White Paper for a Sustainable Peace in Casamance
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Cloth, Commerce and History in Western Africa 1700-1850
The Texture of Change: Cloth, Commerce and History in Western Africa 1700-1850 The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Benjamin, Jody A. 2016. The Texture of Change: Cloth, Commerce and History in Western Africa 1700-1850. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33493374 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA The Texture of Change: Cloth Commerce and History in West Africa, 1700-1850 A dissertation presented by Jody A. Benjamin to The Department of African and African American Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of African and African American Studies Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts May 2016 © 2016 Jody A. Benjamin All rights reserved. Dissertation Adviser: Professor Emmanuel Akyeampong Jody A. Benjamin The Texture of Change: Cloth Commerce and History in West Africa, 1700-1850 Abstract This study re-examines historical change in western Africa during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries through the lens of cotton textiles; that is by focusing on the production, exchange and consumption of cotton cloth, including the evolution of clothing practices, through which the region interacted with other parts of the world. It advances a recent scholarly emphasis to re-assert the centrality of African societies to the history of the early modern trade diasporas that shaped developments around the Atlantic Ocean. -
Guinea-Bissau After Vieira: Challenges and Opportunities
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 20/1999 Guinea-Bissau after Vieira: Challenges and Opportunities On 7 June 1998, an army mutiny led by former Chief of Staff, General Ansumane Mane, plunged the Republic of Guinea-Bissau into a devastating civil war. The coup aimed to oust President Joao Bernardo Vieira, who had come to power in a military coup against Luis Cabral in 1980 and had subsequently won the country's first multiparty elections in 1994. The civil war that followed Mane's mutiny changed the framework of the ongoing transformation process in the former socialist-orientated Guinea-Bissau. It also engulfed the subregion drawing Senegal, Guinea and The Gambia into the power struggle in Guinea- Bissau. In May 1999, after a peace process had already been did not install a military regime after he came to negotiated and partially implemented, Mane's forces power. With the beginning of democratic transition launched another attack on Vieira, and finally in 1990, the military lost its remaining privileges and succeeded in ousting the incumbent leader. Although became part of the marginalised population. Major this coup can be seen as a setback for peace and sections of the army started relying on proceeds from reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau, the new political illicit arms deals with the Casamance rebels and situation that resulted from Vieira's overthrow at least cannabis sales. provided a chance to end a hitherto paralysing state of 'no peace-no war' — akin to the Angolan situation The regional dimension after the Lusaka Accords. The new power G iven Mane's control over major sections of the army, constellation under Mane may well give Vieira's Vieira had to fight the rebellion with the military rather disappointing democratisation assistance of Guinea (400 soldiers) and process fresh impetus. -
Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Stability Challenges and Prospects
Annan, N 2014 Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, stability Challenges and Prospects. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 3(1): 3, pp. 1-16, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.da RESEARCH ARTICLE Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges and Prospects Nancy Annan* The advent of intra-state conflicts or ‘new wars’ in West Africa has brought many of its economies to the brink of collapse, creating humanitarian casualties and concerns. For decades, countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea- Bissau were crippled by conflicts and civil strife in which violence and incessant killings were prevalent. While violent conflicts are declining in the sub-region, recent insurgencies in the Sahel region affecting the West African countries of Mali, Niger and Mauritania and low intensity conflicts surging within notably stable countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal sends alarming signals of the possible re-surfacing of internal and regional violent conflicts. These conflicts are often hinged on several factors including poverty, human rights violations, bad governance and corruption, ethnic marginalization and small arms proliferation. Although many actors including the ECOWAS, civil society and international community have been making efforts, conflicts continue to persist in the sub-region and their resolution is often protracted. This paper posits that the poor understanding of the fundamental causes of West Africa’s violent conflicts and civil strife would likely cause the sub-region to continue experiencing and suffering the brunt of these violent wars. Introduction 24). While violent conflicts are declining in The transformation from inter-state to intra- the sub-region, recent insurgencies in the state conflict from the latter part of the 20th Sahel region affecting the West African coun- Century in West Africa brought a number of tries of Mali, Niger and Mauritania sends its economies to near collapse. -
Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Senegal: Is the Practice Declining? Descriptive Analysis of Demographic and Health Surveys, 2005–2017
Population Council Knowledge Commons Reproductive Health Social and Behavioral Science Research (SBSR) 2-28-2020 Female genital mutilation/cutting in Senegal: Is the practice declining? Descriptive analysis of Demographic and Health Surveys, 2005–2017 Dennis Matanda Population Council Glory Atilola Zhuzhi Moore Paul Komba Lubanzadio Mavatikua See next page for additional authors Follow this and additional works at: https://knowledgecommons.popcouncil.org/departments_sbsr-rh Part of the Demography, Population, and Ecology Commons, Family, Life Course, and Society Commons, Gender and Sexuality Commons, International Public Health Commons, and the Medicine and Health Commons How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! Recommended Citation Matanda, Dennis, Glory Atilola, Zhuzhi Moore, Paul Komba, Lubanzadio Mavatikua, Chibuzor Christopher Nnanatu, and Ngianga-Bakwin Kandala. 2020. "Female genital mutilation/cutting in Senegal: Is the practice declining? Descriptive analysis of Demographic and Health Surveys, 2005-2017," Evidence to End FGM/C: Research to Help Girls and Women Thrive. New York: Population Council. This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Population Council. Authors Dennis Matanda, Glory Atilola, Zhuzhi Moore, Paul Komba, Lubanzadio Mavatikua, Chibuzor Christopher Nnanatu, and Ngianga-Bakwin Kandala This report is available at Knowledge Commons: https://knowledgecommons.popcouncil.org/departments_sbsr-rh/ 1079 TITLE WHITE TEXT FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION / CUTTING IN SENEGAL:TITLE ON IS TOPTHE OF -
Accessing Services in the City the Significance of Urban Refugee-Host Relations in Cameroon, Indonesia and Pakistan
ACCESSING SERVICES IN THE CITY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF URBAN REFUGEE-HOST RELATIONS IN CAMEROON, INDONESIA AND PAKISTAN CHURCH WORLD SERVICE FEBRUARY 2013 Graeme Rodgers/CWS ACCESSING SERVICES IN THE CITY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF URBAN REFUGEE-HOST RELATIONS IN CAMEROON, INDONESIA AND PAKISTAN Church World Service, New York Immigration and Refugee Program February 2013 Executive Summary This report considers how relationships between urban refugees and more established local communities affect refugee access to key services and resources. According to the estimates of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the majority of the world’s refugees now reside in cities or towns. In contrast to camps, where refugees are relatively isolated from local host communities and more dependent on assistance from humanitarian agencies to meet their basic needs, refugees in urban areas typically depend more on social networks, relationships and individual agency to re-establish their livelihoods. This study explores the conditions under which refugee-host relations may either promote or inhibit refugee access to local services and other resources. It also considers how positive impacts of these evolving relationships may be nurtured and developed to improve humanitarian outcomes for refugees. In 2009, UNHCR updated its policy on refugees in urban areas, highlighting the challenges of providing protection and assistance in spatially and socially complex environments. This initiative has encouraged the broader humanitarian community to explore more innovative approaches to understanding and programming related to refugees in urban areas. One of the effects of this development has been to highlight the role of the host community and the importance of considering their needs and perspectives. -
West Africa: Regional Context and Susceptibility to Criminal Economies – 31
2. WEST AFRICA: REGIONAL CONTEXT AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CRIMINAL ECONOMIES – 31 Chapter 2. West Africa: Regional context and susceptibility to criminal economies This chapter reviews the key characteristics of the West African region that are relevant both to understanding the growth of criminal economies, and their interactions with citizens and the state. These issues include the development and demographic status of West African countries, and the dynamics of the region’s economy and trade. The chapter provides an overview of the region’s governance and democracy, and highlights salient features of its peace and security, or instability. Taken together, these characteristics impact on the way criminality develops in the region. Consequently, they are relevant for developing responses to criminality and illicit financial flows, and working to mitigate the impact of these factors on development. ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS: THE ECONOMY OF ILLICIT TRADE IN WEST AFRICA © OECD 2018 32 – 2. WEST AFRICA: REGIONAL CONTEXT AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CRIMINAL ECONOMIES Introduction This report focuses on West Africa and the 15 countries covered by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. ECOWAS brings these countries together around the shared commitment to build a “borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region, built on good governance” (ECOWAS, 2011). This commitment recognises that owing to a range of systemic factors, West African nations and peoples are uniquely bound together, with highly homogenous societies and interwoven, complementary economies. As borders between these states are highly porous, freedom of movement and trade sits at the cornerstone of a shared understanding of resilience, economic growth and development. -
Senegal and Mali 9
Senegal and Mali 9 MACARTAN HUMPHREYS and HABAYE AG MOHAMED n mid-December 1983, hundreds of demonstrators—armed with spears, machetes, and hunting rifles, covered in protective charms, and chanting Iincantations to render them invulnerable to bullets—invaded the streets of Ziguinchor to call for the independence of a region in the southwest corner of Senegal—the Casamance.1 The government responded with a heavy hand, leaving an official toll of 80 injured and 29 dead.2 A handful of those retreating, led by vet- erans from the Senegalese army, under the banner of the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC), headed to the mangroves and dense forest of lower Casamance to set up rebel bases.They started military training and planning attacks on government positions.In doing so,they began a guerrilla war that has left thousands killed and the south of Senegal strewn with land mines.After 20 years of failed negotiations and aborted attempts at achieving military victory,no end to the war is in sight. The civil war in Mali started very differently.On the morning of June 28, 1990, a small group of Libyan-trained fighters belonging to the Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l’Azawad (MPLA), also hoping to gain independence for their region, Azawad, attacked a small government position in Tideremen in the far northeast of Mali.They killed four and gained control of a dozen automatic rifles.Moving south- west,the group attacked more government positions that same evening.In an attack at the town of Méneka, they seized 124 automatic rifles.These attacks were the beginning of a war that would engulf the region in intercommunal conflict, pitting northern “whites” against northern “blacks.”After extensive and broad-based nego- tiations, the war ended with a weapons-burning ceremony in 1996. -
SENEGAL Last Updated: 2007-05-22
Vitamin and Mineral Nutrition Information System (VMNIS) WHO Global Database on Iodine Deficiency The database on iodine deficiency includes data by country on goitre prevalence and/or urinary iodine concentration SENEGAL Last Updated: 2007-05-22 Goitre Urinary iodine (µg/L) Notes prevalence (%) Distribution (%) Prevalence (%) Age Sample Grade Grade TGP <20 20-49 50-99100-299 >300 <100 Median Mean SD Reference General Line Level Date Region and sample descriptor Sex (years) size 1 2 D 2003 Véligara department: SAC by area: Urban B 6.00 - 12.99 65 53.8 12.7 5128 * Véligara department: SAC by area: Rural B 6.00 - 12.99 84 40.5 25.4 Vélingara department: SAC by area: Urban B 6.00 - 12.99 677 2.2 * Vélingara department: SAC by area: Rural B 6.00 - 12.99 878 1.2 Vélingara department: Women by area: Urban F NS 358 5.3 Vélingara department: Women by area: Rural F NS 306 4.2 Vélingara department: PW by area: Urban F NS 46 13.0 Vélingara department: PW by area: Rural F NS 61 11.5 L 1999P Casamance area: 6 villages: All B 5.00 - 60.99 109 97.0 20.0 1563 * 1 Casamance area: 6 villages: All B 5.00 - 60.99 160 30.0 10.6 40.6 * L 1997 Bambey, Kebemer and Koungheul: SAC B 6.00 - 12.99 400 15.0 28.0 38.0 81.0 5129 * S 1995 -1997 Tambacounda and Casamance regions: All: Total B 10.00 - 50.99 8797 21.5 24.5 18.3 64.4 5282 * Tambacounda and Casamance regions: PW F NS 462 50.0 All by region: Tambacounda urban B 10.00 - 50.99 866 17.7 25.1 24.2 67.0 61.1 All by region: Tambacounda rural B 10.00 - 50.99 793 43.6 37.2 12.8 93.6 23.0 All by department: Bakel B -
World Directory of Minorities
World Directory of Minorities Africa MRG Directory –> Senegal –> Diola (Jola) Print Page Close Window Diola (Jola) Profile Casamance is a small area between Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. It comprises Ziguinchor and Kolda, two of the country's eight administrative regions, and is almost completely separated from the state by Gambia. The majority ethnic group in Casamance is Diola (Jola), although they make up only around four per cent of Senegal's total population. There are also significant Diola populations in The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Traditionally farmers, especially rice cultivators, and traders, there has been an increasing tendency for Diola youth to migrate, at least seasonally, to urban centres. Many Diola practice traditional beliefs, while others are Christians and a smaller number are Muslim. Christians and Muslims often mix those rites with traditional beliefs. Historical context Many Diola sold into slavery in the 17th century century were taken to Britain's American colonies, where they were prized for their rice-growing skills. During and since the colonial period, Diola traditional culture and beliefs were eroded by Islam, Christianity and Western education. Casamance was part of the Gambia River complex and in 1889 was arbitrarily separated from Gambia. During the colonial and early independence period it was a distant and neglected region, and under pressure from Wolof cultural dominance in Senegal. Several movements for the independence of Casamance from Senegal developed in the late 1960s and 1970s. A few separatist groups emerged in the early 1980s, spurred on by new government policies that transferred some traditional lands of subsistence farmers in Casamance to northern Muslims of Wolof, Serer or Peuhl ethnicity for use in growing cash crops. -
1.1. Background and Objectives of the Study
CHAPTER I Introduction 1.1. Background and Objectives of the Study Since the end of direct European colonial rule, the post-colonial state has been beset by various crises, including civil wars, authoritarianism, brutal human rights violations and pervasive socio-economic malaise.1 At no other time, however, have these crises reached more devastating proportions than during the post-Cold War period. As Makau Wa Mutua succinctly states: ‘[i]t is as though the African state has gone from the frying pan and into the fire.’ 2 Africa has been engulfed from north to south and from west to east by violent upheavals of severe intensity, with consequences that include genocide and the disintegration of states. As inequalities more often than not followed ethno-cultural or regional lines, most of these strifes involve ethnic-based claims for political inclusion, socio-economic justice and autonomy.3 Even a cursory look at many of these conflicts would attest to this fact. In Algeria, while political violence erupted following the cancellation of the 1992 elections, the Berbers continued their agitation and protest against the non-recognition of their distinct identity and the policy of assimilation into the dominant Arab culture that was aggressively pursued by successive post-colonial governments.4 In Mauritania, the largely black communities were brutally mas- sacred and forcibly removed from their land, dispossessed of their property and expelled from their country while being stripped of their citizenship.5 While fighting involving ethnic-based rebel groups led to the implosion of Liberia6 and Sierra Leone, Senegal continues to contend with an intermittent violence 1 See Basil Davidson The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (1992) 8. -
Senegal Grain and Feed Annual 2018 West Africa Rice Annual
THIS REPORT CONTAINS ASSESSMENTS OF COMMODITY AND TRADE ISSUES MADE BY USDA STAFF AND NOT NECESSARILY STATEMENTS OF OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY Required Report - public distribution Date: 4/19/2018 GAIN Report Number: Senegal Grain and Feed Annual 2018 West Africa Rice Annual Approved By: Joshua Lagos Prepared By: Jasmine Osinski Fana Sylla Report Highlights: Marketing year (MY) 2018/19 total area and rice production for Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Senegal is forecast at 2.4 million HA and 4.2 million MT assuming good weather and continued subsidized inputs that may influence planting decisions. MY 2018/19 total imports for all the aforementioned countries are estimated to increase approximately 14.5 percent to 3.375 million MT on steady demand and expectations of competitive international prices. This annual report primarily focuses on providing an overview of Senegal; it includes an abridged analysis for Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea. Page 2 of 18 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Executive Summary II. Senegal 3 Production 3 Rice Milling and Processing 6 Prices 7 Rice Seed Research and Seed Multiplication 8 Consumption 9 Trade 10 Stocks 10 Policy 10 Marketing 14 III. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea 14 Mali 14 Production 14 Consumption 14 Trade 14 Burkina Faso 15 Production 15 Consumption 15 Trade 15 Guinea 15 Production 16 Consumption 16 Trade 16 IV.- Production, Supply and Demand Data Statistics 17 Page 3 of 18 I. Executive Summary Marketing year (MY) 2018/19 total area and rice production for Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Senegal is forecast at 2.4 million hectares (HA) and 4.2 million MT assuming good weather and continued subsidized inputs that may influence planting decisions. -
Demographics of Senegal: Ethnicity and Religion (By Region and Department in %)
Appendix 1 Demographics of Senegal: Ethnicity and Religion (By Region and Department in %) ETHNICITY Wolof Pulaar Jola Serer Mandinka Other NATIONAL 42.7 23.7 5.3 14.9 4.2 13.4 Diourbel: 66.7 6.9 0.2 24.8 0.2 1.2 Mbacke 84.9 8.4 0.1 8.4 0.1 1.1 Bambey 57.3 2.9 0.1 38.9 0.1 0.7 Diourbel 53.4 9.4 0.4 34.4 0.5 1.9 Saint-Louis: 30.1 61.3 0.3 0.7 0.0 7.6 Matam 3.9 88.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 8.0 Podor 5.5 89.8 0.3 0.3 0.0 4.1 Dagana 63.6 25.3 0.7 1.3 0.0 10.4 Ziguinchor: 10.4 15.1 35.5 4.5 13.7 20.8 Ziguinchor 8.2 13.5 34.5 3.4 14.4 26.0 Bignona 1.8 5.2 80.6 1.2 6.1 5.1 Oussouye 4.8 4.7 82.4 3.5 1.5 3.1 Dakar 53.8 18.5 4.7 11.6 2.8 8.6 Fatick 29.9 9.2 0.0 55.1 2.1 3.7 Kaolack 62.4 19.3 0.0 11.8 0.5 6.0 Kolda 3.4 49.5 5.9 0.0 23.6 17.6 Louga 70.1 25.3 0.0 1.2 0.0 3.4 Tamba 8.8 46.4 0.0 3.0 17.4 24.4 Thies 54.0 10.9 0.7 30.2 0.9 3.3 Continued 232 Appendix 1 Appendix 1 (continued) RELIGION Tijan Murid Khadir Other Christian Traditional Muslim NATIONAL 47.4 30.1 10.9 5.4 4.3 1.9 Diourbel: 9.5 85.3 0.0 4.1 0.0 0.3 Mbacke 4.3 91.6 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 Bambey 9.8 85.6 2.9 0.6 0.7 0.4 Diourbel 16.0 77.2 4.6 0.7 1.2 0.3 Saint-Louis: 80.2 6.4 8.4 3.7 0.4 0.9 Matam 88.6 2.3 3.0 4.7 0.3 1.0 Podor 93.8 1.9 2.4 0.8 0.0 1.0 Dagana 66.2 11.9 15.8 0.9 0.8 1.1 Ziguinchor: 22.9 4.0 32.0 16.3 17.1 7.7 Ziguinchor 31.2 5.0 17.6 16.2 24.2 5.8 Bignona 17.0 3.3 51.2 18.5 8.2 1.8 Oussouye 14.6 2.5 3.3 6.1 27.7 45.8 Dakar 51.5 23.4 6.9 10.9 6.7 0.7 Fatick 39.6 38.6 12.4 1.2 7.8 0.5 Kaolack 65.3 27.2 4.9 0.9 1.0 0.6 Kolda 52.7 3.6 26.0 11.1 5.0 1.6 Louga 37.3 45.9 15.1 1.2 0.1 0.5 Source: