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Palestinian Youth Challenges and Aspirations

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Palestinian Challenges and Aspirations A Study on Youth, Peace and Security Based on UN Resolution 2250 Palestine 2017 Thanks to the support of ” This report was commissioned by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Peacebuilding Support Offi 뤘 ce (PBSO) with funds from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). The report was developed as a contribution to the Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security mandated by Security Council Resolution 2250. The research and consultations for this report followed the key research questions and methodology developed for the Progress Study. The content of this report does not necessarily represent the views of the United Nations.” Palestinian Youth Challenges and Aspirations A Study on Youth, Peace and Security Based on UN Resolution 2250 Palestine 2017 3 Table of Contents 5 BACKGROUND 7 PART ONE: STUDY METHODOLOGY 7 Study objectives 7 Study questions 7 Study type and method 8 Study Limitations 8 Data collection tools 9 Study community 9 Target Groups: 11 PART TWO: ANALYSIS OF FIELD DATA 11 First: Challenges and difficulties facing youth for achieving security and stability 11 Youth understanding of security 11 Young people’s fears causing them to feel unsecure 14 Forms of violence, conflict and insecurity as perceived by youth 15 Causes of violence in the Palestinian society 15 Conflict related reasons (the occupation, internal) 16 How the different forms of violence and conflict affect youth and society 18 The impact of violence on Society 18 Difficulties facing youth and preventing them from living in a safe environment 19 Youth demands that make them feel secure and ensure them living in a safe and stable environment 21 Priorities for reducing obstacles to living in a stable and safe environment 24 Second: Participation of Palestinian youth in peacebuilding, security and non- violence 24 Initiatives towards effecting change 27 Methods for mobilizing (inactive) young people to participate in peacebuilding 28 Methods used by youth to prevent the engagement of their peers in acts of violence 30 Third: Challenges preventing young people from participating in peacebuilding, security and violence prevention 30 Factors preventing young people from participating in peacebuilding initiatives or violence prevention activities 31 Challenges facing youth when they participate in non-violence and peacebuilding initiatives and activities 33 Fourth: Factors promoting youth contributions to peacebuilding and non-violence 33 Young people’s suggestions to enhance and increase their effective participation in peacebuilding and non-violence 34 Youth recommendations and suggestions towards living in a secure and peaceful environment 37 ENDNOTES Palestinian Youth Challenges and Aspirations Background Youth comprise one third of Palestinian society, representing 30% of the 4.95 million population. The percentage of males is 104.2 to every 100 female. Youth live under harsh conditions, with around 40% unemployed, of whom 50% are among graduates. One person out of 25 young people is with disability. Polls indicate that over one third of youth wish to migrate abroad (37% in Gaza and 15% in the West Bank)1. There are differences in unemployment between men and women, as the rate is 21% among males and 43% among females. Also the rate is higher in the Gaza Strip (40%) than the West Bank (16.9%). The school dropout rate is 31% (36% males and 25% females). The percentage of males who completed their university education (Bachelor’s degree and above) is 8.7%, whereas it is higher among females (11.9%)2. Data reveals that 75% of youth use social media networks (Awrad 2014). Internet use is 74% among males and 64% among females. Youth who use mobile is 84% (91.9% males, and 77.3% females)3. used do not read daily newspapers or magazines, while 87% watch television, 27% listen to Radio, and 25% use the internet on daily basis (2010). Data show that 20% of youth were subjected to at least one form of violence (19% males and 33% females), third of them were subjected to physiological violence, 38% to physical violence, and 1% to sexual violence.4 Youth as well as development specialists and academics, emphasize that young people are absent from the processes of decision-making, community development and participation in building peace and achieving security. The consequences of this situation has been reflected on society as a whole, with youth being the most affected at all levels, losing a multitude of opportunities to develop and enhance their roles. They have become unemployed, with less education opportunities, less public participation, and little hope for a better future. Several factors have contributed to the insecurity and prevalence of violence, including primarily the ongoing conflict with the Israeli occupation, the continuous violent practices against the Palestinians, as well as the dispute between Hamas and Fateh that has evolved into various forms of confrontations and reciprocal violence. This has led to the emergence of anti-democratic practices at the level of leaderships, the creation of extremist groups, the development of armed conflicts and tribal disputes, leading to multiple forms of community violence. 5 On the other hand, and despite the difficult circumstances under which they are living, young people have launched several initiatives seeking to achieve peace among the conflicting sides and reinforce security and peace in society. Nevertheless, looking at the overall outcome of the different youth-led initiatives and activities, their influence seems to be limited given the important role youth are required to play. The situation of the Palestinian youth is complex. On one hand they are addressed with optimism, since they are the largest segment in society that is expected to effect the desired change sought by all Palestinians in the form of national unity, liberation and ending the occupation. On the other hand, youth issues do not receive adequate attention and fail to occupy a central position in the decision-making agenda. This is in spite of the urgent need for Palestinians to build a more efficient economic, political and social system that would contribute to a better life and safer environment, and this cannot be achieved without the involvement of youth as the creators of development and builders of the present and the future of the nation. Resolution 2250 came in response to the disorders caused by wars, conflicts and the prevailing violence and extremism around the world, which are depleting the energies of youth in particular. The resolution seeks to promote the participation of young people in peace and security and urges the states to increase youth participation and representation in decision-making processes at all levels. The resolution emphasizes the need to engage youth inclusively in sustainable social and economic development and to promote their involvement in planning and policy-making, political participation, violence prevention, and promotion of societal peace by means of positive change towards peacebuilding in conflict and post-conflict situations. The resolution calls for taking the necessary measures to involve and integrate youth in plans and programs towards building a violence-free and peaceful society and effecting positive change. The resolution consists of five main components, namely: participation, protection, prevention, partnerships and reintegration. Youth, Peace and Security focus group in Jenin. July 2017 6 Part One: Study Methodology Study objectives To understand the factors that predispose youth to practicing violence, factors that prevent them from experiencing violence, and factors that enhance their positive engagement in building a peaceful and safe society, and identify examples of innovative non-violent actions, activities, events and initiatives that aim to promoting peace and achieving security and stability as well as to integrate youth in relevant national programs by the government and civil society. Study questions In order to achieve the objectives of the study, a number of questions were formulated by the research team in a participatory approach, while taking into consideration the specific characteristics of study locations, and in light of the guiding questions proposed by the progress study on Youth, Peace and Security. These questions are as follows: 1. What are the challenges facing Palestinian youth in the areas of peace and security? How does it affect their lives? 2. What activities, initiatives or projects related to peacebuilding and conflict prevention that Palestinian youth assume and what is their impact? 3. What factors prevent or hinder the participation of Palestinian youth in peacebuilding and their contribution to security? 4. What factors promote and support active participation of youth in peacebuilding, prevention of violence and social cohesion? 5. What recommendations do young people make to better contribute to and lead activities aimed at building sustainable peace, achieving security and preventing violence? 6. What are youth attitudes towards the role of Palestinian Authority (PA) institutions, civil society, the media and the international community in supporting and promoting youth contributions to peacebuilding? Study type and method 7 In order to understand factors which predispose youth to practicing violence and those which prevent them from experiencing violence and to identify their contributions to building a peaceful and safe society and activities in
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