Annan, N 2014 Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in : Causes, stability Challenges and Prospects. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 3(1): 3, pp. 1-16, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.da

RESEARCH ARTICLE Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges and Prospects Nancy Annan*

The advent of intra-state conflicts or ‘new wars’ in West Africa has brought many of its economies to the brink of collapse, creating humanitarian casualties and concerns. For decades, countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea- Bissau were crippled by conflicts and civil strife in which violence and incessant killings were prevalent. While violent conflicts are declining in the sub-region, recent insurgencies in the region affecting the West African countries of Mali, Niger and Mauritania and low intensity conflicts surging within notably stable countries such as Ghana, and sends alarming signals of the possible re-surfacing of internal and regional violent conflicts. These conflicts are often hinged on several factors including poverty, human rights violations, bad governance and corruption, ethnic marginalization and small arms proliferation. Although many actors including the ECOWAS, civil society and international community have been making efforts, conflicts continue to persist in the sub-region and their resolution is often protracted. This paper posits that the poor understanding of the fundamental causes of West Africa’s violent conflicts and civil strife would likely cause the sub-region to continue experiencing and suffering the brunt of these violent wars.

Introduction 24). While violent conflicts are declining in The transformation from inter-state to intra- the sub-region, recent insurgencies in the state conflict from the latter part of the 20th Sahel region affecting the West African coun- Century in West Africa brought a number of tries of Mali, Niger and Mauritania sends its economies to near collapse. As a result, the alarming signals of the possible re-surfacing sub-region’s security environment has often of internal and regional violent conflicts. been viewed as one that continues to be pre- More critical to add is the low intensity con- carious and unstable. Although conflicts are flicts surging within notably stable countries not always violent, those that have plagued such as the conflict in Senegal, West Africa at community, state and regional the intermittent Dagbon chieftaincy crisis in levels have been characterized by violence Ghana and the Niger Delta conflict in Nige- (Afisi 2009: 59–66). For decades, countries ria to name a few (Olonisakin 2011: 11–26). such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire These conflicts have resulted in the ‘destruc- and Guinea-Bissau were crippled by conflicts tion of lives and property, the internal dis- and civil strife in which violence and inces- placement of people, a region-wide refugee sant killings were prevalent (Afolabi 2009: crisis, poverty and disease, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, human and drug trafficking, illegal exploitation * Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ghana of natural resources and banditry’ (Afolabi [email protected] 2009: 25). Art. 3, page 2 of 16 Annan: Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa

Ending violent conflicts in West Africa to continue experiencing and suffering the remains one of the main challenges of the brunt of these violent wars. Against this sub- region. This is possibly attributed to background, the author attempts to support the sudden shift from inter-state to intra- discourses on violent conflicts and civil strife state conflicts that characterized most part in West Africa by first giving an overview of of the late 1980s through to the 21st century violent conflicts and civil strife in the sub- posing a new challenge of intra-state peace region; identifying and expatiating on the consolidation and conflict prevention. Par- causes of these conflicts; elaborate on exist- ticular for a number of actors including the ing initiatives; identifying challenges imped- sub-regional bloc, the Economic Commu- ing efforts towards ending conflicts in the nity of West African States (ECOWAS) which sub-region; and finally concluding with pros- was set up to build economic integration pects for future conflict resolution. (Jaye et al 2011: 1–7). Nevertheless, over the years, states, the ECOWAS, Civil Society Conceptualizing Conflicts and War groups and the International Community Ending in West Africa have taken measures to resolve and end vio- The conceptualization of conflicts and war lent conflicts in the sub-region. Examples ending is dynamic and constantly evolving can be cited of ECOWAS’ timely response to particularly in the post- era. With the violent civil wars that erupted in Liberia the paradigmatic shift from inter-state to and Sierra Leone in 1989 and 1991 respec- intra-state conflicts, many literatures have tively through the deployment of the ECO- different definitions and concepts of conflict WAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) (Jaye et and its resolution. To Bernard Mayer (2000) al 2011: 1–7). Despite these efforts which conflicts can be explained through a three- have achieved some appreciable success, dimensional lens. That is ‘conflict as per- the cradle of peace and stability in the sub- ception,’ ‘conflict as feeling’ and ‘conflict as region remains brittle and the possibility of action.’ As a perception, Mayer identifies that a resurgence of seemingly ended conflicts is conflict is often the conviction that ‘one’s own high.1 Buttressing the latter is the example needs, interests, wants, or values are incom- of West Africa’s first Republic state, Libe- patible with someone else’s’ (Mayer 2000). As ria, where the country relapsed into a sec- a feeling, conflict can be expressed through ond civil war in 1999 after ECOWAS Cease several emotions including ‘fear, anger, bit- fire intervention ended the first civil war in terness, sadness, hopelessness’ or the combi- 1996.2 In the period between 2010 and 2011, nation of these (Mayer 2000). Finally, Mayer Côte d’Ivoire almost plunged back into civil highlights that conflict involves actions war after its disputed November 2010 elec- which may be ‘violent or destructive’ (Mayer tion led to violent confrontations between 2000). To the ECOWAS, conflict is defined loyalists of then President Laurent Gbagbo as ‘contradictions inherent in power rela- and opposition Alassane Ouattara claiming tions and which manifest themselves in the lives of over 3000 Ivoirians and displac- individual and group interactions with one ing many (BBC News Africa 2011). These few another and with nature in the pursuit of examples raise questions on the capacity and limited resources or opportunities’ (ECPF mechanisms used to resolve conflicts in West 2008). For the purposes of this article, con- Africa and the effectiveness of these mecha- flict could be seen as a violent expression of nisms to ensure sustainable peace in the sub- disagreements and frustration often arising region. The paper posits that failure to iden- from unmet needs and aspirations. As indi- tify and thoroughly address the fundamental cated earlier, while conflicts are not always causes of West Africa’s violent conflicts and violent, the ones that have affected West civil strife would likely cause the sub-region Africa have been characterized by violence Annan: Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa Art. 3, page 3 of 16 and brutality. While the conceptualization of either coups d’état or insurgency. While the low intensity conflicts (LIC) remains unclear, former have often been short-lived (eg. Mali this article refers to LIC as prolonged, sub- and Guinea-Bissau coups in 2012), the latter tle yet staid altercations between different however have been protracted (eg. Liberia, groups often with socio-economic, political Sierra Leone, and Northern Mali). and military intentions. LIC has the potential of erupting into full-blown conflict if unre- Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in solved. West Africa Invariably, conflicts in West Africa have West Africa has been grappling with violent been notably fuelled by multiple interrelated conflicts and civil strife for decades, how- causal factors including poverty, human ever, the periods between the 1980s and the rights violations, bad governance and cor- 1990s leading to the new millennium pre- ruption, ethnic marginalization and small sented more violent and protracted conflicts arms proliferation (Fithen 1999; Voz di Paz which destabilized many of its economies and Interpeace 2010; Vinck et al 2011; Keili (Aning and Bah 2009; UNSC Report 2011). 2008). While the above causes persist, some Notable countries that plunged into violent of the conflicts that have occurred in the sub- conflict during that period include Liberia, region have been linked to certain triggers Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire which often ignite the uprisings. According (Aning and Bah 2009). to ECOWAS, as defined in its Conflict Preven- tion Framework 2008, these triggers are asso- Past conflicts ciated with sudden happenings that arouse Liberia plunged into its first violent civil war in tensions often leading to violent conflicts December 1989 with the invasion of Charles (ECPF 2008). For example, the 2012 coup Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia d’état in Mali was reportedly triggered by the (NPFL).3 Taylor’s rebellion, which sought to lack of support from the Traoré regime to the overthrow the autocratic and repressive rule Malian army to handle the of then President Samuel Doe, not only suc- in January 2012 which led to the death of ceeded with his ascension to power in the several national soldiers (Chew 2012). 1997 elections, but also resulted in the out- Ending war or conflicts especially in West break of a violent seven-year civil war (Vinck Africa has been quite a challenge due to its et al 2011). In 1996, with the support of the complex multi-causal factors, multiple actors ECOMOG, violence was abated leading to a and the nature of the conflict; often con- ceasefire. Nevertheless, this seeming peace tributing to prolonging the conflict. James was short-lived as longstanding and simmer- Fearon (2002), in his article ‘Why do some ing ethnic tensions, corruption, subjugation civil wars last so much longer than others?,’ and abject poverty of the people thrust the identified that although coup-related civil country back into a second civil war in 1999; wars are often brief, ‘sons of the soil’(often two years after Taylor was elected into office led by insurgent and rebel groups) tend to as president (Kieh and Klay 2009). During be longer and difficult to resolve because the ensuing five-year civil war, the coun- they often hinged on ethnic fragmentation try was besieged by violent confrontations and undemocratic leadership. Furthermore, between Taylor’s NPFL, the Liberians United Fearon explained that the latter tends to be for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) protracted because the belligerent groups and the Movement for Democracy in Libe- expect to gain military supremacy or use ria (MODEL) until the signing of a Compre- violence to acquire favourable agreements hensive Peace Agreement in 2003 led to the (Fearon 2002). Evidently, the nature of civil attainment of appreciable peace and stability wars in West Africa has taken the form of in Liberia (Vinck et al 2011). By the end of the Art. 3, page 4 of 16 Annan: Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa second civil war, there were reported high the 1998 conflict, characterized by periodic cases of rape and torture, high death rates, political crisis, the coup d’état in April 2012 destruction of basic infrastructure and ser- which led to the arrest of Prime Minister Car- vices, malnutrition and about 21,000 child los Gomes Júnior threatened the security and soldiers to disarm and demobilize (Vinck et already fragile peace of this small West Afri- al 2011). The 2009 report of the Liberian can state (Crisis Group 2012). Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Furthermore, the civil conflict that plagued indicated that 250,000 people were killed Côte d’Ivoire, the one-time economic power in the almost 14-year conflict and one mil- house and the beacon of stability in West lion displaced (LTRC 2009). Subsequently, in Africa cannot be overlooked. Deeply rooted 2010, the country reportedly ranked 162 of in ethnic-religious divisions and identity 169 countries in the Human Development aggravated by politics of exclusion, the coun- Index, making it one of the poorest countries try erupted into full-fledged civil strife in Sep- in the world (Vinck et al 2011). tember 2002 (Ogwang 2011).4 Following the Two years after the outbreak of civil war in explosion of the civil strife into a violent con- Liberia, violent civil conflict also erupted in flict, several peace initiatives were adopted neighbouring Sierra Leone in 1991 hinged but failed to resolve the conflict in Côte on a coup led by Foday Sankoh’s Revolution- d’Ivoire until the successful signing of the ary United Front (RUF) rebel group against Ouagadougou peace accord in 2007 restored President Momoh’s regime (Richards 2003). peace and stability in the country (Ogwang Clashes between the Ghaddafi and Taylor 2011: 6). With three years of relative peace supported RUF and the incumbent resulted in the country, Ivoirians were ready to take in over a decade long violent conflict which to the polls in November 2010, a critical elec- was officially declared over in February 2002. tion which was anticipated to consolidate The conflict, arising from corruption, bad the peace the country had enjoyed and unify governance, social injustice, and breakdown its stratified population. Much to their cha- of democratic institutions resulted in the grin, the country nearly relapsed back into killing of 50,000 people, and the destruc- a violent civil war after the disputed elec- tion of infrastructure as well as other perti- tions led to a violent confrontation between nent social services (Kargbo 2002). Similarly, loyalists of incumbent Laurent Gbagbo and Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire experienced main opposition Alassane Ouattara (Ogwang violent civil conflicts in 1998 and 2002 2011). The following five-month battle led to respectively. Like other West African states, the death of over 3000 people and the dis- Guinea-Bissau’s history is characterized with placement of many.5 periodic conflicts however; the ‘7th June War’ in 1998 pushed the former Portuguese Present and emerging conflicts colony into a violent civil strife (Voz di Paz Generally, even though there is a decline in and Interpeace 2010). The 11-month conflict large scale violent conflict and civil strife, which ended on 7 May 1999, led by Brigadier pockets of simmering tensions, insurgency Ansumane Mane, was supposedly caused by and the re-emergence of coups d’état contin- weapon trafficking in neighboring Senegal ues to trouble the sub-region. For example for the Casamance independence movement, the recent coups d’état in Guinea-Bissau and corruption and human rights abuse. Like all Mali; insurgency in the Sahel region affect- violent conflicts, casualties were recorded ing West African countries of Mali, Niger as it claimed the lives of thousands and and Mauritania, as well as low-scale con- entrenched poverty in the country (Voz di flicts in notably stable countries like Ghana, Paz and Interpeace 2010). Despite enjoying Senegal and Nigeria further makes the sub- turbulent peace over the past ten years after region capricious and prone to more violent Annan: Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa Art. 3, page 5 of 16 conflicts (Gilmour 2012; Olonisakin 2011). politics of exclusion, international Since gaining independence in 1960 from forces, and local struggles (Obi 2012). the French, Mali, Africa’s third largest gold producer suffered several coups and ethnic Admittedly, while the aforementioned con- tensions until attaining multi party democ- stitute the broader causal factors, embedded racy in 1992 with the election of President within and related to them are bad govern- Alpha Konare (BBC News Africa 2012a). Nev- ance and corruption, human rights viola- ertheless, the democracy and relative stabil- tions, poverty, ethnic marginalization and ity in the country was not to last, as the re- small arms and light weapons proliferation surfacing of violent conflict in the north by (among others), which continue to serve as the National Movement for the Liberation of triggers and drivers of violent conflicts in the Azawad (MNLA) Tuareg rebels and Al-Qaeda sub-region. Even though there are several in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) in 2007 and other specific causes of violent conflicts and the coup d’état in 2012 resulted in killings, civil strife in West Africa, the paper will focus mass forced displacement of civilians desta- on discussing the aforementioned. bilizing Mali’s political tranquillity (Gilmour 2012; BBC News Africa 2012a).6 Further- Bad governance and corruption more, the recent in Post-colonial rule of West African countries northern Nigeria, which hinged upon reli- has been fraught with several challenges. gion and economic deprivation, also poses Elemental among them are the issues of bad security concerns in the sub-region. Since governance and corruption. Following inde- its emergence in 2002, the Boko Haram pendence, several regimes across the sub- insurgency has taken many lives, displaced region have mismanaged state resources and several thousand and destroyed state prop- weakened governance institutions which erty (Walker 2012). Travelling to the south has resulted in economic stalemate, politi- of Nigeria, the prolonged Niger Delta con- cal apprehensions and breakdown of social flict over oil has further compounded the peace and stability. Today, these twin factors insecurities in West Africa’s most populous constitute a major cause of violent conflicts nation. The Niger Delta conflict has led to and civil strife in West Africa. Several schol- several kidnapping of expatriates, casual- arly works on conflicts in the sub-region have ties and the increased use of sophisticated identified bad governance and corruption as weaponry in the region by militant groups the underpinning factors fuelling and renew- such as the Movement for the Emancipation ing violence in West Africa. Conflicts in Nige- of the Niger Delta (MEND) thereby heighten- ria, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte ing insecurity within the country and across d’Ivoire and other West African countries the sub-region (Ejibunu 2007). notably hinge upon bad governance and cor- ruption. For instance, in the Sierra Leonean Causes of Conflicts in West Africa war, it was identified that bad governance, The root of violent conflicts and civil strife in corruption and poverty were the root causes West Africa is linked to several complex fac- of the conflict (Fithen 1999). Additionally, tors. In his article, ‘Conflict and Peace in West research conducted in Liberia by Patrick Africa,’ Cybil Obi identifies that: Vinck, Phuong Pham and Tino Kreutzer in 2011 indicated that majority of the popula- The roots of conflict in West Africa tion (64 per cent) identified, among other are much deeper and complex, and factors, greed and corruption as the cause of are embedded in the interplay of his- the Liberian civil war (Vinck et al 2011). torical factors, socio-economic crisis, Corruption in West Africa’s most populous legacies of authoritarianism and the nation, Nigeria, has been highlighted as one Art. 3, page 6 of 16 Annan: Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa of the underlining factors in the Niger Delta is being destroyed by the President. It conflict and the more recent, yet very pro- was there that the destruction began. nounced, Boko Haram insurgency (Ejibunu If the President takes twenty-four bil- 2007; Brock 2012). Ironically, the Niger Delta lon (CFA), what is left? (Voz di Paz and region though blessed with the largest oil Interpeace 2010: 52). resource in Nigeria is also the poorest region in the country. This is perhaps attributable Another expressed that: to the high corruption at the national level which does not give opportunity for oil The health centres do not have any- wealth to trickle down to the ordinary ‘Del- thing; patients have no bed and no tarians’ and the larger Nigerian population. sheets. The leaders go to build build- In 2003 for example, the Nigerian Anti-Cor- ings. It is not the people that are ruption Agency, the Economic and Financial spoiling them. The people are united, Crime Commission (EFCC) reportedly esti- but the State does not want our unity. mated that 70 per cent of the oil earnings, They are pitting us against each other. constituting over US$ 14 billion was stolen We are told, `That person is not worth and wasted (Ejibunu 2007). Reportedly, the anything. That lineage is not worth majority of the perpetrators of corruption anything.’ So we fight while they will in Nigeria include senators, ministers, com- sit and eat together, laugh and clap missioners and individuals with higher con- (Voz di Paz and Interpeace 2010: 52). nections in the political playground (Ejibunu 2007).7 In affirming the linkage between cor- Clearly if the above mentioned persists and ruption and violence in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, remains unresolved it could increase the Hassan Tai Ejibunu (2007) indicates that ‘see- likelihood for more violent conflicts and civil ing money coming from the Federal Govern- strife rather than ending them and building ment, on earnings on crude oil sales, with sustainable peace in the sub-region. essentially none of it reaching the ordinary people, has created condition for insurrec- Human rights violations tion’ (Ejibunu 2007). Incidences of human rights abuses and vio- Likewise, in a small country like Guinea- lations are numerous in West Africa and as Bissau, bad governance and corruption are such this forms the basis for the eruption and deeply entrenched in the social, political, renewal of violent conflicts and civil strife judicial and economic system leading to bit- in the sub-region. Across the sub-region, ter pent-up feelings among the local popula- there are reported incidences of sexual and tion which are sometimes expressed through gender-based violence, reprisal killings, beat- violence (Voz di Paz and Interpeace 2010). In ings, impunity for state officials and institu- their 2010 joint report on the ‘Root Causes tions, high social injustice, repressive and of Conflict in Guinea-Bissau: The Voices brutal leadership, and unequal distribution of the People,’ Voz di Paz and Interpeace, of state resources among others (HRW 2003). international non-governmental and peace- All these serve as both triggers and conse- building institutions, chronicled the voices quences of war. For instance in Nigeria, vio- of local citizens of Guinea-Bissau on issues of lations of the human rights of local citizens corruption and conflict. Some citizens were underscore as one of the factors causing the quoted saying: militancy in the Niger Delta region (Ejibunu 2007: 17). Many of the oil companies in the The President steals. The Governor region are reported to be causing environ- steals. The minister and even the Prime mental pollution and economic marginali- Minister steal. The administrator zation while the state supinely looks on. A steals. Who will not steal? The country specific example is the 1992 killings of youth Annan: Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa Art. 3, page 7 of 16 from Bonny, a local community, during a Nguema Mbasogo regime in Equatorial peaceful demonstration against the ecologi- Guinea for example, is not only accused of cal pollution and marginalization caused pervasive corruption but also rife human by Shell Company (Brisibe 2001). Unfortu- rights abuses including detention of politi- nately, the state security institutions support cal opponents, torture, extrajudicial killings, these oil companies to violate the rights of interference in the judicial system, disregard its own citizens as was the case in January for rule of law, widespread violence against 1993 when 300,000 Ogoni protestors who women and impunity of security forces were harassed, arrested and killed by Federal (Freedom House 2011: 14; USDS 2011). government troops when demonstrating Similarly, the government of Alhaji Yayha peacefully against Shell oil for environmen- Jammeh of is accused of similar tal pollution and economic marginalization human rights abuses and violations (USDS (Ejibunu 2007: 17). 2011). As stated earlier, although these vio- In Guinea-Bissau as well, the impunity lations have not resulted in violent conflicts for human rights abuse by state officials in in these countries, their linkages to politi- part led to the violent conflict that desta- cal and internal tensions in both countries bilized the country in 1998 (Voz di Paz and cannot be overlooked (McSherry 2006).10 Interpeace 2010). Local authorities are often For instance, since 1994, Yayha Jammeh’s accused of engaging in beatings and oppres- 19-year regime has experienced over four sion of the local citizens creating a culture attempted coups and several tensions (BBC of ‘Matchundade’8 (aggressive behaviours) News Africa 2012b). which bred major conflict with brutal con- sequences (Voz di Paz and Interpeace 2010). Poverty Due to the continuous existence of these Poverty also stands to be one of the major repressive acts against the citizens and setbacks in West Africa and the continent of among ethnic groups, even after the 1998 Africa. According to the 2012 UNDP Human civil war, Guinea-Bissau seems to be sitting Development report nearly half of sub-Saha- on a boiling pot of tensions which, unre- ran Africans live in poverty (UNDP 2012). solved, could explode into another violent Consequently, the poverty that many across conflict as was mildly witnessed in the 2010 the continent endure can be seen to be one mutiny and the recent April 2012 coup d’état of the major contributing factors to the (Zenoumenou and Okeke 2012). occurrence of violent conflicts in Africa. Like Moreover, human rights violations in seem- the rest of Africa, the West Africa sub-region ingly stable West African countries such is neither immune to the poverty canker nor as The Gambia and Equatorial Guinea are ignorant of its impact on their fragile peace increasingly creating precarious situations and stability. With over 60 per cent of its for instability. Although these countries have population living below the poverty line of not experienced large-scale violent conflicts US$1 a day, civil unrest and grievances, both in recent times as their neighbours have, the recipes for conflicts, become widespread. brutal, undemocratic, unequal and authori- These agitations sometimes take violent tative rule by incumbent regimes is creating forms and are seen as channels for punish- tensions which, unresolved, could bring the ing governments for their failure to allevi- countries to a boiling point of violent war and ate poverty (ECOWAS 2006). For instance, in civil strife. The 2011 Freedom House report research conducted by Vinck et al (2011), 30 on the ‘Worst of the Worst: The World’s per cent of the Liberian population indicated Most Repressive Societies’ named Equato- that poverty was one of the root causes of rial Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire as part of the the Liberian civil war. Similar assertions have 20 most repressed societies in the world also been made with regards to the conflicts (Freedom House 2011).9 The Teodoro Obiang in Nigeria and Guinea-Bissau (Voz di Paz and Art. 3, page 8 of 16 Annan: Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa

Interpeace 2010; Ejibunu 2007). In Voz di Currently, Liberians are still afraid of a poten- Paz and Interpeace’s 2010 report, poverty tial renewal of civil war along ethnic lines was stated as one of the major cause of the when the United Nations (UN) Peacekeep- Bissau-Guinean conflicts, citing food insecu- ing mission ends (Vinck et al 2011). Similar rity, lack of infrastructure and access to basic situations exist in other countries such as social needs as some of the poverty indica- Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria tors in the country (Voz di Paz and Interpeace (Voz di Paz and Interpeace 2010; Ejibunu 2010). Emphasizing the connection between 2007; Ogwang 2011). For a small country poverty and conflict, the Bissau-Guineans like Guinea-Bissau, ethnic divisions are so have an adage which states ‘In homes where entrenched among the various communities there is no bread everyone fights and no one and at the national level, resulting in con- is right’ (Voz di Paz and Interpeace 2010). stant fighting and violence (Voz di Paz and Indeed hunger, starvation, lack of economic Interpeace 2010). Likewise, in a country like growth and development create a high likeli- Ghana which is noted for stability and peace, hood of violent conflicts and civil strife. ethnic division in its northern region, among the Andanis and Abudus has led to violent Ethnic marginalization inter-ethnic strife that threatens the peace in Ethnicity by itself is not violent however the the entire country.11 concept has been manipulated in ‘societies polarized into two imbalanced divides with Small arms and light weapons one faction feeling marginalized’ (Annan proliferation and Danso 2013). Correspondingly, James Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) pro- Fearon and David Laitin (2003) also believe liferation is one of the major challenges in that ‘a greater degree of ethnic or religious West Africa. The sub-region remains an area diversity… by itself’ is not ‘a major and direct of considerable SALW proliferation because cause’ of violent civil conflict…’ (Fearon and of their affordability, accessibility and avail- Laitin 2003: 75–90). Nevertheless, to a larger ability; and porosity of the borders and legal extent, for a heterogeneous community like frameworks legitimizing their use (Keili West Africa, ethnicity has become a dividing 2008). As reported by Edeko Sunday (2011), factor that continues to drive violent con- West Africa hosts about 7 to 10 million of flicts and civil strife within and among com- the world’s illegal SALW as well as 8 million munities and states, destabilizing the peace out of the 100 million circulating in Africa in the sub-region. Research conducted across (Edeko 2011: 55–80; Kwaja 2012). Addition- the sub-region identifies ethnicity and ethnic ally, 77,000 of the small arms are allegedly fragmentation as one of the root causes of within the control of West African insurgent violent conflicts in West Africa. Particularly groups (Ebo and Mazal 2003). The circula- for Liberia, this was prominent as 49 per cent tion of illegal arms within and across states of the population reportedly identified eth- has increased the proclivity of conflicts nicity and ethnic divisions as the root cause within the sub-region. Small arms prolifera- of the Liberian civil wars (Vinck et al 2011). tion has contributed to the mobilization for More specifically, in the 10-year repressive coups d’état, undemocratic overthrow of rule of Samuel Doe, the Krahn and Mandingo governments, increasing casualties and vio- ethnic groups were more favoured than the lent inter-communal and intra-state conflicts others which resulted in various ethnic ten- in West Africa (Ero and Ndinga-Muvumba sions that saw the rebellious invasion of 2004). Since the 1960s there have been over Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian, lead- 37 successful military coups in almost all the ing to the violent civil war that overthrew countries in West Africa often resulting in Doe’s government in 1996 (Vinck et al 2011). violent wars; killing millions and displacing Annan: Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa Art. 3, page 9 of 16 many (Keili 2008). Furthermore, small arms on Côte d’Ivoire; the Accra, Cotonou and proliferation notably fuelled the conflicts in Abuja Peace Agreements on Liberia; and Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea- the Lomé Peace Agreement on Sierra Leone Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo (Keili (Aning et al 2010). In terms of mediation, 2008). For example, arms were supplied by ECOWAS was involved in recent conflicts governments to aid the civil wars in Liberia, in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Guinea-Bissau to Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire (Keili 2008). ensure that stability is restored. For instance, For instance, Charles Taylor’s National Patri- during the 2012 coups d’état in Mali and otic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was accused of Guinea-Bissau, the ECOWAS Heads of States supplying and distributing Foday Sankoh’s and Governments appointed H.E. Blaise Revolutionary United Front (RUF) with arms Compoare of Bukina Faso and H.E. Good- to fuel the conflict in Sierra Leone.12 The con- luck Jonathan of Nigeria as mediators for flict led to the death of over 50,000 people; the respective countries (ECOWAS 2012). The 30,000 amputations; and the sexual viola- ECOWAS has furthermore been collaborating tion of over 257,000 women (Ploughshares with civil society organizations to implement 2002). Additionally, the Liberians United for its Early Warning Mechanism (ECOWARN) Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) rebel which seeks to prevent and monitor conflicts group received weapons from the Guinean in the sub-region. For instance, for the past governments which they used to kill civilians eight years since the operationalisation of in Monrovia during the conflict in Liberia ECOWARN, ECOWAS has been working with (Keili 2008). the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) to monitor elections in Ghana, Initiatives towards Conflict Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Conakry and Prevention and Resolution in other countries on the continent (WANEP West Africa 2011). In addition, the adoptions of the Pro- The outbreak of violent conflicts and civil tocol, Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict strife in West Africa has led to several actions Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace- and interventions played by different actors. keeping and Security in December 1999 and These actors include civil society organiza- the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework tions (CSOs), ECOWAS, the African Union (ECPF) in 2008, among other protocols, have (AU) and the international community. helped enhance and affirm ECOWAS’ role as At the sub-regional level, ECOWAS’ a key player in conflict prevention and reso- involvement and efforts in addressing criti- lution in West Africa (ECOWAS 2008; ECO- cal security challenges have achieved some WAS 1999). noticeable success. In Liberia, Sierra Leone, The efforts of civil society and women’s Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire, the deploy- groups within the sub-region cannot be ment of peacekeepers through ECOMOG and ignored. Throughout the various violent con- the key mediatory role played by the sub- flicts and civil strife that West Africa has expe- regional bloc helped salvage peace and sta- rienced, these groups have played a pivotal bility, bringing an end to the violent conflicts role in building lasting peace within com- (Olonisakin 2011). Additionally, the involve- munities and states. The initiatives of groups ment of ECOWAS can be witnessed through such as WANEP, West Africa Civil Society Insti- its lead on the process of drafting and signing tute (WACSI), Mano River Union Women’s numerous peace agreements that resulted in Peace Network (MARWOPNET), and Women the attainment of peace in several countries in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET), among in the sub-region (Aning et al 2010). These others, have brokered peace and ended vio- include but are not limited to the Linas-Mar- lent conflicts in West Africa. For example, coussis, Accra II & III, and Pretoria Agreements to end the Liberian war WIPNET, through Art. 3, page 10 of 16 Annan: Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa its advocacy campaign, ‘We want peace, No has been deploying peacekeepers into vio- More War’ forced Charles Taylor and the war- lent conflict territories in West Africa for dec- lords of the LURD to attend the peace talks ades.15 Currently, the global body has peace- in 2003 resulting in the signing of the Agree- keeping missions in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) ment on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostili- and Liberia (UNMIL); however its mission in ties on 17 June 2003 (Jones 2011: 165). In Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) ended in 2005 and a similar action, an advocacy campaign by was replaced with the UN Integrated Office MARWOPNET in 2001 brought together the for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL).16 Through these presidents of Liberia (Charles Taylor), Sierra peacekeeping activities, the UN help protect Leone (Tejan Kabbah) and Guinea (Lansana civilians; disarm, demobilize and reintegrate Conte) for a peace talk (Jones 2011: 166). ex-combatant; support post-conflict recon- This action marked the first time the three struction processes; and establish peace leaders had come together to discuss inse- and stable environment in these conflict curity and peacekeeping along their bor- zones.17 More recently, the global govern- ders (Jones 2011: 166). Other regional civil ance body has also been supporting ECOWAS society affiliated institutions, like the Kofi in addressing the crisis in Mali and Guinea- Annan International Peacekeeping Training Bissau. For instance, the Secretary-General’s Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana (since its incep- Special Representative for West Africa, Said tion in 2003), have trained various military, Djinnit, participated in the ECOWAS Media- police and civilians in conflict prevention tion and Security Council meeting on Mali and peacekeeping. The KAIPTC has also cre- and Guinea-Bissau took place in Abidjan, la ated avenues for dialogue among civil society Côte d’Ivoire, on 19 May 2012.18 In addition, groups and other regional bodies on peace- the establishment of the UN Office for West keeping, peacebuilding, mediation and nego- Africa (UNOWA) in January 2002 has assisted tiation, and post-conflict reconstruction.13 the region to address, inter alia, issues of At the continental and international level, human rights abuse, election violence, cross- the AU, UN and other bilateral and multilat- border insecurities, security sector reforms, eral actors have taken several initiatives to drug trafficking and organized crimes as well support the consolidation of peace in West as provide funding for the implementation Africa. The African Union for example was of state and regional programmes.19 The EU instrumental in ending Côte d’Ivoire’s post- on the other hand, have been, among other electoral violence that occurred in 2010– activities, funding and supporting election 2011. The continental body, among other observation and monitoring programmes initiatives, formed a five-member mediation across the sub-region. Since 2000, it has group including Kenyan Prime Minister Raila deployed 78 Election Observation missions Odinga, Presidents Robert Mugabe (Zimba- worldwide including missions to 10 West bwe), Jacob Zuma (South Africa), Goodluck African countries - Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Jonathan (Nigeria) and Mohamed Ould Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Ghana, Togo, Guinea Abdel (Mauritania) to broker peace between Conakry, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and Senegal.20 the two disputing factions (GNA 2011). Also Through these missions, EU has been work- in response to the April 2012 coup d’état in ing with local communities and state insti- Guinea-Bissau, the AU at its 318th Council tutions to monitor, prevent and resolve elec- meeting placed a ban on Guinea-Bissau from tion-related violence in the sub-region.21 participating in any AU activities until consti- tutional order and peace was restored.14 Challenges to Ending Violent Beyond the borders of Africa, the UN and Conflicts in West Africa the European Union (EU) have also been key Despite efforts made to prevent and end vio- contributors to the consolidation of sustaina- lent conflicts in West Africa, the region con- ble peace in West Africa. The UN for example tinues to experience sporadic violence and Annan: Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa Art. 3, page 11 of 16 volatile security challenges. The major chal- and material resources for conflict resolu- lenge to ending conflict in West Africa can tion have been some of the sub-region’s be attributed to the poor understanding of challenges. For instance, most national secu- the fundamental causes of the conflict. For rity forces lack the requisite equipment and example in the current Malian crisis, the mis- capacity needed to adequately disarm bel- placed understanding of the international ligerent groups. For example, in the Malian community that the root cause of the con- conflict, lack of equipment and capacity of flict is the terrorist activities by Islamists in the national army has been noted as one the region; thus, placing it in the context of of the challenges preventing successive ‘fight against terror’ has in part hindered the governments from addressing the Tuareg process of finding lasting solution for the rebellions since the 1960s (Chew 2012). In conflict (Taylor 2013). In that it has shifted Liberia also, despite the acclaimed heroic the focus from the deep seated root causes intervention of ECOMOG in 1996, material of bad governance, corruption, discrimina- challenges such as lack of equipment, arms, tion, ethnic marginalization, and unstruc- sea and airlift capacities, and machinery to tured military governance) to terrorist some extent, affected the effective imple- activities which is mainly an offshoot of the mentation of the ECOMOG mandate which conflict(Bourkhars 2013). Other challenges in part contributed to the re-surfacing of the identified by scholars include weak institu- conflict in 1999 after peace was restored in tional structures; language barrier (Anglo- 1997 (Isma 2001). Francophone-Lusophone); lack of skills and Additionally, lack of political will of gov- expertise in conflict mediation and dialogue; ernments of West African states to create lack of resources; lack of political will; lack transparent and accountable governance of coordination between and among ECO- institutions, address human rights issues WAS agencies and its partners; and non- and implement signed peace agreements inclusive peace-building processes. These and resolutions is also a challenge hinder- factors make ending violent conflicts in the ing the resolution of violent conflicts in the region increasingly delicate and challeng- sub-region.22 For example, in the 2010 post ing (Afolabi 2009). In affirming the above, electoral violence in Côte d’Ivoire, Laurent Aning and Bah (2009) identified a disjoint Gbagbo’s defiance to the ECOWAS communi- with regards to collaboration and coordina- qué from the Abuja Summit on 24 December tion between and among ECOWAS institu- 2010, calling for him to step down, hindered tions and its external partners (Aning and the early resolution of the conflict; further Bah 2009). This they emphasized is affecting fuelling the crisis as his loyalists continued the implementation of the ECPF which was to fight.23 Furthermore, limited involvement designed to ‘strengthen human security and of women, local communities, grassroots incorporate conflict prevention activities as organizations and civil society in peace-build- well as aspects of peace-building’ (Aning and ing and peacemaking processes perhaps con- Bah 2009). This has in part is also affecting tributes to the challenges impeding lasting the work operation of the ECOWARN. For resolution of conflicts in West Africa. Women instance, recently, the regional early warning play essential roles in peacemaking in their system was criticized for not detecting the communities, homes and organizations signs that led to the April 2012 coup d’état however, when it comes to official negotia- in Guinea-Bissau as the early warning mecha- tions and mediations, women’s participation nism continued to grapple with internal and and representation remain nominal (Iwilade external coordination challenges (IPI 2012). 2011). In West Africa, the primary organs for Lack of resources of states and the sub- conflict mediation in the ECOWAS Member regional body also hinders the resolution of States are the Council of the Wise (CoW) conflicts in the sub-region. Financial, human and the Special Representatives and Special Art. 3, page 12 of 16 Annan: Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa

Envoys of the President (Afolabi 2009). Author Information With the latter represented by only one Nancy Annan is a researcher at the Faculty female President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, many of Academic Affairs and Research of the Kofi women are automatically excluded from par- Annan International Peacekeeping Training ticipating in formal negotiations. The exclu- Centre (KAIPTC), Accra-Ghana. The author sion of women in this process often results would like to thank the partners of the in unresolved tensions. Melanne Verveer, KAIPTC for their support to the Centre and Head of the US State Department’s Office for its activities. Global Women’s Issues, noted at the 2010 Conference on the Role of Women in Global Notes Security that thirty-one of the world’s thirty- 1 See Obi 2012. nine conflicts relapsed back into violent wars 2 After the deployment of ECOMOG to after peace agreements because women Liberia leading to the ceasefire which were excluded from the peace process (USIP ended the first civil war (1989–1996), 2011). Moreover, lack of adequate expertise ethnic strife among groups loyal to and skills of mediators also accounts for this Charles Taylor refueled violence resulting persisting challenge (Afolabi 2009). Further- in the second civil war (1999–2003) until more, effective peacemaking requires ade- the signing of the Accra Comprehen- quate mediation and facilitation skills which sive Peace Agreement ended the second seem to be lacking among members of the civil war in 2003. See Insight on Conflict CoW, and other mediators in the sub-region 2012. (Onwuka 2009). 3 See Insight on Conflict 2012. 4 For instance, Henri Konan Bedie’s con- Conclusion cept of ‘Ivoirité’ marginalized the non- Ending violent conflicts and civil strife in the Ivoirians and the predominant Muslim sub-region requires collaborative and col- north. lective efforts in (a) identifying the causal 5 See France 24 2012. indicators of conflicts; (b) developing con- 6 See UN Togo 2012 and Gilmour 2012. crete strategies and programmes to prevent, 7 For instance a former Governor of Nige- manage and completely resolve these con- ria’s oil elite Bayelsa State, DSP Alamei- flicts; (c) documenting, managing and dis- yesegha allegedly stashed millions of dol- seminating information on lessons learnt lars in foreign bank accounts to procure and best practices of conflict prevention and mansions in the United States and send resolution, and peacebuilding across the his children to private schools in London sub-region; and (d) harnessing indigenous (Ejibunu 2007). conflict prevention mechanisms while lev- 8 It is a Bissau-Guinean culture where a eraging with contemporary mechanisms to man is measured according to his ability adequately address present and emerging to be rough, bold, violent and arrogant. insecurities and violent conflicts. Although 9 The report looks at political rights and the sub-region is increasingly volatile to civil liberties in various countries assess- vicious conflicts, its rich indigenous cultural ing indicators such as electoral process; and social values such as respect, protection political pluralism and participation; of human life, freedom, cooperation and tol- functioning of government; freedom of erance;24 coupled with its diverse population expression and belief; associational and and numerous civil society organizations are organizational rights; rule of law; and prospective strengths and, if well harnessed, personal autonomy and individual rights. could be a driving force for ending the pre- 10 Equatorial Guinea and the Gambia expe- ponderance of violent conflicts and civil rienced attempted coups d’état in 2004 strife in West Africa. and 2006 respectively. Annan: Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa Art. 3, page 13 of 16

11 See Aapengnuo 2012. Aning K E, Birikorang E and Jaye T 2010 12 See The Trial of Charles Taylor 2008. Compendium of ECOWAS peace and secu- 13 For more information see www.kaiptc.org. rity decisions. Accra: KAIPTC. 14 See Ping 2012. Annan, N and Danso, S 2013 Religion and 15 For example, UNAMSIL, see http://www. Ethnicity in Africa: An Obstacle to Devel- un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/ opment? In: Yaye Nabo Séne (ed) Africa: A past/unamsil/. new dawn? Volume 3, January-December 16 Ibid. 2013, Addis Ababa: AU Herald. 17 For more information see http://www. Aapengua, C M 2012 The Dagbon con- un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ddr. flict and cognitive processes. Northern shtml. Ghana Peace, 9 October 2012. Available 18 See UN Togo 2012. at http://northernghanapeace.typepad. 19 For more information see http://unowa. com/northern_ghana_peace/2008/10/ unmissions.org/. the-dagbon-conf.html. 20 For more information see http://eeas. BBC News Africa 2006 Arrest over Gambia europa.eu/eueom/missions/index_ ‘coup plot.’ BBC News Africa, 28 March. en.htm. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 21 Ibid. hi/africa/4852190.stm [Last accessed 9 22 See Obi 2012. October 2012]. 23 For more information see http://www. BBC News Africa 2011 ICC to investigate irinnews.org/report/91566/cote-d-ivo- Ivory Coast post-election violence. BBC ire-ecowas-searching-for-a-regional-solu- News Africa, 3 October. Available at tion-briefing. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- 24 See Afisi 2009 who says in pre-colonial africa-15148801 [Last accessed 2 October Africa, war was not celebrated but when 2012]. it was bound to happen, there were tra- BBC News Africa 2012a Mali profile, ditional regulations that ensured that BBC News Africa, 12 December. Avail- human lives were protected, fighting able at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ takes place outside of the communities, world-africa-13881978 [Last accessed 26 peace agreements were respected, the December 2012]. period and duration of war determined, BBC News Africa 2012b The Gambia pro- type of weapons used, method of combat, file. BBC News Africa, 11 December. Avail- and women and the aged were involved able at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ in peacemaking processes. world-africa-13380407 [Last accessed 24 April 2013]. References Boukhars, A 2013 The Mali conflict: avoid- Afisi, O T 2009 Tracing contemporary Afri- ing past mistakes, Policy Brief No. 148. ca’s conflict situation to colonialism: A Madrid: FRIDE. breakdown of communication among Brisibe, A A 2001 The identity of a people: natives. Academic Journals, Philosophy With special focus on globalization & its Papers and Reviews, 1(4): 59–66. impact in the Niger Delta. In: African Tra- Afolabi, B T 2009 Peacemaking in the ECO- dition, C.O.O.L Conference, Boston, MA WAS Region: Challenges and Prospects, on 18 March 2001. Conflict Trends, 2: 24, Durban: ACCORD. Brock, J 2012 Nigeria’s boko haram killed Aning, K and Bah, S A 2009 ECOWAS and 935 people since 2009. , 24 conflict prevention in West Africa: Con- January. Available at http://www.reu- fronting the triple threats. New York: New ters.com/article/2012/01/24/us-nige- York University, Centre on International ria-sect-idUSTRE80N1GX20120124 [Last Cooperation. accessed 8 October 2012]. Art. 3, page 14 of 16 Annan: Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa

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How to cite this article: Annan, N 2014 Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges and Prospects. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 3(1): 3, pp. 1-16, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.da

Published: 28 January 2014

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