Central African Republic: Peacebuilding Without Peace Swpco Challenges on the Road to Accountable Government Louisa Lombard

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments German Institute for International and Security Affairs m

Central African Republic: Peacebuilding without Peace SWPCo Challenges on the Road to Accountable Government Louisa Lombard

Fifteen years of UN-led peacebuilding efforts in the Central African Republic (CAR) should have culminated with the elections in January and March of this year. But the elections were far from free and fair, and frustration among the country’s rebels and other non-state armed groups has only grown. How did this happen? One reason is that the transitional structures that international agencies advocate – for example political dialogue, disarmament, and elections – have grown out of a vision of how the state ought to be and ignore how politics actually play out on the ground. Because of this, Central African leaders are able to play the peacebuilding game for their own benefit, and peace and democracy slip further away. To foster a more accountable government, would-be peacebuilders must begin by critically assessing where political will for change does and does not lie. Doing so should inspire creative solutions to the security and development challenges confronting the region, such as centring the analysis and resolution of security threats on affected communities themselves rather than placing the central government in the role of lead actor.

On 15 March 2011, the eight-year anniver- former minister of defence and armed sary of his coup, François Bozizé again group chief Jean-Jacques Demafouth (2.79%) installed himself in power. Bozizé’s 2003 – lagged far behind. Just over half the vot- coup unleashed a cycle of rebellion the ing population turned out. In the legislative country has yet to escape. Victories in the elections, too, Bozizé’s Kwa na Kwa (“work, presidential elections of 2005 and 2011 nothing but work”, KNK) party took a solid have consolidated his hold on power. How- majority. Tellingly, some 20-odd members ever, this time he claimed 64.34 per cent of the new parliament have a direct family of the vote already in the first round on relationship to the president – including January 23 and thus avoided a run-off poll. his wife, sons, cousins, nephews, and even The other candidates – ousted former presi- mistresses. dent Ange-Felix Patassé (21.43%), former The opposition decried the conduct of prime minister Martin Ziguélé (6.80%), and the elections. However, their challenges did

Louisa Lombard was a guest researcher in SWP’s Africa and Middle East Division and is SWP Comments 15 a PhD candidate in Cultural Anthropology at Duke University June 2011

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not go far in the Constitutional Court, nied every step forward. Because donor- which is headed by Bozizé’s cousin. Election supported efforts are guided more by hopes observers from both the African Union and for the future – chiefly, the attainment of a the European Union noted a host of irregu- rational-bureaucratic state – than by a criti- larities, such as – in the words of EU Head cal analysis of present political dynamics, of Delegation Guy Samzun – “massive they are easily hijacked for non-democratic fraud” and “terrorization of voters and cer- ends. In this case, that has meant that, tain candidates by the state officials and despite their objective of making politics security forces.” more inclusive, these efforts have resulted Meanwhile, insecurity reigns across in the consolidation of power by Bozizé’s much, if not most, of the country’s terrain – family, party, and allies. the month of April 2011 brought continu- ing attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which has preyed on Central African What is the state in CAR? communities for more than three years, CAR is at best an improbable state. With and clashes between two Central African an area the size of France and a population armed groups and government forces. numbering fewer than four million, its Peace and democracy seem more distant territory spreads around the geographic goals now than in 2005, before the current centre of the African continent. Though phase of internationally supported peace- observers often note that the country is building began. “potentially rich” (it has reserves of timber, oil, diamonds, gold, and uranium), for a range of reasons its resources are hard to What went wrong? exploit on anything but an artisanal scale. As a former UN coordinator in CAR, Toby The government has never had much of Lanzer used to entreat donors, “CAR is a a presence outside the capital. Until the country we should be able to fix.” He would nineteenth century, the people in this area refer to the traits that seem to make the lived in what anthropologists used to call country a simple problem for peacebuild- “stateless societies”, because coercion was ers: a small population; a government eager spread among members rather than held for international intervention; plenty of by a hierarchical or otherwise centralised water and other resources for local develop- authority. In the years just prior to grant- ment; low levels of armament; quite basic ing the colony independence, France ad- requests from armed groups (primarily mitted that the colony was probably the greater inclusiveness in government and worst-off of its territories – in terms of both welfare largesse); and of no strategic inter- the weakness of governing institutions and est for actors from outside the region. The its empty coffers. Self-proclaimed Emperor UN Peacebuilding Fund, created in 2007, Jean-Bedel Bokassa’s profligacy notwith- likely thought CAR would be a straightfor- standing, the country never had the ward case when they chose it as a pilot site resources to undertake any grand nation- and dedicated a budget of USD 10 million. building projects. But a glance at the country’s history A substantive political contract between suggests a less optimistic diagnosis: peace- leaders in the capital and rural residents building – including a succession of peace- has never been established. Instead, leaders keeping forces; a slew of dialogues and evidence ambivalence towards their puta- negotiations; and a series of disarmament, tive constituents, especially those in the demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) remote areas. Proponents of state-building, programmes – has been ongoing in CAR such as international donors like the UN, since army mutinies over salary arrears in assume that government officials do not 1996-7, and a step backward has accompa- address the needs of poor and isolated

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citizens because they lack the “capacity”; The limited returns of technical that is, they see the neglect as first and fore- peacebuilding processes most a problem of insufficient money and DDR is a case in point of how technical skills. But this assessment ignores the fact peacebuilding processes can sideline that solidarity has not yet been constructed exactly those people who are the intended between CAR’s rulers and citizens. Such a beneficiaries. UN planners conceived of political contract is something internation- DDR as a way to help former armed group al aid has proven inept at facilitating. The members rejoin their communities as pro- structures that donors fund are in the main ductive, unarmed workers. However, the technical rather than political – at best they approach starts to become problematic displace such a contract from forming, and once it meets the complexity of specific at worst they actively prevent it. situations. There is no clean break between “wartime” and “peacetime”. Rather, these phases usually blend together, with on- The seeds of rebellion going insecurity and violence after the In fact, to describe the government’s atti- signing of peace agreements. This is the tude towards governing its hinterlands as case in CAR, where the main security ambivalent is an understatement. Down- threats people are confronting fall outside right hostility has also been in evidence: the scope of peacebuilding efforts. The this, for instance, is how the three main increasingly fragmented LRA and amor- rebellions began. In mid-2005 a cigarette phous armed robbers and gangs continue truck under guard by soldiers was attacked to roam and attack. The self-defence-groups- – by whom remains unclear, but the area cum-rebels are communities’ only hope of at the time was confronting grave threats protection. Taking away their guns, as DDR from nomadic armed robbers. The soldiers would in theory do, runs at cross-purposes responded by attacking the local popula- to that need. tion, whom they labelled complicit. Self- On the ground, DDR is less about collect- defence groups rallied in protest. Some- ing guns (few are ever collected) than it is where along the way, Demafouth, living in about distributing patrimonial largesse exile in France, declared himself the presi- to dispossessed youth. The “Bozizé model” dent of the local forces – the People’s Army looms large in armed group members’ for the Restoration of Democracy – and minds: like the fighters who helped Bozizé took them under his tutelage. seize power, they were encouraged to join Most of the other armed groups have armed groups with the promise of material similar origins: mistreatment by state rewards. Leaders made promises about the forces caused already-existing defence pay-out that awaited fighters through DDR, groups to retaliate/fight back with their and the ranks of the groups ballooned – all own show of strength, at which point some after the signing of peace agreements. sidelined politician claimed these margin- At the same time, the DDR Steering alised forces as his own and helped them Committee – composed of armed group assume the form of a rebel group. With the leaders and government ministers, with the notable exception of Damane Zakaria of participation of international donors – met the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity, in Bangui and procrastinated. The Steering the rebel leaders never fought alongside Committee chair, the UN Special Represen- their men on the ground and have only a tative of the Secretary General in CAR tenuous connection to them. The leaders (Sahle-Work Zewde at the time), presided, have used frustrated rural youth as a tool effectively mute, over the stalling. In early to manoeuvre for access to national politics 2011, after two years of this, the UN Devel- in CAR’s capital, Bangui, while failing to opment Programme’s (UNDP) DDR funding address the frustrations themselves. (a total of USD 27 million, from several

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sources) had more or less run out before politicians who stood to make them any activities on behalf of ex-combatants happen. had taken place. In the meantime, Steering Those giving and implementing aid Committee members (and expatriate DDR projects tend to try to shield themselves staff) had benefited from comfortable per from politics by assuming roles as mere diems and/or salaries associated with their “technical advisers”. The aid workers’ positions. technical mandates silence them, but, far The rebellions were the reason for the from being apolitical, this unwillingness convening of an Inclusive National Political to call out Central African leaders’ lack of Dialogue (DPI) in Bangui in December 2008. will for peace and inclusiveness ends up This was the third such inclusive dialogue propping up the status quo. Dispossessed in a decade. Donors pushed for the DPI as a rural folks, for their part, find themselves way of bringing armed opposition, civil so- silenced too – partly by these technical ciety, and the ruling government together processes, and partly by their remoteness.

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und to air grievances, discuss the distribution of Deeply frustrated by their leaders’ failure Politik, 2011 political power, and create more inclusive to take their grievances seriously (the in- All rights reserved structures. frequent ministerial visits to the hinter- These Comments reflect This did not happen. In response to the lands furnish nothing but empty promises), solely the author’s views. DPI’s recommendations, Bozizé created two they have found that neither peaceful

SWP new ministerial posts – the Ministry of En- nor armed opposition allow them an effec- Stiftung Wissenschaft und vironment and the Ministry of Housing – tive voice in debates over the politics of Politik German Institute for and headed them with people from the resource distribution. What options International and rebellion sites. But the addition of a couple remain? Security Affairs of new ministers did not change the bal- Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 ance of power in the government, which 10719 Berlin remained solidly in Bozizé’s favour. Just Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Conclusions Fax +49 30 880 07-100 after the DPI concluded its meetings, an- In the recent elections, people have voted, www.swp-berlin.org other armed rebel group – the Convention but the result is not democracy. Changing [email protected] of Patriots for Justice and Peace – popped this will require, among other things, ISSN 1861-1761 up to protest its exclusion. Yet again, inter- donors such as the UN, EU, and the World

national brokering of peace processes fed Bank to craft programmes that start from factionalisation. an analysis of politics as they actually play out, rather than as it is hoped they will become. And it will require a more hard- A stalled transition headed assessment of political will than has The DPI and DDR should have paved the previously been the case. To that end, the way for the holding of inclusive elections. EU Head of Delegation’s efforts to expose Donors footed most of the bill for the elec- election fraud and the World Bank’s deci- tions (9.5 million euros from the EU and sion to channel DDR monies directly into 6.7 million euros from UNDP) and helped youth-centred rural community pro- design the process using their best tech- grammes all appear to be positive steps. nical processes, such as the creation of an Now that the elections have taken place, Independent Electoral Commission, to donors and new ministers are drawing up ensure fairness. Far from being independ- plans to re-orient development aid. By pri- ent, its composition slanted heavily in oritising efforts that directly bolster Central favour of the ruling party. African citizens’ livelihoods, donors can DDR, inclusive dialogues, and elections help give people resources to launch a truly were all much more pressing concerns for inclusive political process of their own. donors and diplomats than for the local

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