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Israel and the Middle East News Update

Monday, December 15

Headlines: • PM to Tell Kerry: Don't Remove US Veto at UN • Washington Undecided on U.N. Resolution for Palestinian State • Palestinians to Submit Draft UN Security Council Resolution This Week • Poll: Labor-Livni Beats , but Netanyahu Holds Edge Forming Coalition • Likud Slams Lieberman: A Vote for Him Could Lead to Left-Wing Government • Report: Michael Oren Running with Kahlon's Party • Hamas Holds Gaza Military Parade, Vows 's Destruction • Israel’s Gas Offers Lifeline for Peace

Commentary: • Times: “Signs of Recognition” − By Vincent Fean • The American Interest: “There Is No “Plan B” for the Israelis and Palestinians” − By Daniel Kurtzer

S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace 633 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20004 www.centerpeace.org ● Yoni Komorov, Editor ● Nathaniel Sobel, Associate Editor

News Excerpts Israel Hayom PM to Tell Kerry: Don't Remove US Veto at UN Prime Minister flew to Rome on Monday morning, where he was to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Kerry. It was expected that Netanyahu would ask Kerry to ignore the request of Arab League nations that the U.S. not use its U.N. Security Council veto to thwart Palestinian initiatives to set a two-year deadline for the establishment of a Palestinian state and an "end to the occupation." On Sunday night, Israeli officials said Netanyahu would tell Kerry "no to unilateral Palestinian initiatives, no to time-limited negotiations, and no to a peace plan being forced on Israel."

Reuters Washington Undecided on U.N. Resolution for Palestinian State Israel said it hoped the United States would veto any moves at the to set a time frame for its withdrawal from territory Palestinians seek for a state, but a senior U.S. official said it was too early to say. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry will meet Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in Rome on Monday to discuss various proposals for a Palestinian state that are circulating at the United Nations. Later on Monday, Kerry will travel to Paris for talks with European counterparts and then on to London to meet Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat and a delegation from the Arab League, who will urge the United States not to use its U.N. Security Council veto to block the proposals. See also, “Kerry, Russia's Lavrov discuss Middle East, including Israel” (Reuters)

Ha’aretz Palestinians to Submit Draft UN Security Council Resolution This Week The Palestinian Authority plans to submit a draft resolution on ending the Israeli occupation to the United Nations Security Council either late Sunday night or Monday, and will seek a vote on it as early as this Wednesday, senior Palestinian officials said Sunday night. In interviews with the Palestinian media Sunday evening, chief Palestinian negotiator Erekat said the resolution would be submitted later that night or Monday, and that he himself planned to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Kerry sometime in the next two days, probably after Kerry’s meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu on Monday. But he didn’t say when the Palestinians would seek to bring the resolution to vote.

Jerusalem Post Poll: Labor-Livni Beats Likud, but Netanyahu Holds Edge Forming Coalition The new Center-Left list formed by Labor leader Isaac Herzog and Hatnua head could defeat Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud by four seats, a Panels Research poll taken Wednesday night for The Post and its Hebrew sister paper Ma'ariv Sof Hashavua found. The poll found that if elections were held now, the Center-Left list would win 24 seats, Likud 20, Bayit Yehudi 17, Yisrael Beytenu 10, Kulanu 10, nine, eight, six, six, Hadash five and the that will include Balad five. With such results, Herzog would not be able to form a coalition of the necessary 61 MKs, unless he could get either Yisrael Beytenu and Meretz or Yesh Atid and haredi (ultra-Orthodox) parties to coexist.

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Ha’aretz Likud Slams Lieberman: A Vote for Him Could Lead to Left-Wing Government Likud officials sharply criticized Foreign Minister on Saturday, after the leader said he did not "rule out" joining either Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or Labor's head Isaac Herzog after the election. "Lieberman's comments about his willingness to sit in a Herzog-led government prove that voting for Lieberman could shift votes from the right to the left and lead to a left-wing government," the Likud said in a statement. "It is clear that anyone who wants a strong and big government headed by Netanyahu, based on the right and center-right bloc, must vote this time for the Likud."

Jerusalem Post Report: Michael Oren Running with Kahlon's Kulanu Party Former ambassador to the US Michael Oren will be running with former communications minister ’s Kulanu party in the March 17 elections, Israeli media reported on Sunday. A source close to Oren said in response to the Channel 2 report that the former ambassador is examining several options in the public sphere and a decision will be made soon. The news comes after Oren denied rumors forecasting a political run last month. “I have read many reports on supposed political affiliations in the Israeli press,” Oren told in November. “I’m not running for anything. I’m teaching at IDC [Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya], writing a book, and advancing issues important to this country.”

Reuters Hamas Holds Gaza Military Parade, Vows Israel's Destruction Vowing to destroy Israel, Hamas paraded some 2,000 of its armed fighters and truck-mounted rockets through Gaza on Sunday, marking its 27th anniversary with its biggest show of force since the end of the this summer. A ceasefire in August halted 50 days of fighting with Israel in which local health officials said more than 2,100 Palestinians, most of them civilians, were killed. Israel put the number of its dead at 67 soldiers and six civilians. At the parade, a senior Hamas leader reaffirmed the Islamist movement's founding charter's pledge to destroy Israel.

New York Times Israel’s Gas Offers Lifeline for Peace […]Natural gas is both a geopolitical tool and a target in Israel, where a newfound bonanza of resources has the potential to improve ties with energy-hungry Egypt, Jordan and even the Palestinian Authority. But the linchpin of this diplomatic push is not an Israeli official, a Middle Eastern king or an American ambassador. It is an oil company in Texas. Noble Energy, the Houston- based company that runs the Tamar platform and is developing another field nearby, has struck a series of deals in recent months to sell gas from Israel to its neighbors, an export strategy encouraged by the Obama administration to help ease tensions in the region. Both Jordan and the Palestinian Authority have signed preliminary agreements in recent months, while Noble is in talks to supply larger amounts of gas to Egypt.

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New York Times – December 14, 2014 Signs of Recognition By Vincent Fean • Parliaments across Europe — in Britain, Spain, France, Ireland and now the European Parliament — are acting to preserve the prospect of peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. They seek recognition of Palestine on the basis of the 1967 borders as a contribution to a negotiated peace, not a substitute for it. • Sweden has already recognized Palestine. And in 2015, other governments will emulate the Swedes. Palestinians will see that the nonviolence policy of the Palestinian Authority’s president, Mahmoud Abbas, brings international approval and clears the way for United Nations-sponsored talks. Israelis will see that there will indeed be two states in the Holy Land, so whoever they elect next March needs to negotiate that outcome in good faith. • The status quo is bad and getting worse. Europe condemns Hamas rocket fire into Israel, Israeli strikes against United Nations buildings in Gaza, and recent murders in Jerusalem. All are crimes against humanity. • Both peoples have the right to live safely, without fear of their neighbor. Each is the other’s nearest neighbor. Both have the right to self-determination, including statehood. Both need to invest in mutual respect, preventing spoilers from perpetuating myths, suspicion and violence. Life is sacred, irrespective of nationality — that of a three-month-old child in Jerusalem, or a 55-year-old minister in the . • America’s secretary of state, John Kerry, has made strenuous efforts to promote negotiations. Absent was a clear framework: what the international community expects of each party to this conflict. Clarity has been lacking since Bill Clinton’s parameters, set out as he left office in 2000. President still has two years to go — time enough, given the will. • Led by America, the United Nations Security Council should set out the framework and timescale for negotiations. It gripped this issue soon after the 1967 War, producing Resolution 242, ruling out the acquisition of land by force. The two parties to the negotiations should be the state of Israel and the state of Palestine, represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization (as at Oslo, but with a new equity of statehood). • The Security Council is the right guarantor, though this Israeli government demurs. America will always have Israel’s back, and deserves Israel’s trust at the United Nations. There is broad American-European agreement on a fair outcome: the 1967 borders with agreed land swaps enabling most Israeli settlers to remain; Jerusalem as the shared capital of both states; security for both guaranteed by NATO, with American- and European-led peacekeeping forces; and a fair and agreed solution to the refugee question, with all Palestinians gaining the right to live in Palestine. Palestinian sovereignty means an end to the occupation — the full, phased withdrawal of Israeli forces — and an end to all claims. • America cannot do everything. Europe is free to act independently on the shared analysis that the two-state solution is in danger from acts of violence, systematic Israeli settlement construction, the separation barrier, the demolition of Palestinian homes and the seven-year closure of Gaza. Two states are overdue — but are becoming ever harder to achieve. 4

• At Oslo, the Palestinians were promised statehood by 1999. The murder of Prime Minister in 1995 prevented that. Today, recognition gives renewed hope to the majorities in both states, who believe in the two-state concept. • And the European Union matters. It is Israel’s most significant trading partner, and an agreement gives Israel free access for its exports to 28 nations. But the relationship goes deeper still. Israel identifies itself as a Western democracy. John Major, a former British prime minister, said of Israel: “To whom high regard is paid, of him much is expected.” This Israeli government falls short of the values it claims to share with the West, breaking the law in the conduct of its 47-year occupation. It is a crime for an occupying power to transfer its own citizens into territory it occupied by war. That is what the settler enterprise does. • The P.L.O. has recognized the state of Israel on the 1967 borders. Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has professed support for the two-state solution, yet is vague about details. But many in his defunct coalition are working to kill the two-state concept. This is against Israel’s interests, and it’s why Israel is losing Europe. • Peaceful coexistence between the two peoples entails Palestinian sovereignty over its own borders, the legitimate movement of Palestinian goods and people between the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza, and the end of the occupation. A key task for the United States and Europe is to ensure security for both states, working with Egypt to make and keep the peace in Gaza, and with Jordan to protect the Jordan Valley, with European Union and NATO guarantees. • The Palestinian address for a lasting agreement is the P.L.O. in Ramallah, not Hamas in Gaza City. Hamas’s recourse to violence and lack of a peace strategy both need to change. Support for the men of violence will wane decisively when there is a genuine chance of peace with dignity. Egypt and Jordan have key roles as Israel’s peace treaty partners and as beneficiaries of Palestinian statehood. Egypt can stem the flow of weapons into Gaza, while permitting legitimate travel. Jordan is working to calm tensions at the Noble Sanctuary (known to Jews as the Temple Mount) in the old city of Jerusalem. Together with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan uphold the Arab Peace Initiative, which would assure Israel of permanent recognition by over 50 Arab and Muslim states following an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. • Recognition of the Palestinian state is a step toward an equitable negotiated solution. The alternative is the stuff of nightmares: discrimination, violence, revenge and retaliation. • The one-state outcome, which is where Israel is headed, would mean subjugation and violence inside that state. In that scenario, the result would be a descent into tragedy. To preserve its identity, its principles and world repute, Israel needs Palestine just as much as the Palestinians do. Vincent Fean was Britain’s consul- general in Jerusalem from 2010 to 2014.

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The American Interest – December 14, 2014 There Is No “Plan B” for the Israelis and Palestinians By Daniel Kurtzer • The Middle East peace process is in a deep hole, with no easy way out. The Israeli coalition, none too interested in pursuing engagement on peace, is now frozen in place with elections scheduled for March 17. The Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority are weak, don’t govern in Gaza, and barely represent a majority of Palestinian opinion. The PLO seems intent on pursuing a UN statehood option that is guaranteed to elicit a U.S. veto. The United States, the traditional third party and catalyst for negotiations, is absorbed with other crises at home and abroad, and is apparently not interested in investing more effort in the peace process sinkhole. And the context for a negotiated peace is anything but conducive: the Middle East is broken, at war with itself, and in the midst of historic transformations in identity, state power, and religious ideology. • Under these circumstances, it could be argued that the best course of action would be to do nothing: in other words, to wait until the situation is more propitious or “ripe” for peacemaking and for a time when leaders are better prepared to take the necessary risks to reach an agreement. But this is an attractive option only for the opponents of peace. On the Palestinian side, Hamas derives support and legitimation from peace process setbacks, for this bolsters its argument for resistance. The absence of a peace process does not force Hamas to confront its rejectionist, absolutist stance on Israel, enshrined in its Charter. On the Israeli side, settlements leaders and activists take heart from the breakdown of peace efforts, for it provides time to build more settlements and gives meaning to the argument that Israel does not have a partner with whom to make peace. • Doing nothing also really does not mean doing nothing. Life goes on in the meantime, and the bad behaviors of both Palestinians and Israelis (terrorism, incitement, settlements, onerous occupation practices) continue during a period of inactivity in peace making. At bottom, the argument for doing nothing rests on the false premise that the status quo can hold until the situation allows for progress toward peace. Reality is different: status quos in the Israeli- Palestinian arena are never static, and they inevitably deteriorate when positive actions are not taken to improve them. • The alternative to a strategy of doing nothing is often thought to be a “Plan B”—that is, a different strategy than the one that has been followed until now, namely pursuit of the two- state solution. Currently, the market is awash with Plan B’s, with many rushing in to fill the perceived vacuum. For example, former Israeli Ambassador to the United States Michael Oren believes the time has come to return to unilateralism, a theme taken up by others with variations. Former military intelligence chief Amos Yadlin wants Israel to unilaterally determine its borders. , the leader of Israel’s National Home Party, advocates the annexation of Area C—more than 50 percent of the West Bank—while easing up on the rest of the area by providing Palestinians with autonomy. Former settlements leader Dani Dayan argues for “peaceful non-reconciliation,” eschewing annexation while maintaining Israeli control under more relaxed conditions.

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• Other Plan B’s offer different solutions. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman urges Israel to make peace in a regional context, from which a Palestinian state would emerge, and in which there would be territorial and population swaps, along with economic incentives for Israel’s Arab citizens to emigrate. Al Quds University President and former negotiator Sari Nusseibeh has argued for Palestinians to forego independent statehood as a goal and to accept full social and economic rights within Israel, but without citizenship. There is a movement among Palestinians to accept a one-state solution, as long as Palestinians are given full citizenship and voting rights. Some Palestinians have argued that Palestinians should aim for confederation with or absorption into Jordan, rather than pursuing their own independent state. And there are jointly developed, creative ideas such as “two states in one space,” a proposal developed by IPCRI in consultation with Israelis and Palestinians. • Thus far, none of the Plan B’s has gotten much traction, and they are likely to take their place on the library shelf alongside the scores of other plans that have been advocated over the decades. All of these plans share at least one thing in common: They seek to avoid the only common sense outcome of the Arab-Israeli conflict that has been known ever since it was first surfaced in the 1930s by the British Peel Commission: namely, partitioning the land between the two national movements that claim exclusive control over all the territory. • If there really is no acceptable Plan B—and I submit that to be the case, that there is no alternative to a two-state outcome that would be acceptable to a significant majority of Israelis and Palestinians—then what should happen now, when the prospects of achieving Plan A, two states, appears so remote? Israelis and Palestinians need to confront this question on their own; for the United States, the policy implications are clear. • I start with four analytical assumptions: • No progress towards substantive negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians is possible now. Neither side can move because of politics, weakness, and/or ideological rigidity. • An attempt by the United States to revive negotiations now is ill-advised and certain to fail, leading to further weakening of U.S. credibility. • The status quo is neither static nor sustainable, and is likely to deteriorate if nothing is done. • Plan B strategies won’t work and will only serve to detract attention from the obvious, though hard, decisions that ultimately need to be made to reach a two-state solution. • As such, U.S. strategy should be aimed not at reaching negotiations now, but rather at establishing a sound basis of U.S. policy on which to operate in the future. Specifically, during these next two years, the Obama administration should strive to create a sustainable foundation both for U.S. diplomacy and for the peace process itself. This would involve coordinated policy and action along four axes, each of which should be accompanied by a significant public diplomacy effort: • First, the United States should articulate U.S. positions on the core issues—that is, American parameters. (See, for example, here). Forty-seven years after the 1967 war, it is time for the United States to express its views on a peace settlement. The parameters would represent American views of the principles that would drive negotiations, once the parties are ready to negotiate the details. The parameters would represent American policy, and would not be 7

represented as reflecting the positions of the parties. Indeed, the United States would not seek formal responses from the parties. The parameters would represent American policy. • Second, if the United States opposes bad behaviors, it should act accordingly and not simply issue statements of condemnation. U.S. statements that criticize Palestinian violence and incitement, or Israeli settlement activity or occupation practices, have become meaningless, because they are only words. If we truly oppose these behaviors, we need to exact consequences from the party that acts irresponsibly. Without U.S. action, U.S. credibility suffers. Any U.S. actions in response to bad behaviors will be politically difficult and controversial, especially U.S. actions directed at Israel. For this reason alone, the responses must be measured and of a kind that is able to be seen as reasonable by the publics in the region and at home. U.S. security and humanitarian assistance should be fenced off and not become part of this policy of exacting consequences for bad behaviors. • Third, the United States and others need to develop a strategy and take steps to start deconstructing the occupation. The Palestinian economy, trade, and labor are all dependent on Israel, and Israel uses the West Bank as a closed market for Israeli goods. A game plan is needed to build independent Palestinian capacities. These changes will need to be introduced gradually and carefully so as to avoid short-term dislocations especially in Palestinian society. • Fourth, the United States should consult closely with Arab states to develop ways to activate the Arab Peace Initiative, to the extent possible. The Arab Peace Initiative is very important, but its benefits for Israel kick in only at the end of the peace process. If the United States starts to act more forthrightly as advocated here, so too should the Arab states do more than simply reiterate support for their initiative. As the United States takes the steps above, which the Arabs are likely to welcome, the Arabs should also be taking steps to signal Israel about the tangible benefits of peace—for example, regional working groups on pressing issues such as health and water, diplomatic contacts, and the like. • The political fallout in Washington and the region from this integrated U.S. strategy is likely to be severe. Republicans in Congress will seize upon these policies as evidence of bias against Israel and seek to lay claim to being Israel’s only friends in Washington. Right-wing members of the large pro-Israel community in the United States will protest the administration’s actions. The current Israeli government will balk and, at a minimum, accuse the United States of unveiling these ideas so as to interfere in Israel’s elections. Some Palestinians will argue that the U.S. policies do not go far enough. However, the impact of such pushback, both here and in the region, should not be exaggerated. The essence of this strategy is to articulate U.S. policy, to make clear what we support and do not support. • Two immediate questions arise: how does this strategy relate to the Palestinian strategy of forcing a UN Security Council vote on statehood; and should the United States launch this strategy in the midst of an Israeli election campaign? On the first issue, strong and determined leadership by the United States will make any Palestinian UN initiative look weak in comparison. The Palestinians might not back off, but a U.S. veto in this context will be far more reasonable and explainable than a veto in the absence of a U.S. strategy. • Regarding Israeli elections, the United States is a factor whether we articulate a strategy or remain silent. Indeed, U.S. silence at this stage will be represented by some in Israel as

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acceptance of the status quo. To be sure, the announcement of a U.S. strategy now will be far more controversial than waiting until later. However, having an American strategy on the table will also help inform the debate in Israel over the critical issues involved in peace making. On balance, it is far wiser to be upfront about our policy—if we decide to go in this direction—than to unveil it only after the Israelis go to the polls. • The risk/benefit calculation of this strategy clearly weighs in favor of implementing it. Since there is no expectation that it will lead to negotiations, in a sense it can fail only if the United States abandons it in the face of opposition from the region or domestically. Potentially, it could stimulate a healthy debate in Israel and Palestine about issues that are normally avoided. And, at a minimum, it will leave U.S. policy in far better shape to craft a strategy in the future to reach negotiations, once the politics in Israel and Palestine will allow it. Daniel Charles Kurtzer is an American former diplomat. He served as U.S. ambassador to Egypt during the term of President Bill Clinton, and was the U.S. ambassador to Israel from 2001 to 2005 during the term of President George W Bush.

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