L╎intervention Militaire À

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Lâ•Žintervention Militaire À Canadian Military History Volume 2 Issue 1 Article 3 1993 L’intervention militaire à Oka: stratégie, communication et couverture de la presse Claude Beauregard Directorate of Heritage and History, Department of National Defence Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Beauregard, Claude "L’intervention militaire à Oka: stratégie, communication et couverture de la presse." Canadian Military History 2, 1 (1993) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Beauregard: L’intervention militaire à Oka: stratégie, communication et couve L'inteiVention• The Military milita1re InteiVention iOka inOka strategie, communication Strategy, Communication et couverture de Ia presse and Press Coverage Claude Beauregard translated by Graham Timms L'image qui allait devenir le symbole du conflit d'Oka. The picture that would become the symbol of the Oka Le soldat Patrick Cloutier dans unjace aface avec un conflict. Private Patrick Cloutier in a starring match with Warriors qui plus tardjut identifie comme etant Brad a Warrior later identified as Brad Larocque ofSaskatch­ Larocque de Saskatchewan. ewan. (S. Komulainen, Canapress Photo Service) 23 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 2 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 3 Introduction Introduction es evenements qui se sont deroules a Oka he incidents which occurred in Oka during L au cours de l'ete 1990 representent T the summer of 1990 represent the outcome l'aboutissement d'une situation jugee of a situation judged to have been totally totalement inacceptable par la communaute unacceptable by the Mohawk community. What Mohawk. Ce qui devait etre a l'origine was originally to have been the enlargement of l'agrandissement d'un terrain de golf, a a golf course provoked a conflict which ended provoque un conflit qui s'est solde par la in the death of a police officer of the Surete du mort d'un agent de police de la Surete du Quebec and the intervention of the Canadian Quebec et par !'intervention des Forces Armed Forces; in short, the Oka crisis became canadiennes; bref, la crise d'Oka est devenue a national crisis. une crise nationale. Even if the initial cause of the affair is Meme si !'element declencheur est sim­ simple to understand, the situation in Oka ple a com prendre, la situation a Oka demeure remains very complex. In fact, an examination tres complexe. En effet, l'etude du conflit of the conflict shows that the Mohawk permet de constater que la communaute community was strongly divided, that Mohawk est fortement divisee, que les governments were not in a position to react gouvernements n'ont pas ete en position effectively and that there was a rise in d'agir efficacement et qu'il y a eu une mantee intolerance amongst the local population. de !'intolerance au sein de la population locale. The most spectacular incident of this conflagration was certainly the intervention by L' evenement le plus spectaculaire de cette a brigade of the Canadian Armed Forces. The conflagration est certainement !'intervention strategy employed by the Army was, as stated d'une brigade des Forces canadiennes. La in the media, exemplary. In fact, contrary to strategic employee par l'Armee fut, au dire what was expected, the military adopted a des medias, exemplaire. Effectivement, et policy of openness to journalists and used a ce, contre toute attente, les militaires ont minimum of force in regards to the Mohawks. adopte une politique d'ouverture face aux journalistes et ont utilise de la force mini­ This article will study in greater depth the mum envers les Mohawks. aspects of the military strategy during Operation "Salon" 1 as well as the resulting press coverage. Nous nous proposons, dans le cadre du present article, d'etudier plus en profondeur ces deux aspects de la strategic militaire lors de !'Operation "Salon"l et la couverture de I. Overview of the Precursors presse qui en a decoulee. efore starting, it is of utmost importance Bto understand that the military I. Rappel des evenements intervention within the framework of the Oka conflict was the outcome of a situation which vant de debuter, il importe de bien com­ deteriorated over a number of years. In the A prendre que !'intervention militaire dans Fifth Report of the Standing Committee on le cadre du conflit d'Oka represente Native Affairs, presented in May 1991 under l'aboutissement d'une situation qui s'est the title The Summer of 1990,2 the analysis deterioree au fil des ans. Dans le cinquieme begins by presenting certain historical facts rapport du comite permanent des affaires which date to the end of the 19th Century! It autochtones, presente en mai 1991 etintitule can be seen that the conflict goes back a long 2 L' ete de 1990, on amorce !'analyse en way. presentant certains faits historiques qui 24 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol2/iss1/3 2 Beauregard: L’intervention militaire à Oka: stratégie, communication et couve remontent ala fin du XIXe siecle! C'est dire The year 1987 seems to be the starting que le conflit ne date pas d'hier. point of the Oka crisis. In fact, it was in March of that year that le Club de golf Oka Inc., L'annee 1987 semble etre le point de attempted to renew the lease on its nine hole depart de la crise d'Oka. En effet, c'est en golf course. However, the inhabitants of mars que le Club de golf Oka Inc. tente de Kanesatake opposed the renewal and held that renouveler le bail de son terrain de golf de the land belonged to them. In May of 1988, the neuf trous. Or les habitants de Kanesatake golf club proposed the enlargement of the s'opposent au renouvellement et soutiennent course from 9 to 18 holes. In June of the que les terres leur appartiennent. En mai following year, an agreement was reached 1988, le club de golf propose a la ville between the municipality and the golf course d'agrandir le terrain de golf de 9 a 18 trous. in regards to the location and expansion of the En juin de l'annee suivante, une entente est golf course. On March 10, 1990, the municipal conclue entre la municipalite et le club de council suspended the moratorium on the golf au regard de la location et de !'expansion enlargement of the golf course and the Mohawks du terrain de golf. Le 10 mars 1990, le erected barricades to prevent the clearing of a conseil municipal suspend le moratoire sur section of the forest. Shortly thereafter, l'agrandissement du terrain de golf, et les members of the Warriors' Society took control Mohawks erigent des barricades afin of the barricades. Between the 2nd and 6th of d'empecher le deboisement d'une partie de la July, the municipality and the Minister of foret. Un peu plus tard, des membres de la Public Security called upon the Mohawks to societe des Warriors prennent le contr6le des dismantle the barricades. On the lOth of July, barricades. Entre le 2 et le 6 juillet, Ia the municipal council of Oka sought the municipalite et le ministre de la Securite interventionofthe Suretedu Quebec (SQ). The publique demandent aux Mohawks de SQ decided to intervene the next day and the demanteler les barricades. Le 10 juillet, le assault on the barricades ended in the death of Conseil municipal d'Oka sollicite Corporal Lemay. 3 Meanwhile, in a gesture of !'intervention de la Surete du Quebec. Cette solidarity, Mohawks from the Kahnawake derniere decide d'intervenir le lendemain, et reserve, on the south shore of the St. Lawrence I' assault aux barricades se solde par la mort River, erected barricades which blocked access du caporal Lemay.s C'est alors que, dans un to the Mercier bridge. geste de solidarite, les Mohawks de la reserve de Kahnawake, sur la rive sud duSt-Laurent, On August 6, a request for assistance was erigent des barricades et bloquent l'acces au made to the Canadian Armed Forces by the pont Mercier. Minister for Public Security and the Attorney General of Quebec, Mr. Sam Elkas, as outlined Le 6 aout 1990, une demande d'aide des in the National Defence Act. In fact, at the Forces canadiennes est formulee, beginning ofthe crisis, military assistance was conformement a la Loi sur la defense limited to technical aid and loans of equipment. nationale, par le ministre de la Securite However, the Surete du Quebec was rapidly publique et procureur general du Quebec, M. overcome by the events and the Army had to Sam Elkas. En effet, au debut de la crise, take charge of the operation. l'aide militaire se limitait a une assistance technique eta des prets d'equipement. Mais la Surete du Quebec sera rapidement depassee par les evenements, et l'Armee devra II. The Military Intervention prendre en charge les operations. A. The National Defence Act he military intervention in Oka drew its T inspiration from Section XI ofthe National Defence Act, entitled "Aid of the Civil Power." The articles in question are 232 to 242 of the Act. 4 25 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993 3 Canadian Military History, Vol. 2 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 3 II. L'intervention militaire The Act stipulates that a written request A. La Loi sur la dtifense nationale from the Attorney General of the province in which a riot or violation of the peace occurs 'intervention militaire a Oka s'est inspiree must be made to the Chief of Staff of the L de la partie XI de la Loi sur la defense Canadian Armed Forces.
Recommended publications
  • Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces: Leadership, Education, and Professional Development
    University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2018-12-10 Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces: Leadership, Education, and Professional Development Domansky, Katie Domansky, K. (2018). Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces: Leadership, Education, and Professional Development (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/34926 http://hdl.handle.net/1880/109304 doctoral thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces: Leadership, Education, and Professional Development by Katie Domansky A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE PROGRAM IN MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES CALGARY, ALBERTA DECEMBER, 2018 © Katie Domansky 2018 ABSTRACT After the “Somalia Affair” of the early 1990s, a government investigation concluded that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) had become dysfunctional as a professional military force and needed to be comprehensively reformed. It was perceived to
    [Show full text]
  • War on the Air: CBC-TV and Canada's Military, 1952-1992 by Mallory
    War on the Air: CBC-TV and Canada’s Military, 19521992 by Mallory Schwartz Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctorate in Philosophy degree in History Department of History Faculty of Arts University of Ottawa © Mallory Schwartz, Ottawa, Canada, 2014 ii Abstract War on the Air: CBC-TV and Canada‘s Military, 19521992 Author: Mallory Schwartz Supervisor: Jeffrey A. Keshen From the earliest days of English-language Canadian Broadcasting Corporation television (CBC-TV), the military has been regularly featured on the news, public affairs, documentary, and drama programs. Little has been done to study these programs, despite calls for more research and many decades of work on the methods for the historical analysis of television. In addressing this gap, this thesis explores: how media representations of the military on CBC-TV (commemorative, history, public affairs and news programs) changed over time; what accounted for those changes; what they revealed about CBC-TV; and what they suggested about the way the military and its relationship with CBC-TV evolved. Through a material culture analysis of 245 programs/series about the Canadian military, veterans and defence issues that aired on CBC-TV over a 40-year period, beginning with its establishment in 1952, this thesis argues that the conditions surrounding each production were affected by a variety of factors, namely: (1) technology; (2) foreign broadcasters; (3) foreign sources of news; (4) the influence
    [Show full text]
  • Ware, Cameron Bethel
    Fonds 5 Cameron Bethel Ware fonds. - 1906-1999. – 3.6 m of textual records and other material LCol CB Ware (7th from left) toasts the Regiment and its Founder, Shilo, Manitoba, 17 March 1946 (PPCLI Archives P12.1(2)-1) Cameron Bethel Ware was born 9 August 1913 at London, Ontario, the son of Colonel F.B. Ware. He joined Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry upon graduation from Royal Military College, Kingston in 1935. When the Second World War broke out in 1939 Lieutenant Ware was attached to the British Army. He was taken on strength in September 1939 and rejoined the Regiment in England in 1940 as a Major. He was appointed Second in Command of the Regiment 19 February 1942 and on promotion to Lieutenant Colonel 11 August 1943, led the Regiment in the Italian Campaign from the invasion of the mainland until the end of the battle of the Liri Valley 27 June 1944. He was Mentioned in Despatches and awarded the Distinguished Service Order. He was given command of the 3rd North Shore Regiment from 5 June 1945 to 3 November 1945. Following the War he commanded Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry at Camp MacDonald, Manitoba in 1946-1947. He was promoted to Colonel in 1950 and commanded the Calgary Garrison until his appointment as Commandant, Canadian Services College, Royal Roads, British Columbia in 1952. Promoted to Brigadier General in 1954 he headed the Canadian Military Mission, Far East, Tokyo. In 1955 he became Director General, Military Training in Ottawa and was then appointed Commander 1st Canadian Brigade Group in Calgary in 1958.
    [Show full text]
  • Regimental Manual of Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
    TABLE OF CONTENTS Regimental Manual of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Colonel-in-Chief The Right Honourable Adrienne Clarkson, PC, CC, CMM, COM, CD Colonel of the Regiment Brigadier-General V.W. Kennedy, OMM, MSM, CD (Retired) Founder and first Colonel of the Regiment The late Brigadier A. Hamilton Gault, OBE, DSO, ED, CD Allied with The Rifles The Royal Australian Regiment 2018 Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Regimental Manual 2018 1/8 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF CHANGES, AMENDMENTS AND/OR UPDATES Serial Subject Changes, Amendments and / or Updates Source 27 Aug 18 Shoulder Title, Dress Expanded information on the shoulder titles 3-3 Environmental Uniform including photos 2 PPCLI Historic Company Added the section on 2 PPCLI’s camp flags 3-34 Flags 01 Oct 18 Colonels of the Regiment Added appendix C – Colonels of the Regiment 1-C Broom-i-loo Added appendix D – Broom-i-loo rules 2-D Toast to the fallen Added appendix E – Toast to the fallen 2-E 11 Oct 18 Gratuities Clarified the eligibility based on years of service 4-9 19 Oct 18 Gratuities Clarified what the new regimental certificate folder 4-B looks like 21 Feb 19 Wording Changed all references to World War 1 or 2 to First all or Second World War 01 Aug 19 Post nominals Fixed LCol Elliott’s post nominals 2-C 10 Jan 20 Past Colonels of the Regiment Added MGen Vernon 1-C 16 Jun 20 Post nominals Corrected LCol Schjelderup’s post nominals 2-C RSC Meetings Added Battle rythm 1-7 27 Jul 20 REC voting members Added the appointments of MWO to voting 1-14 members 2/8 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION This manual is published for members of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry by Regimental Headquarters under the authority and with the approval of the Regimental Executive Committee.
    [Show full text]
  • 2016 Patrician The
    1 THE PATRICIAN 2016 2 2 THE PATRICIAN THE PATRICIAN 2016 2016 3 4 Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry salutes the following for their support in the production of The Patrician Charlene King (Royal LePage) Guthrie Woods Products Ltd Realtors Association of Edmonton Rosslyn Inn & Suites St. Albert Royal Canadian Legion Supply Sergeant The Canadian Corps of Commissionaires The Flag Shop Valerie Moroz (Royal LePage) 5 THE PATRICIAN VOLUME LXVIII Allied with The Rifles and The Royal Australian Regiment Colonel-in-Chief The Right Honourable Adrienne Clarkson, PC, CC, CMM, COM, CD Founder and the First Colonel of the Regiment Brigadier-General A. Hamilton Gault, OBE, DSO, ED, CD Colonel of the Regiment Major-General W.B. Vernon, CD (retired) 6 The Patrician is the Regimental Journal of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, published under the authority of the Regimental Executive Committee Editor Major Q.M. Innis, CD Regimental Major Assistant Editor Captain D.B. Boyes Regimental Adjutant Business Development Warrant Officer S.A. Peterson, CD Layout Editor Master Corporal S.E. Cherney, CD To order a copy of The Patrician 2016 edition, contact: Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Regimental Headquarters PO Box 10500 Station Forces Edmonton, Alberta T5J 4J5 www.ppcli.com 7 TABLE OF CONTENTS Colonel-in-Chief-------------------------------------------------- PPCLI Association Colonel of the Regiment-------------------------------------------- Victoria Branch----------------------------------------------------- Regimental
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Commanders of the Canadian Army
    Commanders of the Canadian Army General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia 1. Lieutenant-General Sir E.S. Smyth 1875–1880 2. Major-General R.G.A. Luard 1880–1884 3. Major-General Sir Frederick Dobson Middleton 1884–1890 4. Major General The Rt Hon Lord Treowen 1890–1895 5. Major-General Sir W.J. Gascoigne 1895–1898 6. Major-General Sir E.T.H. Hutton 1898–1900 7. Major-General Richard Hebden O’Grady Haly 1900–1902 8. Major-General The Rt Hon Earl of Dundonald 1902–1904 Chief of the General Staff 1. Major-General Sir P.H.N. Lake 1904–1908 2. Major-General Sir W.D. Otter 1908–1910 3. Major General Sir C.J. Mackenzie 1910–1913 4. Major-General Sir W.G. Gwatkin 1913–1919 5. General Sir Arthur W. Currie 1919–1920 * 6. Major-General Sir J.H. MacBrien 1920–1927 7. Major-General Herbert Cyrill Thacker 1927–1928 8. Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton 1929–1935 9. Major-General E.C. Ashton 1935–1938 10. Major-General T.V. Anderson 1938–1940 11. Major-General H.D.G. Crerar 1940–1941 12. Lieutenant-General Ken Stuart 1941–1943 13. Lieutenant-General John Charles Murchie 1944–1945 14. Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes 1945–1951 15. Lieutenant-General Guy Granville Simonds 1951–1955 16. Lieutenant-General Howard Douglas Graham 1955–1958 17. Lieutenant-General Samuel Findlay Clark 1958–1961 18. Lieutenant-General Geoffrey Walsh 1961–1964 * The position of Chief of the General Staff was renamed "Inspector-General and Military Counsellor" between 1919 and 1920.
    [Show full text]
  • The CF's Approach to Non-Lethal Weapons &
    THE CF’s APPROACH TO NON-LETHAL WEAPONS & THE STRATEGIC OSTRICH EFFECT Major R.S. Dunn JCSP 38 PCEMI 38 Master of Defence Studies Maîtrise en études de la défense Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs et not represent Department of National Defence or ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce without written permission. papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le Minister of National Defence, 2012 ministre de la Défense nationale, 2012. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 38 - PCEMI 38 MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES NON-LETHAL WEAPONS (NLWs): THE CF’s APPROACH TO NLWs & THE STRATEGIC OSTRICH EFFECT By Maj R.S. Dunn 7 May 2012 This paper was written by a student La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College in stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes fulfilment of one of the requirements of the pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic cours. L'étude est un document qui se document, and thus contains facts and rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits opinions, which the author alone considered et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriate and correct for the subject. It appropriés et convenables au sujet.
    [Show full text]
  • O Kanesatake and Kahnawake, Under Operati on SALON, Peaked at 3,700 Soldiers.1
    Timothy C.Winegard The 1990 Oka Crisis is considered a defi ning moment in Native-Canadian relations. Contrary to popular belief, it was not an isolated event but rather the 300-year long convergence of two distinct cultures that culminated in OOka:ka: a violent clash in the microcosm of Oka and included the A Convergence of Cultures domestic deployment of the Canadian Forces, 4,500 strong. and the Canadian Forces Drawing on a strikingly wide range of hitherto untapped historical and primary sources, including interviews and – Timothy C. Winegard government documents secured through the Access to Informa- tion Act, Oka: A Convergence of Cultures and the Canadian Forces dispels the common mythology and disinformation OOka: surrounding the causes and events of the Oka Crisis. k Winegard highlights the relevance of Oka, as an integral a part of Canadian history, towards the formation of govern- : mental policy and the active participation of Indigenous a A Canadians in their ongoing effort to shape and alter their n d C social and political realities within Canada and their th onver resistance to cultural assimilation. This innovative study e also engages in a detailed probe of the most controversial Ca g and volatile Canadian Forces internal security operation of ence of n the twentieth century. ad i a n F C o ultures r ces OOkaka OKA: A Convergence of Cultures and the Canadian Forces Timothy C. Winegard Copyright © 2008 Her Majesty the Queen, in right of Canada as represented by the Minister of Nati onal Defence. Canadian Defence Academy Press PO Box 17000 Stn Forces Kingston, Ontario K7K 7B4 Produced for the Canadian Defence Academy Press by 17 Wing Winnipeg Publishing Offi ce.
    [Show full text]
  • 01 July 2021 PAGES: 154 Compiled By: Surgeon C
    S E N I O R O F F I C E R S CANADIAN FORCES 1 9 6 4 t o 1 9 9 9 UPDATED: 01 July 2021 PAGES: 154 Compiled By: Surgeon Captain John Blatherwick, CM, CStJ, OBC, CD, BSc, MD, DPH, FRCP(C), LLD, DSc =============================================================================== =============================================================================== 1 GENERAL OFFICERS - CANADIAN FORCES AUGUST 1964: MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE: Honourable Paul Hellyer, PC, MP ASSOCIATE MINISTER: Honourable Lucien Jean Joseph CARDIN (LCdr retired) DEPUTY MINISTER: Mr Elgin ARMSTRONG CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF: ACM Frank R. MILLER, CC, CBE, CD VICE-CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF: LGen Geoffrey WALSH, CBE, DSO, CD ASSISTANT CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF: AVM Wilfred Winter BEAN, OBE, CD CHIEF - OPERATIONAL READINESS: LGen Jean Victor ALLARD, CC, CBE, DSO**, GOQ, CD DEPUTY CHIEF - OPERATIONAL READINESS: RAdm Robert Phillip WELLAND, DSC*, CD CHIEF - PERSONNEL: VAdm Kenneth Lloyd DYER, DSC, CD DEPUTY CHIEF - PERSONNEL: AVM M.P. MARTIN, CD CHIEF - LOGISTICS & ENGINEERING: AM Clare ANNIS, CBE, CD DEPUTY CHIEF - LOGISTICS & ENGINEERING: MGen Ledford George LILLEY, DSO, CD COMPTROLLER GENERAL: LGen Robert MONCEL, DSO, CD DEPUTY COMPTROLLER GENERAL: RAdm Charles Joseph DILLON, CD ADJUTANT-GENERAL: MGen William Alexander Beaumont ANDERSON, OBE, CD CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF - RCAF: AM Clarence Rupert DUNLAP, CBE, CD CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF - RCN: VAdm Herbert Sharples RAYNER, DSC*, CD VICE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF - RCN: RAdm Robert Phillip WELLAND, DSC, CD ASST CHIEF OF
    [Show full text]