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Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Stability Challenges and Prospects

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Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Stability Challenges and Prospects Annan, N 2014 Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, stability Challenges and Prospects. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 3(1): 3, pp. 1-16, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.da RESEARCH ARTICLE Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges and Prospects Nancy Annan* The advent of intra-state conflicts or ‘new wars’ in West Africa has brought many of its economies to the brink of collapse, creating humanitarian casualties and concerns. For decades, countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea- Bissau were crippled by conflicts and civil strife in which violence and incessant killings were prevalent. While violent conflicts are declining in the sub-region, recent insurgencies in the Sahel region affecting the West African countries of Mali, Niger and Mauritania and low intensity conflicts surging within notably stable countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal sends alarming signals of the possible re-surfacing of internal and regional violent conflicts. These conflicts are often hinged on several factors including poverty, human rights violations, bad governance and corruption, ethnic marginalization and small arms proliferation. Although many actors including the ECOWAS, civil society and international community have been making efforts, conflicts continue to persist in the sub-region and their resolution is often protracted. This paper posits that the poor understanding of the fundamental causes of West Africa’s violent conflicts and civil strife would likely cause the sub-region to continue experiencing and suffering the brunt of these violent wars. Introduction 24). While violent conflicts are declining in The transformation from inter-state to intra- the sub-region, recent insurgencies in the state conflict from the latter part of the 20th Sahel region affecting the West African coun- Century in West Africa brought a number of tries of Mali, Niger and Mauritania sends its economies to near collapse. As a result, the alarming signals of the possible re-surfacing sub-region’s security environment has often of internal and regional violent conflicts. been viewed as one that continues to be pre- More critical to add is the low intensity con- carious and unstable. Although conflicts are flicts surging within notably stable countries not always violent, those that have plagued such as the Casamance conflict in Senegal, West Africa at community, state and regional the intermittent Dagbon chieftaincy crisis in levels have been characterized by violence Ghana and the Niger Delta conflict in Nige- (Afisi 2009: 59–66). For decades, countries ria to name a few (Olonisakin 2011: 11–26). such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire These conflicts have resulted in the ‘destruc- and Guinea-Bissau were crippled by conflicts tion of lives and property, the internal dis- and civil strife in which violence and inces- placement of people, a region-wide refugee sant killings were prevalent (Afolabi 2009: crisis, poverty and disease, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, human and drug trafficking, illegal exploitation * Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ghana of natural resources and banditry’ (Afolabi [email protected] 2009: 25). Art. 3, page 2 of 16 Annan: Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa Ending violent conflicts in West Africa to continue experiencing and suffering the remains one of the main challenges of the brunt of these violent wars. Against this sub- region. This is possibly attributed to background, the author attempts to support the sudden shift from inter-state to intra- discourses on violent conflicts and civil strife state conflicts that characterized most part in West Africa by first giving an overview of of the late 1980s through to the 21st century violent conflicts and civil strife in the sub- posing a new challenge of intra-state peace region; identifying and expatiating on the consolidation and conflict prevention. Par- causes of these conflicts; elaborate on exist- ticular for a number of actors including the ing initiatives; identifying challenges imped- sub-regional bloc, the Economic Commu- ing efforts towards ending conflicts in the nity of West African States (ECOWAS) which sub-region; and finally concluding with pros- was set up to build economic integration pects for future conflict resolution. (Jaye et al 2011: 1–7). Nevertheless, over the years, states, the ECOWAS, Civil Society Conceptualizing Conflicts and War groups and the International Community Ending in West Africa have taken measures to resolve and end vio- The conceptualization of conflicts and war lent conflicts in the sub-region. Examples ending is dynamic and constantly evolving can be cited of ECOWAS’ timely response to particularly in the post-cold war era. With the violent civil wars that erupted in Liberia the paradigmatic shift from inter-state to and Sierra Leone in 1989 and 1991 respec- intra-state conflicts, many literatures have tively through the deployment of the ECO- different definitions and concepts of conflict WAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) (Jaye et and its resolution. To Bernard Mayer (2000) al 2011: 1–7). Despite these efforts which conflicts can be explained through a three- have achieved some appreciable success, dimensional lens. That is ‘conflict as per- the cradle of peace and stability in the sub- ception,’ ‘conflict as feeling’ and ‘conflict as region remains brittle and the possibility of action.’ As a perception, Mayer identifies that a resurgence of seemingly ended conflicts is conflict is often the conviction that ‘one’s own high.1 Buttressing the latter is the example needs, interests, wants, or values are incom- of West Africa’s first Republic state, Libe- patible with someone else’s’ (Mayer 2000). As ria, where the country relapsed into a sec- a feeling, conflict can be expressed through ond civil war in 1999 after ECOWAS Cease several emotions including ‘fear, anger, bit- fire intervention ended the first civil war in terness, sadness, hopelessness’ or the combi- 1996.2 In the period between 2010 and 2011, nation of these (Mayer 2000). Finally, Mayer Côte d’Ivoire almost plunged back into civil highlights that conflict involves actions war after its disputed November 2010 elec- which may be ‘violent or destructive’ (Mayer tion led to violent confrontations between 2000). To the ECOWAS, conflict is defined loyalists of then President Laurent Gbagbo as ‘contradictions inherent in power rela- and opposition Alassane Ouattara claiming tions and which manifest themselves in the lives of over 3000 Ivoirians and displac- individual and group interactions with one ing many (BBC News Africa 2011). These few another and with nature in the pursuit of examples raise questions on the capacity and limited resources or opportunities’ (ECPF mechanisms used to resolve conflicts in West 2008). For the purposes of this article, con- Africa and the effectiveness of these mecha- flict could be seen as a violent expression of nisms to ensure sustainable peace in the sub- disagreements and frustration often arising region. The paper posits that failure to iden- from unmet needs and aspirations. As indi- tify and thoroughly address the fundamental cated earlier, while conflicts are not always causes of West Africa’s violent conflicts and violent, the ones that have affected West civil strife would likely cause the sub-region Africa have been characterized by violence Annan: Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa Art. 3, page 3 of 16 and brutality. While the conceptualization of either coups d’état or insurgency. While the low intensity conflicts (LIC) remains unclear, former have often been short-lived (eg. Mali this article refers to LIC as prolonged, sub- and Guinea-Bissau coups in 2012), the latter tle yet staid altercations between different however have been protracted (eg. Liberia, groups often with socio-economic, political Sierra Leone, and Northern Mali). and military intentions. LIC has the potential of erupting into full-blown conflict if unre- Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in solved. West Africa Invariably, conflicts in West Africa have West Africa has been grappling with violent been notably fuelled by multiple interrelated conflicts and civil strife for decades, how- causal factors including poverty, human ever, the periods between the 1980s and the rights violations, bad governance and cor- 1990s leading to the new millennium pre- ruption, ethnic marginalization and small sented more violent and protracted conflicts arms proliferation (Fithen 1999; Voz di Paz which destabilized many of its economies and Interpeace 2010; Vinck et al 2011; Keili (Aning and Bah 2009; UNSC Report 2011). 2008). While the above causes persist, some Notable countries that plunged into violent of the conflicts that have occurred in the sub- conflict during that period include Liberia, region have been linked to certain triggers Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire which often ignite the uprisings. According (Aning and Bah 2009). to ECOWAS, as defined in its Conflict Preven- tion Framework 2008, these triggers are asso- Past conflicts ciated with sudden happenings that arouse Liberia plunged into its first violent civil war in tensions often leading to violent conflicts December 1989 with the invasion of Charles (ECPF 2008). For example, the 2012 coup Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia d’état in Mali was reportedly triggered by the (NPFL).3 Taylor’s rebellion, which sought to lack of support from the Traoré regime to the overthrow the autocratic and repressive rule Malian army to handle the Tuareg rebellion of then President Samuel Doe, not only suc- in January 2012 which led to the death of ceeded with his ascension to power in the several national soldiers (Chew 2012). 1997 elections, but also resulted in the out- Ending war or conflicts especially in West break of a violent seven-year civil war (Vinck Africa has been quite a challenge due to its et al 2011). In 1996, with the support of the complex multi-causal factors, multiple actors ECOMOG, violence was abated leading to a and the nature of the conflict; often con- ceasefire.
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