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National Dialogues in Peacebuilding and Transitions CREATIVITY and ADAPTIVE THINKING Elizabeth Murray and Susan Stigant, Editors PEACEWORKS National Dialogues in Peacebuilding and Transitions CREATIVITY AND ADAPTIVE THINKING Elizabeth Murray and Susan Stigant, editors NO. 173 | JUNE 2021 Making Peace Possible NO. 173 | JUNE 2021 ABOUT THE REPORT In response to requests for advice and support from international organizations and policymakers in countries considering national dialogues, the United States Institute of MEDIATION, NEGOTIATION Peace presents this report examining six markedly different dialogues in the Central & DIALOGUE African Republic, Kenya, Lebanon, Senegal, Tunisia, and Yemen. Through the case studies, comparisons of the processes, explanations of lessons learned, and sets of detailed questions, it offers guidance and tools for practitioners and policymakers. ABOUT THE EDITORS Elizabeth Murray is a senior program officer in the Africa program at USIP, where she manages programming in the Central Africa region. Susan Stigant is the director of Africa programs at USIP, where she leads programming in the Greater Horn of Africa, on the Red Sea, and with the African Union and regional partners. Cover photo: Clerics vote during a press conference held in Sana’a, Yemen, on September 26, 2013, in response to issues raised in Yemen’s national dialogue. (Photo by Hani Mohammed/AP) The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website (www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject. © 2021 by the United States Institute of Peace United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Avenue NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: (202) 457-1700 Fax: (202) 429-6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.USIP.org Peaceworks No. 173. First published 2021. ISBN: 978-1-60127-847-0 Contents Introduction 5 By Elizabeth Murray and Susan Stigant Central African Republic’s Bangui Forum 19 By Rachel Sullivan Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation 35 By Neha Sanghrajka Lebanon’s National Dialogues 51 By Elie Abouaoun Senegal’s Assises Nationales 63 By Emily Fornof and Penda Ba USIP.ORG 1 CONTENTS CONTINUED Tunisia’s Dialogue National 73 By Daniel Brumberg Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference 87 By Erica Gaston Lessons and Guiding Questions 101 By Elizabeth Murray and Susan Stigant 124 About the Authors 2 PEACEWORKS | NO. 173 Summary The proliferation of national dialogues in the early interference and maintain momentum. The selection of 2010s prompted the United States Institute of Peace a convener—whether an individual, group, or organi- to explore diverse experiences—in the Central African zation—also affects public perceptions of the dialogue. Republic, Kenya, Lebanon, Senegal, Tunisia, and Although national conveners can increase ownership Yemen—to draw lessons for practitioners and policy- and buy-in to a process, bias is a risk, particularly when makers from those case studies to design future a dialogue is convened by a sitting leader. dialogues that most effectively advance peacebuilding. National dialogues with hundreds of delegates and A national dialogue can be a useful approach along the broad agendas offer the possibility of bringing tradi- path toward sustainable peace. In line with the founda- tionally underrepresented groups to the table for a tional principles of peacebuilding, the shape, form, and conversation and problem-solving about the drivers of structure of any national dialogue need to be tailored to conflict in a country. At the same time, these broad pro- the specific context. The temptation is to look to national cesses may become bogged down by disagreement dialogues as the transformative step in a peace agree- or complex structures or produce an untenable number ment. Expectations are high: achieve inclusion; broaden of recommendations. Smaller dialogues can allow for participation; advance justice; and resolve fundamental more in-depth conversations, particularly around sensi- issues of identity, forms of governance, constitutional tive issues, but may reinforce existing power structures. priorities, and political reform. National dialogues, how- ever, are not a panacea. They are best conceived as Dialogues are far more likely to engender meaningful part of a broader continuum of mutually reinforcing local, change when they are backed by a credible coalition subnational, and national efforts that foster dialogue, that can work toward implementation of the dialogue forge agreements, and drive toward peace. through law or policy. A clear implementation plan prior to the dialogue’s inception is also critical to provide stra- In all national dialogues, the decisions made during tegic momentum beyond the final conference or report. the preparatory phase set the tone for the process and International partners can play an important role in keep- affect its ultimate legitimacy in the eyes of political forc- ing attention and resources focused on implementation. es and the public. A clear mandate for the dialogue, In earlier phases, international engagement needs to be whether derived formally or informally, from a national measured to encourage genuine national ownership. process or an international process, can help buffer USIP.ORG 3 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AN Assises Nationales (Senegal) KNDR Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation AU African Union LAS League of Arab States CAR Central African Republic MLCJ Mouvement de Libération Centrafricaine pour la Justice CCC Constitutional Consensus Commission (Tunisia) MSU UN Mediation Support Unit CIPEV Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (Kenya) NCA National Constituent Assembly (Tunisia) CNRI National Commission on the NDC National Dialogue Conference (Yemen) Reform of Institutions (Senegal) ODM Orange Democratic Movement (Kenya) CPR Congress for the Republic (Tunisia) ONAT National Order of Tunisian Advocates CSI Common Space Initiative (Lebanon) PDS Senegalese Democratic Party CTO Technical Organizing Committee PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization (Central African Republic) PNU Party of National Unity (Kenya) DCG Donor Coordination Group (Kenya) STL Special Tribunal for Lebanon DDR disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration TJRC Truth Justice and Reconciliation DDRR disarmament, demobilization, Commission (Kenya) repatriation, and reintegration UFDR Union of Democratic Forces for Unity ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States (Central African Republic) FPRC Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la UFR Union des Forces Républicaines Centrafrique (Central African Republic) FSS Front Siggil Senegal UFRF Union des Forces Républiques GCC Gulf Cooperation Council Fondamentales (Central African Republic) GCCI Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative UGTT Tunisian General Labor Union GPC General People’s Congress (Yemen) UNDP United Nations Development Programme IDPs internally displaced persons UPC Union Peace Conference, 21st Century Panglong (Myanmar) IREC Independent Review Commission (Kenya) UTICA Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade, and Artisans JMP Joint Meeting Parties (Yemen) 4 PEACEWORKS | NO. 173 South Sudanese President Salva Kiir Mayardit, right, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni attend the opening of South Sudan’s National Dialogue committee in Juba, South Sudan, on May 22, 2017. (Photo by Jok Solomun/Reuters) Introduction By Elizabeth Murray and Susan Stigant National dialogues continue to make headlines around 2016, culminated in a national conference in November the world, having recently been proposed or convened 2020.1 In response to early criticism, President Salva in countries grappling with some of the world’s most Kiir Mayardit responded to calls for greater independ- persistent and deadly conflicts. Motivations driving ence by stepping down from his role as chair in 2017. these processes are varied and complex. In some The steering committee subsequently negotiated circumstances, leaders—civic or political elites—hold a confidence-building measures, including the release of genuine conviction that an inclusive conversation can some political prisoners. South Sudanese participated forge progress toward elusive peace. In others, sitting actively and vocally in the local and state-level confer- leaders seek to cement their power, extend their terms, ences. Preliminary reports seem to have documented or co-opt opposition while placating critics under the faithfully citizens’ views, including criticism of the sitting guise of consultation and inclusion. government and calls for leadership change. Many remain reticent, however. Some political and armed In 2020, several national dialogue processes were un- opposition, along with some civic groups, question the der discussion or underway around the globe. In South value of a national dialogue during an ongoing civil Sudan, the dialogue, which had been announced in war, staggering food insecurity, and consistent reports USIP.ORG 5 of human rights violations and closing political space. Any hopes of renewing Myanmar’s otherwise defunct Many are closely watching the dialogue and awaiting a Union Peace Conference (UPC), also known as the 21st clear articulation—and concrete demonstration—of its Century Panglong, were dashed on February 1, 2021, relevance to the national peace process and reduction when the Myanmar army (Tatmadaw) launched a coup, in communal conflict. detained the political leadership, and began deploying brutal violence on its own population. The UPC itself Zimbabweans also explored national dialogue
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