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THE MINERAL INDUSTRIES of BENIN, CAPE VERDE, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, and TOGO by Thomas R

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THE MINERAL INDUSTRIES of BENIN, CAPE VERDE, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, and TOGO by Thomas R THE MINERAL INDUSTRIES OF BENIN, CAPE VERDE, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, AND TOGO By Thomas R. Yager BENIN Benin did not produce or refine petroleum and depended upon imports to satisfy its petroleum requirements. In 2003, imports The West African country of Benin was a producer of of petroleum products amounted to $74.1 million, or 11% of cement, clay, gold, and sand and gravel. Other reported mineral total imports (International Monetary Fund, 2004a, p. 79). occurrences included iron ore, limestone, marble, phosphate In May 2003, the West African Gas Pipeline Company rock, rutile, silica sand, and stone (Ministère des Mines, de Ltd. (WAPCo) (a consortium composed of Chevron Nigeria l’Energie, et de l’Hydraulique, 1992, p. 3, 9-10, 15, 18-19, 21). Ltd., Nigerian National Petroleum Corp., Shell Petroleum The Ministère des Mines, de l’Energie, et de l’Hydraulique was Development Company of Nigeria Ltd., and the Volta River responsible for the administration of the mining sector. The Authority of Ghana) signed an agreement with the Governments Office Béninois de Recherches Géologiques et Minières was of Benin, Ghana, Nigeria, and Togo that confirmed the parties’ responsible for mineral development administration. commitment to building the West African Gas Pipeline. The In 2003, the gross domestic product (GDP) based on 1,000-kilometer (km) pipeline could begin to deliver natural purchasing power parity was estimated to be about $7.5 billion. gas from Nigeria to existing and planned powerplants in Benin, The GDP grew by 4.8% in 2003 compared with 6% in 2002. Ghana, and Togo by mid-2005 (Chevron Nigeria Ltd., 2003). Manufacturing and handicrafts accounted for 9% of the GDP; construction and public works, 4%; water, gas, and electricity, References Cited 1%; and mining and petroleum, less than 1%. From 1998 to 2003, the value of output in the mining and petroleum sector fell Chevron Nigeria Ltd., 2003, Stakeholders in West African Gas Pipeline sign major agreement: Lagos, Nigeria, Chevron Nigeria Ltd. press release by nearly 80% because of the cessation of petroleum production. May 22, 1 p. During the same period, the value of output in the water, gas, Crankshaw, Paul, 2003, Benin, in Mining annual review 2003: Mining Journal and electricity sector nearly doubled (International Monetary Ltd., CD-ROM. Fund, 2004a, p. 53-54; 2004b, p. 206; 2004§1). International Monetary Fund, 2004a, Benin—Selected issues and statistical appendix: Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund Country Report Artisanal miners produced small amounts of gold. Ciments No. 04/370, November 24, 99 p. du Benin S.A., Société des Ciments du Benin, and Société des International Monetary Fund, 2004b, World economic outlook—The global Ciments d’Onigbolo produced cement; these companies had a demographic transition: Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund, combined cement production capacity of 875,000 metric tons September, 287 p. Ministère des Mines, de l’Energie, et de l’Hydraulique, 1992, Benin mining per year (t/yr) (table 2). Limestone was quarried at Pobe for resources: Contonou, Benin, Ministère des Mines, de l’Energie, et de use in Société des Ciments d’Onigbolo’s cement plant. Société l’Hydraulique, 23 p. Benino-Libyenne des Mines produced marble at Dadjo. Resources of iron ore at Loumbou-Loumbou and Madekali Internet Reference Cited were estimated to be up to 500 million metric tons (Mt) at a grade of 46% to 52% iron. Development of these resources International Monetary Fund, 2004 (September), Benin, World Economic Outlook depended upon the availability of electricity. The state- Database, accessed December 3, 2004, via URL http://www.imf.org/external/ owned utility Société d’Eau et d’Électricité was investigating pubs/ft/weo/2004/02/data/index.htm the possibility of building a new dam and a 900-megawatt hydropower station at Arjarala. The cost of the project was CAPE VERDE estimated to be $150 million; the phosphate deposits at Mekrou could become more viable if the dam were completed Mining’s contribution to the economy of Cape Verde, which (Crankshaw, 2003). is an archipelago of 10 islands and 8 islets located about 600 km In 2003, Benin’s production of electricity increased to 67 off the West Coast of Africa, was minimal. In 2003, the nation’s gigawatthours (GWh) from 53.1 GWh in 2002 and 58 GWh in GDP based on purchasing power parity was estimated to be 1998. From 1998 to 2003, imports of electricity from Ghana $2.4 billion. The GDP increased by 5.3% in 2003 compared rose to 512.8 GWh from 252.3 GWh. During the same period, with 4.9% in 2002 (International Monetary Fund, 2004, p. 206; domestic consumption of electricity rose to 474.2 GWh from 2004§). 266 GWh (International Monetary Fund, 2004a, p. 62). Most of the nation’s mineral requirements were imported; cement imports were estimated to be 170,000 metric tons (t). In early 2004, Cape Verdean and Italian investors planned to start construction of a cement plant with a capacity of 40,000 1References that include a section mark (§) are found in the Internet t/yr. The plant, which was expected to cost $5 million, would Reference Cited sections. use pozzolanic materials from Santo Antao Island. Resources BENIN, CAPE VERDE, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, AND TOGO—2003 4.1 of pozzolanic materials on Santo Antao Island were estimated to Monetary Fund, 2004a, p. 34, 46, 63, 77; World Bank Group, be 6 Mt (International Cement Review, 2003; Panafrican News 2004, p. 4). Agency, 2003). Artisanal miners accounted for more than 90% of the Central Salt was produced on the islands of Mindelo and Sal; gypsum, African Republic’s diamond production. From 160,000 to on Maio; limestone, on Boa Vista, Sal, and Santo Antao; and 180,000 workers were involved in artisanal mining operations. volcanic rock, on Santo Antao. Production of clay on Boa Vista, Several small-scale local mining companies and companies Sal, and Sao Vicente was intermittent. The Direcçäo Geral da with temporary mining permits accounted for the remaining Energia regulated the importation and distribution of mineral production. The development of commercial-scale diamond fuels. No domestic oil or natural gas production was reported. mines has been inhibited by the difficulty of establishing adequate security for alluvial deposits, which are often in remote References Cited parts of the country (International Monetary Fund, 2004a, p. 34-35, 37). International Cement Review, 2003, Cape Verde, in Global cement report The Government was trying to increase artisanal diamond (5th ed): Dorking, United Kingdom, Tradeship Publications, Ltd., p. 99. production by forming mining cooperatives. Individual International Monetary Fund, 2004, World economic outlook—The global demographic transition: Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund, artisanal miners were unable to invest in equipment that would September, 287 p. increase their productivity because of unstable incomes; with Panafrican News Agency, 2003, $5-million cement factory for Cape Verde soon: cooperatives, however, miners could pool their risks and borrow Dakar, Senegal, Panafrican News Agency press release, December 20, 1 p. the funds needed to purchase motor pumps and excavators. The number of mining cooperatives has risen to 150 from 5 in recent Internet Reference Cited years (International Monetary Fund, 2004a, p. 43). Diamondworks Ltd. of Canada held concessions for the International Monetary Fund, 2004 (September), Cape Verde, World Economic Outlook Database, accessed December 3, 2004, via URL http://www.imf.org/ Banguna, the Bria, the Gbali, the Mambere, the Nzako, and external/pubs/ft/weo/2004/02/data/index.htm. the Ouandja alluvial diamond mining areas. The company had exclusive rights to buy diamond from the 60,000 artisanal CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC miners who worked on its properties. Diamondworks planned to explore for kimberlites in 2004 (Mining Review Africa, The mining industry of the Central African Republic was 2004). dominated by the production of diamond and gold; small Vaaldiam Resources Ltd. of Canada planned to explore for amounts of kaolin and quartz crystals were also mined. Other diamond at its CAR Kimberlite Project by the end of 2004. The mineral occurrences in the Central African Republic that have company’s exploration activities were on hold in 2003 as the been identified include copper, graphite, ilmenite, iron ore, company focused on acquiring properties in Brazil. Vaaldiam kyanite, lignite, limestone, manganese, monazite, rutile, salt, tin, also held a 1% gross royalty on diamond production from the and uranium. Boungou River alluvial deposit. By the third quarter of 2004, In 2003, the GDP based on purchasing power parity was Boungou River was expected to start producing diamond at a estimated to be about $4.6 billion. The GDP fell by 7.5% in rate of 30,000 carats per year (Vaaldiam Resources Ltd., 2004). 2003 compared with a decline of 0.6% in 2002. The mining The Ministère des Ressources Energétiques et Minerales sector accounted for nearly 7% of the GDP; construction, 4%; was responsible for the administration of the mining sector manufacturing, 2%; and public utilities, 1%. In 2003, the in the Central African Republic. Official diamond exports value of output in the mining sector contracted by 7% because were handled by the Government’s Bureau d’Evaluation et of lower diamond and gold production. In the manufacturing du Contrôle du Diamant et Or, which signed a 4-year contract sector, the value of output fell by about 22%, and in the public with Independent Diamond Valuators of Belgium in 2002 utilities sector, by 1%. The downturn in the economy was to verify the Bureau’s valuation of diamond exports. The partially attributable to a civil war that started in October 2002 change in Government in March 2003 prompted a review of and concluded with the overthrow of the Government in March the Central African Republic’s compliance with the Kimberley 2003.
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