishonest behaviour demonstrated by Canadian soldiers was completely out of synch with Canadian values. Continuing revelations of unacceptable behaviour across the entire institution led to a loss of trust and respect for the CAF in general. The civil authority wasn’t

14 David Pugliese, “The Tainted Mission – Part 1: The Somalia Affair,” The Spectator, Hamilton, , 21 June 1997. 15 Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society 23:2 (Winter 1996), 149. 16 James Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society 29:1 (Fall 2002), 8.

xii blameless – with numerous studies demonstrating that decisions made by successive Canadian governments had an impact on deteriorating military morale, professionalism, and capabilities – but military actions were undeniably disconnected from political and public expectations.17 A serious breakdown in the civil-military relationship was manifest in Canada and the government chose to respond by criticising and investigating the military.

On 23 January 1995, Defence Minister announced that the CAR would be disbanded – a first within the CAF.18 He also called for the creation of a civilian panel to investigate the incidents in Somalia within the context of the entire mission.19 With mixed feelings amongst CAF personnel, and a refusal on the part of commanding officer Lieutenant- Peter

Kenward to accept “that this regiment is disbanded in disgrace,” the final parade of the CAR was held on 5 March 1995.20 Fifteen days later, the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of

Canadian Forces to Somalia (the Commission) was created by an Order in Council. It was given a mandate to conduct a comprehensive examination of the Somalia mission pre, during, and post- deployment, including those areas left out by the initial military inquiry.21

If the civil-military relationship was straining under the initial Airborne controversy, it came close to breaking during the Commission’s tenure. Several high-ranking soldiers and civil servants hampered the Commission by not complying with orders for disclosure, failing to produce

17 For examples of these arguments see: John A. English, Lament for an Army; Douglas Bland, The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada, 1947 to 1985 (Kingston, ON: Ronald P. Frye, 1987); J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s Army: Waging the War and Keeping the Peace (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2002). 18 This was the first time that a Canadian military unit was disbanded for disciplinary reasons, rather than as a cost- cutting or down-sizing measure. 19 Canada, Information legacy, Control No. 903646, Document No. DND018447, “Letter from David Collenette to the Right Honourble Hnatyshyn, Disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment,” Volume 83H Tab 26. 20 Peter Kasurak, A National Force, The Evolution of Canada’s Army, 1950-2000 (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2013), 1; Canada, Information Legacy, Control No. 001877, Document No. DND018977, “Letter from LGen Reay to CDS NDHQ, The CDN AB REGT recommendations for Consideration,” 19 April 1994; Canada, Information Legacy, Control No. 900235; Document No. DND 388203, “Letter from Land Force Command, Report – Fact Finding Mission, the Canadian Airborne Regiment,” 22 January 1995. 21 Canada, Information Legacy, History of the Somalia Inquiry, “Order in Council – Terms of Reference P.C. 1995- 442,” 20 March 1995.

xiii documents requested under the Inquiries Act, and even attempting to destroy documents related to the Somalia deployment. 22 The Commission described a “wall of silence” concerning the investigation, noting that officials were slow to cooperate in providing information, occasionally altered documents released to the media, attempted to delay or invalidate the inquiry through legal action, and were caught lying in their testimony at the inquiry to deflect blame to more junior ranks.23 At the same time, rumours and allegations were emerging from another CAF mission regarding more inappropriate behaviour; soldiers involved in Canadian operations in the former

Yugoslavia – from units other than the CAR – were suspected of misconduct related to alcohol consumption, wild parties, indiscriminate weapons fire, excessive use of force, sexual harassment, and sexual misconduct.24 Hope that the violence in Somalia simply represented the actions of a few bad Airborne apples faded quickly from public discourse in the face of these new developments. Public opinion polls showed a dramatic decline in confidence levels in the CAF between 1994 and 1996, with an Angus Reid poll indicating that scarcely half of retained any faith in Canada’s military forces. A similar poll in 1997 revealed that 54 percent of

Canadians surveyed believed that the recent troubles in the military “were evidence of widespread, fundamental problems in the whole structure of Canada’s Armed Forces.”25

The Commission agreed. Its final report concluded that the CAF mission in Somalia was poorly conceived and executed, demonstrating a failure of command that led to organizational breakdown and violence. Historic problems within the Airborne, political difficulties in organizing the mission, the impact of a last minute change in leadership on the eve of departure, as well as an

22 Commission, Dishonoured Legacy, Chapter 39: Openness and Disclosure of Documents, 1199-1201. 23 Ibid. 24 “Military Investigates Misconduct,” Historica Canada, first published in Maclean’s on 29 July 1996, accessed on 28 April 2015, http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/military-investigates-misconduct/#top. 25 “Slim majority keep faith in armed forces,” Calgary Herald, 3 August 1996, page A3; “Many Canadians say Forces in trouble,” Calgary Herald, 1 February 1997, page A10.

xiv apparent “chronic inability on the part of [the CAR’s] senior officers to perceive and deal with problems within the regiment” were all identified as contributing factors. 26 However, the

Commission also recognized broader institution-wide leadership failure as the superseding issue.

It suggested that a problem inherent to CAF professional culture had hindered the military’s effectiveness:

“Such systemic or institutional faults cannot be divorced from leadership responsibility, and the leadership errors in the Somalia mission were manifold and fundamental: the systems in place were inadequate and deeply flawed; practices that fuelled rampant careerism and placed individual ambition ahead of the needs of the mission had become entrenched; the oversight and supervision of crucial areas of responsibility were deeply flawed and characterized by the most superficial of assessments; even when troubling events and disturbing accounts of indiscipline and thuggery were known there was disturbing inaction or the actions that were taken exacerbated and deepened the problems; planning, training and overall preparations fell far short of what was required; subordinates were held to standards of accountability that many of those above were not prepared to abide by. Our soldiers searched, often in vain, for leadership and inspiration.”27

Numerous other committees established to investigate the apparent problems quickly supported and reiterated the Commission’s conclusions. These included former Defence Minister Douglas

Young’s ‘Blue Ribbon’ Panel on Leadership and Management in the Canadian Forces, former

Chief Justice Brian Dickson’s review of various military justice issues, the House of Commons

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs’, the Special Senate Committee on the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia, and the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves.28

26 Desbarats, Somalia Cover-Up, 21. 27 Commission, Dishonoured Legacy, Preface, xxix. 28 Department of National Defence (DND), Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces by The Honourable M. Douglas Young, P.C., M.P., Minister of National Defence and Minister of Veterans Affairs, 25 March 1997; Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services, Chairman Brian Dickson, Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services, 14 March 1997 and Report on the Quasi-Judicial Role of the Minister of National Defence, 25 July 1997, together comprising the “Dickson Report” (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997); House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, Chairman Pat O’Brien, Moving Forward: A Strategic Plan for Quality of Life Improvements in the Canadian Forces (Ottawa: The Committee,

xv Together, the conclusions reached by each of these investigations had far-reaching implications. They suggested that Somalia was not an isolated incident or a unique event in exceptional circumstances. Rather it was a symptom of broader institutional problems and a general leadership malaise that went far beyond individual officer mistakes on the battlefield.

Somalia served as a catalyst, facilitating national recognition of these pre-existing and fundamental issues. The military institution itself was perceived as deeply flawed with problems stretching up the chain of command that were systemic in nature, pointing to an inappropriate organizational culture that was out of touch with the values and expectations of the government and overall

Canadian society. These issues implied that serious deficiencies in cultural attitudes regarding duty and accountability had developed within the organization. These deficiencies were not new, nor were they a result of the Somalia experience itself. They were entrenched features of CAF culture that had developed over time and would remain a problem if left unattended. Somalia simply demonstrated that these issues had led to a serious loss of professionalism and, ultimately, a failure of leadership.

1998); and Special Senate Committee on the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia, Report, Issue 1: April 9, 1997 and Report, Issue 2: April 17, 1997 (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, 1997).

xvi INTRODUCTION

Very quickly after the Somalia Affair, sweeping change was widely acknowledged – at least outside the military – as the only way to restore Canada’s lost faith in its armed forces. This drive for change was initiated in 1997 with the introduction of a comprehensive military reform program by then Minister of Defence Douglas Young. This program was designed to fundamentally alter the way in which the Canadian military perceives of itself as a professional organization and to inculcate an ethos appropriate to the CAF and its role within Canadian society.

Unlike previous civilian-led reform efforts, which generally focused on institutional organization and administration, these reforms collectively sought to change the ethos and culture of the institution itself.1 These reforms were far-reaching and covered a range of issues including mission preparation, professional development, ethics and accountability, ethos, pay, benefits, and deployment procedures. Significantly, these reforms were imposed upon a resistant military by external government forces. This included civilian oversight in the form of the Minister’s

Monitoring Committee on Change in the Canadian Forces (MMC). The role of the MMC was to externally observe, verify, and measure the success of the reform implementation process. While the

Committee – which sat for six years – lacked the authority to actually implement anything, it was able to hold in camera hearings, speak to troops without their superiors present, and then to report to the Minister of National Defence on the rate of progress, experiences, and conditions under which

1 Examples of previous administrative reform efforts include the integration and unification of the Armed Forces in the 1960s, the incorporation of the Official Languages Act, and policies on multiculturalism, women, homosexuals, and other minority groups. For a cultural examination of the CAF’s institutional reaction to these changes see: Donna Winslow, Phyllis Brown, and Angela Febbraro, “Diversity in the Canadian Forces,” in Cultural Diversity in the Armed Forces: An International Comparison, eds. Joseph Soeters and Jan van der Meulen (New York: Routledg 2007).

1 the reforms were actually being implemented. 2 The creation of this external civilian body to monitor internal military changes represented a loss of professional status for the CAF. It also made the post-Somalia reform process a unique event in the history of Canadian defence policy.

Within the overall reform movement, the need to redress the perceived failure of military leadership and loss of CAF professionalism was a critical focus. In a well-functioning military, these concepts complement and support one another in a self-reinforcing relationship. Good leaders help in cultivating and maintaining a strong professional ethos, while simultaneously, a strong professional ethos is necessary to support a system of training and education that is capable of developing good leaders. Unfortunately, the CAF officer corps failed to cultivate this relationship. As Defence Minister Young noted in his 1997 report, inadequate officer professional development had resulted in weaknesses in leadership and management of the CAF, a failure to adapt to changing conditions, lack of strategic thinking, disciplinary difficulties, and isolation from broader Canadian society.3

Young was aided in his assessment by four prominent military historians and political scientists – Dr. J. L. Granatstein, Dr. David J. Bercuson, Albert Legault, and Desmond Morton - who collectively focused on education as both the problem and potential solution through which to address these issues.4 They noted that “the CAF [had] a remarkably ill-educated officer corps, surely one of the worst in the Western world.”5 Only 53.29 percent of officers had a university

2 Letter from the Honourable Willard Estey and “Preliminary Report of the Defence Minister’s Monitoring Committee,” 31 March 1998, accessed through Department of National Defence, ATI Request A-2011-01593/TO-3. To avoid confusion, the term “military professional” in this paper refers to the officers of the Canadian Armed Forces, and does not include the non-commissioned officers. 3 DND, Report to the Prime Minister by the Honourable M. Douglas Young. 4 Dr. J.L. Granatstein, For Efficient and Effective Military Forces, a paper prepared for the Minister of National Defence, Canadian Institute of International Affairs (25 March 1997); Dr. David J. Bercuson, Report to the Minister of National Defence, University of Calgary (25 March 1997); Albert Legault, Bringing the Canadian Forces into the Twenty-First Century, a report submitted to the Minister of National Defence (25 March 1997); and Desmond Morton, What to tell the Minister, a paper for the Minister of National Defence (25 March 1997). 5 Granatstein, For Efficient and Effective Military Forces, 19.

2 degree by 1997 and only 6.79 percent had graduate degrees, most of those in technical and science based areas. More than a quarter of officers only had a high school diploma. 6 This slowly contributed to the development of an officer corps with only a vague understanding of what ethos, professionalism, and leadership meant to the Canadian military institution; further, the institution itself lacked the intellectual framework to push its officers to question current practices and adapt to the shifting societal, political, and strategic context in which they were to operate.

Recognizing this problem, sixteen of the post-Somalia reforms were specifically focused on officer training, education, and professional development. They recommended a diverse range of changes to improve education and to alter the CAF’s institutional ethos. These included: making a university degree a pre-requisite to commissioning as an officer; a review of the Officer

Professional Development (OPD) Program and teaching methodologies; a thorough examination of the undergraduate program at the Royal Military College (RMC) of Canada; introducing methods for integrating a broad liberal arts based curriculum at various military institutions while also embracing the technical phase of professional development; and addressing civil-military issues related to professorships, cooperative programs, and the Regular Officer Training Program

(ROTP). These reforms were designed around the belief that an effective military force requires an officer corps that is educated as well as trained, in both the theory and practical application of military force.7 It was no longer sufficient for CAF officers to focus solely on tactical, technical, or military solutions to assigned or unexpected problems. They needed to possess the basic skills of critical evaluation and analysis to thoroughly understand the nature of those problems, while also cultivating the knowledge and skills to adapt or improvise to suit changing conditions. “Put

6 Ibid. 7 Young, Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces.

3 simply, they must acquire the thinking skills that a liberal arts education affords as the basis for whatever technical learning they need also acquire.”8

It has been twenty years since the introduction of the reform program and of these sixteen reforms in particular. It is time to assess the degree to which they have been implemented and the impact they have had on the CAF as an institution. An integral component of any reform process is an evaluation of the change that has occurred. It is necessary to determine how much progress has been made in order to evaluate the success of the reform movement and to move forward with further positive growth and development. The question is: to what extent have these reforms succeeded in altering the way that CAF officers are professionally developed, trained, and educated? Has there been a fundamental shift in the way that the institution views and values education and professionalism?

In practical terms, the answers to these questions are easily evaluated. Statistical data, policy documents, curriculum changes, and the creation of new committees and learning institutions all provide evidence that, to a certain extent, the way in which officers are developed has fundamentally changed. One must simply match the request made by a particular reform to tangible actions taken. For example, if degrees were to be made a pre-requisite for officer commissioning, then officers must now have a degree to be commissioned. Much more difficult to evaluate, is the extent to which these reforms have been permanently institutionalized within the organization. Did the CAF simply change its behaviour in a few areas to satisfy government demands or have the organization’s underlying assumptions been fundamentally altered? After all, serious deficiencies in cultural attitudes regarding duty, accountability, and the value of education to professionalism were identified as the source of CAF problems. If those cultural norms and

8 Canada, Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Interim Report – 1999 (Ottawa: National Defence, June 1999), 42.

4 conventions remain, any reforms achieved may be simply serving as makeshift expedients against further civil-military strife. The fear is that entrenched organizational traits incompatible with an innovation are likely to resume, allowing the organization to return to familiar practices and undermining the attempted change.

For this reason, scholars of military innovation studies argue that a change in culture is necessary to ensure the institutionalization of any reform. Culture represents the values, beliefs, assumptions, and norms that prescribe thought and action within an organization. It influences an organization’s members by telling them who they are, in what ways things are done, and how they should understand the world, the organization, and their role within both.9 To permanently alter the behaviour of an entire organization – meaning that the reforms remain even after personnel and leadership change – the underlying cultural norms that contradict the intended reforms must be altered as well. This type of change is exceptionally complicated. It demands an understanding of individual and organizational learning processes, as new knowledge for application can be gained through different methods or pathways including formal education, training, battlefield experience, generationally shared knowledge, and informal networks or communities of practice.

It requires a new group narrative providing meaning for the altered cultural attributes; these narratives represent the primary source material informing understandings of self-identity and what constitutes appropriate behaviour. 10 Modified operation and reward systems provide motivation and incentives for consistent changes, while clear performance improvement producing visible group benefits reinforces their acceptance. Finally, leadership buy-in provides the final and most critical element, tying all the others together.

9 Terry Terriff, “Warriors and Innovators, Military Change and Organizational Culture in the US Marine Corps,” Defence Studies 6:2 (June 2006), 218. 10 John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 156.

5

Considering these features or components of effective cultural change within the larger process of military innovation, this dissertation seeks to develop an understanding of the leadership reform process within the Canadian post-Somalia context. The goal is to determine the extent to which these reforms have been implemented, accepted, and institutionalized. The CAF was to become a professional organization that championed critical and strategic thinking, and that constantly questioned itself and the world around it, acquiring, interpreting, and retaining new knowledge while modifying its behaviour to reflect changing conditions. Is the military still a reluctant partner within the reform movement or has there been a cultural shift within the institution, a shift to accept a new understanding of Canadian professional military ethos, professional development standards, and the importance of education to officer development?

6 CHAPTER 1 The Processes of Military Change

In any military organizational reform program, a range of factors influence how the program develops and whether the process of change is successful, partially successful, or has failed outright. These factors include civil-military relations, bureaucratic politics, strategic context, and military or strategic culture. They may manifest differently in different situations, with a greater or lesser impact at any given time, but each has an effect on how an organization reacts to innovation and change. Even the absence of one factor as a element is significant.

Over the last several decades, a growing literature examining the sources and development of major military change – that is changes in the goals, actual strategies, and/or structure of a military organization – has developed.1 A major focus of this literature is the process of military innovation, which includes developing new military technologies, tactics, strategies, and structures.2 Innovation can occur as a stand-alone process or it may evolve along other pathways.

It may begin as adaptation, adjusting existing military means and methods over time until multiple adjustments gradually form new innovations. Or it may include external processes of military emulation, importing new tools and ways of war through imitation of other militaries. Emulation is usually a product of threat assessments, norm diffusion, or alliance politics. 3 Together,

1 This definition for “major military change” was provided by Theo Farrell in a paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention in 1996, San Diego, CA. Quoted in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, “The Sources of Military Change,” in The Sources of Military Change, Culture, Politics, Technology, eds., Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002), 5. 2 Adam Grissom, “The future of military innovation studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29:5 (October 2006), 907- 908. 3 Farrell and Terriff, “The Sources of Military Change,” 5-7. See also: Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, “Military Transformation in NATO: A Framework for Analysis,” in A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change, eds. Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga, and Theo Farrell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 7.

7 innovation, adaptation, and emulation represent three methods or pathways through which military change can occur.

In the Canadian case, the reforms recommended by the government and implemented by the military are an example of major change and represent innovative solutions to perceived problems. They were not simply small adjustments to existing means and methods or an effort to emulate or adopt the structures and practices of another organization – although these processes occasionally contributed. These reforms challenged existing ideas, practices, and cultural norms, while incorporating the attributes necessary to fulfill a consensus definition of military innovation: namely that an innovation must change the manner in which military forces function in the field, demonstrating a link to operational praxis; must be significant in scope and impact, negating minor reforms with ambiguous effects; and must be tacitly equated with greater military effectiveness.4

This definition was synthesized by Adam Grissom from the “tangle of orthogonal, and even contradictory, definitions” put forward by military innovation scholars over the past thirty years.

While diverse in their presentation, Grissom recognized that all scholars gravitate towards historical cases of military innovation that share these three distinct components.5

The post-Somalia reforms meet each of these criteria, at least in intent if not also in practice.

The size and scope of their impact was certainly all encompassing, touching nearly every aspect of military life. Force structure, recruitment, training, professional standards, ethics and accountability, disciplinary conduct, doctrine, ethos, and strategic outlook are only a sample of the areas targeted by the reforms. These were not minor, ambiguous changes. Further, these reforms focused on altering operational practices and increasing military effectiveness as end goals.

Somalia represented a failure on the battlefield and demonstrated that the CAF was ill prepared to

4 Grissom, “The future of military innovation studies,” 907. 5 Ibid.

8 meet Canada’s contemporary security needs. Every reform included in the program was meant to fundamentally improve the manner in which Canadian soldiers prepare for missions, execute them, and then return home to learn from their experiences.

Given this innovative focus, the emerging field of military innovation studies can provide significant insight into the myriad factors influencing the Canadian reform process. Military innovation studies seeks to explain and understand the factors that determine whether a military organization will innovate, as well as the processes by which it can successfully do so.

1.1 The Sources of Military Innovation

Change is a constant in any organization. Technological developments, the acquisition of new equipment, structural alterations, or the introduction of innovative processes, strategies, or doctrines are all normal evolutionary features of organizational growth. However, fundamental or major change is rare. Institutions, and especially military institutions, are generally characterized as conservative, inflexible, and fearful of change. As Stephen Rosen notes, “everything we know in theory about large bureaucracies suggests not only that they are hard to change, but that they are designed not to change.” Bureaucracies produce routine, repetitive, and orderly action supporting continuity not variation.6 While willing to make small adjustments as necessary, they prefer tried and tested structures and strategies rather than adopting new and novel approaches.

Military organizations in particular seek to bring order and linearity to an environment governed by chaotic unpredictability.

While this implies that military organizations must be pushed and prodded – if not occasionally dragged kicking and screaming – into major change initiatives, it is certainly true that major change within military organizations can and does occur; the historical record is

6 Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 2. [Emphasis original]

9 littered with relevant examples. The question then becomes, why do military organizations, given their tendency to resistance, ever undertake change, and what are the particular processes by which this change occurs?

Barry Posen first sought to answer this question in 1984 with his book The Sources of

Military Doctrine. Posen is considered the first scholar to really introduce military innovation studies, presenting a new social scientific approach to military innovation in his book. Posen combined elements of historical narrative, operational history, and bureaucratic case studies to determine which forces are the most relevant to encouraging militaries to innovate. He situated his discussion within a theoretical comparison of organization theory and balance of power theory.7

The former focuses on explaining organizational behaviour in large, functionally specialized bureaucracies. The theory posits that within modern state structures militaries operate as one of many specialist bureaucracies, commanding a specific type of expertise that ensures a measure of independence. Military organizations will be left to their own devices, as civilians lack the knowledge or skills to evaluate a state’s military needs and will become dependent on a professional military for advice and then action. Further, it predicts that these militaries will tend towards deliberate evasion of civilian control in the pursuit of their own interests. 8 These assumptions are derived from the idea that organizations are always seeking to reconcile their mission, capabilities, and influence. Every organization has a particular function or purpose – a mission to perform – that they believe they are best suited to address. To perform this mission effectively, many organizations need to maintain substantial and expensive capabilities, and thus

7 Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 34-80. 8 Ibid., 41-59.

10 they seek influence, to both protect their position of authority on a given subject as well as to impact budgetary decisions and earn a suitable share of finite resources.9

In contrast, balance of power theory seeks to explain the behaviour of sovereign political units in any unregulated environment. The constraints and incentives inherent within an anarchical international system push state actors towards particular actions. In general, periods of international calm will tend to see little civilian interest in military affairs as the possibility of war appears remote; the more volatile the international situation, the greater the threat of war, and the more likely civilian attention will shift from other priorities towards the military.10

Posen applied these two theories to focused case studies of interwar doctrinal developments in Britain, France, and Germany, seeking to identify and explain examples of innovation. He found that organization theory is useful to understanding the operational preferences and general behavioural tendencies of militaries themselves, but balance of power theory explains when and why civilians intervene to force change. He concluded that militaries are unlikely to innovate autonomously for reasons consistent with organization theory: changes in traditional patterns always involve uncertainty, and organizations detest uncertainty; they seek stability to negate the uncertainties of war both on individuals and on the organization as a whole; military organizations are also very hierarchical, which restricts the movement of ideas from the lower ranks to their superiors who are in the best position to effect change; and finally, those at the top of the hierarchy, who have achieved their rank and position by mastering the old doctrine, are uninterested in bringing in new doctrine to encourage their own obsolescence.11 Posen noted that militaries – and each individual service in particular – tend to zealously guard the status quo, fearing that any

9 Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla A. Clapp, and Arnold Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Second Edition (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 25-61. 10 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 59-79. 11 Ibid., 224-225.

11 change might result in a loss of autonomy, authority, funding, or influence. Exceptions occur only in response to operational failures of such magnitude that they challenge the organization’s basic purpose.12 The German Reichswehr in the aftermath of the First World War serves as one example.

While it largely returned to the offensive doctrine with which it started the war, significant changes were instituted under Chief of Staff General Hans Von Seeckt. Von Seeckt identified what he believed to be German tactical failures during the war and revised existing doctrine to embrace movement and combined arms, which he felt would successfully prevent the recurrence of trench warfare.13 Ultimately, Germany’s defeat in the war prompted a more critical military analysis of the tactics employed and made the idea of reform acceptable.

To explain any innovations occurring without a significant battlefield catastrophe, Posen looked to civilian intervention guided by national security imperatives. He noted that in low threat environments civilian leaders tend to focus their attention on other matters of state, generally satisfied with evolutionary or incremental improvement within their militaries and are unlikely to interfere in military matters. In situations when threats to national security are high, however, civilian leaders intervene to impose or guide innovation, usually with the assistance of a supportive officer or two from within the service itself. He suggested that these officers provide civilians with necessary military expertise and someone on the inside to foster and push innovation in the desired trajectory.14 The support provided to senior civilians in Great Britain by Air Marshall Hugh

Dowding serves as Posen’s strongest case study in support of this argument. He contended that civilian leadership spearheaded efforts within the Royal Air Force (RAF) to improve British integrated air defence immediately preceding the Second World War, but that Dowding’s

12 Ibid., 41-47. 13 Ibid., 190-191. 14 Ibid., 59-67.

12 interference was required to overcome internal opposition, which sought to focus on strategic bombing instead.15

Posen’s focus on civilian interference has been bolstered by numerous other empirical studies including Kimberly Zisk’s Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military

Innovation 1955-1991 and Deborah Avant’s Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars. Zisk’s examination of Soviet doctrinal development during the Cold War discusses how the Soviet military was influenced by civil servants and academics to respond to

NATO doctrinal changes. She demonstrated that the role of civilian defence analysts grew markedly over time and played a vital role in late Cold War Soviet defence planning. While she conceded that innovations enhancing current resources or organizational autonomy originated from within the military itself, she argues that any radical changes were derived from external civilian sources.16 Deborah Avant shifted the focus to British and American counter-insurgency campaigns, exploring differences in their actions in both South Africa and Vietnam.17 She traced political system variances to the ability – or inability – of political leaders to do more than micromanage their forces or to replace senior commanders in the field. Arguing that civilian choices made during the initial establishment of a military will condition civil-military relations over time, she explained military innovation through the long-term interaction between the military and its environment.18 She emphasized the “principal-agent” nature of the relationship between military and civilian leadership, noting that military leaders will invariably strive to keep their

15 Ibid., 141-178. 16 Kimberly M. Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation 1955-1991 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). 17 Deborah Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). 18 Ibid., 14-15.

13 benefactors satisfied to ensure their institutional survival.19 Like Posen and Zisk, Avant traced success or failure in military innovation to dynamics in civil-military relations.

The key issues within this civil-military school are military responsiveness to civilian policy and the ability of civilian policymakers to effect military innovation. The literature recognizes that militaries are often less inclined than their civilian counterparts to contemplate or undertake major change in response to changing strategic or policy priorities. Like all organizations they tend to have a significant interest or stake in current practices, equipment, and structures.20 Opinion remains divided, however, on whether civilian interference is effective or necessary in directing military innovation. Posen’s argument supports the idea of civil intervention: he recognized the sluggish tendencies of militaries when it comes to change and suggests that most innovation is likely to occur or succeed when civilian policymakers get involved and garner assistance from supportive officers. Zisk also acknowledged the potential efficacy of civilian involvement, but rejected the idea that militaries must always be forced to change. She highlighted examples of “young turks” not yet socialized into the military organization, or “old timers” secure enough in their own careers to take risks, who have initiated significant change.21

Other scholars reject the premise that civilian interference is necessary at all. Stephen

Rosen contends that militaries can and will innovate by choice, even without a significant failure to shake the institution. In Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military he focused on visionary military leaders who lead innovative reform movements within their organizations without civilian motivation. These officers rely on their formal position of leadership and influence to give the change movement legitimacy.22 He argued that change imposed by external forces will

19 Ibid., 49-75. 20 Farrell and Terriff, “Military Transformation in NATO,” 8. 21 Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, 126-129. 22 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 18-22.

14 fail because civilians lack the necessary experience and expertise to ensure requests are accurate and feasible; innovations are often ambiguous by nature, as they are something untried and new, and civilians trying to request or design change within the military realm are at a distinct disadvantage. The professional military is also likely to perceive any civilian orders related to new military innovations as outside of legitimate civilian authority.23 Rosen cited the failure of the

American army to develop army-wide capabilities for counterinsurgency, even after an order given directly by President John F. Kennedy, as a classic example of these issues. Despite holding a meeting with senior military officers to make clear his personal interest in counterinsurgency, as well as creating a counterinsurgency committee on which his brother Robert sat, Kennedy could not force his military officials to accept a change. Senior army leaders believed in the superiority of conventionally trained infantry and supported the continued domination of conventional wars within the army’s strategic requirements. They “effectively blocked the shift to counterinsurgency while giving lip service to the president’s orders,” demonstrating that civilian commands to carry out military innovation are extremely difficult to enforce.24

Rosen contended that the impetus for change must originate from within the military organization itself. He recognized that militaries are disciplined, hierarchical bureaucracies that rely on officers who have worked their way up the chain of command to obtain positions of influence and power. “Unless ranks are abolished or radical forms of civilian control are introduced, in a disciplined professional army senior officers will control the professional lives of junior officers.”25 Change will occur only through the actions of those who have power and can influence an ideological struggle to redefine the legitimate activities of all members. In other

23 Ibid., 11. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid., 21.

15 words, change must work within the system. No “maverick” who “‘bucks the chain of command’ and appear[s] over the heads of their military superiors in order to use an outside force” to bring about innovation, will succeed.26 Here, Rosen challenges Posen’s conception of a ‘supportive’ officer willing to back civilian driven change. He stressed that support for new concepts must originate from within the military itself. The role of Air Marshall Dowding in the development of

British interwar air defence best illustrates their disagreement: for Posen, British civilian leaders visualized an innovative new air defence system before engaging Dowding to support its development; in contrast, Rosen argued that the internal dynamics and activities of the RAF worked to create a framework for the innovation, which eventually garnered civilian support.27 In

Rosen’s narrative, Dowding was not a maverick officer championing civilian ideas while challenging the military organization. Rather, he was a reformer working within the military system to effect change, with external support.

In Rosen’s view, respected senior military officers must formulate a strategy for innovation that reflects both intellectual and organizational factors. Civilian involvement is useful only to the extent that it supports or protects these senior officers and their programs. Pointing to examples in the United States (US) Navy and Marine Corps, Rosen demonstrated that “mainstream” officers – as opposed to mavericks – consciously challenge old theories and methods for waging war. They then suggest new methods to replace them before managing the inevitable political struggle characteristic of any attempt to implement change in a bureaucracy. Rosen argued that successful implementation will result when these officers open promotion paths for junior reformers who choose to engage with the new innovative concepts.28 Rosen emphasized the importance of intra-

26 Ibid., 11. 27 Ibid., 13-15. 28 Ibid., 20-22.

16 service rivalries to this process, positing that innovation results from competition. Senior officers manage competition over resources and authority between different branches of a military service, and thus oversee engagement with any innovations resulting from this competition.29

Rosen’s emphasis on intra-service rivalry highlights the important role that can be played by bureaucratic politics in determining when and why innovation occurs. In theory, bureaucracies are highly organized groups, characterized by formalized rules and regulations, systematic record keeping, hierarchies of status, defined career paths, and a concern for organizational identity. They have formal, neutral, rationally organized social structures that are meant to overcome uncertainty and problems associated with patrimonial systems that regulate relationships through privilege and favour.30 As Robert Merton and other scholars have noted, however, bureaucratic neutrality can often break down in practice, while those characteristics considered strengths can lead to rigidity in thought and action or resistance to change over time.31 Marshall Meyer noted that “bureaucracy arises due to demands for fairness and impartiality in administration, which are attained through rules and strict accountability.” However, the growth of bureaucratic structures can result “in proliferation of hierarchy and fragmentation of the environment such that effectiveness may be self-limiting and periodic reorganization needed.”32

The nature of bureaucratic politics is such that for any single issue, the military is composed of numerous individuals, services, branches, and other units that will have various approaches and differences in goals and objectives. Each different person or group will have divergent interests and perceptions regarding how to address any one problem, leading to potential conflict over the

29 Ibid., 76-105. Rosen differentiates between peacetime, wartime, and technological innovation. Given the subject of this study, his arguments related to peacetime innovation are the focus here. 30 Patricia M. Shields, “The Bureaucracy in Military Sociology,” in Armed Forces and International Society, Global Trends and Issues, eds. Jean Callaghan and Franz Kernic (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 181. 31 Ibid., 181-183. 32 Marshall W. Meyer, Change in Public Bureaucracies (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 41.

17 issue.33 Graham Allison explored this phenomenon in Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban

Missile Crisis by examining how organizational processes and capabilities – essentially the working bureaucracy – constrains and shapes leadership decisions. Choosing to innovate, to step outside of established means and methods, can require leaders to challenge and even undermine successful bureaucratic norms. The complicated bureaucratic machine, with all of its rules, hierarchies, and regulations makes the change process extremely daunting.34

Allison also recognized that the array of resources available to any person or group, as well as their freedom to take action, emerges directly from bureaucratic policies and processes.

Competition for resources, funding, leadership attention, authority, and autonomy of action develop between different bureaucratic elements within the overall organization, leading to rivalries, politicking, and negotiation. 35 These trends can hinder innovation if fear of losing resources, influence, etc., leads to caution and inaction. But in some cases, they can have the opposite effect. Rosen’s intra-service model already highlighted this potential. Other scholars present inter-service examples, focusing on the relationship between different military services and arguing that resource scarcity can be a key catalyst for innovation. Different services will compete to address contested mission areas using different capabilities, believing that the victor will accrue additional resources. Innovation is the result.36 Vincent Davis provided a technology- driven explanation within this school, arguing that militaries will innovate by first building technologies and then integrating them into doctrine. Mid-level officers within different services

33 Jerel A. Rosati, “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective,” World Politics 33:2 (January 1981), 236-237. 34 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). 35 Ibid. 36 Grissom, “The future of military innovation studies”, 910-911.

18 compete within this model to integrate their technological innovations into warfighting doctrine and thus assert their service’s authority on any given mission.37

Owen Cote also attempted to understand innovation by examining competition between military services. He built upon Rosen’s intra-service argument, but suggested that cooperation within one service to out-innovate a rival service has a stronger influence than intra-service competition. Those who are likely to compete or hinder the success of any one intra-service innovation will generally champion those changes that will improve their own service’s situation relative to another.38 His argument is bolstered by evidence from the US Navy’s development of the Polaris and Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile weapon systems and subsequent changes in nuclear doctrine.

One important element shaping bureaucratic politics within any organization is culture.

Organizational culture influences all relationships, internal or external, that an organization cultivates and itself can serve as a major causal factor in – or hindrance to – innovation. Theo

Farrell has been identified as the original figure propagating the cultural model of military innovation. He argued that culture fundamentally shapes an organization’s reaction to technological and strategic opportunities.39 Unfortunately, culture can be an ambiguous concept.

As Colonel M. D. Capstick noted, the general term culture defies easy, cross-disciplinary definition.40 Often used differently by historians, psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists, culture is a fluid and indistinct concept. However, military culture lends itself nicely to definition

37 Vincent Davis, The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases, Monograph Series in World Affairs, University of Denver 4:3 (1967), 56. 38 Owen Reid Cote Jr., The politics of innovative military doctrine: The United States Navy and fleet ballistic missiles, dissertation prepared for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Ann Arbor, US: Dissertations Publishing, 1996), 28. 39 Grissom, “The future of military innovation studies,” 916. 40 Colonel M.D. Capstick, “Defining the Culture: The in the 21st Century,” Canadian Military Journal 4:1 (Spring 2003).

19 within a sociological lens, given the institutional nature of both the military and its role within broader societal and governmental processes. Edgar Schein’s definition for culture as “group norms” among a set of people that “has had enough stability and common history to have allowed” these norms to form, is thus useful.41 He proposed that culture can be understood as a pattern of basic assumptions, invented, discovered, or developed by a given group learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration. These assumptions must have worked well enough in the past to be considered valid, and to be passed on to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel about problems.42

Allen English pushed this definition further, suggesting that culture must also be linked to identity. Successful organizational cultures provide a sense of identity for their members through the socialization of new recruits by previous generations. Norms and values dictating attitudes and behaviour are thus propagated over time. 43 Donna Winslow agreed with English, describing culture as a “social shaping force” that serves to mobilize groups. It “shapes members’ perceptions and cognitions of meanings and realities.”44 She also noted that belonging to the group can become a predominant focus of identity, especially within military forces, where group achievements are rewarded over individual successes, and group goals often exclude independent thought or reasoning.45

In simplest terms then, military culture can be understood as “an amalgam of values, customs, traditions and their philosophical underpinnings that, over time, [create] a shared

41 Edgar Schein, “Organizational Culture,” American Psychologist 45:2 (1990), 111. 42 Ibid., 111-112. 43 Allen English, Understanding Military Culture, A Canadian Perspective ( & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 14-21. 44 Donna Winslow, “Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline in Peace Operations,” Canadian Review of Sociology 35:3 (1998), 347. 45 Ibid., 346.

20 institutional ethos.”46 It is the sum of the motivations, aspirations, norms, and rules of conduct governing the behavior of military members, and serves four basic functions: providing a sense of identity for members of the institution, serving as a tool for interpreting organizational events, reinforcing organizational values, and acting as a control mechanism on the behavior of members. 47 Essentially, culture provides a sense of purpose, a framework within which to understand and solve problems, and a guide for identifying appropriate situational behavior.

The factors that influence the development and evolution of this culture over time are varied and often interdependent. Further, as Joseph Collins recognized, they occur both within and outside the institution. 48 Williamson Murray identified the primary influences as: historical experience, professional ethos, geography, operational environment, recent experience, technology, and civil-military relations (particularly the relationship of the larger society to the military).49 While some, such as historical experience and geography, are permanent and static, others are constantly evolving and provide different challenges at different times. Together, these factors create a dynamic environment within which culture must evolve and adapt. Some cultures embrace change and maintain flexibility, often incorporating a learning culture into their broader cultural focus. Others resist change and embrace the status quo. Organizational cultural preferences and bias often provide convincing explanations for why certain organizations continue to pursue methods and ways of warfare that are incompatible with strategic or operational realities and resist attempts at innovation.50

46 Commission of Inquiry, Dishonoured Legacy Volume 1, Chapter 5: Military Culture and Ethics, 77-82. 47 English, Understanding Military Culture, 5, 16. 48 Joseph Collins, “The Complex Context of American Military Culture: A Practitioner’s View,” The Washington Quarterly 21:4 (1998), 213-214. 49 Williamson Murray, “The future of American Military Culture: Does Military Culture Matter?” Orbis 43:1 (1999), 28-29. 50 Terry Terriff, “Warriors and Innovators,” 216.

21 Within military innovation’s culture model, Farrell and Terry Terriff have differentiated between planned change – when senior military leaders manipulate or reshape culture to lead the organization toward innovation – and externally led change, where outside shocks can fundamentally undermine existing norms and values, reshaping culture and providing fertile ground for innovation. 51 The first of these processes, planned change, involves the active mobilization of ideas and interests behind new beliefs of identity and appropriate behaviour. It suggests a conscious use of culture by military elites. 52 This may include military leaders instigating innovation through the promotion of new theories of victory. This military-led innovation idea recognizes that you need a leader with authority to champion change that challenges those norms, values, or practices that military organizations take for granted.53 Another planned change example includes political elites seeking to alter culture at the national level, subsequently affecting military change in the process. 54 For example, Edward Rhodes demonstrated how a late-nineteenth century campaign by American political leaders to promote a national identity consistent with naval power resulted in the development of a powerful US navy.55

The second process – which can often be tied to the first in either producing planned change or playing a supporting role in change campaigns already underway – focuses on trauma from external sources significant enough to undermine existing cultural norms. Farrell and Terriff identified utter defeat on the battlefield as the archetypal example of such an external shock.56

51 Farrell and Terriff, “Sources of Military Change,” 8-9. 52 Ibid. 53 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 19-20. 54 Farrell and Terriff, “The Sources of Military Change,” 9. 55 Edward Rhodes, “Constructing Power: Cultural Transformation and Strategic Adjustment in the 1890s,” in Politics of Strategic Adjustment, eds. Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Rhodes (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998). 56 Farrell and Terriff, “The Sources of Military Change,” 8.

22 Innovation that challenges organizational identity requires this type of outside jolt to the system to force a fundamental re-evaluation of accepted purpose and practice.

Strategic imperative for change can also serve this function. Threat is an obvious and plausible stimulus for the introduction of innovative ideas and willingness on the part of military forces to accept change. The same is true of new technological developments, those of the enemy or your own developed to gain an added advantage on the battlefield. As Terry Terriff and Frans

Osinga noted, “military organizations will innovate when they perceive that they face new challenges from a change in the strategic/military environment or because operational experience has indicated that their battlefield effectiveness is inadequate or inappropriate.”57 The reaction of many European states to the new international environment in the post-Cold War period demonstrates this trend. France, for example, learned from its experience in the 1991 Gulf War that expeditionary capabilities, alongside coalition or allied partners, were integral to its long-term success within the post-Cold War international system. Poland reached the same conclusion, albeit much later, after several uncomfortable deployments abroad that exposed deficiencies in conducting expeditionary operations.58

Altogether then, this study proposes that the key factors affecting the process of military innovation are derived from four primary sources: civil-military relations, bureaucratic politics

(including intra- and inter-service politics), military or organizational culture, and strategic imperative for change. In any specific case study, factors within these major elements can be categorized as either sourcing change or serving as a factor affecting its implementation, what

Terriff and Osinga classify as drivers and shapers. Those factors that drive innovation serve as the

57 Terry Terriff and Frans Osinga, “The Diffusion of Military Transformation to European Militaries,” in A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change, eds. Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga, and Theo Farrell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 195. 58 Ibid., 59-82, 167-186, 195-196.

23 source or motivation for change, while shapers condition the trajectory and content of the change process.59 In either case, these ‘agents of change’ serve a fundamental role in pushing or guiding an organization towards innovation and in ensuring that the implementation of change doesn’t halt before innovation is achieved and institutionalized.

Of course, without a champion, these agents of change would struggle to have an impact.

As Lieutenant-Colonel Jeffrey Stouffer argued, “leaders are the principal agents of change and their actions largely determine the success or failure of any change effort.”60 Stouffer’s statement focused broadly on the introduction and implementation of change as one of many military leadership challenges, but his statement is interesting on multiple levels. The term “leaders” could be interpreted, as Stouffer suggested, as high-ranking political or military brass choosing to implement a change program; the government and/or officer corps use their position of influence and authority to introduce innovation from the top down. Posen’s civilian led efforts with

“maverick” support, Rosen’s “reformers”, and Farrell and Terriff’s planned change model are all relevant here. A case could also be made that “leaders” refers less to rank and more to leadership initiative, providing for examples of bottom-up innovation. Another interpretation might shift the focus entirely, to leaders (in the officer corps sense) as shapers rather than drivers of change. The question then becomes: to what extent does the buy-in of the officer corps, regardless of who initially drives the change movement, matter to whether innovation is successful? How much buy- in is necessary – one officer, two, all of them? These questions become even more complicated when the specific innovations concern changes to leadership interpretation and development. Who

59 Ibid., 209. 60 Jeffrey Stouffer, “Change,” in The Military Leadership Handbook, eds. Bernd Horn and Robert W. Walker (Dundurn Group, 2008), 32.

24 or what must serve the leadership role in an innovation program designed to change leadership itself?

1.2 Leading Change

For many scholars, the role of institutional leadership is integral to both the introduction and success of any military innovation. These leaders are responsible for influencing individual growth and success, as well as organizational direction, effectiveness, and development. As

Colonel Bernd Horn noted, they are “charged with overseeing system capabilities and performance and making major policy, system, and organizational changes designed to ensure the organization’s continued strength, relevancy, and viability.”61

A common assumption amongst many of the authors already cited is that military innovation is a top down process, a direct result of the choices made by leadership who exercise influence and authority over subordinates. This is hardly surprising. After all, the institutional performance of any military is a direct result of processes operating within a structured, complex, hierarchical bureaucracy. Military leaders operationalize political objectives through policies and programs that are delegated down the organizational hierarchy or chain of command for implementation. Authority flows from the top of the structure down to its executing elements, where “top” refers to senior military leadership as well as organizations external to the military chain of command that exercise influence over institutional behaviour (political leadership).62

In Posen’s view, military institutions either react to battlefield failures or to civilian leaders who forcefully push militaries into novel activities to address new threats. Either way, he

61 Colonel Bernd Horn, “Institutional Leadership: Understanding the Command, Management, and Leadership Nexus,” in Institutional Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Contemporary Issues, ed. Robert W. Walker (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007), 99. 62 James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War, Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007 (California: Stanford University Press, 2010), 34.

25 concluded that military leadership inevitably acts in such a way as to satisfy or reflect the wishes of their political leaders. Avant placed more emphasis on civil-military organizational relationships as sources of resistance or support for military innovation, but supported Posen’s top down view. She simply shifted the focus from civilian driven change to the military pursuing incentives to meet civilian needs. Even Rosen, who rejected the argument for civilian led innovation, understood the innovative process as one instigated by visionary senior officers with influence and legitimate positions of power. In each of these cases, innovation is driven from the top down.

Aligning these explanations in what he calls the “great man” school, Keith Bickel noted that each top down description showcases the leaders of innovation as falling within one of four categories: civilian intervener, military leader (near or at the top of his service hierarchy), military maverick, or military genius.63 In the first case, civilians intervene from outside of the military organization because they fear that current military doctrine or structures do not meet the needs of national strategy; they take action to avert future military disaster or defeat by altering the political parameters within which the military operates. The second case describes military leaders who possess the rank, and therefore the power, to effect changes within the military bureaucracy. The idea here “is that while the power of an idea may be determined by the character of the man who holds it, the outcome of the bureaucratic struggle around that idea hinges on who is doing the struggling.”64 A maverick officer is the opposite of the ranking military leader, seeking to effect change without possessing the rank within a given service to directly do so. This officer’s vision for change is usually at odds with or a step ahead of his military superiors. Finally, the role of

63 Keith B. Bickel, “Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940,” a dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Company, 1998), 20. 64 Ibid., 21.

26 military genius is filled by individuals to whom the intellectual genius behind a certain idea or doctrine is accredited. Bickel cited Captain Earl Ellis, progenitor of amphibious warfare, and

British Air Chief Marshal Hugh Trenchard as examples.65

Unfortunately, focusing on top down explanations presents an incomplete picture of innovative military processes. There are a multitude of examples and explanations for change within military forces that draw upon bottom up developments. James Russell argued that recognizing and understanding “organically generated innovation” or innovation started at “the bottom,” can help to provide a more comprehensive understanding of military change. Often these complex and dynamic processes enable military organizations to innovate “in the absence of, or prior to, the emergence of new doctrines at the top levels of command or politico-military decision- making structures.”66 Russell pointed to the recent American experience in Iraq to support his argument. He suggested that America’s battlefield performance can be best explained as “a complex, dialectic process of organically executed innovation [that] unfolded over an extended period.” Change resulted from “a process led from the field by units engaged with the enemy, and this unit-level innovation preceded the formation of the US military’s new COIN [counter- insurgency] doctrine by many months.”67 He asserted that the hierarchically driven change of the

Posen, Avant, or Rosen variety simply does not adequately explain the American experience in this case. Theo Farrell reached a similar conclusion regarding British operations in Helmand

Province, . He traced the efforts of six different task forces deployed between mid-

2006 to mid-2009, noting that the British military campaign evolved from one centred on hard military power directed at destroying the Taliban, to one championing ‘soft effects’ and securing

65 Ibid., 21-22. 66 Russell, Innovation, Transformation and War, 40. 67 Ibid.

27 the civilian population. These changes were adapted and improved upon in each successive deployment by troops learning in the field. The process of institutionalizing these lessons in structural and doctrinal changes didn’t begin until much later.68

These wartime examples of bottom up innovation, those of the ‘learn and innovate or die’ variety, are supported by a myriad of others occurring throughout history. 69 However, Sten

Rynning also demonstrated that bottom up innovation is just as plausible during peacetime. He focused on France’s recent experience with military transformation, suggesting that the Chief of

Staff’s 2006 transformation plan, Document de politique générale sur la transformation, was not the onset of reform, but rather one of its outcomes.70 He argued that French political leadership was frozen in a stand off by the late 1990s while the military brass were preoccupied by inadequate preparation in allied military affairs. Transformation finally emerged when the Chief of Staff reacted to reform efforts among the lower echelons of the French forces and developments taking place in allied American and British forces.71

Within this bottom up process, the leaders of change don’t often fit within any of Bickel’s

“great man” categories. They are not civilian, nor mavericks challenging political authority within the institution. They are rarely a leader within the top ranks of a given service. While they may display certain elements of military genius, their role is different than that of the intellectual doctrine makers working on a prospective vision for future warfare; change here is based upon

68 Theo Farrell, “Improving in War, Military adaptation and the British Helmand, 2006-2009,” in Contemporary Military Innovation, Between Anticipation and Adaptation, eds. Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky and Kjell Inge Bjerga (New York: Routledge, 2012), 130-146. 69 Examples include the gradual evolution of German infantry tactics during the First World War or US innovation in Normandy during the Second World War. 70 Sten Rynning, “From Bottom-Up to Top-Down Transformation: Military Change in France,” in A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change, eds. Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga, and Theo Farrell (California: Stanford University Press, 2010), 61. 71 Ibid., 59-62.

28 reflective analysis of actual experience.72 Bickel suggested that the leader of bottom up innovation could be considered a “promoter of change”, a recognized authority on a particular form of warfare. He labeled them the “expert”, someone often at the front lines of the fight and the learning curve, who may influence the opinion of peers but who is still subject to the whims of superiors who can accept or reject innovative ideas.73 He used a case study of the tactical adaptation and innovation behind the development of the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual to support his conclusions. He argued that the efforts of low to mid-level officers after their experiences in the

‘small wars’ of Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua led to doctrinal changes in the face of opposition from senior leadership. They used “informal channels” such as personal written or verbal communication with other officers and the creation of monographs, either published or student papers; formal doctrinal changes, in the form of the Small Wars Manual, emerged later.74

His conclusions are supported by Russell, who provided contemporary examples of informal channels in his discussion of army websites, blogs, emails, and other forms of digital media used to share experiences and expertise with new units who then applied the lessons learned.

Bickel’s analysis is particularly interesting for the emphasis he placed on the role of individuals. While he recognized that environmental and organizational factors – strategic conditions, politics, bureaucracy, culture, etc. – absolutely influence the process of institutional change, he argued that organizations ultimately learn through individuals who learn.75 First, he meant that new ideas or conceptions are introduced to the organization via individuals or groups of individuals who have new understandings of particular processes, structures, or events. An idea presented by these individuals will spread to others within the organization, either from the top

72 Bickel, “Mars Learning,” 22. 73 Ibid., 22-23. 74 Ibid., 28 75 Ibid., 301.

29 down or from the bottom up. In this sense, individual learning precedes organizational learning.

Bickel’s argument also related to how change is institutionalized. He argued that a new idea or concept may be introduced to an organization, but if the individuals who make up that group don’t understand and then accept it, the change process will fail: organizations can only learn if all the different elements or individuals that make up that organization learn. 76 The key becomes understanding how individual knowledge is introduced and then assimilated within the organization to become fundamental and permanent change.

1.3 Institutionalizing Change

This conception of ‘military change as organizational learning’ is consistent with a growing body of organizational learning theory, which builds on learning theory applied at the individual level to understand how institutions learn and adapt. It assumes that organizational learning begins when individuals first recognize – through experience or personal study – a need for change. These individuals then disseminate that knowledge throughout the larger organization seeking to change behaviour and institutional memory.77 Learning occurs in the institution when the lessons learned remain even after personnel change. The question becomes: how do these new ideas take hold, transferring from individual change leaders to the institution as a whole?

According to Peter Senge, who outlined how to create and maintain a “learning organization” in his book The Fifth Discipline, “individual learning does not guarantee organizational learning. But without it no organizational learning occurs.”78 It is therefore useful to consider learning processes at the individual level to understand how knowledge may be

76 Ibid., 299-303. 77 Ibid., 299-300; James H. Lebovic, “How Organizations Learn: U.S. Government Estimates of Foreign Military Spending,” American Journal of Political Science 39:4 (Nov. 1995), 836. 78 Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline, The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 1990), 139.

30 transferred. In her book, Lifting the Fog: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War, Janine

Davidson outlined three individual learning processes: experiential, generational, and informal networks and communities of practice. The first recognizes that individuals can learn formally, through institutionally provided education and training, or informally through self-study and experience. In each case, learning occurs experientially, through “hands-on” activities, or through intellectual reflection – reading, listening, and thinking.79 Generational learning concerns the role of experience and worldviews. Learning is facilitated by sharing knowledge among the members of one generation, with a delayed impact on the behaviour of the organization. The premise is that different generations learn different lessons. Once a new generation “whose early professional experience differed greatly from the one before it gains decision-making authority in an organization, we might expect new policies to be applied and organizational change to occur.”80

Davidson gave the example of changes to American military organization and doctrine following the Vietnam War, which many analysts and military leaders perceived to be the result of a new generation, with shared experiences, taking control.81

Finally, “informal networks” and “communities of practice” represent individuals who voluntarily participate in order to share information. In an informal network, individuals share problems, ideas, and solutions to learn from each other’s experiences. Bickel’s monographs and student papers along with Russell’s websites, blogs, and emails are all examples of this.

Communities of practice share a similar goal, but are slightly more formal in identity and purpose: they are a community of experts committed to improving practices within their profession rather

79 Janine Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2010), 24. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid., 25.

31 than a group of individuals hoping to learn from one another.82 They may use informal networks as well, but formal conferences and published papers – which may or may not be institutionally sponsored – are also a focus. Both informal networks and communities of practice help individuals make shared sense of their knowledge and experience.

Of importance here is the idea that individuals can gain new knowledge for application through a number of methods or pathways including formal education, training, battlefield experience, generationally shared knowledge, and informal networks or communities of practice.

In theory, if an organization wishes to alter institutional practices they can use any or all of these methods to disseminate new ideas to the individual members of the organization; the idea is that if all individuals within the group learn something new, the organization has learned something new. Unfortunately, this process in practice is much more complicated. Learning does not occur in a vacuum. Individuals all possess deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, and other understandings – what Senge called “mental models” – that influence how they understand new information and take action. Each individual sees their environment through a series of mental models that together represent their view of the world. These models provide the context in which individuals view and interpret new material while also determining what stored information is relevant. Mental models help make sense of the world we see, but they can also restrict our understanding to ideas that make sense within the mental model itself.83 The result is that not all individuals will be receptive to learning new ideas, may understand them differently than their colleagues, or interpret them in a way not intended by the institution. Thus, simply providing new information does not ensure institutional learning or change occurs.

82 Ibid., 25-26. 83 Daniel H. Kim, “The Link Between Individual and Organizational Learning,” Sloan Management Review 35:1 (Fall 1993), 38-39.

32 An important distinction must also be made between learning at the individual and organizational levels: unlike individuals, organizations create and develop learning systems that influence their immediate members and are also transmitted to others through organizational histories and norms. Individual learning is important, as “it is true that organizations have no other brains and senses than those of their members,” but as Bo Hedberg stated,

“it would be a mistake to conclude that organizational learning is nothing but the cumulative result of their members’ learning. Organizations do not have brains, but they have cognitive systems and memories. As individuals develop their personalities, personal habits, and beliefs over time, organizations develop worldviews and ideologies. Members come and go, and leadership changes, but organizations’ memories preserve certain behaviours, mental maps, norms, and values over time.”84

Hedberg was alluding to the fact that organizations develop their own mental models of how the world works that also influence how individuals accept and understand new knowledge. Daniel

Kim described a feedback loop, where an organization draws from a set of individual intellectual frameworks to develop its own collective mental models; in turn, the organization’s mental models can exert an influence on how the organization’s individuals view the world around them.85

Strongly institutionalized models will help to condition or direct individual learning, trying to ensure consistent interpretation and understanding of new information. These shared mental models must be supportive of change efforts if individuals are expected to understand and accept them.

Other scholars would describe this influence as organizational culture – the values, beliefs, assumptions, and norms that prescribe thought and action within an organization. The idea remains the same, however. Cultural characteristics tell the individuals within an organization who they

84 Bo Hedberg, “How organizations learn and unlearn?” In Handbook of organizational design, eds. P.C. Nystrom and W. H. Starbuck (London: Oxford University Press, 1981), 6. 85 Kim, “The Link Between,” 39-43.

33 are and how things are done, influencing their understanding of the world, the organization, and their role within both.86 The result is that highly institutionalized cultural attributes will shape identities, prescribe appropriate actions, and filter new ideas and knowledge. They can influence what, how, and if the members of an organization learn. Like Senge’s mental models, the culture of an organization must be supportive of any change effort. Any “long-standing, persistent organizational traits that are not compatible with an organizational innovation are very likely to resume and thus the organization in time will return to the way it has always done things, undermining the attempted change.”87 John P. Kotter gave the following corporate example to demonstrate this idea: he described a situation in which the General Manager (GM) of a company, after years of hard work, forced an inwardly focused and sluggish aerospace organization to begin producing innovative new products at a rapid pace. Over a five-year period, revenues went up sixty-two percent, while net income rose seventy-six percent. The GM retired, proud to have made a significant contribution to the business. Unfortunately, the new style of operating was never firmly grounded in the company’s culture and within two years of his retirement, both the new product introduction rate and the success of those products in the marketplace dropped quickly.88

Kotter argued that some of the central assumptions within the company’s culture were incompatible with the changes that had been made. Unfortunately, these inconsistencies were never confronted. While the GM and his transformation program worked tirelessly to reinforce the new practices, the total weight of their efforts overwhelmed any cultural influence. When their consistent efforts ceased, the culture reasserted itself and undermined their changes.89

86 Terriff, “Warriors and Innovators,” 218. 87 Ibid., 219. 88 John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 145-146. 89 Ibid., 146.

34 The impact of culture may also be felt in the initial stages of a change movement. Cultural attributes can affect how potential change leaders introduce new information or how organizations initially react to it. Williamson Murray gave the example of the French army, US Army Air Corps, and the Royal Air Force during the interwar years. Each of these organizations was prone to making evidence fit accepted theories and developing a culture that rejected dissent from the

“official” view.90 Such cultures are not conducive to individual creativity, initiative, or ingenuity, discouraging change movements before they can begin. Davidson agreed that certain organizations may be more culturally predisposed to learn from experiences than others; some actively promote the collection and dissemination of new information, others rigidly adhere to standard operating procedures and ignore new information.91 Organizational theorists call these groups “resistant to change” while organizational learning theorists call them “learning-deficient.” Regardless, they are constrained actors uncomfortable with adjusting behaviour, rules, or procedures, leading to incremental learning at best.92

These examples reinforce the idea that to ensure the institutionalization of any innovation, a change in culture or shared mental models is necessary. Innovation in a bureaucracy means actually doing things differently and continuing to do things differently even after personnel and leadership change. Kotter suggested that this kind of change is only possible “after you have successfully altered people’s actions, after the new behaviour produces some group benefits, and after people see the connection between the new actions and the performance improvement.”93

90 Murray, “The Future of American Military Culture,” 32-33. 91 Davidson, Lifting the Fog of Peace, 19-22. 92 Bickel, “Mars Learning,” 299-300; Lebovic, “How Organizations Learn,” 836. 93 Kotter, Leading Change, 156.

35 Terry Terriff built on this idea to outline three interrelated and necessary components of cultural change: narrative, behaviour, and perceived benefits.94

First, the narrative that provides a definition or meaning for the altered cultural attribute must change. Terriff argued that military culture is formed and constituted by discourses or narratives based on historical (and sometimes current) events, circumstances, and individuals.

They may be based purely on historical fact or have apocryphal or mythical stories mixed in.95

These narratives furnish the primary source material that informs understandings of self-identity, what it means to be a member of a particular organization, and what constitutes appropriate behaviour. If innovative changes are to be accepted permanently within an institution, these narratives must be compatible with intended outcomes.

Second, there is a need to alter the behaviour of the people comprising the organization.

After all, a successful innovation – by definition – must change the manner in which military forces function. This process begins, as Terriff argued, with imparting new knowledge and ideas to supplement or replace the old.96 This usually occurs through education and training that teaches members to think and act differently. Subsequent changes in behaviour that reflect these new lessons must then be rewarded for individuals to see a benefit in complying with the change. Rosen and Avant focused on promotion paths as an important incentive. Rosen contended that institutional change will only occur if young officers who are learning and practicing the new ideas are promoted, suggesting that generational change is key to success. 97 Avant agreed, citing promotion policy as a key mechanism for rewarding the changed behaviour of officers. She further asserted that “we should expect that military organizations will be responsive to civilian goals

94 Terriff, “Warriors and Innovators,” 219. 95 Ibid., 217. 96 Ibid., 219. 97 Rosen, Winning the Next War, 21.

36 when military leaders believe that they will be rewarded for that responsiveness,” highlighting the fact that incentives in the civil-military sphere can also factor in.98

The important role of formal leadership in the change process can be further highlighted here. As Davidson noted, leaders play a critical function in “preventing, promoting, or permitting learning to occur in their organizations.”99 They choose who is recognized, rewarded, or promoted for their actions, judging candidates on characteristics, values, and behaviours that they determine are important. Further, they can create structures or processes that are designed to disseminate new knowledge and to allow their members to share and interact with new ideas. Conversely, they can be responsible for hindering organizational learning; they may block or intervene in learning processes through education and training, delay or deter bottom up communication, or fail to capture and disseminate new knowledge or ideas.100 If the formal leadership of an organization fails to reward behaviour associated with a change movement, that movement is not likely to succeed.

The third element of Terriff’s culture change model concerns perception. The members of the organization must see that the change is resulting in a net benefit for the group; clear improvements in performance must be easily observable and unambiguous.101 Major change takes time. While those in support of the change effort will tend to stay the course, most of the rest expect to see convincing evidence that all of their effort is paying off. Indications that the changes are working, that they aren’t just absorbing resources and time, are necessary to ensuring consistent and continued commitment to the change process. Within the corporate world, Kotter suggested that this is done through highlighting short-term wins. Meeting interim deadlines and gaining

98 Avant, 99 Davidson, Lifting the Fog, 26. 100 Ibid. 101 Terriff, “Warriors and Innovators.”

37 positive press are both examples. He noted that focusing on short-term results, as part of a larger picture, is necessary to building the credibility needed to sustain efforts into the future. These results reinforce reform efforts, give them momentum, demonstrate that sacrifices are paying off, allow testing of a vision against concrete conditions, undermine the efforts of cynics and resisters, and also help to retain the essential support of leadership.102 To have a positive effect, these results must be clearly visible to the entire organization, must be unambiguous, and must clearly relate to the change effort.103

Within a military context, where improved military effectiveness supporting battlefield success is the primary goal, short-term wins are difficult to discern, particularly during peacetime.

This is especially true when changes relate to leadership and professionalism, concepts that are often very hard to quantify or define. Little agreement exists among scholars or practitioners regarding what it means to be a leader and whether or how you can prepare, educate, or train such a person within a given profession. While the purpose of this dissertation is to decide how – if at all – the CAF perception and interaction with these concepts changed as a result of the post-

Somalia reforms, it is useful to consider the wider discussion regarding these issues. The following chapter outlines various perceptions of professionalism, leadership, and military education as they have changed over time, to provide a conceptual foundation from which to understand the

Canadian case.

102 Kotter, Leading Change, 119. 103 Ibid., 122.

38 CHAPTER 2 Military Leadership, Professionalism, and Education

The Somalia Affair has been described in this dissertation as representing a “loss of professionalism” for the CAF, which is a description with multiple connotations. It denotes a scenario in which a professional body lost touch with its ethos, resulting in system breakdown and a failure to maintain or live up to certain values or ideals. It also refers to the introduction of external oversight; civilian scrutiny in the form of the MMC during the reform implementation process removed, to a certain extent, the professional imperative for internal regulation. It also speaks to the trust lost by the Canadian public in the CAF’s ability to maintain and pass on the knowledge and expertise required to meet national security objectives. Together, these issues represent the elements required for designation as a modern professional organization: namely, to be considered professional an organization must demonstrate superior knowledge and expertise in a given field, uphold a responsibility to its client to provide the service it was created for, and maintain an ability to regulate itself according to specific standards.1

This definition or list of necessary professional qualities was presented in this form by

Samuel Huntington in The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military

Relations.2 Huntington argued that a modern definition of professionalism requires all members of the profession to demonstrate qualities of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Expertise refers to specialized knowledge and skills in a particular field acquired through prolonged education and experience. It forms the basis of objective standards for professional proficiency and provides a benchmark against which to measure the relative competence of members of the

1 Samuel Huntington, Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage, 1957, 7. 2 Ibid.

39 profession.3 Expertise also highlights the comparative ignorance of everyone else, allowing the professional to “dictate” what is good or bad for the client and leaving the layman with “no choice but to accede to professional judgement.”4

The professional is also a practitioner as much as a scholar and operates within a realm that is essential to the functioning of society.5 This means that professions are distinct from all other careers or occupations in which an employee simply receives money for services rendered. True professionals are characterized by their desire to be of service rather than simply operating in the hopes of financial compensation. A profession is considered a vocation operating in a social context and performing services essential to the functioning of society. This application of expertise for the overall good gives professionals a measure of authority within society, referred to by Sam Sarkesian as “a virtual monopoly of power and responsibility, in a certain area of social need.” 6 Because the broader community rather than the profession grants this authority, responsibility is the second of Huntington’s necessary attributes. Society chooses to invest professions with powers and privileges in particular areas and in return the profession shares knowledge and advice when called upon, utilizing its special skills for socially approved purposes.

It must uphold a responsibility to provide the client – society – with the service it was created for.

To maintain this societal backing and position of authority, professions also develop customs, values, and laws that serve as a regulative code of ethics. Sarkesian explained that this code establishes norms of behaviour within client-professional relationships as well as relations between members of the profession itself.7 It engenders a sense of corporateness that sets members

3 Samuel Huntington, Soldier and the State, 8. 4 Ernest Greenwood, “Attributes of a Profession,” Social Work 2:3 (July 1957), 45. 5 Marris L. Cogan, “Toward a Definition of Profession,” Harvard Educational Review 23 (Winter 1953), 48-49. 6 Sam C. Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield, The New Military Professionalism (Willowdale, ON: Pergamon Press, 1981), 6. 7 Ibid.

40 apart from others who do not share the same knowledge, skills, or directed responsibility.

Huntington referred to this corporateness as a shared sense of “organic unity and consciousness…as a group apart,” which necessitates an ability to identify and regulate standards to which the profession is held accountable and methods through which to transfer knowledge and skills to different generations.8

While each of these professional criteria apply to the modern military, making the officer corps a professional body, military professionalism remains separate and distinct from most others.

This is due to its unique purpose and function within society: the management of violence in the resolution of a social problem, including an acceptance of unlimited liability and a licence to apply deadly force in the service of the state.9 This description encompasses the varied roles that the military has come to fulfill within society relating to the concentration of coercive force for both external defence and the maintenance of internal order.10 The military can be said to have expertise in the management of violence towards successful armed combat, a responsibility to the state to provide security and to defend societal values, and an ability to regulate, train, and educate itself according to specific customs, standards, and laws.

These characteristics set modern officers apart from the warriors of previous ages, although past conceptions of the soldier’s role in society continue to confuse current understandings.

Modern, permanent, standing armies are often professional forces composed of full-time career soldiers or conscripts that are not disbanded during peacetime. Permanent soldiers differ from reserve soldiers, who are activated only during specific periods despite being enrolled for the long

8 Huntington, Soldier and the State, 10-11. 9 Bengt Abrahamson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1973), 223; Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 11-12; Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1971), 15. 10 Amos Perlmutter and William M. LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems,” The American Political Science Review 76:4 (December 1982), 782.

41 term, and those who serve in temporary armies, which are raised from the civilian population during a war or threat of war and disbanded soon after. In popular culture, use of the term

‘professional’ to describe a soldier is often used to differentiate between a career, permanent soldier and an amateur soldier who doesn’t devote his full time to the job and is not paid for his services; in this case, professional contrasts with amateur rather than with a tradesmen of similar skills. Huntington noted that the military itself has been influenced by this trend and has struggled to accept the implications of its own professional status: “The phrases ‘professional army’ and

‘professional soldier’ have obscured the difference between the career enlisted man who is professional in the sense of one who works for monetary gain and the career officer who is professional in the very sense of one who pursues a ‘higher calling’ in the service of society.”11

Here, Frederic J. Brown and Zeb B. Bradford’s description of military professionalism is particularly useful. They recognized that membership in the officer corps does not necessarily equate to professional status:

“Professionalism is more than simply belonging to the officers corps. It is a status determined jointly by the officer and his government. Neither the state nor the officers corps will grant professional standing to the man who lacks the necessary competence or who will not agree to make an unconditional commitment to duty if he is in the combat army. The unconditional quality of his commitment is signified by the career length and life of selfless sacrifice, ranging from Melville Goodwin’s ‘genteel poverty’ to the Gettysburg ‘last full measure of devotion.’ Professionalism thus has both objective and subjective content. It is objective in that professional status is granted by the state if certain performance criteria are met by the officer. It is subjective in that the officer must feel a sense of duty to serve the lawful government ‘for the full distance,’ even at the risk of his life. Mentally, he does not condition his obligation.”12

This description speaks to the added dimensions of duty and honour intrinsic to military professionalism as well as the important civil role in defining and conditioning it. Morris Janowitz

11 Huntington, Soldier and the State, 8. 12 Zeb B. Bradford Jr. and Frederic J. Brown, The United States Army in Transition, (Beverley Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1973), 223.

42 recognized these differences by qualifying his definition of military professionalism with the concepts of gentlemanly conduct, personal fealty, brotherhood, and the pursuit of glory. He explained that military elites consider themselves “special” and “apart” because they embody the martial spirit while upholding a personal sense of fealty and allegiance, both to society and to their brotherhood.13 An incredible sense of group loyalty and fraternity within the military contributes to contemporary understandings of military honour, but also to a shared code of professional honour regarding obligations to ‘the people’.14 Janowitz described this code as self-generating, drawing on the historical achievements and practical contributions made by the military to society, whether rooted in myth or reality. The general characteristics of professionalism are given military substance here, by incorporating distinct understandings of duty and honour into its purpose and function.

While these factors and elements contribute to the military’s comparative uniqueness as a profession, any professional authority or identity that it enjoys is entirely sanctioned by the overall community. Thus, any discussion about the substance of military professionalism must also be a discussion about the realities of civil control. This control is well established in most democratic societies, conditioned by explicit laws and regulations as well as various societal customs and norms, but its characteristics help to shape understandings of military professionalism. The military must demonstrate expertise and authority in the coercive use of force, but also acceptance of the community’s value system and ‘rules of the game’: it must be competent at making war only within the general framework of values that its society subscribes to.15 This means that the nature of civil-military relations is crucial to shaping the professional nature of the military.

13 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, (New York: The Free Press, 1960), 218-219. 14Ibid., 218-220. 15 Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield, 8-9.

43 In the Canadian case, all security and defence decisions are the responsibility of the Crown acting on the advice of the governing cabinet in Parliament. While Parliament is the body responsible for overseeing and shaping national defence policy, the Department of National

Defence (DND) implements and supports that policy using various tools at its disposal, including the CAF. Members of the CAF remain servants of the Crown, but are accountable to the government of the day and mandated to execute, abide by, and defend its policies. As a group, it has sole expertise in Canada for the preparation of forces for war (or for military operations short of war), the formulation of tactics and operational strategy to be used by those forces, as well as in the logistics and operational command required to deploy them. The officer corps is responsible for providing this function to Canadian society when its government demands it. These powers and their distribution have been enshrined in common law, codified in the Constitution Act, and constrained only slightly by statute law including the National Defence Act.16 These laws and regulations assert the principle of civil control in Canada, while the distribution of responsibility for military affairs between various civilian and military leaders is an attempt to secure it.17

In theory, this is a system that was built on the principle of civil control of the military, accepting the fact that the military sphere and the civilian sphere differ fundamentally from one another. As A.J. Bacevich suggested, clear distinctions are made in this system between the exclusive domain of soldiers and that of civilian government: warfare versus politics.18 This leads

16 Philippe Lagassé, “Accountability for National Defence, Ministerial Responsibility, Military Command, and Parliamentary Oversight,” an IRPP Study, 4 March 2010, 6. 17 Ibid., 8, 42-47. In this case, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is the highest-ranking military officer in the CAF with a duty to provide the government with professional military advice and to control and administer all military activities in accordance with government objectives. The Deputy Minister of National Defence advises and reports to the Minister of National Defence, ensuring that the CDS and the military are kept accountable to the government, while the Minister is individually responsible and accountable for the state of Canada’s national security and of its armed forces. 18 A.J. Bacevich, “The paradox of Professionalism Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955,” in The Military and Society, Civil-Military Relations, ed. Peter Karsten (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1998), 193.

44 to an ethos of military life inherently different from that of the civilian world. Civilian respect for that military ethos, as well as for the privileges and responsibilities shouldered by soldiers as part of a distinctive and self-regulating profession, is the price that society chooses to pay to purchase military deference to civilian authority.19 In practice, the terms of that contract differ within specific contexts and particularly as conditions change over time.

In the Canadian case, that contract experienced a slow break down over the course of the twentieth century until, in the 1990s, the civilian government determined that the price for professional identity and authority was not being adequately paid by military deference to civilian goals and values. While the specific details of this breakdown will be covered in the following chapter, it is enough to note here that numerous factors contributed to a shifting understanding of the boundary between military and civilian spheres in Canada. A suitable military ethos supporting a strong professional culture aligned with Canadian values was slowly eroded over time, contributing to society’s loss of trust in the CAF and a professional confusion within the organization.

This understanding of military professionalism has a distinct civil-military focus. It incorporates community and institutional level issues emphasizing the political role of the military in democratic society, military versus civilian values, and the linkages between both groups. The substantive issues of professionalism – expert knowledge and skills, professional ethics, and political perspectives – have all been considered here at a macro level. However, Sarkesian reminded us that the perspective of the individual soldier is equally important. Sarkesian described professionalism as a balance between individual, institutional, and community level considerations, viewing their relationship as a system of concentric circles. At the centre lies the

19 Ibid., 193-194.

45 individual professional officer whose immediate concern is to the core value system that personally affects him. This system influences his own view of himself and his immediate world and is coloured by concerns of personal honesty, integrity, conduct, and competence.20 Each individual perceives of these issues or values from their own conscience, giving their professional understanding a decidedly individualistic dimension. However, they are also strongly influenced by institutional socialization. Each officer perceives of his relationship to the institution as directly linked to his personal value system and performance. The institution sets criteria for that performance and establishes the rules and principles by which the officer must apply his personal beliefs.21 The institution provides the context within which the personal, professional value system of the officer operates.

The institutional level is subsumed within the outer circle or community level, where the political perspective related to civil-military relations is paramount. Only a small group of officers at the highest level of the military hierarchy are directly involved in community level issues on a day to day basis, but every member of the profession contributes indirectly. While the common interests of the individual officer are largely removed from military-society relations, the performance and individual value system of each officer within the institution directly contributes to the community’s overall image of military professionalism.22

In the end, it is the responsibility of the officer corps – which holds within it the expert knowledge and expertise that is learned over a career – to cultivate, maintain, and develop the characteristics necessary to maintain the military as a profession.23 Officers work to ensure the transmission of desired professional qualities through different generations and to direct, motivate,

20 Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield, 10. 21 Ibid., 10-11. 22 Ibid., 11. 23 Huntington, Soldier and the State, 15-16.

46 and enable others “to accomplish the mission professionally and ethically, while developing or improving capabilities that contribute to mission success.”24 Leadership is an integral component in the cultivation and maintenance of a strong professional culture.

2.1 Leading Professionalism

If an organization hopes to create, nurture, and maintain professionalism and professional behaviour, it must take action – or more accurately, the leadership of that organization must take action. James R. Ball, while speaking from a corporate perspective, explained that leaders must proactively and continuously nurture professionalism to ensure that the general principles that inspire professional qualities, values, behaviours, and skills do not deteriorate over time. He argued that unprofessional behaviours exist “when leaders do not act or inadvertently allow them to exist by failing to proactively establish, communicate, and enforce a code of conduct and standards of excellence.” 25

In a military context, a breakdown in professionalism or the existence of unprofessional behaviours constitutes a failure of leadership within the officer corps. Senior leaders within the corps can foster a positive or negative professional culture through both action and inaction. In order to be considered positive, the content of each of these actions and their outcomes must coincide with the values and expectations of the client – in the military case, the government and society. Negative actions or outcomes are those that foster values, traditions, skills, or expertise that are not in line with or undermine societal expectations, while inaction allows inappropriate

24 Colonel Bernd Horn and Lieutenant-Colonel Allister MacIntyre, “Emerging from a Decade of Darkness: The Creation of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute,” in In Pursuit of Excellence: International Perspectives of Military Leadership (Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 71. 25 James R. Ball, “How to Nurture a Professional Culture in Your Organization,” Virginia Society of CPAs (July 2007), accessed on 28 April 2016, http://accounting.smartpros.com/x58021.xml

47 values and skills to grow and permeate the profession. Inaction can also fail to provide members with correct information, behaviour to model, or necessary feedback.

As Ball explained, leaders can contribute positively within their profession by establishing rules, teaching acceptable principles and skills, while also reinforcing good professional behaviour. 26 This includes adopting written codes of conduct that prescribe clear policies, procedures, values, and behaviours, ensuring that all members have consistent benchmarks and targets to achieve. No one is left guessing right from wrong or trying to determine from their own personal experience what is expected of them to think and act professionally within the organization. It also involves teaching these principles to new generations and fostering the expertise and skills required for professional development. This is achieved through a suitable training and education system that incorporates the ethos and values of the organization. Finally, leaders must provide reminders and reinforcement of proper professional behaviour through modeling, incentives, discipline, and accountability. Everyone must learn about and meet professional standards throughout their career, even as those standards change, and consequences for inappropriate behaviour are as important as rewards for proper professional conduct.

The question of how best to prepare officers to fulfill their professional role is one that troubles all militaries, regardless of time and place. The process is complicated by the need to reconcile two seemingly incompatible elements: the combat imperative with intellectual professional growth. Militaries struggle to develop a suitable system that incorporates appropriate amounts of both training – practicing a “predictable response to a predictable situation” – and education – preparing “a ‘reasoned’ response to an unpredictable situation.”27 While the first

26 Ibid. 27 Dr. Ronald G. Haycock, “The Labours of Athena and the Muses: Historical and Contemporary Aspects of Canadian Military Education,” Canadian Military Journal (Summer 2001), 8.

48 focuses on practical skills with tangible results, the second fosters creative or critical thinking in the face of the unknown. Together, they promote superior military knowledge, practical expertise, and dedication to service alongside the conflicting objective of learning to think independently.28

2.2 Professional Military Education

Finding the right balance between training and education in the preparation of officers has proven difficult for most military organizations. The debate centres around what values should – or inadvertently do – come to dominate. Peter Foot referenced the often used metaphorical debate over Sparta versus Athens to demonstrate the issue: the problem centres around finding the right balance between the predominantly ‘Spartan’ values of discipline, self-sacrifice, patriotism, and personal heroism, and the more ‘Athenian’ values of learning and high culture, creative and critical thinking, and cross-cultural sympathies. Sparta teaches mastery of what is known, while Athens gives you the tools with which to deal with the unknown.29

While Foot recognized that contemporary officers generally progress through their careers from predominantly Spartan values to predominantly Athenian ones, he also acknowledged that this progression does not always occur smoothly. Conventionally, experiential learning has dominated within many military organizations, leaving education neglected and underdeveloped.

This is a result, as Professor Ronald Haycock noted, of both the general perception of war and the nature of its development over time: first the “heroic warrior” concept has “associated the military more with muscle, individual prowess and patriotism than things cerebral like education”; and second, “mounting technological advances in weapons [has] put a premium on knowing how to

28 Richard A. Preston, To Serve Canada: A History of the Royal Military College since the Second World War (Ottawa: Press, 1991), ix. 29 Peter Foot, “Military Education and the Transformation of the Canadian Forces,” Canadian Military Journal (Spring 2006), 15.

49 use them.”30 Symbolizing the tension between theory and practice, these factors often result in the military mindset that those who have been to war know all that there is to know.

Traditionally, the issues and trends that challenged military leaders were “largely practical ones that involved training for carrying out specific skills and indoctrination for cooperative group effort in the face of battle” – essentially learning how to fight and how to fight as part of a team.31

Today, these are the elements that usually get subsumed within the range of activities labelled

‘training’, separate from other, more cerebral aspects of military preparation. John B. Hattendorf explained that the introduction into the military sphere of new scientific knowledge and technological innovations led to a growing separation of these two areas of expertise. He noted that the introduction of the practical aspects of gunpowder, artillery, fortification, cartography, and navigation brought with them a need to look beyond training for battle to broader education in mathematics, physics, and other sciences. Those who led military forces were increasingly required to make some effort to understand what was happening at the forefront of scientific thought. This was also true for the soldiers serving under them, who were progressively required to undergo scientific training to understand and apply new and different concepts and technologies on the battlefield.32

The transition from a predominant training focus to incorporating new knowledge into officer development plans was not smooth, as many questioned the necessity of including scientific education in the development of all officers. Was this new knowledge a practical issue for those applying their skills regularly in battle, or an academic issue for scholars to investigate and reason

30 Ronald G. Haycock, “‘Getting Here from There’: Trauma and Transformation in Canadian Military Education” Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies 32:1 (2004), 45-46. 31 John B. Hattendorf, “The Conundrum of Military Education in Historical Perspective,” in Military Education: Past, Present, and Future, eds. Gregory C. Kennedy and Keith Neilson (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), 2. 32 Ibid., 3-5.

50 through before providing advice to soldiers? Was this education necessary for militaries preparing for campaigns or was it a prerogative of the governments designing policies at home? Questions like these highlight the important ambiguities between theory and practice that militaries have been increasingly required – and have long struggled – to define.

Early on, the answers to these questions were satisfied by the political and social systems that divided Western societies into different classes. The leadership for military forces usually came from the aristocracy or upper classes, which supported military education through providing its offspring with the literacy skills, basic education, and social graces that were required in high command and at the centre of government.33 In this period, character rather than knowledge was considered paramount, and that character came from breeding and social position rather than training. Young noblemen received military education from childhood, but that education was a reflection of whatever the governing classes considered important at the time. This could include anything from music and hunting to using weapons and taking part in military-like sports.34

As scientific development increasingly required a more sophisticated knowledge base, military academies began to appear in Europe to help supplement aristocratic education. The early military schools of the sixteenth century began with a focus on horsemanship and the preparation of cavalry officers, but gradually incorporated scientific knowledge into their programs. These schools first appeared in Italy and quickly spread throughout Europe, with scientific military academies opening in Sedan in 1606 and in Siegen in 1617.35 French army reforms in the early

1720s led to artillery schools at a number of garrisons and the Royal Academy opened in

33 André Corvisier, Armies and Societies in Europe, 1494-1789 (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1979) 105-108. 34 Martin van Creveld, The Training of Officers, From Military Professionalism to Irrelevance (New York: The Free Press, Macmillan Inc., 1990), 19. 35 Hattendorf, “Conundrum of Military Education,” 3.

51 Portsmouth, England in 1733 followed by the Royal Military College at Woolwich in 1741.36

These types of military academies began to proliferate by the eighteenth century, but as John Child pointed out, a shift in availability did not necessarily equate to a general shift in acceptance of education as integral to officer development. He argued that an extensive education remained unnecessary for advancement through the ranks.37 As a general rule, armies continued to view weapons, drill, and tactics as necessary elements of officer development, while skills in leadership, command, and strategic thinking remained the purview of those from an acceptable heritage and class. The latter skills were not considered easily learned in a classroom or by studying books – at least not by everyone.38

In specific circles and by individual scholars, the growing need for the intellectual development of officers was slowly acknowledged and recorded. Hattendorf credited General

H.H.E. Lloyd for being the first to recognize this shift. In his 1766 history of the Seven Years’

War, Lloyd stated: “It is universally agreed upon, that no art or science is more difficult than that of war; yet by an unaccountable contradiction of the human mind, those who embrace this profession take little or no pains to study it. They seem to think that little knowledge of a few insignificant and useless trifles constitute a great officer.”39 While he acknowledged that there was a mechanical aspect to warfare that could be addressed using fixed rules and principles derived from something akin to a mathematical formula, he also understood that these rules had to be applied to ever-changing and unpredictable circumstances, requiring a well-rounded education.40

36 Ibid. 37 John Child, Armies and Warfare in Europe, 1648-1789 (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1982), 92-96. 38 Ibid., 98. 39 General H.H.E. Lloyd, The History of the Late War in Germany between the King of Prussia and the Empress of Germany and her Allies by a General Officer, quoted in Hattendorf, “Condundrum of Military Education,” 6. 40 Ibid.

52 Lloyd’s beliefs were born out of and contributed to broader developments in Enlightenment thought at the time. By the late 1740s, many military theorists were engaging with the reason- based outlook of the period in an attempt to replace the “arbitrary traditions”, “blind prejudices”, and “disorder and confusion” that had come to characterise warfare. They sought to introduce

“critical analyses and systematic schemes [to override] circumstantial differences and historical change,” believing that “the organization of armies and the conduct of war could become an orderly discipline with clear theoretical tenets.”41 Up to this point, historical study had formed the foundation of military theory. This was based on the idea that war could be studied systematically by historical observation, by the selection of successful forms of organization, and by the imitation of stratagems from antiquity and beyond.42 Military theory was essentially a synthesis of the best military models of the known cultural past.43 The Enlightenment recognized the importance of this historical knowledge base, but overshadowed it with the notion of universal rules and principles.

Over time, the German contribution to Enlightenment thought (Aufklärung – literally

Enlightenment) emerged to reject the intellectual premises that guided earlier concepts while still striving to define a systematic broadening of military knowledge. If earlier Enlightenment ideas had been fuelled by a desire to build systems and a general definitive formula, the German movement was motivated by a more humanistic vision for military theory with a strong educational emphasis. This German school emerged by the late 1770s and really took off by the 1780s until the end of the century. It concentrated on disseminating the growing base of military knowledge throughout the wider circles of the officer corps.44 A belief was formed that “the art of war, like

41 Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 27-28. 42 Ibid., 7. 43 Ibid, 9. 44 Ibid., 54-55.

53 all arts, required a professional education and considerable knowledge, and could be treated theoretically on the basis of rules and principles that relied on historical evidence, could be used as a partial substitute for direct experience, and should be applied to particular cases through critical judgement.”45 Military officers, whose lifetimes were not long enough to sufficiently learn perfect knowledge and skills through experience, could use theory to supplement whatever experience failed to provide.

Frederick the Great rounded out this period as the great influencer of German

Enlightenment thought, and while he focused a little more on principles than his predecessors did, he still championed the idea that applied thinking through theoretical study was a necessary requisite for leadership. He argued that experience never repeats itself in exactly the same way and

“it is not probable that any similar chain of causes should, in a short time, produce the same circumstances… past facts are good to store in the imagination and the memory; they furnish a repository of ideas whence a supply of materials may be obtained, but which ought to be purified by passing through the strainer of judgement.”46 Frederick facilitated the circulation of instruction manuals among his officers, conducted seminars, expanded and reorganized the cadet corps, encouraged the establishment of military libraries in garrison towns, while also opening several military schools; he provided five schools – at Wesel, Magdeburg, Breslau, Königsberg, and Berlin

– where officers studied during the winter months. 47 Patronage and descent still remained a predominant factor in rank and promotion, but curriculums increasingly incorporated history, languages, applied mathematics, and strategy into their traditional focus on fortification, siege

45 Ibid., 57. 46 Frederick II, King of Prussia, The History of the Seven Years War, Part I, Translated by Thomas Holcroft (London: G.G. J and J. Robinson, 1789), Preface, ix and xii. 47 Martin van Creveld, The Training of Officers, 22.

54 work, and field encampments.48 Over time, and following a devastating defeat at Jena in October

1806, this Prussian system continued to evolve and began to incorporate written exams for entry to the Kriegsakademie (Prussian institute of advanced military learning), an expanded curriculum, lengthened programs, and a view of military schools as more than just professional training centres. Military schools were soon considered proper universities, as “seats of higher military learning that would originate new ideas and spread them throughout the army.”49

The army itself also began to assume a more prestigious position within German society in this period, allowing it to start insisting on the need for theoretical study and professionalism as essential qualifications for officers. Martin van Creveld explained that this transition was possible

– and highly successful – due to political changes uniting the German state and fostering a new social structure under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. In Bismarck’s Germany, the rising commercial-industrial middle class, which had long been excluded from political power, put a heavy emphasis on the importance of education. It also possessed a fervent admiration for all things military. Van Creveld argued that this new class shared its military admiration with political elites and the traditionally dominant Prussian nobility, helping to unite these diverse groups behind a common respect for the military institution. 50 As a result, military education, and the

Kriegsakademie in particular, came to command a reverence within German society stemming from both the military and intellectual traditions. “Consequently its prestige stood far higher than that of any mere civilian university, and it was able to attract the crème de la crème.”51 This was true for students as much as for faculty. Permanent instructors at the academy were active and decorated members of the German army, most were considered “men on their way to the top,” and

48 Ibid., 22-23. 49 Ibid., 26. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid., 27.

55 a faculty position was a coveted assignment and an honour.52 This serves as an example of cultural, societal, and military norms uniting to support the professional development of officers. In this case, a strong military tradition and respect for the armed forces combined with an equally strong deference to the value of education, to create to a stronger military education system that reflected values and traditions in both civil and military circles.

These improvements to education within the Prussian and later German system coincided with the appearance of military schools in many other European states. This included St. Cyr in

France, High Wycombe and Marlow (later Sandhurst) in England, and West Point in the United

States. These institutions, among others, reflected the fact that late nineteenth century approaches to officer education were highly influenced by the Prussian Army system. This is particularly true after its great successes in the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars. Its evolving staff system and the idea that different levels and types of education were appropriate for different officers at various stages of their career had a significant and relatively widespread impact.53 The Prussian staff corps and its focus on extensive education, particularly education in the history of warfare, impressed military observers from around the world who began to emulate the Prussian Army’s

‘staged approach’ to developing officers: first, a broad general education and initial indoctrination to military life was provided at the outset of a soldier’s career, followed by specialized mid-career training specific to environmental specialties and, in the end, further broad education in theoretical issues and practical training in specific applications required for senior command positions.54

The opening of new military schools also demonstrated a growing acknowledgement of the fact that the conduct of war was becoming – if still slowly – a recognized profession in which

52 Ibid., 27-28. 53 Hattendorf, “Conundrum of Military Education,” 7. 54 Ibid.

56 officers could benefit from some form of education above and beyond their training.55 What exactly constituted education versus training, how much of each was appropriate, and which should be given priority throughout an officer’s career became the new overriding issues. Two opposing schools of thought emerged in response: the first continued from the early Enlightenment focus on drawing lessons from past experiences to create concrete principles; the second viewed historical study as a tool to train judgement through indirect experience.56 One group focused on the creation of exact principles for military operations based on quantifiable data and empirical evidence, while the other emphasized political and human aspects of war alongside the intellectual growth required to understand their nuances in a military context. 57 Both shared a guiding objective – the search for a general theory of warfare – but approached the issue from different theoretical foundations: warfare understood as an exact science versus warfare understood as an art.

The first group included scholars like Dietrich Heinrich von Bülow, who sought to

“organize disorder” by providing rules or principles for modern armies to follow as a prescription for success.58 Antoine-Henri de Jomini also fell into this camp. Despite labelling his definitive work, The Art of War, his conclusions were decidedly prescriptive in nature with a formulaic approach to operations using principles and maxims: “All of my works go to show the eternal influence of principles and to demonstrate that operations to be successful must be applications of principles… they are unchangeable, human reasoning can neither modify nor destroy them.” 59

Success or failure on the battlefield was determined for Jomini by the ability of officers to properly

55 Richard A. Preston, Canada’s RMC, A History of the Royal Military College, (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 4. 56 Hattendorf, “Condundrum of Military Education,” 8. 57 Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought, 70-95. 58 Ibid., 82-83. 59 Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War, translated by G.H. Mendell and W.P. Graighill, in Three All-Time Classics on Politics and War, special edition (Rockville, Maryland: ARC Manor, 2007), 321.

57 apply these principles in creative ways and at decisive times. While he acknowledged that “war is not an exact science, but a drama full of passion; that the moral qualities, the talents, the executive foresight and ability, the greatness of character, of the leaders, and the impulses, sympathies, and passions of the masses, have a great influence upon it,” he ultimately concluded that there is “not a single case where these principles, correctly applied, did not lead to success.”60 When failure did occur, it was the result of a failure in command, not of the principles themselves:

“I do confess that no book can introduce those things into a head where the germ does not previously exist by nature. I have seen many generals – marshals, even – attain a certain degree of reputation by talking largely of principles which they conceived incorrectly in theory and could not apply at all. I have seen these men intrusted with the supreme command of armies, and make the most extravagant plans, because they were totally deficient in good judgement and were filled with inordinate self-conceit. My works are not intended for such misguided persons such as these, but my desire has been to facilitate the study of the art of way for careful, inquiring minds, by pointing out directing principles.”61

Jomini’s understanding was that the conduct of war was an exact science that could be learned if the proper education was provided. However, its application required a particular nuance and timing: concrete principles applied with an artist’s touch. An educated officer was important to the extent that he could access valuable auxiliary knowledge, but

“it was not necessary that he should be a man of vast erudition. His knowledge may be limited, but it should be thorough, and he should be perfectly grounded in the principles at the base of the art of war… it is beyond question that war is a distinct science of itself, and that it is quite possible to be able to combine operations skilfully without ever having led a regiment against an enemy.”62

This suggests that a ‘proper’ education could trump practical experience if the right officer was involved. Nothing, however, trumped true natural talent and bravery. For Jomini, “the first of all

60 Ibid., 443-444. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., 282.

58 requisites for a man’s success as a leader is, that he be perfectly brave. When a general is animated by a truly martial spirit and can communicate it to his soldiers, he may commit faults, but he will gain victories and secure deserved laurels.”63

Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, a contemporary of Jomini, also acknowledged the importance of natural military talent to successful leadership in battle. For

Clausewitz, military genius constituted a harmonious balance of mind and temperament that provided officers with the physical and moral courage to inspire others, face danger, and accept responsibility. The key descriptors here are courage, intelligence, coup d’oeil, presence of mind, and political understanding.64 His conception differed from Jomini’s in its focus on strength of intellect rather than strength of character, but he still placed great emphasis on the important influence that military genius can bring to bear on the success of any given officer.

Clausewitz also noted, however, that genius does not act intuitively without the benefit of prior experience and study: “No activity of the human mind is possible without a certain stock of ideas; for the most part these are not innate but acquired, and constitute a man’s knowledge.”65 He reconciled his focus on military genius and equally strong assertion that military education was imperative, by arguing that both were necessary to create the perfect military leader. Every soldier possesses elements of genius, as it derives from human nature, and every soldier can undertake theoretical study to improve his intellect, but only the presence of both may result in “the perfect unity of character and intellect that produces a superior military leader.”66 Education formed an important element of officer development for Clausewitz, but unlike Jomini, his understanding

63 Ibid., 444. 64 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Eds. And translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 100-103. 65 Ibid., 145. 66 Ibid.

59 required that theory inform an officer’s actions rather than dictate them. Military education was to produce intimate familiarity with the subject of war, but never to construct an algebraic formula for use on the battlefield:

“The closer it comes to that goal, the more it proceeds from the objective form of a science to the subjective form of a skill, the more effective it will prove in areas where the nature of the case admits no arbiter but talent. It will, in fact, become an active ingredient of talent… [theory] is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or more accurately, to guide him in his self education, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man’s intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life… All the positive results of theoretical investigation – all the principles, rules, methods – will increasingly lack universality and absolute truth the closer they come to being positive doctrine. They are there to be used when needed, and their suitability in any given case must always be a matter of judgement. A critic should never use the results of theory as laws and standards, but only – as the soldier does – as aids to judgement.”67

Clausewitz championed the value of theory for all soldiers, accompanied by critical thinking, and particularly when provided by a broad education grounded in historical study. He called history

“the foundation for theory,” as “the events of every age must be judged in the light of its own peculiarities. One cannot therefore understand and appreciate the commanders of the past until one has placed oneself in the situation of their times, not so much by painstaking study of all its details as by an accurate appreciation of its major determining features.”68

Many other scholars within this period concurred with Clausewitz, falling closer to the

‘warfare as an art’ argument, and increasingly calling for a broader, liberal education for officers.

Alfred Thayer Mahan – although easily placed within the scientific camp given his “six principles for naval leaders” – ultimately asserted that officers required a temperament balanced by opposing characteristics related to artistic aptitude and deterministic clarity.69 As Jon Sumida noted in his

67 Ibid., 141, 157-158 68 Ibid., 593. 69 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 (London: Bison Books, 1980).

60 study on Mahan, the naval scholar desired a balanced officer, dominated by an artistic mentality capable of making judgements in the face of difficult conditions, but also possessing a strong ability to engage with administrative and engineering approaches.70 He believed that this type of officer was created through the provision of advanced education that was broadly focused and based firmly on a foundation of historical study.71

Julian Corbett, a civilian historian writing on concepts of maritime strategy and sea power in this period, also recognized the value of a broad education for officers focused on critical thinking as opposed to rules and principles. He championed a move toward a wider military outlook that included political, military, diplomatic, and commercial concepts, relationships, and ideas.72 This approach reflected wider developments related to the permeation of liberal ideals throughout the Western world in the early twentieth century. The creation of a number of international agreements by this time began to introduce certain restraints on warfare, limiting armed conflict in ways that created a requirement for officers with wider and deeper educations.

This reflected an emerging belief that militaries were not meant to use violence simply for the sake of using violence, but rather to do so with a certain amount of deliberation.73 Hattendorf described new aspects of professional military specialization and education in this period that evolved from innovations in international law, allowing political and societal developments to increasingly widen the scope of what constituted ‘military studies’.74

This trend was both positively and negatively affected by the experience of the First World

War (1914-1918), which introduced warfare on an unprecedented scale, involved mass casualties,

70 Jon Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and teaching command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 117. 71 Ibid. 72 Sir Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1988. 73 Ibid. and Michael Howard, Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation of Armed Conflict – Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 3. 74 Hattendorf, “Conundrum of Military Education,” 9.

61 mobilized entire societies to support war efforts, and pushed unparalleled numbers of soldiers through military training and education systems as rapidly as possible. During the war, the focus shifted from determining what education was necessary to maintain a high standard of officer in the modern world, to how can standards of education be upheld when more bodies, educated or not, are required at the front as soon as possible?

After the war ended, officer development systems were affected by the specific lessons learned during the conflict, which related both to combat effectiveness as much as to shifting societal norms. Some lessons centred on evolving understandings of how wars should be fought and won. These included lessons focused on the introduction of new and evolving technologies and tactical innovations that had altered the military landscape.75 These types of lessons were incorporated into training programs for future officers in all countries, although the particular lessons varied in each case, as did their effectiveness in preparing forces for the next war. In some instances, militaries focused to a detrimental extent on these specific, combat-type lessons, leading to a move away from the prewar broadening of military studies. France, for example, allowed its officer schools to become little more than “holding pools for a surplus of old, experienced (and, to add to the problem, victorious) officers” in the interwar period. 76 French military leaders increasingly focused military studies on experiential lessons learned during the First World War.

This contributed to the loss of a broader historical foundation for critical thinking and understanding, dropped in favour of a narrow and experientially focused education system.77

75 Martin van Creveld, Technology and War, From 2000BC to the Present, (Toronto: The Free Press, 1991), 175- 177. Examples include the development of highly innovative infiltration tactics by the Germans as a result of lightweight machine gun and artillery pieces that could be hauled forward by advancing infantry, usually referred to as Hutier Tactics. The use of the tank to provide cover for advancing infantry while withstanding a strong barrage, used to great effect by British forces and their allies, is another example. 76 van Creveld, Training of Officers, 43. 77 Robert A. Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939 (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1985), 83-92.

62 Robert Doughty noted that the French came to rely on “textbook solutions” to problems raised during the First World War, assuming that those problems would reappear, unchanged, in any future conflict. He credited War Minister General Huntziger for first publicly recognizing this issue in November 1940, when he noted that this narrow approach failed to produce officers who could solve unanticipated problems, make swift decisions, or issue concise orders rapidly in changing situations.78 Great Britain also suffered from a similar narrow focus. Those responsible for constructing and providing military education in the interwar period consisted of experienced

First World War veterans who took the view that “the only military history that mattered was recent history and that future conflicts would be decided by methods similar to those with which they had fought and won in .”79 Brian Bond argued that this bias was a primary factor in why the British delayed a shift towards mechanization and armoured warfare for as long as they did.80

Other lessons from the war focused more generally on understandings of what warfare meant in the modern world. These incorporated political, social, and moral changes, which affected the overall perception of soldiers, militaries, and their roles within different societies.81 In some states, a general postwar rejection of all things martial or militant was introduced; it was, after all, the “war to end all wars” for many.82 Some militaries were left isolated from their client societies, forced to learn lessons from their experience and to decide how that information should be

78 Ibid., 186. 79 van Creveld, Training of Officers, 51. 80 Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1980), 37- 38. 81 President Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’, demand for national self-determination, and the creation of an international body to facilitate inter-state cooperation are all examples of this. Margaret McMillan, “World War I: The War That Changes Everything,” Wall Street Journal, 20 June 2014, accessed on 19 October 2018, http://www.wsj.com/articles/world-war-i-the-war-that-changed-everything- 140330039. 82 H.G. Wells, The War that Will End War, (London: Frank & Cecil Palmer, 1914).

63 understood and disseminated to new generations of officers without much societal input. This was certainly the case in France and Great Britain, where the anti-military intellectual climate cultivated after the war served to isolate their militaries from other facets of society, contributing to an inward, military-focused approach to developing the officer corps. While small attempts were made to expand the image of war as a predominantly military affair – such as the British decision to include short visits to industrial firms for studying officers – there was little effort made to introduce soldiers to the non-military aspects of warfare during this period. Nor were many changes made within these states to complicate or expand the education systems already in place when the war first broke out.83

Some states did manage to grasp the new scope and scale of warfare emerging in this period to build on earlier attempts at broadening military studies. The Americans, for example, chose to incorporate politics, economics, foreign policy, and other social subjects into postwar professional development programs. Van Creveld suggested that, in this respect,

“the US Army was among the first to grasp the implications of World War I for the conduct of future armed conflict. In 1919, at a time when the authorities in most countries were only beginning to wake up to the problem, the American Secretary of War N.D. Baker wrote that modern officers required a ‘full comprehension of all agencies, governmental as well as industrial, involved in a nation at war’.”84

Foreign policy, national objectives in war, the coordinated use of military and economic power, the role of public opinion, business administration, and industrial technology were all subjects that became incorporated into courses for developing officers at the US Army War College.85 This focus also led to the development of the Army Industrial College in 1924, which sought to educate officers in the knowledge and skills required to supervise the procurement, mobilization, and

83 van Creveld, Training of Officers, 51. 84 Ibid., 63. 85 Ibid., 62-63.

64 distribution of all necessary military and non-military supplies in times of war. Van Creveld argued that this educational focus on the broader aspects of running a global war is what allowed the

Americans to achieve several “smashing grand strategic successes” during the Second World War; he highlighted the American emphasis on questions of economic and industrial mobilization and pursuit of foundations for cooperation with civilian agencies.86

Van Creveld also noted however, that neither the Army War College nor the Army

Industrial College ever managed to attain a level of acceptance during this period – whether measured in quality of study or in social prestige – equal to that of a first-rate civilian university.

He blamed the US Army’s traditional lack of emphasis on theory in education, including military theory, as well as its belief that education was a “luxury” and that an extensive period of study for all officers was impractical and unattainable.87 This mindset reflected a cultural bias within the US towards individual leaders who were “doers rather than thinkers.”88

In this respect, Van Creveld highlighted the impact and role of societal culture in shaping each military’s relationship with education. The American’s were open and interested in education when it provided tangible value and wasn’t hindered by theoretical trappings of an impractical nature. In the German example, Aufklärung ideas evolved to encourage Germans to embrace an emphasis on Bildung (education) in support of all human endeavours, contributing to a reverence for military education that necessitated periods of study for senior military leadership. Even after defeat in the First World War led to closure of the Kriegsakademie in 1919, its principles and practices were fostered within Germany in other ways and in other institutions before it was reopened in 1935, demonstrating a consistent German deference to officers educated within the

86 Ibid., 66. 87 Ibid., 64. 88 Ibid., 65.

65 military school system.89 As already discussed, the French and British were also influenced by deeply rooted cultural beliefs and various wartime experiences that shaped their approach to education over time. While not comprehensive, these generalizations and cursory examples show that military education has not been an assumed part of officer professional development, even as late as the Second World War. Its inclusion was neither a given nor a necessity for every military and it manifested very differently in each unique cultural situation, reflecting particular traditions, structures, and economic circumstances.

The experience of the Second World War and its aftermath changed this situation, serving to shift the discussion related to military education and increasing the importance placed on it throughout an officer’s career. While cultural factors, historical circumstances, and wartime imperatives still led to variation among different militaries, a number of developments occurred to increase interest in military education and imbue it with a new sense of importance. First, the dictatorial regimes that emphasized narrow concepts of technically efficient and effective armed forces that came to dominate by mid-twentieth century, were defeated during the war. This demonstrated for many the “impropriety of militarism” and a narrowly focused officer corps.90

Hattendorf cited the series of postwar war crimes trials targeting those in military uniform as well as the broad-based membership acquired by the newly formed UN as evidence of this trend.91

The wide-ranging acceptance of the UN Charter had particularly important implications for the evolution of military education as well. It was indicative of new understandings regarding the broad role and limitations of armed force in the modern world. The Charter affected understandings of state sovereignty and a military’s role in protecting it, prohibited the use of

89 Karl Demeter, The German Officer-Corps in Society and State, 1650-1945 (New York: Praeger, 1965). 90 Hattendorf, “Conundrum of Military Education,” 9. 91 Ibid.

66 force, introduced an international focus on protecting human rights and on supporting international intervention for humanitarian purposes, all of which altered and restricted the purpose and use of armed forces in signatory states. The obligation to give assistance to the UN and to refrain from assisting the target states of preventive or enforcement action, particularly in military terms, further altered perceptions of military form and function.92 This necessitated changes to how militaries understood their role within society and within the international system, as well as how they prepared their officers to participate within those arenas.

One important feature of the new ‘United Nations world’ was the fact that militaries repeatedly found themselves in charge of occupation or intervention forces in foreign lands – first as postwar occupiers and rebuilders of defeated states, but increasingly as part of peace operations designed to maintain global stability, state sovereignty, or to protect the inherent human rights of groups and individuals. The original manifestation of these operations – usually termed “traditional peacekeeping” – evolved out of the legacy of conflict resolution mechanisms introduced by the

League of Nations after the First World War: soldiers from various foreign militaries deployed to post-conflict zones to serve as “inter-positional buffer forces” between belligerents to help create an environment conducive to peaceful conflict resolution.93 Soldiers worked to keep an already agreed upon peace by reducing contact between the different sides of the conflict and diminishing the probability of disagreement, escalation of tension, or a breach of the peace. Soldiers involved in these operations faced new challenges related to serving on foreign soil, on multinational forces, with objectives and goals other than the usual ‘total defeat of enemy forces’. As Clausewitz articulated, “fighting” has always been the central act of militaries and “the object of fighting is

92 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, 1993). 93 The League of Nations was an international organization, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, created after the First World War to provide a forum for resolving international disputes.

67 the destruction or defeat of the enemy… whether by death, injury, or any other means – either completely or enough to make him stop fighting.”94 Militaries were now required to officially incorporate new roles and functions on top of the traditional. This led to engagement on diverse battlefields and required consideration of issues related to cultural differences, language barriers, working within multinational coalitions, and cooperating with civilian agencies and organizations in roles that were occasionally very non-traditional. This introduced new avenues for required officer training and education, and once again challenged the accepted balance between the two.

The Second World War also introduced nuclear weapons into the military and political arsenal. This represented a new weapons technology that soldiers were required to study, understand, and utilize as a resource to meet objectives – another example of technology catalyzing the need for broadening educational curriculum. It also had both tactical and strategic implications.

Soldiers were required to reconcile the emerging need for a new nuclear strategy – how and where to incorporate these utterly destructive weapons into their plans to defeat the enemy – with the equally important imperative of trying to avoid actually deploying these weapons as part of any plans to defeat the enemy. Given their destructive potential, the non-use of nuclear weapons in a diplomacy of deterrence and compellence came to direct both political and military engagement with them; it became enough to avert aggression, to avoid war, in order to win.95 While the intricacies of nuclear strategy and deterrence throughout the Cold War period have been covered in significant detail elsewhere, it is enough to note here that the impact of nuclear weapons on officer educational requirements was significant.96 Soldiers had to explore new ideas related to the

94 Clausewitz, On War, 226-229. 95 Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy, The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), 178-179. 96 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1965); Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976); Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

68 unviability of conventional warfare as a suitable military option as well as a new tendency to redefine war as the creation and maintenance of armed forces rather than their operational deployment.97 In addition, a prolonged lack of engagement in large-scale conventional warfare as a result of these developments – the Korean War (1950-53) being the only conventional example in the period – also created conditions conducive to an expansion of the military education system.

Soldiers were required to learn more material related to the increasing complexity of the tasks assigned to them, but a ‘long peace’ meant that more officers could take the time required to pursue education.

A great many other societal developments throughout the second half of the twentieth century also affected, and in many cases served to promote, improvements and advances in education among officers. One of the most important was the expansion of civilian higher education. According to Van Creveld, this “served to threaten the status of the officer in society…

In an age of rapid technological change and rising life expectancy, armed forces all over the world adopted the ‘up or out’ manpower management system.” 98 This meant that officers were increasingly retiring while still in their working years and could expect to face significant competition when looking for a second career. Advanced education thus came to matter to individual soldiers much more than before. A case could also be made that increasing civilian educational standards necessitated a reciprocal increase in military education standards simply due to a values-based responsibility: if the military must demonstrate acceptance of its client’s value system and operate within the general framework of values that its society subscribes to, then higher education should be an ascribed value for the military if it is one for society.99

97 Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 98 van Creveld, The Training of Officers, 101. 99 Sarkesian, Beyond the Battlefield, 8-9.

69 The end of the Cold War once again introduced a new strategic context within which militaries and their officer development systems had to evolve. The Cold War bi-polar international system characterized by deterrence was replaced by a new spirit of cooperation and internationalism, at least at first, which appeared to support greater interdependence, cooperation between states, and reliance on multilateral institutions to solve conflict. Initially, there was a perceived lack of imminent threat that raised questions about the future role of military forces.100

It quickly became apparent, however, that conflict was still prevalent and that international crises were more – not less – common after the Cold War ended.

Throughout the 1990s, the international community continually involved itself in crises around the world, increasingly engaging in conflicts within states rather than between them, and keeping armed forces with abilities in conflict resolution and peacekeeping in high demand. A multitude of UN peace operations were dispatched to conflict zones including Somalia, while coalitions of liberal democracies began to engage in their own attempts to ensure a lasting and democratic international peace. These coalitions were usually led by the US in conjunction with major powers in the European Union, and progressively began to define international peace and security in a more activist and robust fashion, going beyond traditional peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance to peace enforcement.101

The evolving post-Cold War strategic context required more of officers. They needed to learn about and understand how the character of conflict was changing, in an increasingly globalized world, in which they were being asked to occupy both traditional and non-traditional

100 John Lewis Gaddis, “Toward the Post-Cold War World,” Foreign Affairs 70:2 (Spring 1991), 102-122. 101 Henning Frantzen, NATO and Peace Support Operations 1991-1999, Policies and Doctrines (London: Routledge, 2004); David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul, Human Rights and International Intervention (London: Pluto Press, 2002); Kelly Kate Pease and David P. Forsythe, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention, and World Politics,” Human Rights Quarterly 15:2 (May 1993), 290-314.

70 military roles. As Stephen Biddle noted, military forces were increasingly called on to do many different things, to exercise their ‘military power’ or capabilities in a variety of unique and evolving ways. Militaries are now required to maintain expertise and capabilities in a wide-range of areas, including “the defence of national territory, invading other states, hunting down terrorists, coercing concessions, countering insurgencies, keeping the peace, enforcing economic sanctions, showing the flag, or maintaining domestic order.”102 These capabilities require a broadening of both training and education to meet objectives and expectations as well as an adequate level of skill and expertise in the military profession.

In the Canadian case, this transition towards broadening and developing a new understanding of warfare and military professionalism was complicated by the country’s unique history. It navigated these changes as a member of the Western political and military sphere, but was highly influenced by its colonial roots, experiences in both world wars, and small power role in multiple alliances and UN peace operations. The following chapter considers these factors and provides a detailed outline of military development in Canada related to professionalism and officer education. It demonstrates how important growth in these areas was hindered by particular values and practices that reflected the unique history of Canadian military and political development, leading directly to the systemic problems that plagued the CAF by the 1990s.

102 Stephen Biddle, Military Power, Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 5-7.

71 CHAPTER 3 Educating Canada’s Military: A Battle Against Cultural Norms

“…without a properly educated, effectively trained, professional officer corps the Forces would, in the future, be doomed to, at the best, mediocrity; at the worst, disaster.” - General, G.V. Allard, Former Chief of the Defence Staff Foreword to the 1969 Rowley Report

It appears that General Allard’s statement – the last line in his foreword to the 1969 Report of the Officer Development Review Board (Rowley Report) – was a fair bit closer to foreshadowing than simple warning. His suggestion that ineffective education, training, and professional development would lead to disaster for the Canadian military was confirmed in the reports emerging post-Somalia. The CAF failed to cultivate a suitable officer development system supporting a strong professional ethos, and this contributed to the myriad problems facing the institution by the 1990s.

General Allard commissioned the Rowley Report in 1967, at a time when the Canadian military was in the midst of politically mandated integration and unification; these processes put the administration of the armed forces under a single defence staff and amalgamated the original three services – army, air force, and navy – into one unified military force.1 Major-General Roger

Rowley and the Officer Development Review Board (ODRB) were given the task of sorting out the different education systems of each service for merger into one coherent program. Their report laid out a scheme for “the rationale, educational content, courses of study, transition to and governance of a Canadian Forces officer development system.”2 This system was to overcome

1 Bland, Administration of Defence Policy, 63-87. 2 Ibid.

72 perceived issues with conventional practices while also addressing the differences in knowledge, skills, traditions, and expectations valued within each former service-oriented arrangement.

This was no easy feat, and as demonstrated by the Somalia Affair, it was not accomplished with any great degree of success. The Canadian military education and professional development system was dominated by particular values and practices that hindered its growth and development. These cultural traits were formed during the seminal years of each service and evolved through several major developments, including integration and unification. They reflect the unique history of the Canadian military and any understanding of the state of officer education and development leading up to Somalia must acknowledge their influence. The following discussion considers these issues and demonstrates that developing officers and producing an effective professional ethos in Canada has always been exceedingly difficult, usually requiring battle with many incompatible cultural norms.

3.1 The Origins of the Problem: Myths, Apathy, and Tactical Fixations

Canada’s overall military educational culture is a direct reflection of the combined history, traditions, and experiences of its three services: the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). These three distinct and separate services carried out professional development in their own unique fashion before forcible unification led to an integrated approach. From the beginning, however, a number of inherent general themes – influenced by the country’s colonial roots, geographic isolation from apparent threats, regional diversity, and legacy of diverse combat experiences – emerged to shape and guide Canada’s approach to officer development and education.

As Canada’s senior and largest service, the Canadian Army can claim the greatest influence on the foundational development of military education in Canada. Prior to Confederation in 1867,

73 responsibility for the defence of British North America rested with the and Royal

Navy (RN) supplemented by local colonial militia units. These units were given official status with the Militia Act of 1855, which retained a reliance on universal military service, but provided for a small, volunteer, uniformed, paid citizen force, armed even in peacetime, and known as the Active

Militia. This tiny force of no more than 5000 is the immediate origin of today’s Canadian Army, with most modern units and regiments claiming descent from the original militia organizations.3

When Canada gained autonomy with Confederation, it retained its militia tradition rather than immediately creating a regular or permanent force. Both the government and general population of the new country had little desire to take control of their own defence – a proposition much too costly to be popular – and were happy to continue relying on whatever aid the British were willing to provide.4 Canada devoted her resources to the maintenance of a close relationship with the Commonwealth, trusting in the Imperial Government’s obligation to defend the Empire with all of the resources at its command. Essentially, Canada sought to preserve a position of limited liability in its own defence.5 Garrisoned British soldiers remained in Canada to man the major fortresses, provide an officer corps to organize and lead the militia, while the Royal Navy protected the coast. Most Canadians perceived of little need for a large professional force given this continued relationship with Great Britain.

There was also a strong conviction that the militia was much more valuable than any regular force would be. Militia units were widely – if wrongly – credited for victory in the War of 1812 against the United States, contributing to an assumption that volunteer soldiers were more than

3 Directorate of Training, Canadian Forces Headquarters, “Introduction to the Study of Military History for Canadian Students,” ed. C.P. Stacey, 6th edition, (Ottawa, ON: Canadian Forces Headquarters), 12. 4 Stephen John Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army 1860-1939 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). 5 C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, Volume I 1867-1921 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 3.

74 capable of providing sufficient defence for Canada.6 In addition, the general Canadian public, including Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald and other government officials, were suspicious of full-time soldiers, generally holding them in contempt. In essence, “regulars” were considered useful only for “hunting, drinking, and chasing women…they had no skills, and…they were soldiers because they were no good at anything else.”7 Macdonald did not judge soldiering to be a true profession, nor a vocation requiring education in specific knowledge or skills. He shared this view with a majority of Canadians, who believed that soldiering was not a particularly difficult skill to acquire. It didn’t help that soldiers in this period – part of what David Bercuson calls the

“old army” – were mostly unmarried, living isolated in barracks, rarely left base, and had little interaction with larger Canadian society.8

The general contempt of regular forces stood in stark contrast to public perception of the militia, perceived as “hard-working farmers who were pure of motive and moral and who would fight with great spirit and daring when the time came to defend home and hearth.”9 Despite having demonstrated its uselessness as an independent fighting force on numerous occasions, the militia remained the key to military self-reliance in the minds of most Canadians. This has come to be known as the “militia myth”.10 Over time, this belief in the superiority of the militia restrained

Canada’s progress in the creation of an effective professional armed force. Not only did Canadians believe that a regular army was not really required, but the lack of a permanent force tradition in

6 In fact, the militia did not save Canada from American invaders during the War of 1812. It was British regulars alongside their First Nations allies who saved the day. Desmond Morton, Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia 1868-1904 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970). 7 Bercuson, Significant Incident, 43. 8 Ibid.; English, Understanding Military Culture, 89-90. 9 Bercuson, Significant Incident, 43. 10 Morton, Ministers and Generals.

75 Canada meant that few Canadians even understood how to organize or maintain such an organization.11

Over time, budgetary considerations and commitments in other parts of the world led Great

Britain to lose enthusiasm for its defence obligation to Canada. Soldiers and resources were slowly withdrawn from North America, with the last Imperial troops returning to England on 11

November 1871.12 Canada was forced to accept that a national military establishment was required to replace British leadership and expertise in defence of the dominion. It responded by raising two batteries of garrison artillery in October 1871 to protect and maintain the fortifications of Quebec and Kingston, and also to serve as schools of gunnery for the militia batteries. The opening of infantry and cavalry schools followed, with permanent and non-commissioned officers as instructors. These soldiers represent the earliest core of what might be considered the Canadian regular service. However, their primary role was envisioned simply as instructors for the militia; they were not initially intended to grow into a large standing permanent force. This was due to the continued belief in government that the “militia was enough” and that any Canadian military force would always ever fight under British higher command. Thus, they developed a small regular force to provide necessary training in practical skills to militia units, ensuring that Canadian citizens were ready to defend themselves alongside the British should a need ever arise.13

In 1874, the Royal Military College Act was passed to officially provide for the education and training of these young Canadian “permanent” officers. The Royal Military College opened its doors to its first class of eighteen cadets in 1876.14 Notably, this new educational institution

11 Harris, Canadian Brass. 12 Directorate of Training, “Introduction to Military History,” 16. 13 , Canada’s Soldiers, The Military History of an Unmilitary People, 3rd Edition (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada,1974), 239-243. 14 Preston, To Serve Canada, 14. Originally called the Military College of Canada, the institution was given the right to use the prefix “Royal” by the Queen in 1878.

76 differed from other military colleges of the period: unlike its British and other European predecessors, which usually produced career officers for regular armed forces only, RMC had a mandate to prepare cadets for either civilian careers or military commissions. Graduates had little or no legal obligation to career service. This double function reflected the general public apathy towards developing a permanent force in Canada. Those who championed the creation of a new officer school and the development of regular forces feared that a purely military institution would be too unpopular and garner little support or funding. They designed the school to appeal to students and their families regardless of whether they wanted to ultimately end up in the military.15

The majority of those who enrolled at the school hoped to become civil engineers and the RMC curriculum was designed to make that a reality. The result was a dual focused program including an academic curriculum dedicated to sciences and engineering with a military component fixated on training and technical skills. The course was four years long, as in other Canadian universities, and included compulsory mathematics, fortification, artillery, surveying, military history, law, strategy and tactics, French or German, chemistry, geology, and drills and exercises. By the 1890s, only nineteen RMC graduates had joined Canada’s permanent force, while most of the others chose to enter the private sector.16

Positively, the civilian friendly academic portfolio at RMC served to strengthen academic standards at the school; it was easier to maintain the quality of the degree when graduates could end up in civilian careers.17 Negatively, the training-centric military component focused almost exclusively on technical and tactical skills. This suited the anticipated wartime function of

Canadian soldiers as supplementary forces for a larger imperial army. Even if graduates did choose

15 Richard A. Preston, Canada’s RMC, 4-6. 16 Preston, To Serve Canada, 14. 17 Ibid., 13.

77 to opt for military careers, they were expected to take commissions in the British Army or to serve as tactical trainers for the militia in Canada. They were not intended to play any sort of strategic function or decisive role in the formation and overall implementation of Canadian defence policies.

RMC’s military/civil education system was designed to create a reserve of officers for potential emergencies in a country where defence was not perceived of as an immediate problem.18 British military strength, supplemented by well-trained Canadian citizen soldiers, was still expected to defend Canada against all aggressors.

This disregard for the need to develop professional military expertise and knowledge was reinforced by Canada’s first major military experience. Canadian success on the battlefield in

South Africa during the Boer War contributed to the perpetuation of the militia myth. Although the Canadian campaign involved much time spent doing mundane tasks away from the front lines, and included discipline, authority, looting, and learning curve issues, the overall efforts of

Canada’s citizen militia soldiers earned them much praise. Further, although there was a serious effort to ensure that the Canadian contingent was independent from the British Army – in that its structure, leadership, dress, and equipment was all meant to distinguish it from other

Commonwealth regiments in South Africa – its soldiers still served under higher British command.

Canadian troops contributed little to the overall direction, strategy, or priorities of the war.19 The success of Canadian soldiers in South Africa added credence to the belief in the superiority and dependability of the citizen soldier over the disciplined, barrack-bred British regular, and reinforced the belief that a permanent force was largely unnecessary.20

18 Ibid., 15. 19 Carman Miller, Painting the Map Red, Canada and the South African War, 1899-1902 (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1993), 50-55. 20 Ibid., 9, 438-439.

78 These biases were echoed in the early development of Canada’s navy. Very little thought was given to establishing a naval force until more than thirty years after Confederation, as dominion status and the dominance of the RN served as an acceptable safeguard. It wasn’t until the Naval Service Act of 1910 that Canada began to build a permanent navy of its own.21 The Act proposed to build a national naval service and fleet, one that closely paralleled the RN in traditions and structure, as well as a Canadian naval college to train officers. The Royal Naval College of

Canada opened its doors in Halifax in 1911 with the task of providing “a complete education in all branches of naval science, tactics, and strategy.”22 Initially, then Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier intended that this college would function similarly to RMC, creating the potential for synergy in

Canadian military education. However, because graduates would serve in a naval force that closely paralleled the RN, the college followed RN practices and not those of RMC, giving the naval college a completely different purpose from the outset.23

Traditionally, the RN “stressed the ability to handle a ship as the supreme quality of a naval officer.”24 Competent ship-handlers were the ultimate end goal and education was valuable only to the point where it contributed – rather than interfered – with the naval officer’s primary function: the running of a ship. A strong belief developed that education was no substitute for experience, the acquisition of which required actually manoeuvring a ship. Thorough grounding in basic seamanship skills and experience gained “before the mast” became preferable to long periods of classroom instruction. Education was a necessary evil, desirable in limited quantities only, and specifically designed to augment an officer’s sea training.25 This outlook was passed on to the

21 Marc Milner, Canada’s Navy, The First Century (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 17-18. 22 P. Willet Brock, “Commander E.A.E. Nixon and the Royal Naval College of Canada, 1910-1922,” in The RCN in Retrospect 1910-1968, ed. James A. Boutilier (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1982), 33-34. 23 M. Hadley, A Nation’s Navy, In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992), 299. 24 Ibid., 298. 25 Ibid.

79 RCN. The two-year curriculum developed at the Canadian naval college allowed no personal selection of subjects. It provided instruction in navigation, seamanship, pilotage, engineering, applied electricity, physics, chemistry, mechanics, mathematics, English, history, geography,

French, and German. Seamanship was considered the most important class. After completion, cadets were sent to an RN training ship for one year to qualify as sub-lieutenants, after which they would receive commissions in the dominion naval forces.26 Once again, semi-colonial status served to condition and shape the education and professional development of Canadian military members. While naval officers were ultimately expected to serve in Canada, rather than receiving

British commissions like army officers, the influence of Imperial structures, traditions, and values dominated.

It was not until the experience of the First World War that the overall perception of military professionalism in Canada shifted at all. As a junior ally in this conflict, Canada performed exceptionally well. The country contributed brave if limited manpower, significant natural, industrial, and technical resources, as well as a strong tactical prowess.27 However, this success was slowly won, as soldiers were forced to learn in the field and under fire. The serious initial difficulties experienced in this conflict demonstrated for Canadians that ignoring military development in peacetime could lead to massive hardship and casualties. Further, the commendable efforts of RMC graduates during the war demonstrated that educated, professional forces on the battlefield could help to negate some of those problems. Approximately 980 ex-RMC cadets, all that are known to have been able and available, served in the war. Most of these individuals were part of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) or the Canadian Permanent

26 Ibid., 299-300. 27 Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 53-146.

80 Force, while another 390 served with various British forces.28 Although ex-cadets only made up a little over 2 percent of all CEF officers throughout the war, over 22 percent of the first contingent’s command and staff when it moved overseas in 1914 were from RMC. RMC graduates also received a large share of wartime promotions to high rank and decorations for valour or distinguished service.29

Canada’s wartime experience and a related rise in nationalism and national awareness, contributed to a greater degree of Canadian control over the military as well as paving the way for

RMC’s “Canadianization” in 1919. 30 Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Macdonell, who had commanded the First of the CEF in France, was appointed RMC’s – the first officer of the Canadian permanent force to be given this appointment. The institution never returned to the old practice of appointing English officers.31 Under Macdonell’s leadership, RMC became much more of a Canadian institution than it had ever been before, although the transition process was slow: British traditions didn’t immediately disappear, many RMC graduates continued to accept British commissions, and Canadian officers were still often sent to England for staff and regimental training. While colonialism was definitely on the way out, its exit manifested very slowly within the Canadian military.32

Unfortunately, the new appreciation for military professionalism cultivated during the war did not entirely survive the post war period. In the years following the First World War, Canada left the battlefield behind and turned her back on Europe. The experience between 1914 and 1918 was one that most Canadians wanted to forget; few were disposed to focus on military affairs or

28 Preston, To Serve Canada, 20. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 George Stanley, “Military Education in Canada, 1867-1970,” in The Canadian Military, A Profile, ed. Hector J. Massey (Canada: Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972), 174-175. 32 Ibid., 176.

81 to even consider preparing for another major conflict. Disillusionment, confusion, and frustration characterized public opinion in this period and isolationism came to typify Canadian national policy.33 While many Canadians were still supportive of Canada’s imperial relationship with

Britain, a strong distrust of European statesmanship, ambition, and policy had been fostered by

Canada’s wartime experience. Above all, Canada was determined to avoid future participation in conflicts that did not directly threaten Canada or Canadian interests.34

This shift towards isolationism and anti-militarism led quickly to significant changes in military policy, including drastic reductions in military spending. Each service was left scrambling to maintain resources and make ends meet. Unfortunately, as Colonel Bernd Horn and Lieutenant-

Colonel Allister MacIntyre have noted, the need for professional development and the organizations required to ensure it are often the first to be considered for cost savings when budgetary pressures mount.35 True to form, when the Naval budget was slashed in 1922-23 and the director of the Naval

Service was told to make due with what was left, he made the Royal Naval College of Canada one of the first casualties; it officially closed its doors in June 1922.36 Naval education for the next fifteen years was mainly improvised: personnel were sent to England for courses that could not be given in Canada, and attempts were made to entice RMC cadets to the Navy during summer training in Halifax.37

33 James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 5-8. 34 Ibid., 7-8. 35 Horn and MacIntyre, “Emerging from a Decade of Darkness,” 77. 36 Hugh Francis Pullen, “The Royal Canadian Navy Between the Wars, 1922-39,” in The RCN in Retrospect, 1910- 1968, ed. James A. Boutilier (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1982), 66-67. 37 Ibid., 67.

82 The Royal Canadian Air Force, finally becoming a permanent component of Canada’s defence forces in April 1924, fared little better. 38 It became a directorate within Militia

Headquarters rather than an independent service as a result of major reductions in air force estimates in the early 1920s. Early on, it was involved mainly in civil-government air operations: exploration of the North, charting air routes for land and seaplanes, establishing bases, delivering the mail, and forestry patrols.39 Unlike the Navy, the RCAF conducted most of its officer training at home and only sent a small number of officers annually to Britain to take advanced courses with the RAF. It neither possessed its own school dedicated to officer education and development, nor was it interested in creating one.

For each of the services, which were simply trying to survive the postwar period, developing, properly educating, and professionalizing their officers was not a primary concern.

This trend made RMC’s continued existence especially important. It became “one of a few small islands of military interest in a pacifically inclined Canada” and facilitated what little educational development officers received across each of the armed services. 40 However, the same compromises and issues stemming from disinterest and apathy towards military affairs continued to hinder development. Courses at the college remained focused on facilitating easy interaction between the military, academic, business, and professional communities in Canada, allowing students the option to take up civilian careers upon graduation. Professional development options and processes continued to remain ad hoc and little funding was put aside for making changes.41

38 Allan English and Colonel John Westrop (Retired), Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command: The Human Dimension of Expeditionary Air Force Operations (Ottawa, ON: National Defence and the Canadian Forces, 2007), 10. 39 Allen English, Understanding Military Culture, 94. 40 Preston, To Serve Canada, 20. 41 Stanley, “Military Education in Canada,” 176-177.

83 The little money that was spent on the military focused on non-operational activities, which included aid to the civil power and the development and administration of unemployment relief camps known as “Royal Twenty Centres.”42 These politically attractive, but non-military roles were the result of military leaders simply seeking any role for the military, fearing that funding could be reduced even further. While this focus may have allowed the military to survive the interwar years intact, it largely ignored the need to foster and develop the art of actually fighting a war. This didn’t tend to concern many officers, however. Like most of their military and political predecessors, then Chief of the General Staff Major-General Andrew McNaughton and the politicians to whom he catered, believed that military knowledge was “mainly a matter of technical proficiency that any scientifically educated person could master probably better than a regular officer.”43 They continued to deny the existence of a profession of arms akin to an academic discipline. A military profession, requiring detailed and concentrated formal study simply did not exist within the Canadian psyche.44

Further, Canadians could still rely on Great Britain to do the intellectual work for them, regardless of whether or not the outcomes suited Canada’s needs. All training manuals continued to come from Great Britain and Canadian staff checked in regularly with their British counterparts to adhere as closely as possible to the British model. Peter Kasurak noted that Canadian innovations were often ignored or abandoned, while all changes within Canada awaited comment from British superiors.45 The adopted British staff system also ensured that Canadian officers were trained to British standards, while those chosen for further study were sent to British staff colleges at Camberley and Quetta. Not only did Canadians fail to perceive of a need for professional

42 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, 124-130. 43 English, Lament for an Army, 21. 44 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, 3-9. 45 Kasurak, A National Force, 15.

84 military development, they believed that what little was required could be found and provided elsewhere. Thus, very little in the way of adequate military training or officer education was conducted during the interwar period.

Any positive intellectual development that did occur at this time was achieved “through individual inquisitiveness and diligence.”46 Examples can be found in the efforts of Lieutenant-

Colonel E.L.M. Burns to stimulate the collective intellect of the interwar Canadian military by publishing his views on mechanized warfare in Canadian Defence Quarterly. Captain Guy

Simonds similarly published his thoughts in rebuttals to Burns’ work. Other isolated attempts by non-regulars like Stanley Todd to independently learn all that they could about their particular area of military expertise, can also be found.47 However, these individual attempts to both intellectually and practically prepare for warfighting represent what the military was not accomplishing institutionally.

As a result of this interwar neglect, Canada had few troops ready for immediate action upon the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 and the learning curve was steep. Despite being woefully unprepared, Canada eventually made significant and occasionally brilliant contributions to Allied success – just as it had during the First World War. With its limited manpower, but relatively substantial natural and industrial resources, the Canadian military showed strong tactical and technical prowess. Once again, however, it contributed little to the overall direction of the

Allied war effort, leaving strategy and the major decisions to others.48 This second global war experience served to reinforce the belief in Canada – both within the military and without – that

46 English, Lament for an Army, 22. 47 David Moule, “The Burns-Simonds Debate Revisited: The Canadian Defence Quarterly and the Principles of Mechanized Warfare in the 1930s,” Canadian Military History 22:1 (Winter 2013); English, Lament for an Army, 22. 48 J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 1939-1945 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975).

85 tactical and technical skills were all that was required for Canada to be a productive, desirable, and efficient military ally.

3.2 The Cold War and a New Strategic Environment: Professionalism of a New Kind

At its peak size in March 1944, the Canadian active army held 500,000 regular officers and other ranks, a significant change from the less than 4,200 members it contained at the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. By the time the war ended, the consisted of an army headquarters, two corps, two armoured divisions, two independent armoured brigades, and three infantry divisions.49 It was a force that experienced extremely significant growth in both size and capability throughout the war.

Despite this growth and improvement, Canada’s postwar army “quickly melted away.”50

In fact, within twenty-four months of the end of the Second World War it had virtually disappeared as Prime Minister Mackenzie King implemented his postwar program. Canada was to become a welfare state in which a strong standing army was not an important factor. This new policy was based on the assumption that if Canada did have to fight another war, it would mobilize in the same way it had in 1914 and 1939: the militia would form the core of the army and there would be a period of up to one year after the commencement of hostilities before any Canadian force would need to actually take the field. The role of Canada’s small peacetime army became focused on “developing facilities and techniques to train sufficient reserve forces to allow Canada to create a viable expeditionary force when necessary.”51 Its purpose was to defend Canada, train the reserves, and prepare for possible future mobilization as part of a larger allied force. These initial

49 David J. Bercuson, Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 13-15. 50 Ibid., 13. 51 Ibid., 16.

86 postwar plans retained the old assumptions and traditions that had hindered the military’s peacetime intellectual and professional development in the past.

This postwar mindset was forcibly changed, however, as the strategic situation became unstable and descended into the Cold War. The Canadian Army was called on to create and maintain a brigade-size force for operations in the Korean War (1950-1953) and another for service with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe. In addition, it would have to develop equipment and doctrine suitable for waging tactical atomic warfare. For the first time in its history, the Army was forced to “contemplate independent institutional existence as a full-time, standing army,” determining what “its standards were, who should be officers, and how they should be trained.”52 For the first time, the Canadian Army was forced to think and operate as a real professional organization.

Early changes in support of this professionalization focused on the expansion of the military school system. HMCS Royal Roads, a college created by the RCN in 1942 as a wartime training facility for officers, remained open after the war and adopted a two-year training and education program. After completion of this program, naval officers would train at sea for a specified time before attending a six-month course at the Royal Naval College in Greenwich,

England. 53 The Air Force joined the ranks at Royal Roads after it was decided that RCAF requirements for officers were sufficiently like those of the Navy and that funding was not enough to support an independent Air Force facility. The result was a joint two-year RCN-RCAF college at Royal Roads that commenced operations in 1947.54

52 Peter Kasurak, “Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform,” Armed Forces and Society 37:1 (2011), 96. 53 Preston, To Serve Canada, 24. 54 Ibid.

87 Meanwhile, the Army was debating whether to re-open RMC, which had been closed in

1942 with its buildings used to accommodate various wartime courses. While there was agreement that all officers should have some form of general education, how much and what that education should look like was a source of disagreement. The 1945 Chesley Committee under Brigadier L.M.

Chesley found that the ideal method for educating junior officers would be to re-open RMC as a university with a four-year degree course. However, expense issues led the committee to suggest that officer cadets be sent to civilian universities for their degrees before receiving a six-month course in military training at RMC.55 When former RMC cadets challenged the validity of these conclusions, taking their concerns right to the Minister of National Defence , another committee was commissioned under the leadership of Brigadier Sherwood Lett. In 1946, the Lett Committee emerged with a similar, but compromise suggestion: officers should be drawn from both RMC and civilian universities providing similar four-year programs.56 Of significance here is the analogous conclusion that Canadian officers should be provided with a university education. Whether that necessitated completing two years or four, receiving a degree or a diploma, specializing in particular fields, or pursuing a broad and diverse combination of courses, still remained sources of contention. But including some element of university education as part of an officer’s training program was becoming institutionally accepted as positive and necessary.

After taking over as Minister of National Defence in 1946, pursued the officer education and RMC issue with vigour. In fact, his unpublished memoirs suggested that the issue of officer training took up the majority of his time during an eight-year term of office.57 He eventually sorted out a new mandate for RMC alongside the Chiefs of Staff and Air Vice-Marshal

55 The Chesley Committee was appointed by then Chief of the Defence Staff, Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes, who fully supported its conclusions. 56 Preston, To Serve Canada, 311-329; Stanley, “Military Education in Canada,” 178-179. 57 Preston, To Serve Canada, 24.

88 E.W. Stedman, who he sent on a fact-finding mission to study and report back on American and

British education programs at West Point, Camberley, Cranwell, and Dartmouth.58 Together, they decided to re-open RMC in 1948 as a tri-service college, meaning that cadets from all three services would be educated together for the first four years of their professional development.

Further, they incorporated Royal Roads into the system, making the RCN-RCAF program tri- service as well – despite significant early opposition from the Navy in particular. Claxton fought hard for this inter-service approach to education, believing that integrating the three services at the cadet level would allow for consistent general education and environmental influences, while also providing an opportunity for collaboration and knowledge-building between each different group.59 A third tri-service school, Collège Militaire Royal (CMR) in St. Jean, Quebec was also created to address the issue of French-speaking officers.60

Interestingly, DND did not allow these colleges to educate more than twenty-five percent of the total officer corps, hoping that civilian secondary schools could make up the deficit to save the military much needed funds. This result did not ultimately manifest due to the need for rapid force expansion and public disinterest.61 Career officers were simply not emerging from civilian universities in sufficient numbers. In 1950, then Chief of the General Staff General proposed to combat this issue by reducing the course at the military colleges to two years; he believed this would double the number of graduates. Other officers within the system rejected this plan on the grounds that it might push training to supersede education. 62 The alternative to

Simonds’ proposal was to introduce compulsory service. Cadets would have their education

58 Ibid. 59 Stanley, “Military Education in Canada,” 180. 60 Haycock, “Getting Here from There,” 48. 61 Ibid., 48. 62 Stanley, “Military Education in Canada,” 182.

89 subsidized at any of the three military colleges or at a civilian university, and in return would serve for three years after graduation in the service of their choice. Following their three years of service they could choose to return to civilian life or accept a permanent commission.63 This plan would eventually become the Regular Officers Training Plan, which came into full effect in 1954.

Permanent staff colleges also became a fixture of the postwar professional system in

Canada. The Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College was established in 1947 to provide a one-year course (later lengthened to two years and finally 10 months) producing trained staff officers. Previously, Canadian regular army officers attended courses at the British staff colleges at Camberley and Quetta; the pre-Second World War size of the Canadian military had not been large enough to justify the existence of a permanent staff college within Canada.64 In

1948, a National Defence College (NDC) was established as the senior “Canadian Joint Services

Staff College.” It was meant to train and supply senior military and government personnel for the coordination of civil-military operations. Attendance was not mandatory for senior officers’ education or career progression, however, and the college was not considered by the military to be a strategic school.65 As Ronald Haycock noticed, when press reports suggested that the new NDC would be similar to the British Imperial Defence College and to the US National War College, the military made it clear that senior officers would continue to go to British or American strategic schools. This meant that the military was retaining its dependence on allies for higher strategic development, despite recognizing a need to expand the professional system within Canada. This would hinder the creation of a high-level military forum for developing a unique national strategy.66

63 Ibid., 182-183. 64 Ibid., 187. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid., 49.

90 Unfortunately, as the Cold War progressed into the 1950s, the challenges increasingly faced by the Canadian Army did not appear to require much academic rigour or introspection.

There was a clear mission in this period – countering the Soviet threat – and the Army was entirely focused on the technology, weaponry, and training required to do so. It had what it considered to be a relatively successful combat record in Korea and its contingent of regulars in Europe appeared suitably equivalent to a division of conscripts from any other Allied military of the time. While soldiers were also sent on the occasional peacekeeping mission, these operations fell within the understood model and few Canadians were fired upon or saw combat.67 It was a simple time that required a particular formula. The world was divided into two distinguishable spheres, each of which largely accepted unwritten rules about direct confrontation and maintaining a global status quo. The Army was entirely concerned with improving expertise in using tanks and infantry to face the Warsaw Pact in a land battle, while supporting the greater strategic thinking of the

Americans and the British. 68 NATO reports and common doctrinal publications simplified operating procedures, and policy was dictated by the stronger powers. Canada was left free of any strategic burden as well as major operational decision-making. Education and academic development were not priorities and did not appear necessary to success within the system.

National security in this period also commanded a significant level of secrecy, while the

Soviet threat mitigated disclosure. This meant that the Canadian military easily operated without public interference.69 As Horn and MacIntyre observed, the result was the entrenchment of a very closed mindset within the military that avoided public interaction and disclosure. It was allowed to work on its own – within the context of the national institution and NATO framework – with

67 Kasurak, “Concepts of Professionalism,” 100. 68 David J. Bercuson, “Up from the Ashes: The Reo-Professionalization of the Canadian Forces after the Somalia Affair,” Canadian Military Journal 9:3 (2009), 33. 69 Horn and MacIntyre, “Emerging from a Decade of Darkness,” 56-57.

91 little intrusion from the outside world and within easily understood parametres. Experience dictated that technical expertise and practical skills honed on the battlefield could be the key drivers for professional success.70 A techno-centric culture was soon entrenched in which higher education had little importance and a fervent anti-intellectualism developed. This was despite a growth in education amongst the broader Canadian population. Bentley and Horn have argued that this anti-intellectualism “denuded the officer corps of individuals capable of, or willing to undertake analysis, critical thinking, reflection and visioning in the larger geo-political and societal context.”71 Those few who did seek higher education were deemed suspect, obviously preparing for a post-military life. The only acceptable values or skills were those that related to understanding the system: the military hierarchy, the operating environment, the Soviet enemy, NATO doctrine, and the equipment, tactics, and staff work required to fulfill the prescribed Canadian role.72

A 1965 Minister’s Manpower Study highlighted the education and professional issues contributing to these problems. Its committee on officers, under the chairmanship of Major-

General W.A.B. Anderson, acknowledged that confusion over the military’s definition of professionalism existed at the time. While the military considered itself professional, the Canadian public was still uncomfortable with this designation, conflating the “professional military mind” with rigidity and conservatism.73 The committee argued that military professionalism was actually tied to the need for decisiveness, not inflexibility, making the issue about how the military itself defined and understood that need for decisiveness. The committee recognized that during war, time is an enemy, leading to a need for quick decisions involving life or death that often have to

70 Ibid., 57. 71 Bentley and Horn, “The Road to Transformation,” 36. 72 Horn and MacIntyre, “Emerging from a Decade of Darkness,” 59. 73 Canada. National Defence. Report of the Minister’s Manpower Study, May 1965, Volume 1, page 10 and 12, DND Access to Information Request.

92 be made on the basis of insufficient information or evidence. In peacetime, a military must emphasize contingency plans for events that may or may not occur, requiring soldiers able to adapt and construct flexible responses. To this end, the committee recommended a broad military education for most officers to cultivate quick, adaptable minds capable of being decisive during both war and peace. It advocated for “the discipline of mind and breadth of outlook which flow from a liberal university education… balanced between the humanities, science, and engineering.”74 It also acknowledged that some officers needed a specialized education to meet service needs; those soldiers should focus on science, engineering, or commerce related to military equipment and weapons systems, planning and coordination of programs, or on geopolitics related to areas in which Canada had military interests. For the rest, a general liberal university education was enough to prepare officers to cope with the varied changes that were likely to occur in defence policy, organization, and equipment over the course of a career.

The study also concluded, however, that not all officers required university degrees. The report attempted to quantify the number of degrees required within the Canadian Forces by determining a minimum essential level of education for the efficient completion of any particular job. It arrived at an overall number of 2,343 university degrees required for the officer corps – including both baccalaureate and post-graduate qualifications – separated into engineering, commerce, science, and general learning categories.75 Of interest is the fact that the report did not recommend all officers hold some sort of university degree. It accepted matriculation as a satisfactory standard for many positions and only 153 of the total 2,343 degrees were designated as post-graduate (Masters level), all in areas of technical and scientific inquiry.76 The major reason

74 Ibid., Volume 1, page 57. 75 Ibid., Volume 1, page 68-69 76 Ibid., Volume 1, pages 56-71.

93 given for keeping these degrees to a minimum was “the cost” associated with providing such education. 77 The study did, however, recommend that a change be made to make a degree mandatory for all individuals of the rank of colonel or higher. This meant that a general university baccalaureate degree was to be the accepted standard for the higher ranks, with only a scattered number of positions requiring a specialized degree.78

This report is interesting for what it says about the CAF’s approach to officer education by the 1960s. Namely: that a completely degreed officer corps was not considered a necessity, although technological and societal changes were leading to a recognition that degrees were more important than ever before; that a general, liberal education providing critical thinking skills was enough for most officers and should be considered a requirement for the rank of colonel and above; and that cost was one of the primary driving factors in whether degrees were considered useful or

“worth it” when much of a soldier’s education could still be learned on the battlefield.

As this report was published, organizational and structural changes to Canada’s military system began to consume all developmental planning and implemented changes. Beginning with the recommendations of the Glassco Royal Commission in 1964, several initiatives were designed and launched to eliminate overlap and inefficiency in the armed forces. 79 These included abolishing the three service chiefs and replacing them with a single Chief of the Defence Staff in

1964 and unifying all three services into a single Canadian Forces (CF) in 1968.80 The Army merged support branches and headquarters with the other services, reduced its strength from

77 Ibid., Volume 1, pages 68. 78 Ibid., Volume 1, page 59. 79 Canada, Royal Commission on Government Organization (Glassco Commission), (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1964). 80 Bercuson, Significant Incident, 69-70.

94 49,760 to 40,192 in less than five years, while the regimental system of managing careers and promotions was supplanted by centralized personnel management.81

Civilian bureaucrats were also introduced into the military decision-making process during this unification period, confusing the chain of command and placing “administrative acumen above military insight on the list of qualities required of CF officers.”82 David Bercuson identified a subsequent rise of “military technocrats”, who became confused about their proper role in the defence hierarchy due to civilian and bureaucratic values overriding traditional military ones.83

The focus shifted to re-organization and a cost-effective unified officer development program, fuelling rather than correcting the anti-intellectual culture that had come to characterize the CAF.

Contributing to these problems was the fact that the military had yet to define its purpose or outline a distinctive philosophy of military professionalism within Canada. As noted, Canadian approaches were dominated by British and later American organization, concepts, and objectives.

While the growth of the regular forces post-1945 had increased efforts to inform the intellectual development of soldiers, a coherent national strategy and agreement on how best to educate officers had yet to manifest in Canada. When unification resulted in a single service, the need to develop a “contemporary and Canadian professional ethic” became a necessity.84 To this end,

Chief of the Defence Staff General Jean Allard appointed Major-General Roger Rowley as Chair of the Officer Development Board (ODB) on 16 October 1967. This board was responsible for sorting out a rationale for standing forces in Canada, the requirements of a Canadian profession of arms, retention rates, career development, and officer education for a unified armed force.85

81 Kasurak, “Concepts of Professionalism,” 100. 82 Bercuson, Significant Incident, 72. 83 Ibid., 69-74. 84 Preston, To Serve Canada, 98. 85 Officer Development Review Board, The Report of the Officer Development Review Board, Maj-Gen Rowley and the Education of the Canadian Forces (Rowley Report), eds. Randall Wakelam and Howard Coombs (Waterloo, ON: Press of Wilfrid Laurier University, 2010).

95 Rowley further expanded this mandate, noting that no Canadian had ever “waxed philosophical” about the Canadian military before. He was determined to develop a philosophy for the profession of arms in Canada beyond the articulation of a simple rationale.86

Rowley and the ODB released their report in three volumes (dubbed the Rowley Report) in 1969 after two years of intense study. In that time the Board was given full access to the staff branches at Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ), the subordinate commands, military colleges,

Defence Council, Chief of the Defence Staff Advisory Committee, Canadian Forces’ Council, and

Programme Review Board. It also met regularly with militaries in other countries, particularly the

US and Great Britain, to study their officer development systems and policies first hand. The report covered historical, existing, and future issues and trends in Canadian military policies as understood in the late 1960s. This included the historical and philosophical background to relevant issues of professionalism and ethics, an examination of existing Canadian and foreign systems, as well as an outline for an officer development program to meet future Canadian needs.87

Ultimately, the report drew a direct link between military professionalism and formal education, noting that a “general education on which to build a detailed expertise has become a necessary qualification for the modern professional officer.”88 It understood “the professional” as an expert, as someone who used both study and practical experience to gain knowledge of an intellectual nature. This knowledge was to be gained on the battlefield as well as at institutes of education and research, while journals, conferences, and interpersonal communication would maintain contact between the theoretical and practical sides of the profession.89 The report further noted that a true professional must be aware of the history of his profession and how it contributed

86 Preston, To Serve Canada, 100. 87 Officer Development Review Board, Rowley Report, 17-20. 88 Ibid., Volume 1, 4. 89 Ibid., Volume 1, Chapter 2, Section 1.

96 to the cultural tradition of his society. It argued that an officer’s educational pattern was responsible for “imparting firstly this cultural experience and secondly the specialized skills and knowledge of his profession. It is on the basis of the latter that the professional will measure competence among the members of his profession; but it is on the basis of the former that he will claim for his profession a dimension which separates it from a trade or skill.”90 To help officers become true professionals, the ODB recommended that they be aided in developing an “effective level of military expertise” and equally “their intellectual potential.” This would allow them to fully understand the philosophy and ethics of their profession while gaining the skills required to devote themselves to its service.91 This recommendation led to the conclusion that all officers must have a baccalaureate degree as a minimum standard for commissioning.92

The ODB also went a step further by suggesting that formal education should not conclude when an officer is commissioned. Given the increasing rate of societal, scientific, and technological development, an undergraduate level degree was not considered enough to promote lasting advancement in the profession. The Rowley Report thus recommended that education, including a significant research component, play an integral role in an officer’s post- commissioning development.93 This included “career courses” specially designed to meet military professional requirements and which would become increasingly intellectual in nature as the officer rose in rank. The report noted that these courses “should be virtually mandatory for advancement in the profession… [and] they should not be considered detours, dead ends, or short- cuts” – a reference to the unpopularity of education within the military at the time.94 The report

90 Ibid. 91 Ibid., Volume 1, Chapter 6, Section 1. 92 Ibid., Volume 1, Chapter 6, Section 4. 93 Ibid., Volume 1, Chapter 6, Section 6. 94 Ibid.

97 also highlighted that “original contributions to the professional body of knowledge” in the form of research conducted during postgraduate study was also important to advancing professionalism.

This focus on degree status for officers is a significant feature of the Rowley Report. It supported intellectual and professional growth, while also reflecting existing sociological and technological trends. The ODB recognized that it was attempting to outline an officer development system within a time of great change. First, unification meant that officers were going to need to cultivate knowledge and expertise beyond their own service, branch, or specialty.95 The “cultural understanding” required of a “true professional” was going to be stretched under unification as the military navigated through the amalgamation of different service cultures and traditions. Second, rapid advances in science and technology were leading to new generations of weapons and support systems that were necessarily going to require formal study beyond the matriculation level.96

Third, increasing multilateralism, globalization of conflict, and communications systems were leading to a requirement for officers with increased knowledge of government, international affairs, and the behavioural sciences. This meant that officers were going to need to possess a broader understanding of “warfare as a deliberate human act, together with an ever-increasing need for an understanding of the social sciences,” requiring “intellectual development in liberal arts subjects as an important facet of military professionalism.” 97 The ODB concluded that a broadening of educational outlook and opportunity was a method through which to address these issues and bring the Canadian military through this period of change unscathed.

There was also recognition of the fact that society and its relationship with education were changing rapidly in this period as well. The baccalaureate degree had become the “general goal of

95 Ibid., Volume 1, Chapter 5, Section 4. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid.

98 most capable young men” between the ages of 18 and 24 who wanted a professional career. The amount of young males enrolled in post-secondary had doubled within Canada between 1955 and

1965 and was projected to double again by 1975.98 Higher education had become extremely desirable for social status, professional accreditation, alongside a genuine interest and desire to broaden intellectual growth and outlook. The ODB recognized that future CAF officers were going to be drawn from a pool in which the best and brightest were likely destined to attend university.

It therefore concluded that the military must establish a degree requirement to ensure the continuation of quality recruits. It is interesting to note that the ODB believed the “requirement of a university degree for an officer [had] been forced, in effect, on the services by the increased number of degree holders in Canada and this in order solely that the standards of officer quality existing in previous years be maintained.”99 Studies indicated that officers were traditionally recruited from the top 15 percent, intellectually, of the male population. Moving forward, the top

15 percent were likely headed for university, so the military was being “forced” to establish degree requirements to hold the line and get the same quality of recruit. Later post-Somalia arguments for degree status took this logic one step further, focusing on a need to reflect and uphold the values of society: if education had become a value for Canadian society, it should be a value for the

Canadian military.

The Rowley Report concluded with the outline of a framework, referred to as a “sketch” of a new officer development concept for Canada. This proposed system incorporated each of the

ODB’s recommendations and was grounded in its thoughtful articulation of professionalism and understanding of the military’s purpose and role within Canada. It included five major elements: an undergraduate program leading to baccalaureate standing and an effective military training

98 Ibid., Volume 1, Chapter 6, Section 4. 99 Ibid.

99 program; a junior staff course offered at the captain level to teach unified and general junior military staff procedures and operational staff procedures; a command and staff course offered at the major level to impart list competence; an advanced military studies course offered at the lieutenant colonel level to broaden list competence and emphasize military expertise, particularly through studying high-level military operations; and finally, the creation of a national security college to develop an awareness of the national and international environment, while imparting military-executive ability.100

This system was to be based upon the implementation of progressive and well-defined career courses that were developed, controlled, and presented by a single agency, a proposed

Canadian Defence Education Centre (CDEC). At the policy and planning level, the CDEC would analyse CAF needs and develop policies and plans to provide the necessary education and professional development to meet those needs. At the operating level, it would effectively serve as a university with two colleges: the Canadian Defence College (CDC) focused on in-service professional development for commissioned officers, and the Canadian Military College (CMC), which would provide undergraduate and graduate education. The CDEC would ensure that the necessary co-operation and co-ordination between the hierarchy of military schools, post-graduate institutions, and all services was maintained, highly organized, well integrated, and effectively commanded.101

Following the release of the Rowley Report, changes were made to the CAF professional development system that focused on reconciling the differences in officer development among the various pre-unification services. While it did represent the beginnings of a unified officer

100 Ibid., Volume 1, Part 2, Chapter 9, Section 2. 101 Ibid.

100 professional development system as envisioned by Rowley, it failed to address many of the anti- intellectual concerns raised by the ODB Report.

The changes began in January 1970 with the creation of the Canadian Defence Education

Establishments (CDEE), controlled by Brigadier General W.A. Milroy, Commandant of the

Canadian Army Staff College. According to Milroy, the CDEE was instituted in place of a CDEC on his own recommendation, a response to the “realpolitik of events in Ottawa.” He determined that a new and highly visible organization during a period in which the defence establishment was shrinking in Canada, would not be well-received. Further, he felt that the three existing military colleges should retain their power base, supporting positive regional visibility and opportunities for cadet recruiting.102 This view also reflected the fact that the CDEC concept had essentially been attacked, largely by the military colleges, almost as soon as the report was released.

Amalgamation and its potential for loss of control, independence, or identity, in addition to the costs involved, were cited as reasons for their resistance.103

The CDEE, created with a mandate to centralize and then supervise officer education, was quickly replaced in 1972 with a Directorate of Professional Education and Development (DPED).

Run by a colonel, this directorate focused on administering the military and staff colleges from the national level, reporting to two intermediaries, the Director General Recruiting Education and

Training and the Chief of Personnel Development. These individuals were responsible to the

Assistant Deputy Minister for Personnel, who controlled the various military educational

102 Colonel (Retired) Randall Wakelam, “Officer Professional Development in the Canadian Forces and the Rowley Report, 1969,” Historical Studies in Education (Fall 2004), accessed on 3 July 2018, http://historicalstudiesineducation.ca/index.php/edu_hse-rhe/article/view/334/393. 103 Ibid.; Preston, To Serve Canada, 102-103.

101 institutions, chaired the Educational Council, and had overall responsibility for education and professional development policy.104

The CDEE was subsequently replaced by a command structure that persisted with varying acronyms, including the Canadian Forces Training System (CFTS), until it became the Canadian

Forces Recruiting, Education, and Training system (CFRETS) in 1995. Wakelam has suggested that the CDEE system, while top-down in design, was largely supported by policy initiatives from staff officers or the colleges themselves. He referenced his time spent in the neighbouring

Directorate of Language Training from 1989 to 1991 as the section head responsible for language training policies, plans, and operations to make his argument. From his perspective, senior officers were often “burdened with high volumes of minutiae,” and “were not well positioned to deal with professional development issues. Moreover, these generals, caught in staff rather than line appointments, often found themselves without the necessary authority to make decisions and issue direction.”105

The Canadian Forces Individual Training Policy for Officers was also released in 1972.

This policy identified four “periods of development” for officers, each with a “distinct pattern of employment and training appropriate to the officer classifications.”106 These included:

• Development Period I: Officer cadet to completion of initial classification training. Normally this was achieved in the rank of Lieutenant.

• Development Period II: from Lieutenant to Major.

• Development Period III: from Major to Lieutenant-Colonel.

• Development Period IV: from Lieutenant-Colonel to Colonel.

104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Major Bernd A. Goetze, Military Professionalism: The Canadian Officer Corps (Kingston, Ontario: Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University, 1976), 49.

102 The classification of these periods was meant to provide a clear delineation between each stage of an officer’s career, providing guidelines for expectations and prerequisites of knowledge and experience that was consistent across the CAF.

At this time, enrolment in the office corps was accomplished through five distinct commissioning plans: Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP), University Training Plan (UTP),

Direct Entry Officers (DEO), Officer Candidate Training Plan (OCTP), or Commissioning from the Ranks Plan (CFR).107 Only two of these – ROTP and UTP – were designed to produce officers with academic educations to the baccalaureate level. ROTP provided university training for potential officers between the ages of 16 and 21, with secondary education of Ontario Grade 12 equivalent or upwards. A candidate was selected to attend any of the three Canadian Military

Colleges (RMC, CMR, or Royal Roads) as an officer cadet, or a civilian university for up to five years. After successful completion of a degree program, the soldier was commissioned into the

CAF and had a four-year period of obligatory service. The UTP was similar, in that it was designed to produce officers with a basic baccalaureate degree from those who had Grade 12 equivalent or higher on entry to the plan, but applicants were restricted to serving individuals between 21 and

31 years of age. Upon graduation, participants were commissioned as a lieutenant with five years of obligatory service.108

Direct Entry Officers were those with post-secondary education, or previous commissioned service who were allowed to enrol in the CAF and receive an immediate commission. No obligatory service was associated with this plan. The OCTP scheme was open to selected high school graduates for officer classifications not requiring a technical or specialty degree. The CFR

107 Ibid., 23. The “Men” in UTMP included all non-commissioned members of the CAF, from the rank of private through to Chief Warrant Officer. 108 Ibid., 24.

103 plan was open to suitable non-commissioned officers who showed “superior” technical, administrative, or leadership abilities. 109 Together, the last two plans covered any potential shortfall from the first three.

Regardless of entry process, all officers in the first Development Period received the same training progression: they were required to conform to the standards outlined in the “Basic

Specifications” for officers, before beginning the second phase of training that would prepare them for employment in a particular occupational classification. The aim in this first phase was to

“transform the candidate from whatever his previous orientation, into a junior officer capable of performing a variety of tasks peculiar to his new profession,” including the use of basic military skills, counselling and administering personnel, and how to function in subordinate positions of varying responsibility anywhere in the CAF.110

The perspective officer was then assigned an occupational classification and completed pre-commissioning training at a functionally oriented school.111 Training time varied from six to nine months depending on qualification, with ROTP and UTP students completing their training in sections throughout the summer months between academic years. Commissioned into the CAF at the rank of Lieutenant, the officer would round out the first development phase with on-the-job training for the next two or three years.112 Advanced levels of classification training, and selection for specialist courses would follow in subsequent periods.113

In 1974, a new command and staff training program was incorporated into the second and third officer development periods. It included three formal courses: the Junior Staff Course (JSC),

109 Ibid., 25. 110 Ibid., 51 111 For example: combat arms, fleet, security, administration and logistics, etc. 112 Goetze, Military Professionalism, 51. 113 Ibid., 52. Specialist courses could include: mine warfare, combat intelligence, personnel management, etc.

104 the Junior Command and Staff Course – Land (JCSC(L)), and Command and Staff Course (CSC).

Every junior officer attended the JSC between the third and seventh year of commissioned service

(Development Period II) to learn how to “perform staff functions of a general nature that are appropriate to their rank and to provide the foundation for their subsequent professional development.”114 Its ten-week curriculum included six subject areas with several specific learning objectives: Staff Duties, Communication Processes, Service Knowledge,

Leadership/Management, Professionalism, and Current Affairs.115

The JCSC(L) was a 16-week scaled down version of a course formerly taught at the

Canadian Army Staff College. All junior land environment combat arms officers and those destined for employment with land units, formations, or headquarters attended the course between their third and seventh year of commissioned service. Its goal was to “instruct junior officers in the conduct of land operations in war, and specifically to prepare the student for staff appointments in any field formation (eg. Brigade, division, etc.) headquarters at the rank of captain, to develop command ability at the rank of major, and to develop an understanding of the principles of command at the rank of lieutenant-colonel.” Its curriculum covered: Organization, Characteristics, and Tactics; Operational Staff Duties; and Administration and Logistics.116

The final element, a 44-week CSC course designed for selected from all classifications, took place during Development Period III and provided a basis for promotion to lieutenant-colonel. Its aim was to develop officers for senior command and staff appointments during the ninth and thirteenth year of commissioned service. Except for those soldiers who attended the National Defence College, this course represented the final stage of formal

114 A.P. Wills, “A New Professional Development System for Canadian Forces Officers,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 3:2 (Autumn, 1973), 37. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid., 37-38.

105 professional training. This study program was organized around ten topic areas: Introductory

Studies to establish a common base of knowledge of the organization, characteristics, employment, and logistics support of the CAF; Environmental Studies; Joint and Combined Operations;

Executive Skills, to develop a further understanding and ability in communications, research, problem solving, the military profession, leadership, command, and management concepts; War and Strategy; Military Technology; Canadian Defence and Foreign Policy; Canadian Political

Affairs; Canadian Economic Affairs; and International Affairs.117

In 1976, four years into the new officer professional development system, Major Bernd A.

Goetze provided a critique of the system as part of the National Security Series for the Centre for

International Relations. Goetze noted that “while a number of technical problems (curriculum, course length, etc.) remain to be worked out, conceptually the ‘unified’ basic officer training programme is working well.”118 He did, however, note several areas of weakness that required further action. First, he warned that the “generalist aspects” of officer development were being approached in a superficial way, arguing that the use of words like “to acquaint” or “to familiarize” when defining learning objectives for topics like Canadian social and political matters, military professionalism, or international affairs, were inadequate as a standard of knowledge.119 Second, he asserted that the collective level of academic education being demanded or provided was still insufficient, particularly in the liberal arts. While he acknowledged that ROTP and UTP reflected official recognition of this problem, the funding for those plans restricted the number of officers who could actually take advantage of them.120 He also noted that there was no evidence to suggest that academic progression had been linked in any way to career progression within the new four

117 Ibid. 118 Ibid., 52. 119 Ibid., 69. 120 Ibid., 74.

106 phase system. Finally, he suggested that a focus on analytical, research, or policy advisory skills were still missing. The new system was described as lacking emphasis on the theory and practice of modern decision-making, an analytical approach to national or international events that affect

Canada’s security position, the competing social demands facing the Canadian government, or an awareness of the responsibilities the military profession has toward Canadian society at large.121

Other critiques of the new system were catalogued by submissions to Canadian Defence

Quarterly, newly reactivated in 1971 after it stopped publishing in 1938. As during the interwar years, this journal served the important function of providing a tool for CAF personnel to foster debate, raise questions, and intellectually challenge the system. Several articles published during the 1970s raised important questions about CAF professionalism and the new professional development system, particularly related to the educational development of officers. Captain P.S.

Bury wondered why Canadian society appeared to consider its military forces largely irrelevant, noting that his instruction to date had failed to capture the reason for this sentiment or examine ways to change it.122 Captain J.O. Dendy asserted that junior officers continued to lack any form of assistance to undertake mandated professional self-improvement.123 Lieutenant-Commander

J.G.M. Smith raised concerns over pre-commissioning officer production, suggesting that RMC was simply “giving away” university degrees that suited the professors, regardless of CAF requirements.124 Finally, Captain M.N.G. Hutton lamented the fact that “there was no professional development between the basic officer course and the Staff School.”125

121 Ibid., 69-71. 122 Captain P.S. Bury, “The Profession of Arms in Canada Today: An Infantry Officer’s View,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 1:2 (Autumn 1971), 46. 123 Captain J.O. Dendy, “Needed: Direction, Support Recognition of Professional Self Improvement,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 1:3 (Winter 1971), 42-45. 124 Lieutenant-Commander J.G.M. Smith, “What is Wrong with Pre-commissioning Officer Education,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 2:1 (Summer 1972), 11-13. 125 Captain M.N.G. Hutton, “On Professional Advancement: Training for Junior Officers,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 3:1 (Summer 1973), 58.

107 These critiques were just a few among many, as the new system had incorporated the logic and some general solutions provided by the Rowley Report, but many of the detailed recommendations were not implemented and went largely unheeded. The baccalaureate did not become the standard for officer commissioning, higher education – with or without a significant research component – was not embraced for officers as they rose in rank, professional and ethos development did not increase in importance, senior officer professional development was generally ignored, and a CDEC – in any form – was not introduced. While the curriculum at the

Canadian Forces Command and Staff College was changed to accommodate unification, the specific recommendations made by the Rowley Report for improving the content of courses and the quality of faculty were not carried out. Further, the NDC largely maintained the format criticized by the report until it closed in 1994.126 The system put in place was a much more restrictive, bureaucratic, and training-focused construct than anything envisioned by Rowley. It supported independent military college control of professional development and reaffirmed the primacy of tactical and operational training over education or strategic development in the minds of CAF leadership.

Unfortunately, this system would remain in place, largely unchanged, until the mid-1990s.

For the next two decades, many of the issues recognized by the Rowley Report were repeatedly identified in subsequent studies as ongoing problems requiring action: in 1978 the ADM(Per) commissioned a “systematic study” into post-graduate requirements for senior officers; in 1979 a proposal was introduced to link post-graduate training to 66 NDHQ positions; in 1980 there was

“near agreement” on deciding to provide 44 training list positions for the purpose of post-graduate training; and the Officer Professional Development Council (OPD Council) – one of the few

126 Officer Development Review Board, LGen Robert W. Morton (Retired), chairman, Final Report of the Officer Development Review Board, Volume 1 (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1995), 17.

108 Rowley recommendations accepted – was consumed with the issue of post-graduate training for officers throughout 1983 and 1984.127 These studies and reports were consistent in their critiques of officer development, noting similar problems over time.

In 1985, Major-General (Ret’d) C.G. Kitchen produced his contribution to the debate in

Out Service Training for Officers, a report written at the request of the ADM(Per). This report was a detailed study of post-graduate requirements for officers and recommended ways to keep the system “current, related to rapid change, cost-effective, and responsive to Canadian needs.”128 It focused on improving post-graduate links to Canadian universities through things like relationship building with civilian institutions, expanding out-service training, providing credits to support external education, adding unlinked post-graduate positions while ensuring they were not detrimental to careers, and establishing a CAF presence in Canadian universities.129 Few of these recommendations were implemented at the time.

One year later, the ‘Lightburn Study’ articulated “an appropriate senior officer professional development system for the Canadian Forces.”130 This report was part of an overall review underway in the OPD Council and once again recognized recurring issues within the professional development system. While it documented similar problems to previous studies, its articulation of the reasons behind why reforms were only “sporadic” and “ineffective” was somewhat novel. It

127 Canada, National Defence, Senior Officer Professional Development (Lightburn Study), an NDHQ/CPD Study for the Professional Development Council (30 April 1986), 27. The Officer Professional Development Council (OPD Council) provided recommendations on selected facets of the Officer Professional Development systems such as curriculum matters, course objectives, career path recommendations, integration of doctrine, and organizational development. Its authority extended to matters pertaining to professional education and officer development, its membership included the of the CFC and CLFCSC, and it answered to the ADM(Per). Howard G. Coombs. “In the Wake of a Paradigm Shift: The Canadian Forces College and the Operational Level of War (1987-1995), Canadian Military Journal 10:2 (2010), 20. 128 Canada, Department of National Defence, Out Service Training for Officers (Kitchen Report) (Ottawa: Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) National Defence Headquarters, March 1985). 129 Ibid., 2. 130 National Defence, Lightburn Study, Section 1: Intro, Aim (Number 8).

109 acknowledged that the implementation of reforms was being hindered by difficulties with cost and practicality, but also in some cases, by “currency or relevancy.” 131 Lightburn accepted that resources are scarce and finite, requiring appointment to the most pressing operational needs, and that these needs rarely encompass academic achievements within a military designed for operations and war. Academic growth is not, and perhaps should not, be a broad military aim.

However, the military also lives in a world of bureaucratic preparation and peace. Lightburn asserted that it must organize for war while also simultaneously engaging in the wider and continuous activity known as “defence”. Failing to define defence – including its environment, requirements, and necessary knowledge base – was recognized as a significant source of the CAF’s inability to improve its officer development system.132

An emphasis on the role of emotion and misperceptions within the Lightburn Study is even more interesting. It recognized that a major difficulty with the overall system and potential reforms was the emotion and confusion generated by that system regarding both the purpose and the desired result of professional development. Some took the need for reforms personally: if the current system was considered inadequate for preparing officers for their roles, that meant current officers were not adequately discharging their duties. Ultimately, however, the problem centered on the question of what the purpose and role of the military was meant to be. Was there a need to broaden intellectually, embracing the idea that a better-educated person is a better officer? Or should a military officer’s focus remain riveted, always, on the profession of arms? Athens vs. Sparta.

Lightburn highlighted this issue within the Canadian military by noting that,

“there are a multitude of ‘unwinnable arguments’ if we pursue rigidly a path of ‘we are what we were.’ It is only too easy to establish artificial contradictions between military purpose and academic pursuits, between operational aims and bureaucratic realities,

131 Ibid., Section 1: Intro, Background (Number 1) 132 Ibid., 16-24.

110 between military traits and civilian values, and between readiness for war and peacetime requirements. It is also too easy to profess or decry the merits of NDC, a degree, PG training, operational experience or NDHQ tenure based on one’s own personal qualifications and experience.”133

The study further noted that the argument over education and development constituted more than disagreements on a personal or individual level. It shaped relationships and actions within the institution, between environments and departments, and affected the development and indoctrination of young cadets:

“One of the more ominous indications of a need to rationalize the development requirement is the host of misperceptions and attitudinal difficulties in this area. Operational officers pursuing PG (post-graduate) training are viewed to have lost their military focus; officers seeking broadening positions in NDHQ are viewed to be forsaking their environmental ties; officers serving in NDHQ are viewed to be ‘bureaucrats in uniform’; management training is viewed to be ‘civilianization’; support occupation officers are viewed to be ‘getting all the PG gravy’; career managers openly caution against PG urges, and even against NDHQ postings; and former senior officers proudly inform impressionable first year RMC cadets that they ‘escaped NDHQ duty’.”134

All of this despite the fact that the majority of senior officers interviewed as part of the Lightburn

Study expressed “a certain dissatisfaction” with the current system, describing it as “not enough” to prepare officers for senior positions in current conditions.135 The issue here, once again, is centered on the question of how the military should prepare for “operations in war” versus

“defence in peace” and what those two concepts mean within Canada. The solution presented by the Lightburn Study was a stronger central framework for the officer development system, with a focus on increasing engagement with “National Security Studies” – defined as a broader approach to defence incorporating political, bureaucratic, and non-military aspects of security alongside the more traditional considerations.

133 Ibid., 2-3. 134 Ibid., 7-8. 135 Ibid., 6.

111 This tension between what was expected of soldiers versus what skills and knowledge their professional development was providing them, continued as the CAF entered the unanticipated transition out of the Cold War strategic environment. Lieutenant-General Richard Evraire’s 1988 report, General and Senior Officer Professional Development in the Canadian Forces (Evraire

Report), reiterated the issue once again: that the system continued to prepare officers for past roles and experiences, relying on historical and cultural understandings of how best to make soldiers rather than focusing on contemporary requirements.136 His research found that “the officer who reaches the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, Colonel, or General finds that despite numerous successful attempts over the past decades at identifying General and senior officer professional training and development requirements, the Department has expended few resources towards satisfying these requirements.”137

Evraire noted that individual members of the CAF officer corps performed two basically distinct but mutually supporting functions by the end of the Cold War: combat officers performed combat oriented training and administrative functions, while defence staff officers dealt primarily with military organizational and operational planning, defence policy development, equipment procurement and other duties of an administrative nature.138 While officers in the operations category predominated in the rank structure (with more than 70 percent filling that role), general or senior officers were regularly called on to occupy posts in both combat and defence staff roles.

Evraire called this trend “evidence of the primacy of combat operations in the Canadian Forces,” noting that most officers were chosen for these positions irrespective of their occupational category

136 Lieutenant-General Richard Evraire, “General and Senior Officer Professional Development in the Canadian Forces” (Evraire Report), Canadian Defence Quarterly (December 1990). 137 Ibid., 33. 138 Ibid., 34.

112 and many were inadequately prepared to assume their posts.139 This was due to the differences inherent to each role:

“The successful General and senior combat officer is an experienced commander and staff officer who understands the peculiarities, complexities and vagaries of joint and combined operations at his own and at one or two levels above his level of command. He is also capable of acting as national commander in a foreign theatre; and can represent Canadian military and other interests in multinational military and other environments… Additionally the General and senior combat officer’s environment is currently (and will to an even greater extent in the future be) filled with technological complexities… A General or senior officer professional development program that ignores the technological changes in the combat officers environment will do so to everyone’s detriment.”140

This was in contrast to the environment for defence staff officers:

“Combat must be the principal focus of the combat officer, in peacetime as well as in war. It must also be the principal focus of the defence staff officer. The General and senior defence staff officer must also be capable of exercising effective management in situations and environments other than military in nature. He must be trained to work analytically and be sensitive to a myriad of military and non-military factors and issues; he must be prepared to deliberate as well as to write and speak logically and convincingly; he must be able to distinguish between shades of gray in argumentation, and to compensate for many of his interlocutors’ frequent lack of familiarity with military matters. He must be patient and diplomatic, but dogged in his pursuit of an acceptable military solution; all the while reconciling judgments of a purely military nature with government defence policy, with the treat to national security, with national and international economic realities, as well as social, cultural and other factors which impact on military planning and policy development decisions. In short, to be fully effective, he must possess a ‘knowledge base’ and particular skills that extend far beyond the realm of combat.”141

In Evraire’s view, the professional development program for general and senior officers – as it existed in 1988 – was insufficient and underdeveloped. It contained very few courses and seminars designed to teach the combat and defence staff skills and knowledge required for officers to function properly within both realms and understand their interdependence. Instead, “the program consists of continuous and, in most cases, inefficient on-the-job training and development

139 Ibid. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid.

113 experience.”142 Statistics derived from an examination of personnel management records in the office of the Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel) in 1988 supports this argument: out of the

1,543 officers of lieutenant-colonel to general rank in this year, only 50 percent had obtained a degree, and only 24 percent of those officers had completed any form of post-graduate education.

Out of the 119 officers of colonel and general rank, only 26 percent had attended NDC or an equivalent institution. Further, these records indicated that, in any given year, only 15 percent, on average, of all eligible CAF officers in the rank of colonel attended NDC.143

The solution to these problems, for Evraire, centered on four specific changes: the articulation of precise criteria and goals for general and senior position requirements, communicated in a written document to avoid vagueness, disagreement, and confusion; the promise of promotion for those interested in obtaining, either on their own or with DND support, defence policy training and development; a new professional development program structure with opportunities and obligations for advanced education in senior positions focused on defence policy needs; and the creation of a research center, school, or institution to provide an intellectual home for the Canadian professional military officer.144 Such a center would provide a space in which to carry out continuous and comprehensive research in the field of strategic studies, completely missing from the CAF at this time, while also providing tangible proof for all members that officer development and education are important and valued within the institution.

Evraire’s vision and recommendations for the future of officer development in Canada focused on enhancing the CAF’s level of professionalism in the context of a modernizing world.

If the CAF officer corps was going to fulfill its role, not only as provider of security and defence

142 Ibid., 35. 143 Ibid., 34; Statistics, Deputy Minister (Personnel), 1988. 144 Ibid., 38-40.

114 but as purveyor of strategic military advice in an increasingly complex, sophisticated, and globalizing battlefield, it was going to have to re-develop its training and development program to reflect a greater emphasis on defence policy options. In other words, the CAF must expand its primary focus from combat operations to provide a more diverse, broad-based, and strategically minded education for officers.

Evraire’s recommendations were published just as the Cold War period came to an abrupt close, ushering in a significant strategic change within the context of international relations and

Canadian defence imperatives. The dissolution of the bi-polar system of power that had characterized international relations for the previous four decades, created a new strategic environment that was both more volatile and complex. For the first time in over forty years, the most direct threat to Canadian security did not come from the Soviet Union via nuclear attack.

Rather, the country faced a disparate group of both state and non-state actors in an increasingly globalizing world. Canada and the CAF were required to adapt to this changing security environment in order to continue supporting and protecting Canadian national interests in the most effective way possible. It quickly became apparent, however, that this process was not going to occur smoothly or easily.

115 CHAPTER 4 At the Heart of the Problem: A Failure of Leadership and Professionalism

The Cold War period had seen international political forces coalesce around two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, creating a bipolar system and holding international relations in an East-West confrontation that centered on their unique interests.

Alliances were formed within each bloc and state behaviours appeared predictable. While major conflicts did arise, a direct, traditional military confrontation between the two nuclear superpowers never materialized. They fought each other mainly through proxy wars and sought to take advantage of the economic and military vulnerability of smaller states to gain an advantage over one another.

The Canadian military became very comfortable in its perceived role in this environment.

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, it settled nicely into the American bloc’s strategic embrace as a moderately wealthy middle power that could focus entirely on the tactical and occasionally operational requirements needed to fulfil the clear mission of countering the Soviet threat. The CAF was entirely focused on the technology, weaponry, and training required for this role. Canada had little strategic burden or major operational decision-making, and became quite comfortable providing its officers with the limited tactical and technical knowledge required for success within this system.

As the Cold War came to a close, both CAF doctrine and broader defence policy objectives were focused on maintaining this emphasis. The last defence policy paper produced before the

Cold War ended – the 1987 Challenge and Commitment – A Defence Policy for Canada – called for increased funding, better equipment, and more soldiers to achieve primary objectives that were based on traditional Cold War assumptions: Canada would pursue a strategy of collective security

116 within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance, including a continental defence partnership with the United States. Within this broad framework, defence policy would contribute to the maintenance of strategic deterrence, credible conventional defence, protection of Canadian sovereignty, peaceful settlement of international disputes, and effective arms control. 1 These objectives recognized the belief, once again, that the most serious direct threat to Canada was a

Soviet nuclear attack on North America and that the best counter to such a threat was a strategy of deterrence based on the maintenance of diversified nuclear forces. As Canada did not possess, and had no intention of possessing, nuclear weapons, its contribution to deterrence at the strategic level would remain the provision of support to ensure the survival of its allies’ nuclear forces.

Similarly, CAF combat doctrine remained focused on developing a “big army” with a corps model as its framework. This included plans for a heavy mechanized infantry force with several layers of anti-armour weapons with which to absorb and defeat an assault by a Soviet operational manoeuvre group.2 New equipment, vehicles, and anti-tank weapons were envisaged alongside a mobilization plan that incorporated more soldiers – both Regular and Reserve – with little consideration of cost or cultural and structural issues that might hinder the plan.3

When the Soviet Union unexpectedly collapsed in 1989, Canada and the CAF were thrust into an entirely new strategic situation requiring a reconsideration of political and defence policy priorities. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and German unification had suggested that the division of Europe into hostile blocs was over. Significant progress had been achieved in the elimination and reduction of various weapons and there emerged a historic opportunity for

1 Canada, Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence, Challenge and Commitment – A Defence Policy for Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1987), Letter from the Prime Minister, 49 2 Kasurak, A National Force, 203-213. 3 For example, the army intended to support personnel growth to form a “big army” through a massive expansion of the Reserves. However, the government had not provided the legislative basis for a larger, more prepared Reserve through funding or policy changes to protect Reservist jobs or income while serving.

117 international collaboration to resolve ongoing violent conflicts. Many governments seemed more willing in this initial period to work together through the UN and other multilateral channels to resolve problems and disagreements while also preventing new ones. Market-oriented economics, free trade, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law appeared poised to become widely accepted and, to a greater extent than ever before, implemented norms.

From a strategic perspective, the Canadian government entered this period with a great deal of optimism. It was generally inspired by the “new internationalism” that appeared to “support greater interdependence, cooperation between states, and reliance on multilateral institutions.”4 As

Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall noted, multilateralism had been a

“long-standing Canadian mantra… What is new is the growing willingness of other countries to use multilateral institutions.”5 The government quickly embraced this new internationalism and attempted to take advantage of the increased potential for activism on the world stage.6 It hoped that the elimination of the Soviet Union and conflict among major states had created a space for greater Canadian involvement within a more peaceful world.

Instead, the new political environment saw significant changes in globalization, economic integration, and technology that contributed to, rather than mitigated, antagonisms. As national economies opened up and protectionist policies were dismantled, competition increased within and among states. Improved access to technology brought improvements to weapons as well as their widespread dissemination, while technological improvements to communication – which helped to resolve some disputes – also meant that marginalized groups became more and more aware of the extent of their marginalization. Old ethnic antagonisms quickly resurfaced and clashed as the

4 Grant Dawson, Here is Hell: Canada’s Engagement in Somalia (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2007), 9. 5 As quoted in Dawson, Here is Hell, 11. 6 Ibid., 9-11.

118 mix of national identities imposed by those in power during the Cold War period were tested and often rejected. Intra-state conflicts were increasingly perceived to pose a threat to international political stability and intervention by foreign states and coalitions of states became more commonplace than during the Cold War.

In response, the Canadian government found itself repeatedly deploying its military forces to deal with crises around the world, sending a record number of troops on an unprecedented number of operations in the 1990s – each unique and markedly different than any seen during the

Cold War. In this period Canada maintained its record of participation in almost all UN peace missions, including major operations in Haiti, Cambodia, Somalia, and .7 It also supported operations undertaken as part of coalitions, usually comprised of liberal democracies and led by the US alongside other major powers in the European Union, which increasingly defined international peace and security in a more activist and robust fashion. These operations tended to move beyond the traditional peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance model to engage in peace enforcement.8 Canada participated in Operation DESERT STORM in Iraq, in the United Task

Force (UNITAF) in Somalia, in the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, and contributed to bombing runs in support of Operation ALLIED FORCE within the former Yugoslavia.9 Between

1989 and 2001 the CAF deployed on approximately 67 missions, compared to 25 during the period

1948-1989.10

These deployments also occurred at the same time as serious budget and personnel cuts to the military. The 1989-90 budget saw defence expenditures substantially reduced – by about $2.7

7 For more information see: http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations/past.page. 8 Alexander Moens, “Revitalizing our Defence and Security Capacity,” Policy Options (October 1999), 29. 9 Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada, 5th Edition (McClelland & Stewart: Toronto, 2007), 275-281; Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 379-380. 10 Horn and MacIntyre, “Emerging from a Decade of Darkness,” 62-63.

119 billion – and growth limited to 5 percent from the lower expenditure base.11 This led to the closure of military bases, a 2,500 reduction in military personnel, and the cancellation of equipment projects like the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines.12 While the 1991 budget added extra money for defence because of costs incurred by operations at Oka and in the Persian Gulf, this reductionist trend continued through the 1990s.13 The budget was further slashed by 23 percent between 1994 and 1999, while armed forces personnel were cut by almost 30,000.14

Ultimately, the military was asked to do more in this period, with less, in a new operating environment that it neither understood nor had the intellectual infrastructure to properly study and figure out. It was unprepared for the change and did not have the tools with which to deal with it.

As General Rick Hillier explained, “the Canadian Forces was not a learning organization; we didn’t conduct analyses and come to logical conclusions following complaints from the field or clearly identified problems. We just had not gotten to the point where we could really self-critique our problems; we didn’t look to improve or at how to learn.”15 Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire concurred:

“Right up until the end of the Cold War, it was all experiential. It was drills, doctrines, and so on and it was clear cut. It was vehicle recognition and the whole thing. And it was Eurocentric and that was it. But what we had done was stumbled into an era where all those tools didn’t seem to work anymore. Worse than that is that we were entering an era where the mandates were not classic anymore. It wasn’t attack and defend. It was establish, establish an atmosphere of security. How the hell do you establish that? What’s the doctrine behind establish? That action verb. And what is an atmosphere of security? A police state? We were being deployed with these things and we were interpreting them and writing rules of engagement and taking casualties, yet not exactly clear what they meant… We were going in as Cold Warriors into an era where you were not at war, you were in conflict. And

11 Budget Papers, Tabled in the House of Commons by the Honourable Michael H. Wilson, Minister of Finance, on 20 February 1990, accessed on 30 January 2017, http://www.budget.gc.ca/pdfarch/1990-plan-eng.pdf, 77. 12 Michel Rossignol, Political and Social Affairs Division, Defence Policy Review (12 October 1993), accessed on 9 February 2017, http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/MR/mr112-e.htm. 13 “The Budget Plan 1999,” Tabled in the House of Commons by the Honourable , Minister of Finance, 16 February 1999, accessed on 7 February 2016, http://fin.gc.ca/budget99/bp/bp99e.pdf; and Budget 1995 Fact Sheet chapter on Departmental Spending Reductions, Department of Finances Fact Sheet. 14 Haycock, “Athena and the Muses,” 7. 15 General Rick Hillier, A Soldier First, Bullets, Bureaucrats, and the Politics of War (Toronto, Ontario: Harper Collins Publishers Ltd. 2009), 66.

120 we’re asking you to participate in conflict resolution and may be one day as you to be engaged in conflict prevention.”16

He concluded that in this new environment, “Generals who only knew how to fight were useless!

What they needed was another set of intellectually based skills and knowledge that would permit them to participate in the resolving of the conflict without having to revert to the use of force.”17

Canadian contingents trying to operate within this new context, without the proper equipment or intellectual tools, repeatedly struggled with incidents of unprofessional and occasionally criminal behavior. During multiple operations, “questionable shootings, disciplinary infractions, particularly drunkenness, as well as black marketeering and misappropriation of funds and resources created scandals,” while “opulent spending practices and the squandering of resources by senior officers rocked the institution.”18 Despite much good work being done by many Canadian soldiers, these incidents and their public exposure undermined the credibility of the CAF as an institution. Its reputation quickly eroded in the eyes of the general public, until the

Somalia Affair sparked significant enough backlash to serve as a catalyst for change, forcing introspection and reform.

4.2 Identifying the Problem: The Somalia Affair and its Aftermath

When Canadian soldiers were deployed to Somalia in 1991, the Canadian federal government and the military were still trying to reconcile post-Cold War hopes and aspirations with actual economic and strategic realities. Expectations arising from the anticipated post-Cold

War ‘peace dividend’ were only starting to diminish in the face of continued and evolving conflict.

16 Interview with Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire by Dr. David Bercuson, 29 April 2013, Parliament Hill, Ottawa, Ontario, recording and transcript held by author. 17 Ibid. 18 Colonel Bernd Horn and Dr. Bill Bentley, Forced to Change, Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces (Toronto, Ontario: Dundurn, 2015), 36.

121 Despite the declining military budget and waning public interest in military engagement,

Canadian soldiers left for Somalia with very little opposition from the Canadian public.19 At the time, images of starving Somalian people suffering amidst famine and civil war filled newspapers and television screens across the country. Sending aid in the form of peacekeepers and a humanitarian airlift was entirely acceptable to the general population. Even as looting and violence by rival factions quickly compelled operations to incorporate the use of armed force, Canadian involvement in more robust peacemaking and peace enforcement operations in Somalia did not seriously raise public concerns. 20 Military action in support of ‘human security’ reinforced

Canada’s political and strategic interests, while dovetailing nicely with an informal understanding held by many Canadians that their soldiers served best – and most often – as peacekeepers.21

It is perhaps this belief, beyond the obvious moral considerations, that left Canadians so stunned when news of violence committed by their ‘peaceful’ CAF soldiers emerged from Africa.

Canadians were shocked and appalled by Shidane Arone’s death and they immediately began asking hard questions. How could this happen? Was the Canadian Airborne Regiment properly prepared for this mission? Is racism and intolerance a widespread problem within the Canadian military? Who is ultimately responsible for this inexcusable violence against a civilian?

Unfortunately, as Canadian society struggled to understand the Arone tragedy, evidence of questionable conduct related to the other violent incidents in Somalia began to emerge. There were

19 Barbara McDougall, “Canada and the New Internationalism,” Canadian Foreign Policy 1:1 (Winter 1992-1993); Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, vol. XI, 14786, , 7 December 1992; Ibid., vol. XI, 14791, David MacDonald, 7 December 1992. 20 Katie Domansky, “The Canadian Forces in Somalia: An Operational Assessment,” The Canadian Army Journal 14:1 (Spring 2012), 101-121. 21 Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, “’s Legacy, Human security and the rescue of Canadian defence policy,” International Journal 56:1 (Winter 2000-2001); J.L. Granatstein, “Peacekeeping: Did Canada Make a Difference? And What Difference Did Peacekeeping Make to Canada?” in Making a Difference? Canada’s Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order eds. John English and Norman Hilmer (Toronto: Lester Publishing Limited, 1992).

122 four incidents in total, and while investigations were launched into each, charges were laid against

CAF soldiers in only two of them where it was determined that they failed to operate in accordance with Canadian rules of engagement.

The first of these incidents occurred on 17 February 1993, when members of the Canadian

Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG) defended a bridge against a crowd of approximately

300 angry Somalians. The hostile group threw rocks at the Canadian soldiers and neither the seizure of one of the instigators nor several warning shots fired by Canadians had any effect on the mob. Eventually, the soldiers shot at two of the riot instigators in an effort to disperse the crowd. Achieving its desired effect, these shots also wounded both Somalians who were immediately evacuated to the local hospital for medical attention; one was pronounced dead on arrival.22 A unit investigation was commenced immediately to determine whether the Canadian response was appropriate. This investigation concluded that the soldiers and leaders involved in this particular event acted in accordance with Canadian rules of engagement. No charges were laid against any participants.23

The second incident, on 4 March 1993, involved two Somalian civilians who approached the Canadian compound after dark. The Somalians were noticed by Canadian sentries when they tried to find a way through the barbed wire surrounding the compound. The Canadians tried to arrest the intruders, who proceeded to flee on foot. Neither warning shouts nor shots halted their flight. Eventually, aimed fire was applied and both Somalians were hit; one was wounded while the other was killed.24 In this case, the investigation into the actions of the CARBG soldiers resulted in the laying of charges. A charge of negligent performance of a military duty was laid

22 Canada, Information Legacy, document DND288515, “Briefing Note prepared by MGen Boyle for the Minister of National Defence,” 29 October 1993. 23 Ibid., document DND010550, “Backgrounder, Operation Deliverance Summary of Incidents,” April 1993. 24 Ibid., document DND018099, “Briefing Note for the Minister of National Defence,” 21 June 1993.

123 against commanding officer of the CARBG, Lieutenant-Colonel Carol Mathieu. He was accused of giving orders while in Somalia authorizing the use of deadly force against thieves, contrary to the Canadian rules of engagement. Captain Rainville, the officer leading the CARBG

Reconnaissance Platoon in Somalia, was charged with unlawfully causing bodily harm and negligent performance of duty. This included allegedly telling his subordinates that they could use deadly force and to “get them,” referring to the fleeing Somalians, in effect counselling his soldiers to commit an illegal armed assault. Both men were subsequently acquitted of these charges.25

The third incident involved the death of Arone on 16 March, while the fourth occurred only one day later when members of the CARBG were escorting a convoy of International Red Cross vehicles. When they arrived at the Red Cross compound a scuffle broke out and a Somalian gunman shot at the Canadian soldiers. Returning fire, the Canadians hit one Somalian in the stomach; this man was pronounced dead upon arrival at the medical centre.26 As was the case in the first incident, the investigation into this death concluded that the soldiers involved acted in accordance with Canadian rules of engagement and consequently no charges were laid.27

As information about these incidents emerged in Canada, an isolated event involving Arone became part of a larger picture, causing the scope of public questions to expand: If earlier incidents had indicated that problems existed, why were they not dealt with before Arone’s tragic death could occur? Were they covered up? How far up the chain of command might the cover have extended? What did this series of incidents suggest about deeper institutional problems related to command and control, accountability, and leadership? It was hard to argue that a “few bad apples”

25 Canada, Dishonoured Legacy, Volume 1, “The Somalia Mission: Post-Deployment, The Courts Martial.” 26 Canada, Information Legacy, document DND127201, “Presentation, Somali Incident,” 18 November 1993. 27 Ibid., document DND288515, “Briefing Note Prepared by MGen Boyle for the Minister of National Defence,” 29 October 1993.

124 had committed a terrible crime, when more than one incident had occurred, involving different soldiers each time, who did not always face appropriate consequences for their actions.28

The response of the CAF to what occurred in Somalia took many forms. First, a special

Military Police (MP) investigation team from NDHQ was sent to Somalia on 23 March 1993.29 Its investigation resulted in several courts martial against individual soldiers, most dealing with the murder of Arone. The most prominent of these were against Master Corporal Clayton Matchee – the person who allegedly beat Arone to death – and Private Kyle Brown. MCpl Matchee was charged with second-degree murder and torture in relation to this death, although he was found mentally unfit to stand trial in April 1994 following his suicide attempt while in custody. Private

Brown was also charged with second-degree murder and torture and was found guilty of manslaughter and torture. Brown was sentenced to five years imprisonment and dismissal with disgrace from Her Majesty’s service.30 Several other individuals were indicted in relation to this death, with charges ranging from negligent performance of duty to torture and unlawfully causing bodily harm. Only two of these soldiers were acquitted of all charges against them.31

Given the seriousness of the incidents in Somalia, as well as concerns raised by Members of Parliament, the media, and the general public, then Minister of National Defence Kim Campbell directed the CDS to appoint an internal board of inquiry. This board, which conducted its first

28 Sherene Razack, Dark Threats & White Knights, The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping and the New Imperialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 7-14. 29 Canada, Dishonoured Legacy, Volume 1, “The Somalia Mission: Post-Deployment, The Courts Martial.” 30 Ibid.” 31 Ibid., Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, Volume 1, “The Somalia Mission: Post-Deployment, The Courts Martial.” Those charged include Sergeant P. Gresty, Sergeant M. Boland, Major A. Seward, Private D. Brocklebank, and Captain M. Sox. Sergeant Gresty was acquitted on two counts of negligent performance of duty, Sergeant Boland was convicted of negligent performance of duty while the torture charge against him was stayed, Major Seward was acquitted of unlawfully causing bodily harm but was found guilty of negligent performance of duty for giving instructions to abuse detainees, Private Brocklebank was acquitted of both torture and negligent performance of duty, while Captain Sox was acquitted of causing bodily harm but found guilty of negligent performance of duty.

125 phase from April to July 1993, would look into issues that went beyond the specific courts martial.

Its terms of reference were to investigate the “leadership, discipline, operations, actions, and procedures of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group” including “the Battle Group’s antecedents in Canada and higher headquarters in Somalia prior to and during its employment in

Somalia.”32 This included issues such as the threat and environment in Somalia, doctrinal aspects of the mission, humanitarian operations, support for the CARBG, command and control relationships, discipline within the CAR, training, selection of personnel for the mission, rules of engagement, attitudes towards the lawful conduct of operations, professional values and attitudes within the CAR, as well as cultural differences and racism.33 Regrettably, this mandate excluded matters that were the subject of Military Police investigations, which, at the time of the inquiry, included both the beating death of Shidane Arone and the highly contentious shooting of two civilians on 4 March. This undoubtedly contributed to a belief within Canada that the military inquiry was incomplete and insufficient.

CDS John Anderson named T.F. de Faye as President of the board, alongside members Brigadier General Clive Addy, Brigadier General Charles Emond, and

Professor Harriet Critchley (University of Calgary). Advisors included Mr. Stephen Owen (British

Columbia Ombudsman), Lieutenant-Colonel Ken Watkin, and Chief Warrant Officer John Marr.34

The board set a precedent in that it represented the first time that civilians were appointed as members and special advisors on an investigation into internal military matters. Regulations had to be changed to permit the precedent, but the inclusion was deemed necessary to demonstrate

32 Canada, Information Legacy, ‘de Faye Inquiry’, “Terms of Reference.” 33 Canada, Dishonoured Legacy, Volume 1, “The de Faye Board of Inquiry,” 342. 34 Canada, Information Legacy, document DND335009, “Information Briefing by MGen Boyle,” 18 November 1993.

126 DND’s willingness to deal with the Somalia issues “openly and bring unique experience to the board discussions and activities.”35

In total, the de Faye board of inquiry heard from seventy-nine witnesses in camera, including military personnel and representatives from non-governmental organizations. It released its final report on 19 July 1993, citing several conclusions that “disturbed” Admiral Anderson.36

While many features of the mission were deemed “satisfactory,” problems were found in several areas:

• While the mission was conducted in accordance with existing CAF doctrine, directions

and procedures for handling detainees were neither clear nor appropriate to the

situation in Somalia

• Sufficient civilian-military cooperation did not exist between personnel on

headquarters staff

• The extended use of hard rations, poor mail delivery, and adverse press coverage was

unnecessary and detrimental to morale

• An unacceptable number of accidental weapons discharges were attributed to a lack of

discipline and leadership

• Discipline within 2 Commando – one of three CAR Commando units sent to Somalia

– was flawed, the unit failed to adjust operational procedures for UN operations, and

leadership problems had resulted in challenges to authority even before deployment.37

35 Ibid. 36 Canada, Dishonoured Legacy, Volume 1, “Press conference with Admiral Anderson (CDS),” 342. 37 Issues deemed satisfactory included the camp in Somalia itself, the doctrinal aspects of the mission, medical support, vehicles and clothing, family support services, screening of personnel for Somalia, cultural tolerance, and the quality of individual leadership during training and operations. Canada, Information Legacy, ‘de Faye Inquiry’.

127

Despite these issues, the inquiry concluded that “for the most part, the professional values and attitudes of the CARBG in Somalia were of the highest order, and the alleged failures were not indicative of any systematic fault in the ethos, attitudes, or value system of the Airborne or of the

CF as a whole.”38 It recommended action to address the perceived problems, but determined that improvements in these specific areas would solve any necessary issues and prevent a repeat of similarly violent events in future missions. CDS Anderson largely agreed with the recommendations of the de Faye board, and he took several actions to address its concerns.

In September 1993, the Somalia Working Group was formed as an internal DND committee to monitor the progress of the CDS’ improvements. It had a mandate to “collate all ongoing departmental activities associated with the Somalia Affair with a view to (a) advising the

MND [Minister of National Defence], CDS, and DM [Deputy Minister] on future courses of action to be taken; (b) informing group principals of upcoming significant milestones facing the

Department; and (c) co-ordinating the NDHQ staffing of Somalia-related activities to ensure accuracy and timeliness.”39 Leadership of this committee was given to Major General ,

Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy and Communications) and “DND point man for all

Somalia-related issues.” Other members included MGen Boyle’s deputy, staff of the Minister of

National Defence, the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Deputy Minister, the special assistants of the

Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff and the ADM (Per), the directors general of Public Affairs and

Security, the Director of Parliamentary Affairs, and a member of the office of the Judge Advocate

General.40

38 Canada, Dishonoured Legacy, Volume 1, “The de Faye Board of Inquiry,” 344. 39 Ibid., “The Somalia Working Group,” 346-347. 40 Ibid.

128 The Working Group met weekly to deal with briefings, responses to ministerial inquiries, monitor the Somalia courts martial and disciplinary proceedings, and participate in Somalia related public affairs activities. The group’s weekly reports were distributed to the Minister and to senior officers and managers at NDHQ, while MGen Boyle reported directly to CDS Anderson and

Deputy Minister Robert Fowler.41

It also released an after action report in July 1994, to highlight the issues that still remained unresolved one year after the de Faye board had completed its investigation.42 The verdict of this after-action report was far from positive, suggesting that “there were serious deficiencies and weaknesses in the de Faye board’s analysis and recommendations.”43 A major issue was identified as the fact that much of the confidential information redacted from the de Faye report would eventually become publicly available through testimony at the courts martial. These testimonies were going to indicate, according to MGen Boyle, that some of the de Faye Board’s conclusions were wrong or incomplete and that leadership problems did in fact reach up the chain of command.

He noted the following specific issues:

1. Discipline: The de Faye Board concluded that, with the exception of cases currently under

investigation, disciplinary problems within the CAR were the exception rather than the rule.

The Working Group warned that the public was likely to perceive this conclusion as

“incorrect or too soft” from the testimony and information already available in the public

domain, but that the perception “may get worse with the anticipated testimony at the

upcoming courts martial next spring.”44 MGen Boyle informed the CDS that

41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., 348. 43 Canada, Information Legacy, Commission Report, “The Somalia Mission: Post-Deployment, The Somalia Working Group.” 44 Ibid., document DND335009, “Information Briefing by MGen Boyle,” 18 November 1993.

129 “statements from BGen Beno, Maj Seward and others contained in the Board’s testimony point to the fact that significant disciplinary problems existed within 2 Commando prior to their deployment to Somalia. These problems are associated with the use of pyrotechnics and the car burning incidents of 2-3 October 1992… The fact that these incidents have not yet been fully resolved is not known by the public and this is important since some of the suspects are also linked to the Somalia incidents.”45

2. Selection and Screening: The de Faye Board concluded that, “in the minds of commanders

involved, the unit had taken every reasonable measure to screen out unfit and undesirable

personnel.” In contrast, the Working Group suggested that “there is a proven link between

the people involved in the Somalia incidents and those involved in the Petawawa incidents

prior to deployment.”46 According to the testimony of LCol Morneault, he was “well aware

of an ‘informal leadership’ problem” in 2 Commando and had proposed to BGen Beno that

the entire Commando be left behind unless the problem could be resolved. BGen Beno

disagreed, suggesting that only 25 people be transferred internally in order to break up the

network. Ultimately, LCol Morneault was relieved as commanding officer and was replaced

with LCol Mathieu, who had insufficient time to resolve the issue. LGen Boyle warned that

“this issue will most certainly surface during court martial proceedings… the disagreement

between BGen Beno and LCol Morneault is at the heart of this issue, but it also leads to

another potential issue: the extent of the leadership problems.”47

3. Leadership: The Working Group found that the de Faye Board had “drawn a correct, if

incomplete” conclusion about the leadership problems faced by the CARBG because it had

focused solely on leadership weaknesses within 2 Commando. MGen Boyle noted that

“because of the terms of reference, the Board could not fully investigate the leadership problems experienced by the senior officers, but the public is now aware that there were problems at that level and concrete evidence will probably be made public at the court martial proceedings for LCol Mathieu and possibly Maj Seward.”48

45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., document DND335009, “Information Briefing by MGen Boyle,” 18 November 1993. 48 Ibid., document DND334979, “Information Briefing for the Chief of the Defence Staff.”

130

He cited documents from both the 4 March incident and Arone’s death as evidence of direct

attempts at the officer level to “cover up” what had happened. He noted that these actions

“now prove that the extent of the problems reached far beyond 2 Commando.”49

4. Rules of Engagement: the de Faye Board concluded that restrictions with regards to looters

in Somalia lacked clarity in the rules of engagement. It recommended reviews of policy

relating to the use of warning shots, after-action reporting, the use of non-lethal means and

weapons, and suggested that the CAF needed more careful analysis of policies and structures

to support tactical commanders.50

The Working Group found that the problem was much wider than a lack of clarity,

noting that the use of deadly force “appeared to sub-unit commanders to be authorized to

stop looters who were running away, whether they had a weapon or not.”51 Further, this

interpretation of the rules of engagement concerned the members of a US Special Forces

team who were in the area. They reported it to Col Labbe, who brought it up with LCol

Mathieu at several occasions. “Col Labbe was left with the impression that LCol Mathieu

understood his representation but the 4th of March incident and the fact that LCol Mathieu

has been charged for giving order to shoot thieves and looters which resulted in the approved

rules of engagement not being followed by his subordinates, would seem to indicate that this

problem was never adequately addressed in theatre.”52 MGen Boyle concluded that this point

was very important: as the mission was changed at the last minute from peacekeeping to

peace enforcement, the rules of engagement should have been shaped differently. He

49 Ibid., Testimony of MGen Jean Boyle, Volume 86, PG 16839-16841, 12 August 1996. 50 Ibid., ‘de Faye Inquiry’. 51 Ibid., document DND334979, “Information Briefing for the Chief of the Defence Staff.” 52 Ibid.

131 concluded that “consequently, the problems with the rules of engagement are not only linked

to leadership but are also linked to training.”53

5. Training: The Working Group challenged the de Faye Board’s conclusion that the CARBG

was “very well trained” for its task in Somalia and that consequently general purpose training

should be continued by the CAF, complemented by mission-specific training if required.

MGen Boyle noted that public perception would likely reject this conclusion after testimony

regarding the disagreement between BGen Beno and LCol Morneault and the subsequent

dismissal of Morneault on the grounds that his unit was not operationally ready. “This may

in the public mind, call into question the quality of the Battle Group’s training.”54

6. Racism: Generally, the de Faye Board found that members of the CAR were “adequately

prepared, adapted well, showed a remarkable degree of tolerance and that professional

values and attitudes were of the highest order.” Apart from evidence of “one or two white

supremacists” and the incidents of violence, the Board found “no evidence of a systemic

problem.”55 MGen Boyle warned that these conclusions “were probably too narrow” and

were likely to be challenged by the general public as more information was made available

during the courts martial. He noted that the remnants of systemic issues at Petawawa in the

1980s, racist tattoos and symbols, as well as the wide use of racist expressions – which were

left “unsevered” in the de Faye Board’s report to the public – “may reinforce the public

image of an unprofessional force to the public.”56

Ultimately, “what was in the De Faye report did not coincide with what I was reading in the military police reports,” Boyle explained. “The board’s conclusion that disciplinary problems

53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid., ‘de Faye Inquiry’. 56 Ibid., document DND334979, “Information Briefing for the Chief of the Defence Staff.”

132 were the exception and not the rule is not borne out by the testimony to the Board of Inquiry. I concluded that evidence to be received at the various Courts Martial, would seriously attack the validity of this conclusion.”57 MGen Boyle recommended that the MND establish an independent board of inquiry to evaluate the role of the chain of command in preparing and deploying the CAR on its mission to Somalia, as well as to evaluate NDHQ’s performance in the Somalia events, with particular attention on its handling of the “significant incidents.” He suggested that several decisions taken at NDHQ “may have exacerbated the already tenuous situation in Somalia.” 58

Public opinion strongly favoured the Working Group’s conclusions. The de Faye inquiry and recommendations were met by marked criticism in the media and among Canadians, due in large part to the fact that it was an internal military inquiry with a limited mandate, conceived of and carried out in perceived haste.59 Many critics felt that this first investigation did not reach to the heart of the issue and their concerns were bolstered by the Working Group’s report. Further, continuing revelations about racist and inappropriate conduct within the CAR – long before deploying to Somalia – began to emerge alongside a growing defensive posture within the armed forces and defence department. Allegations of a cover-up throughout the highest ranks of the CAF and DND pervaded media reports and debates in parliament.60 The Somalia Working Group itself was accused of releasing doctored information as part of its duties to process requests under the federal Access to Information Act.61

57 Ibid., Testimony of MGen Jean Boyle, Volume 86, PG 16839-16841, 12 August 1996; Ibid., document DND334979, “Information Briefing for the Chief of the Defence Staff.” 58 Canada, Dishonoured Legacy, 349. 59 Chris Klep and Donna Winslow, “Learning Lessons the Hard Way: Somalia and Srebrenica Compared,” in Peace Operations between War and Peace, ed. Erwin A. Schmidl (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 126. 60 Desbarats, Somalia Cover-Up, 1-6; Canada, Dishonoured Legacy, Volume 5, “Allegations of Cover-Up.” 61 Klep and Winslow, “Learning Lessons the Hard Way,” 118; Canada, Information Legacy, Volume 86, Testimony of MGen Jean Boyle.

133 Finally, following the airing of two videotapes on CBC television in January 1995 – showing CAR members engaging in racist behaviour and using human vomit, urine, and excrement as part of an initiation activity – the government was moved to take further action.62 The Hon.

David Collenette, then MND, announced the disbandment of the CAR on 23 January 1995, against the advice of the CDS. 63 This was followed on 20 March 1995 by the establishment of the

Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia under the federal

Inquiries Act.64

The Commission of Inquiry was designed to be independent and public. It was given a mandate to look into all aspects of the deployment to Somalia and consisted of three commissioners – two judges and one journalist – as well as lawyers, researchers, and Royal

Canadian Mounted Police investigators. In addition, independent and concurrent studies were commissioned from outside experts to consider the military justice system, training, racism, and military culture, among other things. The Commission was meant to be a comprehensive examination of the Somalia mission pre, during, and post-deployment, including those areas left out by the initial military inquiry. Chairman, Judge Gilles Létourneau, outlined the Commission’s approach by stating that it was “primarily concerned with the decisions, omissions, if any, and actions of those superior officers who could have influenced the whole course of the whole

Somalia operation as opposed to a single incident… We are going up the chain of command, not down at the level of the junior ranks where various corrective measures have already been taken.”65

62 Canada, Information Legacy, document 823800, “After Somalia, Scenes From a Scandal,” pictures taken from video by Christopher Dornan, 1992, exhibit number P-53. 63 Canada, Dishonoured Legacy, Volume 1, “The Somalia Working Group,” 350. The CAR was officially disbanded on 5 March 1995. 64 House of Commons Debates, 1st Session, 35th Parliament, Volume X, 3 March – 3 April 1995, “Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia,” Hon. David Michael Collenette (Minister of National Defence and Minister of Veterans Affairs, Lib., 21 March 1995), 10751. 65 Quoted from Klep and Winslow, “Learning Lessons the Hard Way,” 127.

134 The Commission began its inquiry by reviewing all reports and court martial proceedings already generated. This was followed by cataloguing all documents, notes, and electronic mail messages held by DND, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and the Privy Council Office (PCO) that had anything to do with Canada’s participation in Somalia.

By the end of 1996, it had received over 150,000 documents totalling more than 600,000 pages.66

Public hearings began in May 1995, first to determine issues of standing before the Inquiry, and then to hear the testimony of witnesses regarding the multiple phases of the Somalia mission. June

1995 saw hearings on the Commission’s mandate, as well as an overview of the policies, regulations, rules, practices, structure, and organization of the CAF, DND, and Canada’s military justice system. In October, evidence on the pre-deployment phase of the mission was first presented, continuing until February 1996.67

In April 1996, new CDS Jean Boyle (promoted in January 1996) issued a message to all

CAF members to “stand down” non-essential operations in order to thoroughly search all files for

Somalia related documents not yet forwarded to the Commission. Testimony on the in-theatre phase of the mission also began in April, although this phase was suspended after only twelve witnesses in reaction to evidence of document tampering, document destruction, and failure to comply with orders for disclosure of documents. The Commission was forced to hold special hearings to deal with missing and altered documents as well as discrepancies in operational logs supplied to the Inquiry by DND. 68 It described a “pattern of evasion and deception” in the behaviour of CAF officers and senior civil servants and asserted that many witness testimonies were “characterized by inconsistency, improbability, implausibility, evasiveness, selective

66 Canada, Information Legacy, “Exhibits and Documents.” 67 Canada, Dishonoured Legacy, Volume 1, “Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia,” 352. 68 Ibid., Volume 5, Chapter 39, “Openness and Disclosure of Documents.”

135 recollection, half truths, and even plain lies.”69 This evidence of “calculated deception” fuelled public belief in the legitimacy of cover-up allegations and suggested much about the poor state of leadership in the armed forces.

These accusations were also bolstered by other news coming out of the Canadian mission to Bosnia at the time, which provided further examples of discipline breakdown and professional failure. Between September 1995 and July 1996, Canadians learned that CAF soldiers had been engaged in “drunken debauchery, black-market profiteering, sexual liaisons and physical abuse of patients” at the Bakovici hospital.70 Senior officers were also accused of “lining their pockets through unjustified expense claims” and “misusing government resources, such as executive aircraft” for their personal benefit. 71 Lieutenant-General Armand Roy, Deputy Chief of the

Defence Staff and commander at Oka in 1990, had to repay $80,000 and resign after evidence emerged that he had padded expense accounts.72

Despite the Commission’s preliminary findings, the government steadfastly maintained that a Somalia cover-up had not occurred. While it admitted that mistakes were undoubtedly made, it promised that their source would be addressed and that they would never be repeated. New MND

Douglas Young (appointed in October 1996) proceeded to abruptly conclude the mandate of the

Commission with an Order in Council in March 1997.73 As the Commission had already been granted three extensions, he felt that further investigation would be counter-productive rather than helpful. He argued that Canadians were now interested “in how we are going to react in the future,

69 Ibid., “Preface,” xxxii-xxxiii. 70 Hugh Winsor, “Military brings new shame on Canada,” Independent (19 January 1997), accessed on 3 May 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/military-brings-new-shame-on-canada-1283978.html. 71 Kasurak, A National Force, 269; Also see: Brian Nolan and Scott Taylor, Tarnished Brass: Crime and Corruption in the Canadian Military (Toronto: Lester Publishing Limited, 1996). 72 Morton, A Military History of Canada, 288. 73 Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), Order in Council, PC Number 1997-0174, 4 February 1997, accessed on 5 November 2014, http://orders-in-council.canada.ca/results.php?lang=en.

136 should such incidents happen again. They want to be sure that there is not a repetition of all the problems we have heard about and discovered during this inquiry.” 74 Essentially, Young contended that the issues and mistakes at the heart of the problems in Somalia had been sufficiently recognized, acknowledged, and recorded; it was time to move forward and actually make changes to do something about them.

Young backed up his argument with a Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and

Management of the Canadian Forces (Young Report).75 This report emerged from an investigation launched in December 1996 to conduct a thorough review of CAF structure and practices. Many

Canadian experts, including four university professors who each produced their own papers, and a Special Advisory Group on the military justice system and military police investigation services, aided Young in his effort.76 Released on 25 March 1997, the Young Report represented an attempt to move forward from the Somalia Affair by presenting recommendations for how to address the perceived problems.77 Those recommendations, 65 in total, were comprehensive, covered nine specific themes, and represented a general framework for change that intended to make the CAF more cohesive, effective, and able to adapt to new circumstances and challenges.78

74 Canada, Parliament, Oral Question Period, Somalia Inquiry, 4 February 1997, Hon. Douglas Young (Minister of National Defence and Minister of Veterans Affairs, Lib.) accessed 5 November 2014, http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=35&Ses=2&DocId=23326 62#SOMALIAINQUIRY. 75 Canada, Young Report, 25 March 1997. 76 Ibid., “Introduction”, 1. The other papers were prepared by: Dr. D.J. Bercuson, PhD, FRSC, University of Calgary; Dr. J. L. Granatstein, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Professor Albert Legault, Laval University; Desmond Morton, McGill Institute for the Study of Canada; and the Special Advisory Group chaired by Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Right Honourable Brian Dickson. 77 The final report of the Somalia Commission was subsequently released in June 1997, also providing recommendations for how best to ensure positive change. 78 The nine themes included: the role of the CAF, military discipline, values and ethics, military leadership, command and rank structure, operational missions, terms and conditions of service, the integrated civilian-military headquarters, and informing Canadians.

137 The largest section of the document was devoted to military leadership and recommendations to improve officer training, education, and professional development. The prominence of this issue emerged from one of the report’s central conclusions: that inadequate officer professional development had resulted in weaknesses in leadership and management of the

CAF, a failure to adapt to changing conditions, lack of strategic thinking, disciplinary difficulties, and isolation from broader Canadian society.79 These conclusions were supported by the findings of the Somalia Commission, released several months later in June 1997. The Commission had also found that organizational indiscipline leading to systemic breakdown had contributed to the problems in Somalia. It cited rampant careerism, individual ambition, flawed oversight and supervision, as well as inaction or lack of action to deal with incidents of indiscipline and

“thuggery,” concluding that Canadian soldiers had been searching “often in vain, for leadership and inspiration” throughout the Somalia Affair.80 While it conceded that some individual officer failings affected the success of the mission, it was the oversights, mistakes, ineffective decisions, and overall bad judgement of certain ranking officers that contributed to significant problems in mission planning, interpretation of the rules of engagement, and discipline. Further, it deplored the alleged instances of cover-up and destruction of evidence that emerged during its investigation, which were entirely disconcerting.

Ultimately, each study devoted to analysing the issue had concluded that leadership failures went far beyond individual officer mistakes on the battlefield in Somalia. They stretched up the chain of command and were systemic in nature, with broad institution-wide leadership failure leading to organizational breakdown. This failure was directly related to a ‘value gap’ between the

CAF and Canadian society, as well as a cultural malaise related to military professionalism, ethos,

79 Ibid. 80 Canada, Dishonoured Legacy, “Executive Summary.”

138 and attitudes regarding duty and accountability. These deficiencies were not new, nor were they a result of the Somalia experience itself. They were entrenched features of CAF culture that had developed over time while the Canadian military was continually re-conceptualized in response to multiple different strategic contexts. Somalia and the decade of darkness simply demonstrated that these issues had led to a serious loss of professionalism and, ultimately, a failure of leadership.

The resulting reform movement would focus on military education as a key piece of professional development to overcome and rectify the perceived problems.

139 CHAPTER 5 The Reform Movement

As the examples of unprofessional and occasionally criminal behaviour by CAF members began to accumulate in media and investigative reports, Canadians demanded accountability.

Something had to be done to forestall recurrences and restore the lost public trust in a military whose reputation simply continued to diminish with each new revelation. The journey towards the necessary reforms was neither quick nor simple, however. It lacked consensus among many military and civilian leaders regarding the source of the problems as well as the required solutions.

It also challenged traditional civil-military assumptions related to military responsibility and corporateness. It was particularly hindered by the deeply-rooted anti-intellectual organizational culture of the CAF, which neither embraced major reform nor the focus on education and professional development that was being demanded.

Over time, a reform movement did materialize. It started with small, incremental changes introduced by the military in response to the initial incidents, but was eventually driven further by civilian demand, strategic need, practical bureaucratic requirements, and in no small part by high- ranking “change champions” in both the military and civilian realms. The process was occasionally painfully slow, but as David Bercuson noted, “the entire Canadian Forces at first crawled, then wandered, then stumbled, but eventually began to march forward with determination to a new professionalism rooted in the history and values of Canadian society, based upon a fighting ethos, with a democratic ethic and with one of the best-educated officer corps of any armed forces anywhere.”1

1 Bercuson, “Up from the Ashes,” 37.

140 5.1 Driving Reform

Responsibility for addressing the initial crisis during the Somalia Affair fell to senior DND leaders, both military and civilian. They responded with the in-theatre military police investigations that led to several courts martial, and the de Faye inquiry to examine more broadly the CARBG’s leadership, discipline, actions and procedures related to the Somalia mission. As already noted, the de Faye board investigation concluded that the professional values and attitudes of the CARBG in Somalia were exemplary. It dismissed the notion that systemic problems had contributed to the incidents of violence that occurred. What problems it did perceive, were to be addressed by the following recommendations outlined in its July 1993 report:

• Conduct research for long-range communications and technologies to reduce risks for

troops

• Clarify orders on the custody and detention of military personnel and civilian individuals

• Develop a joint civil-military relations capability for future UN operations

• Improve in-theatre rations

• Review the plastic rifle magazine used in Somalia

• Improve public affairs approaches to supporting high-risk CAF deployments

• Consider command and control issues for commanders of Canadian contingents

• Review the policy and practice of using warning shots and implement standardized

reporting requirements

• Carefully analyse policies and structures necessary to supporting tactical commanders

• Rites of passage activities and symbols should be examined

141 • Cultural briefings should be improved during pre-deployment training.2

CDS Anderson accepted these recommendations and issued orders to launch the reviews and reforms they called for. He directed Land Force Commander Lieutenant-General G.W. Reay to review the organization and staffing of the CAR, “keeping in mind the de Faye board’s recommendation that the CAR must have high-calibre and stable leadership.”3 He also ordered action to ensure that Airborne training conformed to standard CAF practice and requested a review of all disciplinary cases within the Regiment between the beginning of 1992 and its deployment to

Somalia. The goal was to ensure their proper resolution, including appropriate disciplinary action if necessary. LGen Reay conducted this review, and submitted a full report outlining changes made to address the problems as well as suggested areas for further consideration pending the completion of the Somalia courts martial.4 Changes included:

• Removal of LCol Mathieu as commanding officer of the CAR. He was replaced by LCol

Kenward.

• Changeover of the sub-unit commanders within the regiment.

• Changeover of the personnel of the regiment by 25 per cent.

• Appropriate actions in regard to all disciplinary cases taken, except for the car burning

incident of 2-3 October 1992.

• Reproval of BGen Beno for his negligence in not ensuring the unit readiness prior to

deployment.

2 Canada, Dishonoured Legacy, Volume 1, “Recommendations of the de Faye Board of Inquiry.” 3 Ibid. 4 Canada, Information Legacy, document DND 309157, “Response to leadership and discipline issues – Canadian Airborne Regiment,” 28 October 1993 and annexes control number 001082.

142 • Maintained the status quo for the internal structure of the CAR, but proposed it report to

the Land Force Central Area in Toronto instead of the brigade in Petawawa.5

Anderson also ordered a comprehensive review of all CAF policies, orders, and regulations dealing with racism, civilian-military relations, and rules of engagement, including a review of the involvement of all CAF members and applicants for enrolment with racist organizations.6 This order effectively ignored the de Faye conclusion regarding a lack of systemic racism in the CAF requiring action. A review was subsequently conducted by Director General Personnel Policy with input from Director General Security and Judge Advocate General (JAG). The review recommended that a deliberate counter-racism program be implemented within the CAF, including: the publication of a clear statement of policy guidance to Commanding Officers on how to deal with racist activity; a program of education and awareness to ensure that all members know and understand the reasons for the policy; and procedures for screening applicants unable to accept the policy.7

Following discussion at Armed Forces Council in August 1993, the new ‘Racist Conduct’ policy was circulated to the CAF on 25 February 1994. 8 This policy established new procedures for dealing with racist conduct by CAF members, including a range of administrative and disciplinary measures – such as potential release from service – for those who contravened the policy. It also included a focus on pre-deployment screening or “selection methodology” for assessing the “social and behavioural suitability of individuals identified for UN and out-of-

5 Ibid., document DND335009, “Information Briefing by MGen Boyle,” 18 November 1993. 6 Canada, Dishonoured Legacy, Volume 1, “Response of the CDS.” 7 Canada, Information Legacy, document DND016307, “Briefing Note for the Minister of National Defence, Racism and the Canadian Forces,” 7 April 1994. 8 Ibid. The Armed Forces Council is the senior military body of the Canadian Armed Forces. It meets to advise and assist the Chief of the Defence Staff on all matters concerning the command, control, and administration of the forces.

143 country deployments.”9 This effectively addressed the de Faye concern that screening of all personnel for future missions should include the assessment of attitudes, instead of a singular focus on soldiering skills.

A project entitled ‘Awareness Education and Training for Harassment and Racism

Prevention’ (AETHRP) was also introduced, managed by Chief Personnel Careers and

Development alongside Director General Recruiting, Education, and Training.10 Implementation was set to be phased in over the next two years, with each individual Command given control over the focus and scope of changes. It was “not the intention that cmds cease their current initiatives, but rather fine tune them in line with the new CF administrative order and supplement them as appropriate with initiatives/programmes developed by the AETHRP project.”11 The program was applied to the entire defence team – military and civilian – and was complemented by a communications strategy to keep all parties engaged and informed of progress.

Meanwhile, the trials of soldiers found culpable by the military police in Somalia kept the incidents of violence at the forefront of public thought throughout 1993 and 1994. This contributed to the overall necessity for creating MGen Boyle’s internal Somalia Working Group, which coordinated all activities and communication related to the investigations, changes, and ongoing disciplinary proceedings. It was MGen Boyle and his group who first recognized that the military’s approach to problem-solving and reform – the courts martial, de Faye review, and subsequent changes – were not going to be enough to satisfy public concerns. He expected issues “to arise publicly once the media will be able to link the [de Faye] Board findings to the evidence to be

9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., document DND215747, “Briefing Note for the Minister of National Defence, Responsible Group: LGen Addy,” 7 April 1994. 11 Ibid., document NS091800, “Annex C to BN 24 MAR 94, CF Harassment/Racism TRG,” 24 March 1994.

144 introduced in the court this spring,” suggesting that the public was going to reject the Board’s limited conclusions.12

His forecast proved prescient. As the courts martial proceedings, videos of bad Airborne behaviour, and continued examples of unprofessional conduct in multiple theatres became public knowledge, Canadians turned on the military. They refused to accept that the reviews and alterations suggested and implemented by the defence establishment constituted enough change.

A few tweaks to the current system was not going to address the perceived systemic problems. As far as Canadians were concerned, their soldiers had failed them. It didn’t matter that the CAF achieved remarkable successes in meeting operational objectives while on deployment in

Somalia.13 Canadian soldiers had repeatedly acted in ways that contradicted Canadian values. As the investigations progressed and further revelations in other theatres were revealed, their disappointment was only compounded. The CAF lost the trust of its parent society. “We had been marginalized,” wrote Hillier. “Canadians did not recognize us as their armed forces…There was almost no way that anyone could have turned the tide of public opinion that was against us at that time.”14

The ensuing Somalia Commission didn’t help either. Two years of public hearings portrayed a military that was confrontational, evasive, and confused, with several members accused of trying to withhold information from both the commissioners and general public.15

MGen Boyle, now Chief of the Defence Staff, was himself implicated: his testimony to the inquiry included “darting eyes, verbose answers, memory lapses” and accusations levied against his

12 Ibid., document DND335006, “Information Briefing for the Chief of the Defence Staff.” 13 Domansky, “The Canadian Forces in Somalia.” 14 Hillier, A Soldier First, 123-124. 15 Kasurak, A National Force, 268-269.

145 subordinates for document tampering.16 He also admitted that the military, including the Somalia

Working Group, had regularly chosen not to provide documents to the commission if it could not see their relevance to the investigation.17 General Hillier described watching Boyle “being grilled” on the stand by the Commission’s lawyers: “The senior-ranking military officer in Canada was treated with absolute stunning contempt. It was so clear that we had no standing in Canadian society and were viewed as a bunch of robots in uniform who were getting what we deserved.”18

Horn and Bentley have suggested that these types of responses from senior officials “made a bad situation worse... Faced with increasing criticism from the media and public at large, the senior DND leadership, both civilian and military, decided to stonewall the detractors.” The authors described an attempt to “ignore the criticism, and when this failed, they selectively released information, often in a misleading manner.” 19 This contributed to public distrust, but also supported a growing “disfunction” and lack of trust within DND and the military institution itself.

The Somalia Commission’s report cited a 1995 DND survey of the attitudes of military members and civilian employees that revealed “dissatisfaction towards leadership. Survey respondents believed that leaders in the Department were too concerned about ‘building their empires’ and

‘following their personal agenda,’ and that DND was being too bureaucratic.”20 The survey acknowledged that “employees, both military and civilian, are losing or have lost confidence in the Department’s leadership and management.”21 General Hillier recalled that,

“the perception across the junior ranks was that we, the leaders, had broken faith with those we led, and if there is one thing I learned over the years, it is that perception is reality. Our soldiers did not trust us. We could do little to address the key issues that weighed so heavily

16 Morton, A Military History of Canada, 287. 17 Canada, Information Legacy, “Testimony of MGen Boyle”; Sandra Whitworth, Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 96. 18 Hillier, A Soldier First, 125-126. 19 Horn and Bentley, Forced to Change, 37. 20 Canada, Dishonoured Legacy, Volume 2, “Leadership.” 21 Ibid.

146 on them and their families. The Canadian Forces moved into crisis and focused on survival, not excellence or shaping for the future or serving Canada.”22

The hardships endured by soldiers and their families in this period certainly exacerbated these feelings. Soldiers repeatedly left on deployment to serve their country, usually for six months, before returning home for a six month stay, followed by redeployment abroad once more.23 Service families lived under increasing strain, in inadequate military housing, suffering the effects of extremely low pay – much less than any other profession in Canada at the time. “Drunkenness, wife-battering, and divorce were frequent,”24 and “we had soldiers working at part-time jobs, not because they were energetic and industrious and wanted more money, but because they had to do that to feed their families. We had military families lining up at food banks, and people in uniform who had difficulty making their rent.”25 This was all occurring as the public narrative increasingly accused the military of failing to live up to its duties and obligations in service of the country.

ADM (Pol) at the time, Kenneth Calder, asserted that “the sheer damage that was being done inside the institution in terms of morale and pride in the job, the role, and so forth – that was being ground to shreds by the Somalia Inquiry, which threatened the existence of the Canadian Forces as an effective institution. It wasn’t that [the reform program] had to be done because the government wanted it, it had to be done because the institution needed reform.”26

Government demands continued to factor in, however, as policy and budget considerations were equally prevalent drivers of change. The federal budget released in February 1994 included massive cuts to defence spending and forced another round of considered reform planning by the defence establishment. Substantial reductions were imposed by this budget on DND and CAF

22 Hillier, A Soldier First, 93. 23 Granatstein, Canada’s Army, 396. 24 Ibid. 25 Hillier, A Soldier First, 128. 26 Interview with Ken Calder, Former ADM (Pol), by Dr. David Bercuson, 17 February 2015, Ottawa, Ontario, transcripts and recording held by author.

147 personnel, infrastructure, overhead, and support elements, making the “management renewal of the DND/CF an imperative.”27 MND David Collenette called on the military to “restructure… become leaner and more efficient in the way we manage our resources.”28 Subsequently, the new

1994 White Paper on Defence sought to provide Canadians with an “effective, realistic, and affordable defence policy.”29 While it expected the CAF to maintain its multi-purpose, combat- capable forces to protect Canadians and fulfill a wide-variety of domestic and international operations, it also acknowledged the serious fiscal constraints facing the country. The paper declared that the CAF must be “both reduced and refocused” in response to the struggling finances of the federal government.30

As part of this process, twenty-one National Defence facilities – bases, stations, units, and installations – were closed, while activities at a further seven facilities were reduced and two more were consolidated. This included the closure or reduction in operations at multiple CAF educational establishments: the NDC was terminated, staff schools closed, Royal Roads and

College Militaire were shut down, while RMC was reduced by approximately 15 percent.31 MND

Collenette explained to the House of Commons that the choice of reductions “were made after an exhaustive review of every item in the defence budget.” Noting that “previous cuts have hit operational capability and capital equipment programs,” he argued that “further paring in these areas could compromise the combat capability of the Forces. In order to preserve an operational

27 National Defence, Chief of the Defence Staff General AJGD de Chastelain, NDHQ Action Directive D 8/94, 9 June 1994, 5570-1 (CDS), DND Access to Information Request. 28 Ibid. 29 Canada, Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1994), 3. 30 Ibid., 40-43. 31 Haycock, “Athena and the Muses,” 7.

148 capability, we have addressed our overhead and our excess capacity… In short, we will eliminate activities that are not essential to our prime defence missions.”32

The inclusion of CAF educational institutions in these “non-essential” cuts has been cited by Horn and Bentley as evidence that “the importance of education was still not accepted or realized” by the Canadian military:

“So blind was the leadership and so entrenched the organizational culture that despite the walls beginning to fall in amongst them, when the first wave of criticism and budget cuts were announced, it was the National Defence College, the CAF Staff School, and two of the three military colleges (i.e. Royal Roads in Victoria and CMR in Saint-Jean) that were closed.”33

General Hillier has suggested the decision was much more difficult to make, sharing the nuances involved in the decision-making process with the following description:

“Two of our military colleges ended up closing their doors, despite the fact that everybody felt that they were sacred cows. In hindsight, there were no sacred cows in the military at that time. When you face a budget cut and you’ve still got to continue carrying out certain operations, then suddenly sacred cows take on a whole different meaning. In truth, three military colleges were far too many for such a tiny Canadian Forces, which would shrink further, and clearly we needed to get rid of at least one. Everybody involved in the discussions felt that if we tried to close Royal Roads Military College, in Victoria, BC, without doing something else, the blowback from the western provinces would be enormous, and rightly so. The thinking was to throw in College Militaire, in Saint-Jean, Quebec, as one of the cuts because it was a francophone institution and would never be closed. But Prime Minister Chretien took one look and said, ‘Close it!’ Suddenly, something that everyone had anticipated would not get approval was a done deal, and we closed CMR as a military college.”34

As part of the plan to close the educational institutions, CDS authorized the creation of the CF Officer Development Review Board in 1994. Under the chairmanship of

LGen R.W. Morton, the ODBR was designed to review the education and professional development required by CAF officers during their careers and recommend a program to meet

32 Canada, Information Legacy, document NS010411, “Speaking Notes for the Honourable Collenette, Minister of National Defence and Minister of Veterans Affairs to the House of Commons,” Ottawa, 23 February 1994. 33 Horn and Bentley, Forced to Change, 38. 34 Hillier, A Soldier First, 129-130.

149 those requirements.35 De Chastelain asserted that “it had become essential that the CF undertake a detailed examination of the OPD requirements and methodologies of the future,” to create a new plan appropriate to a system with less resources.36

The primary focus of the ODRB was the creation and institutionalization of a formal system of education and professional development to replace the “mixed formal and informal system that [had] evolved over the past 30 years.”37 In its assessment, it considered multiple sources as background: the Rowley Report and various other professional development studies published by the CAF; the systems developed by a broad range of allied militaries, including the

United States, the , France, and Australia; and the systems of various civilian institutions, both in Canada and abroad, that were involved in strategic analysis and professional education.38

Upon review, the ODRB concluded that, despite the multitude of reviews and studies it had conducted on the subject over the previous thirty years, the CAF continued to lack a codified framework or articulated professional philosophy. This had led its formal system of officer education and development instituted in the 1970s to become “inadequate and largely unsystematic. The formal CF OPD regime has been marked by inertia, static curricula, and an inability to respond to change.”39 In particular, it noted “inadequacies and inconsistencies” in the pre-commissioning preparation of officer candidates, in the focus on “informal and experiential development,” in the lack of emphasis on leadership principles at each level of officer

35 National Defence, CDS de Chastelain, NDHQ Action Directive. The Board was originally under the chairmanship of MGen G.C. Tousignant, but was later shifted to LGen Morton. 36 Ibid. 37 Officer Development Review Board, Morton Report, 19. 38 Ibid., ii. 39 Ibid., 16.

150 development, and in the outdated curriculums at the military colleges based on 1976 officer specifications.

It also found that the Development Periods I through IV, introduced by the 1972 OPDS, were never regulated or formalized in policy and lacked instructions in terms of entry and exit requirements. This meant that “little attention was paid” to each development phase during an officer’s career. In reality, attendance at professional development institutions, such as the

Canadian Forces Staff School, Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, and NDC “had little or no effect on the officer’s promotion or selection to command.”40 While not ignored, professional development was being conducted on an ad hoc basis, in relative isolation at each institution.

“The current system of officer professional development is, in fact, not a system of professional development in the strict sense of the word; instead, it is a collection of loosely connected institutions, educational/training programmes, and policies and orders that were not governed by a single-purpose hierarchy. The subject institutions are viewed by the officer corps and the environments with some degree of skepticism.”41

This conclusion is supported by the various examples of individual efforts, or bottom-up attempts to improve the opportunities for educational and professional growth throughout this period. In the absence of a unified or organized institutional effort, individual soldiers and separate educational institutions had taken steps to improve things. In 1973, driven by CAF personnel and their dependents who wanted more education, “and were pushing from the bottom up to have access to it,” the University of Manitoba introduced a plan to provide university level courses for everyone in the CAF.42 The university also granted accreditation to some of the more sophisticated military training programs. In 1992, to address the “growing desire for higher education” among

CAF officers, particularly in subjects related to the profession of arms and society, RMC

40 Ibid., 20. 41 Ibid., 155. 42 Haycock, “Athena and the Muses,” 14.

151 introduced its own source of “extension education.”43 While the engineering division at RMC had long been supported by a strong graduate studies program with sponsored officers earning a variety of degrees, the same was not true of the arts. As Haycock noted, RMC was moved to act in response to “the high number of phone calls and letters” from individuals who wanted opportunities for further study in professional topics.44 RMC decided to “take the education to where the clients were,” and by the end of 1992 was teaching post-graduate courses from its War Studies Masters program in Toronto at the Canadian Forces College. “It had the willing cooperation of the people there, and it used a few of their Command and Staff students as the first experimental lot.”45 Four years later, the program had its first graduate and over 300 officers of varying ranks were working on a Master of Arts in War Studies at several other major centres across the country. Haycock asserted that the success of this program “only confirmed again, that military personnel wanted higher education, were willing to do it on their own and were driving the demand from the bottom up in the absence of a top-down policy.”46

There were also motivated leaders within the military hierarchy that actively worked to introduce higher education into the system, absent an institutional push. LGen Dallaire described his efforts in the early 1990s to introduce educational opportunities at the operational level, recognizing that the CAF possessed suitable opportunities for military skill development, but lacked any sort of intellectual component. He recognized deficiencies in the Canadian system after attending a British higher command and staff course for colonels and brigadier-generals to learn the operational level of war in January-March 1991.47 The first Canadian officer to attend the

43 Ibid., 14-15. 44 Ibid., 15. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Interview with Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire by Dr. David Bercuson, 25 April 2013, Parliament Hill, Ottawa, Ontario, recording and transcript held by author.

152 course – which resembled a short post-graduate seminar focused on significant reading, research, interactions with guest speakers, and a required publication at the end – Dallaire returned with a desire to address the lack of a similar opportunity within the Canadian system. He wrote a paper entitled “Operational Deficiency of the Canadian Officer Corps at the Operational Level of War,” and began to champion the creation of similar courses in Canada.48 Dallaire was sent to the course by LGen , Commander of the Army, with the blessing of the Chief of Personnel

Development LGen Scott Clements. He was given the opportunity to learn new intellectual skills, but was also asked to determine if those skills were obtainable – or not – within the CAF at that time. “They let me go, but said, when you’re there, why don’t you look at what that deficiency might be in the Canadian Forces,” Dallaire explained.49 This example is demonstrative of the fact that individual efforts were being made to improve the professional development of Canadian officers.

In its final September 1995 report, dubbed the Morton Report, the ODRB proposed a new officer development model to provide an “orderly” development process throughout the entire career of an officer. While it put greater responsibility on the individual, requiring a commitment to lifelong learning, it also outlined a hierarchy of responsibility that would support a forces-wide approach to professionalization. A centralized agency led at the highest levels of the military would be given the singular mandate of supporting officer professional development. A reporting chain from its commander to the Armed Forces Council on matters of leadership and policy would provide a clear line of responsibility and accountability. Further, to overcome the “paucity of controlling documentation on both policy and operations procedures of OPD,” the report called

48 Ibid. 49 Ibid.

153 for a new “hierarchy of orders, policy, and documentation” to sustain a clear, cohesive, and consistent system.50

The Morton Report model rested on four pillars, each contributing equally to an individual officer’s development: education, training, experience, and self-development. Education, the first pillar, would play a much more prominent role than it had in the past, enjoying equal status to military training and experiential learning. The report argued that the CAF had taken a “minimalist approach to officer professional development, providing just enough education. The goal of providing ‘intellectual development’ [had] been one that was not wholly accepted by many in the training establishments.”51 Consequently, post-secondary education was focused primarily on the technical occupations, with little to no focus on intellectual development.

Officer

Professional Development

Training Development Education - Experience

Self

Figure 1: The Four Pillars of Officer Professional Development as outlined in the Morton Report52

50 Officer Development Review Board, Morton Report, 19-21. 51 Ibid., 37-38. 52 Ibid., 6.

154

The content of CAF education curriculums at various institutions was also found lacking by the ODRB. The report declared that general education in security and defence policy matters, the management of a government department, or in professionalism and military ethos were almost non-existent. In particular, the report noted that the Basic Officer Training Course (BOTC) had no real leadership training or discussion of concepts like “service ethos” and “military ethos.” There was only one fourth-year course at RMC that dealt with military professionalism and ethics at the time. Further, the ODRB found that the scope of CAF military ethos was not being made explicit to any of the educational institutions responsible for developing officers, and subsequently not to their students or faculty either.53

Acknowledging that “a sound education is the cornerstone of our professional officer corps,” the report advised that the CAF raise its entry-level standard for officers to at least a relevant community college diploma, with a baccalaureate degree or higher academic achievement remaining desirable.54 It also recommended that any new OPD system “must ensure that officers undertake development in national security, regional security, and strategic and war studies,” in addition to incorporating a strong focus on ethos and other values considered fundamental to leadership and professionalism.55 The importance of continued education throughout an officers career was highlighted, with the report calling for the creation of a College of Military Professional

Education (CCPME) – akin to the Canadian Defence Education Centre proposed by the Rowley

Report. Its purpose would be to deliver and administer courses for officers, including postgraduate studies and executive studies. The CCPME would be the “in-service source of continuing

53 Ibid., 42-43. 54 Ibid., 84. 55 Ibid., 18.

155 education for the CF and a catalyst to reinforce the principles of life-long learning in the officer corps.”56

The model also retained the four development periods spanning an officer’s career:

• DP1 – pre-enrolment selection, the BOTC and Military Occupation Classification

(MOC) training prior to commissioning

• DP2 – MOC training after commissioning and service as a junior-level officer

(lieutenant and captain) plus Staff School

• DP3 – mid-level career service, preparation for senior officer appointments (major and

lieutenant-colonel) and Canadian Forces Command and Staff College (CFCSC)

• DP4 – senior-level career service (colonel, brigadier-general, major-general, lieutenant-

general, and general).57

Corresponding broadly to rank but still allowing for individual learning rates, each period would be formalized, with clear entry and exit requirements. Leadership principles, including military ethos and ethics were to feature prominently at each level, from pre-commissioning training through to senior and general officer courses and seminars.58 The system would also satisfy various social and political imperatives, such as bilingualism, alignment with the Charter of Rights and

Freedoms, and the Canadian societal expectation for involvement in peace operations.

To implement its model, the Morton Report provided a series of specific action recommendations, divided into two sections: the major system implementations first, followed by recommendations for existing institutions and programs. These changes focused on the specific

56 Ibid., 158. 57 Ibid., 20. 58 Ibid., 156.

156 principles and concepts, governance structure, research, and quality assurance components that the

ODRB deemed necessary to correct the weaknesses and deficiencies noted throughout the report.

It counselled the CAF to introduce these changes, as envisaged, to attain a degree of

“organizational and intellectual synergy never previously realized in OPD in the CF.”59

Following its distribution in September 1995, the Morton Report informed the work of the

Officer Professional Development Working Group (OPDWG). Chaired by Commodore K.A.

Nason, this group was given a mandate by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) to examine the Morton Report and identify those recommendations that could “feasibly be implemented.”60 It was to develop a plan for a revised Officer Professional Development System based, in part, on

Figure 2: The Officer’s Professional Development Handbook the work of the ODRB. It eventually published the Officer Professional Development Handbook, which outlined the revised system.61 The handbook incorporated the ODRB’s four pillars and four

59 Ibid., 153. 60 Letter to recipients of the ODRB Report from Colonel P.J. Holt, Director Recruiting Education and Training for the Chief of the Defence Staff, “Report of the ODRB,” 19 February 1996, DND 5570-1 (DRET 2-2-2), DND Access to Information Request. The OPDWG was given its mandate on 18 September 1995. 61 Canada, National Defence, Officer’s Professional Development Handbook, 17 March 1997, A-PD-007-000/JS- H01, Department of National Defence, DND Access to Information Request.

157 developmental stages, confirming that university education would continue to be part of the strategy of enhancing the qualifications, credibility, and the overall professionalism of officers.62

It differentiated between academic and military professional education – the former acquired through a university environment and focused on academic pursuits, the latter through institutions such as the CFC and focused on the military art – noting that both are required to see an officer through all developmental levels.63 The Handbook also, in very general terms, outlined the CAF’s interpretation of the “profession of arms,” including a statement of ethics, ethos, and definition of military leadership.64

Another change instigated by the Morton Report included the establishment of an

Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC) for colonels and naval captains to prepare for leadership appointments at the operational level, and a National Security Studies Course (NSSC) to help prepare for employment at the strategic level. Both of these courses were approved by senior leadership by early 1997, responding to the need for academic study in security and national defence topics.65 They were structured to use a graduate school delivery methodology, including a lecture-discussion format that was adopted to provide a more active way of presenting the material. This had the added benefit of allowing students to immediately debate and engage with subject material. Seminar papers and term papers were also made requirements, which students had to present and defend before their peers and have graded by subject matter experts. The focus was on critical thinking involving analysis, synthesis, and evaluation.66 Randall Wakelam, one of

62 Canada, National Defence, The Officer Professional Development Working Group Final Report (Ottawa, 1996), 13. 63 National Defence, Officer’s Professional Development Handbook, 9-10. 64 Ibid., 1-5. 65 Randall Wakelam, “Dealing with Complexity and Ambiguity: Learning to Solve Problems Which Defy Solution,” Strathrobyn Papers, Centre for National Security Studies, No. 4 (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2010), 9, accessed on 28 June 2018, https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/237/251/wakelam-eng.pdf. 66 Ibid., 13.

158 the three designers of the new courses, who also subsequently led the development team that finalized the curriculum for the first AMSC, explained that the changes were made in response to the Morton Report’s conclusions. He noted that when the concept for the courses was presented to

General Dallaire, described as the “senior education authority within the CAF at the time,” he approved. General Dallaire, “who could also compare the curriculum with his experiences as a student in the United Kingdom as well as his personal experiences in Rwanda, he was happy with both the content and rigour of the plan.”67

Despite these changes, Horn and Bentley have argued that the Morton Report was generally

“not well received by the CAF. Some reforms were implemented, including a review of the

[Officer General Specification] to address some of its deficiencies, as well as to attempt to ensure that the document reflected the needs of the CAF officer corps in the post-Cold War environment.”

While they acknowledged the publication of the Officer’s Professional Development Handbook, both concluded that “there was little effort, however, to introduce a comprehensive restructuring of the OPD system.” Most of the recommendations put forward by the report were determined to be “unmanageable,” while the rest were “subsumed into the larger and increasingly strained CAF staffing process” where they competed for scarce funds.68 This interpretation reflected the general

CAF attitude towards this issue already identified in this paper: that despite a recurring interest in strengthening professional development and educational opportunities, systemic reform was hindered by a general apathy and lack of funds. There was neither the institutional desire to overhaul the whole system, nor the resources. What changes that were introduced were limited

67 Ibid., 13-14. Wakelam was the lead developer for the original AMSC and participated in the briefing to Dallaire in the fall of 1996. 68 Horn and Bentley, Forced to Change, 40.

159 and focused, representing incremental and ad hoc reform on an as-needed basis. While military- driven reform was not absent, it was neither comprehensive nor institutionalized.

By early 1997, the Young Report and Somalia Commission Report were both published, adding hundreds of specific recommendations for change from outside of the military hierarchy to those already implemented. Many of those reforms pertained to the need for a more educated, professionally developed officer corps, highlighting issues that the military was well-aware of, but had yet to take significant action on. Both reports had reached similar conclusions regarding the state of leadership and professionalism within the CAF, as well as the positive role that could be played by higher education in rectifying the problems.

They also both represented initiatives driven from within the political sphere to address military problems. While the Commission responded to a perceived lack of military scrutiny or explanation for the Somalia mission itself, Young’s investigation was launched within the context of continuing attacks on the CAF by the media and general public. Young was determined to

“staunch the continued blood-letting” by conducting a study “on his own terms.” He would engage all elements of the defence establishment in Canada to “personally review” the state of the

Canadian Forces and report his findings to the Prime Minister. The goal was to “come to prompt conclusions leading to rapid action” supporting extensive change.69

Young has described his motivations for launching this review as both politically and personally driven. He noted that the Prime Minister demanded solutions to the problem during a time of fiscal constraint and in advance of a federal election. “I was just asked to go in and clean it up,” he explained. “The Prime Minister just said, look, you have to go in and you have to do

69 Fraser Holman, “The State of the Canadian Forces: The Minister’s Report of March 1997,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 26:4 (Summer 199), 32.

160 what you have to.”70 He also described a personal rejection of the way that Canadian soldiers were being treated at the time, and a desire to help support a valuable Canadian institution:

“I was just really appalled. I mean it was a feeding frenzy… There was nothing positive happening to the Canadian Forces at that time… the morale was terrible, there was so much going on that the military was being discredited on the street. And I wasn’t prepared to continue to let that happen without at least trying to change it.”71

He also suggested that “I knew after I had taken on Lloyd Axworthy’s job as the Minister of Human

Resources and Development, that I would never be re-elected. So, I told the Prime Minister that whatever he wanted me to do or whatever I had to do, I would do it, without having to look over my shoulder and see how the electorate was responding.”72

Young’s instigation of a reform movement thus reflected several imperatives: a political concern with the ongoing lack of public confidence in the CAF, despite the changes being introduced by the military itself at the time; a need to “right the ship” in the face of significant budgetary restrictions, particularly if the Liberal government was going to attempt an early election; and the fortuitous appointment of Young, unconcerned with re-election and personally committed to making life better for soldiers working within a broken system. In many respects,

Young represented the “civilian intervener” described by Posen in his civil-military explanation for military change. He was a civilian policymaker who inserted himself into military issues to conduct a review that ultimately recommended reforms, regardless of the military’s chain of command or professionalism. As Dallaire explained, “ took the general officer corps

70 Phone interview with former Minister of National Defence Douglas Young by Dr. David Bercuson, March 2015, recording and transcript held by author. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid.

161 to task and said you guys have to reform, you have to change this outfit now or else you are going down the tubes. So it took a politician to get us to get this really moving.”73

Although driven from outside the military hierarchy, the momentum generated by Young was not authoritarian, incorporating input from the military as much as from academics, politicians, and civilian defence professionals. “It wasn’t just a one-way street,” he explained. “We talked to so many people and we listened…to all levels of the military,” from “officers to the chaplains, and even to the people working in canteens.” 74 He also noted that a number of supportive officers bought into the political desire for military reform, specifically mentioning the positive assistance of Vice Admiral , who became acting CDS in October 1996 after

Boyle’s resignation.75 Young noted that many officers, like Murray, understood the gravity of the situation and were extremely helpful in working to conduct a review and put together his report and recommendations for change. While Young “didn’t give a damn about impinging on the military’s chain of command and its professionalism,” because “the chain of command had gotten us to where we were,” he “didn’t get much push back. Let me be clear. It wasn’t an authoritarian thing.”76 The need for change was recognized by many within the military hierarchy; how to do it, and how much was necessary, remained sources of contention.

Altogether then, the factors driving – serving as the source or motivation – for the post-

Somalia military reform program were varied. While the program was certainly pushed in the end by civilian intervention led by Young, a combination of many complex issues contributed to its materialization. The initial need for change was certainly triggered by the trauma of the affair

73 Interview with Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire by Dr. David Bercuson, 29 April 2013, Parliament Hill, Ottawa, Ontario, recording and transcript held by author. 74 Phone interview with former Minister of National Defence Douglas Young by Dr. David Bercuson, March 2015, recording and transcript held by author. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid.

162 surrounding the significant incidents in Somalia. Early incremental changes made by the military were a response to the Somalia events, effectively constituting a “failure on the battlefield,” though not a strategic one. The changes included tactical and operational modifications to improve battlefield effectiveness, in-theatre morale, and communications – both within the military chain of command and in a civil-military sense. They also included an ethical component, incorporating counter-racism training and policies.

These changes were minimal, however, and satisfied neither the government nor the

Canadian public, who came to view the problems as much larger than isolated incidents on one mission. Ongoing scandals involving cover-up allegations, lack of transparency from CAF officers, and misconduct in other theatres led to a significant breakdown in civil-military relations.

The respect granted to the CAF as a specialized bureaucracy within Canada, possessing a measure of independence to address internal problems, was negated by a perceived lack of institutional will to comprehensively identify and address systemic issues. A reform package, submitted to and approved by the Prime Minister, was produced for the military, albeit with input from CAF members. But the government had determined that the CAF was failing to pay an adequate price for professional identity and authority through suitable deference to civilian goals and values.

Changes were required by the government, not simply requested. The CAF faced an absolute need to reform in order to regain the confidence of the government and ensure future autonomy, authority, funding, and influence, all important elements for a professional military force.

Further, the break in civilian-military relations was a significant factor. As Vice Admiral

Gary Garnett (VCDS from September 1997-2001) noted, “radical action was required if the

Canadian Forces was to regain its place as a national institution of distinction and one that

163 Canadians were proud of.”77 The CAF had lost the confidence and trust of the Canadian people, its client society. Future access to support, funding, influence with the government, and likely also recruits, would have continued to suffer without the introduction of radical reforms to address concerns.

Other civilian-imposed constraints served as further drivers of change, including budget reductions and the continuing high demand for participation in overseas operations during the

1990s. The decreases levied on Canada’s military budget by successive federal governments severely restricted the CAF ability to continue operating at peak performance. Not only were

Canadian soldiers being deployed, repeatedly, on difficult missions, with unfamiliar mandates, and often with outmoded equipment and weapons, quality of life issues – related to pay, benefits, and family support – were also lacking. Limitations due to budget in this period necessitated changes to eliminate organizational and bureaucratic redundancies and introduce new methods for managing resources and personnel, particularly as the government continued to demand significant deployments.

On the professional development and education reforms in particular, a further driver of change beyond those already mentioned, included the process of military emulation: importing new tools and ways of war through imitation of other militaries. Minister Young has credited some of the impetus for the focus on education to “bench-marking,” the act of going out and studying comparable military systems to determine best practices. He stated:

“I never thought that we could just go out and say ‘we’re going to be the biggest and the best and the fastest and have the latest equipment’. What we did was we looked around the world at somewhat similar situations – New Zealand, Australia, Britain, the Americans – and asked what are they doing with their military? What are they doing differently? What have they done that we might want to replicate? Are there things we certainly don’t want to do because it hasn’t worked for them? So, a lot of

77 Vice Admiral , “The Canadian Forces Response,” a paper presented at the ‘Forced to Change – Education and Reforms Ten Years Later’ conference, University of Calgary, 31 January – 1 February 2008.

164 what came about came from that bench-marking against other existing military organizations and the educational thing just seemed to really jump out. It was what you needed to do in this day and age to have a modern, efficient, capable organization.”78

As part of the Young Report, a Benchmark Study of the Armed Forces of Australia, Italy, the

Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Canada was submitted to the Prime Minister, outlining this argument.79 This was backed up by the consensus assertion from the four academics who helped Young complete his review, that education was key to change. Bercuson, Granatstein,

Legault, and Morton all shared the common belief that the Canadian officer corps was undereducated and lacked a coherent professional ethos or development process. In comparison with allies and other similar militaries, the CAF was behind the curve. The academics and Young collectively looked to professional military education as the solution to many of the CAF’s leadership problems.

5.2 Shaping the Reform Program

Before Minister Young could proceed with an official program to start implementing the reforms identified in his report, he lost his seat in the June 1997 federal election. The Honourable

Art Eggleton was chosen to replace him as MND and was responsible for introducing the system that would ultimately support the implementation of the reforms demanded of the CAF. Over 350 specific reforms were chosen by the government from the Somalia Commission Report, Young

Report, Dickson Report, Report on the Quasi-Judicial Role of the Minister of National Defence,

78 Phone interview with former Minister of National Defence Douglas Young by Dr. David Bercuson, March 2015, recording and transcript held by author. 79 The Honourable M. Douglas Young, Minister of National Defence and Minister of Veterans Affairs, A Benchmark Study of the Armed Forces of Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Canada, 25 March 1997. The paper provided comparative information on each country for the purpose of helping Canadians put into perspective the issues raised and discussed in the broader Report to the Prime Minister. Each country was chosen for comparison due to similarities in customs, traditions, economic output, middle power status, size, membership in NATO, or peacekeeping participation.

165 and Report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves.80 Sixteen of those reforms were directly related to the development of military leadership and professionalism.

To ensure the efficient and comprehensive application of these reforms, Eggleton introduced a Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces in October 1997. The MMC was a civilian group, external to the military, although a retired brigadier-general served as a member. It was given a two-year mandate (later extended) to monitor and report back to the Minister on the progress of military reform implementation. This included evaluation of effective results against the Minister’s own stated objectives and advice to the Minister on potential improvements, if required, to the reform process.

The MMC had final say in whether a reform had been successfully achieved, and could require the military to “try again” or “keep trying” if it determined that efforts made were not enough.81 The

MMC was also meant to serve as a “window” through which the Canadian public could follow the development and progress of change.82

The idea for a monitoring committee “came from the political level. Basically, it came from the Minister’s office,” according to former ADM (Pol) Kenneth Calder.83 The setting up of the

MMC “reflected a concern that if there wasn’t a mechanism to account, to which to be accountable, that in fact a lot of the measures would be set aside or forgotten about or diluted or whatever. There needed to be a requirement for something to keep the foot on the accelerator, to give the process

80 The Report on the Quasi-Judicial Role of the Minister of National Defence was written by the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services. The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves was chaired by former Chief Justice Brian Dickson. 81 Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, “Leading and Managing Strategic Change,” Reference: Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change, Final Report (December 1999), The Military Museums of Calgary Archives, Bercuson Files, Box 28I, Binder 2. 82 Canada, Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Interim Report - 1998, (Ottawa: National Defence), “Chapter 1 – Introduction and Overview,” 1. 83 Interview with Ken Calder, Former ADM (Pol), by Dr. David Bercuson, 17 February 2015, Ottawa, Ontario, transcripts and recording held by author.

166 movement.”84 Eggleton described the idea for the Committee as a result of various discussions with senior people in government who recognized that the reforms amounted to a “forced culture change” for a very traditional organization that generally resented interference.85 He claimed that the MMC was a response to the concern that “the military, the top brass, would say yes to this, but by the time it floated down through the system and actually got into some implementation, it would get lost.”86 The MMC was “a group of people that were going to keep on top of this, they were going to chase it right to the end, and make sure that it wasn’t just ticking the box, that there really were things being done.”87

The MMC reflected the fact that the CAF, like all large bureaucracies, might struggle with the process of implementation, regardless of whether it accepted the need for reform in the first place. Important elements could get lost unintentionally in the bureaucratic shuffle, or they could be rejected as they filtered down through the ranks and were perceived to challenge successful bureaucratic norms. As much as officers like Admiral Murray or LGen Dallaire supported the overall reform effort, others were equally resistant. Kasurak cited the example of Colonel G.J.

Oehring, Land Force Commander G1 (chief of staff for personnel). Oerhing saw the main issues in this period as decreasing morale caused by media malignment and the continued treatment of soldiers as “costly disposables” by political leaders. Oehring argued that soldiers had lost confidence and trust in their leadership due to “force reductions, loss of job security, increased commitments, frozen pay, rent increases for military housing, and denigration by the media.”88 At the same time, he believed that public misconceptions were being fuelled by media denigration

84 Ibid. 85 Interview with , former Minister of National Defence, by Dr. David Bercuson, 26 April 2013, Victoria Building, Vancouver, BC, recording and transcript held by author. 86 Kasurak, A National Force, 269-270. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid.

167 and a lack of political action to stop it. “Oehring did not think the army responsible in any way for its predicament,” and he was not alone.89 Horn and Bentley referenced the officer who replaced

Dallaire as Special Assistant to the CDS on Office Professional Development after his retirement from the CAF. The replacement represented the “old-school, bureaucratic process-driven approach. He introduced himself by asserting that the team would proceed in accordance with how he had done business for the last thirty years.”90

These types of officers represented active resistance to the reform program, which existed down the chain of command. “It was the old gang, ‘no problems in Somalia, just a slip up, no problems with the system’,” explained Deputy Minister at the time Louise Frechette.91 There were also officers who, while they supported the overall effort, were resistant to particular reforms.

Eggleton referenced the idea of an Inspector General as one example: “It met with a lot of hostility from people,” even while they supported other reforms.92 The MMC set out to avoid and overcome this type of resistance and other bureaucratic weaknesses by monitoring and advising on all change initiatives from the beginning, including the process of implementation and evaluating effectiveness in meeting stated objectives.

The MMC originally consisted of Chairman Willard Estey and members John Fraser,

David Bercuson, D. Bevis Dewar, BGen Sheila Hellstrom (ret’d), Carole Lafrance, Laurier

LaPierre, and John Rankin, although Estey was replaced as Chairman in May 1998 by John

Fraser.93 It was tasked with producing four semi-annual reports for the MND describing the progress made by the CAF towards implementation of the reforms. The first report, essentially a

89 Ibid., 270. 90 Horn and Bentley, Forced to Change, 98. 91 Quoted from Horn and Bentley, Forced to Change, 98. 92 Interview with Art Eggleton, former Minister of National Defence, by Dr. David Bercuson, 26 April 2013, Victoria Building, Vancouver, BC, recording and transcript held by author. 93 DND, “Defence Minister Announces New Monitoring Committee on Change,” 14 October 1997, Box 4, 250-2, Vol. II, Fraser Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta.

168 plan of work, was delivered in March 1998.94 This was followed by two interim reports, submitted in November 1998 and June 1999, and a concluding “report card” or final report, presented to the

MND in December 1999.95 Each of these submissions detailed the activities of the MMC in observing reform implementation, including attendance at DND meetings, requesting, studying, and discussing progress reports from the CAF, conducting visits to CAF bases, and holding discussions with CAF personnel. Throughout the process, the MMC was given complete access to all CAF sites, documentation, or personnel that it deemed relevant to its mandate.96 The Committee commented that it had “been enjoying the full cooperation of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, which have been providing required documentation and information.”97

In each of its reports, the MMC outlined the status of implementation and made observations under eight thematic groupings: openness and disclosure, accountability, human resources management, the basic structure of the CAF, military justice, operations, the reserves, and leadership. Each subject was given its own section, which listed the specific related reforms alongside descriptions of the actions taken to address them, and observations made by the committee regarding the process, problems, and relevant successes. The “status” of each reform was also included, which detailed the concrete actions taken to achieve its implementation and the

MMC’s position on whether that implementation had successfully occurred. The Committee explained that,

“we found this to be the most appropriate way of dealing with the inevitable overlapping among decisions and the fact that some decisions have greater significance than others for the overall objectives of the change program. This reporting structure also facilitated the Committee’s strategic approach to assessing the successes and shortcomings of the

94 Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change, Preliminary Report of the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change, 31 March 1998, Box 28C, Bercuson Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 95 Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change, Interim Report – 1998; Interim Report - 1999; and Final Report - 1999 (Ottawa, Ontario: National Defence, December 1999). 96 Ibid., Final Report – 1999. 97 Minister’s Monitoring Committee, Interim Report -1998, “Chapter 1 - Introduction and Overview,” 2.

169 implementation process and thus to provide useful observations to the Minister and to the DND/CF about progress within the program of reform.”98

After the submission of its final report, marking the completion of its original mandate, the

Committee ceased to exist. However, the MND asked several members – John Fraser, Bev Dewar, and David Bercuson – to continue monitoring specific areas that were determined to still be

“incomplete.” Minister Eggleton announced the reconstituted committee in February 2000, explaining that “those few areas in which the Committee noted some deficiencies are being addressed as part of the Department’s ongoing change program.”99 The MMC Phase II – referred to as the Minister of National Defence’s Monitoring Committee – would continue to provide advice to the Minister and monitor the reforms “primarily but not exclusively” in the areas of leadership (training and education) and the Reserves, particularly regarding the “apparent impasse” in reserve restructuring.100

The reconstituted MMC submitted quarterly reports, through several extensions of its mandate, remaining in operation until the publication of its final report in November 2003.101

Despite an acknowledgement by the Committee that “there remain several areas still in need of improvement” at that time, it was disbanded in response to budgetary concerns and a need to focus on the ongoing war in Afghanistan.102 Then MND John McCallum made the decision to suspend the Committee based on advice from an advisory committee within DND that was looking at how to reduce expenditures. He explained that suspension did not mean the reform program was being

98 Minister’s Monitoring Committee, Final Report – 1999. 99 Department of National Defence, “Defence Minister Welcomes Final Report of the Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change,” Press Release, 9 February 2000, Project Number: NR-00.015, accessed on 25 July 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=defence-minister-welcomes-final-report-of-the-minister-s- monitoring-committee-onchange/hnmx18xj. 100 Letter from Art Eggleton to John Fraser, 17 November 1999, Box 4, 250-0, Fraser Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 101 Minister’s Monitoring Committee, Final Report – 1999. 102 Interview with former MND John McCallum by Dr. David Bercuson, 26 April 2013, Ottawa, Ontario, recording and transcripts held by author.

170 abandoned, simply that the balance of the MMC’s proposed changes were to be “left in the hands of the CF and DND.”103

Not everyone agreed that the Committee’s work was done, however. Chairman John Fraser noted that “I felt very strongly that this was not a wise thing to do… The armed forces had not yet pulled themselves out of it all!” He added that “I don’t think McCallum understood first of all the necessity of the Committee, I don’t think he understood just how bad things were and just how much work needed to be done.”104 In a letter sent to the Minister in October 2003, Honorary

Colonel Dr. J.D. Johnston expressed his “strong recommendation” for the continuation of the

Committee for another two years “in light of the changes in the military/geopolitical challenges since the Committee’s inception.” He argued that the reserve restructuring process would continue to require the stabilizing influence of the Committee, and that liaisons with Canadians regarding making a difference through the military, especially the Reserves, was sufficient enough reason for its continuation.105

Despite these voices of dissent, the Committee was suspended, although this did not end the process of implementing the post-Somalia reforms; it simply marked the end of direct political involvement through a monitoring mechanism. While it is not the purpose of this paper to determine whether the MMC was necessary or effective in ensuring reform implementation, it is important to note the role of the Committee as a shaper of the reform movement. The MMC was created in anticipation of resistance from the CAF, both bureaucratic and cultural, to the process of change. And there was resistance. Even those who bought into the reform program were often

103 DND, “Monitoring Committee Releases Final Report on Reserve Restructure,” Press Release, 20 November 2003, Box 28D, Bercuson Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 104 Interview with John Fraser by Dr. David Bercuson, 29 August 2013, Vancouver, BC, recording and transcripts held by author. 105 Letter sent from Honorary Colonel Dr. J.D. Johnston to Honourable John McCallum, Minister of National Defence, Box 4, 250.0, 250-1, Fraser Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta.

171 frustrated by the need to report to the Committee. Dallaire explained that, while an “essential tool” because of its role as a sounding board and its provision of direct access to the MND, the

Committee was a burden in terms of time.

“We weren’t keen on you or the rest of the gang because we felt it was extra work and we couldn’t get on with the thing and we had to keep, you know, responding to your needs versus doing our jobs… And there was reticence in the staff, let alone no funding… It wasn’t an overt confrontational thing. It was considered to be a difficulty amongst a zillion others that we had going on at the time. And so it was another added burden.”106

Lieutenant-General George MacDonald, former Vice Chief of the Defence Staff after September

2001, called the MMC “a bit of an encumbrance” because of the need to take time to report to it.107

He also noted, however, that “the sheer existence of the Committee, and the fact that they had direct access to the Minister was important during that period… I think the fact that there was, not an oversight mechanism, but a monitoring mechanism was important to ensure that we continued to make progress in these areas.”108 His sentiment echoed that of his predecessor, Vice

Admiral Gary Garnett: the MMC “was a stick. When I saw parts of the organization not moving,

[the Committee] was a stick that I had to use.” He asserted that without the type of monitoring system provided by the Committee, “it would have been even more difficult for the Vice Chief to have gotten as much of the reform process done as possible.”109 Former CDS General Maurice

Baril called the Committee “shock treatment” for the CAF. “Too many times we had said things that we were not going to do. Now we were imposed on by a committee that would be looking

106 Interview with Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire by Dr. David Bercuson, 29 April 2013, Parliament Hill, Ottawa, Ontario, recording and transcript held by author. 107 Interview with Lieutenant-General George Macdonald former Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, by Dr. David Bercuson, Ottawa, Ontario, 26 April 2013, recording and transcripts held by author. 108 Ibid. 109 Interview with Vice Admiral Gary Garnett by Dr. David Bercuson, 24 November 2014, Victoria, BC, recording and transcripts held by author.

172 over our shoulders, not telling us what to do, but reporting on what we were actually going to do.”110

Many politicians agreed with these perceptions. Eggleton suggested that the Committee

“ensured these changes,” which would likely not have happened without it. “I think it would have got lost in the system, as I said we would have got into a check box mentality and there would have been some implementation… but some people would have said we’ll outlast the Minister, he can’t be here forever.”111 Ken Calder concurred: “I think that the committee and the fact that the committee was going over to talk to the people, and was reporting obviously would have generated momentum for change. And would have kept that process of change going forward.”112

The MMC, as well as the resistance and bureaucratic friction that it faced, conditioned the trajectory and content of the changes introduced. As will become clear in the next chapter, other factors, including budget concerns, resource availability, and communication problems also influenced the momentum and progress of the reform effort. Each of these elements conditioned the trajectory and content of the changes introduced, varying in scale of impact over time.

110 Interview with General by Dr. David Bercuson, 24 April 2013, Ottawa, Ontario, recording and transcripts held by author. 111 Interview with Art Eggleton, former Minister of National Defence, by Dr. David Bercuson, 26 April 2013, Victoria Building, Vancouver, BC, recording and transcript held by author. 112 Interview with Ken Calder, Former ADM (Pol), by Dr. David Bercuson, 17 February 2015, Ottawa, Ontario, transcripts and recording held by author.

173 CHAPTER 6 Implementation

While many of the major reforms put forward by the Young Report and Somalia

Commission report were focused on improving standards of leadership and professionalism in the

CAF, only sixteen explicitly focused on leadership issues. Those sixteen can be divided into four thematic areas for ease of classification: Values and Ethics, Officer Education, Officer

Professional Development, and Leadership Standards. These areas correspond to the categorization system used by the MMC within its various reports and help to clearly delineate between related reforms. In this paper, each reform is further classified according to its source, listed as either YR for Young Report or SCR for Somalia Commission Report. The sixteen leadership reforms of interest to this dissertation include:

Values and Ethics

• Recommendation YR 9: Produce by June 1st a formal statement of values and beliefs to be integrated into all recruiting and training programs, professional development activities and performance assessments of members of the Canadian Forces at all levels.

Officer Education

• Recommendation YR 10: Change the policies beginning in 1997 to make a university degree a prerequisite to commissioning as an officer, with the only exceptions to be made for those commissioned from the ranks.

• Recommendation YR 12: Begin immediately a thorough review of the undergraduate program at the Royal Military College. This review will ensure for each graduate a broad- based education, well grounded in the sciences and humanities, with special emphasis being placed on the development of values, ethics, and the leadership skills needed to prepare officers for responsibilities and service to country.

• Recommendation YR 13: Increase the number of military professors at the Royal Military College. His will enhance the contact officer cadets have with experienced military officers throughout the academic year and serve to highlight the value that is placed on continuing education and higher learning.

174 • Recommendation YR 14: Strengthen the current cooperative programs between the Royal Military College and civilian institutions of higher learning to ensure greater interaction between officer cadets and their civilian counterparts. Distance learning and video technologies will be employed to facilitate the interchange.

• Recommendation YR 15: Ensure that the Board of Governors being established with an appropriate geographic and gender balance provides enhanced guidance to the Royal Military College.

• Recommendation YR 16: Re-establish the compulsory affiliation of students enrolled in civilian universities under the Regular Officer Training Plan with military establishments in the area of their universities, in order to provide them with regular training and military contact throughout the academic year.

Officer Professional Development

• Recommendation YR 11: Undertake this year a review of the Officer Professional Development Program and teaching methodologies to ensure their relevance given that in future almost all officers will have university degrees.

• Recommendation YR 17: Revise and expand the curriculum of the Land Force Command and Staff College to strengthen the knowledge of operations at the tactical level and broaden the understanding of the military profession, including army heritage and ethos, and ethics and decision-making. The first course will begin in the summer of 1997.

• Recommendation YR 18: Review the curriculum of the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College to ensure proper emphasis on operations in the spectrum of conflict between traditional peacekeeping and all-out war, ethics in the 21st century, leadership, and management. The quality of academic instruction will also be examined.

• Recommendation YR 19: Begin in 1998, a three-month course to prepare officers at the colonel/captain (navy) level for senior leadership responsibilities; it will emphasize ‘jointness’, senior leadership, and ethics.

• Recommendation YR 20: Begin in 1999 a more strategically-oriented, six-month course to be attended by officers about to be, or recently promoted to general rank or its naval equivalent; it will emphasize executive leadership, strategic operations, and resource management.1

Leadership Standards

• Recommendation SCR 15.1: The Chief of Defence Staff will adopt formal criteria, along the lines of the core qualities of military leadership, other necessary attributes, and indicative performance factors set out in Chapter 15 of the Somalia Commission report, as

1 Canada, Young Report, 14-17.

175 the basis for describing the leadership necessary in the Canadian Forces, and for orienting the selection, training, development, and assessment of leaders.

• Recommendation SCR 15.2: The core qualities and other necessary attributes set out in Chapter 15 of the Somalia Commission Report be applied in the selection of officers for promotion to and within general officer ranks. These core qualities are integrity, courage, loyalty, selflessness, and self-discipline. Other necessary attributes are dedication, knowledge, intellect, perseverance, decisiveness, judgement, and physical robustness.

• Recommendation SCR 15.3: The Chief of the Defence Staff adopt formal criteria for the accountability of leaders within the Canadian Forces derived from the principles of accountability set out in Chapter 16 of the Somalia Commission Report, and organized under the headings of accountability, responsibility, supervision, delegation, sanction, and knowledge.

• Recommendation SCR 15.4: The Canadian Forces make a concerted effort to improve the quality of leadership at all levels by ensuring adoption and adherence to the principles embodied in the findings and recommendations of this Commission of Inquiry regarding the selection, screening, promotion, and supervision of personnel; the provision of appropriate basic and continuing training, the demonstration of self-discipline and enforcement of discipline for all ranks, the chain of command, operational readiness and mission planning; and the principles and methods of accountability expressed throughout the Report.2

These reforms, like the rest, were introduced to the military in 1997 after the government accepted the recommendations put forward in the major reports. Their implementation began in earnest after the MMC was given its mandate later that fall, although preliminary discussions and work on some of them had already commenced. For example, the three and six-month courses for senior officers (YR 19 and YR 20) had already been discussed and approved by senior leadership, leaving only their design and implementation to be carried out. These courses were the result of a military response to conclusions from the Morton Report, and their inclusion in the Young recommendations likely resulted from military input during the Minister’s investigation. As Gary

Garnett noted: “We met many times to provide input to the Doug Young reform system via Ken

2 Canada, Dishonoured Legacy, Volume 2, “Leadership.”

176 Calder, who worked directly for Doug Young to do that, so we had been consulted.”3 Another example would be the “Statement of Defence Ethics” (YR 9), which was approved by the CDS and DM on 16 December 1996, but reviewed and revised to create a new draft in July 1998. This document was then sent for comments to the three environmental Chiefs of Staff, before a re- revised document was presented and discussed at the Ethics Advisory Board meeting held on 26

October 1998. It wasn’t formally promulgated throughout the defence establishment until a letter signed by both the CDS and DM was released on 26 March 1999.4

The MMC worked quickly from the launch of its mandate on 14 October 1997 to construct an outline and plan to achieve its goals.5 On 25 November, it assigned specific issue areas to each member and outlined a two-phase process within which data collection, site visits, discussions, and interviews with relevant stakeholders could be organized and completed before its first interim report. Members Bercuson and LaPierre were assigned responsibility for the leadership reforms, with the understanding that any member could study and comment on any issue area.6

In the first phase (November-December 1997), each MMC member examined the recommendations in their primary area of responsibility to consolidate those repeated in more than one report. They determined a hierarchy of need to identify which issues required immediate attention and should be included in the first report, versus those that could be a secondary focus.

They also articulated for each recommendation its “underlying meaning” and determined a fair and practical test for assessing implementation, requesting input from appropriate departments and

3 Interview with Vice Admiral Gary Garnett by Dr. David Bercuson, 24 November 2014, Victoria, BC, recording and transcripts held by author. 4 Canada, National Defence, “Statement of Defence Ethics,” 1998, accessed on 23 August 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/about/statement_defence_ethics-eng.pdf; MMC, Final Report – 1999, 87. 5 DND, “Defence Minister Announces New Monitoring Committee on Change,” 14 October 1997, Box 4, 250-2, Vol. II, Fraser Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 6 Memorandum from Agnes Vanya to all members of the MMC containing draft notes from 25 November 1997 meeting, Box 28C, Misc. Corresp., Bercuson Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta.

177 units. Finally, they identified the CAF sites to be visited and draft questions to be asked of on-site personnel.7

In the second phase (January-March 1998), the Committee focused on evaluating the process and effectiveness of implementation. Members conducted further research on key issues identified during phase one, prepared for their site visits in January and February 1998, and began drafting preliminary report findings. They met on 3 March 1998 to consolidate their separate reports and prepare the first interim report for the MND, which was submitted by Chairman Estey on 31 March.8 This report essentially constituted a scope of work for the Committee, and also marked the shift in chairmanship from Estey to Fraser.9

On the military side, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff Gary Garnett – appointed in

September 1997 – was responsible for creating and instituting the process to ensure that the reform implementation was correct, documented, and had appropriate accountabilities and timelines. To that end, he established “a database, in the secretariat” of NDHQ that was maintained by “a small group of guys who worked for the Vice Chief to monitor each and every reform.”10 He described this base of operations as “interactive,” and noted that it worked out of his office, directly with him, and helped to coordinate the implementation process. “The database contained actions required to implement the change initiatives and in broad terms how DND/CF intended to deal with each of the recommendations, the associated milestones, and any other control measures.”11

It was updated on a continuing basis by the senior officers and senior public servants in particular offices of primary interest (OPIs) that had been assigned responsibility for each of the reforms.

7 Ibid. 8 DND, Preliminary Report of the Minister’s Monitoring Committee, 31 March 1998, Box 28C, Bercuson Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 9 Ibid. 10 Interview with Vice Admiral Gary Garnett by Dr. David Bercuson, 24 November 2014, Victoria, BC, recording and transcripts held by author. 11 Garnett, “The Canadian Forces Response.”

178 These individuals and their groups updated the database internally on a continuing basis, in addition to highlighting achievements on an internet database monthly for external consumption.12

Garnett explained that his group met with the MMC every six months, “or more frequently if desired,” to discuss progress and any issues that had arisen. His office also did a complete analysis of the database six months prior to any MMC report to the MND, which was distributed to all members of the Daily Executive Meeting (DEM) for validation.13 Any particular problems were discussed with the OPIs and, if necessary, brought to the attention of the CDS and DM. He noted that “considerable detail was included in the report to the MMC on the overall status of those initiatives that were partially implemented and those that required longer timeframes.” 14 In addition, there were “post meetings” including the CDS and DM after each report from the MMC to review the document with all the OPIs. A full review was then sent to the MND.

In the first year of the reform implementation program, several preliminary actions were taken by the CAF specifically related to the leadership reforms. The process began with a meeting on 29 October 1997, where the MMC received comprehensive briefings from the Deputy Minister,

Chief of Defence Staff, Vice Chief of Defence Staff, Assistant Deputy Minister, Assistant Deputy

Mininster (HR-Mil), Judge Advocate General, the CAF Provost Marshall and Director General

Reserves and Cadets. Each senior officer provided an overview of their area of responsibility and their plans for putting in motion the change initiatives to which they were committed.15

12 Ibid. 13 Daily Executive Meetings (DEMs) provide an opportunity for the Deputy Minister and Chief of the Defence Staff to address ongoing operations and activities, emerging issues, and other pressing matters. 14 Garnett, “The Canadian Forces Response.” 15 DND, “Semi-Annual Report of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff to the Minister of National Defence Monitoring Commmittee on the Implementation of Change Initiatives in the Department of National Defence and the Canadain Forces,” September 1998, A-2012-00018, 01530-A0013290, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, 1.

179 In December 1997, the three Environment Chiefs met with the MMC to discuss responsibilities and process related to reform introduction. The CAF Officer Professional

Development Council (OPDC) also met to discuss preliminary work, decisions, and next steps related to reforms of the professional development system.16 At the 3 December OPDC meeting, the Advanced Military Studies Course and National Security Studies Course, already in the planning stages, were discussed and the details codified for presentation to the Armed Forces

Council the following spring. These courses were intended to fill the gap in senior officer professional development created after the closure of the Canadian Forces College in 1992 (YR

18 and YR 19).17

On 21 December 1997, the terms of reference for a new Defence Ethics Program (DEP) were outlined in a letter from the CDS and DM. Although senior DND and CAF leaders had endorsed the development of an ethics program in February 1994, the DEP was not formally authorized until 1997. Regardless, this program was introduced “to provide the focus, framework, and processes necessary to guide, assess, and continuously improve the ethical conduct of CAF personnel and DND employees.”18 It was given a mandate with five elements: to maintain the

Statement of Defence Ethics and other required ethics documents moving forward; to manage a structural framework, consisting of a Program Authority and an Ethics Advisory Board made up of ethics coordinators from Environments and Groups; to allocate sufficient personnel, training,

16 Letter sent from Marc Wittingham, Director Public Policy to Dr. David Bercuson, “Re: 11 December meetings,” 24 December 1997, Box 28C, Misc. Corresp., Bercuson Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. The Environment chiefs at the time included: Chief of the Land Staff LGen Bill Leach, Chief of the Air Staff LGen David N. Kinsman, and Chief of the Maritime Staff Vice-Admiral . 17 Record of Decisions of Meeting 1/98 of the Officer Professional Development Council, NDHQ Ottawa, 16 June 1998, 1150-110/P78 (DRET), A-2012-00021, Stack-01, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario. 18 Letter signed by CDS General Maurice Baril and DM Louise Frechette, “Terms of Reference – Defence Ethics Program,” 21 December 1997, accessed 23 August 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/about-reports-pubs-ethics/ethics-terms-of-reference.pdf.

180 and funding from all CAF organizations to implement the DEP; to establish and maintain ethics processes; and to develop and uphold a clear set of program goals.19

In March 1998, the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College provided the MMC with documentation on changes to address YR 17, including a curriculum review and subsequent alterations to the Canadian Land Force Staff Course.20 The documents outlined the curriculum review already completed in June 1997, but re-reviewed in the fall to ensure the MND’s recommendations were being addressed. The next course was set to commence in August of 1998, after the release of a completed new curriculum by May 1998.21 The MMC was provided with particulars on the changes, including a separation of the material into two sections – a staff course and a command and staff course – allowing for further instruction and engagement with concepts related to army heritage, ethos, and ethics.

On 14 April 1998, CFRETS informed the MMC that several steps had been taken to improve the curriculum of the AMSC and NSSC. 22 The AMSC course curriculum “had progressed,” with an interim course syllabus already complete and ready for review. The first course was slated to commence on 9 September 1998. Course curriculum for the NSSC, the first iteration of which was set to start in 1999, was “still under development,” but CFRETS noted that learning objectives for this course had already been defined and submitted for review.23 The design of these courses was patterned after the US Army system, in which a School for Advanced Military

19 Ibid. 20 Colonel W.N. Brough, Director of Army Training for Commander, Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College, “Report on Leadership and Operational Issues,” 12 March 1998, sent to Dr. David Bercuson of the MMC, Box 28I, Bercuson Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 21 LCdr Jack Logan, SO Development Period 3, “Response to MND Committee to Monitor Change,” 14 April 1998, responsible organization: Col. D. Bourque, Director Professional Development, CFRETSHQ, A-2012-00171, Stack- 01-A20120017_2012-12-03_11-04-09, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario. 22 LCdr Jack Logan, SO Development Period 3, “Response to MND Committee to Monitor Change,” 14 April 1998, responsible organization: Col. D. Bourque, Director Professional Development, CFRETSHQ, A-2012-00171, Stack- 01-A20120017_2012-12-03_11-04-09, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario. 23 Ibid.

181 Studies supported the development of majors and lieutenant-colonels, and a US Army War College helped provide professional development for colonels. Both courses were successfully launched on time. 24

On 22 April 1998, the Armed Forces Council (AFC) met and recognized degree status for all officers as a goal on which the officer professional development system would now rest (YR

10). It also recognized the need to reconcile this change with the current set of officers that did not possess degrees, as well as to phase in implementation to offset any recruiting shortfalls that might occur and affect operational readiness. 25 The environmental commanders and Commander

CFRETS had previously each expressed concern related to the potential negative impact of the degree status recommendation on the ability of the CAF to continue operating effectively. There was consensus among those stakeholders that any change in policy would need to be phased in to ensure that current recruiting goals could be met. The concern was that the CAF would be unable to generate enough recruits without non-degree entry officers, and that those currently serving would struggle to find their place within the new system.26

Approximately 3200 serving Trained Effective Strength (TES) officers did not possess a degree at this time, although it was determined that many had some form of post-secondary education that could assist in an academic upgrading program.27 Termination of service for this group was deemed unviable for ethical and other reasons related to operational effectiveness, leaving three options for consideration:

• Option A: Make it compulsory for all serving officers to obtain a degree.

24 Horn and Bentley, Forced to Change, 104. 25 “Briefing note for the Minister,” Officer Degree-Cancellation of Officer Candidate Training Plan (OCTP), 29 April 1998, A-2012-00169 D1, Stack-01, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario. 26 “Armed Forces Council Briefing Synopsis,” Degree Requirement for Commissioning, 22 April 1998, A-2012- 00169 D2, Stack-01, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario. 27 Ibid.

182 • Option B: Provide resources for academic upgrading at current levels (status quo).

• Option C: Strongly encourage academic upgrading by providing increased resources,

incentives, cost reimbursements, and strong institutional supports.

The AFC endorsed Option C, recognizing that an increase in financial commitment would be required to concretely support academic upgrading for part and full-time study. It determined that

DND would be required to provide strong support, resources, and financial compensation to those who undertook academic upgrading, although the need for financial support would decrease over time as officers obtained their degrees.28 It also warned that “strong visible support of all leaders is required to support an increase in the volume of academic upgrading to achieve a better-educated officer corps.”29

For new entry officers, the AFC endorsed the following option: it would maintain all entry plans that provided officers with degrees prior to commissioning, plus commissioning from the ranks (CFR), but would also introduce a newly constituted Continuing Education Officer Training

Plan (CEOTP). This CEOTP would absorb present direct entry officers (diploma) and OCTP enrolment, while providing for a phased in change of recruiting goals to offset any recruiting shortfalls that might occur.30 All selected CEOTP candidates enrolled after 1 September 1998, were to be counselled and required to sign a statement of understanding at the recruiting centre acknowledging that they would not be retained by the CAF unless they had attained a baccalaureate

28 Ibid. 29 “Briefing to Armed Forces Council, Degree Requirement for Commissioning, Minister’s Report Item #10,” with slides, 22 April 2018, A-2012-00169 D1, Stack-01, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario. 30 “Armed Forces Council Briefing Synopsis,” Degree Requirement for Commissioning, 29 April 1998, prepared by Maj Butt, DRET 2-2, 992-2219 and LCdr Searle, DRET 2-5, 996-4941, A-2012-00169 D2, Stack-01, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario.

183 degree, been selected for the University Training Plan, or were deemed to be making “satisfactory and ongoing, imminent progress toward a degree by the end of that term of service.”31

A phase-in period for CEOTP was included to prevent long-term damage to the officer corps (i.e. not enough intake) and allow time for a newly focused recruiting campaign aimed at university and college students to take effect. That phase-in period was scheduled to last until

September 2002 to prevent long-term damage related to personnel shortages for any single occupation.32 The Council demanded that a sufficient flow of trained officers, particularly out of

ROTP and direct entry (Degree), be established before plans such as OCTP or direct entry

(Diploma) were cancelled or reduced in scope.33 Priority in the interim would be to continue to fill

RMC.

RMC itself underwent the “thorough review of the undergraduate program” required by

YR 12 after its Board of Governors was established in 1997 (YR 15). The Board was created to provide advice and recommendations to the MND concerning all matters related to RMC. It was also mandated to work at improving lines of communication with both College alumni and the community in order to enhance resources for the operation of the College, and to ensure that officer professional military education remained at the forefront of policy.34

One of the Board’s initial tasks was to ensure that the Somalia recommendations related to

RMC were fully implemented. In order to achieve this, it struck a committee chaired by a former

Chief of Defence Staff General Ramsey Withers to examine the undergraduate program at the

31 NDHQ/DRET Admin, “University Degree – Enrolment Policy – Regular Force Officers,” Refs: A. DRET 2020 October 1997, written on June 1998, A-2012-00169 D1/Stack-01, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario. 32 “Armed Forces Council Briefing Synopsis,” Degree Requirement for Commission, 29 April 1998. Predictive modelling by the Personnel Operational Research Team had shown that any change in intake source quotas needed to be phased in over four to five years to ensure the operational effectiveness of critical operational groups. 33 Ibid. 34 Canada, National Defence, “RMC Board of Governors,” accessed on 11 August 2018, https://www.rmc- cmr.ca/en/college-commandants-office/rmcc-board-governors.

184 college. On 30 April 1998, the report of this study group – entitled Balanced Excellence: Leading

Canada’s Armed Forces in the New Millenium (Withers Report) – was published. It outlined how the college could “ensure for each graduate, a broad-based education, well-grounded in the sciences and humanities, with special emphasis being placed on the development of values, ethics, and leadership skills needed for responsibilities and service to country.”35 The Withers’ Report outlined a new orientation and structure for RMC’s undergraduate program, grounded in the belief that the college “must constitute the very ‘heart and soul’ of the officer corps of the Canadian

Forces.”36

To complete the report, the committee interviewed senior officials, operational commanders, as well as RMC faculty and cadets to establish the “as is situation,” before attempting to “bridge the gap” between that reality and the aim set out by the Board of Governors. After careful analysis of multiple options, the Committee decided on a ‘Balanced Excellence Model’ to provide the desired outcome. This model called for students to enter RMC for two academic years, including an intense eight-week language, occupational, and environmental familiarization component in the summer between first and second year. After the initial two years, they would undergo 16 months of occupational training, having selected their occupations in the February of their second year, before returning to RMC for two more years and the completion of their degrees.

Successful officer cadets would be commissioned at the end of their third year, although they would remain at RMC as fourth year students.37

35 Withers Study Group, Balanced Excellence: Leading Canada’s Armed Forces in the New Millenium, a Report of the RMC Board of Governors (30 April 1998), A-2012-00021, Stack-16, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, I. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., 21, 55-58.

185 Throughout this training and education period, the four pillars inherent to the unique structure of RMC were given prominence: academic, military, language, and physical fitness were

“nested within the Balanced Excellence Model” to achieve optimum effectiveness “through a process of integration whereby they form a seamless web promoting leadership skills, military ethos, and academic excellence.”38 The Committee found that the focus on these four pillars had been allowed to become “unbalanced” over time, describing a system in which significant effort had actually being expended to keep them separate and unrelated to one another. It believed that the academic and language pillars had become “strong,” while the physical fitness pillar was merely “adequate,” and the military pillar was left “weak and unfocused.” It blamed campus culture and prevailing attitudes for the discrepancies, suggesting that the academic and military elements of both the college and of the CAF as a whole had become disconnected. If the CAF had failed to cultivate a healthy respect for and desire to integrate academic achievements into officer development, the college itself had done the same with military learning; it had focused too narrowly on developing the academic side of officers, neglecting to simultaneously include enough focus on the military element of their education. The committee recommended that each pillar make more of a contribution, equally, to the development of each student to ensure the creation of highly professional military officers.39

To achieve this desired outcome, the report made several recommendations related to better integrating RMC into the CAF. This would include its full integration into the regular CAF command structure and encouraging the three Environments to take a more active role in ensuring its excellence. Faculty and staff improvements would be made to better reflect the integrated but dual academic and military nature of the college, including an increase in the number of qualified

38 Ibid. II. 39 Ibid., 52-54.

186 military officers in the classroom in the academic pillar.40 It would also include enhancing a new militarily oriented “core curriculum” for all cadets over all four academic years. This progressive curriculum would comprise roughly 30 percent of a typical degree program and be made up of a selection of mandatory subjects, including international affairs, military theory, military history, leadership, information technology, emerging technology, and strategy. All RMC graduates would receive a broad, balanced, liberal education, incorporating both the arts and sciences, as well as enhanced leadership education.41 The goal was to create cohorts of graduating officers that shared a common body of knowledge in addition to their specialized degrees.

The report also recommended the establishment of a CAF University within the context of

CFRETS. Moving beyond its original mandate limited to undergraduate education, the committee suggested that the RMC programs of continuing education and post-graduate study could be incorporated into a “coherent career long development process fully responsive to the overall needs of the CF.” 42 It proposed a comprehensive CAF University structure, under the overall coordinating authority of Commander CFRETS, that would cover all developmental phases (DP

1-4) of an officer’s career, including undergraduate education, staff college, post-graduate training, and senior post-staff college education. It argued:

“A CF University structure would allow the creation of an educational speciality or at least a meaningful career pattern for a small number of selected, interested officers. The requirement for military officers in the academic pillar at RMC, their value to both continuing and post-graduate education, their role in a leadership institute, DP 3 level staff training and DP 4 senior officer education is obvious. Within a CF University such officers could be productively employed in a career path along the following lines: a posting to RMC to achieve an advanced degree, followed by a mix of operational, staff, and educational postings. These latter postings would generally by at Kingston and Toronto, but could, perhaps, be elsewhere in the various elements of the CF University. There is no question that some, if not many, of these officers would merge into the more

40 Ibid., 21-55. 41 Ibid., 36-37. 42 Ibid., 29.

187 conventional officer progression stream, resulting in a modest percentage of the most senior officers in possession of this experience.”43

Ultimately, the MND accepted and directed that all recommendations from the Whithers

Report be implemented, except one: The Balanced Excellence Model. The model had been “firmly rejected” by the three Service representatives in the RMC Board of Governors due to the fact that

“it would be too disruptive for the overall officer training system by creating a customized model for RMC alone.”44 In its place, the CAF would work to create an entry system to satisfy all three services called the Enhanced Leadership Model (ELM). First approved in early 1999, the ELM would focus on improving the early stage of officer development, including commissioning, basic training, and initial military education. 45 In its original form, the ELM included an Initial

Assessment Period that would replace the Basic Officer Training Course 1, followed by a Basic

Officer Training Period to enhance knowledge and skills after assessment. Next was the

Environmental Familiarization Period, including familiarization with all three environments, followed by a final period of Professional Military Education and Second Language Training.46

The ELM was slowly revised over several years to adapt to certain issues, including duplication of courses, changes to delivery facilities and locations, the needs of direct entry officers, as well as the ability to custom build packages for individuals if necessary.47

On 16 June 1998, the OPDC met again to discuss further changes to the officer professional development system. It noted that the AFC had endorsed its recommendations for the AMSC and

NSSC courses, directing that there be no related obligatory service and that both courses be pre-

43 Ibid., 30. 44 Horn and Bentley, Forced to Change, 102. 45 Canada, National Defence, “Building on a Stronger Foundation,” the Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff 1999-2000, accessed on 20 August 2018, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/D1-15-2000E.pdf. 46 Draft Proceedings, MMC Meeting on the Revised ELM, 20 February 2001, Box 28H, “Leadership and Education Issues, MMC Documents,” Section 3, Bercuson Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 47 Ibid.

188 requisites for promotion.48 It also approved the new Officer General Specification (OGS) for presentation to the AFC in September 1998. The new OGS included an updated organizational structure, designed to “guide the development of a professional military ethos among the officer corps” and “set out a regime for advancement that encourages a culture of noblesse oblige and professional accountability.”49 While not a radical division from the old OGS, this new document was more focused on the issues raised by the reforms and represented a better organized statement of core and measured competencies. The OPDC also introduced a new provision at this meeting that the OGS be “reviewed and updated regularly by the Council and will thus, from now on, be a standing agenda item for this council.”50 This new arrangement was made in response to concerns raised by council members that a mechanism to review the OGS on a regular basis was needed to deal with changes in resources, funding, and national security priorities. It couldn’t be allowed to languish.

Regarding the overall OPD system, the Council decided at this meeting that OGS-based training would remain the minimum common standard and would therefore be mandatory for all officers in a particular DP, with the level of training varying according to occupation. Specific decisions regarding changes to Staff College requirements and participants was delayed until more information could be gathered about staff checks and deliverables. The Council would reconvene in December 1998 to discuss details related to cost, training effectiveness, and operational impact.51

48 Record of Decisions of Meeting 1/98 of the Officer Professional Development Council, NDHQ Ottawa, 16 June 1998, 1150-110/P78 (DRET), A-2012-00021, Stack-01, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, 2. 49 “Comparison of Old and New Officer General Specifications,” created for MMC member Mr. D Bevis Dewar, A- 2012-00171, Stack-01-1201200171_2012-12-03_11-04-09, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario. 50 Ibid., 3. 51 Ibid., 3-4.

189 Amidst these changes, the MMC’s second Interim Report was presented to the MND in

November 1998. It detailed the actions taken in the areas of openness and disclosure, accountability, human resources management, the basic structure of the CAF, military justice, operations, the reserves, and military leadership. This report noted the successes perceived by the

CAF and provided its own perspective on shortcomings.52 In general, its conclusions were quite positive. It noted that many initial steps had been taken by the CAF to introduce individual reforms in each of these subject areas, while acknowledging that some introductions were slow, only partially completed, or delayed entirely for introduction at a later date. 53 While this delay did not preclude the introduction of those reforms eventually, it did speak to the complexity and breath of the overall reform effort. Not all reforms could be addressed at the same time due to resource and personnel availability and capacity, as well as the fact that many of the reforms required more than simple one step fixes. The Committee acknowledged that more time was required before the effectiveness of many reforms could be appropriately measured, cautioning that “the degree to which such an ambitious program will succeed is dependent upon a number of factors. Among the most critical are strong leadership, persistence, and adequate resources.”54

Regarding the leadership reforms specifically, the MMC reported slow but positive progress. In the area of Values and Ethics, it noted that basic training for the CAF had been extended from eight to ten weeks to ensure that all new recruits could be made aware of the ethics, responsibilities, traditions, and values that they, as Canadians in uniform, represented. A new course dealing with pre-command training requirements was also developed to teach the basics of military law, human rights, public affairs, legal responsibilities, resource management,

52 Minister’s Monitoring Committee, Interim Report -1998. 53 Ibid., 3. 54 Ibid.

190 employment equity, and ethics. The MMC acknowledged these changes and additions as evidence of an effort to meet the reform requirements, but suggested that further examination and monitoring was needed before its assessment could shift from ‘progress’ to ‘success’. While it also noted that a new CAF-wide statement of values and beliefs had been developed, the Committee worried that it had “not yet been integrated into training and recruiting politics.”55 The MMC pledged to continue monitoring how the statement would be integrated into functional areas, recruiting, training, professional development, and assessment policies.

In the category of Officer Professional Development, the MMC reported that an examination of past and current curricula of the Land Command and Staff College revealed “a serious and successful effort” to meet the Minister’s criteria. The increased lecture time and choice of reference material indicated “a commitment both to the letter and spirit of the decision.”56 The

Committee declared itself “satisfied” that this recommendation (YR 17) had been implemented.

The other reforms in this category were deemed to be “ongoing,” with the MMC promising to continue monitoring their application and comment on them in its next report.57

A similar assessment was given for the reforms to Leadership Standards. While the CAF had reported that “the new Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System includes evaluation of officers based on core qualities” and that “the Officer and NCM Professional Development

Systems are also being refined to include these criteria,” the MMC countered that “much of the work in this area is still in progress.”58 It required more evidence that the formal statement of ethos and values in the CAF, published in March 1997, did in fact contain all of the same criteria found in Chapter 15 of the Somalia Commission report; containing “many” of the same criteria, as stated

55 Minister’s Monitoring Committee, Interim Report – 1998, 42-43. 56 Ibid., 42. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., 40.

191 by the CAF, was not considered enough.59 The MMC promised more substantial comment on these issues in the next report.

Concerning Officer Education, the MMC had much more to say. Positively, it acknowledged that a “special Study Group” (Whithers) had reported to the RMC Board of

Governors on a new orientation and structure for the College’s undergraduate program. It praised

RMC for “striving for ‘balanced excellence’ in education and training for future CF officers.”60 It also claimed to be “encouraged” by the work being done by ADM (HR-Mil) on “‘visioning’ the ideal officer of the future.”61 Constructive work had thus been completed in terms of refining current systems and the conceptualization and planning for new programs and changes. The MMC acknowledged the progress, but raised concerns regarding the implementation of new policies, particularly around the issues of organization and timing. It stated: “While action on these education initiatives is being undertaken by individual environments and institutions, no CF-wide policy is in place to direct the process.”62 Essentially, the CAF was perceived to be taking a tactical approach to implementation of the education reforms, while the MMC deemed a strategic plan necessary. That strategic plan was connected to the idea that the end goal for the CAF should be a culture change, not simply ad hoc reforms to the current system. There needed to be a long-term strategic plan in place, including a communication plan assuring a strong message being delivered from all directions, to safeguard the permanency of the reforms.

The MMC’s concerns related to this issue continued into 1999. At a February meeting with

DND officials on the progress of implementing the reforms, the MMC reiterated its observations.

59 Ibid., 40-41; Canada, National Defence, “Semi-Annual Report of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff to the Minister of National Defence Monitoring Committee on the Implementation of Change Initiatives in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces,” September 1998, “Matrix of ongoing recommendations for every report,” 17. 60 Ibid., 41. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid.

192 On curriculum changes at RMC, it found that some changes had been made, but that they had been implemented without any sort of strategic guidance. “It’s the cart before the horse,” it complained, with implementation of immediate change taking place without consideration of a central vision.

“The rush of completion appears to be more important than doing well.”63 Committee member

Carole LaFrance outlined the specific weaknesses perceived within the CAF’s approach:

• Resources: “It is ‘crisis management’ – I’ve repeatedly heard that there are not nearly

enough funds to re-do training so that it will accomplish the goal of changing culture.

Chiefs have indicated that there is just one pool of financial resources and when a choice

has to be made, that the priority must be equipment to keep the forces running.”

• Vision: The “direction” of the reforms had not been clearly set out and there seemed to

be a “vague notion about ‘soft values’ being very important but even the term ‘soft

values’ as expressed seems to put it ‘down there’ in the value system.”

• Commitment: “Everybody I spoke to seems to be committed to something, but they

cannot clearly define what it is and what they do describe is not the same thing for all

of them.”64

LaFrance concluded:

“There is no communicated plan or public relation campaign addressed specifically to culture change and it isn’t identified in any strategic plan that I could find. Top brass seems to have a lot on their plates and this is just one issue. Therefore, there seems to be more lip service than actual careful planning or even understanding of the needs and requirements to effect a cultural change. There is not even a consistent expression used to describe what they are trying to accomplish.”65

63 “Draft Proceedings – MMC Consultation with DND Officials,” Ottawa, 11-12 February 1999, Box 28I, Bercuson Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 64 Carole LaFrance, “Comments submitted for informal discussions,” Minister’s Monitoring Committee, 26 May 1999, Box 4, File 250-2, Vol. I, Fraser Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 65 Ibid.

193 From the military perspective, Vice Admiral Garnett described a “philosophical difference in opinion” here between the MMC and the CAF:

“They [the MMC] criticized the implementation process in that reforms were frequently implemented individually and not in larger packages of logical interacting reforms, together like those in bill C-25, where they felt there would be a larger return. The MMC did acknowledge that the more ideal process would have taken longer and been more complex to implement. Remember this was during the period of increasing numbers of overseas missions and many reforms directly related to the critical improvement of that process. It was my opinion that any delay in implementing reforms or changes only gave those who did not support them (and there were always those) or had other agendas (and there are always those) to solidify their position and make it even more difficult when the time came to implement. Once decisions are made, you have to proceed promptly to take advantage of the impact and to establish momentum right from the beginning.”66

Garnett’s comments alluded to the difficulty inherent in pushing conservative, bureaucratic organizations to make major changes. He suggested that momentum was necessary to overcome resistance, whether from individuals or from the complexity intrinsic to bureaucracy. The MMC countered that a consistent and strategic vision was necessary to ensuring proper and permanent implementation. Introducing the reforms one at a time could result in something getting lost in the shuffle, purposefully ignored, or forgotten and allowed to disappear over time. As will be shown, the strategic approach won out in the end.

Garnett’s comments also spoke to the presence of ongoing resistance to the reforms within the CAF, not endemic within the organization, but present, particularly within the mid-level, operationally focused officers. As demonstrated already, most high-ranking senior leaders accepted the absolute need for reform. There may have been differences of opinion on certain specific reforms, and differences related to pace and process of implementation, but overall the majority of senior leaders accepted the reform program itself. Comments and actions, including

66 Garnett, “The Canadian Forces Response.” Bill C-25 was a bill introduced to amend the National Defence Act to institute statutory changes required by many of the other recommendations in the key Somalia reports. Bill C-25 was introduced for First Reading by the MND in the House of Commons on 4 December 1997.

194 interactions with the MMC, from leaders like Romeo Dallaire, Larry Murray, Gary Garnett, and others, demonstrate buy-in at the highest levels of the military. What resistance to the program that did exist, came largely from the middle of the rank structure: commanding officers, particularly those deploying into an operational theatre where combat was possible, were frequently cited as sources of friction. As former CDS General stated,

“There was some resistance to the highly educated officer from the operational community. You know, you had to be an operator, you had to deploy to the field and you had to have gone to or the Balkans or wherever it was and ultimately to Afghanistan to be somebody. And so there were those who thought that, ya it was great if you’d gone through RMC, that was fine, you know you got a degree and that was probably a good start... But then, did you really need one? For many officers, they were saying ‘what do we need all of that education for? We need them out in the field!”67

These comments highlight the cultural component of what resistance that did exist. The

CAF was still a product of its tactical, technical, anti-intellectual past. These officers had been brought up in a system that rejected education as a prerequisite for a well-rounded leader.

Experience in the field was more important than time in a classroom. Numerous examples can be cited, in which opportunities to pursue post-graduate education were met with disdain and disappointment. General Baril provided an example in which the “two best lieutenant-colonels of the army” were chosen to undertake two years of post-graduate study in 1997. He described the reactions of both officers as shock: “One was crying… and he took me aside and said ‘Sir, what have I done? They are saying they need me for post graduate for two years, its’ going to ruin my career.” The other reacted similarly, asking “how could you do this to me?”68 BGen K.C. Hague,

Commandant of RMC at the time, reiterated the concerns of those officers during his presentation

67 Interview with General Ray Henault by Dr. David Bercuson, 18 February 2015, Ottawa, Ontario, recording and transcripts held by author. 68 Interview with General Maurice Baril by Dr. David Bercuson, 24 April 2013, Ottawa, Ontario, transcripts and recording held by author.

195 to a workshop co-hosted by DND in December 1998 on “Educating Canada’s Military.”69 He noted that there was “still a perceived and sometimes actual bias against an officer who leaves the regiment for a year or two to pursue a post-graduate degree.” He urged the CAF to work harder to ensure that the institution as a whole recognized the value of officer education and that “a highly educated officer corps is a vital operational requirement.”70

What these examples demonstrate, is that without a change in priority within the overall rank and promotion structure of the CAF, the reforms were never going to be institutionally established. As Terriff argued, individuals must see a benefit in complying with any major change for it to become widely accepted. The promotion of the two officers from Baril’s example to full colonel before they started their studies, and an explanation of their post-graduate schooling as an

“investment in their future within the CAF,” is an example of this.71 The formulation of a new

CAF Performance Appraisal System (PAS) (SCR 15.2), is another. The PAS, described by the

MMC in early 1999 as a “positive step in the right direction,” was a comprehensive appraisal system designed for both developmental and administrative purposes.72 It featured separate units that included the traditional personnel evaluation, but also now included an element on personnel development. In the first segment, a narrative-based form would be used by a supervisor to identify critical tasks, expected results, and an action plan for identifying future goals and

69 BGen. K.C. Hague, Commandant, Royal Military College, “Presentation to the Workshop on Educating Canada’s Military,” Educating Canada’s Military Workshop, 7 December 1998, Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario, A-2012-00021, Stack 18, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 The ‘developmental’ purpose of performance appraisals includes support for goal-setting, identifying strengths and weaknesses, exchanging feedback, planning for self-development, and supporting individual training decisions. The goal is improvement of employee competencies and employee engagement. The ‘administrative’ purpose includes job design and improvement, making promotion, termination, or re-assignment decisions, deciding on rewards or punishments for behaviour, and supporting organizational training decisions. The goal here is to evaluate past employee performance to drive future human resource decisions. Debra L. Nelson and James Campbell Quick, Organizational Behavior: Foundations, Realities, and Challenges, 3rd ed. (Cincinnati: South-Western College Publishing, 2000), 193-195.

196 accomplishments. Supervisors would comment on strengths, areas for improvement, and a more detailed action plan. In the second unit, performance – real and potential – would be assessed.

Some assessment factors were trait-based and included leadership, ethics and values, and dedication. Others focused on behaviour and included items such as “working with others,” and professional development. 73 This new PAS system placed more emphasis on core leadership qualities and professional development achievements for the promotion of officers, requiring supervisors to assess members for conduct (on and off duty), as much as reliability, accountability, and professional initiative.74

As a result of many of these changes, the MMC described a “definite shift in the concept of command to the concept of leadership” within the CAF by early 1999. It noted that “it is clear change has occurred.” It also warned, however, that “this change has not been properly articulated.

The shift from ‘do what I say because I’m the commander’ to ‘follow me because I’m the example of what you should be too,’ must be more clearly indicated to all ranks.”75 A perfect example of this issue would be the problems cited by students of the new senior level courses at the Canadian

Land Force Command and Staff College (CLFCSC). In an anonymous submission to the MMC in

January 1999, these students suggested that serious problems in the execution of the new courses existed, despite positive changes to their curriculum and focus. This meant that new topics, such as ethics, were being included, but instructors appeared to have no interest in teaching the subjects or modelling that ethical behaviour in their day-to-day activities. The students noted that “the instructors continue to take great pride in the fact that their role is not to teach or motivate

73 DND, CF Human Resources, “CFPAD DOAD (Draft), Canadian Forces Personnel Appraisal System,” A-2012- 00169 D2, Stack 12, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario. 74 National Defence, “Semi-Annual Report of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff to the Minister of National Defence Monitoring Committee,” 17. 75 “Draft Proceedings – MMC Consultation with DND Officials,” Ottawa, 11-12 February 1999, Box 28I, Bercuson Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta.

197 students,” and that there existed a double standard between what was expected of students in terms of behaviour and what was modelled by the instructors.76 They described cheating by instructors during sports games, a lack of interest in course material, and preferential treatment for

“favourites.” The anonymous students lamented that the officers running the courses did not appear to value their role as leaders, trainers, or educators. They also warned that “the course is meant for officers who are much junior to those who the ‘old course’ was meant for. This means that they do not/will not have in the future the amount of practical knowledge required to teach themselves,” and may simply adopt the poor behaviour being modelled.77

This example also highlighted one of the consistent problems cited by both the CAF and its civilian observers during the early reform process: communication through the ranks. A lack of successful internal departmental communication meant that the corporate message regarding the reforms was not being communicated effectively. Reforms, like curriculum changes, had been introduced, suggesting that the letter of many of the reforms were being honoured. However, the new value being placed on professional growth, education, ethics, accountability, and leadership

– the spirit of the reforms – was not being introduced to the same extent. VCDS Garnett acknowledged that “for the first couple of years there was difficulty in communicating some of the things that were going on.”78 He suggested that senior leaders would articulate a plan for implementing a particular reform, see proof of its inclusion, before finding out that its fine details were lost somewhere down the line. His successor, LGen Macdonald cited similar issues after

76 Email from Rainer Ness, aka “Whistleblower69” to Dr. David Bercuson, “Re: MND 17 & 18,” 15 January 1999, Box 28C, “Bosnia-9”, Bercuson Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 77 Ibid. 78 Interview with Vice Admiral Gary Garnett by Dr. David Bercuson, 24 November 2014, Victoria, BC, recording and transcripts held by author.

198 taking over. He commented that “lack of communication” was a part of CAF culture requiring continual work to overcome.79

Recognizing this issue, however, the CAF did begin to take action to address the problem and strengthen internal communications from a corporate perspective in late 1998 and 1999. Key early achievements included:

• Migration of the DND/CAF national newspaper, the Maple Leaf, to a bi-monthly as

opposed to monthly publication.

• The use of periodic inserts in the Maple Leaf to profile issues such as DM or CDS

priorities and CAF quality of life.

• Greater use of email to distribute general messages and information more quickly

through the institution.

• Completion of two presentations to the Defence Management Committee (DMC) on

ways to continue to strengthen internal communications (which included the need to

strengthen corporate information materials to support internal communications through

the chain of command).

• Research into the use of existing cable infrastructures to enable internal communications

using video.80

Communication issues also served as part of the impetus behind CDS Baril appointing the first ever Special Advisor to the CDS on Officer Professional Development in February 1999.

LGen Dallaire became the first incumbent and was given the task, alongside his team, of

79 Interview with Lieutenant-General George Macdonald former Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, by Dr. David Bercuson, Ottawa, Ontario, 26 April 2013, recording and transcripts held by author. 80 Canada, National Defence, Semi-Annual Report of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff to the Minister of National Defence Monitoring Committee on the Implementation of Change Initiatives in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, March 1999 (Ottawa: National Defence, 1999), 7-8.

199 coordinating an overarching program for activities related to professional development changes.

A major feature of his role was to communicate, across the CAF and to the MMC, the elements of a coordinated plan for implementation and expectations for success. This position operated outside the chain of command and reported directly to the CDS on a weekly basis. 81 Essentially, it represented the CAF response to problems associated with a lack of strategic direction in reform implementation. The goal was to bring focus, commitment, and clear direction from the top to the change process.82

The MMC celebrated this addition to the CAF reform arsenal in its Interim Report – 1999, submitted to the MND in July of that year. It claimed to be “very supportive of this recent initiative” (Special Advisor), although it regretted that these types of strategic planning activities were not put into place earlier. The result, it declared, was that “local initiatives to reform education and development, commendable in themselves, are running ahead of much of the strategic guidance on what they should be aiming to achieve, and they will require further changes as the strategic guidance becomes available.”83 It urged the CAF to give as much priority as possible to this new strategic planning process so that the reforms could move forward with focused guidance.

Again, the purpose and goals of the reforms needed to be articulated and communicated broadly, with repeated confirmation of support from senior leaders, to be successfully institutionalized.

The new Special Advisor on OPD was part of a broader, strategic framework for defence planning and decision making introduced in June 1999, entitled Shaping the Future of Canadian

Defence: A Strategy for 2020 (Strategy 2020).84 Strategy 2020 sought to identify the challenges

81 DND, “Building on a Stronger Foundation.” 82 Minister’s Monitoring Committee, Interim Report – 1999, 3. 83 Ibid., 3-4. 84 Canada, National Defence, Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1999).

200 and the opportunities facing DND and the CAF as both adapted to a rapidly evolving and complex world. It was a roadmap defining the route forward for the CAF, with a focus on future force development and the resources necessary to operate.

One of the eight strategic objectives outlined in the Strategy 2020 document was to

“nurture pride in the institution by meeting the highest of public standards in terms of ethos, values, and professionalism.”85 This would require the “development and sustainment of a leadership climate that encourages initiative, decisiveness, and trust while improving our leaders’ ability to lead and manage effectively.” To this end, the Special Advisor and his group developed several initiatives related to visioning the characteristics and qualities required of officers in the future, articulating the meaning of accountability, developing a code of ethics that included the concepts of self-analysis and self-improvement in a professional officer corps, as well as creating research and development centres dedicated to leadership.

LGen Dallaire’s group took its first steps by producing a Statement of Requirement (SOR) for Officer Professional Development, entitled Canadian Officership in the 21st Century.86 This document was a “vision statement” outlining an officer corps aware of its responsibilities to the nation and committed to the military ethos upon which military effectiveness depends.87 It sought to provide an institution-wide, strategic framework to guide the implementation and institutionalization of the post-Somalia reforms, repeatedly described as integral to success by the

MMC.

Officership 2020 presented its vision in two parts: a conceptual framework analyzing the probable major world trends over the following 20 years and the type of officers necessary to

85 Ibid., 5. 86 Canada, National Defence, Canadian Officership in the 21st Century, Detailed Analysis and Strategy for Launching Implementation (Officership 2020), March 2001 (Ottawa: National Defence, 2001). 87 Ibid.

201 address them; as well as a plan of action for implementation to achieve its strategic objectives. It asserted that the CAF must “realign the attitudes and philosophies underlying officership” within the institution, arguing that the CAF system continued to reinforce “bad leadership habits” like unreceptivity to alternate ideas or models, maintaining a tactical focus, or failing to embrace opportunities to develop conceptual and critical thinking skills.88 The reforms implemented to that date – a new OGS, degree status, and curriculum reform, among others – were steps in the right direction. They had not, however, led to a significant, institution-wide shift in the perception of how officers should be developed or the goals that they should be striving to achieve. The changes, in typical and historical CAF style, were piecemeal and largely isolated to specific institutions or groups.

As an aside, the general reaction of senior leaders to the original Officership document underscored the arguments just listed. Colonel Bernd Horn, serving as Chief of Staff for Special

Advisor Dallaire, noted that when Officership 2020 was considered by the AFC at the end of 1999, it enjoyed “strong support.” In fact, an electronic decision support tool utilized by the AFC to determine the level of agreement regarding the plan, indicated that 85 percent of the participants accepted it. 89 However, when it came time to sign the document for its official adoption, many individuals refused. Horn stated:

“It was at this stage that the bureaucratic guerrilla warfare surfaced. Although in the collective forum all seemingly agreed to the document and its contents, when it came time to sign the final version, a number of three-star generals refused, stating they still had some fundamental concerns with the document, as well as the allegation that there was simply not enough collaboration and ‘buy-in’ throughout the department.”90

He disputed that final argument, describing a situation in which repeated attempts by the Special

88 Ibid., I-4 to I-14. 89 Horn and Bentley, Forced to Change, 106. 90 Ibid., 77, 106-107. Horn and Bentley define “bureaucratic guerrilla warfare” as a situation in which “no overt disagreement is voiced in public, but subsequent actions are designed to resist unwanted change.”

202 Advisor’s staff over the previous year had been “either ignored or rebuffed.” Those that did participate in the process did so reluctantly, showing “a lack of preparation and interest throughout.”91 The officers who refused to sign were accused of intentionally stalling the process.

Horn suggested that they fell back on their experiential and intuitive mindsets rather than engaging in the discussion or with the evidence provided to move forward in a different direction.

The Officership document would go through several iterations before it was eventually accepted and released in March 2001, receiving formal endorsement by both the CDS and MND.

Incorporating the comments and concerns raised by resistant stakeholders it looked slightly different than the original, but still presented the first institutional articulation of a forces-wide approach to professionalism and officer development.92 LGen Dallaire credited the “full and complete backing” of CDS Baril for finally getting the document through its bureaucratic resistance.93 It was BGen Charles Lemieux, however, who took over the role of Special Advisor after LGen Dallaire was medically released from the CAF, who saw the document through to its final form.94

A principal tenet of Officership 2020 was the assertation that the CAF must evolve to become a “learning organization” embracing critical thought and debate. Its authors had found that one of the hindrances to change up to that point had been a perception by many officers that the

91 Ibid., 107. Efforts by the Special Advisor on Officer Professional Development’s group included: extensive consultations with over 50 officers, academics, and other officials; use of an “empowerment model” of engagement that consisted of large working group meetings in three tiers (colonel level, one and two star level, and AFC level); provision of extensive research and reading packages, as well as detailed records of discussions and summaries. 92 The MMC expressed reservations numerous times regarding the evolution of Officership 2020. In January 2001, it maintained that it was “worried” about the “vision and coherence of the OPD program” after being briefed by BGen Charles Lemieux on the “subtle, yet striking changes to the vision statement since LGen Dallaire’s earlier draft.” Letter from John Fraser to MND Art Eggleton, 16 January 2001, Box 28H, “Leadership and Education Issues, MMC Documents,” Section 2, Bercuson Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 93 Interview with Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire by Dr. David Bercuson, 29 April 2013, Parliament Hill, Ottawa, Ontario, recording and transcript held by author. 94 Letter from John Fraser to MND Art Eggleton, 16 January 2001, Box 28H, Bercuson Papers.

203 CAF remained incredibly risk averse. Most feared that they would be “hung out to dry” if they took risky decisions that ultimately appeared to be mistaken, or they were uninterested in embracing new ideas that weren’t part of the traditional CAF focus or outlook.95 A learning organization is defined as an organization skilled at creating, acquiring, and transferring knowledge and at modifying behaviour to reflect new knowledge and insight.96 It seeks to learn as much from failure as from success, embraces knowledge and lessons-learned from outside its own boundaries, and works to actively communicate and send knowledge from one part of the organization to another. Officership 2020 – the document itself, as much as the resistance to it – suggested that CAF norms and behaviour continued to contradict these ideals. The institution and many of its members continued to shy away from the acknowledgement of failure, allowed parochialism, tribalism, and stove-piping to hinder lines of communication, and rejected the pursuit of new ideas and ways of doing things because “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”97

To realize the goal of becoming a learning organization, Officership 2020 identified eight key initiatives that the CAF needed to embrace. These included: ensuring the intellectual development of officers; improving the common body of CAF knowledge; developing policy, concepts, and doctrine; strengthening the military ethos; cultivating external relationships and links; providing OPD flexibility; and securing organizational capacity and resourcing.98 While several significant changes were suggested to support these initiatives, three in particular provided a framework supporting the rest: 1) the establishment of a comprehensive governance structure to direct officer professional development, characterized by centralized control and decentralized execution; 2) growth in the number of “centres/cells of excellence” that specialized in subjects

95 Ibid., I-14 96 Senge, The Fifth Discipline. 97 Canada, Canadian Officership in the 21st Century, I-16 to I-17. 98 Ibid., I-23 to I-24.

204 such as leadership, technology, national security, and defence; and 3) development of a common body of knowledge that comprehensively spanned all developmental periods.99

The first component was focused on the creation of a CAF university – an institution to

“house” the governance structure providing centralized strategic guidance for all activity related to professional development. This would integrate all elements of the CAF education system, ending the relative independence and isolation of RMC and the other colleges, and providing a new level of unified coherence moving forward.100 Effectively, Officership 2020 advocated for a shift in ownership over OPD away from CFRETS to this new university. It maintained that

CFRETS was already stretched too thin handling current problems. “The complexity and scale of the Officer Development System in the future would require high-level strategic oversight and a robust mechanism to ensure its relevance, coherence, and rigor.” 101 It also promoted the establishment of a separate leadership institute within the new system, responsible for coordinating and supporting research and doctrine related to leadership and the profession of arms.

The second component concerned the consolidation and addition of educational and professional “centres of excellence” to the CAF system. Each centre would be the formally acknowledged authority on a specific area of study, providing “analysis, lessons-learned, and a future-oriented view” in that area. They would also provide a pedagogical function, producing and circulating material for use corporately and throughout the OPD system. Leadership, ethics, technology, joint experimentation, change management, national security, and defence, were listed as priority subjects for these centres.102

The third component was concerned with knowledge and information – the ethos, doctrine,

99 Ibid., II-2 to II-10. 100 Ibid., II-2. 101 Ibid., I-20. 102 Ibid., II-3.

205 leadership values, and other principles and standards that were meant to inform and guide the CAF as a professional organization. This constituted the product that would be controlled, developed, and shared by the structure and elements included in the first two components. Officership 2020 asserted that this body of knowledge must be multi-disciplinary, incorporating the humanities and social sciences as much as the applied sciences, and must be delivered sequentially and progressively through all four development periods.103 A series of “capstone manuals” related to the profession of arms, leadership, and joint and combined operations were suggested as first steps towards building this knowledge base.

As the CAF worked to introduce and implement the elements of Officership 2020 into its development processes, the MMC ended its tenure as monitor of the overall reform process. It presented its Final Report to the MND in December 1999, outlining the perceived successes and ongoing challenges of the reform program.104 In general, it reported that a “significant” and

“commendable” amount of progress had been made with respect to the reforms and institutional change. With the exception of the restructuring of the Reserves and some ongoing leadership issues, “the accomplishments are many and have been made over almost all the subject areas.”105

But while it commended the CAF for the achievements accomplished, it also expressed concerns related to the full and lasting success of the change program: “We have seen troubling signs that while the change program is widely accepted as good and deserving of support, it is still felt by some, even among the CF/DND leadership to be secondary to their core concerns, and to represent a job to be done rather than new values to be lived.”106 It cited several specific problem areas as examples:

103 Ibid., II-4. 104 Minister’s Monitoring Committee, Final Report – 1999. 105 Ibid., 5-6. 106 Ibid., 7.

206 • Officers continued to describe the “new culture” of the CAF mostly in terms of learning

to manage with fewer resources, out-sourcing, and developing managerial as well as

military skills.

• There continued to exist a lack of connection between the idea of the CAF as a self-

improving learning organization and the need to change the content of courses.

• No established process had been created to capture the product of the Special Advisor

on Officer Professional Development for quick incorporation into the definition of the

qualities needed in future officers. It asked how the potentially “radical” proposals

expected imminently from the Advisor were going to be considered and acted upon.107

Remember, this report emerged before the final iteration of Officership 2020 was

accepted or any subsequent responsive actions taken.

The MMC claimed that these examples showed how institutional or cultural change had yet to take root. While progress had been made, “the idea of cultural change is not yet internalized enough to trigger instinctively feelings of determination, persistence, and urgency to get the job done.”108

In response to the concerns raised by the MMC’s final report, MND Eggleton decided to reconstitute the committee into a second phase focused on monitoring the leadership and reserve reforms.109 John Fraser agreed to continue in his capacity as Chair of the reconstituted Minister’s

Monitoring Committee on Change (MMC2), and would serve alongside members Bev Dewar and

David Bercuson.110 While issues related to the contentious Land Force Reserve Restructuring

107 Ibid., 7-8. 108 Ibid. 109 Letter from Minister Art Eggleton to MMC Chairman John Fraser, “MMC reconstituted into Phase II,” 17 November 1999, Box 4, 250-0, Fraser Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 110 Canada, Department of National Defence, “Defence Minister Welcomes Final Report of the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change,” News Release, 9 February 2000, Box 4, File 250-1, Vol. I, Fraser Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta.

207 (LFRR) program would take up a significant amount of time for MMC2, it would also carefully monitor the ongoing efforts related to the leadership reforms, which continued well into the new millennium.

Those efforts had been moving forward in earnest as a result of Officership 2020, but also because of a report produced by a private consulting firm hired by VCDS Garnett to analyse and make recommendations related to a forces-wide professional development system. Consulting and

Audit Canada considered the proposals contained in Officership 2020, the Whithers Report, and those still being produced through ongoing efforts by the Special Advisor and his team to make its recommendations.111 Its report, published in July 1999, focused predominantly on the idea of a

CAF university to oversee and coordinate OPD moving forward. Rejecting the Whithers’ recommendation that such an institution be contained within the CFRETS framework, it recommended a separate Canadian Defence Academy (CDA), with RMC and a new leadership institute driving academic development. It asserted that this academy must function differently than any of its predecessors, including the CDEE and CFRETS, by incorporating the following strategic objectives: adding further rigour to professional military education; enabling CAF personnel to develop their intellectual potential; and ensuring coherent and integrated CAF educational processes.112

The MMC2 also weighed in regarding the proposed CDA prior to its start up. At a meeting on 7 December 2001, its members championed the creation of a new CDA with a strong and unified focus on education within the OPD system, but questioned the planned governance

111 Consulting Auditing Canada, Governance Framework for a Canadian Defence Academy, Report for the CDS, July 2001. 112 Ibid., “Chapter 6.”

208 structure for the academy, calling it “too fragmented.”113 The Committee also raised concerns over the “continued lack of liberal arts education mentioned here,” warning yet again that “people must be able to think strategically, not just technically.”114 These concerns were reiterated through several more MMC2 meetings the following year, with the addition of an argument related to a disconnect between the set-up of the CDA and the establishment of its curriculum.115 In a letter to the MND dated 18 April 2001, John Fraser warned that the CAF had pushed for the CDA too quickly. He argued that “education policies should be promulgated before the CDA structure is approved,” noting that the “lack of serious effort to show that the CF is really serious about establishing a liberal arts education at the CDA,” remained a major concern.116

The CDA was officially opened on 1 April 2002, following the decision to disband

CFRETS.117 It was mandated to coordinate all professional development and formal education for the officer and senior non-commissioned officer corps, with its Charter specifically stating that

“the Canadian Defence Academy exists to champion life-long learning and to promote the professional development of members of the Canadian Forces.”118 The CDA was designed around several core ideas challenging the problems and championing the ideals cited throughout the post-

Somalia reform process: a single CAF agency must take active responsibility for Canadian defence education; education and the intellectual capacity of CAF members is a “prime resource” to be

113 Draft Proceedings, MMC2, 7 December 2001, Ottawa, Ontario, Box 4, 250-2, Vol. II, Fraser Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 114 Ibid. 115 Draft Proceedings, MMC2, 10 January 2002, Box 28F, “Re:CFC” Bercuson Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta; Draft Proceedings, 25 July 2002, Box 28H, “Leadership and Education Issues, MMC Documents,” Section 3, Bercuson Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 116 Letter from Chairman John Fraser to MND Art Eggleton, 18 April 2002, Box 4, 275-9, 230-2, 250-0, Fraser Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 117 CFRETS was “disbanded in the hope that new structures were being put in place that would be better able to ‘operationalize’ recruiting, education, and training policies.” Letter from Vice-Admiral , Senior Advisor Professional Development, to MND Art Eggleton, 30 July 2001, A-2012-00021, Stack 01, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario. 118 Canadian Defence Academy, Charter: Canadian Defence Academy, accessed on 2 November 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/cda.page.

209 nurtured, honed, and exploited; members of the CAF should participate actively in their own professional development; and there can be multiple training pathways to achieving military qualifications.119 Referred to by Dr. A. J. Barrett as “both victory and vindication for the many who argued for so long that a sound professional education rests at the heart of defence reform,”120 the CDA represented a new and different effort to understand and direct professionalism, informed by education. It was meant to be an active and flexible leader of the OPD system, operating as an agent of continuous change and reform rather than simply the initiator of the latest panacea solution.

The CDA was organized under the command of a major-general, originally Commodore

D.C. Morse, who was “directly responsible” to the CDS. This was meant to ensure consistent and visible “top-level support” for the new academy, particularly during its start-up phase.121 Its headquarters consisted of a new Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI), a Directorate of

Professional Development (DPD) and a Directorate of Learning Management (DLM). While CFLI conducted research on virtually all aspects of military leadership to produce doctrine on leadership and the profession of arms, the DPD directed the delivery of professional development products, and the DLM developed new techniques and processes to deliver education and enhance lifelong learning throughout the CAF.122 RMC and CFC in Toronto were both brought under the CDA umbrella.

Upon the creation of the CDA, the Special Advisor on OPD and his team were officially disbanded, although many of its members shifted to CFLI to continue their activities. This included development of the capstone manuals outlined within Officership 2020. To continue the

119 Dr. A. J. Barrett, “A Ministry of Education for Defence,” Canadian Military Journal (Winter 2004-2005), 90. 120 Ibid. 121 Horn and Bentley, Forced to Change, 111-112. 122 Horn and MacIntyre, “Emerging from a Decade of Darkness,” 66; Horn and Bently, Forced to Change, 112.

210 monitoring and advisory function provided by this group, an Education Advisory Board (EAB) and a Professional Development Oversight Council (PDOC) were also established by the CDA

Charter to help support the academy – and the CAF in general – to achieve its mandate. Both provided the MND and CAF with an external view on education and professional development, providing advice on the alignment between CAF programs and best practices in the public service and private sector.123 While the PDOC covered all OPD related issues, the EAB advised the MND on the place and value of education within the professional development system and on the trends and initiatives in education and the development of public and private sector professionals in

Canada.124 At the time, Senior Advisor Professional Development and eventual member of the

EAB, Vice Admiral Lynn Mason, asserted that the creation of these monitoring groups “attest[ed] to the fact that recent policy development decisions and implementation plans are being monitored and projects prioritized for resourcing and implementation.” He added: “In summary, it can be said that implementation is proceeding satisfactorily and that the bureaucracy is responding to the requirement to integrate PD initiatives into the Defence Program.”125

In 2003, the first of the required capstone manuals, Duty With Honour: The Profession of

Arms in Canada, was published under the auspices of CFLI. 126 Duty With Honour provided an understanding and vision of the Canadian military profession, as well as the intellectual and doctrinal basis for all personnel and professional development policies in the CAF. It addressed both the theoretical and practical facets of military professionalism, codifying what it means to be

123 Canada, National Defence, “Canadian Educators Named to Defence Education Positions,” News Release, 6 December 2002, NR-02.077, accessed on 22 August 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=canadian-educators-named-to-defence-education- positions/hnmx1bjn. 124 Ibid. 125 Letter from Vice-Admiral Lynn Mason, Senior Advisor Professional Development, to MND Art Eggleton, 30 July 2001, A-2012-00021, Stack 01, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Ontario. 126 Canada, National Defence, Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada Second Edition (Ottawa: National Defence, 2009).

211 a military professional in Canada. This included a detailed articulation of a unifying military ethos for the CAF – the lack of which was cited as a causal factor for CAF leadership malaise in many of the post-Somalia reports. Comprised of three components – Beliefs and Expectations (unlimited liability, fighting spirit, teamwork, discipline, and physical fitness), Fundamental Canadian

Values, and Core Military Values (duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage) – this statement of ethos provided a written articulation of the values informing Canadian military professionalism across all environments.127 In fact, this document represented the first time that any statement of CAF professional identity or its component parts had ever been defined in writing.

The production of capstone documents continued in 2005 through 2007 with the publication of Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations, Leadership in the

Canadian Forces: Doctrine as well as the two related applied manuals, Leading the Institution and

Leading People.128 Altogether, these documents and manuals articulated the rationale behind the specific, value-laden understanding of leadership that would be used within the CAF moving forward. This rationale built upon the many core principles of effective military leadership outlined in the previous CAF doctrinal publications of 1972-73, but introduced several new concepts and explicitly rejected certain ideas that were no longer considered correct or relevant.

Dr. Alan Okros, the leader of the CFLI team that conducted the research and produced these documents, noted that four of these specific evolutions are of particular note. First, there was a shift away from the earlier perspective that there should be three distinct levels of strategic, operational, and tactical leadership to correspond with the three levels that the military is organized

127 Ibid., 25-34. 128 Canada, National Defence, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations (Ottawa: DND, 2005a); Canada, National Defence, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine (Ottawa: DND, 2005b); Canada, National Defence, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution (Ottawa: DND, 2007a); Canada, National Defence, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading People (Ottawa: DND, 2007b).

212 to function at.129 Instead, the critical differentiation was made between developing and employing small groups and teams versus adjusting broad institutional dimensions – Leading People versus

Leading the Institution. The former focuses on achieving assigned objectives, while the latter seeks to align the institution with the external environment to set the conditions for small team success.130

This led directly into the second evolution of note: that Conceptual Foundations rejected previous assertions that only senior officers constituted members of the profession, with others relegated to the role of technicians. It presented a single approach to leadership, regardless of level, and asserted that all members of the Regular and Reserve components of the CAF were members of the profession of arms.131 The third evolution applied the same arguments across the entire CAF, asserting that there “should be commonality in how both [leadership and professionalism] are articulated in the land, sea, and air environments and subordinate doctrinal publications promulgated by those responsible for force generation in these environments.”132

Finally, the fourth evolution related to the creation of a Canadian Forces Effectiveness framework, developed from the incorporation of organizational behaviour research on competing

(outcome) values and the Duty with Honour framework of professional and ethical (conduct) values.133 According to Okros, this framework challenged the “taken-for-granted assumption in much of the leadership literature that ‘good’ leaders automatically know what to do or when to do it by acknowledging the likelihood of continuing tensions amongst competing outcome (what should we focus on doing) and conduct (how should we do it) values.”134 It also extended the understanding of consequences related to leadership influences beyond the military context,

129 Dr. Alan Okros, “Leadership in the Canadian Military Context,” CFLI Monograph 2010-01 (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, November 2010), 2. 130 Ibid.; Canada, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations, 4-5. 131 Canada, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations, 75, 82. 132 Okros, “Leadership in the Canadian Military Context,” 3. 133 Ibid.; Canada, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations, 23-26. 134 Okros, “Leadership in the Canadian Military Context,” 4.

213 recognizing that leaders at all levels can influence other outcomes, such as public and political confidence, trust, and support for the institution.135

In November 2003, after submission of its Final Report – 2003 to MND John McCallum, the MMC2 was finally, completely disbanded.136 In its final report, it noted that “the great majority of the concerns [it] had expressed in previous reports had been or were being addressed with coherent plans for future action” already outlined by DND and the CAF. Specifically, it noted that

“a culture change in respect of the promotion of education within the CF appears to be taking place, for which the leadership should be commended.”137 Further, it applauded efforts related to

Officership 2020, adoption of the various capstone manuals, CDA Charter revisions, and the introduction of an overarching education policy statement entitled Professional Development:

CDS Strategy and Direction. It was “especially pleased to note” that this document reflected the

Committee’s repeated comments related to the “importance of including among the educational opportunities available, the option of liberal arts as equally important to science, technology, and business administration.” It quoted the CDS Strategy and Direction document, that “members of the CF must acquire a balance of the humanities/social science, natural and technological sciences and leadership knowledge.”138

Despite the various achievements acknowledged, the Committee still recognized that several areas remained in need of improvement. For example, it felt that greater emphasis should still be placed on the role of Canadian universities (outside RMC or the CFC) in the process of educating officers.139 It made note of each of those areas of “unfinished business” to support

135 Canada, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations, 19. 136 Department of National Defence, “Monitoring Committee Releases Final Report on Reserve Restructure,” Press Release, 20 November 2003, Ottawa, Box 1, Fraser Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 137 Ibid., 24. 138 Ibid., 26. 139 Ibid., 25.

214 ongoing work by OPD leaders within the CAF, commenting that “the balance of proposed changes are being left in the hands of the CF and DND” for consideration and implementation.140 It hoped that those elements would form part of an ongoing change initiative, building from and continuing in the spirit of the post-Somalia reforms.

The final disbandment of the MMC represented the official end to the formal program of reform implementation introduced by the government in reaction to the Somalia Affair. While it marked a halt to specific government oversight of the change process, it did not signify a belief that all changes were fully complete, or that the military would cease all change efforts moving forward. The government simply accepted that the CAF and DND were well on their way to completing most of the necessary reforms and had acknowledged the need to continue operating according to those reforms moving forward.

140 Ibid., 25.

215 CHAPTER 7 Institutionalization?

In practical terms, the successful implementation of the post-Somali leadership reforms is easily evaluated. One must simply match the request made by a particular reform to tangible actions taken. The outline provided in the previous chapter offered numerous examples of these actions and the reforms introduced to address each of the post-Somalia recommendations related to leadership. It showed that a university degree was made a prerequisite to commissioning as an officer. Professional development programs were extended to senior officers, including generals.

A major overhaul of the curriculum at RMC was conducted after the release of the Withers Report, including a compulsory and significant dose of arts, humanities, and social sciences education for all officer cadets. The Canadian Forces College introduced major new courses in both national security studies and strategic studies as part of its compulsory staff training, and a Special Advisor and committee were established by the CDS to study and institute a new professional development program, independent of the chain of command. The list goes on. It is clear that change did occur, and that a plan for continued change was in place when the official reform program came to an end with the disbandment of the Minister’s Monitoring Committee.

However, considered together, the leadership recommendations introduced after Somalia were about more than just altering curriculum and getting a degree to further career progression.

These reforms were meant to introduce a new cultural value into the CAF, one which championed continuing and higher education on equal footing with military training. The goal was to make the

CAF a ‘learning organization’, constantly questioning itself and the world around it, acquiring, interpreting, and retaining new knowledge and modifying its behaviour to reflect changing conditions. Acceptance of this value required a significant shift away from the traditional,

216 conservative, and anti-intellectual culture of the CAF prior to the reform program’s introduction.

An examination of the programs, practices, and initiatives that are still supported and championed by the CAF today can help to determine which reforms were ultimately incorporated into CAF and

DND systems and provide significant insight into the permanency and impact of the post-Somalia leadership reforms.

In the area of Values and Ethics, the CAF continues to maintain the Defence Ethics

Program, first introduced in 1997. The DEP still operates with a mission to consistently apply the highest standards of values and ethics across DND and the CAF. It also guides Canada’s defence personnel in choosing conduct that is consistently ethical.1 The “Statement of Values and Ethics,” first produced by this group, remains the capstone document on the issue, informing the recruitment, training, and education of all officers. The incorporation of this document’s principles and obligations into the writing and revision of CAF training manuals, course syllabi, and professional assessment activities began immediately after its introduction in 1997, and is still included in all learning material and courses at each stage of an officer’s career.2

The CAF’s keystone doctrine manual, Canadian Military Doctrine (2009), also reflects the changes brought by the Statement, discussing the “ethical” and “moral component of military power.”3 This followed the Army’s previous doctrine manual, CFP 300 – Canada’s Army (1998), which was actually redesigned immediately before its release to reflect the Statement. It included

“material establishing the moral and ethical basis for army professionalism,” and contained a

1 Canada, National Defence, “Defence Ethics Program,” accessed 23 August 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/defence-ethics.page. 2 Minister’s Monitoring Committee, Final Report – 1999, 87-88; National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Resources within DND/CAF on Statement of Defence Ethics.” 3 Canadian Forces Joint Publication CFJP 01, Canadian Military Doctrine, Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, April 2009, accessed on 25 August 2018, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2010/forces/D2- 252-2009-eng.pdf.

217 complete chapter on ethical and professional values. 4 Of particular interest, is the fact that the

DEP has continued to publish reports and guidelines on ethics, values, and their incorporation into training activities. It also hosts and participates in conferences with relevant officers, politicians, academics, and other experts to consider, examine, and discuss important concepts. 5 This demonstrates a continued investment in study and analysis supporting best practices related to understanding and applying ethics in a defence context.

A cultural shift is reflected through behaviour, however, as much as words, and the recent need for the CAF to implement an enhanced Diversity Strategy and Action Plan is telling.

Operation HONOUR was introduced to “strengthen an inclusive and respectful culture” within the institution. It was launched in response to an external investigation that found an underlying sexualized culture in the CAF, which if not addressed, would likely lead to more serious incidents of sexual harassment and sexual assault.6 The report, published in early 2015, concluded that serious and degrading behaviour has been tolerated up to the highest levels of command. Sexual assault, date rape, inappropriate relationships with commanding officers, and enforced silence were described as common features of daily operations. A culture of sexualization and hostility towards women and LGTBQ members was considered prevalent, having been nurtured by the actions – and inaction – of senior officers. There was a broadly held perception that those in the

4 Kasurak, A National Force, 271. 5 For example see: National Defence, Defence Ethics Program, “Ethics in Practice,” proceedings on the Conference on Ethics in Canadian Defence,” 30-31 October 1997, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2014/mdn- dnd/D2-109-1997-eng.pdf; or “Giving a Voice to Ethics in the CF,” proceedings on the Conference on Ethics in Canadian Defence, 1998, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-ethics/1998-conference-military- environment.page; “Guidelines for Defence Ethics Training,” 5 March 2004, http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/about-reports-pubs-ethics/ethics-training-guidelines.pdf. 6 Chief of the Defence Staff, “CDS Op Order – Op HONOUR,” 14 August 2015, accessed 26 August 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/caf-community-support-services-harassment/cds-op- order--op-honour.pdf. In early 2015, former Supreme Court Justice and External Review Authority Marie Deschamps reported on sexual misconduct within the CAF, determining that an underlying and dangerous sexualized culture existed within the institution and needed to be addressed immediately.

218 chain of command either condone inappropriate sexual conduct or were willing to turn a blind-eye to such incidents, “imposing” an environment “where no one speaks up and which functions to deter victims from reporting sexual misconduct.” The report further argued that the only solution to these issues was comprehensive cultural change. “It is not enough to simply revise policies or to repeat the mantra of ‘zero tolerance’… without broad-scale cultural reform, policy change is unlikely to be permanently effective.”7

The conclusions of this report are disconcerting, for their content as much as for what they say about the inclusion of ethics and values into CAF policies, doctrine, and training since Somalia.

It is disappointing that senior leaders, supposedly imbued with a new understanding of professionalism and moral standards, allowed this inappropriate sexualized culture to grow. It suggests that the professional and ethical shift desired from the post-Somalia reforms remains incomplete. New departments dedicated to supporting ethical behaviour and statements outlining those ethics are positive organizational changes related to narrative. A lack of behavioural change, particularly when no one is watching, suggests that a cultural shift across the institution in this area has only been partially realized.

The response to the report from the highest levels of the CAF, does provide some hope, however. It is encouraging that as part of Operation HONOUR, extended training and education activities have been developed, specially trained Sexual Offence Response Teams are investigating complaints, and CAF leaders have taken administrative or disciplinary action against those who were found to have committed inappropriate acts.8 The point here is that this issue did garner an

7 Marie Deschamps, External Review Authority, “External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces,” 27 March 2015, accessed on 26 August 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/caf-community-support-services-harassment/era-final- report-(april-20-2015)-eng.pdf. 8 Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “2016-17 Departmental Results Report,” (Ottawa: National Defence, 2017), accessed 23 August 2018,

219 institutional response, which highlighted culture, ethics, values, and professionalism as concepts and ideals that are important to the CAF. Using language like “inconsistent with the Profession of

Arms,” and “runs contrary to the values of the professionalism and ethical principles of

DND/CAF,” are indicative of an attempt to further alter the narrative regarding acceptable values and behaviour.9 The focus on educational initiatives to teach new behaviours is also significant.

Together, they suggest that the CAF is working to alter institutional norms in this case, as much as it is punishing the bad behaviour of those who were “caught out.” It remains to be seen whether these initiatives manage to succeed in supporting a cultural shift related to this issue.

In the area of Officer Education, numerous initiatives launched during the reform program remain in place today. The RMC Board of Governors continues to provide advice and recommendations to the MND on matters related to the college, including its strategic direction. It has the authority to approve any changes to the academic program on behalf of the Minister, and acts as an advisory body to assist and guide the Commander of CDA to review and revise programs offered at and through RMC and related structures. This includes a focus on the college’s military, academic, sports, and second language programs, its selection and promotion of professors, its

Strategic Research Plan, as well as its business and long-range development plans.10

The 18 voting members of the Board consist of the Chair, nine regular members, seven ex officio members (members by virtue of their position), and one member designated by the Royal

Military Colleges of Canada. The Chair is appointed by the MND, as are the nine regular members

“whose backgrounds reflect as much as possible the social diversity of the country, in keeping

http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/about-reports-pubs/drr-2016-17_dnd_english_-final-30- oct-_-web-site.pdf. 9 Chief of the Defence Staff, “CDS Op Order – Op HONOUR.” 10 Royal Military College of Canada, “Terms of Reference,” Board of Governors, accessed 23 August 2018, https://www.rmc-cmr.ca/en/college-commandants-office/terms-reference.

220 with the fundamental value of equality embodied in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and to encompass an appropriate mix of academic, private sector and public sector backgrounds.”11 With the exception of a comment from the MMC in July 1999 that criticized the Board for having only one member from west of Ontario, it appears that the Board does attempt to ensure an appropriate geographic balance of members whenever possible.12 The current list of Board members confirms this conclusion.13

In addition, this Board was responsible for actioning the review of undergraduate education at RMC in the form of the Whithers Study Group and its report, Balanced Excellence: Leading

Canada’s Armed Forces in the New Millenium. Dated 30 April 1998, this report outlined a new orientation and structure for RMC’s undergraduate program that advocated for a broad-based education for all graduates, well-grounded in the sciences and humanities, and with special emphasis on the development of values, ethics, and leadership skills.14 The Whithers Report was forwarded to the MND in June 1998, at which time all but one of its recommendations – the

Balanced Excellence Model, which was replaced by the Enhanced Leadership Model – were accepted for implementation.15 RMC’s stated mission continues to focus on developing leaders loyal to the fundamental principles and ethical guidelines for officers outlined in the Whithers

Report. It also remains dedicated to providing both undergraduate and graduate degrees in the humanities as well as the sciences and engineering. Its degrees include a number of military and strategic studies focused programs, including a unique Bachelor of Military Arts and Sciences.16

11 Ibid. 12 Minister’s Monitoring Committee, Interim Report – 1999, 41. 13 Royal Military College of Canada, “Members of the Board of Governors,” accessed 23 August 2018, https://www.rmc-cmr.ca/en/college-commandants-office/members-board-governors. 14 Ibid. 15 Canada, “Building on a Stronger Foundation.” 16 The Bachelor of Military Arts and Science (BMASc) is a unique degree programme for the CAF, offered through Continuing Studies and is thoroughly grounded in the elements of the military profession. It integrates in-service

221 While it doesn’t encourage one degree over another, and doesn’t specifically advocate for arts- based learning, it certainly provides resources and opportunities for students to engage both the sciences and the humanities throughout their undergraduate and graduate programs.

Today, RMC remains part of the Canadian Defence Academy system, created in 2002 to serve as the “institutional champion of CAF professional development.”17 The CDA has served its function and played a leadership role in the design, development, and delivery of individual training and education and the overall professional development system since its inception. It does so through the operation of multiple schools and colleges – including RMC and RMC Saint-Jean, which is set to begin granting full degrees in May 2021 to its first class which started in August

2018. 18 It also supports the delivery of e-learning services for over 48,000 DND and CAF personnel through the DNDLearn system19 and the provision of seven advanced courses through

CFC that annually graduate over 600 senior military and civilian students, including many from foreign militaries.20

The CDA maintains that the uniqueness of this military college system – loyal to the four pillars: academic study, bilingualism, fitness, and military ethos – offers a unique and favourable environment (role modelling) for officer cadets, which cannot be matched by civilian

training with special and standard university courses. The programme is designed for the serving military member and recognizes university-level achievement appropriate to the profession of arms. 17 Canada, National Defence, “Review by ADM (RS) in accordance with the Access to Information Act,” January 2015, iv, accessed on 18 July 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/about-reports-pubs- audit-eval/245p1258-209-eng.pdf. 18 Brigadier-General Kevin Horgan, Chief of Staff, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, “Playing the Long Game on SSE Implementation,” The Maple Leaf, 7 June 2018, accessed on 25 August 2018, https://ml-fd.caf- fac.ca/en/2018/05/13076. 19 DNDLearn provides members of DND and the CAF with a corporate on-line Learning Management Platform. This platform is an “enterprise environment for managing, developing and delivering on-line training, as well as for providing the Defence Team with an environment favourable to continuous learning and the sharing of knowledge.” Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Defence Learning Network,” 17 November 2014, accessed on 18 July 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-elearning/dln.page. 20 Ibid., 1.

222 universities.21 However, it also recognizes the value inherent to working with civilian universities and colleges to provide educational and training opportunities for cadets, whether from a financial or civilian-military relationship-building perspective. The CDA system has thus introduced several tools and processes designed to create interactions and partnerships with civilian post-secondary institutions. These partnerships are meant to create opportunities for the CAF to focus on operational training and education while using civilian institutions to deliver areas of common interest that meet minimum military requirements.22 A specific example of these measures would be the ‘Memoranda of Understanding’ signed between RMC Royal Roads University in Victoria,

BC and Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia. These memoranda allow CAF members to transfer credits earned from CFC courses to a master’s program at one of these universities.23

Another example would be the joint venture between the CAF and , which has enabled geomatic technicians to be trained at a civilian centre of excellence and earn a Red Seal college certificate. 24

As of 3 June 2015, the CDA has operated from within a new Military Personnel Generation

(MILPERSGEN) formation, which has a mandate covering all military personnel generation requirements and recruiting, through to basic training and common support trade schools, including the CDA. While the CDA continues to exist as an ‘education group’ within this broader framework, MILPERSGEN has a broader focus with the “mission of leading the CAF personnel generation system to uphold distinction in the Profession of Arms.”25

21 Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Evolution of the Canadian Defence Academy,” 2015, accessed on 23 August 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-audit-eval/245p1258-209.page#exec. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 National Defence, “Review by ADM (RS) in accordance with the Access to Information Act,” January 2015, 37, accessed on 18 July 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/FORCES_Internet/docs/en/about-reports-pubs-audit- eval/245p1258-209-eng.pdf. 25 Department of National Defence, “Military Personnel Generation,” accessed on 23 August 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/military-personnel-generation.page.

223 Beyond the provision of formal education and training, the CDA system has supported the overall intellectual development of the CAF through research, analysis, and publications conducted under the auspices of CFLI and the Canadian Defence Academy Press. The research projects and various monographs produced or supported by these groups have sought to critically engage with leadership theories and practices to advance the discussion. Beyond producing the original articulation of CAF leadership doctrine with projects like Officership 2020 and Duty with

Honour, these groups have continued to critique and development new ideas related to military- relevant understandings of leadership and professionalism.

In 2014, the CDA undertook a review of the CAF’s professional development system, the first review since the changes instituted as part of the post-Somalia process. Its examination considered all elements of the system – concepts, doctrine, framework and structure – to determine its continued relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency for CAF needs, present and future.26 The review noted that the same documents developed as part of the post-Somalia process – Strategy

2020, Officership 2020, Duty with Honour, Conceptual Foundations, Leadership Doctrine,

Leading People, and Leading the Institution – continue to provide the strategic guidance for professional development and the theoretical foundation for leadership within the CAF. These documents “demonstrate how the CF is committed to providing members with PD throughout their military careers, and promoting a continuous learning environment.”27 The review also noted, however, that multiple changes to the system were necessary to ensure that it remained relevant within a changing security, political, and fiscal environment. It promoted alterations to ensure greater emphasis on career-long self-development in various arts and humanities-focused subject

26 National Defence, “Review by ADM (RS) in accordance with the Access to Information Act,” January 2015, “CAFPDS Study Update,” 8. 27 Ibid., 8-9; Department of National Defence, Canadian Defence Academy, The Roadmap to Achievement, A Guide to the Canadian Forces Professional Development System, (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2011), 1-3.

224 areas, as well as new systems to facilitate linkages between prior learning, professional development requirements, and career management.28 A key take-away was the need for consistent and focused funding in support of these initiatives.

One example of an immediate responsive change was the creation of a Chief of the Defence

Staff Guide to Professional Reading, which provides all ranks with a guide to publications relevant to the profession of arms. Authorised by then CDS Thomas J. Lawson, the Commander of CDA prepared and administered the guide for all CAF personnel. The CDS stated that a key product of professional development should be “intellectual fitness,” which is “greatly enhanced through regular professional reading as part of all of our self-development endeavours.”29 The guide, containing readings in 13 interrelated categories like the theory of war and the concept of professionalism, was meant to facilitate and support a ‘lifelong learning’ approach to intellectual development. Updated annually, this guide supports the self-development pillar within CAF professional development, promoting greater emphasis on career-long self-driven education.

Further, its endorsement by the CDS shows high level leadership buy-in to set an example to other members across the organization.

In 2015, an internal CAF review examining the relevance and continued performance of the CDA concluded that it remains a “critical component of the production system for common training, education, and professional development at various stages of a member’s career”; it continues to serve “a demonstrable need.”30 The report cited curriculums aligned to the needs of the CAF, courses delivered in sufficient numbers, “reasonable” stakeholder satisfaction with the

28 Ibid. 29 Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Chief of the Defence Staff, “Guide to Professional Reading,” (Kington: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2014), “Message from the CDS,” 3. 30 Ibid., iv, 4.

225 quality and delivery of programs, and a “high level of student success achieved” as evidence in support of this argument.31 It also noted that the CDA reviews and updates its curriculum and course content on an annual and ongoing basis, including key stakeholders from each environment in the process.32 This demonstrates a willingness to engage in critical reflection and a desire to learn and evolve in response to changing conditions and new challenges.

The evolution of the Academy has not been without issue, however, and it continues to face hurdles related to logistical and funding problems that hinder processes and procedures.

Examples include a lack of capacity to meet training demand, particularly during the expansion of the CAF between 2009-2012 that led to long wait times for progressive training courses, and shortages in personnel and resources that have also led to slow validation of courses and a “very long-term plan to deliver improvements.”33 Here, financial issues and a lack of resources are at the forefront. Horn and Bentley lamented that the CDA and its system were a “major target” during the budgetary crunch that accompanied the Strategic Review in 2010-2011.34 The review called for the elimination of five percent of DND’s lowest priority and lowest performing activities,35 of which the CDA was determined to be one. 20 percent of its staff was cut alongside 10 percent of its expenditures. By the middle of 2012, the CDA budget was cut approximately $80 million per year, with a direction to “make do” with an operating budget between $20 and $80 million less than its average yearly program requirement.36 These cuts led to the perceived “gutting” of CFLI and the CDA Press, described as “the major intellectual engines” of the CDA system. “There remains only one individual who is capable and qualified to undertake scholarly research and

31 Ibid., 5-6. 32 Ibid., 7. 33 Ibid., 9. 34 Horn and Bentley, Forced to Change, 125. 35 General Walt Natynczyk, “The Canadian Forces in 2010-2011, Looking Back and Looking Forward,” Canadian Military Journal, 11:2 (Spring 2011), 7-11. 36 Horn and Bentley, Forced to Change, 125.

226 writing. The organization actually consists of a UT3 – university professor, a CR-04 records clerk, and an AS-05 project manager.”37

Regarding the move to cultivate a degreed officer corps, degree status – complete or in process – remains a pre-requisite to commissioning as an officer with few exceptions. The current entry system into the CAF includes the following avenues of enrolment for Regular force officers:

• Regular Officer Training Plan, which allows candidates to enter the Canadian military

college system as officer cadets, where they receive a baccalaureate degree. If there are

more qualified candidates than the system can accommodate, or a particular program is not

offered, candidates can apply to an accredited program at another Canadian university as

part of this plan.38

• Direct Entry Officer Plan, which recruits individuals who have already completed a

university degree in a suitable discipline.39

• Commissioning from the Ranks Plan, which enables non-commissioned members without

degrees but related experience and demonstrated potential for leadership to be nominated

for an officer military occupation. Those commissioned under this plan are exempt from

the normal baccalaureate degree requirement for officers.40

37 Ibid., 155, Footnote 23. 38 Department of National Defence, “University,” Royal Military College, accessed on 23 August 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/caf-jobs/education-benefits/paid- education/university.html. 39 Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “DAOD 5002-2, Direct Entry Officer Plan - Regular Force,” Defence Administrative Orders and Directives, 14 May 2004, accessed on 22 July 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-5000/5002-2.page. 40 Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “DAOD 5002-10, Commissioning from the Ranks Plan,” 28 April 2016, accessed 23 August 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence- admin-orders-directives-5000/5002-10.page.

227 • Special Commissioning Plan, which allows non-commissioned members with degrees and

the other necessary attributes for leadership to apply and undertake the military training

required to progress into an officer military occupation.41

• Continuing Education Officer Training Plan, which requires that enrolled officers obtain a

baccalaureate degree during their variable initial engagement or term of service, but does

not provide direct support to do so.42

The CEOTP was officially reintroduced as an entry plan to the CAF in 2006 under CDS

General Hillier. The interim CEOTP, which had been set to expire in 2002 following the initial five-year transition period to the new degreed officer policy, was reintroduced after the CAF reported difficulty in finding sufficient qualified applicants from the remaining officer entry plans, particularly as the War in Afghanistan became a focus. In 2002-2003, ADM(HR-Mil) approved up to 70 CEOTP entries in seven occupations to fill the perceived gap, and the CDS authorized an additional 60 in the following two years in two occupations.43 General Hillier took action to reinstate the plan in response to this continued need for entrants.

Not everyone has agreed with this “need,” however. Horn and Bentley have referred to

Hillier’s decision and the plan itself as “suspect from the beginning.” They argued that expecting junior officers to complete their educational requirement, during a period of high operational tempo, and without the requisite time to do so, was “ludicrous” and “impractical.”44 They noted that few entrants through the CEOTP program in the years immediately following its reinstatement

41 Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “DAOD 5002-11, Special Commissioning Plan,” 28 April 2014, accessed on 23 August 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin- orders-directives-5000/5002-11.page. 42 Variable Initial Engagement (VIE) is a type of engagement that may vary from three to nine years plus subsidized training depending on the military occupation of the officer or non-commissioned member. 43 National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “The Evaluation of Recruiting and Basic Military Training,” November 2012, accessed on 23 August 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-audit- eval/188p0936.page. 44 Horn and Bentley, Forced to Change, 120.

228 were able to meet the requirement for a degree, prompting calls for “amnesty” given how much time and money had already been invested in developing the officers.45 An internal CAF report was quoted as stating that “the opening of the CEOTP [was] considered a major defeat by those who had striven so hard for a degreed officer corps.”46

While these concerns are certainly relevant, it should be noted that the Regular Force

Strategic Intake Plan (SIP) showed “zero intake for the Continuing Education Officer Training

Plan,” in fiscal year 2015-2016. This suggests that it has not become an entry plan of choice, and is still used primarily to cover shortages when they cannot be filled using any other degree-focused plan.47 This speaks to the level of buy-in across the institution for an educated officer corps and implies that, to a significant extent, degreed officers have become an accepted part of the CAF identity. Altogether, the current entry plans in use by the CAF demonstrate deference from the institution to the baccalaureate degree as a necessary element of officer qualification. Except in special circumstances – talent and potential from non-commissioned members or a special-case need to fill recruiting shortages in a particular occupation – all individuals entering the CAF require a post-secondary degree to be accepted as part of the officer corps.

The numbers of degree-holders within the CAF supports this assertion. By 2002, Statistics

Canada reported that more than half of all CAF members aged 25 or older had a postsecondary degree, including 88 percent of officers.48 This contrasted with 19 percent degree-holders across the CAF in 1988, including only 24 percent of officers of lieutenant-colonel to general rank.49 In

45 Ibid., 121. 46 Ibid., 120. 47 Major D. A. Paterson, “A Champion for Institutional Change in the Canadian Armed Forces,” JCSP 40 (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2016), 6, accessed on 23 August 2018, https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/301/305/paterson.pdf. 48 Jungwee Park, “A Profile of the Canadian Forces,” Statistics Canada, Catalogue no. 75-001-X, July 2008, accessed 26 July 2018, https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/75-001-x/2008107/pdf/10657- eng.pdf?st=Z7mWUuJt. 49 Evraire Report, 34; Statistics, Deputy Minister (Personnel) 1988.

229 2009, the numbers jumped to over 90 percent of officers holding the rank of captain and above in the Canadian Forces holding university degrees, with over 50 percent holding a graduate degree.

The average for lieutenants and sub-lieutenants, which includes a larger number of reservists who have been promoted from the ranks without degrees, was still over 80 percent.50

As a supplementary outcome of the degree requirement changes, the CAF has also pushed the benchmark for senior officers further than a baccalaureate. Officership 2020 called on the CAF to expand the undergraduate degree requirement for all officers to “normally require a graduate degree” for senior leadership.51 The Professional Development: CDS Strategy and Direction document noted in 2003 that, “effective 1 September 2006, all officers selected to attend the CF

Command and Staff Course will be expected to undertake the Master of Defence Studies in conjunction with the CSC. All Colonels and above shall be encouraged to enroll in Master’s level studies and shall be priority candidates for subsidized education.” 52 Further, a Professional

Development Study published by the CDA in 2013, included the observation that “a graduate degree has become an expectation within the CAF for the majority of senior officers.”53 This suggests that officers within the CAF have come to view intellectual and academic development as a positive and constructive addition to their development as leaders. One no longer needs to make an either-or choice between education or a focus on the profession of arms.

That said, while officers may no longer have to choose one or the other in career advancement, a graduate or postgraduate level of education is not yet mandatory for senior leaders and there are still elements of the CAF that continue to push for “experience as a substitute for

50 Bercuson, “Up From the Ashes,” 37. 51 Canada, Officership 2020, I-29. 52 Department of National Defence, Professional Development: CDS Strategy and Direction, 2003, Box 4, 250-2, Vol. II, Fraser Papers, Military Museums of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta. 53 Department of National Defence, Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development Study 2013 (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2013).

230 education” for senior appointments. The current OGS, which outlines the essential requirements for officers, continues to lack a graduate degree condition for senior officers, despite repeated attempts to introduce one. While the OGS review board has endorsed revisions to the document that state “a post-graduate education will normally be expected as officers reach General and Flag rank to meet intellectual challenges at the operational and strategic level,” they have repeatedly been quashed. Current policy dictates that once generals reach the rank of major-general, they have achieved “all the learning required” and are automatically given DP 4 equivalency.54

Further, an equivalency board was established during the War in Afghanistan to review the files of officers seeking promotion to brigadier-general. This board regularly worked to give credit for experience and education already completed and to provide advice on what courses, research papers, or other actions could overcome the fact that officers had not completed their DP 4 course, a 10-month study program on strategic leadership. The goal was to find ways to circumvent or work around a lack of education, during a period when officers were able to gain significant experience on the battlefield.55

All together then, this evidence suggests that formal education has become a prerequisite for officers within the CAF – but only to a certain level. It is true that, with few exceptions, officers must have baccalaureate degrees to be commissioned. Institutional support in the form of entry requirements, training plans, and professional development documents is apparent, as is member buy-in; officers are choosing to get degrees in higher numbers than ever before. While the latter can also be said of senior officers and graduate degrees, the numbers are much lower and the belief in the requirement for further education at this level is much less pervasive. The CAF and its

54 Horn and Bentley, Forced to Change 123. 55 Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Programmes and Qualifications – Officers,” accessed on 23 August 2018, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/officer.page; Horn and Bentley, Forced to Change, 121.

231 members appear to have become comfortable with the mantra: education is good, but there is a point when enough is enough. Graduate and postgraduate education for senior officers, while accepted and occasionally applauded now, is still questioned for its value. It is certainly not considered mandatory to developing better leadership and professionalism past a certain point.

Experience still wins out in the end.

Degrees are not the only marker of intellectual development within an organization, however, and Canadian officers continue to actively seek opportunities to engage in discussion, debate, and critiques of established thought and practices to a greater extent than ever before. A myriad of conferences, seminars, and workshops on virtually all aspects of the military profession are now regular features of intellectual life within the Canadian military. Officers participate in these forums, run from within the CAF system or by civilian universities or institutions, on a regular basis. The Canadian Military Journal, which began publication in 2000, continues to operate with an independent editorial board to provide a forum for professional discourse, discussion, and debate.56 This is in addition to a renewed Canadian Army Journal (since 2003), dedicated to the dissemination and discussion of doctrinal and training concepts, ideas, and opinions by both army personnel and interested civilians.57 Its mission is to provide a “forum for the free exchange of critical ideas about defence issues and military matters,” and it has been

“designed to further enhance the continuing development of the profession of arms in Canada and, as it is available to the public at large, to enhance transparency and to better inform Canadians of defence policy issues and initiatives.”58

56 Horn and MacIntyre, “Emerging from a Decade of Darkness,” 65. 57 The Canadian Army Journal: available at http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/262948/publication.html. 58 Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “The Canadian Army Journal,” Land Force Command, accessed on 25 August 2018, http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/262948/publication.html.

232 In 2015, then Brigadier-General , Commander of and

Joint Task Force West, issued a public statement regarding his expectations for officer professional and intellectual development. He stated that his personal goal had become to ensure that those serving in commanding positions within the CAF “hit the books and hit them hard.”59 After taking over as western commander in July 2014, he reworked the professional development program to place a renewed emphasis on educating commanders, specifically focused on professional reading, counselling, and studying military history. “The world situation we face now is so complex. So it requires not only good training at the lower levels, but our leaders need to be extremely well educated in order to be able to deal with these complexities,” he said. He also called on his commanding officers to “pause and reflect on their service,” through the submission of scholarly articles to be peer-reviewed. “As professionals, it’s incumbent on us to contribute to the body of professional knowledge. We’ve got some guys with some great experience overseas, but they’ve got to put pen to paper and capture it.”60 Now a Lieutenant-General, Eyre has recently become the deputy commander of the UN force in Korea, the first non-US general officer to hold the post since the international headquarters command was created 68 years ago.61

Each of these examples are relevant to Davidson’s argument regarding “informal networks” and “communities of practice” as important avenues for organizational learning. They allow members to share problems, ideas, and solutions and learn from each other’s experiences, outside of formal training or educational courses. The CAF has cultivated these types of learning tools, helping to grow as a community of experts committed to improving practices within their

59 Trevor Robb, “Great warriors need great education: Canadian Brig-Gen Wayne Eyre,” Edmonton Sun, 7 February 2015, accessed on 9 February 2015, http://m/edmontonsun.com/2015/02/06/great-warriors-need-great-education- canadian-brig-gen-wayne-eyre. 60 Ibid. 61 Murray Brewster, “Canadian General to become No.2 at UN command in Korea,” CBC News, 14 May 2018, accessed on 26 August 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canadian-general-korea-1.4662008.

233 profession. These types of informal arrangements, separate from official degree requirements, help individuals make shared sense of their knowledge and experience and are an important feature of any professional organization.

It is clear then, that change has occurred as a result of the post-Somalia reform program.

The reforms and their outcomes outlined above are certainly tangible and continuing examples of a change in narrative and, in many respects, behavior regarding higher learning and professional development: soldiers are going to school, they are emerging with degrees that have at least a modicum of arts-based learning, their technical training is not being neglected at staff college, and they are publishing articles and manuals on doctrine and other concepts and ideas related to their profession. There is evidence of intellectual engagement with both the theoretical and practical aspects of warfighting and the military as a profession. This is occurring alongside a recognition that the strategic operating environment has altered, is continuing to alter, and requires frequent thought and reflection.

The very fact that reforms have been implemented and are still adhered in these areas implies that, to some extent, the CAF as a group recognizes the benefits of the post-Somalia leadership reforms. It has accepted that gaining degrees, producing new doctrinal material, training manuals, and lessons learned documents results in promotion, and perpetuates a positive relationship with both the government and general public – which is important, because no one in the military wants a return to the “Decade of Darkness” and imposed government reform. And there are certainly examples of individuals who publicly and repeatedly champion liberal and life-long education and professional development for the officer corps.62

In some areas, however, change remains ongoing: more work, for example, is required in

62 Examples include Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, General Rick Hillier, Lieutenant-General Michael K. Jeffery, Lieutenant-General Wayne Eyre, among others.

234 the area of values and ethics to ensure that behaviour reflects new stated institutional expectations.

Recent efforts suggest that the CAF is aware of this requirement and is willing to attempt to engage in that work, but results remain forthcoming. The budget cuts hindering the ability of the CDA and related groups dedicated to supporting and fostering positive and ongoing professional and educational growth are also of interest. The CAF can profess to be a champion of life-long learning and professional development as much as it wants, but failing to properly support and maintain the systems put in place to ensure those elements, suggests that they have yet to be accepted as permanent or integral components of the overall system.

While more examples exist, we can draw several conclusions from the evidence at hand.

First, change has occurred as a result of the post-Somalia process. The CAF is a more professional, critical, and educated institution today than at any time in its past. It has demonstrated the ability and willingness to regulate itself according to certain professional standards, informed by a professional ideology built on a distinct Canadian military ethos. It is also clear that education has been accepted by the CAF as a necessary element of officer development. However, the emphasis placed on the value of education has not yet extended to higher level graduate and post-graduate learning by senior officers. Here, engagement with the need for continuing education beyond the baccalaureate has been selective and not all-encompassing. There remains resistance towards the idea of senior leaders as “life-long learners” in the formal sense. An experiential-learning focus has remained, although evidence of informal engagement with intellectual development through readings and publications is apparent.

In the area of values and ethics, more work is certainly required to complete the shift in culture related to ethical values and conduct by CAF members, including senior leaders. The sexual misconduct issue that recently resulted in accusations of inappropriate behaviour or inaction to

235 correct wrongdoings at all levels of the institution, suggests a disconnect between narrative and behaviour. The CAF may maintain a Defence Ethics Program and conduct solid work to promote ethical standards through written and verbal communication in all activities within the department, but actions and behaviour have not correlated to the principles espoused by this program.

236 CONCLUSION

The 16 March 1993 torture, to death, of 16-year-old Shidane Arone by Canadian Armed

Forces members operating in Somalia, set off a chain of actions and reactions that cumulatively forced a fundamental re-evaluation and restructuring of Canada’s military establishment. This incident became the epicentre of a growing scandal, joined by evidence of other violent incidents, ongoing and unchecked racist and inappropriate behaviour, and accusations of a cover-up going up the chain of command and into National Defence headquarters. The growing list of disappointments led Canadians to lose confidence in their military and conclude that the CAF was out of control, pursuing its own agenda, and no longer operating in accordance with civilian expectations.

The public outcry and ensuing inquiries and investigations added further fuel to the fire, reflecting a deep chasm within the CAF, the federal government, and Canadian society. The perception of both the government and general public was that ineffectual leadership had resulted in operational and disciplinary breakdown within a military institution that had become deeply flawed.

A review of the CAF’s military education system and leadership development practices prior to

Somalia suggested that these flaws related to an inappropriate professional culture: the CAF had developed a conservative, technically focused, and anti-intellectual mentality, advocating almost exclusively for experiential and tactical learning over any other intellectual pursuits. A broad liberal education as part of officer development had been rejected as necessary because of unique geographic, political, and historical factors that defended experiential-focused learning.

The Somalia experience highlighted these problems inherent within the system and resulted in a reform movement focused on professional development and education as the means through which to address and overcome its perceived shortcomings. The reforms specifically focused on

237 officer training, education, and professional development recommended a diverse range of changes to improve education and alter the CAF’s institutional ethos. They were designed around the belief that an effective military force requires an officer corps that is educated as well as trained, in both the theory and practical application of military force. They also championed the premise that a military must always reflect the norms and values of its parent society and demanded that the CAF better reflect and represent evolving Canadian values.

The introduction and implementation of these reforms was neither quick nor simple and was both driven and shaped by a variety of factors. The process challenged traditional civil-military assumptions and was particularly hindered by the deeply-rooted anti-intellectual organizational culture of the CAF, which neither embraced major reform nor the focus on education and professional development that was being demanded. The reform movement began with small, incremental changes introduced by the military, but was eventually reinforced and driven further by civilian demand, strategic need, practical bureaucratic requirements, and in no small part by high-ranking “change champions” in both the military and civilian realms. The role of the

Minister’s Monitoring Committee as an external, civilian body to monitor, challenge, and report back to the Minister on the progress of military reform implementation also cannot be discounted.

The MMC, as well as the resistance and bureaucratic friction that it faced, conditioned the trajectory and content of the changes introduced. It played a fundamental role in ensuring that the military was continually pushed to engage with and carry out the reforms to align as closely as possible with civilian expectations.

Twenty years after these reforms were first introduced, it is clear that significant and positive change has been achieved towards meeting those expectations. The CAF has overcome its previous anti-intellectual mentality to ensure members get an education and are provided with

238 professional development opportunities. These activities remain grounded in principles formally outlined in documents and manuals that articulate the rationale behind the specific, value-laden understanding of leadership that the CAF hopes to maintain. Further, it regularly reviews and updates its curriculums, course content, and approach to officer development on an ongoing basis, while attempting to include key stakeholders from each environment in the process. This demonstrates a willingness to engage in critical reflection and a desire to learn and evolve in response to changing conditions and new challenges.

This dissertation has shown that the CAF is a fundamentally different institution today than it was when the post-Somalia reform program was first launched. This is undoubtedly a result of its engagement with the reforms and efforts made to introduce new concepts, values, narratives, and behaviours into CAF practices, procedures, and expectations. The CAF is a more educated institution than ever before, with an officer corps that is functioning – more so today that at any time in its history – as a learning organization. While it is still not clear that the CAF has completely institutionalized all of the intended changes or undergone a fundamental culture change, a shift in culture has certainly occurred, improvements can be identified, and the process of change and introspection remains ongoing.

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