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Home , Central African Republic, Chad, Peacebuilding

2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:56 PM Page 32

3.1

Chad and the Central African

The deployment of parallel rocked by a series of coups, the most recent of and operations to ’s which brought the current president, Idris and the ’s borders with Déby, to power in 1990. Despite a number of in 2008 did little to improve the security elections in the interim, the Chadian govern- and humanitarian situations in either country. ment is not widely viewed as truly represen- The conditions of the and internally tative, and over the years both political and displaced persons (IDPs) remained unchanged violent opposition has mounted. Increasingly as insecurity persisted. The crisis, which well-organized rebel groups have capitalized eluded all forms of resolution during the year, on regional instability and porous borders, and continued to complicate efforts to resolve the have consolidated their resistance through a conflicts in Chad and the Central African Re- number of high-level military defections. public (). In the midst of these challenges, While clashes between government and the UN Mission in the Central African Repub- rebel forces have been responsible for the over- lic and Chad (MINURCAT) and the EU Force all insecurity, the situation has been worsened in the Republic of Chad and the Central Afri- by acts of banditry, ethnic and intercommunal can Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) re- , and a pervading environment of im- mained deployed but with no mandate to ad- punity. Armed groups, some of whom have dress the political issues that underpin the into Chad from Darfur, are responsible conflicts. Moreover, both missions were im- for attacking and looting villages, and for driv- pacted by continued tensions between Chad and ing Chadian civilians off of their land. The Sudan that were heightened by reciprocal attacks combination of these destabilizing forces has on the two countries’ capitals by rebel forces, led to massive internal displacement and has leading to finger-pointing between the feuding hampered the delivery of humanitarian assis- neighbors. In the face of these challenges, the UN tance to both Chadian IDPs and refugees from and EU explored plans for a smooth transition Darfur, currently residing in camps in eastern at the culmination of EUFOR’s one-year man- Chad. date. This would see an enhanced MINURCAT In the CAR, internal throughout assume military responsibilities from EUFOR. the 1990s prompted the deployment of a series However, failure to deal with the political under- of international and regional peace operations pinnings of the conflicts—especially in Chad— to address a situation characterized by a series will likely remain a source of serious concern of army mutinies, coup attempts, and armed re- for the coming year. bellions aided or encouraged by the country’s neighbors. The UN Mission in the Central Afri- can Republic (MINURCA) was replaced in Background 2000 by the UN Support Office Chad and the CAR have faced serious internal in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), insecurity for decades, exacerbated in recent which sought to consolidate the gains of a 1999 years by the spillover from the ongoing conflict election. BONUCA’s mandate was to support in Darfur. Since , Chad has been the CAR government’s efforts to strengthen

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CHAD AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC • 33

democratic institutions, consolidate national reconciliation processes, and mobilize interna- tional support and financial resources for de- velopment efforts. Following a steep deterioration of security in 2002, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community deployed the Force Multinational de la Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (FOMUC), a regional force of 380 troops from Chad, , and the Congo with a man- date to support stability and the reconstruction of the Central African Armed Forces. FOMUC has had neither the mandate nor the capacity to bring stability to the CAR.1 BONUCA continues to operate in the CAR today, and has expanded its activities to support the government’s efforts to reform the security sector, reinforce the , and disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate ex-combatants. A particular focus during 2008 was an effort to promote an all-inclusive political dialogue in- volving opposition leaders as well as represen- tatives of the country’s several rebel groups. Meanwhile, in June 2008, the CAR became the fourth country to be placed on the agenda of the UN . In a 2006 report, then–Secretary- General proposed the deployment of a peacekeeping operation to monitor move- ments in the border areas, while working to im- prove security through the facilitation of polit- ical dialogue and the protection of civilians under imminent threat. While this proposal was

3.1.1 Zoe’s Ark

An unusual controversy, with implications The group was arrested as they at- disrupting the already difficult delivery of for peacekeeping and humanitarian activ- tempted to load the kidnapped children humanitarian programs. The legacy of this ities in Chad, began in late 2007 and car- onto a plane, all of whom were later estab- event has been a heightened mistrust of ried over well into 2008. In November lished to be the children of Chadian citi- international—and specifically humani- 2007, a group of French citizens calling zens and not from Darfur at all. The pop- tarian—actors and the introduction of new themselves “Zoe’s Ark” attempted to re- ular backlash against the group, and bureaucratic regulations designed to mon- move 103 children and infants from Cha- indeed against all international actors in- itor the movement of humanitarian staff dian near the border with Darfur, side Chad, was immediate and violent. and the operation of programs. claiming that the children were Darfurian Humanitarian staff and UN personnel from refugees. Western countries were attacked, further 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:56 PM Page 34

34 • MISSION REVIEWS

After considerable discussion and debate, UN Mission in the Central African Republic an agreement was reached that led to the simul- and Chad (MINURCAT) taneous deployment of a UN civilian peacekeep- ing operation, and an EU military “bridging” • Authorization and 25 September 2007 (UNSC Res. 1778) force in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR. Start Date • SRSG Victor Da Silva Angelo () Authorized by Security Council Resolu- • Chief Military Liaison François N’Diaye () tion 1778 (2007), MINURCAT, when fully de- Officer ployed, was to comprise 300 civilian police and • Police Commissioner Gerardo Cristian Chaumont () 50 military liaison officers in addition to appro- • Budget $301.1 million priate civilian personnel. The mission was (1 July 2008–30 June 2009) mandated to select, train, vet, and advise ele- • Strength as of Military Liaison Officers: 46 ments of the Chadian police force (a force that 31 October 2008 Police: 236 would come to be called the Détachement Inté- International Civilian Staff: 307 gré de Sécurité [DIS]), and to provide security Local Civilian Staff: 169 in and around and IDP sites in eastern UN Volunteers: 77 Chad and northeastern CAR. Invoking Chapter For detailed mission information see p. 208 VII of the UN Charter, Resolution 1778 also authorized the European Union to deploy a military peacekeeping operation alongside EU Force in the Republic of Chad and the MINURCAT. The European mission (EUFOR) Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) was mandated to contribute to the protection of civilians in danger, establish wider security • Authorization Date 15 October 2007 (EU Council Joint with a view to facilitating the delivery of hu- Action 2007/677/CFSP) manitarian assistance, and contribute to the • Start Date January 2008 protection of UN and humanitarian personnel. • Head of Mission Lieutenant-General Patrick Nash (Ireland) As of October 2008, EUFOR—deployed • Budget $98.5 million just for a year—had reached full strength with (October 2007–September 2008) • Strength as of Troops: 3,307 3,307 troops, of whom 200 were deployed to 30 September 2008 northeastern CAR. MINURCAT had yet to de- ploy fully, and of the expected 850 DIS offi- cers, 418 had been trained—including some 71 commanding officers—and the remaining DIS UN Peacebuilding Support Office in the training and deployment was expected to con- Central African Republic (BONUCA) tinue into 2009.

• Authorization and 15 February 2000 (S/PRST/2000/5) Start Date Key Developments • Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 24 The conflicts in Chad, the CAR, and Sudan 31 October 2008 Local Civilian Staff: 54 have a strong regional dimension, and the dif- ficult relationship between Chad and Sudan proved to be one of the central drivers of con- flict throughout 2008. For years, there have welcomed by President François Bozizé of the been allegations that the governments of Sudan CAR, it was rejected by Chad’s President Déby, and Chad have been a source of material sup- who was concerned that the UN was trying to port and safe haven to rebel groups fighting in turn Chad into a rear base for operations aimed their respective countries. But recent develop- at addressing the conflict in Darfur. Déby re- ments in both Chad and Darfur have brought quested an all-civilian police force instead. these allegations to the fore. 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:56 PM Page 35

CHAD AND THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC • 35

Chad with which the rebels attacked suggested that The long and largely uncontrolled border be- they had received outside support. The govern- tween Sudan and Chad has been an issue of ment of Sudan immediately accused Chad of particular concern. Rebels from both sides of providing JEM with the means to launch the at- the border have been known to use the neigh- tack and again broke off diplomatic relations boring territory as a rear base to recruit, train, with Chad. and regroup for battle. Accusations of Sudan- Following a September 2008 meeting of ese support to Chadian rebels, and vice versa, the Contact Group in , Gabon, the came to a head in 2008, with major offensives presidents of Chad and Sudan expressed a re- being launched against the capitals of both newed commitment to the Agreement, Chad and Sudan. including an intention to normalize relations In February 2008, rebel groups in Chad and to finalize an experts’ report meant to de- joined forces to launch a coordinated attack on lineate the concept of operations for the border the capital, N’Djamena. The attack originated monitoring force, as recommended in the from the border region between Chad and Sudan, Dakar Agreement. The force will, in theory, be and it was alleged that Justice and Equality drawn from the countries that compose the Movement (JEM) rebels from Darfur—long be- Contact Group. However, coordination and fi- lieved to have benefited from the support of the nancial arrangements are still unclear, and it is Chadian government—entered Chad to reinforce generally believed that the deployment of this the Chadian national army. Rebel fighters reached force will be largely contingent upon a marked the gates of the presidential palace, but the attack improvement in relations between Chad and was repelled with the help of French forces. Sudan. Diplomatic ties between the two coun- This daring move by the rebels further tries were reestablished in October. eroded already poor relations between Chad In addition to the regional developments, and Sudan, leading to the breaking off of diplo- there has been some limited progress toward matic ties. In an effort to normalize relations, the fulfillment of certain internal peace agree- discussions moderated by Senegalese president ments within Chad and, perhaps most notably, Abdoulaye Wade were initiated in Dakar in the CAR. 2008. The result was a commitment to normalize relations and to “ban any activity of Central African Republic the armed groups and prevent the use of the ter- Following recommendations made by a prepa- ritories of any of the two countries to destabi- ratory committee of the inclusive political dia- lize the other,”2 as well as the formation of a logue, the government signed peace agreements Contact Group, jointly chaired by , , with the Armée Populaire pour la Restauration and the Republic of Congo, to monitor the im- de la République et la Démocratie (APRD) in plementation of the agreement. The group was May 2008 and with the APRD and the Union also charged with the formation of a “peace and des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemble- security force” to monitor and secure the bor- ment (UFDR) in June. In early August, both the ders between the two countries. main coalition of opposition political parties The signing of the Dakar Agreement by and the rebel groups withdrew from the dia- Sudanese and Chadian authorities was met with logue process over dissatisfaction with amnesty skepticism by observers who noted that peace proposals put forward by the government, nec- agreements between these countries were almost essary for the participation of rebel and other always followed by a resurgence of violence. leaders in the dialogue. Some of these problems This skepticism seemed warranted when, in May were overcome in a new amnesty proposal ap- 2008, JEM rebels launched an unprecedented at- proved by parliament in late September, and in tack on , reaching Omdurman on the early November President Bozizé announced outskirts of the capital. As in Chad, the speed that the dialogue would take place in December. 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:56 PM Page 36

36 • MISSION REVIEWS

Another important dimension to the un- by the Economic Community of Central African folding situation in Chad and the CAR is the States (CEEAC). It was hoped that this transi- role in and influence of on the central tion would bring a greater number of regional African region. The ex-colonial power contin- actors into the effort to stabilize the CAR. ues to be actively engaged in both countries, The MICOPAX mandate has yet to be for- with an ongoing military presence and a history mally approved, and as 2008 drew to a close, of intervention on behalf of the respective gov- MICOPAX continued to operate under FOMUC’s ernments. In both the CAR and Chad, French mandate. However, the mission will take on a forces stationed in the countries were “rehat- much more multidimensional character than its ted” to serve under the auspices of the EUFOR predecessor, incorporating combat troops, civil- mission. However, France’s record of interven- ian police and gendarmes, as well as a civilian tion in defense of President Déby in particular component. It is hoped that the new civilian continues to generate skepticism over its ability component will play a positive role in reinvigo- to remain impartial if the Chadian government rating political dialogue in the CAR. comes under serious threat. Both FOMUC and MICOPAX worked col- The skepticism was further fueled when, in laboratively in 2008 with UN bodies, particu- February 2008, even as European forces were larly in . It is expected that MICOPAX deploying to Chad, France sought and received will collaborate closely with BONUCA in the the tacit support of the UN Security Council to effort to achieve the political and stabilization defend the Chadian government when the rebels objectives in their respective mandates. While entered the capital, N’Djamena.3 EUFOR and MINURCAT are both present in northeastern CAR, the MINURCAT deploy- From FOMUC to MICOPAX ment in particular continues to be minimal, While both MINURCAT and EUFOR are de- with limited cooperation and dialogue between ployed in the CAR as well as Chad, their pres- it and the other missions. ence in the CAR is much more limited, con- tained entirely to the northeast, where the CAR UN-EU Partnership? borders Sudan. Though the simultaneous deployment of EU The internal stabilization and peacebuilding and UN operations is not unprecedented, it is dynamics of the CAR have, for some years now, unusual, and the lessons learned from the expe- been the remit of BONUCA and FOMUC, the rience in Chad and the CAR are expected to in- latter a multinational peacekeeping presence led form future collaborations between the UN and by the Central African Economic and Monetary the EU. Community (CEMAC). When initially author- The EU’s involvement in this effort was ized in late 2002, FOMUC was intended to sup- politically complex, and carries as much rele- port a process of national reconciliation and to vance for the future of European peacekeeping contribute to the stabilization of the country, by intervention as it does for Chadian security and monitoring the border between Chad and the stability. The EU intervention in Chad was ap- CAR, initiating a disarmament process, and proached as a template for future EU peace- protecting key infrastructure. However, from keeping interventions, a fact that had implica- the very outset, FOMUC was severely under- tions in the planning stages, particularly with resourced; this fact was highlighted in March regard to the degree to which UN planners 2003 when, three months after its deployment, were included in the EU planning process. FOMUC was unable to prevent General François The decision to deploy an EU force in Chad Bozizé’s ousting of President Ange-Félix Patassé resulted from Chad’s refusal to consent to the in a military coup launched from Chad. deployment of UN troops. Consequently, by the In July 2008, CEMAC handed over opera- time the EU decided to deploy to Chad, UN tional authority of FOMUC to the Mission de planners had already undertaken a number of de- Consolidation de la Paix (MICOPAX), to be led tailed assessment missions to evaluate 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:56 PM Page 37

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conditions on the ground. In the wake of Secu- rity Council Resolution 1778, and in the context Mission de Consolidation de la Paix (MICOPAX) of a longer UN discussion about the deployment of a single, multidimensional peacekeeping op- • Authorization Date 2 October 2002 eration, UN staff viewed the EU force as a com- • Start Date January 2003 ponent of a larger UN-led intervention. • Head of Mission Albert Akouéndéngué (Gabon) Conversely, the EU planners approached • Budget $19.3 million the EU mission as a parallel deployment of two (October 2007–September 2008) discreet, if complementary, peacekeeping mis- • Strength as of Troops: 498 sions. Interactions with the 30 September 2008 Civilian Police: 170 were not approached in a coordinated or collab- orative manner, and the terms of reference for each respective mission were elaborated sepa- rately, a fact that resulted in delays in the final- ization of certain technical agreements.4 At the field level, the gaps in coordination, different rates of deployment, and the UN Se- curity Council’s tendency to view the interven- tion in Chad as a subsidiary of the more promi- nent effort in Darfur, had very practical implications for UN and humanitarian actors. In June 2008, a rebel attack on the town of Goz Beida in Chad prompted the deployment of EUFOR troops to protect civilians and evac- uate humanitarian personnel. In the wake of the evacuation, serious concerns were raised over the apparent lack of a coordinated security plan. Though MINURCAT had a small team on the ground, the slow pace of deployment meant ISSOUF SANOGO/AFP/Getty Images that a crucial link between EUFOR and the hu- Members of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA speak with villagers manitarian community was missing, and the while on patrol near the Farchana camp in eastern Chad, 27 June 2008. commanding EUFOR officers were forced to improvise their response. In addition to the coordination challenges, With deployments concentrated in Abeche, Goz it became clear early on in the EUFOR deploy- Beida, and Iriba, EUFOR commanders insti- ment that this well-resourced and highly tuted long-distance patrols, and attempted to tar- trained military force was almost entirely un- get corridors that are central to the distribution equipped to address the day-to-day security is- of humanitarian assistance. The strategy has had sues that plague the region. Configured to con- some positive impact, but EUFOR, with limited front a military threat, the European force has troop numbers and a huge, logistically prohibi- neither the mandate, nor the resources to com- tive of operations, is constrained in its abil- bat the banditry that is at the heart of the inse- ity to provide ongoing security. curity in eastern Chad.5 The force was designed In June 2008, a joint EU-UN assessment and deployed primarily with a view to protect- team traveled to Chad and the CAR to conduct ing refugees and IDPs from attacks emanating a midmandate review and begin preparations from Darfur, and was poorly configured to for the September 2008 Security Council dis- Chad’s internal security dysfunctions. cussions on the renewal and adjustment of the Once deployed, EUFOR attempted to adapt MINURCAT mandate. While it was generally the existing mandate to the day-to-day realities. agreed that the EUFOR deployment did not 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:56 PM Page 38

38 • MISSION REVIEWS

address the core security challenges, it was nev- Some of the existing EUFOR soldiers are ertheless determined that a military capability expected to be “rehatted” as MINURCATtroops, with the means to project itself quickly and ef- alleviating some of the pressure for force gener- fectively throughout the area of operation would ation. However, the Secretary-General’s mission be necessary to confront the ongoing cross-border concept relies heavily on the availability of heli- violence, and to provide for the protection of copters and other aviation assets, resources that civilians and humanitarian actors in the instance have increasingly proved difficult to secure. of a violent attack. On 24 September 2008, the UN Security In his September 2008 report on the situa- Council voted in support of a resolution (1834) tion in Chad and the CAR, the Secretary-General expressing the intention to expand the MINUR- outlined an expanded MINURCAT mission con- CAT mandate to include a military component cept, including a Chapter VII mandate to protect upon the expiration of the EUFOR mandate, civilians, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian and calling on the UN and the EU to begin prepa- assistance, and protect UN staff and resources. rations for the transfer of authority from an EU to This concept describes a strategy of deterrence a UN peacekeeping presence as of 15 March through presence that, given the size and harsh 2009. The precise size and shape of the expanded nature of the terrain, will require extensive aer- MINURCAT deployment remain unclear.6 ial mobility assets (primarily helicopters) and a strong intelligence-gathering capability. The force size outlined by the Secretary-General in- Conclusion cludes 6,000 UN peacekeepers, as well as an ad- As 2008 drew to a close, resolution of the inter- ditional “over the horizon” response capability. related conflicts in Chad and the CAR remained In October 2008, President Déby accepted the a work in progress. Despite efforts to enhance proposed expanded UN mission. MINURCAT, the UN, at the insistence of Chad, For its part, the government of Chad re- lacks an explicit political role for MINURCAT quested that the total DIS deployment be in- in the effort to resolve Chad’s internal political creased from 850 to 1,700 officers, a request instability. International rights and hu- that was to be reevaluated once the initial 850 manitarian advocates have called upon the UN officers had taken up their posts. to give MINURCAT the mandate to initiate an There are a number of challenges that may inclusive political dialogue between the govern- be associated with the generation of the follow- ment of Chad, the political opposition, and the on force. From a logistical standpoint, it is esti- numerous armed opposition groups operating in mated that it would take the UN approximately the country. The government of Chad, however, one year to construct the necessary infrastruc- is resistant to formal UN involvement in its do- ture to launch the mission that the Secretary- mestic politics, and the international community General has described. As such, the Secretary- has so far proven unwilling to press the point. In General’s report emphasized the importance of the meantime, while the situation in the CAR a smooth transition from EUFOR to the ex- saw some modest improvements, it was far from panded MINURCAT, and in particular re- resolved, but a peace and reconciliation confer- quested that the government of Chad ensure a ence convened in December, involving some of full handover of all EUFOR bases and installa- the key actors in the conflict, raised hopes. tions to UN control. 2009_CIC_3.qxd:Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 1/16/09 4:56 PM Page 39

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Notes 1. United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on Chad and the Central African Republic Pursuant to Paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006), UN Doc. S/2006/1019, 22 Decem- ber 2006, p. 4. 2. Republic of Senegal, Dakar Agreement Between Sudan and Chad Signed in Dakar, 13 March 2008, para. 4. 3. United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2008/3, 4 Feb- ruary 2008. 4. United Nations, Action Review (UN-EU planning for EUFOR TCHAD/RCA), June 2007–March 2008, p. 2. 5. United Nations, Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, UN Doc. S/2008/601, 12 September 2008. 6. UN Security Council Resolution 1843, UN Doc. S/RES/1834, 24 September 2008.