Senegambian Confederation: Prospect for Unity on the African Continent
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NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law Volume 7 Number 1 Volume 7, Number 1, Summer 1986 Article 3 1986 SENEGAMBIAN CONFEDERATION: PROSPECT FOR UNITY ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/ journal_of_international_and_comparative_law Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation (1986) "SENEGAMBIAN CONFEDERATION: PROSPECT FOR UNITY ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT," NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law: Vol. 7 : No. 1 , Article 3. Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_international_and_comparative_law/vol7/iss1/3 This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. NOTE SENEGAMBIAN CONFEDERATION: PROSPECT FOR UNITY ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ............................................ 46 II. THE SHADOW OF CONFEDERATION .......................... 47 A. Debate on the Merits of a Union: 1960-81 ......... 47 B. Midwife to Confederation: 1981 Coup Attempt in The G ambia ... .. ............................ 56 III. THE SUBSTANCE OF CONFEDERATION ........................ 61 A. Introduction to the Foundation Document and Pro- to co ls . 6 1 B. Defense of The Confederation and Security of Mem- ber S ta tes ...................................... 65 C. Foreign Policy of the Confederation and Member S tates . .. 6 9 D. Unity of Member Nations' Economies and Confed- eral F inance .................................... 71 1. Econom ic Union ............................. 71 2. Confederal Finance .......................... 76 E. Confederal Institutions and Dispute Resolution ... 78 1. Institutions ................................. 78 2. Dispute Resolution ........................... 81 IV. REACTION TO THE CONFEDERATION ................... 82 V. FUTURE PROSPECTS: CONFEDERATION LEADING TO FEDERA- TIO N ? . .. .. 8 4 V I. C ONCLUSION ......................................... 90 V II. APPENDICES .......................................... 96 A. Protocol on Telecommunications ................. 96 B. Protocol on Transportation ...................... 99 C. Protocol on Information ......................... 104 D. Protocol on Confederal Defence .................. 107 E. Protocol on Confederal Security .................. 111 F. Report on the Alternatives for Association Between The Gambia and Senegal ........................ 115 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 7 I. INTRODUCTION' The struggle against the African continent's commonplace disease of military coups 2 has caused The Gambia and Senegal to administer an uncommon but potentially long-term cure. These two West African nations, so intertwined geographically3 that The Gambia has been de- scribed as a "finger in the belly"" of Senegal, have sought a similarly close political and economic union in the Senegambian Confederation in response to the attempted coup in The Gambia 5 on July 30, 1981.' While the hope is that these neighboring countries have integrated their governmental, defense and other policies 7 for the welfare of both, the fear is that The Gambia has become the victim of hegemony. The initial attitude of many observers towards the Confederation had been one of relief for the preservation of democratic stability and peaceful * The author was the recipient of the Ernst C. Stiefel Award for the most accom- plished paper in the field of comparative, common and civil law. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of several colleagues in completing this note. William J.H. Hough III initiated my curiosity in Senegambia through his knowledge of the region and its history. Andrew Varady scrutinized every draft of this note and significantly improved upon each. C. Joseph Wysocki offered valuable advice which I readily incorporated into my final draft and Bruce A. Thomas provided needed criticisms which were welcomed. 1. Principal source materials devoting a rare section or chapter to the Senegambian Confederation are, "The Senegambian Case," U. EZENWE, ECOWAS AND THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF WEST AFRICA (1983); and "Senegambia: Economic and Monetary Union," P. ROBSON, INTEGRATION, DETELOPMENT AND EQUITY (1983). Periodicals supplying current information on developments in the Confederation include AFRICA; AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL; AFRICA REP; NEW AFRICAN and W. AFRICA. 2. "Over the past two decades, a sizeable portion of the Sub-Saharan region was the scene of political and military conflict . In the wake of independence, violent inter- nal conflict burst forth in many of the new nations, stemming from the pluralism of African societies and the difficulties of postcolonial political consolidation." THE WORLD BANK, ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 10 (1983). Of the 41 Sub- Saharan African countries, 17 are governed by the military, 17 are one party states and 7 are multiparty states. The Gambia and Senegal fall into the last category. A Continent Gone Wrong, TIME, Jan. 16, 1984, at 26, 32 (map and table). 3. "Lying as it does, deep in the belly of Senegal, it is more than certain that should the Gambia experience convulsion Senegal would suffer from stomach-ache." A Small Nation With Big Dreams, AFRICA, Sept. 1981, at 18, 18. 4. Each still itself, ECONOMIST, June 12, 1982, at 26, 29. A map of the region will indicate quickly why The Gambia "points like a finger into Senegal's belly." Id. "Sur- rounded on three sides by Senegal, The Gambia consists of a 200 mile strip, seven to fifteen miles wide, on each bank of the river for which it is named." Welch, Prospectsfor "Senegambia," AFRICA REP., Jan. 1963 at 21, 21. 5. Restabilizing The Gambia, W. AFRICA. Aug. 10, 1981, at 1805, 1805. 6. See infra notes 68-99 and accompanying text. 7. In addition to defense and security the two countries declared their intention to seek monetary and economic unity. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1981, at AS, col. 2. 19861 SENEGAMBIAN CONFEDERATION change for two nations long in need of a closer association. This relief, however, was soon changed to an attitude of concern for the existence of The Gambia as an independent, sovereign country. This note will address this concern and respond to the principal question surrounding the Confederation: Has the sovereignty of The Gambia, a former Brit- ish colony, tiny in area and strength,8 been usurped9 by Senegal, a for- mer French colony, which is much larger in all respects? 0 An analysis of the structure of the Confederation and the history of the region will be combined to consider the prospects for the evolution of the supra- national relationship of Senegambia into a Federation. IT. THE SHADOW OF CONFEDERATION" A. Debate on the Merits of a Union: 1960-81 The product of colonial rivalries between Britain and France in the "scramble for Africa,' 2 The Gambia has been described as forming 8. The Gambia has an area of 4,005 square miles. In 1980, 600,000 people comprised the population, making the country the world's 137th most populous. DEADLINE DATA ON WORLD AFFAIRS, GAMBIA 1 (1982). The Gambia had a 500-man "field force" at the time of the coup attempt. Restabilizing The Gambia, supra note 5, at 1805. 9. S. GELLAR, SENEGAL: AN AFRICAN NATION BETWEEN ISLAM AND THE WEST 74 (1982). 10. Senegal has an area of 76,104 square miles. In 1980, the population totalled 5.66 million people, making the country the world's 82nd most populous. DEADLINE DATA ON WORLD AFFAIRS, SENEGAL 1 (1982). Senegal has a total active armed force of 10,000 per- sons. Id. at 3. 11. EZENWE, supra note 1, at 5. In presenting the story of economic integration among African states, which is described as a story of disintegration, the author states that "[iln spite of the present state of affairs, there is almost a staggering unanimity in principle among African governments, as exemplified in speeches, conferences and reso- lutions, on the urgent need for some form of close economic co-operation. However, that has been shadow rather than substance." Id. (emphasis added). 12. H.A. GMLEY, A HISTORY OF THE GAMatA 96 (1965). In using the phrase "scramble for Africa" to describe the diplomacy of European expansion in Africa by the British and French colonial powers, the author explains that "[in this period Africa was seized terri- torially by the great powers and arbitrarily parcelled out by a series of agreements which betrayed little knowledge of the African environment." Id. In the late nineteenth cen- tury, French traders, government officials and troops began to enter the region previ- ously under British control along the coast of the Gambia river. These expansionary moves into West Africa, propelled by France's "wounded pride" over her defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and her inability to become the dominant power in Europe, evi- denced the beginning of France's need for guaranteed markets and raw materials. Id. at 97-98. After realizing the inevitable clash of British and French interests in the region, Britain pressed for conferences to resolve the issue of possession of the territory along the Gambia river, which it saw as "worthless except for bargaining purposes." Id. at 101- 02. The Conference of 1859 saw the French determined to maintain a strong presence in West Africa and the British satisfied to continue viewing the land around the Gambia NY.L. ScH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. ]Vol. 7 "ludicrous boundaries"' 3 which result in an "irrational intrusion"' 4 into river as a valuable bargaining chip: The French, negotiating from a position of strength, showed no intention of retreating from the coastal.and hinterland areas occupied since 1882. This forced a change in the direction of British policy concerning West Africa. The change of attitude was in line with [Chief of British Military Intelligence] General Brack- enbury's advice that he would not "recommend the surrender of the Gambia • . unless it were accompanied by the surrender by the French of their Gold and Slave Coast possessions." He advised that if no suitable general division could be obtained, the Commissioners [at the Conference] should try to secure the best boundaries possible, particularly in the vicinity of Sierra Leone. Id. at 103.