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2017 Can We Settle This: The Role of Settlements in the Occupied Territories and U.S.- Relations, 1967-1981

Ben-Ephraim, Shaiel

Ben-Ephraim, S. (2017). Can We Settle This: The Role of Settlements in the Occupied Territories and U.S.-Israel Relations, 1967-1981 (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/25204 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/4075 doctoral thesis

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Can We Settle This: The Role of Settlements in the Occupied Territories and U.S.-Israel

Relations, 1967-1981

by

Shaiel Ben-Ephraim

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

CENTRE FOR MILITARY, SECURITY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

CALGARY, ALBERTA

SEPTEMBER, 2017

© Shaiel Ben-Ephraim 2017

Abstract

This dissertation examines the role of settlements in U.S.-Israeli relations. It asks when and how

U.S. policy influences the likelihood of Israel substantially moderating its settlement policy? In addition, it explains when the U.S. took an interest in resolving the issue as well as when and why Israel is responsive to U.S. pressure. The dissertation is the first analysis of the topic based on primary documents. It is also a first cut at explaining policy as part of a strategic interaction, rather than as a phenomenon determined by domestic Israeli factors.

The project utilizes an analytical framework based on Powell and Lake’s strategic choice approach. The framework is used to situate the case of settlements in U.S.-Israeli relations in the literature on bargaining, mediation and compliance. The empirical analysis focuses on the 1967-

1981 period. In the first empirical chapter, the formative policy of the Johnson administration is analyzed alongside the Israeli policy of trickery and obfuscation designed to protect its nascent settlement enterprise. It continues with a look at the Nixon administration up to the 1973 War focusing on the Meir governments efforts to openly promote “defensible borders” and the gradual U.S. acceptance of that conception. The third empirical chapter focuses on the changes wrought by the war in the estimation of the role of settlements during Rabin’s first tenure and the late Nixon and Ford years. The final empirical chapter analyzes the Israeli decision to evacuate the settlements in Sinai as part of the peace agreement with as well as the failure of the autonomy talks.

The thrust of the argument is that despite possessing greater resources and influence, the

U.S. was unable to alter settlement policy within the context of bilateral negotiations. Rather the

ii outcome was dependent on the existence of a willing Arab interlocuter turning U.S. conflict resolution from bilateral bargaining to genuine mediation. Once this occurred, successful mediation depended on U.S. motivation to mobilize its resources and establish credibility.

Mediation succeeded when the U.S was biased against the Israeli territorial position and had a genuine strategic interest in promoting Israeli withdrawal.

iii

Preface

This thesis is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, Shaiel Ben-Ephraim.

iv

Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii

Preface……………………………………………………………………………………..iv

Table of Contents ...... v

Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………..vi

List of Acronyms………………………………………………………………………….ix

List of Tables ...... x

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………...1

Chapter One - Analytical Framework ...... 22

Chapter Two - From Kids to Goats: The Johnson Years, 1967-1968……………………..60

Chapter Three: Sharpening the Sickle: The Nixon years, 1969-1973...... 122

Chapter Four: Illegal Actions: the late Nixon and Ford Years 1973-1976...... 206

Chapter Five: Therefore, they Shouldn’t Exist: The Carter Years, 1977-1981...... 290

Chapter Six: Conclusion ...... 381

Bibliography ...... 409

v

Acknowledgements

You always hear that academic is cutthroat and political. What no one tells you is how much collegiality, fellowship, support and assistance one gets from colleagues and mentors along the way. Without the support of my advisors David Tal and Terry Terriff, there is no way I could have completed this work. Dr. Terriff taught me how to write concisely and to the point and to never lose sight of the research question. Dr. Tal taught me how to write history which focuses on the interaction between actors and which does not get bogged down in details but rather to shape the narrative and form a coherent thesis. Both read chapters swiftly, answered emails within hours (sometimes minutes), wrote countless recommendations and always provided guidance while allowing me to find my own voice. Dr. John Ferris was officially a member of my committee but acted as a third advisor, offering valuable insight, reading all my side project articles and incessantly writing recommendations. I was also deeply lucky to have Dr. Jeremy

Pressman one of my mentors and inspirations on the committee and Dr. Rob Heubert from whom

I have learned a great deal as an instructor and researcher as well. I am also highly indebted to

Dr. Jewel Spangler for serving on my committee and asking the most poignant and informative questions imaginable during my defense. This amazing committee made the defense an enjoyable and (surprisingly) fun two hours that just flew by.

There are many other faculty members who have provided feedback and valuable assistance. From the Hebrew University in I am indebted to Dr. Korina Kagan, Dr.

Dan Miodownik and Dr. Oren Barak who helped with earlier parts of the project. I cannot neglect to mention the late great Dr. Yaa’cov Bar-Siman Tov who serves as a model for the combination of historical research applied within a theoretical framework, which I have

vi attempted to emulate. In addition, I have received valuable feedback from John Mearsheimer,

Oded Haklai, Ehud Eiran, Peter Krause, Lorenzo Veracini, Elie Podeh, Or Honig, Alan

Bloomfield, Boaz Atzili, Nadav Shelef, Manus Midlarsky, Natan Aridan, Jonathan Rynhold,

Ariel Zellman and my dear friend Ziv Rubinovitz. I also want to thank the Association for Israel

Studies which awarded me the Kimmerling prize for a version of the first chapter as well as the editorial staff of Diplomatic History which will soon publish it. Finally, I wish to thank the Y &

S Center for Israel Studies at UCLA, particularly Dr. Steven Spiegel and Dr. Yoram Cohen, for providing me with the opportunity to take the next step in my academic career as a postdoctoral fellow.

One cannot research primary documents without assistance from archival staff members.

It has been far too long since I conducted my archival research and I no longer remember individual names. However, the staff at the US National Archives in Maryland, the Israeli State

Archives in Jerusalem, the Johnson Library in Texas, the Nixon Library in California, the Carter

Library in Georgia, the Yad Tabenkin archives in Ramat Efal, the Beit Berl archives near Kfar

Saba and the Jabotinsky archives in were all incredibly helpful. I must single out the

Ford Library in Michigan which not only provided personal attention but also helped fund my research. I also with to thank those who provided financial support for this project including

CMSS, the Faculty of Graduate Studies, the Office of the Chancellor, the Mount Royal

University Faculty Development Committee, the Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute, the Kahanoff Israel Studies fund, the Association for Israel Studies, the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa and the International Studies Association. Yes, those research trips don’t pay for themselves!

vii

The University of Calgary provided a wonderful network of support over these (far too many) years. The staff at the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies has been amazing. Trisha Henschel and Donna Donna Keene-Ochosky have both been life savers in many a crisis. I have also made wonderful friends at the university that I hope will last a life time, particularly Tushna, Brice, Keith, Jeremy, Matt, Tim, Saira, Mike, Maria, David, Milos, Ruth,

Juliette, Katie, Anastasia, Alex, Kim, Harris, Braden, Sam, Danny, Steffen and Vincent come to mind. But there have been so many wonderful students over the years and I am indebted to many of them and I apologize for not naming everyone. I also thank my friends in Israel and elsewhere for their support, particularly Mira, Amos, Ariel, Yair, Ophir, Anna, Anshini, Anita, Efrat, Ellen,

Kasa, Hagit, Noa, Sama, Costa, Zhanna, Maya and Benny. Also, my family members who are always there for me, my father and mother. As well as my dearly departed uncle Meir and treasured uncle Steven. Not to mention my grandparents, all of whom are now deceased but without whom I would not be who I am today. As well as my amazing cousins who enrich my life and my family. Most importantly, I would like to thank Gugu who has been my support and partner as this project took shape. She made sure I was fed and clothed and undistracted and offered invaluable advice. Without her I would have lost my sanity, probably somewhere in the second empirical chapter. This dissertation is dedicated to you.

viii

List of Acronyms

Achdut Ha’avoda – Faction within the /Labor Party led by . AIPAC – The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the largest and most influential pro- Israel lobbying group in the . Alignment – Name of the Labour Party dominated political bloc in the 1965-1968 period. Breira – A Jewish American organization was an organization founded to express a moderate position on the Israeli-Arab conflict and present an alternative to AIPAC. CIA - Central Intelligence Agency. DMC – Democratic Movement for Change. A moderate party led by Yigal Yadin which joined the led coalition in 1977 and proceeded to disintegrate over the next few years. FATAH - Palestinian National Liberation Movement led by . Originally an independent movement FATAH joined the PLO and became the dominant faction within it. – The right wing -Liberals Bloc party led by . GOI – Government of Israel. Gush Emunim – Bloc of the faithful. A pro-settlement extra-parliamentary civil society pressure group. Herut – The largest and more right-wing faction, led by Menachem Begin, within GAHAL and later within the Likud. IDF – Israeli Defense Force. Jewish Agency – A large non-profit Jewish organization which cooperates closely with Israel on settlement and immigration issues. Meuchad – National affiliated with the Achdut Ha’avoda faction of the Labour Party. Likud – The party that replaced GAHAL as the major right-wing party in Israel in 1973 and was a union of Herut, the Liberal Party, the , the National List and the Movement for Greater Israel. – The dominant Workers Party of the Land of Israel faction within the Labor Party/Alignment led by and later . MAPAM - The Socialist United Workers Party, at times ran independently but during this period was usually the most left-wing faction within the Alignment/Labor Party.

ix

NAHAL- Pioneering Fighting Youth units of the Israeli military. NEA - Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the State Department, which handles Israel and the Middle East. NRP – The which was almost perpetually a junior coalition partner. NSA – National Security Advisor NSC – National Security Council PLO – Palestinian Liberation Organization. RAFI – The Israeli Workers List faction within the Labor Party led by and later . Revisionist Movement – A right-wing ideological stream within based on the teaching of Vladimir Jabotionsky, which laid the foundation for the Likud Party. Settlement Department – The department within the Jewish Agency which handles issues related to settlement. UNDOF - Disengagement Observer Force. The force established by the UN to oversee the Israeli-Syrian disengagement on the in 1974. UNSC – United Nations Security Council. USG – United States Government USUN - U.S. Mission to the United Nations WZO – World Zionist Organization. An international body uniting World Zionist Unions, international Zionist federations; and international organizations that define themselves as Zionist.

x

List of Tables

Table 1: Elements Determining U.S. Mediation Success…………………………………394 Introduction

In 2009 then President Obama demanded that Israel freeze settlement activity in order to facilitate a return to the negotiation table. This led to a standoff lasting well over a year between the Obama administration and the Netanyahu government. The Israeli government eventually caved and announced a 10-month moratorium on settlements.1 The time elapsed and Israel went back to regular construction.2 No notable progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process had been made. Notably, once a moratorium had been reached, Obama was unable to obtain corresponding concessions from the Palestinian Authority.3 Robert Satloff of noted that, “getting into a fight with Israel without having anything to show for it from the Arabs was not what the president bargained for.”4 It is fair to say that the issue of Israeli settlements has been a recurrent and central irritant in U.S.-Israeli relations. Every administration since Gerald

Ford has held public altercations with Israel over settlements. The song and dance of bilateral confrontation over the settlements had been ongoing for several decades now.5

U.S.-Israeli bilateral relations have been noted for their closeness.6 Therefore, the dispute has been notable in an otherwise cooperative and positive relationship. This raises some

1 Barak , “Netanyahu Declares 10-month Settlement Freeze 'To Restart Peace Talks,” November 29, 2009, Ha’aretz, http://www.haaretz.com/news/netanyahu-declares-10-month-settlement-freeze-to-restart-peace-talks- 1.3435 {accessed June 13, 2017} 2 Josef Federman, “Despite relentless Obama criticism, settlements grew as much in his years as in Bush’s,” Times of Israel, September 16, 2016, http://www.timesofisrael.com/despite-relentless-obama-criticism-settlements-grew- as-much-in-his-years-as-in-bushs/ {accessed: June 14, 2017} 3 Elliot Abrams, “The Settlement Obsession Both Israel and the United States Miss the Obstacles to Peace,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4 (July/August 2011), 142. 4 Robert Satloff, “The End of the Beginning,” New Republic, September 27, 2009 https://newrepublic.com/article/69715/the-end-the-beginning {accessed: June 14, 2017} 5 For a summary of the official U.S. position during different administrations see Daniel Kurtzer, “Do Settlements Matter? An American Perspective,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 16, No.3 (Fall 2009), 92-94. 6 Yaacov Bar Siman Tov, "The United States and Israel since 1948: A "Special Relationship?”, Diplomatic History, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring, 1998), 231- 262.; Abraham Ben-Zvi, From Truman to Obama: the Rise of and the Beginning of the Decline of US-Israeli Relations (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Achronot, 2005); Bernard Reich, The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship (: Praeger, 1984); David Schoenbaum, The United States and interesting questions. The United States is considered, just about universally, to be biased towards Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict. There are even significant voices claiming that the

U.S. has pursued Israeli interests at the expense of its own national interest.7 If this is so, why has this irritation persisted?

The reasons for these repeated confrontations are obscured further by their lack of utility.

Despite a stable American public opposition to Israeli settlement construction policies, settlements have continuously expanded. From its meager beginnings, the settlement enterprise has grown tremendously. According to the latest figures, there are 380,000 Jewish settlers in the

West Bank (not including Israeli citizens in East Jerusalem) making up 13% of the population there. If Israeli citizens living in occupied East Jerusalem are included, the number reaches

588,000. As of 2017, there are 127 government sanctioned and 100 unrecognized settlements in the as well as 33 settlements in the Golan Heights.8

Importance of the Topic: Policy

The settlements are almost universally considered to be a principal obstacle to Arab-Israeli peace.9 The primary logic behind criticism of Israeli settlement construction is simple. Efforts to

the State of Israel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Elizabeth Stephens, US Policy Towards Israel: The Role of Political Culture in Defining the ‘Special Relationship’ (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2006). 7 Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel & the Palestinians (Cambridge: South End Press, 1999); , Brokers of Deceit: How the U.S. has Undermined Peace in the Middle East (Boston: Beacon Press, 2013); John Mearsheimer & Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007) 8 Yotam Berger, “Settler Census,” June 11, 2017, Ha’aretz, http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/50years/.premium- 1.4159019 {accessed: June 14, 2017}; Betzelem, “Statistics on Settlements and Settler Population,” Betzelem, May 11, 2017 {accessed: June 14, 2017}. 9 Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel and the Peace Process 1977-1982: In Search of Legitimacy for Peace (Albany: State of New York University Press, 1994), 251; Taylan Özgür Kaya, The Middle East Peace Process and the EU: Foreign Policy and Security Strategy in International Politics (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 81;

1 resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict are based on the premise that Israel should trade land occupied in the 1967 War for peace. Israel has settled in increasingly larger areas, expropriating roughly

10% of the West Bank.10 Israel never claimed sovereignty over the settled territory but Israeli law was applied to them. Therefore, expansion of settlements decreases the territory available for a peace agreement in any of the occupied territories lowering the chances for a deal. In the past optimists noted that most settlers live in concentrated blocks which could remain under Israeli control in return for land swaps. However, the latest figures indicate this may not be so easy as only 56% of the settlers live in these concentrated areas.11 Theoretical attempts to draw a logical border between Israel and a future Palestinian State are therefore increasingly difficult.

The expansion of settlements, despite criticism from the international community, would seem to indicate that external actors have had little influence on Israeli policy. On a certain level, this is not surprising. Israel is known for its disregard for the international community. This attitude emerges from the traumatic heritage of which has engendered an unfortunate (but not always misplaced) sense that “the world is against us.”12 Believing the outside world is dangerous and hostile, Israel has stressed military and strategic considerations means over diplomacy.13 Therefore criticism from international actors has always been treated

Andrew Quinn, “Clinton says Israel Settlements Obstacle to Peace,” Reuters, March 22, 2010) http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/22/us-palestinians-israel-clinton-idUSTRE62L1B820100322 {accessed March 31, 2014); Associated Press, “EU Condemns New Israel Settlements Plan,” , October 31, 2013 http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4447983,00.html {accessed March 31, 2014); Xinhua, “Israeli Settlement "Major Obstacle" for Resumption of Palestine-Israel Peace Talks: Chinese UN Envoy,” People’s Daily, July 27, 2011 http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7453058.html {accessed March 31, 2014); Jim Zanotti, Israel and the Palestinians: Prospects for a Two-State Solution (Washington D.C: Congressional Research Service, 2008) 21-22; One major exception is Elliot Abrams who believes they are minor inconvenience for negotiators and can be easily overcome. See Abrams, “The Settlement Obsession.” 10 Kurtzer, “Do Settlements Matter?,” 90-91. 11 Berger, “Settler Census.” 12 For a good summary of this element in Israeli foreign policy see Alan Dowty, “Israeli Foreign Policy and the Jewish Question,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1 (March 1999), 1-13; Sasson Sofer, Zionism and the Foundations of Israeli Diplomacy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 364-367. 13 Aaron Klieman, Israel & the World after 40 Years (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1990), 86-90; Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land : A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and

2 with suspicion by successive Israeli governments and external attempts to alter Israeli policy often ignored.

On another level, the inability of the United States to curtail settlement policy has been surprising. Israel cannot and does not wish to ignore the wishes of its great power patron. The special influence in this bilateral relationship is engendered by its strategic support for Israel. It supports the Jewish State in the manner most suited to its immediate short-term needs, military hardware. The Israeli military doctrine is based on qualitative superiority requiring a steady supply of top quality military equipment.14 The U.S. has reliably provided Israel with the arms it needs to maintain its qualitative superiority since the late 1960’s.15 In addition, it has often protected its ally from harmful resolutions in the United Nations by casting its veto. Finally, a relationship of trust and mutual sympathy has emerged and undergirded the bilateral relationship.16 The confluence of these factors renders the U.S. uniquely capable of influencing

Israeli policy.

The U.S. also has the motivation and capabilities to influence important developments in the Middle East. In the period studied here and beyond, the U.S. has been the most powerful actor in the international system.17 The U.S. has important strategic interests in the Middle East.

It has looked first and foremost to contain global rivals, particularly the USSR, and keep them

Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press, 2009); Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: Norton, 2000). 14 Michael Handel, Israel’s Political-Military Doctrine (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, , 1973), 63-68. 15 A.F.K. Organski, The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel (New York: Press, 1990). 16 Jonathan Rynhold, The Arab-Israeli Conflict in American Political Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Stephens, US Policy Towards Israel. 17 On U.S. primacy see Stephen G. Brooks, William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton, N.J.: Press, 2008); George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Pres, 2008).

3 from penetrating the region. Furthermore, it has sought to maintain the steady flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to industrial centers such as Western Europe and Japan. It also sought to defend

Israeli security.18 Correspondingly, it has taken the lead in mediation of the Arab-Israeli conflict.19 In its capacity as mediator it has often been successful in wresting concessions out of

Israel, most notably in brokering peace between Israel and Egypt in 1979, among other successful and less successful attempts.20

With all this in mind, the United States is an actor with significant potential influence on

Israeli settlement policy. The official American policy has opposed Israeli settlement construction as an obstacle to peace and has put some nominal effort into curtailing Israeli construction.21 Although it often appears that American foreign policy has been impotent in the face of Israeli settlement expansion, this is inaccurate. Indeed, in both events in which Israel evacuated settlements (Sinai following Israeli-Egyptian peace, and the Gaza Disengagement of

2005) the U.S. was involved. This raises the question of when and why the U.S. is sometimes able to curtail settlement construction but more often seems to have no influence at all.

The issue remains one of great importance. The longer Israel stays in the territory, the more attached to the territory it becomes. Initially the attitude towards returning the occupied territories was pragmatic.22 However, segments of the Israeli population developed an increasing

18 Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 27-35; William Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 11-15; Steven Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 381-382. 19 Daniel Kurtzer, Steven Spiegel, et al., The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 1989-2011 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012); Quandt, Peace Process. 20 For the best full history of U.S. involvement in the peace process see Quandt, Peace Process. 21 Donald Neff, “Settlements in U.S. Policy,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Spring 1994), 53-69. 22 For an overview of Labor Party policy on the settlements see Yechiel Admoni, Decade of Discretion: Settlement Policy in the Territories, 1967-77 (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1992); Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements 1967-1977 (New York: Times Books, 2006).

4 emotional attachment to the territories and to the West Bank in particular.23 As time progressed

Israel has proven unwilling or unable to stand up to settler groups even when they have promoted policies harmful to Israel.24 Therefore, it became increasingly difficult to imagine an evacuation of the West Bank.

Already in the 1980’s there were voices insisting that encroachment on the West Bank was irreversible.25 It is unclear what the term irreversible means exactly. Theoretically at least, there are several ways of possibly circumventing the problem. Settlements could remain under a future Palestinian sovereign state. The settlers could enjoy minority rights. Indeed, it recently was revealed that the Netanyahu government asked for that concession in 2014.26 Another possible solution is that a Palestinian state would be compensated for settled territory with land transferred from Israel proper. However, there is no doubt that continued settlement construction renders a permanent settlement of the conflict more difficult to attain.

In addition, Israeli settlement construction undermines the spirit of reconciliation and trust necessary for conflict resolution.27 Palestinians feel Israel uses peace talks as cover to expand its hold on the West Bank.28 This has correspondingly undermined faith in U.S. mediation in the Arab world. Declarations of opposition to Israeli settlement policy no longer

23 See David Newman, (ed.), The Impact of Gush Emunim: Politics and Settlement in the West Bank (London: Croom Helm, 1985); Tsvi Raanan, Gush Emunim (Tel-Aviv: Sifryat Poalim, 1980). 24 Oded Haklai, “Religious—Nationalist Mobilization and State Penetration Lessons From Jewish Settlers' Activism in Israel and the West Bank,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 40, No. 6 (June 2007), 713-739; Barak Mendelsohn, “State Authority in the Balance: The Israeli State and the Messianic Settler Movement,” International Studies Review, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 2014),499–521. 25 Ian Lustick, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 11-20. 26 Amir Tibon & Barak Ravid, “Netanyahu Demanded Settlers Be Allowed to Remain in Palestine After Future Peace Deal, Document Reveals,” June 11, 2017, Haaretz, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.794973 {accessed: June 13, 2017} 27 On the role of trust in conflict resolution see Roy Lewicki, “Trust, Trust Development and Trust Repair,” in Morton Deutsch, Peter T. Coleman (eds.), The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice (, CA: Wiley & Sons, 2004), 104-136. 28 Edward Said, The End of the Peace Process (New York: Pantheon Books, 2000), 110-111.

5 impress the Arabs. Al Jazeera, a news outlet owned by the Qatari government, noted that “on

Palestine, ineffective, ritual American protests about the ills of settlement expansion have become an embarrassment.”29 Since the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a principle interest of U.S. policy in the region, its credibility as a mediator is important to maintain.

Therefore, the topic of the role of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories in U.S.-

Israeli relations is important. Internal factors are not always decisive in determining Israeli policy on the ground. As discussed above, the United States is the actor with the greatest influence on

Israel. Therefore, its policy on the issue is a crucial factor in attaining peace. The issue also stands to shed some unexplored light on U.S.-Israeli relations. As an issue over which there have been constant clashes and unease, it allows a systematic examination of the “special relationship” through the lens of a particularly contentious issue.

Contribution to the literature: settlements and U.S.-Israeli relations

The topic of U.S. policy towards Israeli settlements in the occupied territories suffers from a dearth of academic study. Three academic studies specifically on the topic are extant, all of which are superficial overviews based on secondary sources.30 Ehud Eiran’s work on settlement projects generally and on the development of Israeli settlements in general takes international factors into account. This is unique. He is also the only analyst of the issue fitting great power

29 Geoffrey Aronson, “How failed to stop Israeli settlements,” Al Jazeera, October 31 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/10/barack-obama-failed-stop-israeli-settlements- 161030075936848.html {accessed: June 14, 2017} 30 Kurtzer, “Do Settlements Matter?”; Neff, “Settlements in U.S. Policy,” 53-69; Zaki Shalom, “The United States and the Israeli Settlements: Time for a Change,” Strategic Assessment, Vol. 15, No. 3 (October 2012), 73-85.

6 influence into a theoretical framework. However, he does not analyze the development of U.S. policy towards the settlements in detail or use primary sources.31

Indeed, none of the works published on the topic thus far rely on archival sources.

Therefore, the analysis of policy is useful for analyzing the outputs of policy but not its inputs and sources. An exception is Gershom Gorenberg’s book on Israeli settlements in the 1967-1977 period which relies on Israeli primary documents. However, the book does not focus on U.S. policy, although it uses American primary documents. Considering the high profile that

American policy on Israeli settlement construction has received in the media, the sparsity of primary sourced academic analysis is surprising.32

The lack of in depth research into the topic of U.S. policy on the settlements has not stopped academics from espousing strong opinions on the matter. An argument has emerged over whether the settlements are an important concern in U.S. policy.33 In regard to U.S. settlement policy, there is an argument over why attempts to constrain Israeli construction have been unsuccessful. Three schools of thought have emerged. One states that the U.S. has been inept in handling the issue.34 The second approach maintains that the United States willingly supported

Israeli settlement efforts. 35 The third approach, not specific to settlement policy, posits that the

U.S. does not oppose Israeli policies counter to the U.S. national interest due to the influence of pro-Israel domestic pressure groups. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argue that “U.S aid

31 Ehud Eiran, Settling to Win: Strategic Settlement Projects in Post-Colonial Times, PhD dissertation (Waltham Brandeis University, 2010); Ehud Eiran, “State Elite Perceptions and the Launch of the Israeli Settlement Project in the West Bank,” The International-Domestic Nexus Democracy and Conflict Resolution,” in Henrick Spruyt, et al. (eds.), Democracy and Conflict Resolution (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 2014), 209-222. 32 Eiran has noted this dearth and has stated he believes it should be corrected. Eiran, “Explaining the settlement project,” 110-111. 33 Notable in arguing that the settlements are not particularly important is Elliot Abrams. Daniel Kurtzer, gives the opposite perspective: Abrams, “Settlement Obsession”; Kurtzer, “Do Settlements Matter?.” 34 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 360; Neff, “Settlements in U.S. Policy”. 35 Chomsky, Fateful Triangle, 42. For a similar approach, see also Khalidi, Brokers of Deceit.

7 has indirectly subsidized Israel’s prolonged and costly effort to colonize the Occupied

Territories, and the lobby has made it impossible to convince Israel to abandon this counterproductive policy.”36 As can be discerned, these argument parallel some of the largest arguments regarding U.S.-Israeli relations. This dissertation does not concur with any of these approaches. Instead it views U.S. effectiveness in curtailing Israeli settlements as a product of larger systemic forces and not a product of dyadic U.S.-Israeli relations.

Contribution to the literature: U.S.-Israeli relations in general

This dissertation is situated in the wider debate on U.S.-Israeli relations. Most accounts of these dyadic relations agree that relations are particularly close. The dominant stream in the literature explains closeness as a product of a “special relationship” built on cultural affinity and mutual emotional resonance.37 The substance of the emotional and cultural bond between Israel and the

United States is based on four mutually reinforcing elements. The first is a perceived common commitment to democracy and liberal values.38 The second is a shared moral and cultural heritage based on Judeo-Christian values. This is based, on a common emphasis on the bible as a

36 Mearsheimer & Walt, Israel Lobby, 336. For works in similar spirit, see Michael Thomas, American Policy toward Israel: the Power and Limits of Beliefs (London: Routledge, 2007); Edward Tivnan, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy (New York: Touchstone, 1987). 37 Bar Siman Tov, "The United States and Israel since 1948; Ben-Zvi, Truman to Obama; Schoenbaum, United States and the State of Israel; Bernard Reich, The United States and Israel; Rynhold, The Arab-Israeli Conflict; Schoenbaum, The United States and the State of Israel; Stephens, US Policy Towards Israel; Noam Kochavi, Nixon and Israel: Forging a Conservative Partnership (Albany: Suny Press, 2009), 74-76; Douglas Little, “The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957-68,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Nov., 1993), 563-585. 38 Gabriel Sheffer and Menachem Hofnung, “Israel’s Image,” in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), Dynamics of Dependence: U.S.-Israeli Relations (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1987), 14-15; For a good general overview of the importance of democratic values in American foreign policy, see Walter McDougall, , Crusader State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 15-38.

8 historical and moral tenet in the self-image of both societies.39 The third is the mutual resonance and importance of the holocaust.40 The fourth is what some would call a shared “pioneering” culture, or in less flattering terms a shared “settler colonial” culture. 41

The last element directly relates to U.S. attitudes towards the settlements. The American history of pioneering and the ideological spirit of “manifest destiny” is believed by some, to facilitate the positive image Israel enjoys in the United States. The logic here is that due to the pioneering heritage of the United States, there is a sympathy towards Israeli settlement practices.

Those influenced by American political culture writ large, identify the creation of settlements with the pioneers of the “manifest destiny” era. By extension, Americans identify the Arabs in the occupied territory with the natives they displaced. If this dynamic is an integral part of the “special relationship”, there should be some sympathy (whether tacit or overt) to Israeli settlement construction on the part of U.S. decision-makers and the wider public.42

The second relevant cultural link is the Judeo-Christian religious bond between the two states. It has been argued that the roots of American exceptionalism can be found in the legacy of

Puritan settlement in New England.43 Puritan religious and political culture stressed not only the

Hebrew bible, but also strongly focused on a parallel between their narrative and the story of the people of Israel. has observed that “more familiar with the geography of the Holy

Land than with their new and strange environs, Americans would give scriptural names such as

39 Bernard Reich, Securing the Covenant: United States-Israel relations after the Cold War (Westport, CON: Praeger, 1995), 11. 40 Stephens, US Policy Towards Israel, 77-81. 41 Reich, Securing the Covenant, 12-13; Sheffer & Hofnung, “Israel’s Image,” 14-15. 42 Sheffer & Hofnung, “Israel’s Image,” 14-20; lla Shohat, “Antinomies of Exile: Said at the Frontiers of National Narrations”, in Michael Sprinker (ed.), Edward Said: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 140-141. 43 Arthur Schlesinger, “America: Experiment or Destiny,” American Historical Review, Vol. 82 (June 1977), 514- 517; Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: a Double Edged Sword (New York: Norton & Company, 1997), 18-20.

9

Salem, Shiloh, and Zion to over a thousand cities and towns in North America.”44 The Old

Testament focuses heavily on the West Bank and Jerusalem, two areas in which a large portion of Israeli settlement construction has taken place. If the strong emotional affinity between Israel and the United States is based on a mutual biblical and religious heritage, this could temper opposition to settlement expansion. U.S. policy may be influenced by a cultural belief that the settled land belongs to the Jewish people.

A rival explanation for the closeness between Israel and the U.S., sees the outcome as a product of the undue influence of pro-Israeli groups in shaping the contours of bilateral relations.

Proponents of this approach argue that said groups hijack U.S. foreign policy and shape it in a manner which often contradicts the American national interest.45 Domestic groups supportive of

Israel obtain their influence through the mobilization of the highly-motivated and influential

Jewish vote and the monetary contributions of a community which earns wages well above the national average and contributes readily to political causes.46 To this can be added the highly effective lobbying of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which has fostered great influence on Capitol-Hill through an organization far superior to anything which anti-Israeli groups can muster.47 Their influence has been greatly aided by the open nature of the American political system and by the lack of organization of countering pressure groups.48 As mentioned above, this school of thought holds that the U.S. has been supportive of Israeli occupation policies,

44 Michael Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present (New York: Norton, 2007), 83-84. 45 Camille Mansour, Beyond Alliance: Israel in US Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 237-285; Cheryl Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 335-344; Mearsheimer & Walt, Israel Lobby, 329-376; Thomas, American Policy Toward Israel; Tivnan, The Lobby. 46 Mansour, Beyond Alliance, 248-250. 47 Ibid., 240-244. 48 Mearsheimer & Walt, Israel Lobby, 140-142.

10 including settlement construction, as a result of the undue influence of the “Israel lobby’ on

American foreign policy.49

The approach taken here supports a third and less visible approach in the literature, which posits that the dyadic relationship has been mostly based on a confluence of strategic interests.50

When based on a purely strategic lens, relationships are based on contingency. Alliance obligations are ultimately unenforceable and can depend largely on the self-interest of the parties. Therefore, insecurity plagues strategically motivated alliances since the support of an ally in moments of crisis cannot be guaranteed. Parties to an alliance attempt to extract the most gain out of the alliance while paying the minimal cost.51 If so, the strategic approach puts the relations between the United

States and Israel in the context of mutual contingency, as both could and would seek out other alternatives if they furthered their strategic interests.

The extent of the strategic importance of the United States to Israel is obvious. For Israel the basic strategic goal was the attainment of security, defined here as “a high confidence of preserving, against external military attack, values presently held.”52 In that context, the Israeli need for American assistance, particularly in terms of arms is quite obvious.53 Another tenet of

49 Ibid., 336. 50 Shai Feldman, “The Future of US-Israel Strategic Cooperation,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy Paper (Washington D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996); , “The American Interest,” Azure, No. 26 (Fall 2006); Organski, $36 Billion Bargain, 51 Glen Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 180-186. 52 Security is here defined narrowly to fit it into a narrow strategic explanation. The definition here is taken from Ibid., 5. The concept is defined as narrowly as possible due to the intentionally narrow frame of the strategic explanation, which is designed to be isolated from other explanations. However, there is a strong case for defining security in a broader way to include social threats, environmental threats, etc. Snyder’s definition is in line with the school of thought which holds that a narrower definition bestows research into security issues greater intellectual coherence. For an expansion on that argument see, Stephen Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35 (1991), 211-239. For wider discussions of the issue see: David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1997), 5-26; Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publisher, 1998). 53 Feldman, “Future of US-Israel Strategic Cooperation,” 7-8; Handel, Israel’s Political-Military Doctrine, 64-65; Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 12-13; Tal, National Security, 43.

11

Israeli strategy is the importance of great power support.54 One essential element in this is the

American ability to veto sanctions levied by the United Nations against Israel.55 The United States has provided Israel with robust diplomatic support for several decades. Between 1972 and 2006, the United States vetoed forty-two potential resolutions aimed at denouncing Israel, more than half of all American vetoes cast during that period.56 In sum, American strategic utility to Israel is expressed in arms sales to Israel and in its diplomatic protection of Israel, particularly in the UN.

Those who believe Israel played an important role in promoting US strategic goals, emphasize Israeli usefulness in containing Soviet penetration into the region. If great power competition in the Middle East is viewed as a competition over strategically important allies,

Israeli military victories over Soviet proxies served an important purpose. They demonstrated that

American arms and diplomatic support are of greater strategic utility than Soviet arms and support, and thereby increased the prestige of the United States as an ally and patron. Israeli victories also forced the to spend a great deal of its finite resources on rebuilding the militaries and economies of their defeated clients.57 Another explanation of Israeli strategic utility to the United

States focuses on the territories Israel occupied in the 1967 War. and Egypt, both countries under significant Soviet influence, wished for the return of their territories and were willing to expend a great deal of resources to achieve this end. This meant that American influence over

Israel became a significant source of influence.58

The approach taken here coincides with the strategic approach generally. However, the argument in this dissertation differs somewhat from the existing bilateral strategic utility approach

54 Feldman, “The Future of US-Israel Strategic Cooperation,” 8. 55 Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 13-14. 56 Mearsheimer & Walt, Israel Lobby, 40. 57 Mearsheimer & Walt, The Israel Lobb, 51-52; Organski, $36 Billion Bargain, 31. 58 Martin Kramer, “American Interest,” 25-27.

12 in that it examines strategic interests from a regional perspective rather than merely a dyadic one.

It looks at U.S. policy towards the settlements as a product of the strategic importance of attaining a peace agreement. It looks at Israeli policy as determined by the security relevance of specific settled territories.

The analysis here is also useful in illustrating wider trends in bilateral relations. Settlements are a particularly persistent irritant in otherwise close relations. Therefore, the policy surrounding them presents a challenge to explanations of U.S.-Israeli closeness. It raises the question of whether these disputes indicate a lack of “specialness” in the relationship, or if there is something unique about the issue of settlements. The argument put forth here is that the nature of bilateral bargaining between Israel and the United States facilitates and encourages open confrontations over settlements without harming the fabric of bilateral relations. These spats have been isolated from the wider fabric of bilateral relations. Therefore, while policy on the settlements has been determined by strategic concerns, the wider bilateral relationship has remained strong and

“special” nonetheless.

Contribution to Literature: Settlements in the occupied territories

The limitations of the work on U.S. involvement reflects a more general problem with the literature on Israeli settlement policy. Existing approaches to U.S.-Israeli relations approach the subject from an almost purely dyadic perspective. Meanwhile, most works view Israel and its society as the actor determining settlement policy unilaterally. A significant stream in the literature analyzes the Israeli settlement enterprise as an outgrowth of a messianic stream of religious-Zionism. In this view, the Israeli state is manipulated into ever greater involvement in

13 the occupied territories by Jewish fundamentalist forces.59 Another approach, influenced by the settler colonialism literature, views the settlements as part of a concentrated Israeli effort to dominate the Palestinian population. In this view, the settlers are part of a top down mechanism of oppression in which government and settlers are united.60 A third approach is influenced by the literature on state-building. In this view, a struggle for political power within Israel proper determines the ability and willingness of the state to absorb the occupied territories through settlement.61 A fourth approach looks at the settlements as an integral part of Zionist culture predating the existence of the State of Israel. In this view, the particularities of Israeli history led it to value the construction of settlements as a political tool and the institutions it had formed in earlier periods, spearheaded settlement in the post-1967 era.62

These approaches have a great deal of explanatory power in terms of internal Israeli processes. However, they miss a crucial element in determining the fate of the settlements: their role in negotiations. Ultimately, the main reason settlements have attained such international prominence is because of their potential role in negotiations. Yet there has been almost no theoretical literature on their influence on bargaining or mediation. Once again, the exception is

59 Michael Feige, Settling in the Hearts: Jewish Fundamentalism in the Occupied Territories (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2009); Hagi Huberman, Against all Odds: 40 Years of Settlement in Judea and Samaria, Binyamin and the Valley, 1967- 2007 (Netzarim: Netzarim Library, 2008); Newman, Impact of Gush Emunim; Raanan, Gush Emunim; Israel Shahak and Norton Mezvinsky, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel (London: Pluto Press, 1999); David Schnall, Radical Dissent in Contemporary Israeli Politics New York: Praeger, 1979); Ehud Sprinzak, The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right (New York; Oxford University Press, 1991); Gadi Taub, The Settlers: and the Struggle for the meaning of Zionism (New Haven, CT: Press, 2010). 60 Akiva Eldar and Idith Zertal, Lords of the Land: the War over Israel’s Settlements in the Occupied Territories, (New York: Nation Books, 2007); Gershon Shafir, “Zionism and Colonialism: A Comparative Approach,” in Michael N. Barnett (ed.), Israel in Comparative Perspective, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 227-242; Lorenzo Veracini, “The Other Shift: Settler Colonialism, Israel, and the Occupation,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 42 No. 2 (Winter 2013), 26-42. 61 Haklai, “Haklai, “Religious—Nationalist Mobilization”; Lustick, Unsettled States; Hendrik Spruyt, Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). 62 Shlomo Gazit, Trapped Fools: Thirty Years of Israeli Policy in the Territories (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Aharon Kellerman, Society and Settlement: Jewish land of Israel in the Twentieth Century (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993); Baruch Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics (Berkley: University of California Press, 1983).

14 the work of Eiran. In an article written with Robert Mnookin, it was noted that settlements could play the role of bargaining chips in negotiations and could pressure potential interlocutors into bargaining before the opportunity “fades” from view.63 However, the article focuses on the influence of settlers on domestic political processes. What is notably missing in the literature is a comprehensive treatment of their role in international negotiations and in U.S-Israeli relations.

Rationale and Research Aims

This dissertation will examine the role of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories in U.S.-

Israeli relations in the 1967-1981 period. The attempt to ascertain a pattern of mutual influence may involve the examination of related topics such as arms sales, aid, US and Israeli elections and the balance of domestic politics: but only to the extent that there is ascertainable influence on the policy towards settlements.

The core objectives of this dissertation are:

• To explain when and how U.S. policy influences the likelihood of Israel substantially

moderating its settlement policy.

• To explain when the U.S. takes an interest and becomes heavily involved in resolving the

issue.

• To explain when and why Israel is responsive to U.S. policy on settlements.

63 Robert H. Mnookin and Ehud Eiran, Discord behind the Table: The Internal Conflict among Israeli Jews concerning the Future of Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, 2005 Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1 (2005), 34-35.

15

• To explain why and how the settlements have become a constant irritant in bilateral

relations.

Subsidiary objectives are:

• To offer a systematic and theoretically informed analysis of the nature of U.S.-Israeli

relations based on their interaction in regard to the issue of settlement.

• To make policy recommendations to further the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Time-frame

The time frame of the dissertation will cover the 1967-1981 period, ending with the final days of the Carter administration. There are two reasons for the selection of this time frame. The first is empirical. The period is both short enough to allow a relatively in-depth examination while still allowing for controlled cross examination. On the Israeli side, it allows for an examination of the shaping of policy towards the territories and settlement and a considerable breadth of time where patterns set into longer term modus operandi. It also covers the three notable stages of Israeli settlement development without needless repetition by including long periods of time wherein settlement patterns and policies remained substantially similar.

These stages can be roughly divided into three relatively distinct categories:

1) Defensible borders stage (1967-74): After a brief period of hesitation, Israeli settlement

patterns were largely based on concepts of future division of the occupied territories. The

settlements were built in areas which the government felt were necessary for maintaining

Israeli security.

16

2) The ideological fervor stage (1974-1977): Government policy continued to be based on

the defensible borders concept, but ideological concerns promoted by Gush Emunim, a

pro-settlement civil society actor, caused significant changes to settlement patterns.

3) The suburban control phase (1978-): the emphasis moves to a focus on affordable

housing in locations which allow an easy commute to commercial centers. In the

meantime, settlements are increasingly focused on strategic hilltops overlooking

junctions dispersed in such a way as to prevent a Palestinian state from being established.

It also includes the general patterns of US attitudes towards the settlements, which would repeat themselves in relation to the settlements starting in 1967 and continue to this day:

1) Pro-forma criticism and practical indifference: typifies the Johnson administration and

the Nixon administration until the 1973 War. This pattern would typify the Reagan

administration, most of the Clinton administration years, the W. Bush years and most of

the Obama years and the Trump administration so far.

2) Resistance to settlement expansion due to an ongoing peace process: this occurred in both

the period of negotiation for the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement (1973-74) and

to varying degrees as part of the Israeli-Egyptian peace process (1977-1980). This pattern

would typify most of the H.W Bush years and the beginning of the Obama

administration.

The time frame allows for control in the dependent variable (or the outcome), which is an Israeli decision on the fate of the settlements. It includes in its purview many years of lack of significant influence on Israeli settlement policy during the Johnson, Nixon and Ford administrations. By contrast, during the Carter administration the U.S. managed to obtain a deal on a settlement

17 moratorium and the full evacuation of the settlements in Sinai. Therefore, this periodization allows for a comparison between successful and unsuccessful U.S. mediation attempts while avoiding redundancy.

If so, the period covered here allows a firm grasp on the dynamics of the Israeli-US dyadic relationship as it pertains to the settlements. Most patterns of interaction observable in the post-1981 period are found within the allotted time frame and thus it allows enough perspective to facilitate a good understanding of the phenomenon. The year 1981 was chosen as a cut-off point. The end of the Carter era signaled the beginning of a settlement policy, on the part of

President Reagan, which was similar to Nixon’s policy.

The second reason is methodological. Following the end of the Carter administration there is a dearth of available primary source material. Israel adheres to a 30-year declassification rule, while the United States adheres to a 25-year rule, thus allowing a very partial picture of policy after 1981. The documents for the Reagan era were gradually declassified during the writing of this dissertation although still in a very partial manner.

Research Methodology

The case study is examined through primary document analysis conducted in archives in Israel and the United States. The Israeli sources are primarily in Hebrew, in which the author is fluent.

Therefore, all translations were executed directly by the author. The major Israeli archive visited was the National Archive in Jerusalem. A secondary archive in Israel is in Yad Tabenkin. The

Research and Documentation Center of the United Kibbutz Movement. For domestic Israeli concerns, the archives of the Likud and the Labor Party were consulted. In the United States,

18

State Department documents were obtained at the National Archive in College Park, MD. The following Presidential libraries were visited: the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library in Austin,

Texas; the Richard Nixon Presidential Library in Yorba Linda, California, the Gerald Ford

Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan and the Presidential Library in

Atlanta, Georgia.

The different administrations are analyzed by utilizing an identical framework to produce an in-case structured and focused comparison. The execution of a focused comparison requires the collection of similar data for the different cases in a systematic manner to address the same variables. 64 Therefore, the same forms and types of documentation were collected for each case and analyzed within an identical structure while asking the same research questions noted above.65 The answers to these questions as reflected by the documents contain the key to understanding the role settlements play in the making and development of US-Israeli relations.

This dissertation does not attempt to formulate or construct a general theory. Rather it aims to establish a specific explanation of the role of settlements in U.S.-Israeli relations. A specific explanation is an explanation of a distinctive event, including its causes and effects, framed in singular terms.66 Instead of a rigid theory testing approach, an analytical framework is utilized. The strategic choice approach, conceived by Powell and Lake, utilizes some of the insights of game theory and applies them in a manner suitable to a causally and strategically complex empirical case. Rather than an attempt to present a theory of bargaining of any sort, the

64 Alexander George, “Case studies and theory development: The method of structured, focused comparison,” In P. G. Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, (New York: Free Press, 1979), 43-68. 65 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 181-204. 66 Stephen Van Evra, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 15-16.

19 goal here is to look at bargaining as an analytical framework capable of generating explanations.

The bargaining literature and its basic concepts are used here to categorise and reduce the inherent complexity of the case study and generate a more complete understanding of why these specific actors behave as they do.67 As such, this analytical framework, we will pluralistically and pragmatically examine the empirical evidence using the structure provided by the strategic approach and consulting the major approaches to bargaining and mediation.

The case study focuses on all interaction between Israel and the United States rather than on specific mediation attempts. This approach can help overcome some of the pitfalls of selection effects. Mediation attempts are likely to be launched when there is a higher chance of success.68 It has been suggested that a focus only on mediated conflicts evinces a selection bias by ignoring situations wherein mediation was not offered or requested.69 However, one of the most important questions in this issue is why and when do negotiations not develop? Therefore, to gain a better picture of the conditions leading to conflict resolution success and failure, it is useful to study an issue area rather than notable bargaining and mediation incidents.70

67 On the differences between a theory and an analytical framework see Liam Stanley, “The Difference Between an Analytical Framework and a Theoretical Claim: A Reply to Martin Carstensen,” Political Studies, Vol. 60, No. 2 (2012), 474-482. 68 Robert Rauchhaus, “Asymmetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management,” World Politics, Vol. 58, No. 2 (January 2006), 228. 69 William Dixon, “Third Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement,” International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Autumn 1996), 678; Lesley Terris and Zeev Maoz, “Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, No. 5 (September 2005), 564. 70 James Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1998), 285.

20

Chapter Outline

Analytical Framework: lays out the analytical framework of the strategic choice approach. It then delves into the context and situates the case of settlements in U.S.-Israeli relations in the literature on bargaining, mediation and compliance.

Empirical Chapters: traces the development of bilateral relations through four periods using the strategic choice framework: 1) The Johnson administration. 2) The Nixon administration (up to the 1973 War). 3) The Kissinger era (late Nixon and the Ford administration). 4) The Carter administration. Each chapter is concluded with an analysis of the period using the framework and the approaches to bilateral relations.

Conclusion: summarizes trends in U.S.-Israel relations in regard to the settlement issue. Major themes from the empirical chapter are put into context. Finally, the policy implications of the findings are elucidated.

21

Chapter 1

Analytical Framework

Israel and the United States enjoy friendly and cooperative relations and therefore sanctions and outright coercion were off the table.1 Instead, the United States resorted primarily to bargaining with Israel. One of the major characteristics of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the unwillingness of the Arab states to recognize Israel or negotiate with Israel directly alongside

Israeli unwillingness to recognize or bargain with the Palestinian Liberation Organization.2

Therefore, it was not always possible to convince the relevant actors to sit face-to-face at the negotiation table or even to agree to bargain through a mediator. Therefore, bargaining between

Israel and the United States can occur in either a bilateral form, or as a form of mediation when

Arab actors are involved. The two are dramatically different and therefore the distinction is significant. The dynamic between the bargaining stages and mediation stages is complex and though the two are interdependent they yield different results.

Bargaining and mediation are both inherently strategic in that the ability of each actor to attain its ends is dependent on the decisions of other actors. Powell and Lake elucidated an approach designed to research the interaction of actors. The strategic approach focuses on interaction between the actors rather than on the internal dynamics of one side or the other, and is

1 Aside from the fact that economic sanctions are not appropriate for relations between allies, there is also a serious question as to whether they work. See in particular Robert Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), 90-136. For the opposing view see Daniel Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 3 (July 2003), 643-659. 2 Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: a History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001 (New York: Vintage, 2001), 690-693; , Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs 1948-2003 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 1-37; Avi, Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, New York: Norton, 2000), 597-609.

22 therefore an appropriate framework for overcoming the problem of one-sided analysis which has plagued research into the settlements so far. The approach is based on three central principles:

1) The interaction of units: The strategic choice approach takes the interaction of actors as

the object to be analyzed and seeks to explain how this interaction unfolds. Actors are

analyzed in terms of their preferences and beliefs. These are analyzed separately from the

influence of the environment and the actions of others. Preferences and beliefs are kept

constant unless there is very strong evidence to suggest otherwise. It is important to note

that preferences are the disposition to make a specific choice and not the act of choosing.3

While maintaining preferences constant is not necessarily a realistic assumption, it is

useful for explanations focused on changes in the strategic environment. The strategic

approach makes a methodological bet that preferences will remain constant at most times

and what explains changes in behavior are changes in the environment which alter the

means in which preferences are pursued rather than changes in preferences themselves.

This also helps avoid circular or tautological explanations.4

3 Jack Nagel, The Descriptive Analysis of Power (New Haven, CI: Yale University Press, 1975), 19. 4 Jeffrey Frieden, “Actors and Preferences in International relations,” in David Lake & Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 44-47; David Lake & Robert Powell, “International Relations: a Strategic Choice Approach,” in David Lake & Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 29-34; Kenneth Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Through Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” in Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 6-9.

23

A unit is defined through the following analytically bound characteristics:

A) Preferences: are the desires of actors which do not vary in response to different

situations.5 They are defined as how actors “rank the possible outcomes defined by

their environment.” The strategic approach does not make assumptions as to the

values which actors promote.

B) Beliefs: are what actors believe in regard to the preferences of others.6

2) Distinction between actors and environment: The actors are purposive and therefore

choose a strategy which best serves their interests. Strategies are designed with the

opportunities presented by the environment in mind. While preferences remain constant,

actions vary in accordance with information, capabilities and the actions and reactions of

the other relevant actors which make up the strategic environment. The environment

includes all levels which influence the outcome in a material way, whether domestic,

bureaucratic or international.7 The units included in analysis are determined

pragmatically in accordance with their empirical influence and not in according to a

general principle.

5 Frieden, “Actors and Preferences in International relations,” 39-76. 6 Lake & Powell, “International Relations,” 6-9. 7 In other words, the classic levels of analysis are discarded in favor of a more pragmatic approach. For the classic levels of analysis approach see J.D. Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1 (October 1961), 77-92; Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

24

The environment interacts with the decisions made by actors in two distinctive ways:

A) Actions: The full spectrum of available actions and how they may interact is taken

into consideration by each actor. This determines the pay-offs available to the actors.8

B) Information: Information that actors possess, or think they possess, regarding the

behavior of others. In any strategic interaction with limited information, the

availability of credible information and the ability to trust the information provided

are essential in determining the actions actors take.9

3) Multileveled interaction: Once preferences and strategies are mapped out, how do these

strategies play out on the bilateral, international and domestic political level? The actions

taken by the players alter the payoffs available in future interactions and provide new

information to the actors thus potentially changing the environment.10

8 Lake & Powell, “International Relations,” 8-9; Ariel Rubinstein, “Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory,” Econometrica, Vol. 59, No. 4 (July 1991), 909-924 9 James Morrow, “The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signalling, Commitment and Negotiation in International Politics,” David Lake & Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 77-114. 10 Frieden, “Actors and Preferences in International relations,” 47-53; Lake & Robert Powell, “International Relations,” 16-17.

25

Analytical Context

Bilateral Bargaining and Mediation

Bargaining is often defined in a narrow and formal manner. Some definitions look at bargaining more narrowly as direct negotiations between representatives of two states in a manner that brings their positions closer together.11 The problem with this approach is that it prescribes certain relations between actors, as well as specific outcomes that are too restrictive. Bargaining can occur between close allies and bitter enemies, tacitly or explicitly, publicly or privately. It can bring the participants closer together or drive them further apart.

Rather than prescribe a focus on any element or format, the most open definition is used

“any form of verbal (or non-verbal) communication, direct or indirect, whereby parties to a conflict of interests discuss, without resort to arbitration or other judicial processes, the form of any joint action which they might take to manage a dispute between them.”12 This will allow a comparison of the different types of bargaining and the outcomes associated with them.

Most of the interaction between the U.S. and Israel regarding Israeli settlement construction occurs in the form of bilateral bargaining. The Arab states normally are not involved directly. Even a cursory understanding of the bargaining process makes it clear that unless the relevant Arab actors are involved, there is little chance of attaining Israel concessions. Requitement is an essential element in obtaining concessions. Fundamental bargaining positions will not be

11 Fred Ikle, How States Negotiate (New York: Harper, 1964); Arthur Lall, Modern International Negotiation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Joseph McGrath, “A Social Psychological Approach to the Study of Negotiation,” in R.V. Bowers, ed., Studies on Behavior in Organizations (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1966), 121. 12 Ian Morely & Geoffrey Stephenson, The Social Psychology of Bargaining (London: Allen & Unwin, 1977), 7.

26 conceded without “the understanding that concessions will be reciprocated rather than banked.”13

If there is little chance that Israel will curtail its settlement construction, why does bilateral bargaining occur? One explanation could be that bilateral talks are useful for exploring possible resolutions of the problem, in anticipation of laying the foundation for successful mediation attempts in future.

However, there is another possibility. Parties may bargain for what Oliver Richmond calls

“devious” reasons. In other words, they wish to get something out of the process aside from an agreement.14 Bilateral bargaining presents an opportunity for both the U.S. and Israel to signal intentions to potential Arab interlocutors. All dyadic bargaining between Israel and the United

States takes place as part of an American attempt to put together a credible mediation effort at the right time. This means that the U.S. is engaged in a constant attempt to build up its credibility as a mediator in the eyes of Arab actors. Therefore, even when the United States does not believe an agreement is attainable, it may find it prudent to appear to be negotiating on outstanding issues.

The alternative is to appear to be doing nothing, which may be seen as a form of tacit support for

Israeli policy.15

The repeated interactions between the two serves as a testing ground for Israeli positions as well. Israel may risk alienating supporters in the United States if it is seen as unreasonable in its unwillingness to enter talks with the United States. Once bilateral bargaining has commenced,

13 I. William Zartman, “Bargaining and Conflict Resolution,” in Edward Kolodziej and Roger Kanet, Coping with Conflict after the Cold War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 271-290. See also Dean Pruitt, “Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks,” International Negotiation, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1997), 237-250. 14 Oliver Richmond, “Devious Objectives and the Disputants' View of International Mediation: A Theoretical Framework,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 6 (November 1998), 707-722. 15 Two books that generally take the approach that the United States did not actually pressure Israel to modify its policies in the occupied territory but rather have sought to assist it in a policy of expansionism are: Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel & the Palestinians (Cambridge: South End Press, 1999); Rashid Khalidi, Brokers of Deceit: How the U.S. has Undermined Peace in the Middle East, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2013).

27

Israel has an incentive to present its negotiation position as more uncompromising than they really.

This may help it gain bargaining leverage for mediation involving the Arab states.16 In other words, bilateral bargaining is a choreographed show intended for an Arab audience and not a substantive forum for negotiation.

Asymmetry in Bilateral Bargaining

The United States is a great power or even a superpower according to some.17 Israel in the meantime is a small state, which at best is a regional power. As such, there is a clear power disparity between the two actors. This raises the relevant question: how significant is the power disparity in bilateral bargaining and how does it influence process and outcome? Tackling the problem starts with an understanding of the term power. Power has long been considered a problematic and difficult concept to define.18 Power in international relations can be understood as the control of capabilities and resources, particularly military and economic which provide an actor with “hard power.”19 In order to complement the concept of hard power, Joseph Nye coined the phrase “soft power” to capture the manner in which states attain desired outcomes through moral and normative leadership.20 The two approaches may harbor disagreement on what power

16 James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer, 1995), 390-401; Andrew Kydd, “Which Side are you on? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 4 (October 2003), 599. 17 William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (July 1999), 5-41. 18 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 13; Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 27. 19 Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Richard Stoll and Michael Ward, Power in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynn Reinner, 1989). 20 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Pereseus, 2004).

28 consists of, but agree on it manifestation. At the core of both approaches is the idea that power is the ability of one actor to produce preferred outcomes regarding another.21

The more powerful actor in the context of bargaining would be the one more likely to attain a better outcome at the bargaining table. The bargaining literature has not reached consensus on the role of power in negotiations. One stream believes that the process of bargaining levels the playing field between actors with disparate capabilities. The idea being that there is an inherent

“fairness” in the way parties negotiate.22 Others believe that more powerful parties can control negotiations and obtain more favorable results by leveraging their advantage in resources.23 There is school of thought focusing on the “power of the weak” and the ability of the lesser actor to obtain concessions from the strong. This is usually done through the threat of collapse or an advantage in motivation.24 It is not clear which of these approaches, if any, are generally correct.

Asymmetry in Mediation

The influence of power asymmetry in mediation is less controversial than in bargaining. Mediation literature focuses on the mediator and its ability to obtain a deal. There is general agreement that

21 William Mark Habeeb, Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Bargain with Strong Nations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1988). For similar definitions see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 12; Zeev Maoz, “Power, capabilities and paradoxical outcomes,” World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1989), 240; I. William Zartman & Jeffrey Rubin, “The Study of Power and the practice of Negotiation,” in William Zartman and Jeffrey Rubin (eds.), Power and Negotiation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 8. 22 Zartman and Rubin mention this approach although they do not give examples of relevant literature. Zartman & Rubin, “Study of Power and the Practice of Negotiation”, 4. 23 Morton Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Lall, Modern International Negotiations; T. Clifton Morgan, Untying the Knot of War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982); Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). 24 Erling Bjøl, “The Power of the Weak,” Cooperation and Conflict, Vol 3, No. 2, (July 1968), 157-168; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 35-36.

29 power parity is conducive to mediation, while asymmetry is detrimental to it.25 The logic behind this proposition is that it is difficult to convince the disputant benefitting more from the status quo to negotiate in good faith as they tend to be concerned that a negotiated deal will leave them worse off. Therefore, the stronger side is unlikely to want to engage seriously in a mediation effort and even less likely to make significant concessions.26 Since the stronger said needs the agreement less, they are likely to place conditions on entering mediation which a weaker power would be less willing to do.27 It is still possible to obtain a peace agreement in asymmetrical conflicts but the onus is on the more powerful side to make concessions and this is unlikely to occur.28

Issue Specific Power

This study focuses on asymmetrical bargaining regarding a specific issue and not an overview of the dynamic of bargaining in general. Therefore, it is not particularly useful to theorize in an abstract sense on power relations in negotiations. What is clear is that the more powerful state, in terms of resources and military power, does not always obtain a better deal at the negotiation

25 J. Michael Greig, “Stepping into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 2 (April 2005), 249–266. Louis Kriesberg, Social Conflicts (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Premtic Hall, 1982); David Quinn , Jonathan Wilkenfeld , Kathleen Smarick & Victor Asal, “Power Play: Mediation in Symmetric and Asymmetric International Crises,” Power Play: Mediation in Symmetric and Asymmetric International Crises,” International Interactions, Vol. 32, No. 4, (2006), 441-470; Saadia Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 328; Oran Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967); I. William Zartman, , ”Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts,” in I. William Zartman, Ed., Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to civil Wars Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 20. 26 Marieke Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 1996), 368. See also Zeev Maoz & Lesley Terris, “Credibility and Strategy in International Mediation,” International Interactions, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2006), 431; Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, “Mediation in International Conflict,” in K. Kressel & D.G. Pruitt, Mediation Research: The Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party Intervention (Hoboken, NJ: Jossey-Bass, 1989), 118. 27 Karin Aggestam, “Mediating Asymmetrical Conflict,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2002), 69- 91; Stephen Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), 336-366; Lall, Modern International Negotiations, 136. 28 Dean Pruitt & Peter Carnevale, Negotiation in Social Conflict (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks, 1993), 147.

30 table.29 The availability of greater accumulative and abstract power can be crucial in determining the outcome of bargaining over a specific issue, but only if resources can be used coherently in the context of the specific bargaining structure.

The most convincing attempt to tackle the influence of power on specific negotiation outcomes is Habeeb’s formulation of “issue specific power.” Although abstract power is relevant to negotiation outcomes, it can only be used in certain contexts and conditions. Actors may attain dissimilar results in different issue areas within the same dyad despite the power differential remaining constant. Instead of utilizing general metrics of power, he suggests focusing on specific issue power in bargaining which is separate from, though related to, structural power.30 Issue power is made up of the following elements:

1) The availability of an outside option. An outside option is the ability of the actors to obtain

the goods at the center of the bargaining process from another source. For an outside option

to have influence over negotiations it must be a credible option for one of the actors. As

long as the Arab states are unable to take back the occupied territories by force, the

settlements are a crucial obstacle which can only be removed through negotiations with

Israel. If the United States needs progress in peace talks, it cannot obtain the necessary

goods anywhere else. Israel is more satisfied with the status quo than the Arab states are

but still hopes to attain peace and sees the U.S. as the only credible mediation option. 31

29 David Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (January 1979), 161-194; Charles Lockhart, Bargaining in International Conflicts (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). 30 Habeeb, Power and Tactics, 14-22. 31 Daniel Kurtzer, Steven Spiegel, et al., The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 1989-2011 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 23-29; William Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 3-7.

31

Indeed, the fact that Israel and the United States have continuously engaged in a peace

process for decades is the most convincing indication that neither side has a convincing

outside option.

2) The desirability of the inside option. An inside option is the payoff derived by the actors in

the status quo extant during negotiations. The side which would be in a better position if

no deal were agreed to, enjoys increased issue power. It can more easily and credibly

threaten to break off talks. If either side possesses a credible outside option, an inside option

offers no discernible advantage. However, if neither side has a convincing outside option,

an actor with a convincing inside option will enjoy the stronger bargaining position.32

The advantage Israel has over the United States is the possession of a comfortable

inside option. At least up until 1973, Israel was comfortable with the status quo. The

continuing construction of settlements was usually managed at a pace which contributed

to the stability of its ruling coalition. In addition, the construction of settlements improves

the Israeli bargaining position over the parts of the occupied territory it wishes to possess.

The inside option was more comfortable for Israel. In the meantime, the U.S. felt that the

resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict was essential to the pursuit of its major interests in

the region and had a burning need to resolve the conflict to further its regional ambitions.33

3) Control. Habeeb defines issue control as “the degree to which each side can achieve its

preferred outcome.” The side that can attain an outcome more compatible with its interests

32 Abhinay Muthoo Bargaining Theory with Applications (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), 137-143. 33 Kurtzer, et al, Ngotiating Arab-Israeli Peace, 23-29; Quandt, Peace Process, 3-7.

32

unilaterally has more control over the issue.34 When the issue at the center of bargaining is

tangible, one side may physically control the asset and one side my control the process of

bargaining over the asset. Very often these two are closely intertwined. If bilateral

bargaining over settlements is analyzed in the simplest terms, Israel wishes to maintain the

freedom to construct settlements in the occupied territories, while the U.S. wishes to curtail

construction. The United States does not have the assets in place to obstruct construction,

while Israel has the ability and infrastructure to construct almost at will.

4) Commitment. Commitment refers to the intensity of the need each actor has of obtaining

their desired outcome. It is determined by the value the sides place on the different possible

outcomes of bargaining.35 The question of commitment derived power is the most complex

and difficult regarding the issue of settlements. In general, small states have a built-in

advantage in terms of commitment, particularly when the issue is central to the smaller

state. Great powers spread their attention throughout the international system, while a small

state may focus on the issue at the center of bargaining as one pivotal to its foreign policy.36

Correspondingly, Israel had a commitment advantage at most times since its desire for

“defensible borders” was central to its strategic-military doctrine. However, the balance of

commitment varied during the examined periods. The United States was at times relatively

comfortable with the status quo in the region and was not committed to pursuing change.

At other times, it felt that a move towards the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict was

essential for the pursuit of its global strategic interests. Due to the importance of the issue

34 Habeeb, Power and Tactics, 37. 35 Ibid., 21. 36 Anette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).

33

in determining the outcome, an in-depth discussion of the issue of commitment is

conducted later in this chapter.

According to Habeeb’s theory of asymmetrical bargaining, Israel would be expected to have a decided advantage in bilateral bargaining. The United States does not have an alternative to dealing with Israel if it wishes to modify Israeli settlement policy. Israel enjoys an advantage in the overall terms of bargaining, since if no bargaining occurred it would be allowed to retain settlements and control its own policy. Israel also usually enjoyed greater commitment to the settlements which it viewed in this period as important to its security and would be politically costly to dismantle. For the United States, settlements are just one issue among many in a peace process being held in one among many areas of interest to its foreign policy. If so, structurally speaking the United States would be expected to have little influence in altering Israeli settlement policy. Indeed, at most times from 1967 until today, the U.S. enjoyed little issue specific power regarding the settlements.

However, as examined below, the level of commitment was not a constant, rather it was a variable and variance in commitment played a significant role in determining bargaining outcomes. At times, the U.S. enjoyed enough commitment to overturn the advantages Israel possessed in terms of a stronger inside option and control.

Commitment in Bargaining

Bargaining is a test of power but equally it is a test of wills. If so, a small state can capitalize on the commitment gap by signalling to the stronger bargaining power that it is strongly opposed to making concessions. If the stronger and less invested state is convinced that the weaker and more

34 invested state is highly committed to the cause, the stronger state is likely to be deterred from entering a confrontation it was likely to lose. If both sides could determine in advance who was more committed to the cause, why bargain at all? The likely outcome would already be known and a lot of time and resources could be preserved by reaching the outcome in advance of bargaining. This would be a far more efficient method.

Unfortunately, the sides have a strong inventive to misrepresent their actual level of commitment. The process of bargaining is ultimately determined by the expectations each actor has of what the bargaining partner will accept. The more committed one appears, the stronger ones bargaining position becomes. By committing oneself strongly to a favorable position, the range of indeterminacy within the acceptable outcome range shifts in favor of the committed party.37 Therefore, actors possess an incentive to appear unwilling to compromise even when they are relatively flexible. In economic literature, this is referred to as “cheap talk.”38 The incentive towards cheap talk has the unfortunate byproduct of rendering statements about commitment unreliable.

The weak state must signal its commitment credibly, since it must make up for its disadvantage in resources by other means. If the stronger side believes there is a parity of commitment, it may be tempted to use its superior resources to pressure the weaker state into making concessions. Any party to bargaining has an incentive to appear committed. But if a side is able and willing to pay a cost for its position, it signals in a tangible way that it is committed to a certain outcome and is unlikely to make concessions. A bargaining partner may take actions

37 Thomas Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (New York: Harvard University Pres, 1960), 21-24. 38 See for example David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks, “Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence,” European Journal of Political Economy Vol. 18, No. 2 (2002), 263–280; Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin,” Cheap Talk,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Summer, 1996), 103-118.

35 committing itself to a favourable bargaining position. This involves creating a situation wherein if the signalling actor were to acquiesce to the demands of its bargaining partner, it would incur a significant cost. Fearon refers to this as a “costly signal.”39 A costly signal is a message sent by an actor which alters the payoff structure evincing commitment to the outcome. By signalling that costs will be incurred if concessions are made, a bargainer can go a long way towards establishing credible commitment.

In Fearon’s influential formulation, the principal mechanism by which a state can intentionally render its bargaining commitment more credible is by incurring audience costs. A state may bind itself by taking public actions committing itself to a specific bargaining outcome, which would inflict domestic political costs on the government if were to back down. The potential domestic audience costs are accrued through tough talk and a political commitment to defend the relevant position. The reputation of the state matters to voters and domestic audiences have reason to doubt the competence of a leader who issues strong statements but does not back them up. These costs arise chiefly from the domestic political audiences interested in the performance of their government in bargaining. When strong foreign policy promises are unfulfilled, they may be punished electorally for unfulfilled assurances. In some cases, backlash may be so severe that it can threaten incumbency.40 A second form of costly signal is made by publicly investing sunk costs in the asset over which bargaining occurs. By making a withdrawal from a specific piece of land costlier, the state can credibly signal its commitment not to concede that area in the process

39 James Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February 1997), 68-90; Abhinay Muthoo, “A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 69 (1996), 134-152; Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 27. 40 Michael Colaresi, “When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 3 (July 2004), 555-570; Alastair Smith, “International Crises and Domestic Politics,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), 630-632; Michael Tomz, “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach,” International Organization, Vol. 61, No. 4 (October 2007), 821-840.

36 of negotiations.41 The ability to generate costly signals is the key to signalling commitment. The state less able to generate audience costs is always more likely to back down in disputes which are conducted in public view.42

Mediation

Mediation is a form of bargaining. It is differentiated from bilateral bargaining in that talks are facilitated by a mediating party which is involved in two-directional communication with the antagonists, and the two sides accept and engage the mediator to communicate on their behalf with the other antagonist.43 The standard definition of mediation is wide: “a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law.”44 Mediation efforts can be classified by the depth of mediator involvement. The “lighter” form of mediation focuses on formulation of positions and facilitation of communications between the adversaries. The “heavier” form of bargaining is based on the manipulation of power and the leverage of resources to attain a desired outcome.45

41 Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests,” 70-71. 42 James Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), 585. 43 Bernd Beber, “International Mediation, Selection Effects, and the Question of Bias” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol 29, Vol. 4 (2012), 400-401. 44 Jacob Bercovitch, J. Theodore Anagnoson and Donnette L. Wille, “Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 28, No. 1 (February 1991), 8. 45 This differentiation is taken from Rauchhaus, “Asytmetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management,” 224 and Ronald Fisher, “Pacific, Impartial Third-Party Intervention in International Conflict: a Review and Analysis,” in John Vasquez, et al., Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 39-59

37

The United States has been heavily involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967 and has had some day-to-day involvement in the conflict throughout the period covered here. To differentiate between bilateral oriented bargaining and mediation, we focus on mediation as a heavy involvement in which the mediator sets the agenda, crafts potential settlements and provides both positive and negative inducements to the parties.46 This dissertation does not focus on light mediation. Lighter mediation attempts focus on the enunciation of issues and the facilitation of communication.47 The vague enunciation of issues occurred constantly. However, it was virtually indistinguishable from bilateral bargaining and usually accomplished very little.

The United States is the ultimate heavy mediator in the region. It has utilized foreign aid, loans and security guarantees regularly to try and alter the payoff structures of the interlocuters.

As part of its effort to attain peace between Israel and Egypt, the U.S. took on a massive program of aid to the two countries and both have been on the top of the list of military aid recipients since.48

The high cost of heavy mediation, raises the question: why does a state choose to mediate a conflict? There are those that argue that mediation is generally conducted out of a genuine desire to resolve the conflict.49 This is probably true, but is certainly not a complete picture. There are many conflicts in the international system. Why pick one over the other? Why utilize the resources involved in “heavy” mediation?

Any analysis based on the rational actor model is based on the assumption that the mediator derives utility from the exercise, otherwise costly mediation efforts would not be attempted. The

46 Thomas Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). 47 Rauchhaus, “Asytmetric Information,” 39-59. 48 Duncan L. Clarke, “US Security Assistance to Egypt and Israel: Politically Untouchable?” Middle East Journal Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 1997), 200-214; USAID, “Congressional Budget Justification,” 2015, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/224071.pdf {accessed: May 29, 2017} 49 For a good review of the reasons states take on a mediation role, see Johan Hellman, “The Occurrence of Mediation: A Critical Evaluation of the Current Debate,” International Studies Review, Vol. 14, No. 4 (December 2012), 598-600.

38 argument put forth here is that mediators make the effort in a bid to attain strategic foreign policy goals.50 Mediation efforts may be designed to strengthen existing alliances or to pursue closer relations with one of the parties. Through their involvement in the process, mediators can foster dependence on the part of the disputants by granting benefits and upholding the agreement. It is also important to note that a heavily involved mediator is unlikely to be truly impartial or neutral.51

This also raises the possibility that the mediator may pursue its own goals in the settlement and could forego possibilities to end the conflict because the terms do not suit its interests.52 If so, to understand U.S. mediation efforts and put them into context, it is important to understand its interests and how fit into its wider regional strategy.

Biased Mediation

As a great power with strategic interests in the Middle East, the U.S. can hardly be suspected of being a disinterested mediator.53 Does the lack of impartiality undermine its mediation capabilities? The literature is split on this issue. Some works hold that impartiality is necessary for mediation success. The argument is that the sides will only trust a mediator who does not favor one side over the other.54 Others believe that non-biased mediation is less effective since a biased state is more credibly committed to the process.55 While, the issue of bias has been covered

50 Saadia Touval, “Mediation and Foreign Policy,” International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, (December 2003), 91-95. 51 Touval & Zartman, “Mediation in International Conflict,” 118. 52 Touval, “Mediation and Foreign Policy,” 94. 53 Kydd, “Which Side are you on?” 598-599; Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict, 18. 54 Beber, “International Mediation,” 397–424; Ronald Fisher, “Pacific, Impartial Third-Party Intervention in International Conflict: a Review and Analysis,” in John Vasquez, et al (eds.), Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era (Ann Arbor, Mi: Michigan University Press, 1995), 39-59; Young, The Intermediaries. 55 Peter Carnevale and Sharon Arad, “Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation,” in Jacob Bercovitch (ed,), Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 11-

39 extensively, little has been written on when and why a mediator evinces bias in mediation efforts and nothing on when changes in the direction of bias may occur. This dissertation will attempt a first cut at explaining the direction of bias in the empirical case.

There are two major conceptions of mediator bias. Closeness between the mediator and one of the parties in terms of personal, political or cultural ties is one form. Carnevale and Arad refer to this as “source bias.” However, this may or may not influence the bargaining position of the sides. More to the point is bias regarding the outcome of mediation, which is classified as

“content bias.” In any conflict, the opposing parties will have differing conceptions of their desired outcomes. If the mediator strongly prefers the conception of one party over the other, it is biased.

If the mediator prefers a solution which is reasonably distant from the preferred outcomes of the two parties, it is unbiased.56

The argument put forth here is that bias was crucial in the success of U.S. mediation efforts.

Mediators suffer from the same problems of credibility that bargaining states do. They may also engage in “cheap talk.”57 Disputants analyze carrots and sticks offered by the mediator with a skeptical eye. It is not enough that the mediator has the resources to punish a disputant holding out on making concessions. The disputants must believe it has the willingness to do so. Since the mediator is not a belligerent party, they may wonder if the mediator will truly punish them if they do not concede. The disputants may also wonder if inducements will be provided once an agreement is reached. A strong and palpable interest in an outcome helps a great power establish

35; Kydd, “Which Side are you on?,” 597-611; Rauchhaus, “Asytmetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management”; Touval, The Peace Brokers. 56 This formulation is used in Kydd, “Which Side are you on?,” and in Young, The Intermediaries. Beber, “International Mediation,” uses a different formulation focusing on the utility derived from the allocation of the stakes of the conflict to one of the sides. I use the first definition because it is far easier and requires less speculation to ascertain mediator positons than intentions and there is no advantage to Beber’s definition justifying the added difficulty. 57 Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 390-401; Kydd, “Which Side are you on?,” 599.

40 commitment. As discussed above, once a power with significant resources successfully signals commitment to the outcome, it can use its significant resources to generate issue specific power.58

Even if sanctions or punishment are not on the table, it is far more likely that the mediator will carry a grudge towards the party responsible for the failure of talks if they have a material interest at stake.59 Therefore, the higher the interest of the mediator in attaining a certain outcome the more credibility he will have.60

A state can signal commitment in various ways and try to trick its counterparts into believing it is more committed to an objective than it is. However, there are structural limits to this. If the mediator does not have a strong interest in the outcome, its commitment is likely to be suspect. As George and Smoke noted, the factors necessary to signal commitment are not always subject to manipulation. Interlocuters make it a priority to understand the interests behind the bargaining positions of their counterparts. Therefore, technical proficiency in signaling and manipulation cannot overcome the stark reality that a central foreign policy interest is not at stake.61

Returning to the empirical case: the U.S. has an interest in appearing tough on the settlements in a bid to increase credibility with the Arab states. But is the interest worth rupturing the strategic alliance with Israel over? If not, there is a strong incentive to engage in “cheap talk.”

When little credibility is invested, the position taken is attuned to presenting a beneficial image to relevant domestic and international audiences, rather than to altering the bargaining positions of

58 Habeeb, Power and Tactics. 59 Touval & Zartman, “Mediation in International Conflict,” 129. 60 Karen Harris & Peter Carnevale, “Chilling and Hastening: The Influence of Third-Party Power and Interests on Negotiation,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 47 (1990), 139; Morrow, “The Strategic Setting of Choices,” 82. 61 Alexander George & Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 560.

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Israel. 62 However, if the U.S. is heavily invested in the outcome of bargaining it can credibly engage in costly signaling. How does a mediator send a costly signal? The argument here is that the stronger the risk of mediator audience costs in the case of failure, the more significant the costly signal sent. Two methods for a mediator to signal commitment are:

1) Tying Prestige to Success – It is reasonable to assume that in most cases the mediator

hopes its efforts will succeed.63 But there can be dramatic differences in the significance

and investment the mediator can make in the process. The more associated the

administration becomes with the mediation process, the costlier the signal sent to the other

actors. For example, when the official conducting talks is a high-ranked politician

associated with the administration, the cost of failure will be higher than if the official is a

bureaucrat.64 If the President or Secretary of State invests a large amount of time in

mediation and no deal is reached, its sends a message that the mediator is unable to gain

results and that an outside option such as war or the mediation of another great power may

be preferable. Under these circumstances, the blow to international prestige can be

significant.

Domestically, failure to achieve an agreement after commitment has been made

may signal that the administration is ineffective in promoting the national interest. This

could erode political capital for the administration and prove a hindrance in future

elections. The more credibility is put on the line through a high public profile, the higher

62 Austen-Smith & Banks, “Costly signaling and cheap talk”, 263 – 280; Farrell & Rabin,” Cheap Talk,” 103-118. 63 Greig, “Stepping into the Fray”, 249-266. 64 James Todhunter, “The Domestic Fruits of Diplomacy: Mediation and Presidential Approval,” International Negotiation, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2013), 213.

42

the potential domestic audience costs for the mediator. A high level of commitment can

allow the advantages the U.S. has in terms of resources to come to the fore.65

2) Promote a National Interest –Great powers may have greater resources than weaker

states but they also need a credible reason to mobilize them. The mediator may have an

issue central to their national interest at stake in negotiations. 66 In that case, the belligerents

would have little reason to doubt the willingness of the mediator to pay a considerable cost

to attain a solution. If the interests of the mediator are aligned with one of the parties, its

willingness to pressure the less preferred party is more credible. By promoting a strong

national interest, the mediator creates audience costs on two spheres. On the international

level, if a great power is unable to attain its foreign policy interests, it may lose credibility

among its allies and deterrent capabilities visa-a-vis its allies.67 It also shows interested

domestic audiences that the mediating government is unable to pursue foreign policy

effectively and this could have important political repercussions.68

When the United States credibly communicates to Israel that their mediation efforts promote an important national interest and the administration successfully ties their prestige to the efforts, it can overcome its shortcomings in terms of commitment. Under those circumstances, it can attain

65 Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests”; Habeeb, Power and Tactics. 66 On the importance of this factor in restraining allies see Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 124-125. 67 Barry Nalebuff, “Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), 313- 335. 68 Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests,” 70.

43 an advantage in issue-specific power which could allow it to overcome Israel resistance to evacuate or freeze settlements.

The Settlements as an Issue in Bargaining and Mediation

Settlement in the political sense is defined as “political action involving the organized movement of a population belonging to one national group into a territory to create a permanent presence and influence patterns of sovereignty in the settled territory.”69 If so, the goal of altering sovereignty is ubiquitous to the concept of settlement. But to what end is sovereignty challenged? The most fundamental difference between rationalist approaches and constructivist approaches in explaining the actions of actors is the differing approaches to the logic behind actor behavior. Rationalist approaches assume that actors take actions in anticipation of attaining efficient consequences.

Constructivist approaches assume actors take specific actions as they are deemed socially appropriate to their role.70

Correspondingly, there are two major ways of looking at the occupied territories and their value to Israel. One is that they are primarily a security issue and were constructed as part of its bid to establish “secure borders.”71 This would imply that the impetus is rational and the territories are divisible. The second views the attachment to the settled territories as an emotional attachment based on historical ties. Some believe this is the major impetus of settlements construction in the

69 Oded Haklai and Neophytos Loizides, “Settlers and Conflict Over Contested Territories,” in Oded Haklai and Neophytos Loizides, eds., Settlers in Contested Lands: Territorial Disputes and Ethnic Conflicts (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 3. 70 James March and Jonah Olsen, “Juxtaposing Rationalism and Constructivism: The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), 943-969. 71 Efraim Inbar, War & Peace in Israeli Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Mordechai Nisan, Israel and the Territories: A Study in Control 1967-1977 (Ramat Gan; Turtledov, 1978); Amnon Sela and Yael Yishai, Israel the Peaceful Belligerent, 1967-79 (London: MacMillan Press, 1986).

44

West Bank, particularly from 1977 and onward.72 This would imply that the attachment is socially constructed and emotional rather than rational. This would render the occupied territories difficult to return unless the emotional and historical narrative was altered.

What follows is an attempt to ground the two approaches in international relations theory.

Logic of Consequences: Settlements as a Costly Signal

In rational terms, the Israeli decision to construct settlements is best understood in the context of its larger diplomatic-security strategy. Israel has viewed the possession of the occupied territories as an important component in its military doctrine. In the Golan Heights, Valley, mountains in the middle of the West Bank and the Rafah salient settlements were part of the Israeli line of defense. Their evacuation would not only remove crucial military lines but could theoretically allow the Arab states to launch an attack from a more advanced position. 73

When a nation is satisfied with its territorial situation but faces dissatisfied rivals, it is confronted with a dilemma. Ideally, it would like to both retain the territory and avoid war.

However, it is aware that the dissatisfaction of its neighbors may lead to war. Therefore, it is in its interests to appease (in the none-judgemental sense of the word) the dissatisfied state with territory.

72 Hassan A. Barari, Israeli Politics and the Middle East Process, 1988-2002 (London: Routledge, 2004); Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements 1967-1977 (New York: Times Books, 2006); Shlaim, Iron Wall; Reuven Pedatzur, The Triumph of Embarrassment (Tel Aviv: Yad Tabenkin, 1996); Ilan Peleg, Begin’s Foreign Policy, 1977-1983: Israel’s Move to the Right New York: Greenwood Press, 1987); Ira Sharkansky, Policy Making in Israel (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997); Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (London: Verso, 2007); Akiva Eldar and Idith Zertal, Lords of the Land: the War over Israel’s Settlements in the Occupied Territories , (New York: Nation Books, 2007). 73 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 67; minutes, March 27, 1972, 194-8/K, Israel State Archives (henceforth ISA); Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 117; Mordechai Nisan, Israel and the Territories: A Study in Control (Ramat-Gan: Turtledove, 1978), 74; Public Diplomacy Division, April 30, 1972, Gazit 5978-2/FM, ISA; Martin Van Creveld, Defending Israel: A Study of Her Borders and a Plan for Peace (New York: St. Martin’s press, 2004), 23.

45

In theory, the larger the amount of territory offered, the lower the risk of war. However, the greater the amount of territory provided, the lower the pay-off from the deal. The rational incentive is to provide just enough territory to a potential rival to avoid war. The inherent security problems render the occupied territories difficult to concede in negotiations. Insecurity and the potential advantage to the offensive military action narrow the range of acceptable bargains.74

To make matters worse, even if an agreement acceptable to both sides is found, there is the matter of distrust. As discussed previously, states have a strong incentive to dissemble. Uncertainty paired with territorial issues of security increase the chances of war through miscalculation and misperception.75 The willingness of the Arab states to fight and the likelihood that concessions will be made at the bargaining table were never predicted by Israel with any degree of certainty.

The Arab states signaled resolve verbally but any nation in crisis has an incentive to overstate resolve. Israel did not have the ability to differentiate between credible threats and “cheap talk.”

Israel was caught in a classic bind of bargaining with incomplete information. If it acted aggressively in terms of securing its preferred borders, it was more likely to attain the borders it wanted. But the more aggressively it pursued settlement construction, the greater the chances of war.76

When an actor is asked to bargain over a good that may increase the future military power of a rival, it presents an acute commitment problem.77 When matters of security are at the core of bargaining, states are concerned that the deal will not be upheld by their rival. This is particularly

74 Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 404. 75 Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 82-114. 76 James Morrow, “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 4 (November 1989), 945. 77 James Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict,” in David Lake & Donald Rothschild, eds., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton, N.J; Princeton University Press, 1998), 107-126; Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Winter, 2006), 169-203.

46 true when concessions would create an incentive on the part of the rival to launch a first strike and give an advantage to offensive military action. The fear of being eliminated in a first-strike attack rationally inhibits territorial concessions. In addition, concessions would make the Arab states stronger and therefore raise the probability that they would renege on any commitment made.78

Therefore, Israel could find itself in a situation wherein it wishes to make concessions but is concerned that the price it will pay if it is exploited is too high.79

With this dilemma in mind, Israel tried to commit itself to future borders it could defend, in order to improve its odds of attaining both a full peace agreement and a strategic part of the territories it viewed as necessary for its defense.80 In the early years of Israeli settlement construction, it pursued construction in areas it wished to retain in a peace agreement, thus evincing commitment to and sinking costs into strategic areas.81 It buttressed the commitment by making public statements vowing not to evacuate settlements. This cannot be dismissed as mere rhetoric.

Combative and strongly worded public pronunciations by democratic leaders establish significant audience costs since reneging could jeopardize their electoral future.82

Israel could not afford to evince uncertainty about the future of strategically important points. As Fearon convincingly shows, when a state shows uncertain commitment to an asset, an attempt to challenge it is likely. Ambiguous signals are likely to be interpreted as a lack of resolve by the challenger, particularly when they are dissatisfied with the territorial status quo.83 Israel has

78 Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 401-409; Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” 169-203. 79 Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” 185. 80 Golda Meir, “Israel in Search of Lasting Peace,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 3 (April 1973), 451-452; Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: Norton, 2000). 285. 81 Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests,” 70-71. 82 Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences,” 581-582; Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 28; Ahmer Tarar & Bahar Leventoğlu, “Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 3 (September 2009), 817–839. 83 Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests,” 75-77.

47 conspicuously vowed not to return certain areas. It is therefore, by omission, signalling greater willingness to negotiate over other areas. For example, Israel has the option of building settlements or allowing settlements to be built in an area without declaring a commitment to retain them. It also has the option of vowing not to return an area without settling it. However, either of these options would weaken the Israeli bargaining position. For as Fearon says “logic holds that attempts to partially commit to a future course of action cannot be credible if the signaller could have taken a fully committing action.”84

This gives Israel an advantage over the United States in bargaining and over the Arab states if mediation is entered. While they could both engage in rhetoric that would tie their hands in order to show a commitment to the settled territory, it is difficult for them to sink costs into assets they do not control. In addition, since Israel appears to be heavily committed to the settled territory and also has control over it, the United States and the Arab states face a heavy risk of backing down in a confrontation with humiliating audience costs.

The tragedy of the construction of settlements as a form of commitment signaling is that once constructed and once public commitment are made not to evacuate them, the domestic political costs to evacuate increase.85 As Schelling predicted, use of commitment tactics in an aggressive manner may establish an immovable position beyond the bargaining range which does not allow the other party to concede.86

84 Ibid., 87. 85 Kyle Beardsley and Nigel Lo, “Third-Party Conflict Management and the Willingness to Make Concessions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 58, No. 2 (2013), 365; 86 Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 28.

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Logic of Appropriateness: The Territories as an Indivisible Issue

In theory, all territory is divisible. A piece of territory can be parceled and divided. However, the nature of certain territories is such that division could significantly lessen its value. When an actor considers a parcel of land to be of particularly salient emotional significance, they may consider its unity to be beyond question. This is ultimately a social construction.87 If territorial indivisibility has been constructed, the side evincing an emotional attachment to the territory is unlikely to divide the territory in return for side-payments or if security conditions are improved.

This often occurs when an ethnic group considers a territorial unit to be its homeland. In these cases, territory is not an object to be exchanged but an element of group identity. Toft’s discussion of the goals a state may have for its homeland, are enlightening for the Israeli case. She holds that settlement patterns are crucial in the status of a homeland. To make a credible claim that a territory is a homeland, the claimants must have a large and heavily concentrated population aiming to become the majority in the settled territory. Ultimately in Toft’s formulation the goal of a claim to homeland status is full sovereignty over the territory.88

Hassner defines an indivisible issue as one which has the following characteristics:

1) Integrity. The parties must hold that the issue cannot be parceled out or subdivided without

significantly diminishing its subjective value.

2) Boundaries. The parties must mean the same thing when they refer to the issue they are

bargaining over.

87 Stacie Goddard, “Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy,” International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 1 (January 2006), 35-68; Ian Lustick, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). 88 Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 17-33.

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3) Nonfungibility. The parties must believe that the issue cannot be substituted for or

exchanged for something of equal value.89

If a territory fulfills all three of these conditions it is indivisible.

In the Israeli case, there is an immediate and unmistakable treatment of Jerusalem as an indivisible issue. The Golan Heights, Gaza and Sinai are either seen as divisible or treated as assets necessary for security purposes. No serious emotional attachment towards them is notable. The

West Bank is more complex. On the one hand, the Labor Party governments unofficially supported the Allon Plan, a plan to divide the territory between Israel and Jordan. On the other hand, many of the Labor Party leaders had an emotional tie to the area and they were very hesitant to negotiate over the West Bank.90 Certainly the Likud government, from 1977 and on, evinced a stronger emotional attachment to the area. However, they did not rule out possible division.91 Therefore, there is a general move towards a perception of the West Bank as indivisible but it is not completed.92

The status of territory in the politics of a settling state can undergo substantial changes over time. Settlers and their supporters may alter the political discourse to the point that a territory, once considered foreign, becomes an inseparable part of the state. Indeed, attempts to withdraw from the territory once this threshold has been passed can result in destabilization of the regime.93 This

89 Ron Hassner, “To Halve and to Hold”: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility,” Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2003), 12-13. 90 Levavi to Eban, Telegram, June 19, 1967, Foreign Ministry, Gazit, 5978-2/FM, ISA; Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, June 22 1967, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, eds. Harriet Dashiell Schwar and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, DC, 2004), doc. 314; Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 28-29. 91 Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel and the Peace Process, 1977-1982; Emanuel Navon, A Plight Among Nations: Israel’s Foreign Policy between Nationalism and Realism (Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag, 2009), 146-166. 92 Lustick, Unsettled States, 352-384. 93 Ibid., 26-51.

50 raises the question: how does a territory become indivisible? Goddard has a rational explanation for a constructivist phenomenon. As we have elaborated above, leaders have rational incentives to create narratives of territorial expansion. By showing they have support for their position and that the public will not support concessions, leaders may strengthen their hands and make it more likely that the other side will concede.94 When trying to build legitimacy for this bargaining policy, an actor may have more than one potential legitimation strategy. It may be tempting to utilize more than one narrative of attachment to solidify the domestic coalition behind the move, to mobilize different constituencies.95 In the short term appealing to a multitude of constituencies increases support for the territorial policies of the government and improves its bargaining positions.

In the long term, this dynamic decreases the territorial flexibility of the government. The use of legitimization strategies amongst diverse social and political audiences can have complex and unintended effects.96 Ideas of territorial expansion resonate with some groups rather than others. By adopting a specific narrative of legitimization, a leader may increase political dependence on certain social coalitions by mobilizing them to a cause while alienating and decreasing dependence on others. Goddard refers to this as a “switching effect.” As this process unfolds, an actor may be locked into language and policies which construct a territory as indivisible. In addition, legitimizing strategies may change social actors and establish new identities and interests tied to the territory and further limiting room for maneuver. Actors in the state, such as settlers, investors in the settled territory and the military may develop interests in the

94 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1988), 434-439. 95 Goddard, “Uncommon Ground,” 41. 96 On complexity in unintended consequences, see Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

51 region and use their influence to block moves to withdraw.97 Socially constructed indivisibility of an issue places serious limitations on rational bargaining. If a territory becomes socially and politically indivisible, the existence of an overlap in bargaining positions is rendered irrelevant and a mutually beneficial outcome may be ruled out.

Defection or Cooperation

Attaining cooperation between states is difficult. Even when a deal is reached, defection is always a possibility. One side or both may not live up to their commitments. There are two distinct forms of defection with very different implications: voluntary defection and involuntary defection.

Voluntary defection occurs when an actor reneges on an agreement willingly even though they had the ability to enforce it. Involuntary defection refers to the inability of the actor to achieve domestic ratification (either literal of figurative) for the agreement.98 There are also less clear-cut situations, such as when the ambiguity and indeterminacy of language is the cause of noncompliance. This can be either intentional in the sense of exploiting language intentionally to achieve ends violating the spirit of the agreement or through genuine differences in interpretation.

Therefore, when defection occurs, it is important to ascertain the causal mechanism behind it.

Israel has an incentive to defect on settlement agreements when two conditions are extant.

If there is domestic opposition to restraint in settlement construction, the Israeli government could have an incentive to act in contravention to an agreement of restraint. Additionally, Israel may have an incentive to cheat if an agreement with an Arab state becomes a distinct possibility. An

97 Hendrik Spruyt, Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). 98 Putnam, “Domestic Politics,” 438.

52 increase of settlement presence in areas over which bargaining is taking place could strengthen the

Israeli bargaining position by signalling commitment to settled territory.

There are also reasons to expect Israel to avoid defection. The U.S.-Israeli bilateral relationship is particularly intense. When interaction is expected to repeat, cooperation is more likely. This concept is referred to as the “shadow of the future.” When future interactions enter the calculation, an actor compares the one-time gains of defection with the sacrifice of possible future gains based on repeated interactions. The more stable and frequent interactions are likely to be, the more likely and profitable cooperation will become.99

The best-known strategy for fostering cooperation in iterated games, is “tit-for-tat.” In this strategy, if one actor cheats, the other actor cheats in return, hoping that the following iteration will be cooperative. This strategy was devised as an answer to the “prisoners’ dilemma.” An actor employing tit-for-tat is never the first to defect but retaliates to a defection in kind, and forgives defection after one act of retaliation.100 Since defections are expected to be rewarded with reciprocal defections, a status quo of cooperation is likely to emerge over time.

This is typically the best strategy for both actors. Theoretically however, Axelrod notes that for each state individually there is another strategic option which may reward them with a higher payoff:

99 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Cambridge, MA: Persus Books, 2006), 126-132; Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International Institutions,” International Organization Vol. 55, No. 4 (Autumn, 2001), 781; Oye, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy.” 100 Axelrod and William Hamilton, “The Evolution of Cooperation”; Robert Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” International Organization Vol. 40, No. 1, (Winter 1986), 1-27.

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“The best reputation to have is the reputation for being a bully. The best kind of bully

to be is one who has a reputation for squeezing the most out of the other player while

not tolerating any defections at all from the other…Fortunately it is not easy to

establish a reputation as a bully. To become a bully, you have to defect a lot, which

means that you are likely to provoke the other player into retaliation.”101

However, it would seem unlikely to expect Israel or the United States to be able to act as bullies considering the length of the shadow of the future in their bilateral relations. They would be expected to engage in tit-for-tat, which according most game theorists would stabilize into long- term cooperation. Especially when you consider that an emotionally resonant “special relationship” has emerged between the two countries.102

That is, unless the payoff structure is significantly different from the prisoners’ dilemma due to circumstances external to bilateral relations.103 There is one important element in which the interaction between Israel and the United States over settlements is not an iterated game. The pay- off structure changes radically over time. The existence of a willing Arab interlocutor for the settled territory is a crucial variable for both the United States and for Israel. For Israel, what matters is how much of a military threat is presented by the relevant Arab state. What matters for

101 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 152-153. 102 Yaacov Bar Siman Tov, "The United States and Israel since 1948: A "Special Relationship?”, Diplomatic History, Vol. 22(2), Spring, 1998, 231- 262; Abraham Ben-Zvi, From Truman to Obama: The Rise of and the Beginning of the Decline of US-Israeli Relations (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Achronot, 2005); David Schoenbaum, The United States and the State of Israel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Reich, The United States and Israel; Stephens, US Policy Towards Israel. 103 Robert Axelrod & Robert Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), 226-254. 228-232; Duncan Snidal, “The Game Theory of International Politics,” World Politics Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), 49-51.

54 the United States is the strategic global utility of the relevant Arab state. When there is no relevant

Arab interlocutor, the pay-off structure is radically different and does not reward either Israeli restraint or U.S. pressure.

Another element which may complicate the willingness of Israel and the United States to cooperate is the dynamic between bilateral bargaining and mediation. As explained above, requitement is an essential element in obtaining concessions. The U.S. cannot offer Israel compensation in terms of security or borders for the freezing or dismantling of settlements.

Rather any Israeli concessions made in bilateral bargaining are likely to be pocketed by the Arab states when mediation commences. In addition, if bilateral bargaining is merely conducted for demonstration effects, the United States does not take it seriously. Not only does the U.S. have little incentive to punish Israel, it would also prefer to keep the issue isolated so as not to harm the strategic relationship with Israel. Therefore, at little risk of retaliation, Israel has an opportunity to enact the “bully” strategy recommended by Axelrod. It has no incentive to cooperate or concede. However, Israel does have an incentive to signal to its future Arab partners that it is a difficult negotiator “type” in the hopes of getting a better deal at the bargaining table.104

During mediation attempts a very different picture emerges. If the “real” negotiation is occurring in mediation, Israel would be expected to be far more concerned about the shadow of the future with the United States. With substantial outcomes and interests on the line, the United

States, would be able to credibly threaten sanctions and assuage with inducements. In addition, since the stakes are high Israel would also have to be concerned about the audience costs faced

104 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 152-153; Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests.”

55 by Arab negotiation partners. Since it is difficult for the Arab states to negotiate with Israel for domestic political and regional interstate prestige reasons, Israel would have to consider the very real effects Israeli violations and defections would have on the stability of Arab governments willing to reach a peace deal. If a government attempting to make peace with Israel were to fall, another opportunity may never present itself. Arab leaders, already hesitant to negotiate with

Israel, would be even more cautious. Therefore, Israel would have a significant incentive to cooperate and a heavy “shadow of the future” would hold sway over its strategic calculations.

Operationalizing the Outcomes

These are the four possible outcomes of the bargaining/mediation stage:

1) Disagreement. The two sides are unable or unwilling to reach an agreement on Israeli

settlement policy in the occupied territories. In this outcome, neither side believes a tacit

agreement has been reached. The disagreement is explicit and can be seen in both public

pronouncements and private consultations.

2) A tacit agreement. Downs and Rocke define tacit bargaining as a situation wherein a state

attempts to manipulate another states’ “policy choices through its behavior rather than by

relying on formal or informal diplomatic exchanges.”105 A tacit agreement is said to have

been reached when both sides are aware that there is an unspoken bargain afoot, but do not

necessarily agree on its properties.

105 George Downs & David Rocke, “Tacit Bargaining and Arms control,” World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 3 (April 1987), 297.

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3) A pledge. A pledge is a statement of intent which does not have legal standing but is imbued

with political and moral obligation. The pledge does not have to be mutual as there need

not be obligations imparted on both sides. However, it must be clear and explicit.106 Pledges

(and certainly tacit agreements) may not necessarily be shared with relevant arms of the

government and bureaucracy, which can lead to behavior which can be damaging to the

agreement or to involuntary defection. 107

4) Agreement. In this case, an Israeli agreement to modify the substance of its settlement

policy. A formal agreement can be either verbal or written but it must be mutual and

explicit. There will usually be a domestic ratification process, in the wider sense of the

word. In other words, a cabinet decision to approve it, a legislature vote or something along

those lines.108 The agreement must be shared with relevant arms of its government and

bureaucracy, and procedures put into place to prevent different arms of the government

from sabotaging the agreement.109

There are three possible outcomes of the implementation stage following either a tacit or an explicit agreement:

106 Kal Raustalia, “Form and Substance in International Agreements,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 99, No. 3 (July 2005), 586. 107 Lipson, “Why are some International Agreements Informal,” 526. 108 Raustiala, “Form and Substance in International Agreements,” 597-598. 109 Lipson, “Why are some International Agreements Informal,” 526.

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1) Cooperation with the agreement. This would entail a good faith attempt to comply with

the terms of an agreement, interpreted correctly, by a side with the government capacity

to enforce and the ability to handle opposition from non-state actors.

2) Voluntary defection. This is when a state knowingly and in a preventable manner

violates an agreement with another state. This can be done artfully. Vague wording or

confusion regarding an obligation can be exploited to evade compliance.110 It can also

be done without a legal justification. Intentional violations of agreements may be

hidden or executed publicly. Voluntary defections may be executed to signal intentions,

while hidden violations are usually intended to pocket gains garnered in the process.111

3) Involuntary defection. There are two types of involuntary defection. The first is when

the government attempts in good faith to uphold an agreement but does not have the

political or technical ability to fulfill it. For example, when a government is unable to

attain domestic ratification.112 The state may also defect involuntarily when it does not

have the capability to enforce the agreement. The problem is compounded when the

restrictions in the treaty are designed to regulate the behavior of non-state actors.113 If

a state makes a reasonable attempt to enforce the agreement in terms of its capabilities,

and is unable to do so, this would qualify as unintentional defection.

110 Oran Young, Compliance & Public Authority: A Theory with International Applications (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 106-108. 111 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 152-153; Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests.” 112 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 438. 113 Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, “On Compliance,” International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring 1993),193-195.

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A second type is defection due to a technical misunderstanding. The language in

the agreement does not provide specified answers to every question involved in

behavior regulated by an agreement. Language in the agreement may not be precise

enough to capture the full meaning of the treaty and a certain amount of ambiguity is

necessary in drafting to overcome differences. This is obviously doubly true when the

agreement is tacit. This can lead to different interpretations made in good faith.114

114 Ibid., 188-192.

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Chapter 2

From Kids to Goats: The Johnson years, 1967-1968

Introduction

This chapter follows the early years of Israeli settlement policy and the initial formulation of

U.S. policy towards settlement construction in the occupied territories. The analysis focuses on the years of the Johnson administration which are particularly important in that they were formative in shaping and limiting the American response to Israeli settlement policy. The circumstances of the Johnson administration, such as its pro-Israeli tilt, the obsessive focus on

Vietnam and the announcement that Johnson would not seek re-election, determined the limited

(but nonetheless important) constraints on Israeli settlement construction policy.

The main thrust of the argument is that Israeli settlement construction in the early years was designed to further its strategy of establishing “defensible borders.” However, in the early days of its settlement policy Israel was highly vulnerable to American pressure. Therefore, Israel obfuscated its purpose from the United States. It did so by proffering a tacit agreement regarding its settlement construction policy. The agreement included an unofficial commitment to build reversible military oriented outposts only. This was acceptable to the United States. The Johnson administration had little interest in engaging with the conflict at the time and did not spend any resources confirming Israeli compliance with the agreement. In the meantime, Israel violated the

60 agreement by building civilian settlements. By the time the United States realized that Israel had not upheld the deal, the Johnson administration had suffered major blows in Vietnam. In March

1968, the President announced he will not seek re-election. Under the circumstances, a new policy towards settlements had to await a new administration. By the time Nixon took office in

January 1969, Israel had made great strides towards consolidating a settlement project.

The Interaction of Units

Existing Beliefs and Preferences: Israeli Strategy and Foreign Policy

Israeli strategic thinking before the 1967 War was conditioned by its geostrategic position which engendered genuine existential fears. The borders of the state were difficult to defend and Israel lacked strategic depth. If surprised, the IDF could not trade land for time while it mobilized and prepared a counterattack. The militaries of Israel’s rivals were also based on regular forces rather than reserves, which allowed them an advantage in terms of mobilization times. The threat was exacerbated by the vulnerability of Israel’s pre-1967 borders, which Michael Brecher referred to as “a strategist’s nightmare.”1 Of particular concern was the “narrow waist” of Israel from the

West Bank to the Mediterranean (9-10 miles across) which would allow foreign forces to sever the country within a few minutes. Western Jerusalem was within the range of Jordanian guns and the capital city was surrounded on three sides so that it could easily be cut off.2 In the north, the settlements of the were vulnerable to Syrian artillery barrages, while in the south, the

1 Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Image, Process, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972, 65. 2 Michael Handel, Israel’s Political-Military Doctrine (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1973), 1.

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Egyptians could cut off shipping through the Straits of Tiran.3 Finally, Gaza formed a convenient launching pad for an Egyptian assault into Israel proper merely 30 miles from Tel Aviv.4 In addition, Israel feared quantitative inferiority on the battlefield. Indeed, the demographic imbalance allowed the Arab militaries to maintain militaries significantly larger, though far less effective, than the Israel Defense Force (henceforth the IDF).5

The consequences of these objectively substantial factors were exacerbated by an exaggerated threat perception. The Israeli leadership tended to view the entire Arab world as a monolithic entity intent on destroying the Jewish state at the first opportunity. Although this was inaccurate, it was fed by the events of the 1948 War, wherein Israel was invaded by its neighbors and by the lofty rhetoric of pan-Arabism.6 Generations of anti-Semitism in the diaspora, culminating in the holocaust, and repeated wars with their Arab neighbors had fostered acute national anxiety. It was widely believed in Israel that if it lost a single war there would be no second chance and the war would end at best in politicide, at worst in genocide.7 This sense was not helped by repeated threats by Arab leaders and in the media against Israel and by the unwillingness of the states of the region to recognize the Jewish state or its borders.8

The Israeli strategy was to rely on military deterrence as the first point of defense. The deterrent qualities of the IDF were formulated in pursuit of a qualitative advantage based on two planks: superiority in manpower and weapons technology. These advantages were harnessed to a

3 Martin Van Creveld, Defending Israel: A Study of Her Borders and a Plan for Peace, (New York: St. Martin’s press, 2004), 23. 4 Handel, Israel’s Political-Military Doctrine, 1. 5 Yigal Allon, A Curtain of Sand, Tel-Aviv: Hakkibutz Hameuchad, 1968), 63; Avi Kober, “A Paradigm in Crisis? Israel’s Doctrine of Military Decision,” Israel Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1995), 188-211. 6 Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel (London: Routledge, 1974). 7 Tal, National Security, 40. 8 Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel; Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally, 224-227.

62 policy of disproportionate reprisals to provocations.9 While manpower was developed domestically, qualitative superiority in weaponry depended on attaining and maintaining foreign sources of supply. This necessitated a constant search for a great power patron to serve as a permanent provider of weapons. Israel also believed great power patronage was necessary to protect it from Soviet intervention in the Israeli-Arab conflict. France served in this capacity from mid-1950’s until the 1967 War, although they were not powerful enough to deter the

USSR. They were gradually succeeded by the United States.10

Should deterrence fail, the strategy of combat was designed to swiftly launch an offensive into enemy territory. Israel fostered intelligence capabilities designed to provide early warning and allow time to prepare for a penetrative strike. The structure of the IDF, heavily based on reserves and with a minimal professional core, necessitated enough warning to mobilize society for war.11 Once called up, the IDF was designed attain a swift battlefield victory by transposing battle on to enemy territory as quickly as possible and attacking vulnerable supply lines.

However, the demographic inferiority and the geopolitical realities of the conflict, meant that

Israel could not land a killing blow against its enemies. No matter how offensive its military orientation was, the strategic outlook could only be defensive. Therefore, it planned to psychologically wear the Arab states down and deter them. It was hoped, that eventually, the

Arab states would be willing to accept the existence of the State of Israel out of necessity.12 The

Israeli strategy was intended to alter the Arab bargaining position gradually, through political attrition.

9 Benny Morris, Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War (New York: Oxofrd University Press, 1997). 10 Handel, Israel’s Political-Military Doctrine, 8-9. 11 Yisrael Tal, National Security: The Israeli Experience, (London: Praeger, 2000), 77-80. 12 Ibid., 46.

63

The 1967 War ended with Israel tripling its size and occupying a large amount of land.

While many of its strategic conundrums remained, it now possessed considerable strategic depth.

It also possessed a “bargaining chip” which could theoretically be traded for political concessions. This meant some adjustment in its strategy was necessary. Israel had to shape both initial preferences as to the fate of the occupied territories and beliefs as to the willingness and ability of the Arab states to negotiate in good faith over the newly attained assets. The 1967-68 period saw Israel shape preferences and beliefs in response to the new environment.

Shaping Israeli Preferences and Beliefs towards the Occupied Territories

On June 19, 1967, the Israeli cabinet decided it would be willing to return the Golan Heights and

Sinai in exchange for full peace. It feared international pressure to withdraw, at least partially due to the memory of the 1956 Suez Crisis when the great powers forced it to withdraw from

Sinai and Gaza.13 Prime Minister Levi Eshkol said in June 1967, that Israel will not be able to withstand international pressure for long: “For a few months we may be able to flout everyone, but we cannot do it for a long time, not to the world and not to the United States.”14 The expectation of international pressure on Israel led to a relatively modest territorial position.

While Israel indicated a willingness to return Sini and the Golan Heights, the cabinet did not reach a conclusion on the fate of Gaza. As for the West Bank, the Israeli government was unable to decide its future. It presented a difficult problem for emotional and religious reasons, but was also strategically vital.

13 For an overview of U.S. policy towards Israel in the 1956 War see Isaac Alteras, “Eisenhower and the Sinai Campaign of 1956: The First Major Crisis in US-Israeli Relations,” in David Tal, ed., The 1956 War: Collusion and Rivalry in the Middle East (London: Routledge, 2001), 25-46. 14 Reuven Pedatzur, The Triumph of Embarrassment, (Tel Aviv: Yad Tabenkin, 1996), 51-52.

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Amongst the issues preventing the formulation of preferences towards the West Bank was the controversy over the identity of the interlocutor and future sovereign in that territory.

Israel wavered between a “Palestinian Option”, which would involve negotiations with

Palestinian notables, and a “Jordanian option” which would involve negotiations with the

Hashemite regime. Talks on both tracks were unsuccessful.15 Therefore, Israel planned for a prolonged occupation. It designed a public diplomacy approach explaining this policy to the world which it hoped would improve its bargaining position.

Israel widened its territorial ambitions for other reasons as well. First, the expected international pressure did not materialize. Alongside the lack of external pressure, the Arab

League Summit held in Khartoum played an important role in hardening the Israeli territorial position. In the summit, the Arab states rejected the Israeli position on a final settlement by refusing to recognize Israel, make peace with Israel or negotiate with Israel. The summit, held on

August 29-September 1, 1967 has become a bone of contention among historians, some of whom believe the Arab states were attempting to signal a willingness to reach a settlement on certain terms and a rejection of armed struggle.16 The Arab League statement left room for a possible agreement of non-belligerence, albeit one which would not include recognition or normalization.

In the final analysis, to consider the Arab position at Khartoum moderate would be overstating the trend, but it was certainly an improvement on the official position taken in the 1964 Arab

League Summit, which called for the “liquidation of Israel.”17

15 Memorandum of Conversation, November 21, 1967, 7052/12/A, Israel State Archives (henceforth ISA); Eshkol to Sasson, November 12, 1967, 7052/12/A, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, June 20, 1968, 7052/12/A, ISA. 16 For the major approaches, see Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881- 2001, (New York: Vintage, 2001), 346; Avi Raz, The Bride and the Dowry: Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians in the Aftermath of the 1967 War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 136-138; Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, (New York: Norton, 2000), 259. 17 Raz, The Bride and the Dowry, 137.

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The official Israeli position was that the summit was a statement of uncompromising belligerence.18 Unofficially Israeli decision makers were aware of a trend towards moderation in the Arab states. Foreign Minister Eban was concerned that acknowledgement of Arab willingness to negotiate would undermine the Israeli negotiating position. In a closed meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, he admitted that “any readiness of the

Arabs to accept things which they refused to accept in the past might lay waste to the front which we have formed.”19 If so, Israeli policy was based on promoting the perception that the Arab position towards a permanent settlement had hardened in order to maintain the integrity of their stance on direct bilateral negotiations and full contractual peace.20 In addition, Israel did not trust the Arab states to bargain in good faith. The new Arab position did not extend to a willingness to agree to full contractual peace with Israel, which was the minimal Israeli condition for withdrawal. Therefore, the position was not deemed sufficiently moderate.

The factors above contributed to a growing sense in the Government of Israel (henceforth

GOI) and its public that the pre-1967 borders did not provide Israel with enough security. For example, in a poll taken in 1968, 95% of Israeli citizens wished to retain Jerusalem in any peace settlement, 88% wished to retain the Golan Heights and 61% wished for continued Israeli sovereignty in Sharm el-Sheikh.21 Increasingly, the Israeli negotiating position was based on the claim that territorial changes were necessary.22 In accordance with these interests, a government decision made on October 30 1968, rescinded the earlier acceptance of the international borders

18 Shlaim, Iron Wall, 259. 19 Raz, The Bride and the Dowry, 138. 20 Ibid., 136-139. 21 Atherton to Battle, June 10, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59 /A1-5632/22, United States National Archives (henceforth USNA). 22 For an overview of the “defensible borders” argument, see Yigal Allon, “Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 55 (October 1976), 38-53.

66 with Egypt and Syria as the basis for a future permanent status agreement. The new formulation saw Israel demand that Gaza remain in Israeli hands and that Sharm El-Sheikh would remain under Israeli control, along with a strip of land guaranteeing territorial contiguity with the international border. This decision was specifically designated to replace the formulation of June

19.23 If so, the decision of October 30, 1968 showcases the evolution of Israeli strategy towards one of “defensible borders”, a concept which took on increasing centrality in its strategic planning and barraging position.24

Shaping Israeli Preferences and Beliefs towards the Settlements

The policy of defensible borders was designed primarily to establish a militarily defensible boundary. However, its secondary purpose was to improve the Israeli position at the bargaining table so that it would retain the largest amount of land possible while still attaining full peace.

Other works have conceived of the Israeli settlement enterprise as an ideological enterprise. In other words, settlements were a tool to maintain religiously and historically important sites while dominating the Palestinians in pursuit of the “greater land of Israel.”25 This approach is suited to explaining Israeli policies in Jerusalem but has little relevance elsewhere. The Israeli government in the Eshkol years was hesitant to build in emotionally and ideologically significant areas of the

West Bank, such as , and in areas heavy in Palestinian population, such as northern

Samaria. Instead it initiated construction in strategically significant areas such as the Golan

23 Israeli Cabinet, October 31, 1968, Labor platform 15/46/39/2, Yad Tabenkin (henceforth YT); Shimoni to London, November 1, 1968, Mordechai Gazit 5978-2/FM, ISA. 24 Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 117; Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 28-29. 25 Janet Abu-Lughod, “Israeli Settlements in Occupied Arab Lands: Conquest to Colony,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 11, 2 (Winter 1982), 16-54; Akiva Eldar and Idith Zertal, Lords of the Land: The War over Israel’s Settlements in the Occupied Territories, (New York: Nation Books, 2007); Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel & the Palestinians, Cambridge: South End Press, 1999).

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Heights and the . In the cases where Israel did build in spots of emotional and ideological significance, there was a strong component of public pressure involved.26

As Israel was unsure what areas to demand and what it could realistically obtain in negotiations, it preferred to obfuscate its territorial demands. Israeli officials insisted that permanent borders could only be agreed upon during face-to-face negotiations. In July 1968,

Eban insisted that “Israel cannot now say where boundaries would be; the nature of the peace settlement will influence the nature of boundaries.”27 This became the standard Israeli line.28 It served two purposes. First, it was a genuine reaction to the deep disagreements in the Israeli cabinet on territorial policy which could not be resolved.29 Second was the avoidance of international pressure.30

Israel effectively served the obfuscation policy through settlement construction as well. It did so by keeping the construction of most settlements secret. When the settlement of Kfar

Etzion was established, the fact was widely publicized and the publicity led to a certain amount of international backlash. From then on, the policy was secretive and the establishment of civilian settlements was not publicized.31 In addition, the character of the settlements was hidden

26 Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements 1967-1977, (New York: Times Books, 2006), 149-151; Hagi Huberman, Against all Odds: 40 Years of Settlement in Judea and Samaria, Binyamin and the Valley, 1967-,2007 (Netzarim: Netzarim Library, 2008), 27; Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 232-237; Zertal and Eldar, Lords of the Land, 13. 27 Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, July 17, 1968, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1964-1968, vol. XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968, eds. Louis J. Smith and David S. Patterson, doc. 213. 28 See also, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, September 14, 1968, FRUS, 1964- 1968, vol. XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968, eds. Louis J. Smith & David S. Patterson (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2000), doc. 252. 29 Eshkol to Eban, November 6, 1968, Office of the Minister Galili 7404-3/A, ISA. 30 Comay to Eban, March 17, 1968, Jarring 4294-3/FM, ISA. 31 Yechiel Admoni, Decade of Discretion: Settlement Policy in the Territories, 1967-77 (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1992), 26-27; Lior to Weiss, Summary of Meeting on Cultivation of Bardale Area, December 31, 1967, 6692-15/C, ISA; Government decision 217, January 28, 1968, Settlements 12-3-93-2, YT; Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 215.

68 from view. Israel built civilian settlements but presented them as military outposts. The military status of the units served an important diplomatic function. The legal counsel to the Israeli

Foreign Ministry, Theodor Meron, advised Eban that civilian settlements in the territories were in contravention of international law. He added therefore that “it is vital that [it] be done by military bodies and not civilian ones.”32 This opinion was based on the legal prohibition expressed in article 49 of the Geneva Conventions. The clause related to settlements built in occupied territories is article 49 of the Geneva Conventions, which reads “the Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”33

However, the establishment of military bases by the occupying state in the occupied territories is both legal and to be expected.34 Correspondingly, Israel decided to present its settlements as military in character, regardless of their actual nature.35

Particularly useful in this regard were units of graduates from Israeli youth groups, known as Pioneering Fighting Youth units (hereafter referred to by their Hebrew acronym

NAHAL). On October 1, 1967, Minister without a Portfolio Yisrael Galili proposed that new settlements be accompanied by military characteristics to help create plausible military deniability.36 With these considerations in mind, most of the settlements approved by the Eshkol government were initially characterized as NAHAL outposts whether its inhabitants were civilians or soldiers.

32 Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire, 99-101. 33 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Article 49(6). 34 See Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949; Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), 1907. 35 Government decision 866, October 1, 1967, Settlements 12-3-93-2, YT. 36 Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 199.

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Indeed, Israel did its utmost to hide and obfuscate its settlement policy. The Israeli government attempted to create facts on the ground which would instill “sunk costs” into the occupied territories to bind itself to parts of them in the future. Until costs had been sunk and the bargaining position had been improved, Israel went out of its way to obfuscate both its territorial policy and settlement construction policy.

Existing Beliefs and Preferences; U.S. Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict during the

Johnson Administration

The United States entered this period with a set of foreign policy preferences and beliefs. The first and foremost foreign policy goal in that region, as in just about any other region, was to contain Soviet influence.37 As Douglas Little memorably put it: “U.S. policymakers from Harry

Truman to Jimmy Carter waged a Cold War against the Kremlin from the sun-drenched shores of the Eastern Mediterranean to the snow-capped mountains of Afghanistan.”38 The struggle to contain Soviet influence commenced in the immediate aftermath of World War 2 and was at the center of U.S. policy in the region throughout the period examined. The Soviet Union, on its part, did its utmost to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict to extend its influence in the region. The

USSR backed the Arab position and armed its allies. In addition, it vocally condemned the U.S.

37 CIA, June 15, 1967, Papers of LBJ, National Security File, 112, Johnson Presidential Library (henceforth JPL); Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East, (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 18-19; A.F.K. Organski, The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 107-108; Qaundt, Peace Process, 11-12; Steven Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 121-123; John Mearsheimer & Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 51-54. 38 Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 117.

70 for backing Israel. Its aggressive policy facilitated Soviet efforts to cultivate alliances (at different times) with important regional actors such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq.39

President Johnson was a classic cold warrior. Doris Kearns described his approach to foreign policy as guided by “his tendency to interpret violent and ideological struggles on other continents as an aspect of the universal conflict of values between freedom and unfreedom and between the interests of the great powers that represented these values.”40 The experiences of the

Kennedy administration had taught the President that Egypt was an unreliable strategic partner.

Johnson tilted heavily towards Israel as he felt they were the most capable and reliable partner in the effort to limit Soviet influence.41

A second major interest of the United States in the Middle East was the safeguarding of the regional oil supply and its free flow into the global marketplace. The need to safeguard the

Persian Gulf was intertwined with the containment of the Soviet Union, as the worst-case scenario was an increase of communist influence (or even invasion) of the region. However, it was also distinct as it addressed the need to maintain internal stability in the Gulf region and an effort to stop local actors from dominating the region or impeding shipping. Up until the mid-

60’s the job was mostly performed by the British, but in 1966 the Johnson administration began

39 National Intelligence Estimate, March 10, 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967, eds. Harriet Dashiell Schwar David S. Patterson (Washington 2000), doc. 183. Doc. 187; Cheryl Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986); Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, May 28, 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967, eds. Harriet Dashiell Schwar David S. Patterson (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2000), doc. 295. 40 Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Harper, 1976), 256-257. 41 John Badeau, The American Approach to the Arab World (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1968); H.W. Brands, The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 183-218; Warren I. Cohen, “Lyndon Baines Johnson vs. Gamal Abdul Nasser,” in eds. Cohen and Nancy Tucker, Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World, eds. Cohen and Nancy Tucker (New York; Cambridge University Press, 1994), 279-309; Douglas Little, “Choosing Sides: Lyndon Johnson and the Middle East,” in The Johnson Years: Volume 3: LBJ at Home and Abroad, ed. Robert A. Divine (Lawrence, KS: Westview, 1994), 150-197.

71 to pick up the slack. Correspondingly, a regional containment strategy was built on alliances with

Saudi Arabia and .42

A third interest was the defense of Israel. While opinions differ as to the motivation for U.S. commitment to Israeli security, it is empirically inarguable that it featured prominently in U.S. calculations from the 1960’s onward. This interest contradicted, or at least hindered, the first two. Attempts to rally support for Soviet containment efforts amongst the Arab states in both the

Persian Gulf and the Levant were complicated by the depth of ties with Israel.43 The American foreign policy establishment had foreseen this problem when it almost unanimously opposed recognizing the State of Israel for fear that it would aggravate relations with the Arabs.44

The only way to pursue this seemingly contradictory set of interests was by pursuing Arab-Israeli peace. As Walt Rostow, Special Assistant to Johnson put it, “we think a peace settlement is the only thing that can give any of us a real chance to build a Mid-East where constructive nationalism and regionalism can block the Soviet thrust.”45 A resolution of the conflict would remove the contradiction between the need to secure Israel and the U.S. interest in containing

Soviet influence and protection of the oil sources and allow it pursue a coherent strategy.46

Therefore the United States has repeatedly and insistently tried to resolve the Arab-Israeli

42 N/a, July 7, 1967, Papers of LBJ, National Security File, 109, JPL; National Intelligence Estimate, April 8, 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula, eds. Nina Davis Howland & David S. Patterson (Washington DC: 2000), doc. 4; Qaundt, Peace Process, 11-12; Little, American Orientalism, 138-140; Walt & Mearsheimer, Israel Lobby, 56-57. 43 Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, January 16, 1964, FRUS XVIII, Doc. 9; Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, May 28, 1964, FRUS XVIII, Doc. 63. 44 Ben-Zvi, From Truman to Obama, 19-22. 45 Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant to President Johnson, January 5, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968, eds. Louis J. Smith & David S. Patterson, (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2000), doc. 33. 46 Strong to Middle East Control Group meeting, June 8, 1967, National Security File, Files of the Special Committee of the NSC, 1, JPL; Bernard Reich, Securing the Covenant: United States-Israel relations after the Cold War (Westport, CON: Praeger, 1995), 4-9.

72 conflict. Indeed, this effort has received broad bipartisan support even if there has been disagreement on the exact contours of the desirable policy.47 This strong strategic interest was at the core of U.S. policy throughout the examined period.

U.S. Beliefs and Preferences: The Policy of the Johnson Administration towards the Occupied

Territories

In the aftermath of the war, the U.S. prepared itself for long-term Israeli control of the occupied territories. The short-term U.S. strategy did not involve placing significant pressure on Israel to withdraw. One report recommended that “territorial questions should remain for later resolution without either side abandoning its claims.”48 There were several factors behind this unacknowledged American belief which will be analyzed in this section.

The United States was loath to take a strong stand on territorial issues in the immediate aftermath of the Six Day War. First, and foremost, it was preoccupied with Vietnam and its unsuccessful policy there wore President Lyndon Johnson down to the extent that he decided not to run for re-election in the 1968 Presidential elections.49

Second, the Johnson administration felt a moral obligation to Israel which it could not easily dismiss. American guarantees of the freedom of Israeli shipping through the Tiran Straits given in 1957, collapsed when Egypt closed the Straits to Israeli passage. The U.S. was unable to provide a solution. Israel waited with relative patience while the United States attempted

47 Qaundt, Peace Process, 14. 48 Strategy for the West Bank, July 10, 1967, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59 /A1/5632/21, USNA. 49 Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, 335-354.

73 unsuccessfully to resolve the crisis. The Eshkol government worked diligently to obtain

American approval of a pre-emptive strike.50 Therefore a significant element of US guilt is discernible in the immediate aftermath of the war. The Israeli argument that it could not rely on international guarantees but rather needed to take unilateral measures was not one the United

States had a ready answer for. When pressed on the subject, US ambassador Walworth Barbour told Eban that the guarantees were “a very sensitive point” and that Israel should avoid “picking at the scab.”51

Third, American public opinion was firmly on the Israeli side in the post-war period.52

An internal State Department memo noted that the State Department received six times as many letters supporting Israel than supporting the Arab position.53 Nathaniel Davis of the National

Security Council (NSC) wrote that the domestic political situation precluded serious pressure on

Israel because of the strength of pro-Israeli sentiment. He also pointed out that Israel was now associated with American prestige and the Arab states were associated with the USSR.

Therefore, Israeli concessions to the Arab states would be seen by the American public as a victory for communism.54 McGeorge Bundy, Special Consultant to the President agreed and advised against throwing U.S. weight fully behind an Israeli-Jordanian settlement, “in the light of the depth and strength of the feelings of the people of Israel and of their supporters in the United

States.”55

50 For the classic account, see Michael Oren, Six Days of War June 1967 & the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 61-126. 51 Memorandum of conversation, August 6, 1967, 7412-1/A, ISA. 52 Roche to Johnson, July 10, 1967, Papers of LBJ, NSF, 109, JPL; Quandt, Peace Process, 45. 53 Donnelley to Acting Secretary, June 26, 1967, Papers of LBJ, NSF, 109, JPL. 54 Davis to Rostow, July 18, 1967, Papers of LBJ, NSF, 109, JPL. 55 Paper Prepared by the President's Special Consultant , July 18, 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, eds. Harriet Dashiell Schwar & Edward C. Keefer (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2004), doc. 374.

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Sympathy for the Israeli position was at odds with the traditional American policy towards territorial questions in the region. The US had in the past insisted on the territorial integrity of all states in the Middle East, and found itself under significant pressure from the

Arab states to uphold its commitment.56 However, the assumption of the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) and the NSC was that some Israeli annexations were inevitable. In fact, most analysts and administration officials believed that some border rectifications, particularly in the

Jerusalem area, were desirable.57 This meant that as Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara put it, “we are in a heck of a jam on territorial integrity.”58 Johnson’s “Five Points” speech, given on

June 19, 1967, laid out the principles of his administration’s approach to the problem. The

President presented the territorial formula stressing “the importance of respect for political independence and territorial integrity of all the states in the area.” However, the American position was that the principle of integrity did not necessarily apply to the pre-war border.

Johnson indicated that the ceasefire borders were not sacrosanct.59

The speech papered over a fundamental disagreement within the administration.

President Johnson, possessed a genuine personal warmth towards Israel and was loath to pressure it on territorial issues.60 As just one example, the President asked Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.

56 Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant to President Johnson, June 13, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 278; Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Secretary of State Rusk and the President's Special Assistant Rostow, June 17, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 306. 57 Memorandum from the President's Special Counsel (McPherson) to President Johnson, June 11, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 263; Strong to Control Group, Middle East Settlement, June 8, 1967, NSF, Files of the Special Committee of the NSC, 1, JPL; CIA Memorandum, Special Assessments on the Middle East Situation, June 9, 1967, Papers of LBJ, NSF, 112, JPL; NSC Control Group to Johnson, June 26, 1967, NSF, Files of the Special Committee of the NSC, 2, JPL. 58 Notes of a meeting of the special committee of the National Security Council, June 12, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 269. 59 President Johnson on Middle East, June 20, 1967, 7412-1/A, ISA. 60 See in particular Abraham Ben-Zvi, From Truman to Obama: The Rise of and the Beginning of the Decline of US- Israeli Relations, (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Achronot, 2005), 79-105; Paul Merkeley, American Presidents, Religion, and Israel: The Heirs of Cyrus (New York: Praeger, 2004), 54-61; Spiegel, Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 118-165.

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Avraham Harman to pass on the message that “I may not worry as much as Prime Minister

Eshkol does about Israel, but I worry as deeply.”61 This was part of the reason for the general support of the Israeli territorial position on the part of the White House. Other figures close to the

President, such as special consultant to the President McGeorge Bundy, Vice President Hubert

Humphrey, National Security Advisor Rostow and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations

Arthur Goldberg supported a generally sympathetic view towards the Israeli territorial position.

There was disagreement between this group and some of the leading figures in the State

Department and the NSC. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Harold Saunders of the NSC advocated a restoration of pre-war borders, in line with the demands of the Arab states.62

Both sides of the argument had influence, but it is fair to say that officials with more sympathy towards the Israeli territorial position determined the contours of the policy. The two major policy actions taken by the U.S. were designed by President Johnson and Goldberg. Those being, respectively, the “five-point” speech and the drive towards the formulation of UN

Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 242. Meanwhile, the State Department and officials more sympathetic to the Arab territorial position were put in charge of day to day management of

American policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, but were constricted by the White House. The upshot of the policy debate was an American territorial position closely aligned with the Israeli one.

Aside from reasons for the lack of pressure on Israel stemming from its preferential treatment of Israel, the United States government (USG) believed the prospects for conflict resolution were slim. This ultimately led the Johnson administration to eschew the role of

61 Memorandum of Conversation, February 7, 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 73. 62 Saunders to Rostow, October 17, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 476; Spiegel, Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 127-130.

76 mediator. First, the USG faced difficulty in selecting the most promising Arab interlocutor. The

Arab state with the most accommodating approach towards a territorial settlement was Jordan.

The United States had other reasons to prefer the “Jordanian option” over other avenues towards a permanent settlement. Jordan was believed to be an anchor of the pro-American Arab camp and was a major factor in the formulation of its regional policy.63 In addition, there seemed to be no other track to pursue amongst the Arab states. Syria was firmly in the Soviet camp, while

Egypt and the US had severed relations.64

Though better than the extant alternatives, the Jordanian track was not promising. Despite the crushing defeat Egypt suffered in the Six Day War, was still widely considered to be the leader of the Arab world. Hussein and other Jordanian officials informed

Rusk and Johnson that Jordan could not move forward until the Arab states coordinated a common position on a settlement with Israel.65 State Department Country Director for Israel,

Alfred Atherton, wrote “Nasser in the end will not give Hussein a green light and Hussein cannot move on his own.”66 The Hashemite government at that time was considered so weak, that if it went too far in accommodating Israel, it would be replaced by a pro-Soviet regime.67

In the context of the reasons listed above to avoid pressure on Israel and direct involvement in mediation, the United States chose to entrust mediation to the United Nations.

The Johnson administration pursued a U.N. resolution which would provide the guidelines for

63 For example, Abraham Ben-Zvi believes that the Jordanian element was the major factor in bringing about a “special relationship” between Israel and the United States. Abraham Ben-Zvi, The Origins of the Israeli-American Alliance: The Jordanian Factor, (London: Routledge, 2007). 64 Ben Zvi, From Truman to Obama, 100. 65 Memorandum of Conversation, June 28, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 331; Memorandum of Conversation, July 14, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 365 66 Atherton to Davies, July 26, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59 /A1-5632/2, USNA. 67 NEA Background Paper, June 24, 1967, Papers of LBJ, Country Files (hereafter known as CF), 148, JPL.

77 mediation. The final product, UNSC Resolution 242, appointed a U.N. representative, to act as mediator between the sides. The representative appointed was Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish ambassador to the Soviet Union.68 The U.S. avoided direct mediation on substantive matters during this period and preferred to let the Jarring mission run its course.69 This attitude would last until May 1968, when it became apparent that Jarring had failed.70

In a corresponding effort to avoid undue involvement, the U.S. did not micro-manage

Israeli occupation policy or settlement construction. It generally expected Israel to conform to the laws of occupation delineated primarily the Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva

Conventions of 1949. Some of the violations the USG was concerned with included the demolition of houses, the Israeli refusal to allow the opening of Jordanian banks, manipulation of foreign exchange rates and the refusal of the Israeli military to allow some of the war refugees to return to their homes. However, it did not see any of these issues as serious obstacles to peace. It is in this context that early American policy towards the settlements should be viewed. 71

In a document listing Israeli violations in the occupied territories, the settlements are mentioned as a concern, but it is noted that Israeli officials have assured the USG that the settlements were designed “for military purposes and could be removed if necessary.”72 If so, the construction of temporary military settlements in the occupied territories was not seen as a major

68 Raz, The Bride and the Dowry, 163. 69 N/a to Johnson, Present status of Middle East peace process, undated, Papers of LBJ, CF, 142, JPL; Smith, January 2, 1968, Papers of LBJ, CF, 144, JPL. 70 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, August 17, 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 240. This change in policy can be traced to Ambassador Arthur Goldberg’s plan of June 23, 1968. See Goldberg to Johnson, June 23, 1968, Papers of LBJ, NSF, Agency File, 70, JPL; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, June 28, 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 202; Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs to Secretary of State Rusk, June 28, 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 203. 71 Saunders to Rostow, October 21, 1967, Papers of LBJ, CF, 140, JPL. 72 Ibid.

78 stumbling block to a permanent settlement. Even when circumstances required a revaluation of

American policy towards the settlements, the U.S. retained a lack of interest in intervening.

The Environment: The Strategic Balance

Prior to the 1967 War, the Johnson administration was convinced Israel was militarily stronger than its Arab rivals. General Earle Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told

President Johnson that “if there was a war that the Israelis would win it in five to seven days”.73

However, the magnitude and speed of the Israeli victory over its Arab neighbors tangibly improved the esteem of Israeli capabilities in the eye of the U.S. government. A CIA report noted, “Israel emerged from the war with a greatly enhanced military superiority over its Arab neighbors.”74 Furthermore, Israeli possession of the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai and the Golan

Heights made it the key to any prospective peace settlement. Thus, the strategic and military importance of Israel increased because of the war.75 Meanwhile, Egypt had not only been defeated militarily but the pan-Arab political ideology it had trumpeted had suffered an irrevocable reversal. The Six Day War marked the beginning of a long and precipitous decline for pan-Arabism and its advocates.76

Strategic cooperation between Israel and the U.S. increased after the war. Prior to the conflict, the United States had been hesitant to sell Israel advanced offensive weapons systems.

Negotiations regarding the sale of the Phantom fighter-jets had been proceeding torturously. The

Johnson administration insisted, before the war, that Israel join the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty

73 Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, p. 141. 74 Special National Intelligence Estimate, August 10, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 418. 75 Bar-Siman-Tov, “The United States and Israel,” 241. 76 Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism," Vol. 57, No. 2 Foreign Affairs (Winter 1978/79), 357.

79 and allow inspectors access to its nuclear facilities in Dimona.77 Despite continued Israeli refusal to budge on this issue, a major deal to provide Phantom fighters was agreed in December 1968.

The deal saw the U.S. replace France as the main arms supplier to Israel.78 Meanwhile, relations with Egypt had greatly deteriorated and diplomatic ties were cut. This was due to Egyptian accusations that the United States had directly participated in the Israeli attack on June 5th.79

Correspondingly, the U.S. had little interest in closer ties with Egypt or Syria. It valued its alliance with Jordan but they had proved militarily inept and the Hashemite regime was in jeopardy. Therefore, the strategic utility of Israel for the U.S. was significantly higher than any of its Arab neighbors.

The Environment: The Domestic Political Situation

The Israeli coalition was dominated by the large bloc established by the Labor Party. The bloc, called the Alignment, included the large Workers Party of the Land of Israel faction (henceforth known by its Hebrew acronym MAPAI) faction and the smaller Achdut Ha’avoda faction. The

Israeli Workers List (commonly referred to by their Hebrew RAFI), faction joined the Labor

Party in 1968 bringing the party up to 55 seats, 6 short of a majority. They were joined in the coalition by the right-wing Herut-Liberal bloc (known as GAHAL) with its 26 seats, which had joined as part of the emergency government formed in the run up to the 1967 War. The National

Religious Party (henceforth NRP), which had 11 seats, the Socialist United Workers Party

77 Abraham Ben-Zvi, “Influence and Arms: John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel,” Israel Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Autumn 2004), 29-59. 78 David Pollack, The Politics of Pressure: American Arms Sales and Israeli Policy Since the Six Day War (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1982), 32-36. 79 William Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Foreign Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 62.

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(known by its Hebrew acronym MAPAM) with 8, the Independent Liberals with 5 seats, and several other small parties numbering 109 seats overall.80

The NRP was more dovish than most members of the Labor party were at that time.

Therefore, the only junior partner more militant than the governing party was GAHAL, which was not able to threaten bringing down the government as Eshkol enjoyed a massive cushion of over forty seats. The settler lobby did not yet exist. Rather there were independent initiatives to promote the expansion of settlement into specific territories. Therefore, settlement policy was designed by Labor Party leaders with little interference form the other parties in the coalition.

In the United States, the Israel lobby was not yet at its peak influence, nor was it needed.

Lyndon Johnson personally sympathized with Israel and did not need swaying. The administration also included several figures who promoted a closer relationship with Israel.

Proponents of a pro-Israeli orientation such as Abe Fortas whom Johnson named to the Supreme

Court, National Security Advisor Walt Rostow and UN Ambassador Goldberg had personal influence on the President.

This atmosphere allowed the development and institutionalization of the Israel lobby allowing it to attain more prominence later. American Jews became more confident in their support for Israel after the 1967 War. The Jewish community and AIPAC chose to engage in persuading the Jonson administration to sell Israel arms, rather than to influence its territorial policy.81 The Johnson administration was sympathetic to the Israeli territorial position and therefore had no reason to focus on issues related to the occupation. Despite their increasing

80 Gershon Kieval, Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories (Westport, CON: Greenwood Press, 1983), 3-50. 81 Ben-Zvi, From Truman to Obama, pp. 82-83; Spiegel, Other Arab-Israeli conflict, 158-164; Edward Tivnan, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy (New York: Touchstone Books, 1987), 59-68.

81 enthusiasm and organization, William Quandt accurately wrote of this period that the pro-Israeli interest groups at this time were “noteworthy by their unimportance” in relation to the peace process.82

Multi-Leveled Interaction

First Steps: Towards a Policy on Settlements

Israeli territorial policy in the first few months after the war was muddled and hasty. There was one very important exception; Jerusalem was settled immediately and in plain view of the international community. The reason for this major difference is first and foremost the overwhelming historical and spiritual significance of Jerusalem to Judaism. The overwhelming majority of the public did not see Jerusalem as occupied territory, but rather as a liberated city.

The policy of de-facto annexation and large-scale construction in the occupied portions of

Jerusalem was supported by a wide domestic political consensus.83

Even regarding Jerusalem, there were concerns over international pressure. While all cabinet members agreed that the municipal unification of Jerusalem was a worthy policy goal, four cabinet members opposed it for practical reasons. Zalman Aran, the Minister of Education, was concerned about international pressure; “If we reach the point, heaven forbid, where we need to yield, the very declaration uniting both parts of the city in the Knesset along with a later

82 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 70. 83 Atherton to Battle, June 10, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59 /A1-5632/22, USNA.

82 withdrawal – would entail devastation.”84 However, Israel moved decisively in the city. Within one day of the cessation of hostilities in the 1967 War, the Eshkol cabinet announced plans to incorporate the part of Jerusalem previously controlled by Jordan and a very large area not previously included within the new municipal borders. The move was later approved by both the

Israeli Interior Ministry and the Knesset.85 The GOI insisted, to mute international criticism, that this was not annexation but rather was a form of “municipal fusion.”86

The international community reacted immediately. Two resolutions were passed in the

General Assembly, and one was put up for a vote in the United Nations Security Council

(hereafter UNSC). Furthermore, persistent complaints from the Arab capitals put pressure on the

U.S. to modify Israeli policies in the capital.87 The sharp international reaction forced the United

States to formulate a policy quickly. Jerusalem was an emotional issue to Jews worldwide but also a central issue as far as its allies Jordan and were concerned. Under the circumstances, the major goal of the Johnson administration was to avoid embarrassment.88

The formal position of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations (hereafter USUN) was that the Israeli moves in Jerusalem could be “considered an interim administrative measure to provide a more convenient and efficient occupation regime.”89 But in the meantime the U.S. voted for a General Assembly resolution calling for “the desirability of establishing an

84 Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 117. 85 Israeli government, June 28, 1967, S-1066/91/10, UNA; Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 60. 86 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, June 30, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 333. 87 Control Group to Rusk, Undated, FRUS XIX, doc. 340; Rusk to all posts, July 5, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 344; Burns to Rusk, August 4 1967, NSF, Files of the Special Committee of the NSC, 10, JPL; Ben-Aharon to Department of the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, June 25, 1968, Jordan 6555-45/FM, ISA. Burns to Rusk, August 23, 1967, Jerusalem, Papers of LBJ, NSF, 111, JPL; Saunders to Rostow, November 5, 1967, Papers of LBJ, CF, 148, JPL; N/a, January 7, 1968, Papers of LBJ, CF, 144, JPL; Parker to Battle, January 15, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59 /A1-5632/21, USNA; to Rusk, February 3, 1967, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59 /A1-5632/22, USNA. 88 Tasca to the Department of State, June 21, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 317. 89 Control Group to Rusk, Undated, FRUS XIX, doc. 340.

83 international regime of the City of Jerusalem.”90 Thus the USG hoped a direct confrontation with

Israel could be avoided, while taking the public position that it discouraged any move towards annexation. This device was unsuccessful. The Arab states insisted that it oppose Israeli policy in

Jerusalem.91 The reluctance of the United States to pressure Israel on the Jerusalem issue is significant. The limited extent of pressure on an issue as salient as this indicates that there were distinct limits to the willingness of the United States to pressure Israel on territorial issues in this period.

Israeli representatives told American officials flatly that Jerusalem would remain united under its control in a future peace agreement. Eban, one of the most conciliatory members of the

Israeli cabinet, insisted “it was inconceivable that Jordan could return to Jerusalem.”92 President

Zalman Shazar encouraged Jews to “settle in the Old City, on Mount Scopus and in all parts of the

Old City.”93 While not precluding the possibility of future negotiation regarding the status of

Jerusalem, Israeli willingness to make concessions was limited to allowing Jordan a symbolic status in the sites holy to Islam.94 A State Department memorandum noted, quite accurately, that what Israel could give is “only status symbols or gimmickry, i.e. flags or extraterritoriality for buildings, not substance or territory.”95 When asked why Israel did not declare that its

90 Rusk to all posts, July 5, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 344. 91 As just some examples of this position repeatedly stated by the Jordanian and Egyptian governments, Tunis to Rusk, July 28, 1967, Papers of LBJ, NSF, 109, JPL; Burns to Rusk, August 4, 1967, NSF, Files of the Special Committee of the NSC, 10, JPL; Burns to Rusk, August 23, 1967, Jerusalem, Papers of LBJ, NSF, 111, JPL; Saunders to Rostow, November 5, 1967, Papers of LBJ, CF, 148, JPL. 92 Memorandum of conversation, July 15, 1967, Papers of LBJ, NSF, 109, JPL. 93 Atherton to Davies, February 23, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A- 1/5632/21, USNA. 94 Ibid.; Memorandum of conversation, August 23, 1967, Papers of LBJ, NSF, 109, JPL; Memorandum of conversation, October 10, 1968, Papers of LBJ, NSF, 113, JPL; Memorandum of conversation, April 9, 1968, Reports and Discussions with the PM, 7052/12/A, ISA. 95 Memorandum of conversation, January 17, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA.

84 administrative steps in Jerusalem were interim or provisional, Eban replied that if they did so “the government in Tel-Aviv would become interim.”96

There was no similar consensus surrounding the contours of settlement in other occupied territories. Decisions elsewhere were influenced by political and ideological cleavages in the

Israeli cabinet.97 The major party of the period, the Labor Party, was in the grips of a leadership dispute. Despite the great military victory, Eshkol came out of the 1967 War politically bruised.

In the run up to the war, Eshkol had been forced to resign as Defence Minister and hand the post to his main rival, Moshe Dayan of RAFI. Credit for the victory was mostly given to Dayan, while the Prime Minister was associated with the perceived indecisiveness evinced during the

“waiting period” preceding the war.98 Eshkol was more powerful within the party, but Dayan was more popular with the public and therefore seen as a political threat.99

As Defense Minister in the post-war period, Dayan loomed large in designing Israeli policy in the territories. Shlomo Gazit, who worked under him, explained that “Dayan was not only in charge of setting the policy; no less important was his complete involvement in its execution.”100 The dominance of Dayan in formulating policy in the territories agitated

Eshkol.101 To capitalize on his popularity, Dayan had made it his public mission to replace the

MAPAI “old guard” which led the party. Shimon Peres, a supporter of the Defense Minister

96 Goldberg to Department of State, July 14, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 364. 97 As mentioned previously, the positions of cabinet members must be taken into account if the coalition is to survive. This is particularly true for the members of small informal decision-making units where most of the important decisions regarding matters of security are made. See Charles Freilich, “National Security Decision- Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths,” Middle East Journal, vol. 60, no. 4 (2006), 651; Kaarbo, “Power and Influence,” 503; Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 17-26. 98 Eitan Haber, “Today War Will Break Out”: The Reminiscences of Brig. Gen. Israel Lior, Aide-de-Camp to Prime Ministers Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir (Tel-Aviv: Idanim, 1987), 179-180. 99 Mordechai Bar-On, Moshe Dayan: Israel’s Controversial Hero (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 147. 100 Shlomo Gazit, Trapped Fools: Thirty Years of Israeli Policy in the Territories (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 65. 101 Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 67.

85 declared that “Dayan was right in saying that we should fight to dislodge Eshkol.”102 In pursuit of this goal, Dayan’s political party RAFI, pursued reintegration into the Labor Party. According to Eshkol’s political secretary, Adi Yaffe, the Achdut Ha’avoda party was brought into political union with MAPAI to block Dayan’s efforts to control the party. Eshkol promoted the Achdut

Ha’avoda legislative leader and former general, Yigal Allon, to Deputy Prime Minister to empower him as an alternate candidate to Dayan for the leadership of the party.103

This rivalry would greatly influence the contours of Israeli settlement policy. The Deputy

Prime Minister came to be identified with a territorial plan, complete with a map of proposed settlements known as the Allon Plan. It was based on his military perception, which valued static defense as the key to defending Israel from a future attack. The Deputy Prime Minister believed the Jordan Valley was necessary for defending the narrow waist of Israel. It also called for settlements in the Golan Heights.104 Well before there was any thought of building settlements,

Allon wrote to the Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, that the Jordan Valley line would be a “natural and most efficient defense line, utilizing the smallest amount of resources, even against a modern army.”105 Security considerations were paramount in his thinking and this would guide his settlement policy.

Allon first presented a plan calling for the division of the West Bank into an Israeli area and a Palestinian area (which would later be slated for return to Jordan) in July 1967. The section

Israel was slated to annex included the Judean desert as well as a large salient near Jerusalem.

The plan also claimed the Rafah salient and Sharm el-Sheikh in Sinai as well as the entire Gaza

102 Kieval, Party Politics in Israel, 24. 103 Hadow, August 1, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59 /A-1/5632/16, USNA. 104 Yigal Allon, A Curtain of Sand, (Tel-Aviv: Hakkibutz Hameuchad, 1968), 255. 105 Dan Schueftan, A Jordanian Option: The “Yishuv” and the State of Israel vis-à-vis the Hashemite Regime and the Palestinian National Movement (Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin, 1987), 242.

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Strip and Golan Heights.106 The areas Israel would keep were to be covered with civilian settlements. Of importance for the integrity of the plan was the establishment of a line of settlements in the Jordan Valley. The Valley was a natural venue for settlement. It bestrides the major crossing of the Jordan River and includes the major routes of a possible invasion of Israel from the east.107 It was also sparsely populated, due to the extreme heat in the area and due to the evacuation of most of its inhabitants in the 1967 War.108 Aside from its emphasis on the Jordan

Valley line, the plan was relatively vague about the rest of the West Bank. It was clearly designed with the constructive ambiguity necessary for bargaining in mind.

The Allon Plan was neither adopted nor rejected by the Israeli cabinet.109 However, its influence on settlement construction policies cannot be overestimated. Yechiel Admoni, who was first the number two and then the head of the Jewish Agency Settlement Department, wrote

“the Allon Plan was the law whose name one does not speak, but by which one acts.”110 On June

15, 1967, the Ministerial Committee for Security first suggested that settlements in the Jordan

Valley be utilized to isolate a possible Palestinian entity from Jordan.111 On August 18, Ra’anan

Weitz of the Settlement Department suggested to the Labor Party committee the creation of 30-

50 points of settlement in a scheme which would create a barrier between Jordan and Israel.112

Despite essentially adopting it as a de-facto settlement program, GOI was wary of the international reaction. Therefore, it preferred to keep the plan unofficial.113

106 Kieval, Party Politics in Israel, 17-18. 107 CIA intelligence memorandum, Economic costs to Israel of retaining captured Arab territories, April 1968, Papers of LBJ, CF, 141, JPL. 108 Admoni to Eshkol, March 18, 1968, 6423-1/C, ISA. 109 Shlaim, Iron Wall, 256. 110 Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 42. 111 Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 204. 112 Ibid., 205. 113 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 52; Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 256.

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Allon’s rival, Moshe Dayan, countered with a plan of his own, similarly based on a concept of strategic defence. The political goal was dissimilar in that instead of seeking division of the territory, military bases and settlements were to be used as a substitute for annexation.114

Dayan believed that the center of gravity for Israeli defensive operations should be the mountain line stretching from Jenin to Hebron. Therefore, military bases and civilian settlements would be established there.115 There would be five such self-contained centers, which he described as

“fists” which would protect the West Bank from invasion.116

On August 20, 1967, the motion to build five IDF bases on the mountain line was approved by the government along with corresponding land requisition.117 However, the civilian settlement component of the plan was not approved.118 In practice, the civilian portion of the model was adopted only in the Etzion Bloc near Jerusalem. Thus, the Dayan plan had only limited influence on the settlement policy of the State of Israel.119 A major reason for the rejection of Dayan’s plan, was that it called for the complete annexation of the West Bank, while

Allon’s plan called for partial annexation. Therefore, Allon’s plan was more acceptable as it provided a relatively attractive compromise between territorial maximalists and minimalists.120

There was no real opposition to the cabinet policy of settling the occupied territories in the Israeli political scene at the time. There was consensus within the coalition that Israel had the right to settle in the newly captured areas. MAPAM, the most left-wing party which joined the

Alignment, was opposed to civilian settlements but supported military-oriented settlements in

114 Rael Jean Isaac, Israel Divided: Ideological Politics in the Jewish State (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 118. 115 Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 124-125. 116 Gazit, Trapped Fools, 151. 117 Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 125. 118 Shlaim, Iron Wall, 258. 119 Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 44-45. 120 Shlaim, The Iron Wall, 256.

88 keeping with the Allon Plan.121 An indication of the mood of Israeli public opinion can be garnered from polling amongst the Jewish population after the war. Only 1% supported full return of all territories while 80% of the public supported either full or partial annexation.122 The growing popularity of the settlement enterprise amongst the Israeli public was indicated by the role settlements played in the 1969 election campaign. The rival parties competed to position themselves as the most supportive of settlement construction.123 Israeli hesitation to build settlements openly and in areas with significant Palestinian population was not due to domestic political concerns but rather due to international opinion.

The Allon Plan, which as followed unofficially, called for settlements in the Golan Heights as well. The Syrian territory was the site of the first self-contained Israeli settlement in the occupied territories. The idea was touted by the Kibbutz Meuchad movement, the movement behind the

Achdut Ha’avoda party. On the days of June 23-25, the Kibbutz Meuchad leadership met to discuss the future of the occupied territories. It decided efforts should be made to “maintain Israeli control in the held territories and strengthen it with settlement facts.”124 Ten days later, Allon proposed to the cabinet the creation of the first work camps in the Golan Heights and suggested they be disguised as military camps. Concerned primarily with the international reaction, Eban and the

Foreign Ministry agreed that the settlement should be kept secret.125 Thirteen days later the first settler spent his first night on the Golan Heights at Aalleiqa, which would become the Merom

Golan kibbutz.126

121 Al Hamishmar, December 12, 1968, Galili personal correspondence 15/46/32/7, YT. 122 N/a, January 4, 1968, Papers of LBJ, CF, 144, JPL. 123 Labor Party spokesman, October 11, 1968, Spokesman 2/937/1969/101, Beit Berl (henceforth BB). 124 Kibbutz committee decision, June 23-25, 1967, Settlements 4-74-2, YT. 125 Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 26-27. 126 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 75-76.

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In September Israel made its first tentative move to settle the as well.127

Two NAHAL settlements were constructed in El-Arish and Lake Bardawil, two areas deemed to be of economic potential.128 There is no indication that the USG was aware of construction in either Sinai or the Golan Heights at the time. It appears secrecy was successfully maintained.

Kfar Etzion: The First Confrontation

One Israeli move to erect a settlement in the occupied territories was not ignored by the United

States, due to the publicity surrounding it. The Etzion Bloc, 18 miles south of Jerusalem, was first settled by Jews in the 1920’s. In May 1948, these settlements were attacked by the Arab

Legion and Palestinian militias, leading to its eventual surrender. The former Jewish inhabitants maintained ownership of part of the land. Following the war, former residents of the area and their children published adverts in national newspapers demanding that the government settle the area.129 The Land of Israel Movement, an extra-parliamentary pressure group, also gave their support, and helped organize a media campaign. Minister of Religions and other ministers strongly supported settlement there as well.130 NRP member of Knesset Michael

Hazani lobbied Eshkol for a meeting with the children of the former residents of Etzion Bloc, which took place on September 22, 1967.131 The domestic political pressure to resettle the Bloc was intense.

127 Government decision 866, October 1, 1967, Settlement 12-3-93-2, YT. 128 Decision 87/B of the Ministerial Committee for Security, September 13, 1967, Settlement 12-3-93-2, YT. 129 Huberman, Against all Odds, 27. 130 Zertal and Eldar, Lords of the Land, 13. 131 Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 190.

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On September 24, 1967, the Israeli cabinet approved a settlement in Kfar Etzion.132

Eshkol insisted on calling the settlement an “outpost”, to give it a more transient appearance, but he harbored no illusions as to its permanence. He said that “over time, kids turn into goats.”133

On September 27, the first settlers arrived, all of whom were civilians. While the settlers were given orders to pretend they were NAHAL soldiers, the establishment of the settlement was announced publicly and appeared in the Israeli media.134 Warhaftig, gave a speech exclaiming

“this settlement will be forever and the sons will return for eternity.”135 Publicity was probably sought due to the domestic popularity of the measure.

The ceremony was noted by the State Department. Their reaction was a stern rebuke from its spokesman, saying “we regret any actions taken by either side which prejudices the conditions that could make possible a lasting and effective settlement. We therefore hope the press reports are erroneous.”136 The news that Israel had announced the construction of Kfar Etzion landed on the desk of President Johnson. A State Department memo to the President found the idea that the settlements will not prejudice future borders “difficult to believe” and that future settlements could “drastically reduce the chances of voluntary relinquishment of the West Bank to any Arab state.”137 The President does not appear to have taken any interest.

The Kfar Etzion settlement was discussed in the General Assembly, and the UN became a forum for attacking Israel on the settlement issue for the first, but not the last time. Gideon

132 Cabinet decision 839, September 24, 1967, settlement 12-3-93-2, YT. 133 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 114. 134 Eldar & Zertal, Lords of the Land, 13; Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 121; Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 190. 135 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 117. 136 Press Briefing Paper, September 25, 1967, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A1- 5632/22, USNA. 137 Lambrakis to Johnson, September 28, 1967, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A1-5632/22, USNA.

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Rafael, Israeli Ambassador to the UN, noted the announcement on Kfar Etzion construction caused “embarrassment and apprehension among outright friendly nations.”138 The British

Foreign Secretary, George Brown, noted that the implications of reports that Israel was building permanent settlements “were clear and disturbing.”139 Facing an international arena hostile to the

Israeli initiative in Kfar Etzion, State Department officials were quoted in as saying that “they were skeptical that these represented purely temporary, military positions.

Some official quarters regard them as likely forerunners of permanent Israeli settlements in the

West-Bank.”140

There was also a wider strategic reason, aside from international opinion, that the State

Department was upset at Israeli steps in both the Etzion Bloc and Jerusalem. The U.S., as previously mentioned, preferred the Jordanian option to the Palestinian option. The enthusiasm for a Jordanian solution increased after Hussein announced on July 12th that he was willing to come to a deal with Israel. This put the onus on Israel, which dithered on the Jordanian offer before admitting to the Americans that they were “not ready for serious talks.”141 King Hussein was upset that the U.S. did not put enough pressure on Israel to come to terms and cease its unilateral actions in Jerusalem. The King complained bitterly to U.S. officials that “it was now apparent America had made its agonizing choice and had chosen Israel.”142 To make matters worse, the Soviet Union was at that time attempting to woo Jordan by offering aid and arms.143

Therefore, the USG was more interested in the fate of the territories previously occupied by

138 Rafael to Tekoah, September 30, 1967, 7462-8 A, ISA. 139 Naum to Jerusalem, September 26, 1967, 7462-8 A, ISA. 140 Hedrick Smith, “Israel Defends Plan on Settlers,” New York Times, September 28, 1967, 1. 141 Bundy to Johnson, July 21, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 385. 142 Burns to the Department of State, July 28, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 393. 143 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, July 21, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 381; Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, August 15, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 419.

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Jordan than it was in the Golan Heights and Sinai. After all, Egypt and Syria were both firmly ensconced in the Soviet camp and both had cut ties with the United States.

However, any urgency felt regarding the Jordanian track was not apparent in bilateral discussions regarding Kfar Etzion. William Dale, of the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv, asked

Shlomo Argov of the Israeli Foreign Ministry for clarifications on the matter. Dale asked of the significance of the fact that some of the settlers were children of former Etzion Bloc dwellers,

Argov explained “it is only natural that the religious NAHAL units include young men from religious agricultural settlements, including settlements created by the remainder the people of

Etzion Bloc.” Dale replied that this explanation “seemed reasonable.”144 Probably the most revealing comments were those of Lucius Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern

Affairs, to Harman. Battle stressed the “need to avoid airing differences of opinion between us in public press.” The second important point he made was that Israel must avoid actions that might provide “ammunition for those at UN who would interpret GOI position as hardening in direction of territorial acquisition rather than negotiated settlement.” Battle said that a sharp response was needed since the “Department was already being criticized in some press circles for reacting in overly (sic) cautious manner to Israel's announcement.” The actual substance of settlement policy was barely discussed.145

The importance of public relations and maintaining a healthy and productive bilateral relationship was the paramount U.S. concern. There seems to have been little motivating U.S. opposition to the construction of Kfar Etzion other than a need to maintain the public impression that Israeli moves to deepen its occupation were contrary to American policy. Therefore, U.S.

144 Argov to Harman, September 28, 1967, 7462-8/A, ISA. 145 Katzenbach to the Embassy in Israel, September 29, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 451.

93 opposition did not outlast the short-lived international outcry over the establishment of the settlement.

The Israeli Foreign Ministry was caught unaware by the decision to publicize the creation of the Kfar Etzion settlement, and was nervous about the State Department rebuke. The Foreign

Ministry staff, overrated U.S opposition to construction. Eban complained that the announcement

“sabotages” Israeli efforts to promote a permanent settlement amongst the international community, based on Israeli backed principles.146 He added that as far as he knew the policy agreed upon had been not to “announce settlements but rather to build them when necessary.”147

The lack of a clear public relations policy was exposed in the New York Times story on Kfar

Etzion. When asked by reporters if the settlement was permanent, a spokesman for the Foreign

Ministry was unable to provide a clear answer other than that Israel would be “keeping all options open.”148

The Foreign Ministry was concerned, incorrectly as it turned out, that the settlement announcement was “playing into the hands” of the State Department which supported a return to the pre-war borders. The Ministry feared that by announcing the creation of settlements, Israel would confirm suspicions that the real Israeli goal was annexation.149 Eshkol read the situation more accurately. He was more concerned that heeding American pressure would have domestic political ramifications. But the Prime Minister accepted the recommendation that there should be no more publicity and in acknowledgement of this need he canceled a planned visit to Kfar

Etzion.150 The almost hysterical reaction of the Foreign Ministry to low-key American criticism

146 Eban to Levavi, September 24, 1967, 7462-6 A, ISA; Government decision 839, Settlement 12/3/93/2, YT. 147 Eban to Levavi, September 24, 1967, 7462-6 A, ISA. 148 Smith, “Israel Defends Plan on Settlers.” 149 Harman to Levavi, September 25, 1967, 7462-8/A, ISA. 150 Yaffe to Eban, September 26, 1967, 7462-8/A, ISA.

94 is instructive. This would seem to indicate that the USG had a significant amount of potential influence over Israeli settlement policy of which they did not take advantage.

The Aftermath of Kfar Etzion: The First Tacit Agreement

The Israeli government was concerned enough with the international response to the construction of a settlement in Kfar Etzion to alter the form, though not the substance, of its settlement policy.

Arthur Lourie, Deputy Director General of the Foreign Ministry, crafted a long-term strategy. He suggested that Israel respond by presenting the creation of settlements as military ones. If asked, the settlements should be referred to as “strongpoints” and that the agricultural aspects be played down as economic. Lourie further suggested that Israel declare that the construction of settlements did not and would not in future foreclose the prospects of territorial agreements with the Arab states.151

Indeed, when asked about the prospects of Israel evacuating the settlements as part of a future peace agreement, Israeli ambassador Harman replied that “any settlement would not leave borders sealed, so that there could be Jews in Jordan as there were Arabs in Israel.”152 However,

Israel never claimed it would evacuate the existing settlements if a peace agreement were agreed upon. A State Department report accurately noted that “the Israeli government has given us no clear indication that it would be politically possible to withdraw the NAHAL units even as part of a political settlement involving an eventual pull back of occupation troops.”153

151 Lourie to Washington, September 25, 1967, 7462-8/A, ISA. 152 Rusk to the Embassy of Israel, October 7, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 458. 153 NEA Report, Israeli Settlements in Occupied Territories, October 19, 1967, Papers of LBJ, CF, 140, JPL.

95

These recommendations influenced Minister without a Portfolio, Yisrael Galili, to propose similar steps to the cabinet. There was no official agreement that all future settlements would be created in the NAHAL format. Allon was concerned that if Israel seemed ashamed of the creation of settlements, international opinion would be adversely influenced; “there are things we do, and the world knows we will not leave and accepts it. But when we recoil, what can we expect from the world?”154 The lack of agreement led to a compromise. All previously established settlements would be designated as NAHAL strongpoints while new settlements would be discussed on a case by case basis.155 In practice, the Lourie paper and the Galili initiative shaped the standard operating procedure for the following months. Israel would maintain that all its settlements were NAHAL strongpoints, whether this was borne out by the facts or not. This strategy successfully dulled American criticism by making Israeli settlement policy seem palatable.

The United States had its own reasons to keep the settlement issue, as well as other sticking points, off the bilateral agenda. UN Security Council Resolution 242, designed by the

U.S. and U.K., called for the appointment of a representative to mediate. This meant that Gunnar

Jarring, appointed by the United Nations, became the main avenue for mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict. The appointment intentionally took some of the impetus off direct American involvement in the peace process.156 The U.S. distanced itself from substantive matters during this period, at least partially due to fears that they would be accused of sabotaging the Jarring

154 Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 199. 155 Government decision 866, October 1, 1967, settlement 12-3-93-2, YT. 156 Saunders to Rostow, December 4, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc 12.

96 mission.157 Therefore the American position throughout 1968 was that the U.S. supported the peace process but did not wish to get involved in the specifics of an agreement.158

With little interest in getting involved, the U.S. adopted a policy of tacit agreement to

Israeli settlement construction along the lines of the Lourie guidelines. Officially, the USG remained opposed to the Israeli policy of establishing military strongpoints in the occupied territories. In practice, the issue was mentioned infrequently and with diminishing stridency. In preparation for meetings between Eban and Rusk, Saunders suggested that the U.S. position should be that “it is seriously disturbed by new para-military Israeli communities in the West

Bank and Sinai.”159 However, the issue was barely mentioned in bilateral discussions. Rusk mentioned the settlements in passing as one of several examples of undesirable Israeli policies, while Johnson failed to refer to the issue.160 U.S. pressure over the decision to build Kfar Etzion, which was never particularly significant, tapered off in late October 1967.161

The reaction to Israeli settlement construction in the Sinai Peninsula was further muted. By late October, the USG was aware of Israeli agricultural oriented settlement construction and Rusk mentioned it to Eban in passing.162 There was some concern that the creation of settlements in the area might foster territorial claims in the future. Battle was concerned that “firmer claims may be

157 N/a to Johnson, Present status of Middle East peace process, undated, Papers of LBJ, CF, 142, JPL; Smith, The Jarring mission, January 2, 1968, Papers of LBJ, CF, 144, JPL. 158 Battle to Rusk, January 3, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59 -A1/5632/16, USNA. 159 Saunders to Rostow, Visit of Foreign Minister Eban, October 21, 1967, Papers of LBJ, CF, 140, JPL. 160 Memorandum of conversation, October 24, 1967, Office of Minister Galili 7404-6/A, ISA; Rusk to Tel-Aviv, October 24, 1967, Papers of LBJ, CF, 140, JPL; Memorandum of conversation, October 24, 1967, Papers of LBJ, NSF, Head of State Correspondence File, 26, JPL; Memorandum of conversation, October 24, 1967, Papers of LBJ, Meeting Notes File, 2, JPL. 161 Hussein visited the United States in early November and the U.S. in no way tried to persuade the King to negotiate directly with Israel. Evron asked Battle if during the talks Hussein was told that he should negotiate directly with Israel. Battle replied that there was no record of this, but it may have been done privately. See Evron to Bitan, November 8, 1967, Office of the Minister Galili 7412-1/A, ISA. 162 Memorandum of conversation, Rusk, Eban, October 24, 1967, 7412-1/A, ISA.

97 in the process of maturing, such as the El-Arish area of the Sinai (where an Israeli paramilitary settlement is at present reviving the fishing industry).”163 However, the issue was barely mentioned in any of the high-level bilateral talks of the time.164

In practice, if Israel restricted construction to military strongpoints, constructed these with minimal publicity and claimed a willingness to dismantle settlements as part of a permanent peace, the U.S. was willing to look the other way. The tacit agreement, along with a lack of interest, led the USG to adopt two tenets of policy. The first was to keep public criticism towards Israeli settlement policy to a minimum. The second was a disinclination to verify Israeli compliance with the agreement. Therefore, when settlement construction was kept secret, the USG remained woefully unaware. It does not appear the U.S. was cognizant of the existence of a fully civilian settlement in the Golan Heights until May 1968, ten months after was established.

In the same report, the State Department referred to the civilian settlement of Kfar Etzion as a

NAHAL strongpoint.165 This even though both settlements were openly civilian in their nature.166

The existence of this implicit agreement, and the lack of verification was the key to the absence of diplomatic incidents during this six-month period.

Israeli policy in Jerusalem differed from its policy in the rest of the occupied territories.

Here Israel signalled its intention to remain openly.167 In October, Levi Eshkol publicly announced that over 1,000 housing units would be built in East Jerusalem and that the Jewish Quarter would

163 Battle to Rusk, November 17, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 530. 164 Memorandum of conversation, October 24, 1967, Office of Minister Galili 7404-6/A, ISA; Rusk to Tel-Aviv, October 24, 1967, Papers of LBJ, CF, 140, JPL; Memorandum of conversation, October 24, 1967, Papers of LBJ, NSF, Head of State Correspondence File, 26, JPL; Memorandum of conversation, October 24, 1967, Papers of LBJ, Meeting Notes File, 2, JPL. 165 Meeker to Battle, May 7, 1968, Legal aspects of settlements, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A-1/5632/22, UNSA. 166 See Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 120-121; Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 26-27. 167 Israeli Statements Made to us Privately Concerning their intentions on a Peace Settlement, July 25, 1967, Papers of LBJ, NSF, 113, JPL.

98 be rehabilitated.168 In December GOI declared it would develop Jewish neighborhoods in north- east Jerusalem and expand the Mount Scopus campus of Hebrew University into areas previously held by Jordan.169 In February 1968, the construction of 3,700 housing units in East Jerusalem was announced.170 In March registration was opened for citizens wishing to buy plots in the Givat

Hamivtar neighborhood.171 Announcements for all of these projects appeared in the press and

Israeli diplomats never denied the intention to continue developing East Jerusalem.

The more public Israeli policy, alongside an intense focus on Jerusalem in the international community, led to a more American attention to the holy city. In contrast to Israeli construction in other parts of the occupied territories, the State Department invested a great deal of time and effort in designing a policy there. Under scrutiny from the Arab states, American diplomats fretted over attendance in functions and meetings held in East Jerusalem out of fear that it would acknowledge the Israeli pretensions in the city.172 Moves to expropriate large tracts of land and build in East

Jerusalem met with firm criticism from the State Department.173 Rusk went as far as to threaten

Israel, that if Jordan raised the question of Jerusalem in a Security Council resolution, “it would be very difficult for this government to avoid taking a position contrary to yours in the Security

Council.”174 The threat towards Israel, that the U.S. might support a Jordanian resolution on

168 New York Times, Excerpts from Levi Eshkol’s Address, October 30, 1967, New York Times, Papers of LBJ, CF, 14, JPL. 169 Barbour to Rusk, Eshkol Visit, December 31, 1967, Papers of LBJ, CF, 144, JPL. 170 N/a, undated, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A-1/5632/10, USNA. 171 Chase to Atherton, March 13, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A- 1/5632/22, USNA. 172 Some examples among many, Barbour to Rusk, January 25, 1968, Papers of LBJ, CF, 141, JPL; Lewen to Moberley, January 25, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59-A1/5632 /22, USNA; Atherton to Barbour, January 26, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59-A1/5632 /22, USNA; Atherton to Campbell, January 31, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59-A1/5632 /22, USNA; Barbour to Atherton, February 7, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A-1/5632/23, USNA; Campbell to Atherton, February 15, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab- Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A-1/5632/22, USNA. 173 Katzenbach to Barbour, January 12, 1968 Papers of LBJ, CF, 141, JPL. 174 Rusk to Tel-Aviv, February 3, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A- 1/5632/22, USNA.

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Jerusalem was a bluff.175 Despite the lack of actual sanctions, the mere threat of the removal of the

U.S. veto indicates a higher degree of U.S. interest.

The attention given to Israeli settlement construction and development in the other occupied territories was paltry by comparison. This meant that Israel could determine its preferred settlement map unilaterally. As the fear of significant international repercussions for unilateral settlement construction lessened, the cabinet cemented its policy around the Allon

Plan. After a few months of hesitation, a ministerial committee decided to build two settlements which correspond with the plan in the Jordan Valley. In late January 1968, the Beit Harava and the Bardale NAHAL strongpoints were formally approved by GOI.176 One was very close to the pre-war border (Bardale) and the second was established in an area previously settled by Jews and abandoned in the 1948 War (Beit Haarava). Israel was testing the waters and it was decided to avoid all publicity surrounding the decision.177 The tentative way settlements were constructed in the Jordan Valley implies that even minor U.S. pressure could have influenced Israeli policy in that area. In fact, Eshkol told the cabinet members that these settlements were temporary and could only be made permanent if there was no international or Jordanian outcry.178

However, there is no evidence that the U.S. was aware of the establishment of the settlements until three months after their construction and even then, no notable protest was recorded.179 Facing no countervailing pressure, Allon told the cabinet in February 1968 that “the

175 Rusk to Amman, February 28, 1968, Papers of LBJ, CF Jordan, 147, JPL. 176 Lior to Weiss, Summary of Meeting on Cultivation of Bardale Area, December 31, 1967, 6692-15/A, ISA; Government decision 217, January 28, 1968, settlement 12-3-93-2 YT; Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 215. 177 Lior to Weiss, Summary of Meeting on Cultivation of Bardale Area, December 31, 1967, 6692-15/A, ISA; Government decision 217, January 28, 1968, settlement 12-3-93-2, YT; Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 215. 178 Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 49. 179 A report on Israeli actions in the occupied territories in late February 1968 mentions that there is only one NAHAL settlement in the West Bank, the one in Kfar Etzion. Atherton to Davies, February 23, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA. See also Campbell to Atherton, March 13, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A-1/5632/22, USNA.

100 tendency of the government not to determine the future of the territories and the contours of the permanent borders, should not prevent us from determining facts of political and security related importance through territorial adjustments.”180 In other words, settlements are related to, but do not determine future borders. The cabinet seemed to agree. By mid-1968, three further settlements were built in the Jordan Valley with no accompanying publicity. Settlement in the area was shaping up according to the precepts of the Allon Plan.181 The policy was still tentative, but becoming progressively assured.

The Hebron Affair: An Involuntary Settlement?

Although Israeli settlement construction increasingly followed a plan, the event which undermined the tacit agreement between the U.S. and Israel was unplanned. Israel had considered settling in Hebron, a city of religious importance to the Jewish faith, and it was included in the territories slated for annexation in the Allon Plan. On January 14, 1968, Yigal

Allon proposed the establishment of a settlement near Hebron. The idea was justified in historical and ideological terms, rather than strategic ones. Allon wrote that “it is unthinkable that Jews not be allowed to settle there. Jews dwelled in Hebron for hundreds of years under the

Ottoman regime and the British mandate.”182 However, the proposal remained stuck in cabinet debates for several months.183 This was mostly due to the dubious strategic importance of

Hebron, which was situated behind where any reasonable defense line for the West Bank would

180 Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 49. 181 Ministerial Committee for Security decision 87/B(A), February 7, 1968, settlements 12-3-93-2, YT; Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 49; Huberman, Against all Odds, 39. 182 Allon to cabinet members, Settlement around Hebron, Jericho and the Solomon Gulf, January 8, 1967 7910- 43/A, ISA. 183 Allon to Yaffe, May 15, 1968, 6433-7/C, ISA.

101 be situated. Eshkol said, “I am willing to give up Hebron…I don’t know what we get out of keeping Hebron.”184 This is an indication of the primacy of strategic objectives over ideological ones in the settlement policy of the Eshkol government.

On April 11, 1968, pro-settlement activists decided to force the hand of the GOI and settle Hebron. The would-be settlers travelled to the city just before the holiday of Passover and rented hotel rooms. The military authorities allowed them to enter the occupied territories on the condition that they leave after the celebratory Passover dinner. However, the next day the activists held a press conference, and announced their intention of staying indefinitely.185

This was the first incidence of what would become a pattern of settler behavior. Settlers and sympathetic activists would make alliances with members of cabinet and act to establish settlements gradually in contravention to official government policy, while exploiting the sympathy of key ministers and military officials. Several cabinet ministers went to Hebron to show support for the establishment of a settlement. A month later it was decided to allow the settlers to be removed from the hotel to “other lodgings” in the city.186 The settlers continued to lobby the GOI and the military authorities to build a Jewish neighborhood either near or in

Hebron.187

These developments were noticed by the State Department, since a potential civilian settlement in Hebron would potentially undermine the tacit understanding. The public nature of the announcement undermined the secretive nature of the settlement policy which had played a part in preventing diplomatic incidents. The lack of a clear strategic rationale for settlement there

184 Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 77. 185 Huberman, Against all Odds, 41. 186 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 149-151; Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 232-237. 187 Hebron settlers to Gazit: Hebron development, December 5, 1968, Security and military 6423-1/C, ISA.

102 undermined the security argument which the U.S. had tacitly accepted. Furthermore, the civilian character of the settlers made it clear that any settlement in Hebron would not be a NAHAL strongpoint. Finally, the religious symbolism of Hebron rendered settlement in the city particularly disruptive and more likely to be permanent due to its emotional and political symbolism. If so, the threat of the creation of a civilian settlement in Hebron undermined tacit

USG agreement to the construction of NAHAL outposts in the occupied territories.

Aftermath of Hebron: The Tacit Deal Undone

The public controversy over civilian settlement in Hebron forced the State Department to design a policy towards civilian settlements. The standoff in Hebron prompted Rusk to request that the embassy in Tel Aviv “restate in strongest terms the US position on this question.” The position of the State Department, as the Secretary of State saw it, should be that “civilian or quasi-civilian outposts in the occupied areas by the GOI adds serious complications to the eventual task of drawing up a peace settlement.”188 It is notable that this was the first time an official of Rusk’s caliber had taken an active interest in the matter, although he (and the President) had been aware of the construction of settlements for months.

The order was met with dismay by the Tel Aviv embassy. In reply, a staff member stated that “none of us can recall having made, with or without instruction from the Department, a special point of this issue.” 189 An examination of the record by the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs

(henceforth NEA) staff in Washington found that “our last and to my knowledge only approach

188 Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, April 8, 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 492. 189 Stackhouse to Precht, April 16, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A- 1/5632/22, USNA.

103 on this subject came at the end of last September” when the embassy was instructed to protest without remonstrances.”190 The reaction would also seem to indicate that the Israeli policy of secrecy and obfuscation was successful in throwing the State Department off balance.

The U.S. had no established policy on civilian settlements. Despite this fact, the NEA staff decided to confront the new Israeli Ambassador. was told to convey to

Jerusalem “urgently the clear opposition of this government to such actions in the occupied territories which conflict with international law and which impede progress with the Jarring mission.”191 This was easily the most severe and explicit expression of opposition to Israeli settlement policy by the United States up to that point.

Despite the dressing down Rabin received, the State Department was still searching for a legally valid and politically salient policy. In the confusion, Heywood Stackhouse, of the embassy in Tel Aviv, speculated that Israel might not be in violation of the Geneva Conventions.192 A legal report drafted by Robert Neuman of the NEA did little to clarify the matter. In a nuanced and subtle argument, Neuman interpreted clause 49 in the Geneva Convention as pertaining to forced deportations. Therefore, he argued that it was not necessarily applicable to current Israeli settlement policy. Neuman noted that “paragraph 6 requires the occupying power to prevent small groups of its nationals from establishing civilian settlements in the occupied territories so long as the movement of those groups is purely voluntary.”193 This interpretation was more sympathetic

190 Precht to Stackhouse, April 30, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A- 1/5632/22, USNA. 191 Atherton to Battle, April 19, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A- 1/5632/22, ISA. 192 Stackhouse wrote that this might be a valid case to make since the Israelis might claim that they are “not transferring {emphasis in original} parts of its civilian population into occupied territory; it may well argue that such a movement is voluntary and uninduced.” See Stackhouse to Precht, April 16, 1968, , Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A-1/5632/22, USNA. 193 Neuman to Atherton, April 26, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A- 1/5632/22, UNSA.

104 to the Israeli right to construct settlements in the occupied territories than even the legal interpretation of the Israeli Foreign Ministry.194

By early May State Department officials agreed that the Geneva Convention forbids the facilitation of civilian settlements by a government. However, Foggy Bottom developed no clear position on independent settlement by Israeli civilians.195 The lofty legal format of the policy debate is indicative of the lack of political urgency. Rather than emphasize the diplomatic and strategic ramifications of recent developments, the Hebron affair was discussed in an abstract and overtly legalistic manner.

Ambassador Rabin, in a second conversation on the topic, was told that the Geneva

Convention clause 49 was designed to “prevent the permanent settlement of citizens of the occupying power upon occupied territory”, however, “Israel did not have a duty to prevent such settlement” but rather to “refrain from stimulating or otherwise facilitating it.” 196 The message was confusing and defanged the previous rebuke. It will come as no surprise that Ambassador

Rabin, a tough and capable negotiator, was not impressed by USG determination.197 Dale brought up the issue in talks with Foreign Ministry officials, who responded, as usual, that all settlements in the territories were NAHAL bases and had no bearing on a future peace settlement. Dale asked how this pertained to Hebron. Michael Elitzur (director of the North American division) replied that the settlers in Hebron were “more of a problem that Israel was dealing with than an expression

194 Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire, 99-101. 195 Precht to Stackhouse, May 7, 1968, Legal aspects of settlements, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A-1/5632/22, UNSA; Meeker to Battle, May 7, 1968, Legal aspects of settlements, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A-1/5632/22, UNSA. 196 Meeker to Battle, May 7, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A-1/5632/22, UNSA. 197 See Atherton to Battle, April 19, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A- 1/5632/22, UNSA.

105 of its policy.”198 If so, the Foreign Ministry implied that the tacit agreement to construct only

NAHAL strongpoints in the occupied territories was still in place.

Meanwhile, the GOI was as confused as their American counterparts. Hebron was not on the preferred settlement map of most cabinet members. However, evicting Jews from a city of emotional significance was politically unpalatable. GOI decided to allow the settlers to remain in

Hebron but forbid others from joining them.199 Attempts to establish a Jewish city nearby and create factories in Hebron were rejected by the cabinet.200 Instead of making an ultimate decision, Eshkol led a motion to form an exploratory committee.201

Concerned that the de-facto decision to allow the settlers to remain in Hebron would be interpreted by the USG as a change in settlement policy, the Foreign Ministry reasserted its statement from May implying that the tacit agreement was still in force.202 This was misleading.

The Israeli government did not have complete control over the situation. The settlers petitioned

GOI insistently until it gave in.203 The turning point came in December, when the committee designated to decide the fate of settlements in Hebron and Etzion Bloc decided to seek out land

“within a reasonable distance of the city of Hebron.”204 The announcement that a Jewish town would be built near Hebron raised concern in the NEA.205 However, there was no follow through on this issue. Arguably, the hesitant step-by step tactics of the government would seem to

198 Elitzur to Rabin, May 16, 1968, 7412-1/A, ISA. 199 Ministerial Committee for Security Decision B/140, May 30, 1968, territories 3194-24/FM, ISA. 200 Huberman, Against all Odds, 47, 55. 201 Cabinet meeting summary, August 25, 1968, 6495-11/C, ISA. 202 Elitzur to Argov, July 25, 1968, territories 4294-1/FM, ISA. 203 Decision of the Ministerial Committee, September 30, 1968, 7900-26/A, ISA; Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 241. 204 Ministerial committee decision, December 10, 1968, 7900-26/A, ISA. 205 Handley to Rusk, October 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A-1/5632/22, USNA.

106 indicate that greater pressure by the U.S. could have nipped settlement efforts in Hebron in the bud.

While the Hebron crisis was unfolding, the State Department and CIA realized that Israel had never upheld the tacit bargain.206 In early April concerns were first raised in the State

Department that several settlements had civilian characteristics.207 The first indication that the CIA and the State Department were aware of any form of settlement in the occupied Golan Heights was in April 1968 when internal documents mention five NAHAL strongpoints in the area, but there was no mention of the civilian character of Merom Golan.208 Only 10 months after the first settlers arrived on site did the USG have concrete information that the settlement there was of civilian nature.209 It should be noted that the decision-making process around the first settlements in the

Golan was deliberately kept so secretive that many members of the Israeli cabinet were misled as to the policy.210 This is one of the reasons it took the United States a considerable amount of time to attain reliable information on settlement construction in the mountainous region.

The political circumstances of the time made it unlikely that the White House would respond sharply to the undoing of the tacit agreement. The USG had been distracted from the

Middle East by Vietnam throughout the Johnson administration. The problem was compounded by the military and political aftermath of the Tet Offensive of January and February, as well as the

206 A report on Israeli actions in the occupied territories in late February 1968 mentions that there is only one NAHAL settlement in the West Bank, the one in Kfar Etzion. Atherton to Davies, February 23, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA. See also Campbell to Atherton, March 13, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A-1/5632/22, USNA. 207 Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, April 8 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 137. 208 CIA intelligence memorandum, Economic costs to Israel of retaining captured Arab territories, April 1968, Papers of LBJ, CF, 141, JPL; Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, April 8, 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 137. 209 Meeker to Battle, May 7, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A-1/5632/22, USNA. 210 Uzay to Eshkol, August 29, 1967, 6692-15/A, ISA.

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May offensive. Correspondingly, the President’s approval rating crashed to 36%, while 52% disapproved of his performance.211 The ability of the USG to influence outcomes on the ground in the Middle East was severely hampered by Johnson’s announcement on March 31, 1968, that he would not run in the upcoming Presidential elections. Traditionally, Presidents in the last of their term with no prospects of re-election are referred to as “lame ducks”, and Johnson was no exception.212 If so, the USG was distracted and unable to cope with the more expansionist policy

Israel adopted at that point.

Israel was confronted on the issue of civilian settlement construction in the Golan Heights only well after Nixon had been elected. At that time, Rabin insisted that Israeli policy had not changed and it exclusively built NAHAL strongpoints in the Golan Heights. This was simply untrue. Parker Hart, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, alleged that these settlements implied a permanent Israeli presence on the Heights. Rabin insisted that all territories other than Jerusalem were negotiable but he “saw no reason why Israel should not do what it wished to fulfill its responsibility for maintaining the territories under its control so long as Israel acted within the context of military occupation and abided by the Geneva Conventions.” Parker

Hart avoided exposing Rabin’s dishonesty.213 Even had the American reaction been sharper, it is hard to imagine that Israel would have made any changes to their settlement policy in the interim between administrations.

Aside from the exposure of Israeli disingenuousness, another development undermined the salience of the tacit bilateral agreement. The Jarring mission was going nowhere. The lack of progress was increasingly blamed on Israeli intransigence and their policy of territorial

211 Robert Dallek, Lyndon Johnson: Portrait of a President (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 332. 212 Goldberg to Rusk, June 6, 1968, Papers of LBJ, NSF, Agency File, 70, JPL. 213 Memorandum of Conversation, December 4, 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 339.

108 obfuscation. The Jordanians indicated that they would be willing to sit down for joint meetings under Jarring’s auspices if Israel clarified its territorial ambitions.214 However, Israel was unwilling to present Jordan with specific territorial conceptions until substantive negotiations commenced.215 Indications of greater U.S. willingness to put pressure on Israel regarding territorial issues is evinced from August 1968 and onward as part of an agreement in the administration that the USG should take a more active role in mediation.216 An example of this is Dean Rusk’s order to Barbour to discuss with Eban the need to provide Jordan with a more specific account of the

Israeli territorial policy and to “press him hard on this matter.”217 The value of obfuscation, designed to protect the nascent settlement project from U.S. pressure, had notably lessened.

Early Construction in the Jordan valley: Signalling Commitment to the Allon Plan

Territorial obfuscation gradually became a liability. Israeli officials had previously been loath to mention the Allon Plan to USG officials. However, the USG was now aware of what Israel was doing. In addition, due to the crisis surrounding the Tet Offensive and the lame duck status of the

Johnson administration, GOI no longer feared effective external pressure. Therefore, Israeli officials now began to reveal their territorial conceptions to both Jarring and American officials.

Rostow wrote to President Johnson, in a message for his eyes only, that “It is very difficult to

214 Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, August 5, 1968, Memorandum of Conversation, December 4, 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 230. 215 Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, August 3, 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 227. 216 This change in policy can be traced to Ambassador Arthur Goldberg’s plan of June 23, 1968. See Goldberg to Johnson, June 23, 1968, Papers of LBJ, NSF, Agency File, 70, JPL; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, June 28, 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 202; Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs to Secretary of State Rusk, June 28, 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 203. 217 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, August 17, 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 240.

109 think of Jordan accepting Israeli outposts permanently on its territory along the Jordan.”218 The

President, heavily preoccupied, did not pick up the gauntlet.

However, this does not tell the whole story. The initial reaction was ambiguous since elements in the USG were sympathetic to the Allon Plan. A CIA report released around this time noted that “the Jordan River and the highlands overlooking that river provide an excellent natural military defensive position.”219 Allon explained the plan to President Johnson in September 1968.

The memorandum of the meeting records only “a brief discussion of the Allon plan for defensive enclaves and a consideration of the security problems the Israelis faced.” No pushback was recorded.220 In fact, Allon received a more pointed questioning of his plan from the hosts of the

Today Show than he did in from U.S. officials.221

State Department and NSC resistance to the plan began to crystalize at the very end of

Johnson’s term. By mid-October 1968, Foggy Bottom arrived at the position that the Allon Plan was not a useful basis for an agreement. Not because it was unsympathetic to the Israeli position, but rather since Jordan would not accept it.222 Eban was told that the State Department considered

“the Allon Plan a non-starter” and that “we do not believe there is any possibility of settlement eventually being reached on basis (sic) Allon plan.”223 Saunders told Argov that “we had heard

Israelis describe the Dayan plan, the Allon plan, the corridor-to-Sharm-el-Sheikh plan and the keep-all-of-Jerusalem plan” but that “there will be no peace if Israel tries to hold onto large chunks

218 Rostow to Johnson, September 30, 1968, Papers of LBJ, NSF, Files of Walt W. Rostow, 12, JPL. 219 CIA intelligence memorandum, Economic costs to Israel of retaining captured Arab territories, April 1968, Papers of LBJ, CF, 141, JPL. 220 Memorandum of Conversation, September 9, 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 247. 221 Allon interview on Today Show, September 10, 1968, 6556-27/FM, ISA. 222 See Rusk to Tel Aviv, October 23, 1968, Papers of LBJ, CF, 142, JPL.Saunders to Rostow, November 15, 1968, Papers of LBJ, CF, 142, JPL. 223 Rusk to Tel Aviv, October 23, 1968, Papers of LBJ, CF, 142, JPL.

110 of territory.”224 Concern about growing Israeli commitment to the plan led Saunders to recommend sending an emissary to Israel in order to “move Israel off the Allon Plan.”225 There was no support for these sentiments from a highly distracted lame-duck White House immersed in the upcoming general elections.

While the Arab states had been notably silent regarding settlement construction elsewhere, they were more vocal in their opposition to the Allon Plan. On December 2, Zaid

Rifai, King Hussein’s private secretary, complained to the U.S. regarding Israeli plans to build settlements in accordance with the Allon Plan.226 A few days later, Egyptian Foreign Minister

Mahmoud Riad delivered a memo to Donald Bergus, the de-facto U.S. representative in Egypt, protesting the Allon Plan without naming it.227 However, an American emissary was never sent to Israel to press it on its settlement policy, and the matter was dropped, probably due to lack of interest on the part of the White House.

Encouraged by the underwhelming USG reaction to the Allon Plan, Israel moved towards open settlement construction. On October 31, 1968, a few days before the U.S. general elections, the Israeli cabinet replaced their decision of June 19, 1967 with a new formulation of territorial demands. Israel now demanded that Gaza as well as Sharm El-Sheikh remain in Israeli hands, as well as a strip of land guaranteeing territorial contiguity with the international border remain under

Israeli control. GOI believed that retaining the strategically crucial Sharm was the only way to guarantee freedom of transit for Israeli shipping through the Red Sea.228 Allon stressed the

224 Memorandum of Conversation, November 14, 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 321. 225 Saunders to n/a, November 25, 1968, Papers of LBJ, CF Jordan, 147, JPL. 226 Symmes to Rusk, December 2, 1968, Papers of LBJ, CF Middle East, 148, JPL. 227 The U.S. and Egypt still had not renewed diplomatic relations following the 1967 War. Bergus to Rusk, December 6, 1968, Papers of LBJ, National Security File, CF Middle East, 161, JPL. 228 Israeli Cabinet, October 31, 1968, Labor platform 15/46/39/2, YT; Shimoni to London, November 1, 1968, 5978- 2/FM, ISA.

111 importance of cementing Israeli control over Sharm through “the creation of a civilian settlement near the approaches to the bay” as it “will strengthen our political and security standing in this vital region”.229 A civilian settlement was established near Sharm after Nixon took office.230 The new formula was sufficiently vague as to allow GOI to keep its territorial options open but specific enough to signal Israeli territorial intentions.

Israel was similarly moving away from its tacit agreement in the Etzion Bloc. In July 1968, the Ministerial Committee for Security decided to expropriate roughly 100 acres of land in the area for the settlement of Jewish families. The plan called for the creation of two further settlements in the Etzion Bloc as well a military camp.231 On October 18, 1968, Yigal Allon publicly announced that the Kfar Etzion settlement would cease to be defined as a NAHAL outpost and would be turned into a civilian settlement. The announcement was noted by the NEA but no actions were taken. 232 Israeli settlement policy had caught the Johnson administration when it was distracted and unaware. The potential problem would require more attention from future administrations.

Israel utilized the opportunity to go public with their desired settlement map as a way of signalling their commitment to specific “defensible borders.” The Nixon administration would read those signals loud and clear.

Conclusion

The early years of the Israeli settlement project presented a unique opportunity for the United

States to exercise significant influence on Israeli policy. In the immediate aftermath of the 1967

229 Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 116. 230 Allon to Eshkol, November 13, 1968, Security and Military 6423-1/C, ISA. 231 Uzay to Gvati, July 29, 1968, Office of the Minister Uzan 6591-4/C, ISA; Weiss to Avni, September 30, 1968, 6423-1/C, ISA; Decision of the Ministerial Committee, September 30, 1968, 7900-26/A, ISA. 232 Jerusalem to Rusk, October 21, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A- 1/5632/22, USNA; Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, November 19, 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 326.

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War, the Eshkol government was so concerned about international pressure that it pre-emptively agreed to return to the pre-war borders vis-à-vis both Syria and Egypt, although not the West Bank.

The sensitivity of Israeli policy to American pressure was also evinced by the reaction to the relatively mild criticism it received as a response to the public establishment of Kfar Etzion. Israel resorted to keeping its settlement construction secret and maintained the charade that all settlement construction was military in character.

Israel built most of its settlements, with the notable exception of construction in Jerusalem, out of pragmatic strategic considerations rather than ideological fervor. Therefore, the GOI would have been pliable to American pressure and coercion if it had been applied. Even when it was clear that American pressure was underwhelming, Israel constructed settlements gradually and hesitantly. The settlements in the Golan Heights were kept so secret that the CIA was unaware of their existence or character for months. Settlements in Sinai were initially built in relatively esoteric areas and were actual NAHAL outposts. In the Jordan Valley, settlements were built gradually and spearheaded by NAHAL units before being civilianized. The uncertainty behind construction in these areas can be contrasted with the self-assured steps taken in Jerusalem, where it is unlikely to believe American pressure would have altered Israeli policy.

The sensitivity of GOI to American pressure on this point brings to light the importance of

Israeli obfuscation. The Foreign Ministry reached a tacit agreement with the USG on settlements based on the Lourie formula. Israel maintained that its settlements were military and their construction reversible. The USG was ignorant of Israeli violations of the tacit agreement, when it was particularly vulnerable to American pressure. This allowed GOI the time it needed to consolidate its nascent settlement enterprise. As a result, the Johnson administration did not prepare an adequate policy to deal with civilian settlements.

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The magnitude of Israeli deception is surprising. The very first settlement Israel had built,

Merom Golan, was fully civilian. Israel did not comply with implicit U.S. agreement to allow it to build NAHAL settlements and misled the U.S. regarding the nature of the Kfar Etzion settlement as well. It also took advantage of Johnson’s “lame duck” status to announce that it would be creating civilian settlements in Etzion Bloc and near Hebron.233 This is a far cry from the supposed trust and openness of a “special relationship.”

Allies may sometimes use deception to avoid or undermine an attempt by an ally to restrain them.234 Indeed, Israel had strategic reasons to obfuscate, and this seemed to take precedence over the health of bilateral relations. In retrospect, the territorial policies of Israel during the Eshkol period do not seem confused and reactive as some historians have portrayed them.235 Rather, Israel utilized the strategic advantages it enjoyed at the time to create a territorial reality in tune with its concept of “defensible borders.” The policy seemed hesitant and confused due to the need to obfuscate construction to protect its nascent settlement enterprise. Hesitancy masked coherent policy substance.

However, the effectiveness of Israeli obfuscation attempts should not be overstated. The lack of information the USG possessed is remarkable. In most cases the CIA and State Department became aware of settlements through press releases. Although Merom Golan was the first Israeli settlement built in the occupied territories, the U.S. government was ignorant of its existence for months and was not aware of its civilian character until May 1968. It appears that the State

233 Jerusalem to Rusk, October 21, 1968, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A- 1/5632/22, USNA; Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, November 19, 1968, FRUS XX, doc. 326. 234 Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 123. 235 Gazit, Trapped Fools, Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrasment; Ronald Ranta, Political Decision Making and Non- Decisions: The Case of Israel and the Occupied Territories (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).

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Department remained unaware of the civilian character of Kfar Etzion until the end of the Johnson administration.236 Therefore it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the U.S. put minimal resources into verifying Israeli compliance with the tacit agreement.

Inaction on the growing problem of settlement construction also indicates the lack of foresight evinced by Johnson and Rusk. Their apathy towards Israeli settlement construction cultivated indifference amongst the intelligence community and stunted the formulation of a coherent policy by the State Department. This reflected the failings of the reactive and uninspiring policy of the Johnson administration towards resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict in the post-1967

War period in general. The policy was not much different when the Johnson administration was aware of construction. Although officially opposed to Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, it did not bring the issue up in public unless it had caught the attention of third-actors as well. For example, construction in Kfar Etzion had been criticized in the United Nations. Therefore,

American criticism was public and direct. Meanwhile, Israeli construction which had been successfully hidden from the international community, such as in Hebron and the Golan Heights, garnered private criticism only.237 The case of Israeli building in East Jerusalem is also instructive.

It attracted worldwide attention and was a major sore point for the Arab states. In a third case, that of the settlements in the Jordan Valley, the Arab states showed an increasing opposition as well.238

Thus the U.S. tended to avoid seeking confrontation with Israel unless spurred by third-parties.

There were strategic reasons for this benign neglect. Israel was supported due to its dominant position in the region. In the war, the Israeli military proved far superior to its

236 Meeker to Battle, May 7, 1968, Legal aspects of settlements, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A-1/5632/22, UNSA. 237 Lambrakis to Johnson, New Israeli Settlements in the West Bank and the Syrian Border, September 28, 1967, Records Relating to Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1951-1976, 59/A1-5632/22, USNA. 238 Symmes to Rusk, December 2, 1968, Papers of LBJ, CF Middle East, 148, JPL; Bergus to Rusk, December 6, 1968, Papers of LBJ, National Security File, CF Middle East, 161, JPL.

115 neighboring counterparts. Therefore, the IDF was the military dominant force in the region.239

Israel, required arms from the United States and was dependent on the United States. However, it enjoyed high confidence in its military abilities and disregarded the military capabilities of its rivals. Israel tripled its size and the newly occupied territories were seen by the U.S. as the key to attaining greater U.S. influence over Egypt and Syria. These factors minimized its vulnerability to

American pressure.240 In addition, two of its major enemies, Syria and Egypt, were firmly in the

Soviet camp. Both states had been weakened and humiliated by the war and their value as allies to the U.S. was in doubt. The pressure put on Israel regarding territories previously occupied by

Jordan was greater. This is mostly due to concerns that Jordanian stability could be threatened if

Israel did not make concessions towards it and fears Jordan would draw closer to the USSR.241

It may be understandable, but in retrospect the USG appears to have made a mistake in eschewing the role of mediator. It was inevitable that the Johnson administration would treat the

Arab-Israeli conflict as secondary to Vietnam. However, emphasis on the role of the United

Nations meant that the U.S. did not put its resources into play. Unfortunately, by the time the USG realized in mid-1968 that their hands-off approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict had allowed Israel to pursue an expansionist course, the Johnson administration was deep in its “lame duck” period and was facing a severe crisis in Vietnam in the wake of the Tet Offensive. By that point, the U.S. had limited leverage over the situation even if it had chosen to engage more deeply with Israel on territorial policy.

239 Yaacov Bar Siman Tov, "The United States and Israel since 1948: A "Special Relationship?”, Diplomatic History, Vol. 22(2), Spring, 1998, 241; Zeev Maoz, Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and Foreign Policy, (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press, 2009), 139. 240 Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest, 131-132. 241 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, July 21, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 381; Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, August 15 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 419.

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Evaluating the Analytical Framework during the Johnson Years

Mediation: The U.S. made a conscious decision to avoid “heavy” direct mediation. This was a result of a lack of optimism as to the possibility of success, a focus on the Vietnam War and the lame duck status of the administration. However, it is also an outgrowth of USG comfort with the status quo. Ideally, it would have been preferable for the USG to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and help improve the position of the United States in the Middle East. Still, the incentive to put a great deal of effort into this was not there. Egypt and Syria were both ensconced in the Soviet camp and both were too weak and humiliated to have been of much strategic use at that time.

Jordan was a loyal ally, but the USG was not certain the regime would survive a sustained effort to reach a peace agreement.242 Therefore, the State Department settled for very light mediation between Israel and Jordan which included passing on information on the other sides’ position but not proffering direct offers from the parties. Israel in the meantime had proven a useful ally, capable of defeating more than one Soviet proxy simultaneously on the battlefield. Its military success and significant territorial gains had made it the major regional power. The USG had little strategic incentive to pressure its close and powerful ally into making concessions to weaker allies and humiliated Soviet proxies.

Bargaining: Interaction was mostly confined to bilateral bargaining and took place almost exclusively between Israeli officials and mid-level State Department bureaucrats. Explicitly the

242 NEA Background Paper, June 24, 1967, Papers of LBJ, CF Middle East, 148, JPL.

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U.S. opposed settlements of any kind and considered them detrimental to the peace process.

Implicitly the message was far more permissive. The level of bureaucrats bargaining sent a message that the White House was not interested in the matter. The NEA in their reaction indicated that they were willing to live with (without embracing) military oriented settlement construction if Israel guaranteed it was reversible. The implicit deal broke down not due to a misunderstanding but rather following unmistakeable Israeli defection from an implicit bargain they were fully cognizant of.

Neither Israel nor the U.S. was particularly concerned with the perception of their positions in the Arab world at this time, probably because they were not taken seriously by either in their disorganized and defeated state. The one partial exception being U.S. concern that Israeli actions in Jerusalem would destabilize the Jordanian regime. But the Johnson administration was not seriously committed to hindering Israeli steps to incorporate East Jerusalem. As expected, bilateral bargaining gained no results in terms of restraining Israeli settlement construction. This even though the Eshkol government was greatly concerned about the possibility of USG pressure and the settlements were in a particularly vulnerable nascent stage.

Issue Specific Power: While neither side had an outside option, Israel obtained a comfortable inside option following the 1967 War. It tripled its size and could now determine which areas it would be willing to return in a future deal. The Arab states were too weak to even consider another round and therefore it felt no pressure to make concessions.

Israel managed to obtain and retain the bargaining advantage over settlements throughout this period. However, this was not a foregone conclusion. Israel had yet to establish full control over its own settlement policy. Even towards the end of the Johnson administration the

118 settlement enterprise remained nascent and vulnerable. Israel was hesitant to annex the territories and to build settlements. A strong push by the USG at this point may have curtailed construction before Israel could establish full control over the issue. This is the major reason Israel engaged in obfuscation and defected on the tacit bilateral bargain.

However, the U.S. was not committed enough to challenge Israeli construction. It was distracted and notably disinterested in taking the initiative in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Israel was not particularly committed to constructing settlements outside of Jerusalem either.

Strong domestic audience costs had yet to evolve. and Israel had not determined that Sinai and the Golan Heights were essential to its security at the beginning of the period. However, with little opposition its commitment grew over time and it was more confident and assertive at the end of the examined period.

The Settlements as a Bargaining Issue: There is a clear difference between the Israeli attitude towards Jerusalem and its attitude towards the rest of the occupied territories. East Jerusalem was immediately annexed (although that term was not used) and literally declared as indivisible.

Meanwhile, the other territories were mostly considered as bargaining chips to be traded for peace. A weak but growing level of commitment is evinced to specific territories such as Sharm.

By the end of the period Israel had begun to signal focused commitment to retaining the Jordan

Valley and Sharm el-Sheikh and was laying the foundations of a commitment to parts of the

Golan Heights as well.

Israel avoided making statements tying itself to the occupied territories (again apart from

Jerusalem) and was not trying to generate domestic audience costs intentionally, although the move made by the settlers in Hebron established potential costs inadvertently. By the end of the

119 period Israel began to signal its intentions to Jordan. The Allon Plan was designed to entice

Jordan into negotiations while clearly making the areas Israel wished to maintain. While the

Jordanian government rejected the offer, Israel maintained a hope that their views would change over time due to diplomatic attrition.

Domestic forces wishing to promote indivisibility in the West Bank were still disorganized.

A core of activists was involved in pressuring the Israeli government to create early settlements, in Etzion Bloc and Hebron. However, during this period, the activists worked informally and in a disorganized way. There were no notably annexationist or expansionist parties in the coalition.

The Alignment had a pro-settler faction (Achdut Ha’avoda) but the rest of the party did not have notable links to the settlers. Furthermore, the NRP had yet to begin its association with the settler movement. While Israeli civil society influenced the timing, the government determined the geography in all cases, with the partial exception of the Hebron affair. In fact, all settlements built in this period conform to the more expansive version of the Allon Plan. All territories aside from

Jerusalem remained eminently divisible.

Defection or Cooperation: Israel made a significant effort to construct something between a tacit bargain and a pledge: settlements constructed would not be civilian in nature and reversible. Israel defected voluntarily from the tacit agreement. In fact, Israel did not so much defect as much as it entered the deal on false pretences. It had already established civilian settlements in the Golan

Heights and in Kfar Etzion. Israel seemed to have almost no concerns about the “shadow of the future” regarding bilateral relations. This could be explained by the bureaucratic level on which dealings occurred and by the lack of U.S. commitment to the peace process. Since the

120 administration was not heavily committed to the peace process, Israel was not particularly concerned as to the consequences of defection.

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Chapter 3

Sharpening the Sickle: the Nixon years, 1969-1973

The main thrust of the argument is that during the Golda Meir years, GOI developed a sophisticated strategy designed to establish recognized “defensible borders.” Its settlement policy was an integral part of the strategy. Israeli decision makers believed that settlements furthered the Israeli goal of changing the borders to reflect security needs in two ways. First, settlements were utilized as a form of pressure on the Arabs states, to create a sense in the Syrian, Jordanian and Egyptian governments that time was not on their side. In this way GOI hoped to bring the

Arab states to the negotiating table. Second, Israel hoped to maintain the settlements in a permanent settlement deal. However, it fully expected that it might be forced to evacuate some settlements in the context of an agreement.

The contention here is that the strategy was also aimed at altering the territorial policy of the USG and had notable success in this regard. As time passed, the formulas for the territorial aspect of a permanent Arab-Israeli settlement offered by the USG moved closer to the Israeli position. This process was facilitated by the increasing influence of , a tacit sympathizer of the “defensible borders” approach. The Israeli strategy also had significant influence on Jordanian policy. However, it failed in that Egypt was neither enticed to the bargaining table for direct talks, nor did it accept Israeli notions of defensible borders.

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The Interaction of Units

Beliefs and Preferences; U.S. Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict during the Johnson

Administration

President Nixon held a complex attitude towards the State of Israel. He possessed a basic empathy for Israel and respect for its reliability and military capabilities. Israel was a staunch and useful ally against the Soviet Union. The President developed genuine respect for the Israeli officials he dealt with most, Rabin and Prime Minister Golda Meir.1 However, this general sympathy towards Israel was tempered by a marked distaste for its American supporters. He counted American Jews and pro-Israeli liberals such as Hubert Humphrey amongst his bitter political enemies. In his memoirs, Nixon complains about the “short-sighted pro-Israeli attitude prevalent in large and influential segments of the Jewish community, Congress, the media, and in intellectual and cultural circles.”2 In keeping with his petty personal style, he was unable to forgive liberal Jews for supporting Israel but withholding support for his policy in Vietnam.

Indeed, his antipathy towards American Jews at times verged on anti-Semitism.3

Questionable personal opinions and racial prejudice notwithstanding, Nixon’s policy towards Israel was not determined by his feelings towards Israel or Jews. Rather the policy was shaped, first and foremost, by the role of the Arab-Israeli conflict in American global strategy vis-a-vis the USSR. The administration often disregarded the unique nature of the region and its internal trends in favor of international strategic considerations.4 Nixon once wrote to Kissinger

1 , American Presidents and the Middle East (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990), 121- 122; Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Gusset & Dunlap, 1978), 596; William Safire, Before the Fall: an Inside View of the pre-Watergate White House (New York: Doubleday, 1975), 565-570. 2 Nixon, RN, 481. 3 Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 169-170. 4 William Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 61-62.

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“above all our interest is – what gives the Soviet the most trouble – don’t let the Arab-Israeli conflict obscure that interest.”5 This is not to say that the Nixon era was a period of head on confrontation with the USSR. Rather the declared strategy of the administration was the pursuit of détente, an attempt to establish better relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S. and reduce the likelihood of confrontation between the powers. This was to be done by “educating” the Soviet government into more cooperative behavior through a complex system of carrots and sticks.6

Despite its role in global competition, the Middle East was not central to the foreign policy of Nixon in his first term. Vietnam was the primary problem until the Paris Peace Accords were signed in January 1973. Indeed, Kissinger Soviet representatives in April 1972 that any progress on the Middle East was “conditional on the end of Vietnam.”7 Other priorities included the pursuit of an opening to China and nuclear arms limitation talks with the USSR.8 The NSC paper determined that the strategic importance of the region was “debatable.” U.S. interests do

“not require that we control or even exercise considerable influence over the decisions of countries in the region but it does exclude the exercise of such control by the USSR.”9

Aside from a sense that other matters were more urgent, the lack of enthusiasm for settling the conflict in the early years of the Nixon administration was also due to pessimism that

5 Steven Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 179. 6 Abraham Ben-Zvi, From Truman to Obama: The Rise of and the Beginning of the Decline of US-Israeli Relations, (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Achronot, 2005), 106-107; Spiegel, Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 172. 7 Jussi Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 305. 8 For a good overview, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: a Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 272-307. 9 NSC Interdepartmental Group, January 24, 1969, Nixon Presidential Material Staff (hereafter known as NPSM), National Security Study Memorandums (hereafter NSSM), H-126, Nixon Presidential Library (hereafter known as NPL).

124 a settlement could be achieved. They shared the assessment of the preceding administration that

Egypt was unwilling to attain a permanent settlement, while Jordan appeared unstable and unable to reach an agreement on its own.10

Further curtailing the ability to effectively promote a settlement was a serious division in the administration as to how to handle the Arab-Israeli conflict. Secretary of State William

Rogers and National Security Advisor (hereafter NSA) Henry Kissinger had differing approaches. Policy differences were exacerbated by a fierce personal rivalry. Rogers and the

State Department focused primarily on regional dynamics and on the standing of the U.S. with

Middle Eastern actors. As a result, they tended to stress the importance of mediating the conflict as an “even-handed” interlocutor. This would involve distancing the U.S. from the pro-Israeli tilt evinced during Johnson’s tenure. Kissinger and the NSC believed that it was in the interests of the United States to maintain a close relationship with a militarily superior Israel. Eventually, so the thinking went, the inability of the Arab states to recoup their losses by force or through the help of the Soviet Union would force them to turn to the United States for assistance.11

President Nixon vacillated between the two approaches.12 Though he leaned towards

Kissinger’s approach, he was not ready to fully trust the NSA on Middle Eastern issues. In a conversation with Vice Chief of Staff Alexander Haig, he expressed his ambivalence: “I have no confidence in State. I’m just saying too, though, Henry [Kissinger] has somewhat of a blindspot

10 National Security Memorandum, October 15, 1970, NPSM, Senior Review Group Meetings (hereafter SRGM), H-048, NPL; Memorandum of Conversation, June 20, 1969, Memorandum of Conversation, June 20, 1969, FRUS XXIII, doc. 125; William Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Foreign Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 85. 11 Quandt, Peace Process, 61-62; Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), 199- 202; Zaki Shalom and Boaz Vanetik, The Nixon Administration and the Middle East Peace Process, 1969–1973: From the Rogers Plan to the Outbreak of the (Eastbourne: University of Sussex Press, 2013), 59- 60. 12 Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 215-28.

125 here, because he doesn’t want to do anything with the Israelis accept for reassure them and get them more arms.”13 Therefore, the initiatives taken by the State Department to resolve the conflict were not given full support by the White House and often floundered. As William

Quandt observed, Nixon was “only prepared to let the State Department test the waters of Arab-

Israeli diplomacy, and was reluctant to throw the full weight of his office behind an activist policy.”14 By 1972, Kissinger had gained the upper hand in the policy struggles, but as his policy was essentially one of maintaining the status quo in the region, U.S. involvement in the region remained light. Therefore, the involvement of the Nixon administration in the Middle East before the 1973 War was half-hearted and disinterested and suffered from unresolved policy disputes which lent it a general lack of coherence.

U.S. Beliefs and Preferences: The Policy of the Nixon Administration towards the Occupied

Territories and the Settlements

The Nixon administration did not pursue a policy of curtailing Israeli settlement construction.

Despite the manifold policy differences between the NSC and the State Department in the early years of the Nixon administration, neither had any interest in the issue. The ability and willingness of the Nixon administration to pressure Israel in general was heavily curtailed by

Cold War logic. Kissinger explained, in his autobiography, that “we were being asked to pressure an ally on behalf of countries which, with the exception of Jordan, had broken relations

13 Conversation between President Nixon and Army Vice Chief of Staff, January 23, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, eds. Nina Howland, Craig Daigle, Edward C. Keefer, (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2011), doc. 6. 14 Quandt, Peace Process, 61.

126 with us, pursued policies generally hostile to us, and were clients of Moscow.”15 If the conflict is seen in such stark Cold War terms, pressure on Israel made little sense.

Unlike their predecessors, the Nixon administration considered the possibility of utilizing coercive diplomacy to pressure Israel. However, there were serious doubts as to its usefulness.

Early in his first tenure, Nixon opined that if “we want a settlement, we may have to cut off arms supply. But Israel is just about tough enough to say, ‘so be it.’ complex.”16 An NSC paper concurred with this assessment “no single inducement – aircraft, financial assistance, a diplomatic position – is likely to “buy” an Israeli change of position on an issue Israel literally regards as vital to its security.”17 More specifically , Country director for Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs cautioned that “we have no really effective way to exert major influence on Israel’s occupation policy.”18 Furthermore, the Arab attitude towards Israeli settlement policy did not foster a significant USG incentive to focus on the issue. The Arab states tended to ignore

Israeli settlement construction in the occupied territories or treat it as an irritant. The administration, gradually realized it would be easier to pressure the Arab states into a partial acceptance of Israeli settlement policy than it would be to curtail Israeli settlement construction.

Paradoxically, the State Department was increasingly aware of the extent of Israeli settlement activity and its significance. In stark contrast to the Johnson era, during the Nixon era the State Department made a point of keeping tabs on Israeli construction. Particularly instrumental in this regard was Wat T. Cluverius IV of the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv, who performed at least three field trips to Israeli settlements and took a keen interest in Israeli

15 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), 351. 16 FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972, eds. Steven Galpern, Adam M. Howard (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 2015), doc. 48. 17 Paper Prepared by the National Security Staff, February 21, 1971, FRUS XXIII, doc. 207. 18 Atherton to Campbell, March 5, 1970, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/4, USNA.

127 settlement policy.19 Closer State Department scrutiny of Israeli settlement policy was abetted by an end to the Israeli policy of obfuscation. Israel was increasingly transparent in its settlement policy. For example, John T. Wheelock of the Jerusalem Consulate reported on a conversation he had with an IDF officer in the Jordan Valley. Wheelock believed there were seven-eight settlements in the area but was informed by the helpful officer that he had underestimated the number and there were nine.20

Greater accuracy in State Department reporting engendered a sense that Israeli settlement construction was becoming a serious obstacle to peace. Cluverius observed that since all settlements were affiliated with powerful kibbutz and organizations, they enjoyed disproportionate political influence. As a result, attempts to evacuate the settlements could cause political instability and there was no certainty that a crisis of this sort “would be resolved in favor of those Israeli leaders who would be willing to give up Jewish settlements.”21 State

Department talking points show concern that Israeli settlement policy was intended to “close off any Arab hope for reversion of occupied territories to them.”22

Reports from the NEA were ignored by Nixon and Kissinger. Considering Nixon’s outlook this is not surprising. More remarkable is the disinterest evinced by Secretary Rogers.

While Rogers energetically pursued progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process, he incorporated his approach into the global strategy of Nixon and Kissinger. Indeed, the early stages of Nixon’s policy in the Middle East often seemed to be aimed primarily at the development and

19 Memorandum of conversation, December 7, 1971, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/4, USNA; Memorandum of conversation, April 16, 1972, 5978-2/FM, ISA; Cluverius to Smith, January 17, 1972, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA; Cluverius to Long, October 13, 1971, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA; Cluverius to Stackhouse, May 31, 1972, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA. 20 Wheelock, February 18, 1971, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/5, USNA. 21 Cluverius to Stackhouse, May 31, 1972, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA. 22 N/A, 1972, Arab-Israel affairs, 59 /A1-5632/5, USNA.

128 maintenance of détente than a wholehearted attempt to resolve the conflict.23 As a result, the years in which Rogers dominated decision making focused on involving the Soviet Union in the peace process. The State Department worked diligently, and unsuccessfully, to attain a two- power and four-power (including the UK and France as well) consensus on the abstract principles of a permanent settlement. The small details of Israeli policy were little more than a distraction in the context of the strategy pursued by Rogers.

Furthermore, the influence of State Department bureaucrats on American foreign policy was curtailed.24 The two primary shapers of foreign policy, Nixon and Kissinger, shared a distaste for the Department. As Robert Dallek put it “they focused a lot of their antagonism on bureaucrats, whom they saw as unimaginative protectors of their control over cumbersome government agencies.”25 As a result, the State Department was consistently undercut. For example, during Meir’s first trip to the United States, in September 1969, it was determined that a direct channel of communication would be established between the White House and the Prime

Minister’s Office, circumventing Foggy Bottom.26

Consequentially, State Department officials were concerned about seeming out of step with the administration. Owen Zurhellen of the Tel Aviv embassy warned that support for pressure on Israel may lead to “a divided U.S. government showing its division in public to the embarrassment of our own Department and our credibility.”27 With little confidence that an emphasis of the issue would receive any backing from primary decision-makers, the State

23 Shalom & Vanetik, The Nixon Administration, 59-60. 24 See Barry Rubin, Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 140-171. 25 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, 93. 26 Meron Medzini, The Proud Jewess: a Political Biography (Jerusalem: Yediot Aharaonoth, 1990), 365-366; Shalom & Vanetik, Nixon Administration, 50. 27 Zurhellen to Atherton, February 2, 1973, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/23, USNA.

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Department policy was not to “seek public confrontation on this issue and hope that we can discuss it quietly.”28 The result was that while the State Department clearly believed that the settlements were a problem, it had no support and therefore no appetite to pursue the issue.

Israeli Preferences and Beliefs: Territorial Policy under Golda Meir

The death of Levi Eshkol saw the majority of the Alignment Party unite behind Golda Meir as

Prime Ministerial candidate.29 Meir’s leadership style was based on the pursuit of party unity, a goal which is completely understandable in a political organization split into four competing factions.30 In order to prevent splits in the party, she believed that spirited debates on the future of the occupied territories were unwarranted; “I am sure that a day will come – and I look forward to it – where a big argument will take place and we will have elections over this issue – but only on the day when an Israeli delegation returns from negotiations with the Arabs…will this debate be timely.”31 In this spirit, her settlement policy was based on the pursuit of the lowest common denominator.

It is commonly stated that Israel did not have a clear territorial policy or settlement policy in the first decade of its control of the occupied territories.32 This was only partially true in the

Eshkol years and is not an accurate description of the Meir years. Under her tutelage, a wide- ranging territorial consensus emerged. Israel would retain control of the Jordan River as a

28 N/A, 1972, Arab-Israel affairs, 59 /A1-5632/5, USNA. 29 Moshe Meisels, “Labor Bureau Selects Meir,” Maariv, March 4, 1969, 3; Memorandum of conversation, March 12, 1969, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/8, USNA. 30 Medzini, Proud Jewess, 397. 31 Dan Patir, “G. Meir Does Not Want a Debate in ‘Labor” on the Territories,” Davar, November 24, 1972, 1. 32 Shlomo Gazit, Trapped Fools: Thirty Years of Israeli Policy in the Territories, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 241- 267; Reuven Pedatzur, The Triumph of Embarrassment, (Tel Aviv: Yad Tabenkin, 1996); Ronald Ranta, Political Decision Making and Non-Decisions: The Case of Israel and the Occupied Territories (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015); Yishai, Land or Peace, 41-53.

130 security border, maintain the top of the Golan Heights, the , a united Jerusalem and

Sharm el-Sheikh. Later the consensus was expanded to include the Rafah Salient. The principle would become known as the “oral law” since it intended to guide policy unofficially. However, under Defense Minister Moshe Dayan’s pressure the policy became part of the official platform of the Alignment Party.33 If so, during Meir’s tenure Israel broadcast an increasingly clear signal as to its territorial intentions.

There was some resistance to these formulations from fringe elements in the coalition, such as the right-wing of the NRP and the MAPAM faction. However, none of the major decision makers came out against this formula. Dayan, known at the time as the most hawkish member of the cabinet, did not push to expand the parameters of consensus. , known as one of the more minimalist ministers had no objection to the “oral law” and said “it is logical not to alter the oral law substantially or fundamentally.”34 The formula was accepted by the

Alignment Party central committee on September 11, 1969, with none opposed and one abstention.35 In 1973 the consensus was reflected again in the document known as the “Galili

Document.”36 Minister of Police Shlomo Hillel correctly stated that “I don’t think, there is a difference between us regarding the settlement map, so let’s get over all this mumbo jumbo.”37

Indeed, one is hard pressed to find significant disputes amongst the primary decision-makers in the government during these years over the future borders of the state or the settlement map.

33 See Memorandum of conversation, April 16, 1972, 5978-2/FM, ISA. 34 Memorandum of conversation, July 26, 1973, Settlements 12-3-93-5, YT. 35 Memorandum of conversation, August 16, 1969, Political Committee 2-026-1969-20, BB; Memorandum of conversation, September 8, 1969, Arab-Israel affairs, 59 /A1-5632/19, USNA; Memorandum of conversation, September 11, 1969, 5978-2/FM, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, November 2 1971, Arab-Israel affairs, 59 /A1-5632/5, USNA. 36 Memorandum of conversation, September 3, 1973, Settlements 12-3-93-5, YT. 37 Memorandum of conversation, August 10, 1973, 7022-13/A, ISA.

131

Did this mean Israel intended to annex those territories and was uninterested in reaching a peace agreement? Not necessarily. A second element in the Israeli position seemed to contradict the territorial consensus illustrated above. The official Israeli position was that while Israel was unwilling to return to the pre-1967 War borders, it would enter into negotiations with the Arab states unconditionally.38 As Galili put it, “the map which the Labor Party will consider as its ultimate one will be worked out when the time comes, and not as a precondition for negotiations, but as the Israeli stand in the course of the negotiations.”39 The two seemingly paradoxical elements, gradually became the policy of the Meir government. The policy had been at the core of the Meir government’s territorial approach since 1971. Both principles were included in the

1973 Labor Party platform:

The Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip, including the Rafah salient will remain under our control and freedom of navigation will be guaranteed by Israeli forces which will control the Straits area. The area will be connected to Israel through a territorially contiguous stretch commensurate with its security objectives, in view of future harassment attempts. Should any Arab state be willing to enter peace negotiations with Israel, talks shall commence without delay. Talks shall be entered with no preconditions, and in this context Israel also does not demand as a precondition that its position on strategic and security borders be accepted. When the time comes the government will debate and decide on its exact position regarding peace agreements, the location of borders designed to replace the ceasefire lines, and relations with each Arab state.40

The official policy can be interpreted in different ways. The first is as an example of policy confusion, wherein Israel desired peace but was foreclosing its own path due to domestic political indeterminacy.41 The second was as lip service to peace, inadequately covering up a

38 Gazit to Dinitz, July 15, 1973, 6718-11/FM, ISA. 39 Melchior to Labor Foreign Department, September 10, 1973, Foreign Relations 2-914-1972-455, BB. 40 Galili to Meir, October 3, 1973, 7022-13/A, ISA. 41 , The Price of Unity (Revivim: Tel Aviv, 1985); Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment; Ranta, Political Decision Making and Non-Decisions; Gazit, Trapped Fools, 241-267; Yael Yishai, Land or Peace, Whither Israel? (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1987), 41-53.

132 transparent agenda of territorial aggrandizement.42 The argument here is that neither approach is accurate. Rather, this was an unsuccessful but strategically formulated attempt to entice the Arab states into bargaining with Israel on its own terms.

Israeli Preferences and Beliefs: Israeli Settlement Policy under Golda Meir

The territorial policies of the Meir government seem contradictory and illogical. However, the two major and seemingly paradoxical elements of the Israeli territorial approach align through its settlement policy. There is no doubt that settlements served primarily to assist Israel in maintaining control of the occupied territories. It is also true that in some cases, particularly in the West Bank, GOI sabotaged its best means of attaining a peace agreement by constructing settlements which are politically difficult to evacuate.

Interpreting the motives of settlement policy through its ultimate outcome is misleading.

Israeli strategy in the 1967-1973 period was built on a massive strategic misperception: that recourse to war was unavailable to the Arab states. Israel believed that the Arab leadership would not start a war due to their military inferiority and the unsuitability of their armed forces to conduct penetrative offensive operations. This assumption turned out to be faulty.43 The error carried over and led the Meir government to overestimate its coercive bargaining power over the

Arab states and doomed the entire strategy. The goal of GOI was to take advantage of Arab military weakness to bring the Arab states to the negotiating table. Once negotiations commenced, Israel would use its superior bargaining position to obtain territorial concessions

42 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: Norton, 2000). 43 For the best full exploration of this failure, see Uri Bar-Joseph, Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 2005).

133 which would allow it to maintain “defensible borders” alongside full peace agreements. Full peace agreements would best serve Israeli security interests, as they would render any attack by

Arab states illegal and less likely. Meanwhile, by retaining strategic points, Israel would minimize the military risks involved with abrogation of the peace agreements, an outcome it considered possible due to the instability of many Arab regimes.

To circumvent these problems, settlements served as a coercive measure designed to bring the Arab states to the negotiating table on Israeli terms. The longer the Arab states waited before agreeing to negotiate directly with Israel, the more occupied territory would be settled.

This in turn would improve the Israeli bargaining position.44 Meir explained “we want to encourage Hussein and Sadat to make peace. If they get up in the morning and say: ‘five years have passed, nothing has happened, Israel is mobilized, that is her problem’… but if they get up in the morning and rub their eyes and say: ‘wait a minute, those Israelis are doing something on the ground, things are changing, they are settling!’ – then this is a different situation, then something must be done, because the situation on the ground is changing.”45 Though the USG disagreed with this position, the Embassy in Tel Aviv did not doubt that these views were more than just a smokescreen for expansionism. As an official wrote, “many Israelis believe sincerely with Dayan that the only hope for peace in the area is to convince the Arabs that time is not on their side.”46

The second role of the settlements was to improve the Israeli bargaining position once negotiations commenced. Israel mostly settled areas it did not intend to return. Even the

44 For a good overview of the views on the role of settlements in the Labor Party, see Memorandum of conversation, September 3, 1973, Settlements 12-3-93-5, YT. See also Gazit, Trapped Fools, 242. 45 Golda Meir interview, “The Arabs must know that Peace will be achieved if they Relinquish Territory,” Maariv, September 8, 1972, 14. 46 Tel Aviv to Sisco, August 20, 1973, NPSM, NSC Files, CFs – Middle East, 610, NPL.

134 moderate Abba Eban said “Israel hopes to keep those establishments she already has inside her frontiers as these frontiers are recognized the day peace comes.”47 However, the settlement policy was more than a form of annexation. Yisrael Galili, the mastermind behind Israeli settlement policy in the Meir era, hoped if all else failed, existing settlements could be traded for other goods at the bargaining table. As he once explained in Knesset, “I hope the settlements will be a factor which influences the negotiations; and I hope the settlements will be a factor influencing the borders. But there is no contradiction between settlement and negotiation without preconditions.”48 In a more candid moment, Galili is quoted as saying “You will not find in all my writings and sayings that we will not relinquish any settlement. I said, we did not settle in order to leave, I said, we will fight for their existence, but I never said we would not relinquish any settlement.”49 In other words, there was an element of bluffing involved in Israeli settlement construction policy. Building signalled an intention to maintain certain territories in negotiations.

However, if the Arab states stood their ground at the negotiation table, the Israeli government recognized it might have to evacuate some settlements.

The Israeli leadership did not publicly express a willingness to dismantle settlements. In fact, they signalled public attachment to the strategic areas.50 For example, Meir announced that

“from now on Jews will eternally sit in the Etzion Bloc”, a statement she later confirmed as official Israeli policy.51 The Israeli government had several reasons to bluff and signal exaggerated commitment to “defensible borders.” First and foremost, most Israeli leaders

47 John K. Cooley, “Israel puts down Roots in Arab Soil,” Christian Science Monitor, May 30, 1973, 5-7. 48 Knesset minutes, March 27, 1972, 194-8/K, ISA. 49 Amos Shifris, Israel Galili: a Man of Words and Deeds (Ramat Gan: Yad Tabenkin, 2010), 322-323. 50 Yechiel Admoni, Decade of Discretion: Settlement Policy in the Territories, 1967-77 (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1992), 55; Memorandum of conversation, August 10, 1973, Alignment platform 7022-13/A, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, April 16, 1972, Gazit 5978-2/FM, ISA. 51 N/a, “From now on Jews will Sit for all Eternity in the Etzion Bloc,” Maariv, March 6, 1970, 13; Knesset Staff Writer, “Meir Confirms Jews will remain in Etzion Bloc for all Eternity,” Maariv, April 1, 1970, 3.

135 genuinely hoped that no major settlements would have to be relinquished. Second, the settlements were popular amongst the public and it made little sense politically to discuss the theoretical prospect of abandoning them. Third, too great a willingness to part with Israeli settlement assets would not serve the Israeli bargaining strategy. To increase the odds of retaining settlements in the context of bargaining or improving their bargaining value, it was necessary to signal attachment to the settled territory.

Rhetoric aside, Israeli decision makers could envision a situation wherein settlements would be dismantled or sovereign rights could be transferred to an Arab state. Moshe Dayan told an Israeli radio station that Israel should “aspire to allowing Jews to settle in all territories”, however he could “imagine the land, or parts of the land not belonging to us.”52 The Galili

Document of 1973, which became part of the Alignment Party platform, hinted at an Israeli willingness to evacuate or hand over control of existing settlements. A map was released by the

Labor Party in 1973 signalled that the settled eastern section of the Golan Heights was not seen as part of the future territory of Israel.53

Israel assured the USG that its settlement policy was reversible. Zurhellen of the embassy in Tel Aviv believed the Israeli government wanted a deal with Jordan in which Israel would retain one third of the West Bank and in the rest it would attempt to achieve “open borders allowing free travel back and forth, trade, and probably settlement and residence.”54 Moshe

Raviv of the Foreign Ministry said “the military and (few) civilian Israeli settlements occupied

52 Daniel Dagan, “Moshe Dayan: I am not one of those who Demand the Whole Land of Israel,” Maariv, May 24, 1973, 3. 53 Yigal Kipnis, The Golan Heights: Political History, Settlement and Geography since 1949 (London; Routledge, 2013), 147. 54 Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, February 13, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 17.

136 territories would not prove any obstacle to peace…inhabitants would simply be moved.”55 Israel must have expected that the message would be received by the Arabs. After all, strategy called for leaving the door slightly ajar, so that the Arab states would negotiate. In summary, settlements were indeed established almost exclusively in areas which Israel preferred to keep.

However, they were not built with an absolute certainty that they would not be evacuated or that they might remain under the sovereignty of one of the Arab states under the terms of a permanent settlement.

To utilize its new territorial strategy and signal intentions to its Arab neighbors, GOI abandoned its policy of obfuscation and publicized settlement construction.56 As part of the abandonment of obfuscation, eight of the 11 NAHAL outposts were civilianized.57 In May 1972,

Dayan announced that Israel had established 39 settlements of which 20 were civilian in nature.58

The key decision-makers became increasingly outspoken as to the goals of their construction policy. Galili, father of the obfuscation policy, explained that “avoiding settlement will be interpreted as weakness and embarrassment regarding the rights of Israel to hang on to the territories.”59 In other words, the publicity surrounding civilian settlement efforts was designed to send a message.

Another indication of the signalling function of the settlements was the lack of investment in development. Everything about the enterprise hinted at impermanence. A World

Zionist Organization (WZO) document from 1973 reveals the pathetic state of most settlements.

Only two settlements had more than 300 residents and more than half of the settlements had a

55 Mark to Atherton, January 13, 1971, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/4, USNA. 56 Yishai, Land or Peace, 44-46. 57 Galili to Meir, March 15, 1971, 6495-11/C, ISA. 58 Knesset Staff Writer, “Dayan: 39 Points Established in the Territories,” Davar, May 17, 1972, 2. 59 N/a, “It is necessary to establish a rural and urban presence – in the territories,” Maariv, May 8, 1969, 2.

137 third of that number.60 Minister of Transportation Gad Yaacobi noted that the number of denizens in most notable settlements “is less than the population increase in one minor borough of Tel Aviv in that same period.”61 There was also a lack of enthusiasm for spending significant funds in the occupied territories.62 Hesitation to pour funds into the settlements was likely related to uncertainty of their future.

Ronald Ranta claims that one of the major reasons the settlements were underdeveloped was fear of “drawing the ire of the US.”63 However, during the Meir years there was almost no pressure by the United States to curtail settlement activity. Indeed, foreign policy considerations take on less importance under Meir than before. After having some influence on settlement policy in the Eshkol years, the Foreign Ministry was shut out of decision making. It was given directives on Israeli territorial positions and without being consulted. Rabin, an employee of the

Ministry, complained they were preoccupied with “diplomatic niceties.”64 There also seems to have been a conscious attempt by some of the ministers to keep Foreign Minister Abba Eban out of the loop. Eban’s attempt to join the Settlement Committee, which was the most powerful forum in shaping Israeli settlement policy, was almost scuttled by other ministers who were worried Eban would operate as a “kashrut observer” and impede settlement construction.65

Another indication that the U.S. did not constrain Meir’s settlement policy, was the significant number of new settlements established in the Meir years. While roughly 24

60 This document does not include Kiryt Arba which was under the purview of the Ministry of Construction. However it was included in the calculation above. WZO, February 19, 1973, Settlements 1973 15-46-76-4, YT. 61 Memorandum of conversation, September 3, 1973, Settlements 12-3-93-5, YT. 62 Galili to Meir. June 29, 1970, Settlements 6495-11/C, ISA. 63 Ranta, Political Decision Making, 142. While this chapter focuses on the Rabin years, Ranta stretches the influence of American scrutiny on settlement decision-making all the way back to 1970. 64 Diplomatic Staff Writer, “Questionnaire to Eban following Rabin’s criticism on the Foreign Ministry,” Maariv, May 16, 1972, 2. 65 Staff Writer, “Peres and Warhatig opposed Eban joining the ‘Settlement Committee,” Maariv, May 12, 1972, 1.

138 settlements had either existed or been planned previously to Meir coming to power, by February

1973 Israel admitted to the existence of 40 settlements in the occupied territories. Constructed with increased fanfare.66 If anything, the Meir government tried to signal a more expansionist territorial and settlement policy than it practiced. It seems that the major goal of Israeli policy was to “plant the flag” in specific spots to garner leverage at the bargaining table. Development was kept to a minimum so that construction would be reversible.

The strategic institutional and bureaucratic changes which occurred in the Meir era reflect the evolving strategic role of settlements. Israeli settlement policy during the Eshkol years lacked a regular and authoritative decision-making forum. Up to 1970, the authority for settlement decision making was under the purview of the Ministerial Committee for the Territories. This committee included representatives of different ministries and served as an arena for competition between decision-makers. 67 In addition, agricultural settlements were under the purview of the

WZO Settlement division, while urban and industrial planning required the involvement of the

Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The situation was simplified through the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee in January

1970. The new organ was given the competence to authorize all new settlements. The committee included members of cabinet and representatives of the Jewish Agency, WZO and the IDF.68 The intention was that no settlement would be approved outside the committee.69

Aside from its institutional authority, the Settlement Committee also garnered a great deal of its authority and power from the personal authority of its chairman, Yisrael Galili. The

66 Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 203-206. 67 Pedatzur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 160-176. 68 William Harris, Taking Root: Israeli Settlement in the West Bank, the Golan and Gaza-Sinai, 1967-1980 (New York: Research Studies Press, 1980), 46-48. 69 Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 116.

139 minister was noted for his influence on Meir, due to their longstanding relationship based on mutual respect and trust.70 The committee was initially headed by Allon but he was replaced by

Galili after four months. The new chairman increased the influence and authority of the body.71

This was partially due to his position as the closest advisor to Prime Minister Meir and partially because of his organizational skills and command of the material. Galili’s domination of the committee was absolute, and the discussion and decisions were predetermined by its chairman.72

Starting in 1970, the government no longer implemented a confused policy based on compromise between decision-makers. Instead, it implemented a streamlined settlement policy under the purview of one decision-maker who enjoyed the full confidence and support of the Prime

Minister. This policy was fully consistent with the ill-fated territorial policy of the Meir government.

The Environment: The Strategic Balance during the Rogers Initiatives Period (January

1969-September 1970)

The War of Attrition: Israeli Strategic Utility Decreases

Israeli strategic utility to the United State remained static throughout the Johnson era and into the early days of the Nixon administration. Israel was the strongest military power in the region. A

CIA report stated that “Israel emerged from the war with a greatly enhanced military superiority

70 Shifris, Israel Galili, 260-261. 71 Hagi Huberman, Roots in the Sand: The Story of Jewish Settlement in the Gaza Strip (Jerusalem: Midrashat Netzarim, 2005), 30; Galili, March 13, 1972, Settlements 6495-11/C, ISA. 72 Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 73-75; Medzini, Proud Jewess, 383-384.

140 over its Arab neighbors.”73 The status quo shifted briefly but significantly in the 1969-1970 period. The War of Attrition broke out in March 1969 and within a few months it became clear that Israel was unable to gain the upper hand. The USSR became involved as an increasing number of Soviet pilots, advisors and anti-air crews were deployed to Egypt. Israel lost a surprisingly high number of planes to anti-air missiles and was unable to prevent repeated raids into Sinai by Egyptian forces.74

The War of Attrition temporarily diminished Israeli strategic utility to the United States, in two mutually reinforcing ways. First, the Israeli inability to gain the upper hand in the war eroded confidence in its military capabilities. Secretary of State Rogers noted that “Soviet presence has reduced the Israeli qualitative superiority, which in turn connotes a new Arab-

Soviet ability to exhaust the Israelis through attrition.”75 Israeli military superiority over Egypt was still assumed but even limited Soviet involvement altered the strategic picture.

Second, the ongoing conflict threatened to involve the Nixon administration in confrontation with the USSR at a time when its energies and resources were consumed by the

Vietnam War. On January 31, 1970, the U.S. received a threat from Soviet Premier Alexei

Kosygin that “if Israel continues its adventurism to bomb the territory of the U.A.R and of other

Arab states, the Soviet Union will be forced to see to it that the Arab states have means at their disposal, with the help of which a due rebuff to the arrogant aggressor could be made.”76 This

73 Special National Intelligence Estimate, August 10, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 414. 74 Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 145-159. 75 Memorandum from Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, June 9, 1970, FRUS XXIII, doc. 123. 76 Nixon, RN, 593.

141 was not a threat of imminent war but was nonetheless an indication that Israeli policy was endangering détente.

Direct clashes between Israeli and Soviet forces exacerbated great power tensions in an area of low priority to the administration. Indeed, as a response to increasing Soviet involvement,

Rogers announced that an Israeli request for more aircraft had not been approved pending further developments.77 The Nixon administration distanced itself from the Israeli position as the USSR deepened its involvement. Israel significantly hampered the USG strategy of détente and complicated its position in the region. It is fair to say, overall Israeli utility to the U.S. decreased during the War of Attrition.

Four-Power and Two-Power Talks: The Primacy of Détente

Though never fully trusted by the President, Secretary of State William Rogers and the State

Department were given primacy in the shaping Middle East policy in the first two years of the administration. Nixon believed the conflict was not ripe for resolution and therefore preferred to hand the matter over to the bureaucracy. Indeed, there was much to lose and little to gain by getting heavily involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. King Hussein was still incapable of negotiating seriously without involving Nasser in the process.78 Meanwhile, Egypt demanded that any deal between Jordan and Israel be dependent on GOI allowing all Palestinian refugees from the 1948 War to return and the full internationalization of Jerusalem.79 These were terms

Israel was unwilling to consider. Evolving Israeli territorial positions also rendered a permanent

77 Yaacov Bar Siman Tov, Israel, the Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1987), 168-172. 78 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 85. 79 Meeting minutes, January 23, 1969, 7052-12/A, ISA.

142 settlement difficult to attain. As mentioned previously, on October 30, 1968, GOI rescinded the earlier acceptance of the international borders with Egypt and Syria as the basis for future peace and now demanded that Gaza and Sharm El-Sheikh remain under Israeli control, along with a strip of land guaranteeing territorial contiguity with the international border between Israel and

Egypt.80 It was difficult to imagine how these terms could be reconciled successfully. The logjam seemed irresolvable.

A secondary, but influential, factor was Nixon’s lingering distrust of Kissinger and a fear that he might be ineffective in negotiating with Arab states due to his Jewish faith. In his memoirs, Nixon explained he made the decision to sideline the National Security Advisor “partly because I felt that Kissinger’s Jewish background would put him at a disadvantage during the delicate initial negotiations.”81 In addition, the Arab-Israeli conflict was at the time considered to be a peripheral theater of the Cold War. This meant that the Nixon administration had little energy and prestige to invest in promoting a settlement to the Middle East conflict.82

The early stages of Nixon’s policy in the Middle East were aimed primarily at the development and maintenance of détente rather than a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The

U.S. pursued talks with the USSR on resolving the conflict through both a two-power and a four- power track, despite having very little confidence that either track would produce results.83 Israel resisted the incorporation of both the USSR and France into the process of negotiations, as both states were fiercely distrusted by GOI. Since talks remained abstract and geared towards the

80 Israeli Cabinet, October 31, 1968, 15/46/39/2, YT; Shimoni to London, November 1, 1968, Mordechai Gazit 5978- 2/FM, ISA. 81 Nixon, RN, 591. 82 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 168-169; Shalom & Vanetik, Nixon Administration, 29; Spiegel, Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 167-168. 83 Kissinger to Agnew, December 8, 1969, NPSM, National Security Council Meetings, H-025, NPL; Minutes of a National Security Meeting, February 4, 1969, FRUS XXIII, doc. 5.

143 maintenance of détente, there was little pressure on Israel in these early stages of multilateral diplomacy. Ambassador Rabin noted that “in the current situation the United States does not come to us with actual demands.”84

With little impetus to alter its policy towards the specifics of a peace agreement which it did not believe was attainable, the early territorial policy of the Nixon administration was identical to that of the Johnson administration. An early policy paper predicted that a most likely territorial resolution to the conflict would include Israel withdrawing “to the international boundary with Egypt, and there must be a special arrangement for Gaza; in the case of Jordan, it means Israeli evacuation of the West Bank except for (a) the minor border rectifications that the two parties may agree upon, and (b) Jerusalem which is a special problem.” It added that for a settlement to be effective, there should be “no Israeli garrisons or settlements in the West

Bank.”85 However, with no agreement on the modalities of a permanent settlement, such as whether to hold direct negotiations, the question of settlements was largely theoretical.

The Environment: The Domestic Political Situation

The Labor Party continued to dominate settlement decision-making without taking coalition partners into account. In the 1969 elections, the large Labor Party bloc won 56 seats. Along with its Arab satellite parties, Meir and her party controlled 60 seats. A large coalition was established

84 Rabin to Meir, June 28, 1969, 7412-3/A, ISA. 85 Paper prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia, February 20, 1969, FRUS XXIII, doc. 8.

144 again, including GAHAL, the NRP, the Independent Liberals and other parties reaching 102 members of Knesset overall.86

The right-wing elements in the coalition were more vocal than during the Eshkol years.

The NRP had begun its transition from a moderate party to a more fundamentalist list. Yehuda

Ben-Meir, one of their members, held extreme views and threatened that if a decision was made to evacuate the West Bank the party would leave the coalition.87 However, the other members remained moderate. GAHAL insisted that if it joined the government, the coalition guidelines would include a specific commitment to increase settlement throughout the occupied territories, a measure which was resisted by Meir who still wished to maintain limits over settlement policy.88 The right-wing party left the coalition over Israeli acceptance of the ceasefire with

Egypt to end the War of Attrition. Begin claimed that by accepting the ceasefire proposal, Israel was de facto accepting withdrawal from all occupied territories including the West Bank.89

However, this did little to destabilize the government as Meir remained in control of a 76-seat coalition.

The 1969-1973 period was a nadir in the influence of pro-settlement advocates. The government enforced its security oriented settlement map and dismantled wild-cat settlements outside strategically important areas.90 In one case, tents set up by would be settlers near

86 Staff member, “Yesterday at 9 Meir announced to President Shazar: I have successfully formed a wide government,” Maariv, December 12, 1969, 3. 87 M. Shmaryahu, “G. Meir’s answer will allow the NRP to vote with the government,” Maariv, March 17, 1971, 1. 88 M. Shmaryahu, “GACHAL demand for a settlement clause may exacerbate rift with MAPAM,” Maariv, November 18, 1969, 1. 89 Kieval, Party Politics in Israel, 58. 90 Tzvi Lavi, “Settlement by 30 youngsters prevented in Grizim Mountain and near Ramallah,” Maariv, June 24, 1969, 3; Bahagon to Meir, October 29, 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA; Yosef Tzuriel, “15 youngsters evacuated forcefully when attempting to settle near Jerusalem,” Maariv, February 18, 1970, 7; Menahem Shmuel, “40 youngsters wishing to settle in ‘Mavo Schechem’ – evacuated by the government,” Maariv, May 28, 1970, 3; Yosef Tzuriel, “100 youngsters were about to settle on a hill near Schechem early in the afternoon, Maariv, September 7, 1970, 4.

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Bethlehem were burned by the police.91 No settlements were set up in contravention to the policies of the Labor Party. The influence of pro-settlement advocates in this period was minimal. The debate over the future of the occupied territories remained an internal affair of the

Labor Party.92

In the United State, Nixon took special pride in a lack of dependence on the Jewish vote.93 In a memo to Rogers, the President stressed that “under no circumstances will domestic political considerations have any bearing on the decisions I make with regard to the Mideast.”

Rather the only considerations were “the security interests of the United States.”94 The American

Jewish community did get involved in opposing the Rogers Plan when it was issued (see below).

However, the plan was defeated because Israel, Egypt and elements in the U.S. government opposed it.95

The settlements had yet to become a major issue for American Jews. However, the first signs of American Jewish dissent towards Israeli policy were already apparent. In May 1973, a petition was circulated protesting the Israeli policy of constructing settlements in the occupied territories. It was signed by over 300 individuals, mostly American Jews, many of whom were members of Zionist organizations.96 This hinted at a lack of unanimity on the issue. Ultimately however, the settlements were a non-issue in the United States at that time.

91 Yosef Tzuriel, “Tents of settlers near Batir set on fire,” Maariv, August 26, 1970, 9. 92 Beilin, Price of Unity; Ranta, Political Decision-Making, 121-138. 93 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 113-114; Saphire, Before the Fall, 564-566. 94 Nixon to Rogers, February 22, 1969, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, NSSM, H-126, NPL. 95 95 Avidar to Bitan, December 23, 1969, 7401-1/A, ISA; Rabin to Eban, December 29, 1969 a, 7401-1/A, ISA.; Rabin to Eban, December 29, 1969 b, 7401-1/A, ISA. 96 Petition, May 17, 1973, 6467-7/C, ISA.

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Multi-Leveled Interaction

The First Rogers Plan: A Territorial Plan Close to the Egyptian Position

The reduced strategic utility of Israel to the USG during the War of Attrition corresponded with the most significant attempt to dictate terms to Israel since the 1967 War. In December 1969,

Secretary Rogers gave a speech laying out principles pertaining to the attainment of a permanent settlement to the conflict between Israel and Egypt. These principles were known as the “Rogers

Plan.” He announced that the U.S. intended to play a “direct role” in promoting a resolution to the conflict. The Secretary of State ruled out major changes in the international boundary and determined that changes “should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security. We do not support expansionism.”97

The Rogers Plan envisioned an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in return for a peace agreement. The speech stated specifically that “secure borders will be established at the international frontier that existed between Egypt and Palestine at the time of the British mandate.” Demilitarized zones were to be established and free transit for Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal guaranteed.98 A parallel proposal for a settlement between

Israel and Jordan, named the “Yost Plan” after the US ambassador to the UN that same month.

The proposal called for the establishment of borders that would “approximate” the pre-war borders but with room for modifications in accordance with “administrative or economic convenience.”99 Notably the plan did not include reference to Israeli settlement activity.

97 Editorial note, FRUS XXIII, doc. 73. 98 Rogers speech, December 9, 1969, 9357-8/FM, ISA. 99 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 91; Shalom & Vanetik, Nixon Administration, 57-58.

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It was a territorial approach close to the demands of the Arab states and one which did not take the concept of “defensible borders” into account. Both plans were undermined by the lukewarm support received from the President and opposition on the part of Kissinger. In an

NSC meeting the day after Rogers presented his plan, the NSA attacked the principles behind the plan. The President said dejectedly that “anything that we do will fail.”100 According to

Kissinger, Nixon undermined the plans presented by the State Department by assuring Meir through back channels that the White House would not press Israel over the proposal.101

The plan was rejected by both Israel and Egypt and then the Soviet Union. Jordan showed some interest but was forced to reject once Egyptian opposition was apparent.102 Israel rejected the Rogers Plan due to objections to the proposed boundaries. Regarding Sinai, Israel was concerned that by delineating the border, the Rogers Plan hampered Israel’s negotiating position particularly vis-à-vis Sharm el-Sheikh.103 Golda Meir explained that “any Israeli government that would adopt and implement such a plan would be betraying its country.”104 Though the Rogers

Plan remained the official territorial policy of the USG, the President did not press it.105

The Second Rogers Plan: Stop Shooting and Start Talking

During May and June 1970, the State Department worked to end the War of Attrition. The initiative was described by Rogers as an attempt to get the sides to “stop shooting and start

100 Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, December 10, 1969, FRUS XXIII, doc. 74; Shalom & Vanetik, Nixon Administration, 59-60. 101 Kissinger, White House Years, 376. 102 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 91; Shalom & Vanetik, Nixon Administration, 68. 103 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, December 18, 1969, FRUS XXIII, doc. 77. 104 Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 158. 105 Letter from President Nixon to King Hussein of Jordan, June 2, 1971, FRUS XXIII, doc. 236.

148 talking.” It was notable for its result, cutting the Soviet Union out and allowing the U.S. to take center stage as the sole mediator between Israel and Egypt.106 The initiative involved not only a cessation of hostilities for 90 days, but also a return to the Jarring talks and implicit recognition of the Egyptian interpretation of Resolution 242.107 Prime Minister Meir initially rejected the terms. She was persuaded by receiving guarantees that Israel would not be pressed into accepting the Egyptian interpretation of Resolution 242 or the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel. A communique from Nixon to Meir further assured GOI that “no Israeli soldier should be withdrawn from the present lines until a binding contractual peace agreement satisfactory to you has been achieved.” The Israeli cabinet officially adopted the ceasefire on August 4, 1970, ending the War of Attrition.108

In January 1971, the Jordanian and Egyptian governments sent a letter to UN Secretary

General U Thant charging Israel with illegal settlement construction in the occupied territories.

The letter called on the international community to put an end to the phenomenon.109 The more stringent Arab position inspired some in the NEA staff to toy with the idea of linking the continuation of the ceasefire with an Israeli commitment to freeze settlement construction. The

State Department believed that the U.S. could not inject this idea into the conversation as it would constitute outside interference in the Jarring mission. The embassy in Amman suggested that Jordan pursue the idea instead.110

106 David Korn, Stalemate: The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967–1970 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 238. 107 Shalom & Vanetik, Nixon Administration, 88-90; Ibid., 246. 108 Shalom & Vanetik, Nixon Administration, 101-104. 109 Tekoah to Gazit, January 14, 1971, 7404-5/A, ISA. 110 Stackhouse to Amman, January 21, 1971, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/26, USNA.

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The Jordanian government proposed that Jarring take the idea to GOI. The suggestion was immediately dismissed by Yosef Tekoah, the Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, as an attempt to “stifle the proper functioning of society, progress and development.” Tekoah suggested that instead talks focus on the “major elements of peace.” Jarring, as he often did, immediately backed down.111 It seems the initiative to include settlements in a deal to renew the ceasefire ended there. This was a rare attempt by the Arab states to bring settlements into the negotiations, however it was half hearted and ineffective. It is important to note that U.S. officials did not discourage the notion of the Arab states emphasizing the problem as a major issue. It simply wished to avoid the consequences of raising the issue in the context of bilateral relations.

Settlements in the Occupied Territories during the Period of the Rogers Initiatives

The 1969 Alignment Party Platform: Putting the Oral Law into Writing

In the early days of Meir’s tenure, the Labor Party was troubled by the threat that Dayan would leave the party. The Defense Minister tended to exploit this fear to get his way, by leveraging his popularity amongst the public.112 Indeed, there was some trepidation amongst the Alignment leadership that Dayan would join forces with the right-wing GAHAL party to run in the 1969

Israeli elections. This was a potent threat, since according to one poll Dayan would garner 31% of the vote if he ran independently.113

111 Tekoah to Eban, January 26, 1971, 7404-5/A, ISA. 112 Moshe Dayan, Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronoth, 1976), 558. 113 N/a, “Public opinion poll preceding elections: 31% would vote for Dayan if he left Labor,” Maariv, June 24, 1969, 8.

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Dayan’s threat had implications for the territorial policy of the party. As explained previously, the settlement plan supported by the Defense Minister was based on construction along the mountains at the center of the West Bank. Since the focus was on the center of the territory and forces were needed to guard the border, Dayan could not envision a territorial compromise and believed Israel should maintain the West Bank in its entirety. In addition, his sense of Jewish history and biblical geography engendered a deeper emotional attachment to the area than most

Labor Party politicians. For these reasons, Dayan pushed for greater integration of the West Bank and its possible annexation. In the run up to the elections, Dayan insisted that the emerging consensus on redefined borders, now referred to as the “oral law”, should be included in the

Alignment Party platform. The attempt was successful and the formula was adopted by the party.114

The Defense Minister also made his continued presence in the party contingent on the inclusion of a plank on settlements in the platform. Dayan’s suggested phrasing called for the government to “hasten the establishment of security outposts and permanent settlements. The government, in its discussions and decisions on settlement, whether rural or urban, will be guided by security considerations and the considerations of national development.”115 The formulation was a departure from the existing policy in that it specifically referenced permanent settlements and urban settlements, when in the past the official policy stated that settlements were to be mostly military and rural. This expansive formula was approved after a long internal debate and published as the official policy of the Alignment Party.116 It is important to note that Dayan did not challenge

114 M. Shmaryahu, “Full agreement between former RAFI faction and the Alignment, Maariv, August 17, 1969, 1; Memorandum of conversation, May 12, 1969, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA; Memorandum of conversation, August 12, 1969, 59/A-1/5632/19, USNA. 115 Alignment Party Platform, August 14, 1969, Labor platform 15-46-39-2, YT. 116 Labor Party, October 1969, Labor platform 15-46-39-2, YT; Ranta, Political Decision Making, 88-91.

151 the Labor Party position on the settlement map itself, rather he wished to make the existing map more public and to build urban settlements to imply permanence.

The “oral law” guided settlement construction in theory and in practice. Meir opposed settlement construction outside the confines of the “oral law.” As Abba Eba wrote of her, “she was not a romantic territorialist.”117 Instead, her territorial vision was based on maintaining Israel as a

Jewish and democratic state. Therefore, while espousing the “defensible borders” doctrine, she opposed the annexation of the West Bank.118 In an interview for Le Monde, the Prime Minister said, “when we establish the map of the new borders of Israel one of our main considerations will be the concern, not to include too large a number of Arabs in the framework of a permanent settlement.”119

Correspondingly, efforts by settler groups to encourage settlement near Arab population centers in Nablus and Ramallah were opposed by Meir. Settlements established outside the confines of the desired map were prevented or dismantled.120 She once stated, referring to ‘wildcat’ settlements, that “we justifiably broke the rules under the British mandate…but I see no glory in those that would wish to break the laws of Israel.”121 The government received a significant number of letters from would-be settlers keen on establishing settlements outside the agreed area.

Invariably, the hopeful activists were kept waiting for a significant amount of time before negative answers were given.122

117 Abba Eban, Personal Witness: Israel through my Eyes (New York: Putnam, 1992), 478. 118 Shlaim, Iron Wall, 285. 119 Gil Caesari, “When we draw final borders for Israel, we will make sure not to include too many Arabs,” Maariv, October 15, 1971, 3. 120 See footnote 90. 121 Yehosha Bitzur, “G. Meir declares that the government itself will establish new settlements,” Maariv, July 9, 1969, 4. 122 Brock to Meir, July 3, 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA; Katzover to Meir, March 1968, 6495-11/C, ISA; Brock to Meir, April 11, 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA; Levinger to Meir, April 13, 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA; Simmons to Meir, April 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA; Hebron settlers to Meir, April 27, 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA; 01 Katzover to Yaffe, June 2, 1969, 6495- 11/C, ISA; Levinger to Meir, August 28, 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA; Hebron settlers to Meir, September 4, 1969, 6495-

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The principles of the “oral law” were not hidden from the USG, since the platform was a public document. Argov told Atherton that “we do not expect the U.S. to approve of this policy, but we do demand that they refrain from disturbing us in our efforts towards obtaining new and secure borders.”123 The CIA noted that in the new Alignment Party platform “much is made of the need for setting up permanent settlements, and incorporation is clearly—although not explicitly—the goal.”124 However, no action was taken to influence the debate. The U.S. did not consider curtailing Israeli construction to be a priority.

Kiryat Arba: Growing from a Bad Seed

The emerging Jewish settlement in Hebron was in limbo after the death of Eshkol. Decisions were made slowly. On April 30, 1969, the government committee for the Etzion Bloc and

Hebron decided to develop an urban settlement near the city of Hebron.125 However, little was done. After all, the decision to establish an urban center was a departure from the existing policy of agricultural settlement and avoiding settlement near major Arab population centers.126

Furthermore, the government did not see Kiryat Arba as a major priority and Gaili was hesitant to spend too great a portion of the settlement budget on the area. Sluggish development was related to the fact that settlement near Hebron did not contribute significantly to the establishment of “defensible borders.”127

11/C, ISA; Shilo to Brock, September 23, 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA; Hillel to Eban, October 27, 1969, 4634-2/FM, ISA; Bahagon to Meir, October 29, 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA; Kiryat Arba committee to Meir, February 2, 1972, 6501-27/C, ISA. 123 Argov to Bitan, December 26, 1969, 7401-1/A, ISA. 124 CIA, August 19, 1969, NPSM, President’s Daily Briefing, 6, NPL. 125 Cabinet suggestion, May 14, 1969, 7900-26/A, ISA. 126 Peter Demant, Ploughshares into Swords: Israeli Settlement Policy in the Occupied Territories, 1967-77 (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam PhD Dissertation, 1988), 224. 127 Ranata, Political Decision Making, 70; Ibid., 225.

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An organized public campaign emerged, including letters, demonstrations and conventions organized by highly motivated individuals in the Hebron settler community, such as

Moshe Levinger and Benny Katzover.128 The National Union of Israeli Students wrote Meir, asking her to “put an end to the humiliating situation to which the Hebron settlers have been subjected.”129 The amount of pressure generated by the well-organized Kiryat Arba settlers dwarfed the efforts of all other settler groups and was increasingly difficult for GOI to ignore.

Finally, on March 9, 1970, Allon announced that the government had agreed to build a neighborhood near Hebron.130

U.S. Ambassador to Israel Walworth Barbour presented GOI with a letter stating that

Israel should “weigh carefully” the establishment of settlements such as the one in Hebron. It continued that the State Department would make a public pronouncement stating that they “have strong reservations” about further settlement construction if “enquired by the press on the subject.”131 Eban responded that Israel was allowing 250 families to settle in Hebron but had no intention of creating a new neighborhood near the city. According to the Maariv newspaper, this dishonest explanation “calmed” the USG.132 However, the State Department remained uneasy regarding construction in Hebron and explained to their Israeli counterparts that their complaints

128 See for a few examples: Katzover to Meir, March 1968, 6495-11/C, ISA; Brock to Meir, April 11, 1969, 6495- 11/C, ISA; Levinger to Meir, April 13, 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA; Simmons to Meir, April 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA; Hebron settlers to Meir, April 27, 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA; Katzover to Yaffe, June 2, 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA; Hebron settlers to Meir, July 23, 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA; Hebron settlers to Bentov, August 1969, 5314-7/C, ISA; Meir to Levinger, October 6, 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA. 129 Amirav to Meir, January 16, 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA. 130 Reuters story, “American spokesman: the U.S. is against settlement in the occupied territories,” Maariv, March 12, 1970, 1. 131 Eliztur to Rabin, April 14, 1970, 9341-3/FM, ISA. 132 Yossef Harif, “The U.S. asked for clarifications regarding settlement in Hebron,” Maariv, May 20, 1970, 1.

154 were “based on real concern and was not simply for the record. USG therefore requires clear statement of intentions.”133

The NEA staff believed that not enough had been done to prevent the construction of

Kiryat Arba. An internal memo noted that “our public comments have been much less explicit and not widely noticed.” and therefore a tougher stand should be taken in future. He argued the

Arabs states would “appreciate a more forthright U.S. public position.” The General Consul in

Jerusalem, Stephen J. Campbell protested the tendency of the Rogers led State Department to focus on generalities and modalities in the Arab-Israeli peace process. He argued that “if we are to maintain conditions in which a peaceful settlement might be negotiated, it is the specific acts such as those cited above which must be halted and if possible negated.” However, the conclusion was that the U.S. should not “accuse Israel of violating international law or of following a policy that prejudices a settlement.”134 A later NEA memo recommended that talks with Rabin would be the appropriate forum to bring up Kiryat Abba issue, despite an imminent visit by the higher-ranking Eban.135 In other words, despite rhetoric indicating the importance of the issue, the NEA did not believe the issue was worthy of a direct confrontation with Israel or of high-level talks.

Not surprisingly, the muddled response of the State Department could not compete with the single-minded pressure of the Hebron settlers. Plans for the development of Kiryat Arba went ahead. However, development was bogged down by bureaucratic inefficiencies and a general lack of enthusiasm in the cabinet. When plans for the settlement were approved, it was discovered that no specific funds had been allocated. Minister of Housing Ze'ev Sherf

133 Elitzur to Rabin, June 4, 1970, 7412-6/A, ISA. 134 Boyd to Atherton, June 19, 1970, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA. 135 NEA to Sisco, November 10, 1970, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA.

155 complained that the decision was made under the assumption that “the Housing Ministry has a budget for that. The assumption is incorrect. We do not have a single Lira.” Lack of funding led to further delays.136

Delays were met with fierce settler advocacy. A large advert was taken out in a few daily newspapers, calling on the government to allow the construction of 1000 housing units near

Hebron.137 The Movement for the Land of Israel, organized a public campaign to encourage construction. An advert appeared in the daily press, signed by notable artists, academics and lawyers, encouraging the government to build the neighborhood.138 The government was swayed but gave way grudgingly. In July GOI announced that a neighborhood would be built near the

Cave of the Patriarchs which would house 250 families, a far lower figure than the one demanded by the settlers.139

Overall, the GOI showed a lack of enthusiasm towards the Kiryat Arba project, which did not match its territorial priorities. The sort of large irreversible, urban and expensive settlement the advocates called for was not part of its policy. The departure from GOI policy of building rural settlements far from Arab population centers was executed under pressure from a determined and well-organized settler pressure group organized by the irrepressible Moshe

Levinger. The Meir government complied for two reasons. First, there was no countervailing pressure of note from the United States. Second, its disapproval was based on vague principles rather than deep conviction.

136 Memorandum of conversation, February 8, 1970, 7900-26/A, ISA. 137 Huberman, Against all Odds, 58. 138 Maariv, March 17; June 2, 19 1970. 139 Yosef Tzuriel, “Next week the construction of new apartments in Hebron will commence,” Maariv, July 7, 1970, 1.

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The Golan Heights: Publicity and Underdevelopment

The USG evinced little interest in the fate of the Golan Heights in the early years of the Nixon administration. As Richard Parker, an NEA staff member put it, “we see no purpose in discussing arrangements regarding this area as long as Syria rejects the Security Council resolution.”140 Even in the case of a full peace agreement with Syria, neither GOI nor the USG advised a withdrawal from the peaks overlooking the Galilee. In discussions between Meir and

Secretary Rogers, Meir said “we will never withdraw from Golan.” Rogers replied, “we are with you on this.”141 The American media was generally sympathetic to the Israeli position as well. A

Washington Post article about the Merom Golan settlement observed that “Israel is staying. From its point of view, the reasons are obvious and utterly persuasive.”142 The Nixon administration did not feel a burning need to attain concessions in favor of Soviet clients such as Syria. Lack of interest in the Syrian track remained constant in both the period of the Rogers plans and the period of Kissinger’s ascendance.143 In lieu of external pressure, Israel was free to design its settlement policy in the area in accordance with its territorial policy.

In the early years of the Meir government, the Golan Heights contained more settlements than any area in the occupied territories. By the summer of 1972 there were 17 settlements on the

Heights.144 However, each of the settlements was small and the overall Jewish population of the

Heights numbered merely 1,200 in 1971. The beleaguered settlers lived in temporary housing for

140 Parker to Sisco, April 1, 1969, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/15, UNSA. 141 Memorandum of conversation, September 30, 1969, 7404-7/A, ISA. 142 Alfred Friendly, “Israeli Border Farmers Worry Over Syrian Fire,” Washington Post, November 27, 1969, K4. 143 Therefore, unlike in other sections in this chapter based on specific territorial issues, the section on the Golan Heights is not divided into chronological sections. 144 Itinerary for Meir visit to Merom Golan, August 1, 1972, 6503-32/C, ISA.

157 years.145 Some of the major decision makers related to the issue were opposed to granting the settlements in the Golan Heights a permanent character. Gvati, Allon and Galili considered permanent quarters to be a low priority amongst settlement goals.146

Delays in development led to rising disaffection among settlers and bureaucrats in the

Settlement Department. The Jewish Agency representative in charge of regional development resigned in protest of delays and inefficiencies.147 A series of stories appeared in the Israeli press criticizing the Ministry of Housing for failing to provide adequate housing.148 One article described the housing conditions in the settlement of Ramat as worse than “what can be found in the most pathetic poverty stricken neighborhoods in Israel.”149 The Jewish Agency,

Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Housing tried to blame each other for the lack of progress.150 After a torturous process, transition to permanent housing in all settlements was finally completed in 1974.151 It would appear moves towards permanence were made out of concessions to public opinion and settler pressure and not due to strategic considerations.

Despite doing almost nothing to develop existing settlements, more publicity was given to settlement development in the Golan than ever before. In March 1972, the Construction

Ministry announced that five new settlements would be established in the Heights in the following year.152 Two months later Davar, the official paper of the Labor Party, ran a story that one of the military outposts on the Heights, NAHAL Golan, would become civilian and renamed

145 Kipnis, Golan Heights, 145-148. 146 Ibid., 140. 147 Menahem Rahat, “Who is blocking settlement construction in the Golan?”, Maariv, August 25, 1969, 11. 148 Aharon Dolev, “In the Golan is my home – is that so?”, Maariv, June 27, 1969, 12; Aharon Dolev, “Well established markets covet settlement territory,” Maariv, August 8, 1969, 13; Ibid. 149 Dolev, “In the Golan is my home.” 150 Bentov to Meir, September 8, 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA; Meir Shamir to Meir, September 16, 1969, 6495-11/C, ISA. 151 Kipnis, Golan Heights, 145-148. 152 N/a, “Land will be prepared for 5 new settlements in the Golan Heights” Maariv, March 27, 1972, 4; Davar staff writer in the Galilee, "Davar, May 9, 1972, 4.

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Kibbutz . The public ceremony was attended by Minister of Agriculture Haim Gvati and included a concert by Yaffa Yarkoni, one of Israel’s premier recording artists at the time.153 The ceremony commemorating five years since the establishment of Merom Golan included another major recording star and a speech by the Prime Minister.154

The publicity surrounding development in the Golan Heights alongside a hesitance to render permanence to the Israeli presence served the Israeli settlement strategy. Historian Yigal

Kipnis describes this strategy as an attempt to “demonstrate Israel’s intention not to withdraw from the Golan without a peace agreement, and to aid in the struggle against these demands when they would appear – had later been accompanied by the aspiration that the settlements would provide the infrastructure for a possible future peace border of the Golan which would be more advantageous than the international border.”155 However, the hesitancy to provide permanent housing indicates that GOI would have been willing to evacuate some settlements in a peace agreement.

Gaza: The Five Fingers of Counterterrorism

Gaza was not included in the territory slated for return to Egypt in the June 19th cabinet decision.156 Over time a consensus emerged that Gaza should be retained in a peace agreement.

Increasingly combative statements by Israeli officials indicated that Israel had every intention of

153 David Shalev, “NAHAl Golan – a civilian settlement,” Davar, May 8, 1972, 5. 154 Itinerary for Meir visit to Merom Golan, August 1, 1972, Merom Golan 6503-32/C, ISA. 155 Kipnis, Golan Heights, 129. 156 Levavi to Eban, Telegram, June 19, 1967, Foreign Ministry, 5978-2, ISA; Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, June 22 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 314.

159 retaining Gaza.157 A forum including Meir, Eban, Allon and Galili determined in April 1972 that

“in the framework of a peace agreement the Gaza Strip will remain an inseparable part of the

State of Israel.”158 Furthermore, Foreign Ministry officials were instructed to shape Israeli public diplomacy on the basis that Gaza would remain in Israeli hands.159

Alongside plans to integrate the Strip into Israel, a major catalyst for the establishment of settlements in the Strip was a wave of terrorism in the area in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.

The IDF found the Gaza Strip difficult to operate in due to the density of the population and a lack of military facilities therein. The defense establishment formulated a strategic concept of separating Gaza into manageable sections by breaking the continuity of the Arab population.

This was to be done by establishing five blocs of settlement and military bases in the Strip. These blocs were referred to as the “five fingers”, with one each to be constructed at the northernmost and southernmost edge of the Strip and three more cutting the Gaza Strip into sectors which the

IDF would find easier to patrol by building settlements between the sections, thus also restricting terrorist movement and organizations.160

In August 1970, after a meeting at the Prime Minister’s house, it was decided to establish two settlements in the Gaza Strip.161 The first to be located where the settlement of Kfar Darom had stood before evacuation in the 1948 War. A second settlement should be erected in the north of the Strip. 162 The official inauguration ceremony of a new NAHAL outpost in Kfar Darom

157 For an early example see Der Spiegel Interview, July 10, 1967, in in Statements by Arab and Israeli Leaders Relative to the Conflict, July 1967, Papers of LBJ, NSF, 113, JPL. 158 Memorandum of conversation, April 16, 1972, 5978-2/FM, ISA. 159 Galili to Representatives, May 3, 1972, Gaza 15-73-3, YT. 160 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 224-225; Hagi Huberman, Roots in the Sand, 29-30; Yishai, Land or Peace, 44- 46. 161 Memorandum of conversation, August 2, 1970, 15-46-40-1, YT. 162 N/a, August 19, 1970, 15-46-40-1, YT.

160 took place on November 30, 1970.163 The settlement of Netzarim, founded in 1972, was placed between the city of Gaza and the Al-Shati and Jabalia refugee camps. Rehavam Ze'evi,

Commander of the Central Military District, said in the commencement ceremony for Netzarim that the settlement “will be the base for the sword and the sickle. The power of the two will grow alternately. If our neighbors will exhibit wisdom we will sharpen our sickles and if terror increases we will sharpen swords.”164 In March there was an announcement in the press that two new settlements would be established near Khan Yunis. The official Labor Party newspaper noted that the settlement “would initially start as NAHAL outposts but would shortly be transformed into civilian settlements.”165 In Gaza, as elsewhere, the GOI built small and almost insignificant settlements but made sure to publicize construction widely.

The USG did not have a coherent policy on the Gaza Strip and therefore its response was muted. In theory, the Nixon administration preferred that the Gaza Strip be handed over to

Jordan in a permanent settlement, with a land bridge connecting the territory to the mainland.166

Another idea floated by the USG in talks with the USSR referred to a transitional administration in Gaza by the UN until the future of the Strip would be determined by referendum.167 However, an internal NEA memo indicates that the USG might have been willing to accept Israeli annexation of the area if Israel accepted responsibility for the refugees dwelling there.168 The confusion meant that some Israeli officials, including Ambassador Rabin, believed that Israel

163 Hagi Huberman, Roots in the Sand, 8-9. 164 Staff writer in the south, “NAHAL Nestzarim outpost raised in the south of the Strip,” Davar, November 7, 1972, 3. 165 Danny Tzadkoni, “United Kibbutz to found two settlements in the south of the Strip,” Davar, March 22, 1972, 3. 166 Parker, February 24, 1969, Arab-Israel affairs, 59 /A1-5632/21, USNA. 167 Basic Provisions for a Final Settlement in the Middle East, Undated, FRUS XXIII, doc. 291. 168 Matter to Atherton, March 7, 1969, Arab-Israel affairs, 59 /A1-5632/21, USNA.

161 might be able to obtain American support for the retention of Gaza in a permanent settlement.169

This contributed to the emerging Israeli policy of integrating Gaza into Israel.

Jerusalem: The Holy City in the Security Council

One partial exception to the rule of U.S. indifference continued to be the issue of Jerusalem.

Construction in Eastern Jerusalem expanded considerably. The construction of the neighborhood of Armon Hanatziv was announced in March 1969.170 Two months later, a ceremony commemorated the establishment of a new neighborhood in the northeastern part of the city, named Ramat Eshkol, after the recently departed Prime Minister. Golda Meir gave a speech on the occasion, vowing that “never again will there be a barrier in the heart of Jerusalem, the holy city, the capital of Israel.”171 The USG was unwilling to confront the Meir government on the issue in bilateral talks.

The Jordanian government attained minor concessions in the American position towards

Jerusalem by bringing up the issue constantly in talks with USG officials and assuring its high profile on the international agenda. In a meeting with Nixon, Hussein said “Jerusalem is the key to any lasting Arab/Israeli settlement since if this question is solved, we believe all other problems will be quickly resolved.”172 Motions to the UN underpinned the centrality of the issue.

In June-July 1969, the United Nations Security Council held meetings on the city. Israel was accused of moving unilaterally to destroy the possibility of a peace agreement. The U.S. voted

169 Rabin to Bitan, April 3, 1968, 7404-6/A, ISA. 170 N/a, “Planning has begun for a new neighborhood in the Armon Hanatziv area,” Maariv, March 24, 1969, 7. 171 Staff writer in Jerusalem, “Ramat Eshkol opened in Jerusalem,” Maariv, May 15, 1969, 7. 172 Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, February 6, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 14.

162 for the resolution censuring Israeli actions, which passed unanimously, in exchange for abandoning proposed sanctions.173 A letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs Joseph Sisco to Rogers reveals that the major reason the USG wished to vote for the resolution was due to an estimation that “such a vote would be a great morale booster to King Hussein and strengthen his hand.”174 The entire exercise was repeated, with the same result in 1971.175 The policy of the USG was to criticize Israeli actions in Jerusalem publicly, while protecting GOI from any sanctions or consequences to its actions. This became a standard U.S. tactic for seeming to take the Arab side in the UN while neutering resolutions of meaningful repercussions.

Gradual Adoption of the Kissinger Approach (September 1970-October 1973)

Changes in the Environment: The Strategic Setting and U.S. Policy during the Kissinger

Era

The Events of Black September: The Ascendance of Israeli Strategic Utility

The War of Attrition ended in August 1970 with Israel’s military and strategic reputation somewhat shaken. However, it redeemed its strategic utility in the eyes of the Nixon

173 Brown to Nixon, July 3, 1969, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/15, UNSA. 174 Sisco to Rogers, July 3, 1969, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/15, UNSA. 175 Situation room to Kissinger, July 19, 1971, HAK’s Evening notes (June 1971-November 1971) NPSM, NSC Files, Subject Files, 342, NPL; United Nations Security Council 298, September 25 1971, http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/441329A958089EAA852560C4004EE74D (accessed: May 4, 2015).

163 administration. Armed Palestinian militants under the command of the Palestinian Liberation

Organization (PLO) had gained significant power in Jordan following the 1967 war. In

September 1970, King Hussein of Jordan moved to crush the militants. To support the PLO, the pro-Soviet Syrian military invaded Jordan on September 19th. The U.S. government requested that Israel threaten Syria to assist the Hashemite regime. Israel mobilized forces on both the

Syrian and the Jordanian borders. These actions played a role in the Syrian decision to withdraw from Jordan.176 To Nixon and Kissinger this was an example of a regional ally of the U.S. policing its neighborhood and therefore complemented the “Nixon Doctrine.”177 The President was grateful to Israel and passed on a message that “the United States is very lucky to have an ally like Israel”, adding “this will no doubt be taken into account in connection with the other matters.”178 The Israeli ability to act as a regional policeman and protect U.S. allies from Soviet pressure considerably increased its utility in the eyes of the United States.179

Israel found itself in an improved strategic position. A National Security Memorandum from the period estimated that “the present situation – with Nasser removed from the scene, quiet on the Suez Canal front and Fedayeen attacks at an all-time low, U.S. military and economic support moving to Israel’s relative satisfaction, and the U.S. pressing no political demands – is relatively comfortable from Israel’s viewpoint.”180 This meant that Israel was seen to have regained its pre-War of Attrition supremacy.181 Just as important, the fear that Israel would find

176 Ziv Rubinovitz, “Blue and White ‘Black September’: Israel's Role in the Jordan Crisis of 1970,” International History Review, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 2010), 697-699. 177 The Nixon Doctrine, announced on July 25, 1969, was based on the idea that the allies of the United States would be responsible for regional security with the U.S. providing support and a nuclear umbrella rather than direct intervention. See Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, 53-55, 97; Robert Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 178 Rabin to Dinitz, September 23, 1970, 9341-9/FM, ISA. 179 For an argument on the importance of this element in USG perception of Israeli strategic utility, see Abraham Ben-Zvi, The Origins of the Israeli-American Alliance: The Jordanian Factor, (London: Routledge, 2007). 180 National Security Memorandum, October 15, 1970, NPSM, Senior Review Group Meetings, H-048, NPL. 181 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, June 21, 1971, FRUS XXIII, doc. 239.

164 itself trapped in conflict with the USSR had faded. Israel had regained, and possibly surpassed, its strategic utility immediately following the 1967 War.

Not surprisingly, in this period increasingly close strategic ties developed between the

U.S. and Israel.182 A tilt towards Israel was also facilitated by the death of Nasser, who despite the disaster of 1967, was still an icon in the Arab world. His replacement with , who lacked similar cache, weakened the status of Egypt.183 The upshot of the readjustment of the balance of power in the Levant was, as Quandt put it, “U.S.-Israeli relations, which had reached a low-point in mid-1970, were quickly brought to an unprecedented high-level by the Jordan crisis.”184 The rationale behind the policy was, as Nixon wrote to Kissinger “we are for Israel because Israel in our view is the only state in the Middle East which is pro-freedom and an effective opponent to Soviet expansion.”185 The USG continued to possess an inflated sense of

Israeli strategic utility until it was altered by the diplomatic and military reversals Israel experienced in the 1973 War.

In Pursuit of a Partial Settlement between Israel and Egypt: A Failed Partial Settlement

The death of Nasser and the events of “Black September” left the U.S. without a clear track to pursue in peace negotiations. The Hussein government was increasingly unstable. The U.S. considered pursuing a “Palestinian track.” However, the consulate in Jerusalem warned that closer affiliation with Palestinian nationalism would weaken King Hussein without allowing the

USG to “gain any real influence in a divided and confused movement called Palestinianism

182 Ibid., 75-83; Bar Siman Tov, "United States and Israel”, 259-260. 183 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 123. 184 Ibid., 120. 185 Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 180.

165 which we could hardly trust.”186 Therefore, by December the Nixon administration decided to discard the Palestinian option and put a greater emphasis on the Jordanian track. 187 However, the increased salience of Palestinian nationalism meant that a Jordanian track based solely on negotiation with King Hussein was obsolete. A National Security Memorandum estimated that although King Hussein had essentially defeated the Yasser Arafat led Palestinian National

Liberation Movement in Jordan (hereafter known by its Arab acronym FATAH), he was too weak to “commit Jordan to an enforceable settlement with Israel.”188 In the estimation of the administration, neither the Palestinian track nor the Jordanian track offered a tangible prospect of success.

The Egyptian track held more promise. Furthermore, the Egyptian track served Kissinger’s goal of moving Egypt out of the Soviet orbit. However, the differences in position between Israel and Egypt relating to the nature of negotiations, post-settlement relations and borders, remained.

Therefore, the idea of a partial settlement was appealing. Dayan had floated a proposal for an

Israeli withdrawal of troops from the eastern bank of the Suez Canal to neutralize tensions between

Israel and Egypt.189 Sadat provided a counterproposal for a partial withdrawal, linked to the implementation of the Egyptian interpretation of Resolution 242. That meant not only the evacuation of all of Sinai and Gaza, but also the resolution of the Palestinian issue. Israel for its part opposed any link between a partial agreement and a permanent settlement as well as any reference to the Palestinians.190 The two sides could not agree on the extent of the Israeli

186 Campbell to State, October 19, 1970, NPSM, Senior Review Group Meetings, H-048, NPL. 187 See Simen Zernichow and Hilde Henriksen Waage, “The Palestine Option: Nixon, the National Security Council, and the Search for a New Policy, 1970,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2014), 182-209. 188 National Security Memorandum, October 15, 1970, NPSM, Senior Review Group Meetings, H-048, NPL. 189 The details of the ultimately failed initiative are beyond the scope of this study. See Moshe Dayan, Dayan: Story of My Life, 526-529; Quandt, Peace Process, 88-92; Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, 190-218; Shlaim, Iron Wall, 301- 309; Shalom & Vanetik, Nixon Administration, 141-81; Spiegel, Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 203-209. 190 Shalom & Vanetik, Nixon Administration, 157-160.

166 withdrawal, whether Egyptian troops should be stationed on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal or if a partial settlement should be directly linked to a permanent settlement.191 As support for a partial settlement faded in 1972, it was not replaced by any notable initiatives. The Nixon administration did not have appealing options to promote the Arab-Israeli peace process at their disposal.

Kissinger’s Early Approach to the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Diplomacy of Frustration

The failure of the partial settlement approach, saw the National Security Advisor take an increasingly central role in formulating U.S. policy in the Middle East.192 The influence of the

Secretary of State and Foggy Bottom, never that high to begin with, gradually declined. By late

1971, Nixon told Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir that Israeli contacts with the State

Department should only be held to keep up appearances.193 Having marginalized Rogers,

Kissinger began to eclipse the President as well. Starting in late 1972, the NSA became almost solely responsible for formulating USG policy in the region. Nixon was distracted first by the

1972 elections and by mid-1973 he was increasingly incapacitated by the unfolding Watergate scandal. Therefore, even when the President disagreed with the policies pursued by Kissinger, he did not make a substantial effort to alter them.194 The NSA gradually became the main decision- maker in regional policy.

Kissinger’s approach was based on fundamentally different assumptions. The major goal of his policy was to deliver Egypt from the Soviet orbit and into the pro-American camp. His

191 Eban, Personal Witness, 500; Ibid., 173-181; Kissinger, White House Years, 1280-1283. 192 Quandt, Peace Process, 75-86; Shalom & Vanetik, Nixon Administration, 130. 193 Shalom & Vanetik, The Nixon Administration, 185. 194 Ibid., 228-231.

167 strategy, or perhaps merely an optimistic spin on the diplomatic impasse, focused on frustrating

Egypt into altering its policy and orientation. In his memoir, Kissinger explained:

As long as Egypt was in effect a Soviet military base, we could have no incentive to turn on an ally on behalf of a Soviet client. This is why I was always opposed to comprehensive solutions that would be rejected by both parties and that could only serve Soviet needs by either demonstrating our impotence or being turned into a showcase for what could be exacted by Moscow’s pressure. My aim was to reproduce a stalemate until Moscow urged compromise or until, even better, some moderate Arab regime decided that the route to progress was through Washington.195

The NSA was not ready to try and break the impasse for another reason. Kissinger was hesitant to involve the U.S. in direct mediation when chances of success appeared dim. Kissinger briefed Nixon after the 1972 elections that the positions of Egypt and Israel were too far apart.

He believed American pressure would be counterproductive as it “would encourage Sadat to refuse to negotiate a little longer, relying on the U.S. to bail him out.” Rather he suggested “the proper approach to the Arab-Israeli problem is to consolidate Israeli confidence and then to try to move through a series of gradual steps that will provide enough movement for the Egyptians and perhaps the Jordanians without being so extreme as to force Israel into a negative stance.”196 This required more coordination with Israel, to the point where the Meir government possessed a veto on major peace initiatives.197

Not surprisingly, the ascendance of Kissinger’s approach ushered in a honeymoon in

Israel-U.S. relations. The diplomatic correspondent for Yediot Ahronot told an American diplomat that “Israeli government confidence in Nixon was unbounded.”198 Ambassador Rabin quite undiplomatically showed support for Nixon in the elections.199 Noam Kochavi argues

195 Kissinger, White House Years, 1279. 196 Kissinger to Nixon, November 9, 1972, NPSM, NSC Files, CFs – Middle East, 610, NPL. 197 Saunders to Kissinger, November 13, 1972, NPSM, NSC Files, Harold H. Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, 1190, NPL. 198 Memorandum of conversation, August 21, 1972, Arab-Israel affairs, 59 /A1-5632/5, USNA. 199 Noam Kochavi, Nixon and Israel: Forging a Conservative Partnership (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2009), 75.

168 convincingly, that in period leading up to and following the elections saw an unprecedented

“convergence of perspectives” emerge between Israel and the Nixon administration.200

Kissinger’s approach was not all that different from the territorial approach of the GOI.

Both shared an interest in making the Arab states believe that time was not on their side. In an

NSC meeting on December 10, 1969, the National Security Advisor laid out his approach to the territorial problem. “The longer Israel holds its conquered territory, the longer the Soviets cannot deliver what the Arabs want. As the time drags on, the Arabs must begin to conclude that friendship with the Soviet Union is not very helpful.”201 Therefore, the continued stalemate in the peace process was viewed by both USG and GOI as a positive development bringing their rivals closer to alter their outlook in a desirable manner.

The Nixon administration increasingly believed that a militarily strong Israel was necessary to demonstrate to the Arab states, the futility of its reliance on Soviet arms. Therefore, he believed that the US should guarantee long-term Israeli military superiority over its neighbors.202 He also concurred with GOI that Israeli security depended on the geographic makeup of its borders. When reporter Mike Wallace asked the National Security Advisor why

Israel was so worked up about a few miles of territory, Kissinger answered “they have a tough problem that way. They can’t afford to lose one battle when they haven’t got a cushion.”203 In an

NSC meeting, he explained to his colleagues that he understood the Israeli dilemma of being

200 Ibid., 24-27, 75-76. 201 Shalom & Vanetik, Nixon Administration, 59. 202 Memorandum for the Record, June 19, 1970, FRUS XXIII, doc. 124. 203 Kissinger and Wallace Telecon, April 3, 1971, Kissinger Transcripts, Digital National Security Archive (hereafter DNSA).

169 asked to trade land for intangible promises and that he feared that GOI would rather go to war than return to the pre-1967 borders.204

With these proclivities in mind, Kissinger began to look to the Allon Plan as a potential territorial solution.205 He developed a tacit sympathy for the Israeli “defensible borders” goal. In early 1972, Kissinger began to develop a new approach to attaining a permanent settlement. He believed previous attempts to resolve the conflict had failed due to an undue emphasis on a formula of trading peace for withdrawal. Instead, Kissinger proposed that a permanent settlement be based on a trade of Israeli security assets for Arab sovereignty rights. In accordance with this approach, security arrangements and assets could be maintained by Israel in the occupied territories under technical Arab state sovereignty.206 Kissinger’s approach raised the prospect of the maintenance of Israeli defensive positions and settlements remaining under Israeli control, without violating Arab sovereignty.

Throughout 1972, Nixon quietly but consistently supported the new policy. This may have been a result of his hesitance to provoke disagreements with Israel during a Presidential election year.207 By mid-1973, the President expressed serious reservations, but he was increasingly weakened and distracted by the Watergate scandal.208 Therefore, from late 1972 until 1973 the new idea was at the heart of the USG position on resolving the conflict. Indeed, as the evidence recounted below will show, the NSA attempted to influence Jordan and Egypt into accepting both Israeli settlement and military assets, through the separation of security and sovereignty.

204 Memorandum for the Record, May 28, 1970, FRUS XXV, doc. 84. 205 Editorial note on Allon-Kissinger meeting of April 20, 1971. FRUS XXIII, doc. 223. 206 Quandt, Decade of Decisions, 153-154; Kissinger, White House Years, 1290; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 216. 207 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, 275-276, 357. 208 Shalom & Vanetik, Nixon Administration, 228-231.

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Multi-Leveled Interaction: Settlements in the Occupied Territories during the Kissinger

Era

The U.S. Position on Jerusalem: What can be done about a Fait Accompli?

The United States maintained its official position of refusing to recognize territorial changes in

Jerusalem. USG diplomats continued to avoid attending ceremonies and events in East Jerusalem as they had since 1948.209 However, domestic politics made it difficult to maintain the position.

The status of the city as the capital of Israel, a question that had been in dispute for over two decades, became a campaign issue in the 1972 U.S. Presidential elections. Democratic candidates promised that if elected, they would recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and move the

U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. These proposals were included in the Democratic

Party Platform.210 The State Department received letters from several members of Congress urging them to move the embassy post-haste. Some at the embassy in Tel Aviv agreed the move should be carried out.211

Most State Department officials opposed the move out of concern over the adverse effect it would have on American relations with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. David Nale of the United

States Information Agency wrote “many Arabs suspect that there has been a change and that

U.S. now tacitly accepts Israeli actions in Jerusalem.”212 State Department Executive Secretary

Theodore L. Eliot argued that a move to Jerusalem “would have a particularly bad effect on the

209 See for example Campbell to Rogers, September 27, 1971, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/23, UNSA; Campbell to Rogers, October 5, 1971, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/23, UNSA; Campbell to Rogers, October 7, 1971, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/23, UNSA. 210 Saunders to Kissinger, August 8, 1972, NPSM, NSC Files, CFs – Middle East, 609, NPL. 211 Zurhellen to Atherton, January 9, 1973, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/23, UNSA. 212 Nalle to Battle, April 25, 1971, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/23, UNSA.

171 position of King Hussein.” Meanwhile continuation of the status quo would have limited adverse effect on relations with Israel as the presence of the embassy in Tel Aviv has “not been a major irritant in U.S.-Israeli relations in recent years.”213 Therefore, the Nixon administration determined that despite domestic political pressures, the embassy should remain in Tel Aviv for the time being. This piece of political theater around the embassy in Jerusalem would be repeated in the future, always ending with the same result.

Similar concerns were voiced regarding the prospects of USG officials attending the

Israeli Independence Day parade of 1973, which would march through occupied East Jerusalem.

Hume Horan, a State Department official, warned that attendance “could stimulate powerful

Saudi religious reflexes.”214 Ultimately, it was decided that embassy staff should not attend the parade.215 It should be noted that no similar anxiety accompanied the formulation of USG policy regarding Israeli settlement policy, at least at this stage. This was a result of the emphasis the

Arab states, particularly Jordan and Saudi Arabia, placed on the status of Jerusalem. As a result, the USG could not pursue its standard policy of benign neglect but rather crafted a pain-staking policy balancing Israeli and Arab demands.

Added attention in Jerusalem did not stop Israeli construction in the occupied parts of

Jerusalem. When a plan was announced to build 35,000 new houses, the State Department spokesman stated, “we feel that unilateral actions that tend to be regarded as changing the status of the city – we would find that unacceptable.” However, officials told the New York Times that an official complaint to Israel was “unlikely.”216 Protests did not deter the GOI. The plan

213 Eliot to Kissinger, July 13, 1972, Arab-Israel Affairs, 59/A-1/5632/5, UNSA. 214 Horan to Barbour, January 2, 1973, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/23, UNSA. 215 Zurhellen to Rogers, March 21, 1973, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/23, UNSA. 216 Hedrick Smith, “U.S. Opposes Plan by Israel to build near Jerusalem,” New York Times, February 17, 1971, 1.

172 presented by the Ministry of Construction was promptly approved by the Jerusalem municipal council. Minister of Housing Ze’ev Sherf said “I am convinced the unanimous vote the municipal Council’s building subcommittee gave the plan yesterday was the result of the State

Department’s comment.”217

Behind the public facade, American opposition to Israeli policy in Jerusalem softened. In

July 1971, Stephen Ward of the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem proposed a plan to resolve the issue of Jerusalem in a permanent settlement agreement. The plan would potentially have allowed

Israel to keep the Mount Scopus-French Hill-Ramat Eshkol neighborhoods in the occupied territories. Ward explained that the changes were necessary since “when these projects are completed more facts will have been established and additional, substantial areas of ‘Arab

Jerusalem’ will have become irrevocably Israeli; there isn’t much that can be done about a ‘fait accompli.’”218 Although the plan was not accepted by the NEA, it showed a growing awareness among American officials that facts on the ground in Jerusalem were unlikely to be reversed.219

The Bedouins of Rafah: The Only Opposition Comes from Within Israel Itself

An Israeli consensus emerged that if Sinai was returned in a peace deal, it was strategically necessary to isolate the Gaza Strip from Sinai and the Egyptian army by establishing an Israeli controlled buffer in the Rafah salient.220 Correspondingly, the first settlement in the salient, named Diklah, was erected in July 1969.221 The settlement was formed as a NAHAL outpost but

217 Henry Raymont, “Israel adamant on housing plans,” New York Times, February 19, 1971, 9. 218 Ward to Stackhouse, July 28, 1971, Arab-Israel Affairs, 59/A-1/5632/5, UNSA. 219 For the argument over the suitability of Ward’s plan see Stackhouse to Ward, August 9, 1971, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/5, UNSA; Sutherland to Stackhouse, August 17, 1971, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/5, UNSA. 220 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 167. 221 Pedtazur, Triumph of Embarrassment, 249.

173 was later converted into the first civilian settlement in Sinai.222 A report from the Embassy in Tel

Aviv noted the speed and quality of the construction work.223 Despite following the initial steps of settlement in the Salient closely, the USG did not reprimand Israel for the move.

The issue of settlement construction in the Salient turned controversial domestically.

1,540 Bedouin families were evicted to facilitate construction in early 1972. The operation was not ordered by the government directly, but rather was taken by Head of IDF's Southern

Command, Major General . The area from which the families were evicted comprised roughly 20,000 acres of land designated for Jewish settlement.224 The secretariat of

MAPAM condemned the move and criticism was echoed by left-leaning organizations.225 The controversial move spawned a military investigation committee into allegations that the evacuated Bedouins were treated inhumanely by the IDF. The Chief of Staff ultimately expressed his reservations at the behavior of some of the officers involved.226 However, the

Israeli Supreme Court determined that the confiscation itself was legal.227

The reaction of most Israeli political parties to the position taken by MAPAM was negative. Meir reportedly told Alignment Party members that “I cannot forgive MAPAM for what they did. It was not collegial, it was unjust, to the military and the state.”228 Four parties:

GAHAL, the NRP, the Free Center and Ben-Gurion’s party, protested MAPAM’s policy and organized a special session in the Knesset to condemn the faction. During the session, Yoram

222 Yechiel Limor, “First civilian settlement Sinai,” Maariv, January 1 1971. 223 Cluverius to Long, October 13, 1971, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA. 224 Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 108-112; Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 220-228; Nir Hefez and Gadi Bloom, The Shepard: The Life Story of Ariel Sharon (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2005), 212-214. 225 Arnon to Dayan, March 13, 1972, 6692-15/A, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, March 23, 1972, Gaza settlements 15-46-69-1, YT; Knesset minutes, March 27, 1972, 194-8/K, ISA. 226 Davar staff member, “Chief of Staff on Rafah evacuation: there were irregularities,” Davar, May 27, 1972, 1. 227 Supreme Court Ruling 302/72. 228 Davar political correspondent, “Ya’ari continues to oppose permanent settlements,” Davar, March 31, 1972, 2.

174

Aridor of GAHAL accused MAPAM of providing Israel’s enemies with “homegrown arguments” against the settlement project and of “in house incitement against settlement in our liberated homelands.”229

MAPAM backed down. The factional leadership promised Meir that it would not protest construction or land confiscation in the area.230 Indeed, members of MAPAM went out of their way to conform to government orthodoxy. Ya’acov Hazan, one of the factional leaders, exclaimed he “now supported settlements in Rafah more than he had in the past.”231 Eventually the MAPAM party conference voted in favor of continued settlement in the Rafah salient “out of a concern for the security of the State of Israel and its future security borders.”232 Opposition to eviction and confiscation was crushed by the combined forces of the government and the right- wing opposition.

The controversy over the evacuation of the Bedouin families echoed in the halls of the

United Nations. The Egyptian government in a letter to the United Nations Secretary General, accused Israel of the “displacement of inhabitants, the destruction of towns, villages and homes, including refugee camps, and the establishment of settlements in violation of the principles of international law.”233 Some of the Bedouin evicted from their lands also wrote a letter to the

Secretary General, asking for International Court intervention.234 A General Assembly

Resolution passed in December 1972 called on Israel to “desist from all policies and practices affecting the physical character or demographic composition of the Arab occupied territories.”235

229 Knesset minutes, March 27, 1972, No name 194-8/K, ISA. 230 Dan Patir, “Tensions lessened between Labor and MAPAM,” Davar, March 24, 1972. 231 Davar political correspondent, “Y. Hazan: I support settlements in the Rafah salient more than before,” Davar, April 20, 1972, 1. 232 Dan Patir, “MAPAM decided in favor of the Rafah salient,” Davar, December 31, 1972, 1. 233 Meguid to Waldheim, January 5, 1972, S-1066 4 1/1, UNA. 234 Ha’aretz, June 27, 1972, Gaza settlements 15-46-69-1, YT. 235 UN General Assembly, December 8, 1972, S-1066 1/1, UNA.

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In sum, the evacuation of the Bedouin families from the Rafah Salient was the most controversial settlement related decision in Israeli domestic politics up to that point and one of the most controversial internationally.236

Despite the high visibility of the question, the USG did not play a role in the debate.

There is no record of a mention of the issue in bilateral talks or relevant official statements. This was noted in Israel. Naftali Feder from MAPAM mentioned to American officials that many

Israelis had noticed that the U.S. did not comment on the controversy surrounding settlements in

Rafah.237 In a conversation with a US embassy staff member, Herut Party spokesman Eliahu

Ben-Elissar noted that, as in the past, “new Israeli settlements in the administered territories have similarly drawn no Western reaction. In fact, the only opposition comes from within Israel itself.”238

The furor over the eviction of the Bedouins of the Rafah Salient was a rare moment of controversy over Israeli settlement policy in the Meir era. As such, it provided the USG with a unique opportunity, at least in theory, to strengthen the forces in the Israeli political system with reservations about Israeli policy. It is difficult to estimate what the results of a firm USG stand on the side of MAPAM would have had, but the result of American inaction was that opposition to the evacuation and to settlement in the Rafah Salient was crushed. There can be little doubt the absence of a USG response was interpreted as consent for both Israeli settlement construction in the area and the human rights violations which accompanied them.

236 See for example the stormy debate in Knesset quoted extensively in Yehosa Bitzur, “MAPAM is throwing out the baby with the bath water,” Maariv, March 21, 1972; See also Nachal Oz to Galili, March 22, 1972, Gaza settlements 15-46-69-1, YT. 237 Memorandum of conversation, April 18, 1972, Arab-Israel affairs, 59 /A1-5632/5, USNA. 238 Memorandum of conversation, April 13, 1972, Arab-Israel affairs, 59 /A1-5632/5, USNA.

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Yamit: from City to Village

The government consensus on settlement construction in the Rafah salient applied to the creation of the usual tiny agricultural settlements. Dayan had bigger plans for the area. In early 1972 the

Defense Ministry formulated a plan to establish a large city in the Rafah salient to be accompanied by an ambitious deep-water port.239 In August the Israeli media reported that was slated to contain a population of up to 4,000 by 1974 and 250,000 by 1992.240 Finance

Minister Pinchas Sapir became an outspoken critic of the plan. He publicly mocked the plans, saying that “I smiled to myself, knowing how much the infrastructure for a new city of a quarter of a million would cost.”241 In an effort at compromise, Galili designed a much smaller proposal to build a “regional center” which would house 350 families by 1975 and be increased to 850 units by 1978.242 The idea of a large city in the area was ultimately abandoned and Galili’s approach was approved.243 Dayan and his allies aside, the idea of expending scarce resources on large irreversible settlement remained unappealing to the Meir government.

The large-scale plans for Yamit caught the eye of the United States. After all, it implied a more permanent and substantial obstacle to peace than the usual miniscule agricultural outpost.

The U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv was clearly not convinced by the announcement of plans to build a smaller settlement and remained concerned. A missive from the Tel Aviv Embassy to Rogers

239 Demant, Ploughshares into Swords, 240-241; Gador to Zusman. April 25, 1972, Settlements correspondence 15- 74-2, YT; Harris, Taking Root, 55-56. 240 Yisrael Harel, “Dayan is about to present a plan for a new town – Yamit – near Dikla,” Maariv, August 24, 1972, 1. 241 Davar staff, “Dispute between opposing views on the territories and their residents,” Davar, November 10, 1972, 1-2. 242 Gazit to Dayan, August 8, 1973, Settlements 12-3-93-2, YT. 243 Galili to Meir, August 12, 1973, 7022-13/A, ISA.

177 suggested that cessation of all settlement activity by Israel was unlikely. Therefore, policy should focus on “getting them to delay implementation of certain aspects of the proposed program which represent significant and highly visible departures. We could therefore, emphasize our misgivings about proposed construction of Yamit and its adjacent network of settlements on

Egyptian territory.”244 However, no steps were taken, possibly because GOI plans to build a large city in Yamit did not resurface.

Interestingly, Dayan’s plans to create a large city in Yamit made an impression on

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Mohamed Heikal, the premier Egyptian political analyst of the time recounts that Sadat was upset about a television interview in which “Dayan had made it quite clear that Israel was determined to build a new port and town at Yamit, on Egyptian territory bordering the Gaza Strip. Dayan had talked of this as a ‘primary military defence line.’

Egypt, his remarks showed beyond doubt, was to be presented with a fait accompli. ‘Look at that,’ said the President. ‘If only for that one statement of Dayan’s I think we should go to war.”

The conversation took place a month before the war.245 If this story is not apocryphal, it would indicate that the Israeli strategy of utilizing settlements to bring Egypt to the negotiating table on improved terms was not only ineffective in the Egyptian case, but also added to the Egyptian frustration which led Sadat down the path to war in 1973. It also shows that the signals Israel was sending were read in the Arab capitals but not in the manner Israel intended.

244 Tel Aviv to Rogers, August 20, 1973, NPSM, NSC Files, CFs – Middle East, 610, NPL. 245 Mohemad Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Ballantine, 1975), 12.

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The Land Trade Liberalization Debate: Sisco puts His Foot Down

In the run-up to the Israeli legislative elections, scheduled for October 1973, Moshe Dayan again sought to portray himself as the most prominent supporter of the settlements. The Defense

Minister spearheaded an initiative to allow public organizations and private Israeli citizens to purchase land in the occupied territories. Up until that point, only the Israel Land Authority and the Jewish National Fund were legally authorized to purchase lands in the occupied territories.246

The cabinet was split. Dayan was supported by Galili, Peres and Justice Minister Yaakov

Shimshon Shapira and initially by Prime Minister Meir; while Sapir and Minister of Tourism

Moshe Kol opposed the motion.247

The Palestinian population in the West Bank, had thus far responded to Israeli settlement policy in a taciturn manner. However, it was disturbed by the privatization measure. Muhammad

Ali al-Jabari, Mayor of Hebron, declared it as “in contradiction to international law.”248

Palestinian Arabs initiated a public campaign designed to shame and intimidate local landowners who would sell lands to Jews. Meanwhile, Palestinian newspapers warned that this was a step towards irreversible Israeli control of the West Bank.249 These reactions raised concern in

Amman that a wave of land sales would push Palestinians off their land and in turn they would flood Jordan.250 King Hussein contacted USG officials and expressed serious concern at the possibility that the law would pass.251

246 Demant, Ploughshares into Swords, 253-254. 247 Ibid., 255. 248 N/a, “Eban visited Hebron,” Davar, March 22, 1973, 2. 249 N/a, “Propaganda in the West Bank against sale of land to Jews,” Davar, April 4, 1973, 2. 250 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 244. 251 Memorandum from Harold H. Saunders and William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, April 9, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 45.

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As a result, the State Department was concerned about the measure. Stackhouse said, “if we passively acquiesce in this, our credibility with Hussein will be seriously, perhaps critically, eroded.” He also noted correctly that in the past when the U.S. had remained silent, GOI had interpreted it as consent.252 The USG broke with its policy of indifference. Joseph Sisco met with new Israeli ambassador before the cabinet vote and warned that “our interests would be affected if Israeli policy on land purchases were to change.”253 Due to the publicity surrounding the measure and the extent of Jordanian concern, a clear U.S. response materialized at the critical moment.254

Prime Minister Meir convinced Dayan to withdraw his proposal. The significant exposure the matter received in the international media influenced her decision.255 There is no clear evidence that American interference was crucial in determining the outcome, but there are indications that it was a consideration. According to the Israeli daily newspaper Maariv, “the position of the United States on the question of the purchase of lands by Jews across the green line – as expressed in the conversation between Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco and

Israeli ambassador to Washington, Simcha Dinitz, greatly influenced the approach of Prime

Minister Golda Meir.”256 On the same day that the initiative was dropped, a letter was sent to

Dinitz informing him of the cabinet decision.257 Normally embassy staff in Washington D.C. were not kept informed of Israeli policy in the occupied territories. This would indicate that the

Prime Minister believed the matter had diplomatic ramifications.

252 Stackhouse to Sisco, April 4, 1973, Arab-Israel affairs, 59 /A1-5632/21, USNA. 253 Saunders to NSA, April 9, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 45. 254 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 244. 255 Gazit to Dinitz, April 8, 1973, 7792-8/A, ISA. 256 Yosef Harif, “U.S. position on land purchase question influenced Golda Meir,” Maariv, April 9, 1973, 1. 257 Gazit to Dinitz, April 8, 1973, 7792-8/A, ISA.

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The affair is a rare example of USG influence on Israeli settlement policy during the

Nixon administration. The USG proved influential for three reasons. First, the Israeli government was split. By intervening, Sisco strengthened the hand of a contingent that was already strong.

Second, the protest was voiced firmly by an individual with policy influence. Important officials such as Rogers, Kissinger and Sisco rarely intervened on issues related to Israeli settlements.

Had a protest been issued by a mid-level NEA official, it would have been unlikely to play a role in swaying Meir. Third, the protest was issued in a timely manner before the GOI decided.

Typically, the USG offered opposition to Israeli settlement policies after they had either been agreed upon or implemented, when a reversal would have been unlikely.

Kiryat Arba: The Tolerated Anomaly

The establishment of a modest urban settlement in Kiryat Arba did not satisfy the demands of the well-organized settler group dwelling there. Settler advocates pushed relentlessly for further development. When construction of 250 housing units was underway, they immediately began lobbying for the construction of 5,000 more units in pursuit of an eventual population of

60,000.258 However, development remained slow.259 GOI also resisted efforts by the Kiryat Arba settlers to turn it into an industrial center.260 The settler advocates increasingly felt the government was not on its side and unwilling to invest in the development of the settlement.

Hostility between the government and the settlers turned malignant in July 1973.

Representatives for Kiryat Arba threatened that if construction in the settlement is not renewed

258 Hebron settlers to Meir, April 21, 1971, 6501-27/C, ISA; Libman to Meir, June 2, 1971, Kiryat Arba 6501-27/C, ISA; Levinger to ministers, December 19, 1971, 6466-2/C, ISA. 259 Galili to Meir, April 3, 1972, 6495-11/C, ISA. 260 Bar-Lev to Meir, April 2, 1973, 6501-27/C, ISA.

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“we will be forced to publicly address these failures before the elections.”261 The threat poisoned an already contentious relationship between the Labor Party ministers and the settlers. Ze'ev

Sherf told his fellow Ministers “that is a settlement with a bad seed, and we will be mourning it for generations if we do not replace them by force with another seed.”262 This contentious relationship would continue into the Rabin government. The Labor Party remained uninterested in establishing a large urban settlement anywhere, particularly near an Arab population center.

The USG followed developments in Kiryat Arba more closely than elsewhere. The NEA initially assessed that Kiryat Arba was a “tolerated anomaly” rather than the official policy of

Israel.263 However, that assessment shifted over time. Cluverius estimated that it was highly unlikely that Israel would evacuate Hebron because it is a “recreation of a pre-1948 Jewish communities.Therefore he believed that “the GOI would expect that the Hebron settlement…would remain.”264 The USG realized that a large amount of pressure would be needed to secure an Israeli agreement to evacuate Kiryat Arba in an agreement.

Kissinger internalized reports that Israel was unlikely to relinquish the area. He was also hesitant, as noted previously, to pressure Israel due to his perception of U.S. interests in the region. It was at this point that the NSA began to integrate settlements into his mediation tactics.

Previous scholarship has ignored Kissinger’s early diplomatic efforts to incorporate settlements into negotiations.265 However, the NSA first toyed with the issue in talks with King Hussein and

261 Kiryat Arba Committee to Meir, July 20, 1973, 6501-27/C, ISA. 262 The term “seed” here refers the Israeli term for the original nucleus of a settlement and not in the colloquial sense. However, the pun is probably intentional. See Memorandum of conversation, July 26, 1973, Settlements 12- 3-93-5, YT. 263 Sterner to Atherton, June 23, 1969, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA. 264 Cluverius to Smith, January 18, 1972, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA. 265 Gershom Gorenberg wrote that Kissinger first discussed settlements as a diplomatic issue as part of the 1974 Israeli-Syrian disengagement process. Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 277. Donald Neff meanwhile completely ignores the Nixon era in his overview on U.S. policy towards the settlements: Donald Neff, “Settlements in U.S. Policy,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Spring 1994), 53-69.

182 his advisor Zaid Rifai in February 1973. Kissinger asked if an arrangement allowing Jews to remain in the Hebron area would be acceptable. Rifai indicated that a continued Jewish presence in Kiryat Arba would not be an obstacle to a permanent settlement, “Hebron and Nablus, where there is strong religious feeling on the part of the Israelis about the sites there. They have no desire to annex these but there is a strong desire of many Israelis to live there…it would be possible for Israeli citizens, including Orthodox Jews, to reside there close to their religious shrines.”266

Four months after the meeting, Rifai presented the USG with a paper outlining King

Hussein’s vision of a permanent peace settlement. Kissinger’s approach influenced the Jordanian government. A concession was made in that direction. The paper included “agreements on a procedure for Israelis to reside inside Jordanian territory near Jewish religious shrines.”267 In other words, Jordan was willing to accept the existence of Kiryat Arba in a permanent settlement, if it was transferred to Jordanian sovereignty. This development indicates two things.

First, Kissinger was increasingly open to taking account of existing settlements in his mediation formulations. Second, Israeli signalling of attachment to the Jordan Valley and Kiryat Arba was forcing Jordan to adjust its territorial expectations accordingly.

Ophira: A Military Presence Disguised as a Civilian One?

Unlike other areas of the occupied territories in this period, the issue of Sharm el-Sheikh was central to Israel-U.S. bilateral bargaining. This was due to its prominence as a sticking point

266 Memorandum of Conversation, February 27, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 30. 267 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, June 30, 1972, FRUS XXIII, doc. 297.

183 preventing progress in the four-power and two-power talks.268 The official Israeli position was that only an Israeli presence in Sharm el-Sheikh could guarantee freedom of transit for Israeli shipping. In a speech before the Knesset, Meir said the area “must remain in our hands with territorial contiguity between Sharm el-Sheikh and Israel.”269 It should be noted, however, that the official Israeli position remained that Israel should “control” the strategic area and not necessarily annex it.270 Thus Israel was, as per usual, signalling commitment to a territorial position while keeping the door ajar.

Israel had long planned to establish a settlement in Sharm el-Sheikh, as it did in most strategically vital points.271 Galili and the Settlement Committee began putting the plan into action in late 1971.272 The initial phase of construction in the settlement of Ophira was modest and slow. The head of the Ophira settler committee wrote to Meir that the government was not developing the settlement quickly enough and those working in Ophira were separated from their families for whom housing was not available.273 Correspondingly, the New York Times reported that “for the time being the town the Israelis named Ophira consists of a gas station, medical aid post, bank, police station and post office, in addition to the temporary accommodations for the men – most without their women – who work there. It even lacks the saloon of an American frontier town.”274 Neither the Finance nor the Agriculture Ministry wanted to pay for even a

268 See for example Telegram from the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts, April 3, 1969, FRUS XXIII, doc. 18; Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, April 25, 1969, FRUS XXIII, doc. 26. 269 Gazit to Eban: Secure borders, November 23, 1971, 5978-2/FM, ISA. 270 Comay to Ruppin, November 26, 1971, 4443-10/FM, ISA; Gazit, February 21, 1972, 5978-2/FM, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, April 16, 1972, 5978-2/FM, ISA; Public Diplomacy Division, April 30, 1972, 5978- 2/FM, ISA. 271 Allon to Eshkol, November 13, 1968, 6423-1/C, ISA. 272 Meeting summary, November 23, 1971, 6495-11/C, ISA. 273 Karny to Meir, June 28 197, 6495-11/C, ISA; Karny to Meir, August 3, 1972, Settlements 6495-11/C, ISA. 274 Henry Kamm, “Israel Keeps Hands Off Sinai Arabs While Developing Tourism and Roads,” New York Times, August 28, 1972, 2.

184 moderate expansion of the settlement.275 In other words, even in one of the most strategically vital points, Israel merely “planted the flag” of a settlement and was hesitant to invest significant funds in developing the spot.

While Israel developed the modest settlement of Ophira, the new USG policy emphasizing “security” and “sovereignty” substantively altered its position on Sharm el-Sheikh.

The Rogers Plan had called for an Israeli-Egyptian boundary which would “approximate” the pre-war borders.276 However, Kissinger had always differed with Rogers on that point. In 1970, the NSA proposed to Rabin that in a permanent settlement Egypt should obtain sovereignty in all of Sinai, “Egypt, in turn, would have to accept an Israeli presence in certain strategic positions such as Sharm el-Sheikh.” The Israeli ambassador recalled in his memoirs that Kissinger

“hastened to add that such an Israeli military presence might have to be disguised as a civilian one.”277 A paper by Saunders written after Nixon’s re-election called for a new approach which would allow Israel some leeway as it “permits agreement on perhaps extensive security arrangements involving an Israeli military presence.”278 The Nixon administration was toying with different ways to facilitate a continued Israeli presence (whether military, civilian or both) in Sharm.

Kissinger presented a different version of the idea to Ashraf Ghorbal of the Egyptian

Foreign Ministry, suggesting that Israel retain “civilian bases or some other such arrangement” in certain strategic points for an interim period.279 There was no response. The idea was brought up

275 Yehusha Bitzur, “The Representative for the Sharm el-Sheikh Complains of Non-Existent Development,” Maariv, November 28, 1972, 4. 276 Shalom & Vanetik, Nixon Administration, 57-58; Quandt, Decade of Decision, 91. 277 Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, 216. 278 Saunders to Kissinger, November 13, 1972, NPSM, NSC Files, Harold H. Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, 1190, NPL. 279 Memorandum of Conversation, June 27, 1972, FRUS XXIII, doc. 296.

185 again in February 1973, when the National Security Advisor met with Hafez Ismail, Egyptian

Chief of Intelligence. Ismail informed Kissinger that Egypt would be willing to consider addressing Israeli security needs in Sinai within the framework of full Egyptian sovereignty over the Peninsula.280 Shalom and Vanetik wrote that “it is possible that he was referring to Egypt’s willingness for a certain Israeli presence in strategic points in the Sinai, principally in the

Straits.”281

Kissinger’s summary of the talks makes it clear that this is not the case. Ismail referred to great power guarantees, demilitarized zones on both sides of the Israeli-Egyptian border and the stationing of an international force in Sharm. When asked specifically about the concept of separating security from sovereignty, Ismail was non-committal stating that “if the issues of territory and sovereignty could be put aside, we could be open-minded.”282 This at most indicated a willingness to communicate the idea to Sadat, but stopped short of tentative approval.

The Egyptians government notably refrained from responding to Kissinger’s idea.283 Ultimately

Ismail’s initiative to launch a meaningful peace initiative petered out.284 These were the last substantive diplomatic offers made by Egypt before they decided to launch a war which would improve their position.

With the evolution of USG policy towards Sharm el-Sheikh in mind, it is not surprising that the establishment of Ophira did not garner criticism from the Nixon administration. State

Department spokesman Charles Bray did criticize Israel for violating international law by paving

280 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, February 25-26, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 28. 281 Shalom & Vanetik, Nixon Administration, 210. 282 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant, FRUS XXV, doc. 28. 283 Memorandum of Conversation, June 27, 1972, FRUS XXIII, doc. 296. 284 Shalom & Vanetik, Nixon Administration, 210-212.

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“a road from Eilat to Sharm el-Sheikh.”285 However, by the time the existence of Ophira had been made public in January 1972, the State Department had lost what little influence it had. The move was met with tacit USG approval. Indeed, Kissinger may have viewed the existence of an

Israeli civilian settlement as useful in that it could serve to disguise an Israeli military presence in

Sharm el-Sheikh which would persist after the attainment of a permanent settlement.286

The Jordan Valley: Pushing Jordan a Little towards the Allon Plan

The Jordan Valley based Allon Plan continued to guide Israeli settlement policy in the Meir years.287 As in other areas, the Israeli government abandoned its policy of secrecy and obfuscation. In May 1971 Israel established a civilian settlement in the region. Hamra was the first civilian settlement, not initially founded as a NAHAL outpost. This began a series of publicized moves to establish civilian settlements and transfers of NAHAL settlements to civilian organizations.288

Jordan Valley settlements were small, underfunded and underdeveloped. Three logistical problems arose, water supply, lack of manpower and dearth of agriculturally appropriate lands.

Despite this, the WZO developed plans to sustain 14-16 small settlements in the area.289 Once constructed, the government did not bother maintaining basic services there. For example, settlers in Patzael complained to the media that they were not receiving mail deliveries, milk

285 N/a, June 10, 1971, Ford Congressional papers, Press Secretary and speech file, D 94, Gerald Ford Presidential Library (hereafter FPL). 286 Memorandum of Conversation, FRUS XXIII, doc. 296; Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, 216. 287 Gazit, February 21, 1972, 5978-2/FM, ISA; Rabin to Meir, June 22, 1969, 7412-3/A, ISA. 288 Yosef Waxman, “First settlement to be erected in the Jodan valley,” Maariv, May 5, 1971, 8; Yosef Waxman, “First cooperative settlement in the Jordan Valley,” Maariv, May 6, 1971, 3; Yosef Waxman, “Argaman NAHAL passed to a seed,” Maariv, May 19, 1971, 4. 289 Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 96.

187 deliveries or reliable bus service.290 Even in the area that was the fulcrum of the Allon Plan, settlements were underdeveloped and impermanent.

Despite the unimpressive scope of settlement in the Jordan Valley, the public Israeli commitment to settlement in the Jordan Valley played an important role in shifting the parameters of a potential Israeli-Jordanian permanent settlement. GOI asserted its attachment to the Allon Plan in bilateral talks with the USG. Eban told Rogers that “there is consensus support in our government to the ideas formulated by Allon."291 The NEA took Israeli statements of commitment at face value. An internal document estimated that “Jordanian fears that the Israelis are proceeding with the ‘creation of facts’ on the West Bank in accordance with the Allon Plan are undoubtedly justified.”292 There was a consensus in the NEA that Israel was making significant strides in solidifying control over the Jordan Valley.

Rather than oppose Israeli encroachment, the USG decided its efforts would be better invested in convincing Jordan to accept it. The NSC increasingly saw the Allon Plan as the basis for an agreement of either the permanent or interim variety. Saunders suggested that Hussein be offered Gaza in return for an Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley.293 Kissinger reported to Nixon, in early 1973, that Israel and Jordan may come to an agreement allowing West Bank settlements to remain on an interim basis. He speculated “there could be agreement on some form of resident alien permits to allow nationals of each country to reside inside the other with

290 Avraham Tirosh, “2-3 moshav and 2 kibbutz settlements in the Patzael bloc in the Jordan Valley,” Maariv, April 30, 1972, 3. 291 Raviv to Jerusalem, April 22, 1972, 7413-7/A, ISA. Rabin made similar comments, see Memorandum of Conversation, June 20, 1969, FRUS XXIII, doc. 125. 292 Sterner to Atherton, June 23, 1969, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA. See also Memorandum of conversation, January 20, 1969, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA. 293 Saunders to Kissinger, November 13, 1972, NPSM, NSC Files, Harold H. Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, 1190, NPL.

188 freedom of movement back and forth.”294 In other word, Kissinger was optimistic that the settlements in the Jordan Valley were not a major impediment to an Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement.

This was accurate. In talks between Hussein and Kissinger in February 1973, Kissinger actively prodded Jordan to accept the Allon Plan. The National Security Advisor asked, “is it inconceivable that there could be some sort of military posts in the Jordan Valley if everything else could be done?” To which the King hesitantly replied, “I suppose it could be done.”

Kissinger said later in the meeting that the position presented by the Jordanian government was

“very fair”, but if it were up to him he would “push it a little towards the Allon Plan.”295 Hussein took note of Kissinger’s attempt to push him towards acceptance of Israeli settlements. Four months later, Rifai wrote a paper on Jordanian terms for a possible permanent settlement which indicated a willingness to allow Israeli settlers to remain under Jordanian sovereignty.296

It is clear Jordan did not consider settlements in the Jordan Valley to be a central issue and was willing to make concessions there in return for concessions in Jerusalem. The USG on its part had begun to act as an advocate of the Israeli territorial position. Particularly notable in this regard is Kissinger’s suggestion that the Jordanians move their position “a little towards the

Allon Plan.”297 The Israeli strategy of utilizing settlements to signal its commitment to “secure borders” had succeeded in altering the territorial positions of both the USG and Jordan

294 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, undated, FRUS XXV, doc. 27. 295 Memorandum of Conversation, February 27, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 90. 296 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, June 30, 1972, FRUS XXIII, doc. 297. 297 Memorandum of Conversation, February 27, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 90.

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The Galili Document: Kissinger’s Underwhelming Protest

In the run-up to the scheduled 1973 elections, Dayan yet again threatened to leave unless official settlement policy was altered. He gathered together former RAFI members and told them that

“with the approach of MAPAM and the approach of Sapir I can’t go on the list running for

Knesset.”298 He also mocked the Allon Plan saying he was “not sure what it is” but that if he understood correctly it was “outrageous to think that the government of Israel would put out a decree on Judea and Samaria, designed to stop Jews from settling in their homeland.”299 Moving away from his previous plan which emphasized settlement on the mountain ridge, Dayan now emphasized a plan to settle throughout the West Bank with the exception of the Nablus and Jenin area.300

The renewed threat of RAFI leaving the Alignment Party precipitated a comprehensive debate on settlement policy in the Alignment Party.301 However, the debate did not focus on the location of prospective settlements. As mentioned previously, the “oral law” was acceptable to hawks and doves alike. Rather, the debate focused on two other issues. First, the rate of development and budgetary investment in existing or planned settlements. The RAFI faction advocated for an impetus on settlement construction at the expense of the budgetary needs of

Israel proper. Meir, Sapir and Minister of Commerce and Industry Haim Bar-Lev opposed that approach. The Prime Minister told Dayan, “if we give it priority at whose expense does it come?

If so there will be no free education for tenth grade and we will not open universities and

298 Memorandum of conversation, July 26, 1973, Settlements 12-3-93-5, YT. 299 Yosef Harif, “Dayan viciously attacks the Allon Plan,” Maariv, February 2, 1973, 2. 300 Dayan’s close political ally Deputy Transportation Minister Gad Yaacobi explained the position in detail to staff members at the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv. See Tel Aviv to Rogers, May 18, 1973, NPSM, NSC Files, CFs – Middle East, 610, NPL. 301 Ranta, Political Decision Making, 121-138.

190 students will go abroad to study.”302 The second issue in dispute was the Dayan initiative on land trade liberalization. The matter returned to the fore after Dayan had again threatened to quit the party.

Galili was, as usual, tasked with drafting a compromise. It recommended that development of the occupied territories not be “favored” over development in Israel proper since

“the debate over the territories is merely part of the wider actions of the government.”303 Dayan’s efforts to push for more permanent and well-developed settlements failed again. He fared better on the private land purchase issue. Private individuals would now be allowed to purchase lands in the territories. However, land would be available to private individuals only if a ministerial committee approved and when the Israel Land Authority was unable or unwilling to purchase the land.304 The compromise was accepted unanimously and the Galili Document became the official policy of the party.305

Labor Party ministers predicted that the Galili Document would not be well received abroad. However, GOI had learned from experience that the reaction was seldom meaningful.

Allon noted that “those who adopt the policy as laid out in the document are taking responsibility for unrest in the field of international politics. However, despite this unrest, I recommend it.”306

The Labor Party released an official statement in English, in preparation for the expected backlash, quoting Galili as saying that the new document did not call “for the annexation of a single inch of territory.”307 However, GOI was not unduly concerned.

302 Memorandum of conversation, August 2, 1973, Settlements 12-3-93-5, YT. 303 Galili to Meir, August 10, 1973, 7022-12/A, ISA. 304 Cabinet decision, August 12, 1973, Settlements 12-3-93-2, YT. 305 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 248. 306 Memorandum of conversation, September 3, 1973, Settlements 12-3-93-5, YT. 307 Melchior to Labor Foreign Department, September 10, 1973, Foreign Relations 2-914-1972-455, BB.

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The Meir government would have been surprised to hear that the document led to the sharpest response yet by a President to Israeli settlement policy. Nixon was angered and wrote to

Kissinger “this is an enormous mistake – tell the Israelis in unmistakeable terms that I believe they hurt their cause and jeopardize our (my) support by such brutal tactics.”308 The Arab states were also notably disturbed by the Galili Document. United Nations Secretary General Kurt

Waldheim and Harold Saunders both reported that Arab governments had raised the matter with them.309 However, Saunders and Quandt of the NSC believed the USG should maintain the existing low-profile policy towards Israeli settlements. They recommended that Kissinger “talk informally with Ambassador Dinitz about our concern with Israel’s new policy toward the occupied territories.” This approach was deemed necessary in order “to avoid the appearance of a major public US demarche on the subject.”310 Despite the rage of the President, the NSC preferred that the situation be handled in the traditional low-key manner. This is not surprising.

Nixon’s standing had been pummeled by Watergate and it made perfect sense to follow

Kissinger instead.

The Galili Document led to soul searching in the State Department. The U.S. embassy in

Tel Aviv noted, with some discomfort, that “it is important to remind Israeli decision makers not to lose sight of the factor of U.S.-GOI relations.”311 Some in the State Department believed the time was right to put a measure of pressure on Israel to curtail its policies. Thomas Pickering opined that “a demarche at this time would be useful to Dr. Kissinger during his UNGA [United

308 Memorandum form the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, September 1, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 86. 309 Tel Aviv to Rush, September 7, 1973, NPSM, NSC Files, CFs – Middle East, 610, NPL; Saunders to Kissinger September 7, 1973, NPSM, NSC Files, CFs – Middle East, 610, NPL. 310 Memorandum from Harold H. Saunders and William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, September 4, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 87. 311 Tel Aviv to Rogers, August 20, 1973, NPSM, NSC Files, CFs – Middle East, 610, NPL.

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Nations General Assembly] discussions. We may expect Arab and nonaligned interest here in

New York in this matter and what we are doing about it.” However, he cautioned that for a demarche to influence Israel, it would have to be directly supported by the White House.312

Sisco believed a forceful and public demarche would compel GOI to move “more rapidly in order to create fait accompli on the ground.” Therefore, he recommended that a low-key approach be made to Eban voicing disapproval in order to “maintain our bona fides with the

Arabs.”313 Kissinger raised the matter on the eve of the 1973 War, but did so in a way that was not designed to alter the substance of Israeli policy. He told Eban “I have been pressured into raising the matter of the Galili Document” without mentioning the fact that the idea of pressing

Israel on the matter had originated with the President.314

The complaint as to the contents of the Galili Document came directly from Kissinger.

However, the message was not perceived as being particularly significant. In a message written one day before the Yom Kippur War broke out, Eban reported to Meir that in his opinion

Kissinger brought the Galili Document up because “Sisco influenced him to bring up the matter.”315 In other words, since the issue was of little interest to Kissinger, it could be disregarded. Kissinger, a noted master at undercutting rival power sources in the USG, almost certainly intended for the message to be interpreted in this manner. Complaints and demarches did not suit the NSC’s policy of exchanging security for sovereignty. Two days after the conversation between Kissinger and Eban, Syria and Egypt launched a surprise attack against

Israel. The Yom Kippur war doomed Kissinger’s strategy to failure.

312 Pickering to Scowcroft, September 6, 1973, NPSM, NSC Files, CFs – Middle East, 610, NPL. 313 Ibid. 314 Eban to Meir, October 5, 1973, 6709-21/FM, ISA. 315 Ibid.

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Conclusion

The Meir years saw a substantial change in Israeli settlement policy. The policy of obfuscation had frayed in the waning days of Eshkol’s tenure and turned completely public under Meir. GOI turned its “oral law” into a written document in the form of the 1969 Alignment Party platform.

It held public settlement commencement ceremonies complete with speeches promising never to withdraw, and featuring celebrated artists. These were covered extensively in the media. This publicly signalled an intention to settle and to remain in the settled area. However, once established, these settlements were underfunded, underdeveloped and underpopulated. A great deal of the development, apart from the initial foundation, which did occur was the result of the pressure of settlers and their extra-parliamentary advocates.

The publicity surrounding settlement construction on the one hand, coupled with lack of development on the other, served a strategic settlement policy. GOI believed that due to its military superiority and possession of the occupied territories, time was on its side. It erroneously assumed that the Arab states did not have a viable military option and therefore it could wait until the enemy was willing to negotiate directly and without preconditions. The Meir government hoped to utilize settlements to expedite this process and improve its bargaining position.

GOI established a significant amount of small settlements, “planting the flag” in strategic areas to both entice the Arab states to the bargaining table and serve as leverage once negotiations commenced. By creating many underdeveloped settlements, GOI could signal its commitment to significant strategic areas without investing precious resources in assets it may

194 have to abandon. The policy was left vague and unstated for both domestic political and international bargaining purposes. However, it did constitute a deliberate policy, albeit a misguided one. A Labor Party election advert boasted that “settlements are rising, and our diplomatic position is secure. This is the result of considered, daring, and far-seeing policy.”316

The evidence would indeed strongly suggest that GOI was convinced that its settlement policy was indeed considered, daring, and far-seeing. They were wrong on all counts.

An unfortunate side effect of the policy was the erosion of U.S. trust towards Israel on the issue. During the Nixon years the NEA made certain to follow Israeli policy on the ground and verify its nature and extent. This was the legacy of the policy of obfuscation practiced during the

Eshkol years. Paradoxically, under Meir Israel had become more open and honest in its approach.

GOI no longer hid the civilian nature of its settlements and publicly espoused its settlement map and pursuit of “defensible borders.” It also made no notable effort to hinder U.S. visits to Israeli settlements. This was more likely part of the Israeli strategy of signalling intentions to both the

Arabs and the United States to alter the parameters of a negotiated settlement.

One area where Israeli settlement policy had its desired effect was on U.S. foreign policy.

The State Department monitored Israeli settlement policy more closely during the Nixon years than it had previously. However, neither the White House nor Rogers were interested in the issue as USG policy was focused on détente and not the pursuit of a genuine resolution of the Arab-

Israeli conflict. As a result, it seemed unlikely that USG attempts to significantly influence

Israeli settlement policy would materialize. Therefore, American policy was increasingly based on the assumption that Israel could not and would not be relinquish much settled territory.

316 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 248.

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Throughout the period examined, the USG pursued a path of least resistance in its territorial policy. The period of the two Rogers’ plans was, in relation to the settlements, essentially a continuation of the benign neglect of the Johnson era. As Kissinger took control of policy in the Middle East, neglect turned into tacit support for the Allon Plan. Lukewarm disapproval made way for attempts to convince the Arab interlocutors to accept the existence of

Israeli settlements. The upshot of this was that, throughout the period, the USG allowed Israel free reign in pursuing its settlement policy unless there was significant opposition on the part of the Arab states. Even then, protests were designed to establish “bona fides” with the Arab states and not meaningfully curtail settlement construction.

The USG was attentive to the concerns of its Saudi Arabian and Jordanian allies. It had little interest in the protestations of Syria and Egypt, which it regarded as Soviet proxies.

Therefore, the Nixon administration barely bothered to respond to public Israeli settlement construction in Sinai and the Golan Heights. When the conservative Arab states evinced distress at Israeli actions in the occupied territories, the USG was compelled to attempt to balance Israeli interests with the concerns of its other regional allies. However, Jordan seemed surprisingly indifferent to settlement activity in Kiryat Arba and the Jordan Valley. Kissinger read this, correctly, as weakness in the Jordanian position and pressured the Hashemite regime to make concessions.

In regard to issues of greater concern to Jordan, USG tried to at least appear more balanced. This was of mostly a matter of projecting the right image to its allies as it had neither the means nor the interest to influence Israeli policy. Notably, in Jerusalem it was compelled to support UN resolutions criticizing Israel and to avoid recognizing Israeli sovereignty in

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Jerusalem. The USG adopted similarly “even handed” public positions in the case of the lands trade liberalization debate and the Galili Document.

Lack of substantive U.S. pressure does not seem to have been influenced by the “Israel lobby.” Domestic politics played a role in the overall tenor of USG policy towards Israel, particularly around the elections. However, the issue of settlements did not arise in American domestic politics. One notable exception was the issue of Jerusalem, which became an issue in the

1972 Presidential elections, when the Democratic Party vowed to support the relocation of the

Embassy to Jerusalem. However, the USG decided after a brief discussion of the matter that the

U.S Embassy should not be moved to avoid sabotaging relations with Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Therefore, even in this matter domestic politics did not have a decisive influence. There is no record of Congressional intervention in the matter of settlements or any action on the part of

“Jewish lobby” groups such as AIPAC on settlement policy elsewhere. Some Senators, such as

Henry Jackson, showed support for Israeli settlements, but there is no evidence this was a factor in the policy of the administration.317

Instead, the level of pressure was influenced by the strategic environment. Israeli strategic utility fluctuated wildly in this period. However, there was no notable increase in U.S. pressure on

Israel regarding settlements during the low ebb of its strategic utility during the War of Attrition.

There was a general increase of pressure on Israel in the form of the Rogers Plan but this did not translate to the specific issue at hand. After Israel had played a significant role in protecting the

Hashemite regime from its Palestinian opponents, the policy changed from one of benign neglect to tacit support. Israel had proven its strategic utility in containing Soviet influence in Jordan. This

317 Jackson address at Israel Bonds, November 28, 1970, 6720-1/FM, ISA.

197 facilitated increased willingness on the part of Nixon and Kissinger to promote Israeli territorial goals.

The ascendance of Kissinger in late 1971 to the role of primary USG decision-maker in the Middle East, brought on an evolution rather than a radical transformation of policy. Where the NEA had grudgingly accepted changes wrought by Israeli settlement policy, Kissinger integrated them into his policy. The National Security Advisor seems to have reasoned that if convincing Israel to evacuate settled territories was unlikely, it would be easier to convince the

Arab states to accept the continued existence of settlements. Therefore, Kissinger and the NSC devised a new territorial approach. Security arrangements and assets could be maintained by

Israel in the occupied territories if they are transferred to Arab state sovereignty. This opened up a number of flexible options for the retention of Israeli settlements.

Kissinger did not believe that a permanent settlement was likely due to incongruence in the negotiating positions of the sides. His strategy for breaking the deadlock was to support Israel and assist it in maintaining its military advantage. Eventually, the inability of the Arab states to recoup their losses by force would force them to turn to the United States for assistance. In his view, the Israeli military advantage and support of the United States would force the Arab states to moderate demands.

Starting in mid-1972 and with increasing stridency in 1973, the USG attempted to move

Jordan and Egypt closer to accepting an Israeli military and security presence in areas Israel considered to be strategically essential. Unwilling and unable to pressure Israel into limiting settlement construction in the occupied territories, NSC staff members began to look at the possibility of Israeli settlements remaining under Arab sovereignty as part of an agreement. This

198 made sense considering Kissinger’s approach of trading sovereignty for security.318 The strategy seems to have been quite successful in the case of Jordan. However, in the Egyptian case

Kissinger’s new territorial approach and the Israeli policy of “planting the flag” played a role in fostering the tremendous sense of frustration which led to Sadat’s decision to go to war in

October 1973.

Evaluating the Analytical Framework for the Nixon Years

Mediation: The Nixon era involved direct mediation and included implied threats of coercive diplomacy against Israel during the period of the Rogers initiatives. Later Kissinger mediated between Israel and Egypt in a “lighter” manner. However, none of these negotiations touched upon the issue of settlements. Rogers focused intently on the larger issues, such as the principle of withdrawal and the nature of peace. The smaller details such as settlements were never reached as the plan was rejected by all relevant states. Meanwhile, Kissinger focused on a less ambitious program of conflict management and his tacit support of Israel’s “defensible borders” strategy made it unlikely that he would pressure it to evacuate settlements. As discussed above, the National

Security Advisor did not believe the time was ripe for serious mediation. Therefore, the minor efforts made at mediation were exploratory.

Minor efforts in the period leading up to the 1973 War saw the first attempts to bridge the gaps over settlements through mediation. The issue was mentioned for the first time in February

1973, in talks with Jordan. The mediation was of the “light” variety but there was subtle pressure

318 Saunders to Kissinger, November 13, 1972, NPSM, NSC Files, Harold H. Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations Files, 1190, NPL.

199 involved. Unexpectedly the pressure was applied on Jordan. Kissinger tested the willingness of the Jordanian government to accept a resolution along the lines of the Allon Plan and indicated to

Hussein that he believed Jordan should adjust its expectations downward and accept the presence of Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley and Hebron. While Jordan showed some willingness, the efforts were unserious. Neither side was ready to make sufficient concessions. In addition, the sticking point of Jerusalem made an agreement highly unlikely. Most importantly, mediation efforts did not involve significant U.S. interests and therefore the impetus behind talks was weak.

The policy of Kissinger at the time was to make the most out of the status quo rather than to change it.

Bargaining: Once again, interaction was mostly confined to bilateral bargaining. There were two major differences between bargaining during the Johnson and Nixon administration. A higher rank of participants was involved. Both Kissinger and Sisco were directly involved in bilateral bargaining at different times and even President Nixon took an interest on occasion. Second, bargaining was now explicit rather than implicit. Despite these changes the U.S. did not enjoy greater influence on Israeli settlement policy. Apart from the land liberalization controversy, there were no recorded cases of U.S. influence on settlement policy and decision-making.

While having very little influence on Israeli policy, bargaining altered U.S. territorial policy. Kissinger and the NSC adjusted their preferences to a permanent settlement which would take the “defensible borders” concept into account. This is an important reminder that influence on positions can go in both directions. Israel was increasingly aware of the demonstrative influence

200 of its actions.319 The U.S. responded to Israeli commitment, which is not surprising considering their strategy involved supporting the Israeli negotiation position on most issues.

The Nixon administration had also begun utilizing bargaining for demonstrative purposes.

The opinions of Saudi Arabia and Jordan were considered and were the main motivation behind attempts to curtail the most visible effects of Israeli settlement policy such as construction in

Jerusalem and the Galili document. The goal of the Nixon administration was mostly to appear to be doing something rather than geared towards attaining actual influence.320 The USG found it both unlikely and unnecessary to alter the substance of Israeli settlement policy.

Issue Specific Power: Neither Israel nor the U.S. enjoyed an outside option while Israel remained just as comfortable in its inside option as it had been under Eshkol. A U.S. mediated peace process was the only way forward. However, the Nixon administration was more conformable with the inside option than the Johnson administration had been. Therefore, by the end of the period examined here, neither side had an incentive to change the status quo. Both Israel and the

United States agreed (erroneously) that the Arab states were too weak to even consider another round.

Israeli control over the settlement enterprise entered a new phase. Israel believed that it could achieve both “secure borders” and full peace agreements by pursuing a unilateral construction policy matched with successful deterrence. The United States became increasingly convinced that it could not materially influence Israeli policy and that Israel did not intend to withdraw from some (if not all) settlements. Having passed the nascence stage, Israel was

319 N/a, “It is necessary to establish a rural and urban presence – in the territories,” Maariv, May 8, 1969, 2. 320 Pickering to Scowcroft, September 6, 1973, NPSM, NSC Files, CFs – Middle East, 610, NPL.

201 confident that construction would change the bargaining parameters and was gratified to observe the change in the territorial position of the United States. Israel established complete control over the issue during this period.

The U.S. remained uncommitted to the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Middle East was generally at a low priority as global détente and the Vietnam War took center stage. During the period of the Rogers’ initiatives, the Secretary of State received lukewarm support from the

White House and did not reach the stage wherein settlements were even discussed. The importance of the region increased after the Paris Peace agreement of January 1973. While that freed up time and resources to focus on Middle Eastern issues, Kissinger still believed the time was not yet ripe for serious negotiations.

Israel in the meantime was more confident and able to convincingly signal a commitment to “secure borders” and a continued presence in strategic spots. Israeli officials made statements tying themselves to the growing settlement project and vowing to retain settlements where they are.321 It became increasingly confident that its construction was not easily reversible. Therefore, it committed itself publicly and politically to a continuation of the settlement issue. The Meir government greatly increased the issue specific power of Israel through a centralized, public and strategically oriented settlement construction policy. Its improved commitment brought partial results at the bargaining table as the Jordanian and U.S. positions eroded.

The Settlements as a Bargaining Issue: The Israeli government signalled an increasing attachment to some settled territories through two interlocking mechanisms. It stated publicly

321 Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 55; N/a, “From now on Jews will Sit for all Eternity in the Etzion Bloc,” Maariv, March 6, 1970, 13; Knesset Staff Writer, “Meir Confirms Jews will remain in Etzion Bloc for all Eternity,” Maariv, April 1, 1970, 3; Memorandum of conversation, August 10, 1973, 7022-13/A, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, April 16, 1972, 5978-2/FM, ISA.

202 that the platform of the government was that it would control the Jordan River, maintain the

Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, a united Jerusalem and Sharm el-Sheikh. Later the consensus was expanded to include the Rafah Salient as well.322 This meant that the Labor Party and its leadership were making an open commitment to certain settled territories and intentionally incurred domestic audience costs. The public and political nature of commitment to the settlement project was repeated through the Galili document of 1973. If the Meir government went back on a pledge taken that openly it would certainly be costly. The government also signalled that it did not intend to keep the central heavily populated parts of the West Bank in a peace agreement or the majority of the Sinai Peninsula. This signalled that the territory was divisible and that Israel was willing to negotiate over the specifics.

At first glance, the settlement construction policy reinforced its territorial policy. The construction process was streamlined through the Settlement Committee and the map of construction matched the contours of the “oral law.” However, upon closer examination there are indications that there was a fair bit of bluffing behind the Israeli policy. Comments made by

Israeli leaders evinced a lack of conviction that all strategic zones could be retained in negotiations. In addition, the unwillingness of the major decision-makers (with the notable exception of Dayan, who was unable to attain policy influence) to invest in developing settlements to the point of irreversibility, indicates uncertainty as to the fate of settled territories in negotiations. In signalling terms, there was a hesitance to sink costs. This was an attempt to balance between the perceived security needs of Israel and the need to leave the door to a peace agreement ajar.

322 See Memorandum of conversation, April 16, 1972, 5978-2/FM, ISA.

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Aside from Jerusalem, it does not appear that any territory was considered indivisible.

Some territories were more important for security than others. If negotiations had commenced,

Israel would have tried to retain Sharm, the top of the Golan Heights and the Jordan Valley. But a careful analysis of the policies indicates that these demands were amenable to compromise. In

Sharm and the Jordan Valley, Israel insisted on control rather than sovereignty. In the Golan

Heights, settlers remained in temporary quarters for years. The policy was designed to prejudice negotiations in Israel’s favor rather than to prevent them.

Domestic political actors wishing to promote indivisibility gained some influence in the

Meir years. They utilized the sympathy of the press and public to their advantage, thus forcing the government to expend more resources than it had planned, particularly in Ophira and Kiryat Arba.

However, settler advocates at this point did not cooperate in a meaningful way and advocated separately for their specific causes. Indeed, no new settlements were established primarily due to the influence of settler advocacy. The West Bank remained divisible in the minds of Israeli decision-makers and they signalled that large parts of the area could be returned as result of the process of negotiations.

Defection or Cooperation: No commitments were made; tacitly or otherwise, and therefore no agreements were broken. The more open and honest environment was probably a product of two developments. The first was the Israeli decision to signal its commitment to the “oral law.”

Therefore, a policy of obfuscation and misleading agreements was not well suited to Israeli foreign policy. The second was the increasing sense of harmony between the goals of Israel and the United

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States.323 Therefore, it may not have been a question of the “shadow of the future” influencing the utility of cooperation but rather that there was no rational incentive to defect.

323 Kochavi, Nixon and Israel, 75-76.

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Chapter 4

Illegal Actions: the late Nixon and Ford Years 1973-1976

During the period examined here, the USG altered its attitude towards the settlements. By the latter portion of the period examined, Israeli settlement construction was considered a genuine obstacle to peace by the USG and opposed openly by top decision-makers and representatives.

The change never amounted to large scale pressure or the use of coercive diplomacy against

Israel. However, it was significant and set the stage for the policy of the Carter administration.

The change to a more critical policy has been noted in some of the secondary literature1 and missed in other works.2 The extant explanation for this development is the increasingly high- profile of Gush Emunim, a pro-settlement civil society group. The publicity engendered by repeated attempts to settle in Sebastia is believed to have attracted increased American attention and criticism.3 However, the Sebastia affair was of very little interest to the USG. The importance of the issue in the eyes of the Ford administration was greatly exaggerated in Israeli

1 Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements 1967-1977, (New York: Times Books, 2006), 343-345; Donald Neff, “Settlements in U.S. Policy,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Spring 1994), 56-57; Idit Zertal & Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land: The War over Israel’s Settlements in the Occupied Territories, (New York: Nation Books, 2007), 52-53. 2 Ehud Eiran, Settling to Win: Strategic Settlement Projects in Post-Colonial Times, PhD dissertation (Waltham: Brandeis University, 2010). 110-111; William Harris, Taking Root: Israeli Settlement in the West Bank, the Golan and Gaza-Sinai, 1967-1980, (New York: Research Studies Press, 1980), 132; Ronald Ranta, Political Decision Making and Non-Decisions: The Case of Israel and the Occupied Territories (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 177-178; Yael Yishai, Land or Peace, Whither Israel? (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1987), 46-53. 3 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 343-345; Zertal & Eldar, Lords of the Land, 52-53.

206 perception due to the importance of the events of Sebastia for Israeli society and politics.4

Indeed, the contours of Israeli settlement policy had almost no influence on American foreign policy in this period. The later Nixon and Ford administrations pursued a strategy which focused heavily on cementing an alliance between Egypt and the United States. Settlements were only seen as a problem in as much as they proved to be an obstacle to accomplishing the goal.

The main thrust of the argument here is that change in the USG position is attributable to a shift in USG mediation tactics. Kissinger pursued a step-by-step process based on interim agreements rather than a full peace agreement. Seemingly insurmountable obstacles such as the status of Palestinian refugees, the location of final borders, and the nature of peace were now consigned to the background. Instead the process focused on the attainment of limited withdrawals within narrow geographical parameters. When the Arab-Israeli conflict seemed insoluble, settlements were a vague and unimportant impediment to practically unattainable peace agreements. However, in the post-1973 war negotiating environment, settlements took on an immediate and pressing significance.

During Syrian disengagement talks, Kissinger discovered that the location of Israeli settlements was likely to hamper room to maneuver in future negotiations. Accordingly, the

Secretary of State began to raise the issue frequently and to shape a policy more critical towards them. The policy was designed with two ends in mind. The first, to avoid blame for neglecting the Syrian track. Kissinger had promised Syria that following the first disengagement agreement, there would be further movement to pressure Israel into withdrawing from the Golan Heights.

4 On the importance of Sebastia and its role as a watershed moment in Israeli society see Peter Demant, Ploughshares into Swords: Israeli Settlement Policy in the Occupied Territories, 1967-77 (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam PhD Dissertation, 1988), 381-435; Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 308-341; Zertal & Eldar, Lords of the Land, 42-56.

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The Secretary of State changed his mind but remained concerned that Assad will act as a spoiler to the peace process. To explain his reticence to continue the Syrian track, Kissinger exaggerated the importance of the settlements as an obstacle to peace. The change in policy was also designed as a warning to Israel to moderate future construction. Kissinger was experienced and savvy enough to understand that pressure on Israel to evacuate settlements outside the scope of mediation over a permanent settlement was unlikely to work. However, he succeeded in raising the profile of the issue internationally and establishing clearer USG opposition to Israeli policy.

Bilateral confrontation on this issue did not fully emerge during the examined period. The settlements were not yet an immediate obstacle to an agreement. The settlements in the Golan

Heights were adjacent to but not within the bounds of the territory demanded by Syria in negotiations. They did impede a potential further move on the Syrian track. Nontheless, the U.S. was not particularly interested in advancing that process. In Sinai, the major settlements were located far from the area relevant to negotiations. In the West Bank, a deal was unlikely.

However, by the end of Ford’s term, it was clear to USG decision-makers that the day when settlements will become an immediate obstacle was drawing near.

Despite increased American concern, the USG could achieve its primary goal of cementing an alliance with Egypt without forcing the evacuation of Israeli settlements.

Therefore, while increasingly critical and resentful of Israeli settlement construction policy, the

USG was hesitant to put significant pressure on Israel. However, by raising the issue repeatedly and with increased vehemence with Arab and other international leaders, Kissinger contributed to greater international awareness of (and hostility towards) Israeli settlement policy.

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The Interaction of Units

Beliefs and Preferences; U.S. Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict during the Later Nixon and Ford Administrations towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Middle East took center stage in American foreign policy following the 1973 War. The War brought about a disruption of the international oil supply and challenged the policy of détente.

Possibly the most immediate challenge to détente in the Nixon years occurred when following agreement on a ceasefire, violations were exploited by Israel to make further advances and surround the Egyptian Third Army. In response, the Soviet Union threatened to intervene militarily. The USG raised its alertness level to DefCon III, the highest level of alert in peacetime.5

Emerging as a military and economic flashpoint of increasing importance the Middle East remained either the top foreign policy priority or close to it throughout the later Nixon period and the Ford administration.6 Just as importantly, the oil and financial crises following the war had pressed home the need to alter the status quo. Oil prices had tripled and inflation was severe.

5 Memorandum for the Record, October 24/25, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 269. See also Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 531-533; Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1994), 420-433; Jussi Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 315-317; Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), 579-584. 6 Steven Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 312. 6 Memorandum of conversation, August 12, 1974, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974– 1976, eds. Adam M. Howard & Edward C. Keefer (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2011), doc. 95; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 973.

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Kissinger realized that to prevent a repeat of the oil crisis, an Arab-Israeli war had to be prevented and negotiations had to maintain momentum.7

Domestic political factors increased the importance of success in the peace process.

Diplomacy post-Yom Kippur War was conducted in the shadow of the Watergate scandal.8

Developments related to Watergate saw Nixon’s approval rating fall to 17%.9 The administration, crumbling under the pressure of the scandal, desperately needed a foreign policy achievement.10 As Kissinger put it, “we needed a visible if sometimes theatrical, affirmation that

America would survive its anguish.”11 Indeed, the scandal and progress in the peace process were interwoven in Nixon’s decision making.

Towards the end of his tenure, Nixon was no longer fully in control. As historian Robert

Dallek wrote, “he was now, at best, a lame-duck President.”12 However, while the Watergate scandal impeded Nixon in his ability to influence foreign policy, it somehow left Kissinger stronger than before. The NSA had been appointed to the post of Secretary of State two weeks before the war broke out. One of the secrets to his authority was Kissinger’s willingness to participate in the charade that Nixon was still in charge. The White House, with occasional

7 Briefing Paper for President Nixon, October 31, 1973, FRUS XXV, Doc. 302; Memorandum of Conversation, November 1 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, eds. Nina Howland, Craig Daigle, Edward C. Keefer, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2011), doc. 307. 8 For an overview of how Watergate eroded American foreign policy capabilities, See Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 122-127. 9 Dallek, Nixon & Kissinger, 517-518. 10 Telegram from the White House Chief of Staff Haig to Secretary of State Kissinger in Tel Aviv, October 22, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 234; Spiegel, Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 278. 10 Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, 292-294; Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 321; Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, 292-294; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 973. 11 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 126. 12 Dallek, Nixon & Kissinger, 540.

210 interference, allowed Kissinger to run his own show while appropriating progress to the forlorn campaign to keep the President in office.13

Aside from the domestic need for an achievement, the region now offered a realistic prospect of progress in the peace process. A promising situation was produced by a change in the strategic balance. On the one hand, the strategic surprise suffered by Israel at the outbreak of the war and its relatively unimpressive military performance humbled Israel and rendered it more amenable to compromise.14 On the other hand, it also eased Egypt’s ability to make concessions by restoring its national pride, allowing Sadat to negotiate as an equal.15 Sensing the new opportunity, Nixon wrote to Kissinger that “I believe that, beyond a doubt, we are now facing the best opportunity we have had in 15 years to build a lasting peace in the Middle East.”16 Kissinger agreed that the war put the USG in the driver’s seat by proving to Egypt that reliance on the

Soviet Union was unlikely to lead to the return of territory lost in the 1967 War.17

The need for an achievement in Arab-Israeli talks was paramount and the atmosphere more amenable. However, the climate was still not favorable to a permanent settlement. The gaps between the bargaining positions of the belligerents remained significant. Egypt was unwilling to offer Israel full peace while the Rabin and Meir governments remained committed

13 Dallek, Nixon & Kissinger, 522-533; Kenneth Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace (New York: Routledge, 1999), 33. 14 Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 495-505; Amnon Sela & Yael Yishai, Israel the Peaceful Belligerent, 1967-79 (London: MacMillan Press, 1986), 24-36; Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, New York: Norton, 2000), 320-321. 15 Joel Migdal, Shifting Sands: The United States in the Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 85-91; William Qaundt, Decade of Decisions: American Foreign Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967- 1976, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977), 205; David Tal, “Who Needed the October 1973 War?” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 52, No. 5 (2016), 737-753. 16 Telegram from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to Secretary of State Kissinger, October 20, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 218. 17 Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, October 24, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 95; Memorandum of Conversation, October 24, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 261; Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, November 2, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 308.

211 to the “defensible borders” concept. Therefore, Kissinger believed that an attempt to prescribe the terms of a final peace deal would likely be rejected by both sides. The Secretary of State avoided involvement in initiatives he believed had a low chance of success. It was his belief that the prestige of his office and of the U.S. in general would be damaged by failure.

The policy decided upon was a series of small steps, loosely connected to a permanent settlement which would disengage the belligerents. A more modest process had lower chances of failure. The process would build trust and make future concessions possible. In addition, domestic instability pertaining to Watergate and the replacement of the President rendered the administration less likely to take chances. Just as importantly, progress would undermine Soviet influence on the belligerents in a gradual manner.18 The step-by-step process was designed to deal with an uncomfortable situation where progress was necessary but still difficult to attain.

The incremental process was designed to limit Soviet influence.19 In doing so, the goal of bringing Egypt into the American orbit was central. It was long believed that Egypt played the role of leader of the Arab world. In addition, Egypt was the most powerful belligerent facing

Israel and its removal from the conflict would go a long way towards ending the Arab-Israeli conflict and removing the leverage the Soviet Union possessed in the region. Finally, the Nixon administration believed that progress on the Egyptian track was the key to removal of the Saudi oil embargo and undoing the intentional increase of oil price by OPEC members.20 Therefore, as

18 Kissinger to Ford, June 10, 1975, National Security Advisor, Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits (hereafter PBMVV), 1974-76, VIP visits 6/11/75 – Israel – Prime Minister Rabin (1), 10, Ford Presidential Library (hereafter FPL); Raviv to Jerusalem, August 1 1974, 9343-7/FM, ISA. William Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967, (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 131-135; Spiegel, 223-228. 19 For an overview of Kissinger’s tendency to prefer global concerns to regional ones, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 327-333. 20 Atherton to Kissinger, July 26, 1974, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, NSC Files, CFs – Middle East, 612, Nixon Presidential Librray (hereafter NPL); Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, December 22,

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Kissinger explained “our own strategy relied on Sadat as the key to Middle East peace. He was, after all, the most moderate leader and at the helm of the largest country in the region.”21 The importance of this goal in Kissinger’s policy cannot be overstated.

The replacement of Nixon by Ford on August 9, 1974, had a minimal effect on USG strategy. Ford accepted the major tenets of the Nixon-Kissinger approach.22 In addition, the new

President was determined to maintain bureaucratic and administrative continuity.23 This included his decision to keep Kissinger as Secretary of State. The policy of step-by-step interim agreements continued unabated. Continuity was also the order of the day regarding the pro-

Egyptian tilt of USG Middle Eastern policy. Ford had been a long-time friend of Israel as a legislative leader. However, as President he proved committed to Kissinger’s vision. The Ford administration tried to balance their alliance with Israel with the budding strategic relationship with Egypt. However, when there was a frontal contradiction between the two, the Egyptian position was preferred.

The overwhelming and unprecedented influence of Kissinger was curtailed somewhat in

November 1975. Ford made several personnel changes. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was dismissed and Donald Rumsfeld was appointed as in his stead. Rumsfeld had far more influence with the President than his predecessor and Kissinger was no longer unchallenged. In addition, the Secretary of State was relieved of the role of National Security Advisor and replaced by Brent Scowcroft. Although Scowcroft was loyal to Kissinger, the removal of the

1973, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room (hereafter FOIA); Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, January 7 1974, FOIA. 21 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 356. 22 John Robert Greene, The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 117. 23 Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald Ford (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 131; Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 489-493.

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NSC from under his control clipped his wings.24 Still, in the Middle East, the Secretary of State maintained his primacy.

More substantial domestic political problems undermined the Kissinger/Ford foreign policy towards the end of the term. A rising antipathy towards détente was in evidence amongst both liberals and conservatives. This was closely tied to the eroding trust of both Congress and the public in the executive power of the White House in the aftermath of Watergate. A series of policy setbacks both domestically and internationally further eroded confidence in the administration. The decision to pardon Nixon in September 1974 and the fall of South Vietnam in April 1975 were notable in this regard.25

The weakness of the administration was seized upon by political rivals such as Henry

Jackson and Ronald Reagan to bludgeon the hapless President. Ford faced a difficult primary challenge from Reagan. This was followed by a challenging and ultimately failed general election campaign. The upshot of these factors was that by late 1975, the administration was unable to run its foreign policy as successfully as it had in the past. However, by this time the

Ford administration had attained its major Middle East policy goal and cemented the alliance with Egypt.

24 Greene, Presidency of Gerald R. Ford, 160-161; Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 492-493. 25 Greene, Presidency of Gerald R. Ford, 117-129; Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 594-620.

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U.S. Beliefs and Preferences: The Policy of the later Nixon and Ford Administrations towards the Occupied Territories and the Settlements

The USG intentionally avoided formulating a territorial policy in the post-1973 War period.

Placing his trust in a process of step-by-step negotiations, Kissinger saw attempts to nail down a territorial formula for a permanent resolution as damaging to the constructive ambiguity necessary to maintain progress.26 Kissinger told leaders of the Jewish community, “there is no

U.S. position on secure borders. There won’t be, as long as it is humanly possible. Our strategy is to postpone the question.”27 Rather the goal was to attain a partial agreement and bring peace gradually closer. Since the USG did not believe a peace settlement could be attained yet, its exact contours were seldom discussed. This meant that the specific location of settlements was not of great importance, unless they involved territory in the center of interim negotiations.

Not much has been written on Kissinger’s attitude towards the settlements. That which has been written is based on wild allegations. The stream of literature critical of Kissinger tends to see him as a knowing instrument in occupation and settlement construction. For example,

Jeremi Suri wrote “Kissinger’s policies did not address the anger, resentment, and desires for political change voiced by citizens living in Arab societies and the territories occupied by Israel after 1967…Washington became an indirect financier of new Israeli settlements.”28 Noam

Chomsky takes this criticism further and wrote “post-1973 Kissinger diplomacy was designed to exclude Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict, thus making it possible for the Labor government

26 Memorandum of Conversation, September 13, 1974, 5976-8/FM, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, September 13 1974, National Security Advisor, Kissinger-Scowcroft Files, 1969-1977: General Subject File: Iran (4), 16, FPL. 27 Memorandum of Conversation, December 27, 1973, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 28 Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007), 270.

215 to pursue its program.”29 Other less hostile narratives assume that Kissinger and Ford perpetuated the indifference evinced by the Nixon and Johnson administrations towards Israeli settlement construction.30

The truth is more nuanced. Kissinger provided tacit support of Israeli settlement construction before the 1973 War. The step-by-step process brought about a change in his perception. The waning days of the Ford administration saw the USG engender a deep hostility towards Israeli settlement construction. The turning point in Kissinger’s attitude came in the midst of the Israeli-Syrian disengagement negotiations as the result of two mutually reinforcing processes. First, the change from the pursuit of a permanent settlement to a focus on modest interim agreements. The U.S. strategy formulated by Rogers had been geared towards resolving the entire conflict. Kissinger promoted an opposing view of wearing down Arab resistance by supporting the Israeli position. Both approaches rendered smaller and more specific questions such as the construction of settlements irrelevant if larger dilemmas had not been tackled. By way of contrast, the step-by-step approach focused on small geographic issues. In the Syrian disengagement one or two hills could take up days of negotiation. In the new negotiation environment, even minor and meagrely populated settlements loomed large.

Second, the modification in the format of negotiations and the change in Kissinger’s attitude, altered the importance the Arab states ascribed to the issue. The Secretary of State exaggerated the extent to which settlements in the Golan Heights blocked future negotiations.31

29 Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel & the Palestinians, Cambridge: South End Press, 1999), 107. 30 Eiran, Settling to Win, 110-111; Harris, Taking Root, 132; Ranta, Political Decision Making, 177-178; Yishai, Land or Peace, 46-53. 31 Memorandum of conversation, March 5, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Kissinger referred to his ignorance in other conversations too. See for example Memorandum of conversation, March 5, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1046.

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As a result, Arab leaders increasingly regarded the settlements as a crucial factor in and of themselves. Beforehand, Arab leaders viewed the settlements as another symptom of Israeli expansionism.

The change in tone and attitude in Damascus, Amman and was striking. In the immediate aftermath of the 1973 War, settlements were rarely mentioned by Arab leaders. A gradual change in their attitudes is evinced in both public and private talks. By the waning days of the administration, settlements were mentioned frequently in bilateral talks and the issue was repeatedly raised in the United Nations by Arab and Muslim states.32 The increase in concern amongst the Arab states in turn heightened American sensitivity to the issue. As a result, the

Ford administration took stronger steps such as issuing a demarche and supporting anti- settlement resolutions.33 Thus a mutual feedback loop of Arab and USG concern significantly raised the profile of the issue. The process would mature fully during the Carter administration.

Though quite tangible, the change in U.S. policy should not be overstated. It manifested in tone rather than substance. The rhetoric in the final year and a half of the Ford administration changed significantly but the United States failed to respond resolutely to Israeli settlement activity. There were two partial and hesitant exceptions to this rule. The first was the furious reaction of Kissinger and Ford to an Israeli announcement that new settlements would be built in the Golan Heights in November 1975. This led to an official demarche (which was never

32 See for example Dafni to Dinitz, July 24, 1974, 7413-10/A, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, September 3, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; North American Department to Jerusalem, November 22, 1976, 6729-5/FM, ISA; Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 369-370. 33 N/A, 1972, Arab-Israel affairs, , 59 /A1-5632/5, USNA; Sober to Kissinger, November 4, 1974, National Security Advisor, The Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974-76, 3, FPL; Telecon, March 24, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Telecon, March 24, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Telecon, March 24, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Telecon, March 24, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of conversation, May 14, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Telecon, November 12, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Telecon, November 12, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA.

217 officially delivered) demanding that Israel cease construction of settlements in general.34 The second occasion was a speech given by U.S. ambassador to the United Nations William Scranton in March 1976, which denounced Israeli settlement construction and declared they were illegal.35

Although both events were confrontational in an unprecedented way, neither was followed up with notable pressure on Israel.

A showdown was not necessary and therefore avoided. The USG could attain its primary strategic goal of cementing an alliance with Egypt without resorting to a costly contest of wills with Israel over settlements. A head on collision with Israel stood to rupture strategic relations and derail negotiations. In addition, a public confrontation with Israel raised the prospect of harmful domestic political costs for a politically vulnerable administration. Kissinger could avoid this route for the time being. U.S. behavior regarding the settlement issue can be contrasted with the significant pressure the Ford administration applied on GOI when refused to withdraw from the Sinai passes in the “reassessment” affair.36 While the settlements were clearly poised to become a serious problem in the future, there was little to gain in the short-term through a public and costly spat.

34 Memorandum of conversation, December 7, 1975, 7414-7/A, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, December 7, 1975, 4997-2/A, ISA. 35 USUN, March 23, 1976, Chief of Staff Jordan, 35, Carter Presidential Library, (hereafter CPL). 36 Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ford, March 20, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 153; Ford to Rabin, March 21, 1975, 5974-11/FM, ISA; Memorandum of Conversation, March 20, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of Conversation, March 24, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 159; Memorandum of Conversation, March 24, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 161; Memorandum of Conversation, March 25, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA.

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Israeli Preferences and Beliefs: Territorial Policy under the Rabin Government

There is a long-standing argument that the first Rabin government did not have a coherent policy or strategy due to rivalry amongst the troika of Rabin, Allon and Peres.37 The evidence does not support this view, at least in terms of foreign policy. There is no question that there were serious tensions between the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister. Rabin visibly detested Peres and the Defense Minister seems to have attempted to undermine official government policy. In addition, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon was sidelined and belittled by the premier. However, these rivalries had little influence on the formulation of U.S.-Israeli relations or the peace process. The Prime Minister had a clear strategy for Israeli foreign policy and, for the most part, guided Israel in the preferred direction.

A major tenet of Rabin’s foreign policy was a belief in the primacy of U.S.-Israeli relations. Strategic reliance on the USG was more than just a necessary evil in Rabin’s eyes. The

Prime Minister had stressed the importance of obtaining American weapons systems to ensure

Israeli qualitative superiority throughout his military and diplomatic career. Furthermore, he believed the USG was instrumental in deterring direct Soviet involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.38 As Prime Minister he stated that “Israel’s very existence will be in jeopardy in case of total desertion by the United States.”39 While Rabin fiercely defended Israeli interests, he was

37 Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ford, October 13, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 106; Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 380-381; Ehud Manor, Yigal Allon: Political Biography 1949-1980 (Or Yehuda: Kinneret, 2016), 330-334; Quandt, Peace Process, 157-159; Shlaim, Iron Wall, 326-329. 38 Rabin to Eban, May 1, 1969, 7412-3/A, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, May 1, 1970, 9357-13/FM, ISA; Rabin to Gazit, March 16 1971, 9341-18/FM, ISA; Efraim Inbar, Rabin and Israel’s National Security (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 34-52; Rabin, Rabin Memoirs, 54-55; Amos Shifris, First Rabin Government, 1974-1977 (Tzur Yigal: Porath, 2013), 78-91. 39 Inbar, Rabin and Israel’s National Security, 43.

219 loath to risk a lasting rupture with the United States. This facilitated Israeli cooperation with

Kissinger’s step-by-step diplomatic process.

The step-by-step process also suited Rabin’s mentality and strategy. The Prime Minister was a noted pessimist, cautious in his approach to negotiations. In his inaugural speech, he exclaimed that Israel would “seek a way to advance towards peace by stages”, because then

Israel could test the Arab states and determine if they “are really bound for peace or not.”40

Delaying progress in the peace process and buying time were stated goals of the Rabin government. Not because he did not believe peace was possible but since in his estimation the international environment was inauspicious for Israeli concessions. As he explained in a cabinet meeting, the Yom Kippur War created a difficult international situation for Israel. The oil crisis had isolated it diplomatically and increased the bargaining leverage of the Arab world. Therefore

“when I am asked, what is the strategy of Israel? My answer is to buy time.”41 A better permanent settlement was likely sometime in the future. Defense Minister Peres opposed this worldview and preferred an immediate bid for a permanent settlement.42 However, despite this opposition the Rabin government successfully cooperated with the step-by-step process.

Rabin also agreed with the emphasis the United States placed on the Egyptian track. As a hard-nosed former general, he believed strongly in removing the threat of the largest Arab military force.43 Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Allon retained a strong desire to advance his own

40 Rabin speech, June 3, 1974, S-1066/10/16, UNA. 41 Memorandum of conversation, December 2, 1974, 7414-10/A, ISA. 42 Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ford, February 11, 1975, FRUS 26, 507; Memorandum of conversation, March 27, 1975, FRUS 26, 577-580; Memorandum of conversation, March 31 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 169; Shlomo Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 150-151; Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 364; Manor, Yigal Allon, 332-334; Shifris, First Rabin Government, 49-55 43 Memorandum of conversation, March 14, 1975, 7419-6/A, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, March 16 1975, 7419-6/A, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, March 18, 1975, 7419-6/A, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, June

220 plan along the Jordanian track. However, Allon and his viewpoint were marginalized by Rabin.44

The Prime Minister saw the Palestinian question as peripheral in relation to the larger threat posed by the conventional Arab militaries. He further believed King Hussein was too politically vulnerable to make a deal. On the other hand, the Prime Minister opposed negotiating with the

PLO whom he considered to be irredeemable terrorists. In this he was completely in tune with

Kissinger’s own perception.45 In general, Rabin and Kissinger possessed similar strategic outlooks. This compatibility on basic perceptions of the conflict also explains why the settlements, despite their rising salience as an international issue, did not become a major irritant in bilateral relations during this period. Ultimately, both Rabin and Kissinger could attain their major policy goals without confrontation.

There was a fascinating paradox in relations between Kissinger and Rabin during the

Ford years. Despite the basic compatibility between their positions, the Rabin government and

Ford administration clashed repeatedly. Arguments over policy often took on a bitter and personal character. This was a result of the overarching importance of bringing Egypt successfully into the American camp. Due to the centrality of the emerging U.S.-Egyptian

6 1975, 5978-9/FM, ISA; Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 441; Quandt, Peace Process, 158; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 174. 44 Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, January 7, 1976, FOIA; Memorandum of Conversation, July 31, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 44 Gazit to Allon, July 31, 1974, USA 9343-7/FM, ISA; Gazit to Allon, July 31, 1974, 9343-7/FM, ISA; Raviv to Jerusalem, August 1, 1974, 9343-7/FM, ISA; Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 364; Manor, Yigal Allon, 318-319; Ranta, Political Decision Making, 146-147. 45 On Rabin and his attitude towards the PLO see Memorandum of conversation, September 10, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 99; Shifris, First Rabin Government, 109-113. On the role of the Palestinians in Rabin’s strategic thinking, see Inbar, Rabin and Israel’s National Security, 23-29. On Kissinger and his attitude towards the PLO see Memorandum of conversation, July 30, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 93; Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ford, October 14, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 109; Minutes of a National Security Meeting, October 18, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 111; Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ford, October 30, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 1; Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ford, November 3, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 114.

221 strategic partnership, Israeli obstinacy in negotiations was often viewed as a direct affront to the

American national interest.

Israeli Preferences and Beliefs: Israeli Settlement Policy under the Rabin Government

There was a strong measure of continuity in official Israeli settlement policy and personnel from the Meir government to the Rabin government. Although Galili no longer maintained the direct influence on overall policy that he had in the Meir years, he remained head of the Settlement

Committee and continued to steer official Israeli settlement policy along the lines of the Allon

Plan.46 The continuity is misleading. Beneath the surface, enthusiasm for settlement construction in the Labor Party had been dampened. One of the major reasons, was the inability of the settlements in the Golan Heights to fulfill a useful military role in the war. As mentioned previously, the Labor Party tended to view settlements as an integral component in its security policy. When it invaded, the Syrian military bypassed most settlements. They failed to bolster the defenses of the IDF. Rather they proved to be a distraction, forcing the military to utilize much needed resources to evacuate and protect civilians in the Golan Heights.47 Just as importantly, the strategy Israel had developed of building settlements to signal to the Arab states that time was not on their side had failed. In response to Israeli diplomatic pressure Syria and

Egypt preferred to go to war and restore their prestige rather than moderate their demands.48

Statements along the lines of those made before the war, that settlements were a form of

46 Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 144; Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 289; Yigal Kipnis, The Golan Heights: Political History, Settlement and Geography since 1949 (London; Routledge, 2013), 162. 47 Demant, Ploughshares into Swords, 282; Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 262-263; Edgar O’Ballance, No Victor, No Vanquished: the Yom Kippur War (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 130-131. 48 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 635-641; Quandt, Peace Process, 124-126; Shlaim, Iron Wall, 317-318.

222 bargaining leverage or a deterrent to force the Arab states to the negotiating table were no longer uttered.

A large contingent in the Labor Party now hoped that the Galili document would be annulled.49 The platform of the Labor Party after the war, sometimes referred to as the

“fourteen-point document”, had a less ambitious plank settlement plank. The new principles of the party called for settlement construction “occasionally in accordance with government decisions.” Neither the “oral law” nor the Galili document were revoked, but they were not mentioned in the platform.50

While enthusiasm for settlements in the Labor Party waned, in national-religious circles it increased. The settlement efforts of official Israel were challenged by the rising power of a civil society group known as Gush Emunim. The activists challenged the Allon Plan borders and made a point of attempting to establish settlements in the heart of Samaria, the area slated for return to Jordan in a future peace agreement. At first the attempts by the group to settle outside the bounds of the Allon Plan were opposed effectively by the government.

However, in mid-1975 an attempt to settle in Ein-Yabrod was not evacuated. The attempt was made in a military camp and this allowed the Defense Ministry jurisdiction over the issue. Here Gush Emunim exploited the support of the RAFI faction, of which the Defense

Minister was the leader, for the construction of settlements throughout the West Bank. The mood of the government and the public changed in late 1975, as a patriotic reaction to the UN General

Assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism.51 The Rabin government found it

49 Memorandum of conversation, December 3, 1973, Labor platform 15-46-39-2 YT. 50 Labor Party platform, November 27, 1973, Labor platform 15-46-39-2, YT. 51 Galili to Rabin, November 24, 1975, Galili-Rabin 15-4-10, YT. See also N/a, February 22, 1976, Settlements 12-3- 94-1, YT; N/a, February 22, 1976, Settlements 12-3-94-1, YT.

223 increasingly challenging to evacuate settlers, though they never fully supported the wildcat settlement. The issue of long term settlement outside the Allon Plan would remain undecided during the period examined in this chapter. If so, the Rabin government continued to construct settlements along the lines of its predecessor. However, the security-diplomatic impetus behind its policy had been enfeebled. Meanwhile, the political forces which wished to settle throughout the West Bank were too strong to ignore.52

The Environment: The Strategic Setting and U.S. Policy during the Late Nixon Era: Israeli

Strategic Utility Lessens

The 1973 War: Israeli Strategic Utility Decreases

The 1973 War altered the balance of power in the Middle East and reduced Israeli strategic utility to the United States in more than one way. Egypt managed to surprise Israel and successfully established a bridgehead on the eastern side of the Suez Canal. This dented the image of Israeli military invincibility. Although Israel ultimately gained the upper hand, its military reputation was shaken. A Defense Intelligence Agency report concluded that the strategic balance in the Middle East had been significantly altered. “Only substantially superior

Israeli military capabilities can adequately deter continued Arab efforts…the present course of hostilities suggests that the Israelis no longer possess the requisite degree of superiority.”53 The

IDF was significantly strengthened by a large-scale rearming program during Rabin’s tenure.

52 Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 144; Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 289; Kipnis, Golan Heights, 162. 53 Paper Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency, Undated, FRUS XXV, doc. 265.

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However, the faith the USG had in the Israeli ability to go it alone militarily had been irrevocably compromised.

Correspondingly, the war deepened Israeli dependence on the United States. Three days into the war, Israeli Ambassador to the United States Simcha Dinitz reported to Kissinger that

Israel had lost 49 fighters and 500 tanks and ammunition supplies were low.54 On October 13 the

United States began a massive mission to resupply Israel with roughly 11,000 tons of equipment.

In addition, Israel lost a degree of its autonomy when the United States forced a ceasefire on

Israel just as it was about to completely encircle the Egyptian Third Army. Kissinger warned

Dinitz, “there is a limit beyond which you cannot push the President…You play your game and you will see what happens.”55 The order to cease attacks on the entrapped formation and allow in non-military supplies was viewed as an ultimatum and obeyed accordingly.56 The war also isolated Israel diplomatically. It lost some support in Europe while most African states cut diplomatic ties. A low point for the Israeli diplomatic standing was the passing of UN General

Assembly Resolution 3379 on Zionism, which referred to the founding ideology of the state as “a form of racism and racial discrimination".57 The US increasingly found itself vetoing anti-Israel resolutions as the lone dissenting vote.

54 Memorandum of conversation, October 9, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 134; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 492. 55 Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Israeli Ambassador, October 26, 1973, FRUS XXV, Doc. 284. 56 Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Israeli Ambassador, , October 26, 1973, FRUS XXV, Doc. 289; Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel, the Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1987), 219-223; Herbert Druks, The Uncertain Alliance: The U.S. and Israel from Kennedy to the Peace Process (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 142-143; Cheryl Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 163-164. David Schoenbaum, The United States and the State of Israel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 208-210. 57 United Nations General Assembly, November 10 1975, United Nations, https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/000/92/IMG/NR000092.pdf?OpenElement {accessed: August 12 2016} Emanuel Navon, A Plight Among Nations: Israel’s Foreign Policy between Nationalism and Realism, (Saarbrucken: VDM Verlag, 2009), 125-134.

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The USG was aware of the depth of Israeli dependence. Kissinger opined that “they know they would have lost this war except for us… If we cut our diplomatic support, they’re dead.”58 In a meeting taking place at the end of the war, Kissinger and William E. Colby,

Director of the CIA, agreed that the new circumstances meant that Israel was more likely to yield to pressure. Kissinger said of Israeli negotiations with Jordan that “the goddamn Israelis won’t give them a thing.” Colby replied, “they’ll have to now.”59 The Israeli government was keenly aware of this situation. A New York Times article quotes an Israeli official anonymously telling the reporter that “no one likes to be completely dependent on one friend, no matter how close a friend he may be. We are vulnerable and we know it.”60 The level of Israeli dependence was certainly higher than any time since 1967.

Israeli strategic utility was further reduced by the potential the 1973 War had of undermining détente. Towards the conclusion of hostilities, the USSR attempted to introduce

Soviet forces into the region as part of a UN peacekeeping force.61 When this suggestion was resisted by the U.S., the USSR threatened to act unilaterally to stop the Israeli advance. In response the USG raised the level of military alert to DEFCON III and alerted several ground units, while moving naval units close to the theater of operations.62 Although the potential for actual combat between US and Soviet forces was not high, Kissinger believed that this was the most significant crisis involving the Soviet Union since the Cuban missile crisis.63 Overall, it is

58 Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, October 24, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 259. 59 Memorandum of Conversation, October 24, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 261. 60 Terence Smith, “Israelis Apprehensive About Dependence on the U.S,” New York Times, June 16, 1974, 26. 61 Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Israeli Ambassador, October 24, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 181. 62 Memorandum for the Record, October 24/25, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 269. See also Dallek, Nixon & Kissinger, 531-533; Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 420-433; Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, 315-317; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 579-584. 63 Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the White House Chief of Staff, October 26, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 285.

226 reasonable to say that Israeli behavior in the 1973 War, and particularly its decision to counter- attack across the Suez Canal, hindered détente.

American economic interests were harmed as well. Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia announced an oil embargo on the United States due to their wartime support for Israel. More importantly, decreased production from the OPEC states raised the price of oil worldwide and created shortages.64 Furthermore, the events of the war and the oil crisis that followed it placed increasing strain on relations between the USG and its Western European allies. Failure of most

NATO allies to support American policy both during and after the war upset its closest alliances.65 On several important levels, American support for Israel had damaged its global interests.

While Israeli strategic utility declined, the importance and strategic value of Egypt increased. Not only had Egypt evinced far better military capabilities than expected in the war, they also displayed a surprisingly high degree of political influence during the economic and political crisis that followed. The “oil crisis”, as it was known, was the major problem facing the

Nixon administration in the immediate aftermath of the war. It became apparent to that Egypt held the key to the removal of the boycott. Saudi Arabia would not alter its policy unless the

Egyptian government gave its approval.66

64 Lloyd Gardner, The Road to Tahrir Square: Egypt and the United States from the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak (New York: New Press, 2011), 127-128, 135; Quandt, Decade of Decision, 200-206; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 153-154. 65 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 450-454. 66 Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, January 13, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 4; Telegram from Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, January 19, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 15; Gardner, The Road to Tahrir Square, pp. 127- 128, 135; Quandt, Decade of Decision, 200-206; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 153-154.

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The sum of these developments was that Israel now possessed lower relative strategic value than it had during the 1967-1973 period, while the strategic value of Egypt rose significantly.67 This is not to say that Israel lost most of its strategic value. The Israeli military maintained its overall military superiority.68 Furthermore, the goodwill of Israel was necessary to attaining the strategic goals of the USG as it possessed the territorial assets necessary to bring

Egypt into the American camp. However, due to its decreased strategic utility and increased dependence on the United States, Israel was more pliable and more prone to respond to pressure.

Correspondingly, the Arab states, and particularly Egypt, had proven increased military and political utility and their positions were taken more seriously.

The Environment: The Domestic Political Situation

The period examined here was one of unprecedented turmoil in Israeli domestic politics. Prime

Minister Meir and her government were weakened considerably by the 1973 War. In April 1974

Meir resigned and oversaw a caretaker government until Rabin took over in June. The first Rabin tenure has been noted for its dysfunction due to personal rivalry. The government dissolved in

December 1976 and the country was led by a caretaker government until May 1977, when the

Labor Party lost power. Throughout the period, Labor Party hegemony eroded as the Likud increasingly challenged it. Labor also found that it could no longer rely on the support of its

67 Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, January 6, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 3; Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, January 13, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 5; Telegram From Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, January 19, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 15; Memorandum of Conversation, January 21, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 16; Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section in Syria, February 5, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 21; Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ford, November 6, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 115. 68 Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, January 13, 1976, FRUS XXVI, doc 254.

228 historical ally, the NRP, which due to an increasingly hawkish orientation moved closer to the

Likud.

Paradoxically, in this time of upheaval and instability Israel proved more able and willing to make concessions than ever before. Elections were held in December 1973 and the Labor

Party retained power with a reduced majority. The first disengagement was signed when the government was still nominally stable. The Meir government was shaken in February when

Dayan announced that he would not participate in a new government.69 Unable to form a stable new coalition, Meir resigned. This announcement was then retracted a few days later and Meir formed a new coalition.70 The new coalition was destabilized almost immediately by the publication of the interim findings of the Agranat Commission, a national investigation inquiry into the failings of the 1973 October War. The commission put the blame squarely on the shoulders of the military brass. Chief of Staff David Elazar was forced to resign. Public demonstrations calling for the government to resign intensified.71 A few days later Meir resigned permanently. The cabinet decided to maintain the existing government but select a new leadership.72

Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres competed for the leadership and Rabin narrowly won.

The result was surprisingly close, proving that Peres had support not only from his own RAFI

69 Yosef Harif, “Golda meets Dayan this morning: will try to convince him to retract his decision,” Davar, February 20 1974, 1. 70 Maariv staff, March 6, 1974, Maariv, 1; M. Shmaryahu, “The government will be presented in the Knesset on Sunday,” Maariv, March 7 1974, 1. 71 Marcus Eliason, “Road end reached: Meir to Resign in Israel dispute,” Washington Post, April 10, 1974, A1; N/a, “The government accepts the resignation of the Chief of Staff following the Agranat Commission,” Davar, April 3, 1974, 1. 72 Yosef Harif & Yehoshua Bitzur, “Golda will announce her resignation today at the cabinet meeting, to the President and the Knesset,” Maariv. April 11, 1974, 1.

229 faction, but also from a sizable minority of MAPAI members.73 In May, Rabin managed to form a government and appointed Peres as Defense Minister. The appointment was forced on the

Prime Minister, who harbored disdain and distrust for his rival, by the harsh realities of party factionalism. There was concern that if Peres was not appointed, the RAFI faction would bolt. 74

Meanwhile, Allon was given the post of Foreign Minister to appease the Achdut Ha’avoda faction and balance against Peres.75 Rabin was unable to bring the NRP into the coalition, as differences over religious issues proved overly contentious. Instead he formed a minimal majority government with two tiny parties. On paper at least, this was the weakest government in

Israeli history.76

At the time, the NRP was being torn apart in a struggle between the older pragmatic dovish faction and a younger messianic and hawkish faction. The coalition was incredibly narrow, consisting of the minimal number of 61 needed for a majority.77 Though weak, it did not depend on the NRP or Likud (as the new right-wing party which replaced GAHAL was known).

However, in theory, any small pro-settlement faction in the Labor Party could bring the government down.

Rabin wished to expand the government. Therefore, the NRP and Labor Party negotiated the return of the religious party to the coalition over lengthy and difficult negotiations. Yehuda

Ben-Meir and , two pro-Gush Emunim members of the NRP insisted on an expanded settlement program as a condition for the joining the coalition. The party agreed to a

73 Terence Smith, “Rabin's Job: Factions a Big Obstacle to Israeli Cabinet,” New York Times, April 25, 1974, 2; Dan Patir, “Alignment delegation will suggest to the President that Rabin form government,” Davar, April 23, 1974, 1. 74 Michael Bar-Zohar, Phoenix: Shimon Peres: A Political Biography (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2006), 416-422, 426-428; Matti Golan, The Road to Peace: a Biography of Shimon Peres (New York: Warner Books, 1989), 132-139; Shifris, First Rabin Government, 188-199. 75 Shifris, First Rabin Government, 178-181. 76 Ranta, Political Decision Making, 140; Shifris, First Rabin Government, 181-188. 77 Ranta, Political Decision Making, 140.

230 formula which supported settlement anywhere in the occupied territories, but only with direct government approval.78 Pro-settlement forces were strong in the Rabin government but they did not have the ability to dissolve the government. A much bigger threat to government stability, and to its ability to follow an independent settlement policy, was presented by Gush Emunim itself. Their influence, which was considerable, will be explored at length below.

It was during this tumultuous period that Israel made some of its most significant concessions as it signed three disengagement agreements. The first disengagement agreement was reached in January 1974, as the government awaited the interim conclusions of the Agranat

Commission. Meir’s resignation and replacement by Rabin took place during the successful negotiations over Syrian disengagement. Despite the difficult domestic circumstances, Israel displayed remarkable flexibility and seemed willing (though unenthusiastic) to pursue further agreements. This would seem to indicate that domestic influences were not paramount in determining the success of negotiations.

In the United States, the late Nixon and Ford administrations continued to formulate a policy based on the national interest rather than domestic political expediency. The Ford administration did not believe they were likely to get much of the Jewish vote no matter what their policy was on Israel. In addition, Kissinger did not take the “Israel lobby” very seriously at first. When Max Fisher, the unofficial liaison of the American Jewish community to both the

Ford and Nixon administrations, told Kissinger that he received a call from AIPAC. The

Secretary of State asked “what is APAC? [sic]”79

78 Dan Patir, “MAPAm and the Independent Liberals demand that the NRP join government,” Davar, October 11, 1974, 1; UPI, “Expulsion of settlers from West Bank stirs Israeli debate,” Washington Post, October 11 1974, A15. 79 Telecon, April 2 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of conversation, August 19 1975, 6710- 11/FM, ISA.

231

The scuffle over the Egyptian “reassessment” affair taught Ford and Kissinger that Israel and its supporters could wield significant political clout. Its influence was not translated into sway over settlement policy. When the Ford administration began to criticize Israeli settlement construction in its latter days, the “Israel lobby” did little to counter it. The U.S. ambassador to the UN, William Scranton gave a speech calling the settlements illegal and criticizing Israeli policy in Jerusalem.80 American Jewish groups protested Scranton’s speech, but notably mentioned only Jerusalem and not the settlements in general.81 The “Israel lobby” was still uninterested in fighting this battle.

Multi-Leveled Interaction

The Geneva Conference: A Cover for Shutting the USSR Out

The official international forum to resolve the crisis of the 1973 War was the Geneva

Conference. The conference was organized as a UN vehicle for the implementation of UNSC

Resolution 338, which called for an immediate cessation of hostilities followed by negotiations.82

It was determined that negotiations would be held under the auspices of the Conference which the United States and Soviet Union co-chaired. It convened on December 21, 1973, with

Egyptian, Jordanian and Israeli delegations in attendance. Syria did not appear, but gave its

80 USUN, March 23 1976, Chief of Staff Jordan, 35, CPL. 81 N/a, “Two Jewish groups criticize Scranton,” New York Times, March 29, 1976, 49. 82 United Nations Security Council, October 22, 1973, Yale Avalon Project, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/un338.htm {accessed July 16, 2016}

232 indirect blessing. A Palestinian delegation was not invited to placate Israel. However, just getting the sides to sit at the same table seemed like a significant achievement. 83

In practice, the conference was utilized by the USG as a tool to shut the USSR out of negotiations while creating the illusion of meaningful participation. Agreements reached through

American mediation elsewhere could be presented and approved at the conference, giving them legitimacy.84 Despite having little actual influence on the negotiation process, the Geneva

Conference and its possible convention and then reconvention were constantly in the background as either a complement to or replacement for the step-by-step negotiation process.

Egyptian Disengagement: Sinai 1

Substantive negotiations between the Israel and Egypt took place as part of an American mediated process of interim agreements away from Geneva. The military and diplomatic situation immediately following the war called for the disengagement of belligerent forces, particularly on the Egyptian front. This was quickly achieved.85 Building on this success, the

USG pursued a wider disengagement agreement which would untangle the military situation in

Sinai. The pursuit of Egyptian-Israeli disengagement saw Kissinger utilize “shuttle diplomacy” for the first time. The Secretary of State flew back and forth between Israel and Egypt, forwarding new proposals while trying to minimize points of contention.86 On January 19, 1974,

83 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 770-785. 84 Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon, December 19, 1973, FRUS 25, 1568-1571; Memorandum of Conversation, January 21, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 17; Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, 302-331; Quandt, Peace Process, 135. 85 Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, November 8, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 327; White House Press Release, November 9, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 334. 86 Quandt, Peace Process, 142.

233 the first disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt was signed and designated as a step towards a permanent settlement. 87

The Egyptian track was the focus of USG policy throughout this period. Neither of the two Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreements involved bargaining over settled areas.

Therefore, it is not central to the topic covered here. During the initial round of talks between

Israel and Egypt, the NSC staff suggested that Israel announce a cessation of settlement construction. The settlements were not in or near the areas of combat but the freezing of construction could have been used as a bargaining chip during negotiations. Notably, Egypt did not demand this. All parties seemed to agree that the issue was an unnecessary distraction in

Israeli-Egyptian disengagement process. 88

Official vs. Unofficial Settlements: The Gush Emunim Era

The pace of officially sanctioned settlement construction remained lackadaisical under Rabin, much as it had been under Golda Meir. However, construction and planning did take place. The central project taken on was establishing a ring of settlements around Jerusalem. The ring envisioned stretched 30-40 kilometers from Jerusalem in a manner which would cut in half the area slated for return to Jordan.89 Outside of Jerusalem, little was done in terms of official settlement construction. Most of the dramatic developments involved the rise of Gush Emunim, a pro-settlement civil society actor. They receive less attention here as they have already been

87 Memorandum of Understanding, January 18, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 14. 88 Memorandum from Harold H. Saunders and William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, November 3, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 319. 89 Demant, Ploughshares into Swords, 503-505; Galili to Rabin, November 1, 1974, Galili-Rabin 15-4-10, YT; Galili to Rabin, December 1, 1974, Galili-Rabin 15-4-10, YT; Memorandum of conversation, July 24, 1975, Galili-Ofer 15-4-47, YT.

234 covered extensively elsewhere. 90 In addition, despite their dramatic influence on Israeli politics in the 1970’s, the civil society group had a surprisingly minor influence on U.S.-Israel relations.

The extent of Gush Emunim influence on Israeli domestic politics has been overestimated. Much of the literature on the topic describe the relations between GOI and Gush

Emunim as typified by tacit support for the civil-society group amongst elements in the government.91 However, the evidence points to a strong animus against Gush Emunim by most powerful members of the government and the Labor Party. The extra-parliamentary group was treated by most members of the ruling party as a threat to its hegemony. This was partially because members of the group, particularly Hanan Porat, had close ties with the Likud and members of the NRP sympathetic to Gush Emunim were pushing the party towards an alliance with the Likud. This was a direct challenge to the ability of the Labor Party to form coalitions in the future.92

More importantly, the ideology of Gush Emunim was a challenge to the diplomatic and security policies of the governing Labor Party. The group espoused a Zionist-religious philosophy based on the centrality of the physical Land of Israel to the redemption of the Jewish people. According to this approach, the Jewish people enjoyed divine right to all land in the

90 Eliezer Don-Yehiya, “Jewish Messianism, religious Zionism and Israeli politics: the impact and origins of Gush Emunim,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, (1987), 215-234; David Newman, “From Hitnachalut to Hitnatkut: The Impact of Gush Emunim and the Settlement Movement on Israeli Politics and Society,” Israel Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Fall 2005), 192-204; David Newman (ed.), The Impact of Gush Emunim (London: Croom Helm, 1985); Ami Pedatzur, The Triumph of Israel's Radical Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 35-60; Tsvi Raanan, Gush Emunim (Tel Aviv; Poalim Librray, 1980); Lilly Weissbrod, “Gush Emunim ideology — from religious doctrine to political action,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 18, No. 33 (1982), 265-275. 91 Harris, Taking Root, 135-138; Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: a History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881- 2001, (New York: Vintage, 2001); 332-335; Shlaim, Iron Wall, 328-329; Yishai, Land or Peace, 124-126; Zertal & Eldar, Lords of the Land, 36-40. 92 Memorandum of conversation, May 23, 1974, Management 38-2-2/H, Jabotinsky Institute Archives (hereafter JAB); Memorandum of conversation, July 22, 1974, Management 38-2-2/H, JAB.

235 occupied territories. Gush Emunim members believed that in order to hasten redemption, all of

Israel’s ancestral lands should be settled by Jews. Due to its divine inspiration, the religious imperative to settle outweighed the authority of the State of Israel. These views spurred Gush

Emunim to become the central force in pressuring the government to expand the settlement enterprise.93

Gush Emunim also opposed the peace process on principle. They rejected international norms and the influence of international opinion on the policy of Israel.94 Therefore, the civil society group opposed negotiated interim and separation agreements, even when no settlements were involved.95 Finally, Gush Emunim engaged in wild cat settlement attempts, designed to challenge government settlement policy and embarrass the Labor Party. The insistence of Gush

Emunim on settling in the heart of Samaria was designed to undermine the Allon Plan.96 Indeed, the entire agenda of the extra-parliamentary group was a challenge to the major tenets of Labor

Party foreign and security policy.

Under those circumstances it is not surprising that Rabin saw them not as a settler advocacy group, but as hardened political rivals. In his autobiography, Rabin called them “a cancer on the body of Jewish democracy.”97 Allon, who initially had some sympathy for Gush

Emunim, was no less critical by mid-1976. Calling them a group of nationalistic demagogues, he accused Gush Emunim of turning the world against Israeli settlement efforts.98 Galili criticized them for their “anti-democratic pretension” and noted that they possessed “an alien fire which

93 Demant, Ploughshares into Swords, 294-305. 94 Yishai, Land or Peace, 127-129. 95 Gush Emunim advert, undated, 7020-6/A, ISA. 96 Shlomo Gazit, Trapped Fools: Thirty Years of Israeli Policy in the Territories, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 262- 269; Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 242-243; Harris, Taking Root, 135-138. 97 Yitzhak Rabin, Pinkas Sherut (Tel Aviv: Ma’ariv, 1979), 249-250. 98 N/a, “Allon calls for defensible borders and settlement momentum,” Davar, June 13, 1976, 3.

236 may eat up our society.”99 Meetings by Labor Party members and officials at lower levels leave no doubt that these sentiments were shared throughout the party.100

The myth of wide support in the Labor Party is based on the limited sympathy evinced for Gush Emunim and their goals by the RAFI faction. The faction of Peres and Dayan supported the construction of settlements throughout the West Bank.101 However, the affinity between the

RAFI faction and Gush Emunim should not be overstated. Some works blame the success of

Gush Emunim on the Defense Minister’s attempts to undermine Rabin.102 This is an exaggeration. Peres believed settlements should be approved by the government and opposed illegal settlement attempts. The only example of Peres acting in contravention to the policy of the government was in his support for the settlement of Ofra. Peres allowed the settlers to establish a work camp and facilitated its development.103 But the Defense Minister never operated in direct contravention to government decisions, as no clear policy was formulated. Eventually, the government approved Ofra as a work camp later.104 Peres certainly followed his own agenda on settlements but did so mostly within the confines of government decisions.

Labor Party sympathy was not a decisive factor in Gush Emunim’s relative success.

Instead, the culprit was the inability of the Rabin government to present a convincing policy alternative. The justification GOI provided for evacuating the Gush Emunim settlers was not expressed in political or diplomatic terms. Rather it was framed as part of a commitment to law

99 Demant, Ploughshares into Swords, 464. For more evidence of Galili’s distaste for Gush Emunim and its methods, see Amos Shifris, Israel Galili: A Man of Words and Deeds (Ramat Gan: Yad Tabenkin, 2010), 310-319. 100 Memorandum of conversation, September 9, 1976, World Union 3-024-1976-68, BB. 101 Dayan, August 2 1969, 6495-2/A, ISA; Alignment Party Platform, October 14, 1973, 7022-13/A, ISA; Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 166; Shifris, First Rabin Government, 106-107; Yishai, Land or Peace, 71. 102 Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 150-151; Israel Shahak & Norton Mezvinsky, Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel (London: Pluto Press, 1999), 55-57; 103 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 311-318. 104 Yechiel Admoni, Decade of Discretion: Settlement Policy in the Territories, 1967-77 (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1992), 153-154; Hagi Huberman, Against all Odds: 40 Years of Settlement in Judea and Samaria, Binyamin and the Valley, 1967-2007 (Netzarim: Netzarim Library, 2008), 97-98.

237 and order. GOI was hesitant to state publicly that Samaria was closed to settlement, although this was the de-facto policy of the government. It was concerned about opposition from RAFI and from the hawkish wing of the NRP.105 Rabin focused on the importance of the democratic decision-making process and ignored the political ramifications of the question of settlement in

Samaria.106 As Admoni has pointed out, this was a mistake since it made government objections seem divorced from security and foreign policy considerations and therefore easily altered.107

After all, if the only problem with settling in the area is legal, the government could alter the law under suitable political pressure. The policy of the Rabin government invited this pressure through its unwillingness to take a firm stand on territorial issues.

The Sebastia Controversy: An Appropriate Zionist Response?

Gush Emunim spent the period examined here working tirelessly to settle in the Samaria region which was still empty of settlements. Efforts to settle illegally focused on the environs of the city of Nablus, referred to in Israel by its biblical name of Shechem. This was a result of its religious and political significance. Politically speaking, it was at the heart of the Samaria area, designated for return to Jordan in accordance with the Allon Plan. It also holds religious significance, as the first capital of the ancient Kingdom of Israel.

Roughly 100 would be settlers took part in the erection of an illegal settlement in

Hawara near Nablus in June 1974, which was forcefully evacuated by the government.108 Prior to a further attempt to settle the area, Peres, Rabin and Galili were contacted to garner support.

105 Galili to Allon, July 26, 1974, 7413-10/A, ISA; Yishai, Land or Peace, 47-48. 106 Rabin speech, July 31, 1974, 6721-37/C, ISA. 107 Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 144. See also Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 323, 340-341. 108 Davar reporter in Jerusalem, “Settlers evacuated from Nablus by force,” Davar, June 6, 1974, 1.

238

However, Gush Emunim did not obtain any.109 In late July 150 settlers headed to the train station near the ancient town of Sebastia. They were carried off by Israeli soldiers.110 Public opinion supported the government effort to curtail settlement.111 Justice Minister Haim Zadok told his colleagues “I think in summary of this operation, the government not only attained all of its goals, but also attained a political achievement regarding public opinion.”112 In this spirit, further attempts by would-be settlers to enter the West Bank were diligently prevented by the IDF.113

The tide of both public and government opinion on settlement in Samaria shifted following the UN General Assembly resolution of November 10, 1975. The Resolution, stating that "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination", enraged Israeli politicians and the public alike.114 The Settlement Committee met two weeks later and decided in response “to the attack on Zionism and the State of Israel, we are obligated to amplify and hasten the execution of a plan of settlement.”115 An interdepartmental forum, including the Foreign Ministry, decided the appropriate response would be the establishment of 11 settlements in the occupied territories over a period of eighteen months.116 In the end, the cabinet authorized 4 new settlements in the

109 Demant, Ploughshares into Swords, 328-330; Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 298-299. 110 Yitzhak Ben-Horn and Yosef Welter, “IDF soldiers had to carry every settler to the bus but did not run into resistance,” Maariv, July 29, 1974, 1; Memorandum of conversation, July 29, 1974, Bureau 2-25-1974-62, BB. Maariv, July 28, 1974 111 Yoel to Rabin, July 26, 1974, 6721-37/C, ISA; Pail to Rabin, July 26, 1974, 6721-37/C, ISA; Kaduri to Rabin, July 26, 1974, 6721-37/C, ISA; Yigal to Rabin, July 26, 1974, 6721-37/C, ISA; Labor circle for the settlement of the problems of state and society to Rabin, July 26, 1974, 6721-37/C, ISA; Salei to Rabin, July 28, 1974, 6721-37/C, ISA; Shoval kibbutz to Rabin, July 28, 1974, 6721-37/C, ISA; Ein Horesh Kibbutz, July 28, 1974, 6721-37/C, ISA; Yigal to Rabin, July 29, 1974, 6721-37/C, ISA; Kibbutz Mizra to Rabin, July 29, 1974, 6721-37/C, ISA; Kibbutz Mishmar Ha’emek to Rabin, July 30, 1974, 6721-37/C, ISA; Kibbutz Ein-Hamifratz to Rabin, August 4, 1974, 6721- 37/C, ISA. 112 Memorandum of conversation, July 29, 1974, Bureau 2-25-1974-62, BB. 113 Yisrael harel, et al., “Gush Emunim Operation Continues – New Groups to the Westt Bank to replace those Evacuated,” Maariv, October 10, 1974, 1; Yosef Waxman, “The Operation is Over – the Settlements Will Continue,” Maariv, October 11, 1974, 1. 114 United Nations General Assembly, November 10, 1975, United Nations, https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/000/92/IMG/NR000092.pdf?OpenElement {accessed: August 12 2016}; Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 324-325. 115 Galili to Rabin, November 24, 1975, Galili-Rabin 15-4-10, YT. See also N/a, February 22, 1976, Settlements 12- 3-94-1, YT; N/a, February 22, 1976, Settlements 12-3-94-1, YT. 116 Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 158.

239

Golan Heights. In explaining the government decision, Zadok told the press that he voted as a protest against the UN resolution and not as a thought-out policy on settlements.117 It would appear that the Israeli government instinctively felt that settlements were the politically appropriate response to an attack on Zionist identity.

Feeling that public opinion was on their side, Gush Emunim tried to settle in Sebastia again. Some would-be settlers marched with signs declaring “I am a Zionist” and slogans opposing the UN decision. Unsurprisingly, the military was not given orders to evacuate the settlers and they remained on site.118 Letters poured into the Prime Minister’s office, this time overwhelmingly in support of the settlers.119 Even Ya’acov Hazan, the head of the left-wing

MAPAM faction, the wing of the Alignment Party most critical of settlement construction, evinced sympathy for Gush Emunim.120 Peres explained that the UN decision was pivotal;

“Seven times the Sebastia settlers were removed by IDF forces. But the eighth time came after the Zionism is racism decision.”121 Hanan Porat, one of the leaders of Gush Emunim, agreed saying: “without those resolutions in the UN, Elon Moreh would not have come into being – this is crystal clear to me.”122 Government weakness was not the only factor leading to the hesitation

117 Hagi Eshed, “In the Settlement Committee: it was decided to establish 4 settlements in the Golan,” Davar, December 3, 1975, 1. 118 Emannuel Pripaz, “Tent camp formed in Sebastia,” Davar, December 2, 1975, 1. 119 Bella to Rabin, December 1, 1975, 6721-38/C, ISA; Rechel to Rabin, December 1, 1975, Rabin settlements 6721- 38/C, ISA; Tal to Rabin, December 1, 1975, 6721-38/C, ISA; 6721-38/C, ISA; Aharoni to Rabin, December 2, 1975, 6721-38/C, ISA; Chen to Rabin, December 3, 1975, 6721-38/C, ISA; Noodleman, et al. to Rabin, December 3, 1975, 6721-38/C, ISA; Shave to Rabin, December 7, 1975, 6721-38/C, ISA; Margaliot to chairman of the Center for the Religious Worker, December 7, 1975, 6721-38/C, ISA; Levin to Rabin, December 7, 1975, 6721-38/C, ISA; Shor to Rabin, December 7, 1975, 6721-38/C, ISA; Shor to Rabin, December 7, 1975, 6721-38/C, ISA; Ram to Zadok, December 8, 1975, 6721-38/C, ISA; Hasan to Rabin, December 8, 1975, 6721-38/C, ISA; Narad to Rabin, December 9, 1975, 6723-71/C, ISA; Ben-Brit to Rabin, December 10, 1975, 6723-71/C, ISA; Cahver to Rabin, December 10, 1975, 6723-71/C, ISA; Rubinstein to Rabin, undated, 6723-71/C, ISA; Tufenbraun to Rabin, undated, 6723-71/C, ISA; Ben-Kochav, undated, 6723-71/C, ISA; Zeidman to Rabin, undated, 6723-71/C, ISA. Some letters opposing Gush Emunim were also received. See Ilam to Rabin, December 3, 1975, 6721-38/C, ISA; Peled to Rabin, December 3, 1975, 6721-38/C, ISA; Groper to Rabin, December 7, 1975, 6721-38/C, ISA. 120 A. Kanarti, “Y. Hazan: Gush Emunim – youngsters of faith,” Davar, December 4, 1975, 1. 121 Memorandum of conversation, April 22, 1976, Alignment leadership 2-28-1976-8, BB. 122 Demant, Ploughshares into Swords, 416.

240 to evacuate the settlers. It was also a genuine desire to stand up to what they saw as an unjust UN resolution.

Placed in a precarious position, the GOI determined that the settlers should evacuate willingly. The government and the settlers reached an agreement by which the core members of the group would be evacuated to the nearby military camp of Kadum until the government decided on its future policy in the area within 2-3 months. The compromise was approved by both Peres and Rabin.123 The cabinet meeting on the fate of the Kadum camp saw a threat to bring down the government develop. The NRP announced that it would not accept a decision to evacuate.124 The decision was made on May 9 to deny permission to establish a permanent settlement in Kadum and to transfer the settlers elsewhere. Both MAPAM and the NRP abstained from the vote, but all others approved. Negotiations between government representatives and the settlers over an alternative location continued for months and the issue was not resolved before the Israeli elections of 1977.125 Ultimately, the government decided not to decide.

The Sebastia-Kadum affair dominated Israeli news coverage at the time and has been written about extensively as a watershed in Israeli history.126 This has misled some into believing

123 Rabin to government, December 8, 1975, settlements 21471-20/GL, ISA; Government press bulletin, December 9, 1975, 6723-71/C, ISA; Demant, Ploughshares into Swords, 407-412; Bar-Zohar, Phoenix, 428-433. 124 A. Kanarti, “NRP to Rabin: we will not accept the evacuation of Kadum against settlers will,” Davar, May 7, 1976, 1. 125 MOFA to representatives, May 1976, 9336-10/FM, ISA; Government decision, May 9, 1976, 7037-11/A, ISA; Daniel Bloch, “Government by decisive majority: there will be no settlement in Kadum,” Davar, May 10, 1976, 1; Demant, Ploughshares into Swords, 428-435. 126 Gazit, Trapped Fools, 264-266; Harris, Taking Root, 136-138; Huberman, Against all Odds, 82-118; Ehud Sprinzak, Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination (New York: Free Press, 1999) 252; Gadi Taub, The Settlers: and the Struggle for the meaning of Zionism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 59-61; Zertal & Eldar, Lords of the Land, 183-187.

241 the events of Sebastia were a turning point in U.S. policy towards the settlements as well.127

There is no evidence of this. The USG, although aware of the developments on the ground, was apathetic.128 In fact, no meaningful policy discussions on the matter were held before or during the Kadum affair. Change in the Ford-Kissinger policy was not linked to the Sebastia affair, rather the change began brewing during the Syrian disengagement and came to the fore towards the end of the administration.

There were two reasons the Sebastia affair, dramatic as it was, had little influence on the

Ford administration. First, the USG believed Rabin had little control over Gush Emunim and that he was doing his utmost to control them. A year before the Kadum affair, the Prime Minister admitted to his interlocutors that he was losing control in his battle with Gush Emunim. Sisco commended the Prime Minister on the forceful action he had taken.129 The events of Kadum did little to change this attitude. Max Fisher told the President during the height of the affair that

Rabin had confided in him that “the right was deliberately stirring this up to embarrass him.”130

A State Department report released a month and a half later confirmed this and commended

Rabin for his actions.131 The CIA estimated that if Rabin was tougher on the group, his coalition might be in danger.132 Therefore, the Ford administration had no interest in putting pressure on

127 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 344-345; Shifris, First Rabin Government, 100-101; Zertal & Eldar, Lords of the Land, 52. 128 Reports on Gush Emunim began appearing on Kissinger’s desk in October 1974. See Situation room to Kissinger, October 9, 1974, National Security Advisor, The Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974- 76, 2, FPL; October 10, 1974, National Security Advisor, The Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974-76, 2, FPL. 129 Memorandum of Conversation, September 11, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 130 Memorandum of Conversation, December 12, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 252. 131 State Department briefing, January 27, 1976, National Security Advisor, Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits, 1974-1976, 17, FPL. 132 Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, May 8, 1976, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, May 11, 1976, FOIA.

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Rabin and destabilizing him. Although Ford personally disliked Rabin, the administration preferred him to a possible Likud-NRP coalition government.133

The second reason USG took little interest in Kadum or Gush Emunim was that progress on the Jordanian track was unlikely. An offhand comment made by the Secretary sheds some light on this. Kissinger showed concern that to make up for not approving the settlement the wildcat settlement, there would be construction in Rafah. He opined, “they can’t expect that

Sadat is going to take that, do they” and observed that it would have been better if Kadum had just been approved.134 The highly pragmatic, and in this case myopic, Secretary of State had no intention of opposing Israeli construction in the West Bank as long as there was no prospect of success on the Jordanian track. His only concern was over the implications Gush Emunim’s activity would have on the crucial Egyptian track.

The Syrian Disengagement Agreement: Assad Protects the Settlements

Improving relations with Syria was not the highest priority for the Nixon administration.

However, a Syrian agreement was deemed to be an essential step towards lifting and maintaining the removal of the oil embargo. Kissinger believed he had a commitment from Saudi King Feisal that “if we [Washington] got some kind of agreement between Syria and Israel, the Saudis would lift the oil embargo.”135 The embargo was lifted while negotiations were still ongoing on March

18th. However, the USG was warned that without progress on the Syrian front it would be

133 For examples of the dislike Ford and Kissinger had for Rabin, see Memorandum of Conversation, June 12, 1975, FRUS 26, 684-685. For Kissinger’s concerns about the Likud taking power, see Memorandum of Conversation, February 19, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 184. 134 Memorandum of conversation, May 14, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 135 Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 154.

243 renewed in June.136 Another reason was to assist Egypt in advancing the peace process with

Israel.137 The thinking was that by bringing the Syrians into the process, the radical axis of Iraq-

Algeria-Syria, supported by the USSR, could be broken up and criticism of Egypt in the Arab world stunted.138

There were also domestic political considerations. The negotiations were an attempt to circumvent the erosion Nixon’s standing because of the Watergate scandal. Nixon had planned a trip to the Middle East to take place in May-June 1974 that would include the first visit by a U.S.

President to Israel. Nixon hoped to use it as a victory lap. This led to pressure on Kissinger to succeed quickly. 139 As a result, he found himself negotiating over minutiae. Kissinger complained it was undignified to travel “around for four weeks talking about a hill here and a hill there.”140 In pursuit of this elusive disengagement agreement, Kissinger would travel 24, 230 miles in just over a month.141

The efforts to get the process going on the Syrian track provoked a sharp response from pro-settler elements in Israel. Several Golan settlements lobbied against withdrawal.142 The

Golan settlement leaders attained backing from the Kibbutz movement affiliated with the Achdut

Ha’avoda faction of the Labor Party. This gave them bargaining leverage over the

136 Telegram from the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section in Syria, February 5, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 21; Dallek, Nixon & Kissinger, 562, 566. 137 Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, January 19, 1974, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, January 21, 1974, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, January 24, 1974, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, February 11, 1974, FOIA. 138 Memorandum of conversation, March 5, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of conversation, March 8, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 846; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 154. 139 Telegram from Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, May 9, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 51. 140 Dallek, Nixon & Kissinger, 581. 141 Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, 330. 142 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 265.

244 government.143 In a meeting between the Prime Minister and the settler representatives, Meir told the settlers that all settlements in the Golan, including the evacuated Syrian city of , were inseparable parts of the State of Israel.144

Distrusting Meir’s assurances, the Likud planned a motion of no-confidence against the government if settlements were evacuated.145 Public demonstrations were held daily, often attended by Likud Knesset Members.146 Indeed, cooperation between the settlers and the opposition party was widespread.147 Several of the demonstrators went on hunger strike in a bid to prevent a withdrawal from the Golan Heights. On a few occasions, those demonstrating made derogatory remarks towards Kissinger, for example referring to him as “Jew-boy.”148 Attempts to forestall the withdrawal also included the establishment of a wildcat settlement in Quneitra. The short-lived community, evacuated soon after an agreement was attained, named itself Keshet.149

The resultant demonstrations were an impressive display in mobilization.

Analysis of the Israeli-Syrian disengagement negotiations in the secondary literature has been inaccurate. Most major accounts of the Arab-Israeli conflict treat the agreement as a minor incident.150 Conversely, the few works that analyze the role of settlements in the talks overrate their importance.151 This is partially because relevant documents had not been declassified when

143 Harel to Meir, January 19, 1974, 6503-32/C, ISA; Rol to Meir, January 24, 1974, 6467-7/C, ISA; Kibbutz Meuchad, January 24, 1974, Kibbutz settlements 4-74-2, YT. 144 Maariv diplomatic correspondent, “Meir announcement on the Golan – designed to shatter any illusions,” Maariv, February 10, 1974, 1. 145 Memorandum of conversation, May 5, 1974, Management 38-2-2/M, JAB. 146 Maariv staff member, “Professors and intellectuals in hunger strike against trends of willingness to withdraw from the Golan,” Maariv, May 7, 1974, 3. 147 Memorandum of conversation, May 23, 1974, Management 38-2-2/H, JAB, Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 268- 269, 277. 148 Memorandum of conversation, May 10, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of conversation, May 12, 1974, Herut 23-2-1/H, JAB. 149 Demant, Ploughshares into Swords, 287-291; Admoni Decade of Discretion, 126; Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 150 Morris, Righteous Victims, 438-439; Shlaim, Iron Wall, 322; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 158-162. 151 Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 128; Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 279; Harris, Taking Root, 86-87.

245 extant accounts were written. Therefore, publicly known elements, such as the existence of settlements and widespread protests, were given greater weight than deserved. For example,

William Harris wrote that Israel used settlements as a political weapon in negotiations and GOI

“waged a campaign of dogged political resistance against Kissinger” to avoid evacuations.152

Gershom Gorenberg correctly notes that the Secretary of State did not pressure Israel on settlements.153 However, he overrates their importance, writing that the lesson of the disengagement was that “settlements could constrain the government, trump international pressure, keep land in Israeli hands.”154 These accounts are misguided. The evidence shows that

Kissinger had no interest in an Israeli evacuation of the settlements and Assad’s major demands could easily be accommodated without removing a single settler.

The false impression that the evacuation of settlements was a central issue in the negotiations was established by Kissinger in his memoir Years of Upheaval. The Secretary of

State created the impression that Assad demanded Israeli settlement evacuation. In response, by his telling, Kissinger deflected these demands due to the realities of Israeli public opinion and the political needs of the Meir government.155 In support of this version of negotiations, Kissinger described an early meeting with President Assad thus:

The exchange gave me an opportunity to make clear to Assad that even the minimum line he had previously given me (returning half of the Golan Heights) was not attainable; Israel would not move any of its settlements for a disengagement scheme. The maximum that was attainable was a bit beyond the prewar lines but short of the settlements.156

152 Harris, Taking Root, 86-87. 153 Gorenberg’s account is better because he utilized the transcripts of Kissinger’s meetings with Meir. But he did not have access to transcripts of the talks with Assad. See Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 277. 154 Ibid., 279. Admoni makes a similar comment in Admoni, Decade of Discretion, 128. 155 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1043. 156 Ibid., 973.

246

In contradiction to this narrative, the word settlements was not uttered in this conversation. The transcript of the meeting shows that Assad demanded the hills near Quneitra be returned along with a strip of 3-4 kilometers to the west of the hills and elsewhere, a line roughly ten kilometers beyond the pre-1973 War line. Certainly, a theoretical withdrawal of ten kilometers would have required Israel to evacuate several settlements. However, Assad did not refer to the issue specifically and was easily persuaded to drop the demand and focus on

Quneitra.157 This did not come as a surprise to the USG. Indeed, the CIA had predicted the return of the city would be Assad’s key demand.158

Later in his memoirs, the former Secretary of State writes that an important breakthrough in talks occurred on May 14; “Amazingly, Assad said he would not challenge the existence of

Israeli settlements in the disengagement process… this was an extraordinary concession.”159 The declassified transcript reveals that this interpretation is misleading. Assad at no point challenged the existence of settlements in the area. What Kissinger refers to is a comment made by Assad regarding security arrangements on hills near Israeli settlements. The Syrian President helpfully suggested that the hills be divided “since Israel insists on the hills and on having settlements on the hills, the line could be along the peak of the hills.”160 This is not evidence of Assad making a concession, rather it indicated his lack of interest in forcing an evacuation of settlements in the context of the disengagement agreement and his eagerness to make a deal.

157 Memorandum of conversation, March 1, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 158 Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, February 23, 1974, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, March 29, 1974, FOIA. 159 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1075. 160 Memorandum of conversation, May 14, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA.

247

Kissinger attempted to introduce the issue of settlements in the Golan Heights into talks with Sadat. However, the Egyptian President minimized their importance. Sadat hoped Israel would understand that the Arab states are “not trying to get their settlements.”161 Sadat evinced a similar attitude towards the West Bank settlements. He even attempted to persuade the King to consider allowing Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley to remain in place as part of a permanent settlement.162 In Sadat’s case the reasons for his lax attitude on settlements is obvious.

No Israeli settlements were near areas under discussion in the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreements. Rather, they were a potential obstacle to a full peace agreement, which was not yet in the offing. Furthermore, the settlements under discussion were not on the territory of Egypt

In Assad’s case, disinterest in settlements is more puzzling unless placed in the context of his wider foreign policy. There are two schools of thought regarding the ideological logic of

Assad’s foreign policy. One sees Assad as identifying with the idea of pan-Arabism or at least pretending to do so to contend for Arab leadership. According to this view, Assad’s commitment to pan-Arab interests rendered Syria unable to resolve its specific grievance with Israel until all disputes with the Arab nation were settled.163 Playing this role required commitment to the resolution of the issues at the heart of the conflict such as refugees, the status of Jerusalem and the rights of the Palestinians. With such seemingly insoluble issues standing between Assad and an agreement, the settlements were not high on his list of priorities. Another approach sees Assad as a proponent of the “Greater Syria” ideology. The idea being that the states of the Levant are

161 Memorandum of conversation, May 4, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; See also Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1060-1061. 162 Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, July 23, 1974, FOIA. 163 See examples of Assad referring to the Arabs as a united nation, Memorandum of Conversation, May 27, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 704. See also Alasdair Drysdale & Raymond Hinnesbusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 55-58; Malik Mufti, Sovereign Creations: Pan- Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 238-241.

248 artificial entities which would ultimately be incorporated into a Syrian entity. Therefore, Assad’s policy was focused on undermining the other states of the region and bringing them under Syrian hegemony.164

There is no contradiction between the two approaches. Assad saw the Arabs as one people, and Syria as their natural leader. Kissinger noticed both elements in Assad’s thinking.

The Secretary of State told a group of professors that “When Assad speaks of other Arabs, I have noticed that he is talking of the same nation. But when Sadat speaks of other Arabs, it is as friendly governments.” Later in the same conversation, he remarked that “to Assad, Israel is just southern Syria.”165 With this grand vision of the role of Syria in the Middle East, a few small settlements were not seen as important impediments.

At the onset of negotiations with Syria USG similarly viewed settlements as a minor inconvenience. Indeed, such was their disinterest, Kissinger and his staff were unaware of the location of settlements in the area. Having discovered their location during talks with Israeli officials, the Secretary of State explained “the situation is complicated by the fact that the Israelis really – and I don’t think any of us ever focused on it – have placed settlements on the Golan

Heights which are very close to the October 6 line.”166 This was at least partially a result of the complete disregard Kissinger had for the NEA, which had been monitoring Israeli settlement

164 For the best formulation of this argument, see Daniel Pipes, Greater Syria: The History of an Arab Ambition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 115-148. See also Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv, “The Syrian Paradox,” in in Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv (eds.), Syria under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 251-252; Joseph Nevo, “Syria and Jordan: the Politics of Subversion,” in Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv (eds.), Syria under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 146-148; Moshe Shemesh, The Palestinian Entity 1959-1974: Arab Politics and the PLO (London: Frank Cass, 1988), 308, 318. 165 Memorandum of Conversation, March 31, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 168. 166 Memorandum of conversation, March 5, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Kissinger referred to his ignorance in other conversations too. See for example Memorandum of conversation, March 5, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of conversation, June 18, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA.

249 policy for several years by that time. However, more important is that it is an indication of the meagre importance of the issue in his thinking up to that point.

Kissinger’s initial reaction, as it had been in the past, was to mollify the Israelis and tacitly legitimize their settlement policy. To convince GOI to cooperate with the disengagement process, he told Meir “you can’t be asked to give up any settlements.” Meir replied that it would also be difficult to withdraw so that the settlements remain 2-3 kilometers away from the border.

Kissinger replied that, “I had never understood, quite frankly, until this debate started a few weeks ago that you had settlements this close to the October 6th line. Now that I have understood this, it is my view for you, at least, that will be the final line.”167 Kissinger’s position of reassuring Israel was clearly intended to calm Israeli nerves and ease them into concessions.

This trend continued in talks with representatives of the American Jewish community.

They evinced concern that disengagement in the Golan Heights could risk the security of the settlements. This was a rare case of the “Israel lobby” mentioning the issue. Kissinger reassured the concerned Jewish leaders that no settlements will be given up.168 However, the talk did not influence policy as it already followed Kissinger’s commitment to Meir that settlements were off the table.

Talks focused on Quneitra and the status of settlements was never negotiated. The main

Israeli objection to returning the city was that it would expose the settlements to enemy fire.169

The main issue was resolved when Israel allowed full Syrian control of the town. As a security measure Israel retained the hilltops overlooking Quneitra under the condition that the peak would

167 Memorandum of conversation, February 27, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; see also N/a to Eban, March 7, 1974, 9357-7/FM, ISA. 168 Memorandum of conversation, March 11, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 169 Memorandum of conversation, May 2, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA.

250 be utilized for observation only. 170 The only settlement related issue that remained was the issue of fields to the west of Quneitra, tilled by members of nearby settlements. The Syrian President insisted they should not be worked by Israelis.171 Kissinger suggested the area be placed under

UN supervision. However, GOI insisted that the area remain under IDF control to protect the settlers.172 Kissinger agreed that “the agony of this is beyond question.”173 However, Meir relented and Israel agreed to put some of the lands worked by settlers in the UN controlled zone.

Gracious in victory, Kissinger complimented her that “no one could have fought for them more tenaciously.”174

The Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement was signed on May 31, 1974. The agreement established the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) which would be responsible for maintaining the ceasefire. The area under its control was demilitarized.175 Notably, another Israeli demand was rejected. GOI demanded a “Presidential commitment that Israel not be required to undertake withdrawal on the Golan Heights that will endanger Israeli settlements.”176 This was denied because it would directly counter assurances given to the Syrian government that the disengagement was a step on the way to a permanent settlement.177 Israeli negotiators further demanded a USG obligation that there would be no pressure for a full withdrawal from the Golan. Kissinger explained that he could not put an assurance of that sort in the agreement but “I have never known a responsible American who

170 Memorandum of conversation, May 18, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of conversation, May 18, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, 330. 171 Memorandum of conversation, March 29, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 172 Telegram from Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, May 9, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 51; Demant, Ploughshares into Swords, 282. 173 Memorandum of conversation, May 16, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 174 Memorandum of conversation, May 19, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. See also Memorandum of conversation, May 20, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 175 Protocol to the Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement, May 31, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 89. 176 N/a, May 1974, 5976-1/FM, ISA. 177 Letter from President Nixon to Syrian President Assad, undated, FRUS XXVI, doc. 80.

251 expects you to go down from [the] Golan.”178 Kissinger reassured his Israeli interlocutors.

However, beneath the surface a significant change in his approach to settlements was taking place.

Aftermath of the Syrian Disengagement: Kissinger Goes After the Settlements

Syria was suspicious of step-by-step diplomacy, suspecting it was a strategy designed to relieve pressure on Israel while it retained occupied Arab lands. Assad had made clear to Kissinger that he would not be satisfied if the disengagement was not followed by further progress on the

Syrian track.179 Kissinger promised that within a year, a second phase would commence.180

However, movement on the Syrian track was delayed so that the USG could focus on the second

Egyptian disengagement. There was concern in the Nixon administration that a dissatisfied

Assad may sabotage the emerging US-Egyptian alliance. The CIA warned that a further round of hostilities could break out between Israel and Syria, derailing the entire process.181 Therefore, the

USG could not afford to leave Assad festering in dissatisfaction.

However, there were obstacles to progress on the Syrian track. The obvious and immediate problem was the location of Israeli settlements in proximity to the boundary. One of the lessons learned from the Syrian disengagement was that ignorance over the location of

178 Memorandum of conversation, May 19, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 179 Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ford, October 11, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 140. 180 Memorandum of conversation, May 22, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 181 Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, March 8, 1974, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, March 13, 1974, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, March 28, 1974, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, April 6, 1974, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, October 20, 1975, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, October 21, 1975, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, October 22, 1975, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, October 27, 1975, FOIA.

252 settlements could be detrimental to progress. This led to more serious attempts at verification of

Israeli settlement construction.182 By the end of the Ford administration, the State Department had a very firm and complete grasp of Israeli settlement policy and its resultant map.183

Armed with better information, the USG could make a realistic assessment of the chances for a second disengagement with Syria. A paper put together by the State Department concluded that while settlements were a complicating factor, they did not render progress impossible. The paper painted five possible outcomes. Three scenarios avoided the evacuation of settlements altogether. Another version involved the evacuation of the settlement of , while the most ambitious plan called for Israel to withdraw from 100 square miles, necessitating the evacuation of El Rom, and Merom Golan.184 As the paper suggested, it is not unreasonable to assume that a further disengagement could have occurred if the USG was willing to put serious effort into it.

Kissinger shelved the proposal. His major concern was that simultaneous negotiations with Syria and Egypt would force Assad and Sadat to “compete in toughness” and escalate demands.185 He also believed that Israel was not capable of moving on more than one track at a time.186 These beliefs, both quite realistic, guaranteed a stalemate on the Syrian front. Since

Egypt was far and away the most important Arab state for American strategy, no move would be

182 Cluverius to Atherton, June 5, 1974, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA; Russell to Cluverius, December 5, 1974, Arab-Israel affairs, 59/A-1/5632/21, USNA. 183 State Department briefing, January 27, 1976, National Security Advisor, Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits, 1974-1976, 17, FPL. 184 Department of State Briefing Paper, Undated, National Security Advisor, the Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974-76, 3, FPL. 185 Memorandum of conversation, March 18, 1975, 7419-8/A, ISA. 186 Memorandum of conversation, March 16, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA.

253 made which would hinder it. Mollifying Syria was an interest only in terms of its ability to sabotage Israeli-Egyptian progress.187

Kissinger was unwilling to expend the effort necessary to obtain a second disengagement.

However, he required a good excuse for shutting Assad out of the process. As a solution to this problem, the Secretary of State exaggerated the significance of settlements on the Golan Heights.

This served two purposes. First, it was a convenient excuse to avoid progress on the Syrian track.

Second, it allowed Kissinger to create a negative atmosphere which would deter harmful Israeli construction in the future. The Secretary of State was increasingly cognizant of the potential harm settlement construction could have on future talks.188 As illustrated below, he was also increasingly resentful of the GOI policy of building the settlements close to the border in what he saw as an attempt to sabotage future negotiation. To drive home the point that settlements were the major obstacle to a deal with Syria, Kissinger used hyperbolic language. For example, he told

American academics that withdrawal of settlements in the Golan would “call into question

Israel’s very existence.”189

The evidence indicates that by May, the Secretary of State had set out to turn the settlement issue from a peripheral matter into a central issue. The Secretary of State felt that the time for a scuffle with Israel was not yet ripe. Israel was not yet being asked to evacuate specific settlements. It was unwise to pay a domestic political price for a premature policy. Instead,

187 Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ford, February 16, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 135; Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ford, March 16, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 147. 188 Memorandum of conversation, May 10, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of conversation, May 4, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; See also Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1060-1061; Memorandum of conversation, May 18, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 189 Memorandum of conversation, March 31, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA.

254

Kissinger fostered opposition amongst Arab leaders. This allowed an atmosphere of anti- settlement sentiment to be fostered while avoiding direct diplomatic confrontation.

The Secretary of State found that Assad was receptive to his manipulations. For example,

Kissinger told Assad that since any permanent deal would require the removal of settlements,

“with the settlements under pressure, it will be easier.” To which the Syrian President replied,

“pressure we can apply.”190 Assad almost certainly meant military attrition aimed at the settlements rather than diplomacy. Kissinger began to use similar tactics on Sadat, telling him that Israeli settlements in the Golan were “worse than morally wrong; it is stupidity.” Sadat did not reply.191 Despite getting little immediate reaction from Sadat, Kissinger repeatedly brought up the issue. He made the point that the settlements made a second disengagement on the Syrian front impossible.192 If so, he attempted to convince Arab leaders that the USG was interested in making another move with Syria but was unable to do so because of Israeli settlement construction. In this way, he hoped to move forward on the Egyptian track while maintaining

Arab good will.

The second step Kissinger took was convince the GOI leadership that the international community opposed Israeli settlement construction stridently. The Secretary of State presented himself as sympathetic to the Israeli position, yet powerless to stand up to anti-settlement forces.

Kissinger misrepresented the attitude of Sadat towards settlements, which was quite benign, and

190 Memorandum of conversation, May 18, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 191 Memorandum of conversation, May 10, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 192 Sober to Kissinger, November 4 1974, National Security Advisor, The Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974-76, 3, FPL; Memorandum of Conversation, April 29 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Pickering to Jerusalem, September 25, 1975, Presidential CFs for the Middle East and South Asia, 22, FPL; Memorandum of conversation, May 4, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of conversation, June 21 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of conversation, September 3, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of conversation, October 1, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA.

255 presented him as seriously aggravated.193 He also warned his Israeli interlocutors that if the negotiations were to fail due to the settlement issue “there will be zero international support for settlements on the Golan Heights…no one has ever supported settlements as part of secure frontiers. This is a fact of life, you can’t avoid it.”194 He also warned GOI officials that if a vote on the issue ever took place in the Security Council, the USG might not use its veto power to protect Israel due to the extent of external pressure.195 Finally, he warned that continued settlement construction could have serious consequences for bilateral relations.196 The message conveyed to Israel was that the international environment was turning sharply against settlements.

As part of this elaborate move to create a false reality, Kissinger gave the Arabs the impression that in private talks, the U.S. was fiercely critical of Israeli settlement construction.

For example, he told the Syrian President that “we have told the Israelis that putting settlements on the Golan Heights was the most irresponsible act I have ever seen a government take.”197 This was a misrepresentation of his talks with Israeli officials in which the Secretary of State continued to avoid confrontation. Rather it appears that Kissinger wished to signal to the Syrians that the US took a tough stance on settlements and would support Assad in blatant opposition to the existence of settlements in the Golan Heights.

In practice, USG did little to curtail settlement construction in the Golan Heights. On

April 18, 1975, a piece appeared in titled “Israel rushes to make Golan

193 Memorandum of conversation, May 4, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of conversation, May 12, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 194 Memorandum of conversation, May 2, 1974, 5976-9/FM, ISA. 195 Memorandum of conversation, May 6, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. He made similar comments on other occasions. See Memorandum of conversation, May 16, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 196 Memorandum of conversation, May 5, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 197 Memorandum of conversation, May 14, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA.

256 outposts permanent.”198 A few days later, an Israeli newspaper reported that the Settlement

Department of the WZO planned to present a plan to the government which, if accepted, would increase the number of settlements on the Heights to 30 by 1978.199 There was no notable reaction to any of these steps by the USG. Rabin did not fail to notice this. The Prime Minister explained to a group of Israeli reporters that “it is clear to them that we will not harm a single

Jewish settlement, certainly not in an interim agreement. To the surprise of many, this makes sense to the American mind.”200 Clearly Kissinger had successfully nourished very different images of his policy towards settlements depending on the identity of his interlocutor.

In sum, Kissinger presented the Israelis with a false reality, in which he supported their settlement policy but found himself unable to do so publicly due to external pressure.

Meanwhile, hostility towards Israeli settlement construction was being fostered by the Secretary of State alone. In talks with Arab leaders, Kissinger portrayed himself as an outspoken critic of

Israeli policy and willing to support a strong Arab stand while in fact he did not lift a finger to halt settlement construction. The USG avoided putting pressure on Israel, in the hopes that pressure would arise from elsewhere. Also, exaggerating the importance of the issue, Kissinger could more easily explain lack of progress on the Syrian track and mollify Assad’s opposition to the peace process. In the meantime, the more hostile environment was designed to make Israel think twice about constructing more settlements.

Just as importantly, this tangled web helped foster trust in Kissinger’s mediation process by convincing all interlocutors that he was sympathetic to their views. This whole mechanism

198 Richard Homan, “Israel Rushes to Make Golan Heights Outposts Permanent,” Washington Post, April 18, 1975, A26. 199 N/a, “There will be 30 settlements in the Golan by 1978,” Davar, May 9, 1975, 2. 200 Memorandum of conversation, July 6, 1975, 7049-3/A, ISA.

257 was meant to allow the Egyptian track to move on without Syria interfering, while preparing the way for future moves in the peace process which may require the evacuation of settlements. This was a classic example of Kissinger’s diplomatic style of maneuvering, which Raymond Garthoff referred to as “his customary diplomatic jujitsu.”201

Who Speaks for the West Bank: The Interlocutor Problem

Settlement construction in the West Bank did not trouble the USG during this period. This was due to the low priority given to the Jordanian track. The problem was that an agreement in the area was highly unlikely. The problems preventing an agreement between Israel and Jordan in the 1967-1973 period remained relevant. Jordan was still too weak and unstable to reach a peace agreement without the backing of Egypt and Syria. In addition, the West Bank was of emotional and security significance to Israel; and the problem of Jerusalem seemed insoluble. These elements rendered an agreement unlikely enough.

The international environment in this period created additional problems. Jordan was not a participant in the 1973 war. Therefore, there was a more urgent need to resolve the disputes on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts. This pushed Jordan to the back of the que as far as American mediation efforts were concerned.202 The second and bigger problem was that Jordan no longer enjoyed the legitimacy to negotiate. The joint statement made by the Arab League members at the 1974 Summit held in Rabat pronounced the PLO to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This implied that Jordan no longer had the power to negotiate with Israel

201 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 432. 202 Memorandum of conversation, December 15-16, 1973, FRUS XXV, doc. 394. Memorandum of Conversation, July 30, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 93.

258 over the future of the territory. King Hussein was forced acquiesce or face isolation in the Arab world.203 The new circumstances led Jordan to announce that it would not participate in the

Geneva Conference and essentially sidelined Jordan from the peace process.204 In late

November, the United Nations granted the PLO observer status in the General Assembly. This further established the PLO as the recognized interlocutor for the West Bank.205

To capitalize on its advantageous situation, the PLO altered its strategy. Following the

1973 War the leadership of the organization determined that rather than holding out for the complete destruction of the State of Israel, it would be willing to establish control over any liberated territory. This was part of a gradual move away from trumpeting the immediate destruction of the State of Israel towards a more moderate negotiation position.206 Despite this,

GOI ruled out any chance of an agreement with the PLO, which it continued to view as an illegitimate terror organization.207

The intended audience of PLO moves towards moderation was the USG rather than

Israel. Indeed, the Ford administration began to take the PLO into account and signalled that further moderation by Arafat could lead to a greater role in the peace process.208 Harold Saunders infuriated the Israelis when he testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that in

203 Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ford, October 30, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 112; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 170-171. 204 Oded Granot, “Amman: Jordan will not go to Geneva as West Bank responsibility taken away,” Maariv, October 30, 1974, 1. 205 UN General Assembly, November 25, 1974, File S-1066/1/1, UNA. 206 Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, March 22, 1975, FOIA; Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 58-67; Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: the Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993), 333-357; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 167; Shemesh, The Palestinian Entity, 261-273. 207 Rabin speech, November 5, 1974, National Security Advisor, Kissinger-Scowcroft Files, 1969-1977: General Subject File: Iran (4), 16, FPL. 208 The first part of the statement was identical to the one issued by the two powers the previous year, but the language on the conference was new. Dinitz to Gazit, July 3, 1974, 7413-10/A, ISA.

259 his opinion the PLO were important to conflict resolution efforts.209 Kissinger realized that in the long run, negotiations between Israel and the PLO could not be avoided. However, he was not ready to dive into those risky waters yet. The Secretary of State genuinely distrusted the PLO and saw them as a pro-Soviet terror organization.210 Caught between two impulses, it is evident that the US did not have a strategy regarding the West Bank, preferring to maintain it on the backburner.

The Jordanian Disengagement: A Missed Opportunity?

The Rabat Summit made a further move on the Jordanian track seem unattainable. Ford and

Kissinger both believed that Israel was primarily to blame. They believed that had Israel been more amenable during talks intended to attain an Israeli Jordanian interim agreement after the

1973 War, Rabat could have been avoided and a Jordanian option could have been pursued.211

This thesis has been repeated in some secondary literature as well.212

This is not borne out by the evidence. Rabin was unenthusiastic about making a deal with

Jordan. However, there are indications that GOI would have acquiesced to an interim agreement with Jordan if it had been a higher priority for the USG. Rather than Israeli attitudes, inter-Arab politics ruled out progress on the Jordanian track well before the Rabat summit. Egypt was not

209 Shifris, First Rabin Government, 117-118; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 181-182. 210 Memorandum of conversation, January 28, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of conversation, June 16 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of Conversation, July 31, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1138-1140. 211 Memorandum of Conversation, January 27, 1976, FRUS XXVI, doc. 255; Telegram from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to Secretary of State Kissinger, November 7, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 117; Memorandum of Conversation, November 9, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 122; Memorandum of Conversation, March 31, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 168; Memorandum of Conversation, June 15, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 189; Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1138-1141. 212 Ben-Ami, Scars of War, 151-152; Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest, 184; Safran, Israel the Embattled Ally, 536-539.

260 interested in the development of a process which would distract from Sinai. As a result,

American plans to advance on the Jordanian track were shelved. Kissinger was unwilling to risk damage to the all-important emerging American-Egyptian alliance to pursue a less important

Jordanian option.

The problem was certainly not a lack of Jordanian enthusiasm. To maintain its position as interlocutor for the West Bank, Jordan pushed hard to be included in disengagement talks at the Geneva Conference.213 The bid failed, but Jordan consistently moderated its position to make it more acceptable to Israel. Jordanian Prime Minister Zaid Rifai proposed that Israel withdraw five miles from the Jordan River as a goodwill gesture. The plan was complementary to the

Dayan plan.214 As an alternative, Rifai also proposed that Israel withdraw from Jericho.215 The

Meir government rejected the ideas put forth by Rifai under the pretext that it contradicted the

Allon Plan. 216 Dinitz explained that Israel could not support withdrawal from the Jordan River because of the presence of Israeli settlements in the area. Warning that if Meir agreed to it, “she would be shot.”217 Indeed, the plan would have required Israel to make significant concessions.

Atherton estimated it would require Israel to evacuate eight settlements.218 The Meir government was clearly disinterested in making a costly deal with Jordan.

Israeli reluctance to make even a small withdrawal from the West Bank was partially due to domestic political obstacles. The NRP joined the government in March 1974. As part of the

213 Memorandum of conversation, January 19, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 214 Report by Secretary of State Kissinger to President Nixon, undated, FRUS XXV, doc. 415; Memorandum of conversation, January 19, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 215 Memorandum of Conversation, December 29, 1973, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of conversation, January 19, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 216 Memorandum of conversation, January 20, 1974, 5976-4/FM, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, January 19, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 217 Memorandum of conversation, February 19, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 218 Atherton to Kissinger, July 26, 1974, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, NSC Files, CFs – Middle East, 612, NPL.

261 coalition agreement, the two parties agreed the government would be free to pursue an agreement in the West Bank. However, new elections would be called before they were implemented.219 When Rabin became Prime Minister he reaffirmed the principle, even though the NRP did not join the coalition.220 This was likely done to facilitate their return into the coalition. This proved to be a significant obstacle to an agreement, as elections would delay the step-by-step process by several months.

These constraints notwithstanding, Rabin was more forthcoming on the West Bank than his predecessor. The new government offered Jordan an administrative corridor into the population centers in the West Bank, while Israeli troops remain. This concept was sometimes referred to as “vertical disengagement” while the withdrawal of troops was called “horizontal disengagement.”221 However, the idea was rejected by the Jordanian government.222 Kissinger lamented that it was amazing “how little Israelis understood Arab psychology that the proposal was continually put forward; not even the most moderate Arab head of government could accept administering the West Bank under Israeli occupation.”223 In this he was entirely correct.

These issues may have been worked out. But ultimately, the Secretary saw Jordanian disengagement as secondary to the primary goal of cementing an alliance with Egypt. In a talk with American Jewish representatives, Kissinger was candid on this point. He told them that compromising with Hussein was an Israeli interest. However, he continued “it is not an

American interest, because we don’t care if Israel keeps the West Bank if it can get away with it.

219 Galili to Meir, March 8, 1974, Galili correspondence 15-46-32-7, YT. 220 Rabin speech, June 3, 1974, S-1066/10/16, UNA. 221 Atherton to Kissinger, July 26, 1974, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, NSC Files, CFs – Middle East, 612, NPL. 222 Memorandum of conversation, February 9, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 223 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1038.

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So we won’t push it.”224 He explained to British Secretary for Foreign Affairs Alec Douglas-

Home, regarding a Jordanian disengagement, that “we can’t push it because Egypt is not interested in it.”225 In other words, pursuit of the Jordanian track was of lesser strategic importance.226

Despite his preference, Kissinger maintained hope that he could achieve both a Jordanian interim agreement and a second Egyptian disengagement. The Secretary of State believed there were reasons for optimism. Jordan evinced moderate positions and the CIA reported that the

Rabin government was more flexible than the Meir government.227 When Allon, recently appointed as Foreign Minister, visited the United States, the Secretary of State floated the

Jordanian idea of withdrawing troops from a corridor including Jericho and other surrounding villages.228 The idea was not dissimilar to the corridor envisioned in the Allon Plan. Not surprisingly, the Foreign Minister was interested.229

Upon reviewing the notes of the Allon-Kissinger meeting, Rabin was upset by the position Allon had taken. The Prime Minister asked Allon to make clear that any withdrawal, no matter how minor, would necessitate elections. In addition, Rabin explained to Allon that he had no intention of making such a dramatic move for an interim agreement.230 However, Allon did not deliver the full spirit of Rabin’s message. He told Kissinger that “if we can get a good

224 Memorandum of conversation, February 8, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. Kissinger evinced similar disinterest in talks with Dinitz. See Memorandum of conversation, February 9, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 225 Memorandum of conversation, February 26, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 226 See also Memorandum of conversation, March 11, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 227 Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, July 13, 1974, FOIA. 228 Memorandum of Conversation, July 31, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of Conversation, August 1, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 229 Memorandum of Conversation, July 31, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 230 Memorandum of Conversation, July 31, 1974, 6717-19/FM, ISA.

263 agreement, I am prepared to go to the country”, referring to the obligation of the government to obtain a mandate for a withdrawal from the West Bank through new elections.231

The Secretary of State was not discouraged. He told President Ford “I made progress with Allon on a scheme which might work. If Egypt will wait, we are in grand shape.”232

Kissinger hoped to reach a speedy conclusion to talks with Jordan, to be free to continue pursuing the Egyptian track. Therefore, he asked Atherton to draw up territorial options for an

Israeli-Jordanian agreement. Atherton worked under the assumption that GOI would not evacuate settlements in an interim agreement. These considerations forced the State Department to focus on the densely populated, and at this time settlement free, area of Samaria. The resultant paper suggested an Israeli pullback from the Nablus area. The idea was nicknamed “the sausage” due to the shape of the evacuated area. The area in question would be demilitarized and linked to

Jordan through a narrow land bridge.233

Israel was cautious but not uninterested in the proposal. When asked by Kissinger about the possibility of making progress on the Jordanian track, Rabin told Kissinger, “we keep the door open but in my opinion, it is better to start with Egypt. It is not a condition on our part.”234

He stated in Knesset that “if there is a serious proposal under which, in return for non- belligerency, we shall have to give up something on the West Bank, I shall give it faithful consideration.”235 The Prime Minister made a similar declaration on American television.236

231 Gazit to Allon, July 31, 1974, 9343-7/FM, ISA; Ranta, Political Decision Making, 146-147. 232 Memorandum of conversation, August 12, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 95. 233 Atherton to Kissinger, August 15, 1974, National Security Advisor, Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits, 1974-76, VIP visits 8/16/74 – Jordan – King Hussein (1), 1, FPL. 234 Memorandum of Conversation, September 11, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 235 Rabin speech, October 9, 1974, 6711-7/FM, ISA. 236 Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, October 9, 1974, FOIA.

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While the Jordanian track was not Rabin’s preferred avenue of negotiation, GOI was willing to explore options.

Israeli intransigence was not the primary reason an interim Israeli-Jordanian agreement was not pursued. Rather the key to this development was the strong Egyptian preference that a second disengagement in Sinai take place quickly. Egypt moved decisively to block an Israeli-

Jordanian disengagement. Sadat believed that a Jordanian move would delay progress on the

Egyptian track. Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy firmly stated that “Jordan can’t move without the solid support of President Sadat. No Arab leader can support King Hussein.” Kissinger received the message loud and clear and stated “if you feel Egypt should come first, we’ll do it.”237 Indeed, it seems that Fahmy’s answer killed any prospect of a move on the Jordanian front.238 Moves on the Syrian and Jordanian front would from this moment on only be considered useful if they facilitated continued progress on the Egyptian track.239

In sum, Egyptian insistence that a second interim agreement in Sinai take precedence doomed plans for an Israeli-Jordanian interim agreement. The eroding position of Jordan in inter-

Arab politics further narrowed the window for an agreement. Indeed, the Jordanian track was unrealistic throughout almost the entire period covered here. In this context, it is easy to understand why settlement construction in the West Bank garnered little attention from the

237 Memorandum of Conversation, August 13, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Kissinger to Ford, August 15, 1974, National Security Advisor, Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits, 1974-76, VIP visits 8/16/74 – Jordan – King Hussein (1), 1, FPL. 238 Atherton to Kissinger, August 15, 1974, National Security Adviser, Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits, 1974-76, VIP visits 8/16/74 – Jordan – King Hussein (1), 1, FPL. 239 Springsteen to Scowcroft, September 5, 1974, National Security Advisor, Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits, 1974-76, VIP visits 8/16/74 – Jordan – King Hussein (1), 1, FPL; Kissinger to Ford, September 9, 1974, WHCF, Subject File, Israel, 26, FPL.

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United States in the 1973-1977 period. Nixon and Ford were unlikely to risk an open feud with

Israel over a track it deemed secondary and unpromising.

Egyptian Disengagement: Sinai II

By late 1974 the USG had decided to move only on the Egyptian track.240 The general contours of the interim agreement envisioned by the U.S. involved an Israeli withdrawal from the Gidi and Mitla passes in exchange for an Egyptian commitment not to use force. Talks broke down in

March 1975 over technical issues such as the depth of the Israeli withdrawal, the control of early warning stations and the duration of an agreement. However, the central sticking point was GOI reluctance to exchange a deep withdrawal from the passes for political concessions short of a full non-belligerency agreement with Egypt.241

Although both parties contributed to the breakdown, Kissinger and Ford blamed Israel.

They increasingly saw Israel as an obstinate obstacle to attaining an alliance with Egypt.

President Ford wrote to Rabin that “I have directed an immediate reassessment of U.S. policy in the area.”242 Israel was punished for its perceived intransigence by delaying the sale of F-15 fighter jets to Israel and ordering government departments to avoid meetings with Israeli officials.243

240 Letter from President Ford to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, November 26, 1974, FRUS 26, 462-463. See also Kissinger to Ford, December 4, 1974, WHCF, Subject File, Israel, 26, FPL. 241 Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ford, February 14, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 134. 242 Letter from President Ford to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, March 21, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 156. 243 Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ford, March 20 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 150; Ford to Rabin, March 21, 1975, 5974-11/FM, ISA; Memorandum of Conversation, March 20 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of Conversation, March 24, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 159; Memorandum of Conversation, March 24, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 161; Memorandum of Conversation, March 25, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA.

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These steps were designed primarily to pressure Israel into acquiescence. However, there was also a spiteful element to the USG position. At times, it seemed the Ford administration cared less about attaining an equitable deal than it did about cementing its alliance with Egypt.

During the crisis, Kissinger said “Israel has to understand their specific terms are less important than continuation of this process—and they will have to take what they can get.”244 Indeed, alongside the interest Kissinger and Ford had in a deeper alliance with Egypt, came an increasingly short-tempered attitude towards Israeli demands and an obsessive tendency to blame

Israeli intransigence for every setback.245 The high value the Ford administration put on improving relations with Egypt, and the decreased utility of Israel, cast the Rabin government as obstructing an American national interest. Bitterness and resentment naturally followed.

The Israeli embassy in Washington D.C. drafted a letter, to be signed by as many senators as possible, calling for continued military aid and support of the Israeli position in negotiations.

The letter, signed by 75 senators including 50 Democrats and 25 Republicans, was made public.246 This incensed Kissinger.247 In his view Israel was now cynically utilizing domestic

U.S. political forces to derail the central plank of U.S. regional policy. After a meeting with

Rabin and Dinitz, Kissinger told the President they were “the world’s worst shits.”248 He used

244 Memorandum of Conversation, February 7, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 130. 245 Telegram from Secretary of State Kissinger to the Department of State, October 31, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 113; Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Ford, November 3, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 114; Letter from President Ford to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, November 26, 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 120. 246 Dinitz to Kidron, April 29, 1975, 414-4/A, ISA; Telegram from the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger in Ankara, May 22, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 175. 247 Telecon, May 24, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Telegram from Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, May 27, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 176. 248 Memorandum of Conversation, June 12, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 184.

267 similar language in a meeting with State Department officials.249 Sisco was concerned that the

Secretary of State was unduly agitated with Israeli negotiating tactics.250

Ultimately, Israel withdrew from the passes in return for an agreement of non- belligerence.251 The documents accompanying the Sinai II agreement shed light on American priorities. A minute of record accompanying the agreement guaranteed that should negotiations between Israel and Syria develop, the USG would not expect Israel to go beyond a “cosmetic withdrawal.”252 As far as the USG was concerned, Sinai II had cemented the Egyptian pro-

American orientation enough that a further step on the Syrian track was no longer worth the effort. The USG also tied its hands regarding negotiations over the future of the West Bank. The

Ford administration agreed that “under existing political circumstances” negotiations with Jordan should be aimed at a full peace agreement rather than an interim deal. In addition, the USG guaranteed that it would not negotiate with the PLO unless it recognized the existence of

Israel.253 Thus to guarantee a swift agreement on the Egyptian track, the USG waived any opportunity of progress in the West Bank or on the Syrian track in the short-term.

249 Memorandum of conversation, March 28, 1976, FRUS XXVI, doc. 277. 250 Telecon, June 25, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 251 Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement, September 1, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 226; Shlaim, Iron Wall, 337- 338; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 179. 252 Minute of Record, September 1, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 230; Memorandum of conversation, June 12, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of conversation, June 13, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 185; Memorandum of conversation, June 20, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 253 Memoranda of Agreement, September 1, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 227; Letter from President Ford to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, undated, FRUS XXVI, doc. 234; Memorandum of conversation, October 1, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 180-181.

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A Mistimed Confrontation: The Demarche that Never Was

As the 1976 Presidential elections moved closer, it would be reasonable to assume that the USG would be disinterested in confronting Israel on settlement construction. Indeed, Harris and Ranta claim that American pressure on Israel regarding settlement construction lessened after the Sinai

II agreement.254 Reasonable as this thesis may seem, it is the opposite of what occurred.

Surprisingly, in the build up to the 1976 Presidential elections, the Ford administration was more confrontational on the issue of than any administration had been until that point.

The context for the new American policy was a change in the Arab perception of the severity of the problem. A change which as previously noted had been engineered by Kissinger himself. Following the Syrian disengagement, criticism of Israeli settlement policies by Arab leaders became more prevalent and strident. The State Department noted that announcements of new Israeli settlements were problematic due to “the difficulties such publicity generates in U.S.-

Arab relations.”255 The next day, Ambassador Keating told Allon that the USG had received a protest from Saudi King Faisal and therefore had to take the issue seriously.256

Complaints were not only more frequent, but the tone took on a pitch nearing hysteria.

King Hussein complained to Ford that with settlements “erupting all over the West Bank, Golan and Sinai. In our view, further failure must be equated with an eruption of war.”257 This was easily the most extreme complaint given by an Arab leader to an American official. The fact that this was delivered directly to the President increased its importance. When Kissinger visited

Damascus, he heard similar complaints. Assad asked, in relation to the results of the Israeli-

254 Harris, Taking Root, 131-133; Ranta, Political Decision Making, 165. 255 Gorenberg, Accidental Empire, 298-290. 256 Dafni to Dinitz, July 24, 1974, 7413-10/A, ISA. 257 Memorandum of Conversation, April 29, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA.

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Syrian disengagement: “what kind of liberation can we call that when the Israelis are not only looking down on Quneitra but also building more and more things right on the edge of that city!

Are we kidding?!”258 Syrian dissatisfaction was particularly dangerous, since there was concern

Syria would take military action to derail the peace process.259

The most important objector, in the eyes of the Ford administration, was the Egyptian government. In late October, Egypt threatened to take construction in the Rafah salient up at the

United Nations.260 A State Department briefing noted that Sadat had asked that the USG “press the Israelis to desist from attempts to resettle tribesmen and establish Kibbutzim in the Sinai.”261

This is a significant departure from Sadat’s lackadaisical attitude towards settlements during the

Syrian disengagement. This is probably a result of both Kissinger’s attempts to play up the problem and, just as importantly, because the relevant activity took place in Sinai. Either way, by mid-1975, the USG believed the issue had become central to the Arab states.262 It was apparent to the Ford administration that continued silence on Israeli settlement construction would exact a cost on its viability as a mediator in the Arab world.

With increased Arab sensitivity in the background, the settlement issue turned rancorous in November 1975. With the UNDOF mandate set to expire, Assad exploited the opportunity for a bout of brinkmanship. Syria increased military tensions on the boundary and the CIA was concerned that hostilities may break out.263 To end the crisis, Syria demanded that substantial

258 Memorandum of Conversation, August 23, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 219. 259 Memorandum of conversation, June 20, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 193; Memorandum of conversation, June 21 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 260 Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, October 30, 1974, FOIA. 261 Sober to Kissinger, November 4, 1974, National Security Advisor, The Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974-76, 3, FPL. 262 Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, September 14, 1974, FOIA. 263 Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, November 4, 1975, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, November 18, 1975, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, November 22 1975, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, November 26, 1975, FOIA;

270 peace talks involving the PLO take place in the Security Council.264 USG threatened to veto any such proposal. The Ford administration managed to reach a compromise with the other Security

Council members, tying the renewal of UNDOF to a “debate on the Middle East problem including the Palestinian question.” The PLO was not mentioned and therefore the USG hesitantly voted in favor of the measure.265

The Israeli government and public were in an uncompromising mood following the adoption of the resolution equating Zionism with racism earlier in the month. The UNDOF resolution increased Israeli resentment towards the international community. A government statement condemned the decision to “surrender to Syrian blackmail and to tie the renewal of the mandate to foreign principles with no bearing on the disengagement agreement.”266 In the meeting in which the government protested the decision, it was announced that four new settlements will be constructed in the Golan Heights. The decision to build settlements had been made earlier, but the timing of the decision and the publicity surrounding it were linked to the resolution.267

Unlike in previous occasions the USG decided to respond to the provocation. There were a few mutually reinforcing reasons for this. Kissinger had changed his attitude towards settlements. The change was followed by, and related to, Arab pressure on the USG to respond to

Israeli settlement construction. In addition, as noted earlier, anger and resentment towards Israel had been building up in the Ford administration, particularly on Kissinger’s part. The immediate

264 Memorandum of conversation, November 29, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 249. 265 United Nations Security Council Resolution 381, November 30, 1975; Telecon, November 28, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 266 Hagi Eshed, “Israel will not cooperate with the Security Council resolution,” Davar, December 2, 1975, 1. 267 Hagi Eshed, “The Settlement Committee: decided to construct 4 strongholds in the Golan,” Davar, December 3, 1975, 1.

271 catalyst springing the Ford administration into action was the belief that Israeli policy may lead to confrontation with Syria. The USG was already upset that the agreement to make only

“cosmetic” withdrawals in the Golan Heights had been leaked to the press. They were equally upset that no such withdrawal was made.268 Kissinger, angrier than usual, told his State

Department colleagues that “the Israelis better get me out of office. I’ll tell you, the next time I’ll finish them.”269 Israeli intransigence was increasingly creating a Syrian obstacle to progress on the Egyptian track.

The CIA warned that the move would provoke Syria.270 Kissinger told Ford that this “is another horror. If we don’t protest the four new settlements they are building on the Golan, we will be blamed for acquiescing.” Ford agreed.271 In response, it was determined that the USG should seek an Israeli moratorium on construction. Syria had specifically asked that pressure be put on Israel to put a moratorium into place.272 The idea was not new, and had been permeating in the Ford administration since mid-1974.273 The timing of the Israeli announcement seems to have been the catalyst for putting an existing idea into practice.

U.S. ambassador to Israel Malcolm Toon was ordered to serve Rabin a demarche stating that Syria believed “the U.S. is insincere in its stated intention to move process forward and is in fact supportive of Israeli delaying tactics. Evidence produced to ‘prove’ this argument is U.S. failure to prevent, or at least express disapproval of, Israeli settlement activities…although the

USG has avoided commenting on the matter publicly, further construction would bring this

268 Dinitz to Allon, November 24, 1975, 7414-7/A, ISA; Pazner to Allon, November 24, 1975, 7414-7/A, ISA; Sober to Sisco, November 20, 1975, Arab-Israel affairs, 59 /A1-5632/6, USNA. 269 Memorandum of conversation, November 29, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 249. 270 Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, December 8, 1975, FOIA. 271 Memorandum of Conversation, December 6, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 251. 272 Memorandum of conversation, June 21, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 273 Springsteen to Scowcroft, September 5, 1974, National Security Advisor, Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits, 1974-76, VIP visits 8/16/74 – Jordan – King Hussein (1), 1, FPL.

272 about. We urge therefore that GOI find some means to place a moratorium on these activities.”274

This was the first time the USG had officially asked that settlement activity cease, albeit temporarily.

The Prime Minister sensed that this was a sharp and undesirable change in policy.

Already bitter at the Ford administration for refusing to veto the UNDOF resolution, Rabin responded harshly. He warned that if the demarche was delivered, he would be forced to bring it to the attention of the cabinet, leading to “most undesirable results in the relations between the

U.S. and Israel.” Therefore, Rabin quite incredibly told the Ambassador that he should reconsider delivering the demarche. A stunned Toon said this put him in a difficult situation. It placed his duty to communicate the policy of the USG in conflict with an equally consequential duty to promote cordial bilateral relations. The Ambassador decided not to deliver the demarche.

Rabin went on the offensive and told the ambassador that he “sometimes wondered if people in

Washington understand what is going on here.” Toon asked if GOI could give assurances that no new settlements would be built. The Prime Minister said that he could only assure the USG that the issue of new settlements would not be raised in the next two cabinet meetings.275

Toon met with Rabin again two days later. He had received orders from Kissinger to withdraw the demarche. However, he wanted the protest on the four new settlements to stand.276

The demarche incident was leaked to the Israeli press, much to Kissinger’s chagrin. In response,

Kissinger told the American press he felt the settlements on the Golan Heights “complicate the

274 Memorandum of conversation, December 7, 1975, 7414-7/A, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, December 7 1975, 4997-2/A, ISA. 275 Memorandum of conversation, December 7, 1975, 7414-7/A, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, December 7 1975, 4997-2/A, ISA. 276 Memorandum of conversation, December 9, 1975, 4997-2/A, ISA.

273 diplomatic process.”277 This was a significant message of discontent, as the Secretary of State had previously avoided addressing the issue publicly. He asked Toon to pass the message to

Ambassador Dinitz that the leak was designed to “embarrass me and the President.”278 Leaks were always a sensitive issue for the secretive Kissinger.

Though unhappy about the leak, the confrontational Israeli response to the demarche did not evoke anger in the Secretary of State. This is not surprising, as the demarche violated one of his primary negotiating principles; it provoked a fight over an issue that was not relevant at the time. When asked in the past by Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam why the USG does not press

Israel more on settlements, he replied “it isn’t in your interest that we get into public fights over issues that are not yet central.”279 The normally wily Secretary of State had issued the ill-timed demarche out of frustration with Israeli tactics. But atypically, he did not have a strategy to back it up and soon realized he was not in a good position to confront Israel. The Syrian track was moribund, and the USG had neither the interest nor the ability to revive it. After all, the reason the Ford administration was sensitive to accusations that it had no interest in the Syrian track was due to their accuracy.

A Possible Second Syrian Disengagement: Losing Faith in Settlements

Assad’s dissatisfaction continued to be a concern for the Ford Administration.280 If Assad acted as a spoiler and managed to obtain the support of other Arab states, the USG was concerned that

277 Pazner to Jerusalem, December 23, 1975, 7414-7/A, ISA. 278 Memorandum of conversation, December 22, 1975, 4997-2/A, ISA. 279 Memorandum of conversation, June 21, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 280 Pickering to Kissinger, September 1, 1975, Presidential CFs for the Middle East and South Asia, 22, FPL; Intelligence materials for President, September 1, 1975, National Security Advisor, White House Situation Room, Former President Nixon’s Briefings 1974-1977, August 1974, 1, FPL.

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Sadat would be isolated in the Arab world and progress on the Egyptian track could be derailed.281 A daily CIA brief warned that “it is on Syria’s attitude that Sadat’s rise or fall as an

Arab leader will depend.”282 The USG began to realize it had been hasty in writing Syria off and allowing them to fester in dissatisfaction.

Kissinger hoped that another Israeli withdrawal from Syrian territory would placate

Assad enough to prevent him from scuppering the peace process. The Ford administration attempted to push Israel into enacting the “cosmetic” unilateral withdrawal previously discussed.283 However, Rabin was noncommittal. He insisted that even a minor withdrawal could not take place before November, if at all.284 Four months later Peres told an unnamed American official that Israel was willing to enter a second round of disengagement talks with Syria, even if it would involve more than a minor withdrawal.285 However, by then the Ford administration felt it was unrealistic to expect more movement before the 1976 elections.286

Preliminary talks took place between Israel and USG regarding potentially reinvigorating the Syrian track after the Presidential elections. Kissinger envisioned a sizable Israeli withdrawal, which would include the evacuation of several settlements in return for a non- belligerency agreement.287 Rabin was surprisingly cooperative. In this round of talks, perhaps

281 Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, September 5, 1975, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, September 10, 1975, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, October 7, 1975, FOIA; Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, October 31, 1975, FOIA. 282 Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, October 24, 1975, FOIA. 283 Memorandum of conversation, June 12, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of conversation, June 13, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 185; Memorandum of conversation, June 20, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 284 Memorandum of conversation, June 15, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 285 Central Intelligence Agency, President’s Daily Brief, October 18, 1975, FOIA. 286 Memorandum of conversation, June 16, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 1019. 287 Kissinger to Ford, January 24, 1976, National Security Advisor, Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits, 1974-76, VIP visits 11/12/75 – Luxembourg – Prime Minister Thorn (1), 16, FPL; Memorandum of conversation, January 27 1976, National Security Advisor, Kissinger-Scowcroft files West Wing Office files, 1969-1977: General subject file: Israel – unnumbered items (10), 19, FPL.

275 because they were more abstract and the time horizon was longer, GOI showed flexibility. The

Prime Minister said that in exchange for Syrian non-belligerency “the removal of settlements is no problem.”288 Rabin’s surprisingly accommodating position was repeated before President

Ford.289 Perhaps by way of explanation, as historian Amos Shifris points out, towards the end of his tenure the Prime Minister became increasingly sceptical regarding the security benefits of settlements close to the Syrian boundary.290 According to several sources, in late February the idea of a significant withdrawal in return for non-belligerency on all tracks was approved by the

Israeli cabinet.291 In Years of Renewal, Kissinger refers to the proposal as “generous and unprecedented.”292 Clearly, by the latter days of the Ford administration, Israel evinced a greater willingness to evacuate settlements in return for non-belligerency agreements.

There are reasons to question how seriously Israel took these proposals. The area was gripped by the Lebanese Civil War and the Syrian invasion of that country.293 The proximity of the Presidential elections meant that serious negotiations were only likely to resume after the elections. In addition, it is possible that Kissinger exaggerated the importance of the initiative in the memoirs to emphasize his role.

However, there is enough documentary evidence to confirm that a consequential change in the position of the Rabin government took place in its latter days. The moderate Israeli position hints that under the right circumstances, the Rabin government could have been

288 Memorandum of conversation, January 28, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 289 Ibid.,; Memorandum of Conversation, January 29, 1976, FRUS XXVI, doc. 258. 290 Shifris, First Rabin Government, 97. 291 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 1035, 1051-1058; Ranta. Political Decision Making, 158-159; Yigal Allon, Oral Testimony, Meeting 8, A-19/5001, ISA. confirmed this in an oral interview. See Ranta. Political Decision Making, 158-159. 292 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 1035. 293 Memorandum of conversation, March 15, 1976, FRUS XXVI, doc. 267; Memorandum of conversation, March 23, 1976, FRUS XXVI, doc. 268.

276 persuaded to evacuate settlements on all fronts. It does not even appear that severe threats and manipulation would have been necessary. Rather, focused and determined mediation on the part of the Ford administration and a genuine willingness on the part of the Arab leaders to match

Israeli territorial concessions with political ones would have been enough.

Center Stage at the UN: The Settlements Become a Major International Issue

The settlements increasingly became a visible international concern and were discussed frequently in the United Nations. In March 1976, the Pakistani and Libyan governments issued a formal letter of complaint to the Security Council denouncing Israeli occupation policy. The complaint focused on Israeli steps to alter the religious and cultural character of Jerusalem.

However, it included a clause calling on Israel to “desist from the expropriation of or encroachment upon Arab lands and property or the establishment of Israeli settlements thereon.”

294 Members of the UNSC worked to formulate a resolution based on the letter.

President Ford was locked at the time in a difficult primary race with California Governor

Ronald Reagan and expected a tough general election campaign. Naturally, electoral considerations came to the fore. This meant the USG had a strong incentive to veto the resolution to placate the Jewish vote. However, the administration wished to avoid giving the Arab states the impression of subjugating foreign policy to electoral needs.295 Conveniently, the official position of the United States was that Israel adequately protected the religious sites in Jerusalem.

Therefore, the USG vetoed because the resolution had not noted “Israel’s punctilious

294 UNSC resolution, March 24, 1976, 6728-11/FM, ISA. 295 Telecon, March 24, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA.

277 administration of the holy places.”296 It was apparent that the Ford administration could not afford to break rank with Israel on the issue of Jerusalem during an election year, since this was an issue which the American Jewish community felt strongly about. Indeed, Kissinger explained the U.S. would have to veto the resolution “for domestic reasons.”297

The settlement issue on the other hand did not present similar domestic political obstacles. Rather it was determined that this was exactly the right issue on which to oppose Israel and improve the image of the U.S. amongst the Arab states. Correspondingly, Scranton gave a speech commenting on the vote, explaining that despite the veto, the USG believed that Israeli settlement activity is “illegal under the Convention.”298 The State Department publicly insisted the speech was a mere reiteration of existing policy.299 However, the use of the word illegal, rather than unhelpful or a similar euphemism, was an unmistakable and intentional escalation in

American rhetoric.

Israel avoided a strong reaction to the speech. Neither side wanted to turn the issue into a direct confrontation. However, the settlement issue now clearly served as a wedge between Israel and the United States. Public opinion in the United States turned against Israeli settlement construction. Even those who normally supported Israeli foreign policy, such as Jewish

American and evangelical Christian groups, did not speak out in favor of Israel on this issue.300

Long-time supporter of Israel, Senator Jacob Javits, criticized construction before a Jewish

American audience.301 The press was similarly strident in its opposition. For example, the

296 USUN, March 25, 1976, Chief of Staff, Jordan, 35, CPL. 297 Telecon, March 24, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 298 USUN, March 23, 1976, Chief of Staff Jordan, 35, CPL. 299 News dispatches, “Israelis voice dismay over U.S. criticism at UN,” New York Times, March 25, 1976, A25. 300 N/a. “Two Jewish groups criticize Scranton,” New York Times, March 29, 1976, 49. 301 Oakley to Scowcroft, May 21, 1976, National Security Advisor, USUN (8), 21, FPL.

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Washington Post ran a column titled “Israeli settlements: time bomb.”302 Supporters of Israel were notably hesitant to support its settlement construction policy.

In May the Egyptian government asked the Security Council to put through a resolution calling on Israel to “rescind” settlements in the occupied territories. This placed the USG in a dilemma. On the one hand, it did not want to risk its strategic alliance with Egypt. While on the other an open confrontation with Israel could influence the elections. Scranton was inclined to go along with the Egyptian initiative. However, Robert Oakley of the NSC, and elements in the

State Department, argued that adopting it would be too damaging to relations with Israel.303

Scranton lost the argument and the USG decided to disassociate itself from the resolution.304 The

Security Council, to circumvent American opposition, released the original draft as a statement rather than a resolution. This allowed the USG to disassociate itself from the outcome without casting a veto.305 The Ford administration managed to squirm its way out of a choice between domestic political concerns and damaging the Egyptian alliance.

In November, another motion criticizing settlements was introduced to the Security

Council. Ford had already lost the elections and therefore the administration had little to lose.

The U.S. supported the resolution and the UNSC released a consensus statement criticizing

Israeli settlement policy.306 Atherton explained there was no choice but to vote for the

302 Rowland Evans And Robert Novak, “Israeli Settlements: Time Bomb,” Washington Post, May 17, 1976, A21. 303 Oakley to Scowcroft, May 21, 1976, National Security Advisor, USUN (8), 21, FPL. 304 USUN, May 26, 1976, Chief of Staff Jordan, 35, CPL. 305 Kathleen Teltsch, “Israel criticized in UN council,” New York Times, May 27, 1976, 5. 306 Peter Grose, “Vote by U.S. Against Israel at U.N. Linked to Effort for Mideast Talks,” New York Times, November 13, 1976, 49.

279 declaration since “our real problem now is maintaining some measure of confidence on the Arab side.”307

Allon was enraged by the American position and refused to shake ambassador Toon’s hand when he arrived at Ben Gurion airport.308 He also told a reporter that “I am only saying good morning out of convention. I am very disappointed in the U.S. vote.”309 Kissinger responded by asking to call Toon back to the US for consultations.310 The Secretary of State refused to meet Minister of Transportation Gad Ya’acobi.311 Ambassador Toon did not back down and criticized Israeli settlement policy in a public forum. The Washington Post wrote that his speech contained “little the Israelis had not heard before from the United States in public and in private.”312 Indeed, the open criticism which had been so scrupulously avoided in the Johnson and Nixon years was now commonplace.

Conclusion

In January 1977, the Kissinger era ended. During that period, the USG had completely transformed its attitude towards settlements from one of tacit support to public opposition. The transformation can be explained by two major factors. The first was the switch in USG negotiation tactics from the pursuit of a permanent settlement to an emphasis on the attainment of interim agreements. The change rendered settlements immediately relevant to the peace

307 Telecon, November 12, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Telecon, November 12, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 308 Telecon, November 12, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 309 Washington Post, November 20, 1976. 310 Telecon, November 13, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 311 Telecon, November 17, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Telecon, November 17, 1976, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 312 H.D.S. Greenway, “Toon Again Scores Israeli Settlements,” November 20, 1976, A12.

280 process and more likely to constitute an obstacle in the foreseeable future. The second was the significant improvement in the strategic position of Egypt and the corresponding deterioration in the relative strategic position of Israel because of the 1973 War. The significant change in the strategic balance, coupled with Egypt’s clear willingness to enter an alliance with the United

States, led to a recalibration of strategy and priorities.

The Nixon and Ford administrations pursued the alliance with Egypt obsessively. All other interests were secondary. The maintenance of a healthy bilateral relationship with Israel, previously held as a primary objective, was now subordinate. The USG preferred to balance between Israeli and Egyptian needs, but when the two were in direct conflict, the Egyptian interests were increasingly preferred. The “reassessment” affair is an obvious example of the willingness of the Ford administration to sabotage relations with Israel to further relations with

Egypt. Similarly, bilateral relations with other Arab states such as Jordan and Syria were shaped by the needs of the Egyptian focused strategy. Indeed, high profile settlement construction spurred by Gush Emunim was ignored because Jordan was to weak to either prevent or contribute to negotiations.

The confluence of the interim approach and the tilt towards Egypt led to a greater emphasis on the settlements. Change began to occur during the Syrian disengagement process.

Sadat and Kissinger wished to neutralize Arab opposition to the step-by-step process by including Syria in the process. Syria was not deemed important in and of itself. Rather its ability to put a spanner in the process was feared. It was soon discovered that the location of Israeli settlements limited the room for future maneuver. Indeed, they were likely to present a serious obstacle to a full peace agreement with Egypt further on down the road. Increasingly conscious

281 of the role of settlements in frustrating future negotiations, the USG became concerned with the issue.

In addition, Kissinger found the existence of settlements in the Golan Heights served as a convenient excuse for an exclusive focus on the Egyptian track. The Secretary of State repeatedly exaggerated the impossibility of evacuating Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights thus justifying his neglect of the Syrian track. In the process, Kissinger raised awareness to the issue amongst the Arab states and throughout the international community. This was also intended to deter Israel from wide settlement construction which may impinge on the continuation of the peace process. It also notably contradicts the idea of a “special relationship”, since Kissinger preferred to strengthen relations with Arab states at the expense of bilateral relations with Israel. By the end of the period examined here, settlements were debated repeatedly in the United Nations and the major press outlets. The relative obscurity which shrouded the issue throughout the Johnson and Nixon years was irrevocably lifted.

Domestic political factors and the “Israel lobby” did little to counter the change in U.S. policy towards the settlements. First and foremost, the USG voluntarily engaged in public confrontation with Israel over settlements during an election year. Second, when the Ford administration vocally and publicly changed their policy on settlements, there was no reaction from pro-Israeli groups. Rather they preferred to focus on an issue more comfortable to them:

Jerusalem. In addition, notable members of Congress, including supporters of Israel, vocally criticized Israeli settlement policy. The “Israel lobby” instinctively shied away from a policy it did not fully support and which it believed was a political loser. This can be contrasted with the fierce reaction to the “reassessment” crisis by the legislative branch and AIPAC. Pro-Israeli forces in the United States were hesitant to do battle over settlements.

282

Israel on its part had lost a great deal of the self-assurance and purpose which had guided its settlement policy previously. On the face of it, Israel retained its commitment and continued to state it would not withdraw from strategically important areas. Indeed, when confronted directly by a USG demarche on settlement construction, Rabin stood firm. However, a closer examination of Israeli policy indicates that it would have been willing to evacuate settlements under the right circumstances. The major strategic roles of settlements had been rendered irrelevant by the 1973 War.

The overall attitude of the government towards settlements was lethargic and hesitant.

Allon and Rabin were increasingly doubtful as to the utility of the settlements though Peres maintained a more positive attitude towards them. The impetus to expand settlement was no longer strategic but rather political and domestic. Gush Emunim increasingly spurred construction as did emotional catalysts such as the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism.

Because the utility of settlements was no longer obvious, there are clear indications that Israel would have been willing to evacuate settlements as part of a permanent or interim agreement on any of the tracks. However, this would have required both strong USG efforts to guarantee the outcome and Arab willingness to repay evacuation in political concessions. Neither of these conditions applied.

Evaluating the Analytical Framework during the late Nixon and Ford Years

Mediation: The Nixon era involved direct mediation concerning the settlements, in the context of the Israeli-Syrian disengagement deal. The U.S. enjoyed significant credibility and tied its prestige to the mediation effort. Henry Kissinger, the primary decision-maker in the USG at that point,

283 staked his reputation on the negotiations. He personally flew back and forth, with a pack of reporters documenting his every move. Failure would have damaged not only the credibility of the

U.S. as a mediator, but also Kissinger’s diplomatic standing. In addition, Nixon was in dire need of a diplomatic achievement and hoped an Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement would relieve his domestic woes.313 The USG clearly had a national interest tied into negotiations. The pursuit of a deal on the Syrian track was necessary both to end the oil embargo and to facilitate the continuation of the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations it considered central to its interests.314 Kissinger’s credibility was never in doubt.

This explains why Israel was more pliant than before. Meir gave in on minor settlement related points, such as the right to till fields to the west of Quneitra and positions overlooking some of the settlements. It may well have been willing to evacuate some settlements in the Golan if it was necessary for a deal to be reached. However, a deal was reached without it. Israeli opposition to a partial deal with Jordan and a second disengagement agreement with Syria, which would almost certainly have involved the evacuation of settlements softened as well. However, the focus of U.S. “heavy” mediation was on the Egyptian track. At this point, progress on that all-important track did not require bargaining over the settlements.

Bargaining: Bilateral bargaining continued to take place at the highest levels. Kissinger began to take a keen interest in Israeli settlement policy after the Israeli-Syrian disengagement deal and discussed the matter on countless occasions with both Israeli and Arab officials. The increased importance of the participants was, once again, not translated into greater influence on policy. In

313 Telegram from Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, May 9 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 51. 314 Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section in Syria, February 5 1974, FRUS XXVI, doc. 21; Dallek, Nixon & Kissinger, 562, 566.

284 one case, Kissinger attempted to apply significant pressure in the context of bilateral bargaining.

This was done against the better judgement of the Secretary of State, who knew that bilateral negotiations were unlikely to produce real movement.315 However, a pressing situation on the

Israeli-Syrian border, which he feared might escalate into hostilities, prompted Kissinger to issue a demarche.

As expected, Israel turned it down. It had little to gain by acquiescing, since there was no reciprocal process underway. But it had plenty to lose. A precedent would be set that the U.S. could force Israel into a moratorium at any time and Israel would be earning a reputation as weak in negotiations when consequential mediation commenced. Israel did its best to signal to the Arab states that it was as committed to the settlements as before.316 However, it was hard to mask reality.

The 1973 War had exposed to all the irrelevance of settlements in modern combat. Israel did not significantly expand its settler map and there was resistance to the inclusion of the Galili document in the Labor party platform.317 Israeli commitment to the settlements was flagging.

The U.S. as expected, used bilateral talks to signal its trustworthiness as a mediator to the

Arab states. Kissinger tried to paint himself to the Arab states as fiercely opposing settlement construction in bilateral talks irrespective of his actual positions.318 The attempt to obtain a moratorium on construction was also intended to signal the correct image to Syria and Egypt. As usual, bilateral bargaining proved inconsequential in terms of actual influence on policy.

315 Memorandum of conversation, June 21, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 316 David Shalev, “Rabin: we did not build settlements in the Golan in order to take them down,” Davar, February 18, 1975, 3; Jerusalem to representatives, November 17. 1976, US ME 4784-3/FM, ISA. 317 Labor Party platform, November 27, 1973, Labor platform 15-46-39-2, YT; Memorandum of conversation, December 3, 1973, Labor platform 15-46-39-2 YT. 318 Memorandum of conversation, May 14, 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA.

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Issue Specific Power:

As always, neither side had a convincing outside option. It is true that the U.S. was increasingly interested in better relations with Egypt. However, it could not resolve the conflict unless Israel relinquished the occupied territories. The Israeli government, as before, had no alternative to their reliance on the United States. If anything, it was more isolated than ever in the aftermath of the 1973 War.

The major change in this period was that Israel was notably less comfortable with its inside option. The “defensible borders” strategy and the role of settlements in them had proven of limited utility. In the meantime, the U.S. had become increasingly uncomfortable with their inside option. The Arab states had successfully utilized the oil weapon as leverage. It also became increasingly clear that the best way to minimize Soviet influence in the region was to successfully resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. This would ostensibly figure to lessen the bargaining leverage of the United States. However, in practice, this served to increase its commitment. It was increasingly clear that the United States was promoting a central national interest by pursuing the peace process and this increased its credibility.

The 1973 War lessened the leverage Israel attained from its control of settlement policy.

While it could continue to shape it, the Rabin government was less confident than before that it could obtain its desired aims unilaterally. Israel was increasingly convinced that peace was necessary in attaining long term security. Therefore, Israel pursued a strategy of attaining a peace agreement with Egypt.319 While Israel did not abandon the goal of maintaining “defensible borders,” it is fair to say that the value of peace in its eyes had increased and the value of

319 Safran, Israel the Embattled Ally, 495-505; Sella & Yishai, Peaceful Belligerent, 24-36; Shlaim, Iron Wall, 320- 321.

286 unilaterally establishing borders and constructing settlements had decreased. This is one of the reasons Rabin found the challenge of Gush Emunim so threatening. By settling in unsettled territories, it bound Israel to a strategy the government believed was no longer beneficial.

The United States became increasingly convinced that under the right circumstances, it could pressure Israel into evacuating settlements. What it needed was to create the right anti- settlement atmosphere and to mediate between Israel and an Arab state willing to trade political assets for Israeli withdrawal and the evacuation of settlements. Kissinger realized that the time to pressure Israel on the issue had not yet come, but when the right mediation opportunity would come, the USG would have the leverage to attain results.

The most significant difference between the post-1973 War situation and the preceding periods in terms of U.S. policy, was the significant increase in U.S. commitment to the peace process. The war placed the Middle East at the center of the international agenda. The ability of the U.S. to provide cheap oil to its allies, one of the building blocks of its hegemonic strategy, seemed to depend on attaining peace in the region. Because of the greater involvement of the

USG, the credibility of the late Nixon and Ford administrations was increasingly bound up in the process. During the late Nixon era, it also took on a domestic political importance as a weighty distraction from the Watergate scandal. U.S. discomfort increased its commitment to the peace process. This allowed it to utilize its increased power credibly. Meanwhile Israeli commitment to its settlements decreased for reasons stated above.

Overall, the 1973 War increased U.S. bargaining power and lessened Israeli issue specific power. This was particularly apparent in terms of the new balance of commitment which had shifted towards the United States. The shift would have even more dramatic consequences in the

Carter era.

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The Settlements as a Bargaining Issue: As shown above, Israel was signalling a decreased commitment to the strategic areas included in its “defensible border” schematic. Israel was cognizant that its policy had led to war and concessions would have to be made to reach a peace agreement. Therefore, it signalled a lesser desire to hold on to the settlements, trading the “Galili document” for the less combative “fourteen-point” document.320 The Labor Party was attempting to lower expectations and relevant domestic costs in expectation of possible withdrawals and evacuations. If in the Meir years Israel had tried to keep the door slightly ajar; in the Rabin years, it hoped to leave a significant opening.

The tragedy of the situation is that a significant element of indivisibility towards the West

Bank began to creep into Israeli society. The advent of Gush Emunim and their influence on

Israeli settlement policy limited government control just as it was trying to signal a more compromising position. Gush Emunim’s increased capacity to settle in certain areas against the will of the Israeli government was noted by the United States and possibly by the Arab states as well.321 If Israel was trying to signal toughness, this would have been a welcome development.322

However, with Israel trying to balance its policy in the other direction, this was seen by the government as unwelcome interference. As Goddard and Spruyt predicted, the occupation of a territory created new domestic political coalitions, which could render withdrawal very difficult.323 It was not yet clear if the Israeli path to withdrawal from the West Bank had been

320 Labor Party platform, November 27, 1973, Labor platform 15-46-39-2, YT. 321 State Department briefing, January 27, 1976, National Security Advisor, Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits, 1974-1976, 17, FPL. 322 Thomas Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (New York: Harvard University Pres, 1960), 37. 323 Stacie Goddard, “Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy,” International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 1 (January 2006), 45-49; Spruyt, Hendrik, Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

288 blocked, since serious negotiations over the area had not yet arisen. But it was clear that steps in that direction were taken.

Defection or Cooperation: Israel and the United States continued to openly disagree on settlement policy. No commitments were made; tacitly or otherwise, and therefore no agreements were broken. When the USG tried to limit Israeli settlement construction through a demarche, Rabin sharply refused. The Israeli government was trying to seem more amenable to compromise while still not appearing to be pushovers in negotiations. This required a careful balance in the image it projected to the United States and the Arab states. Another possible reason Israel did not wish to enter into commitments was its loss of control over settlement policy. The Rabin government may have been concerned that if it took on commitments, Gush Emunim would force Israel to break its guarantees. This was a problem the Begin government would face.

289

Chapter 5

Therefore, they Shouldn’t Exist: the role of settlements in US-Israeli relations during the

Carter Administration, 1977-1981

The period examined here is distinct from the other chapters in terms of outcomes and results. A new government arose in Israel which nominally was more committed to the settlement project.

Despite this, in September 1978 Israel agreed for the first (and last) time to evacuate settlements as part of an agreement with an Arab state. As such the decision is somewhat surprising and bears scrutiny. It has been suggested that the Likud government under Menachem Begin was willing to withdraw from Sinai and evacuate the settlements there to deepen its hold on the West

Bank.1 Certainly Begin was committed to retaining the West Bank. But that is not why Israel agreed to evacuate the settlements.

Begin did not need U.S. support to control the West Bank nor did he receive it. The

Carter administration did not have the will or the inclination to force Israel out of the West Bank.

Even if it did, it was unclear who the area could be handed over to. Jordan was no longer recognized as a legitimate interlocutor for the area by the Arab world, and the PLO were not yet considered a legitimate partner for negotiations by Israel or the United States. Israel argued that by withdrawing from Sinai it would fulfill the Resolution 242 obligation that Israel withdraw from territories occupied in the 1967 War. However, this would clearly not convince the U.S. or

1 Ilan Peleg, Begin’s Foreign Policy 1977-1983: Israel’s Move to the Right (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 95-142; Kenneth Stein, Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, (New York: Routledge, 1999). 171-172.

290 the international community. Therefore, a strategy of giving up Sinai for the West Bank made little sense. In exchange for Israel relinquishing Sinai (and of course attaining full peace from

Egypt) it made concessions in the West Bank towards autonomy and showed restraint (at times) in West Bank settlement construction. Another problem with this theory is that Israeli foreign policy did not develop along those lines. It tried to attain approval for a plan in which the settlements were maintained (albeit without sovereignty). In addition, an examination of the negotiations in Camp David reveals that Begin fought tooth and nail to retain the settlements in

Sinai before giving up on the issue. If so, a deal to trade the Sinai for the West Bank was neither necessary nor attempted.

Ultimately the decision to evacuate settlements in Sinai was not tied to an emotional and ideological worldview. It was a strategic decision. Egypt was offering a deal which was aligned with the major Israeli strategic goal: the removal of its most significant military threat, the large

Egyptian military, from the circle of belligerence. Additionally, Sadat was now offering full peace and recognition, which Israel had aspired to for decades. From a cost-benefit perspective, it would have made little sense to maintain the settlements in Sinai. Particularly since the military value of settlements had been put into question during the 1973 War. In Camp David,

Defense Minister Weizmann even admitted that the settlements in Rafah were not important militarily but only psychologically.2

If Israel had a strong strategic interest in attaining a peace deal with Egypt, and the evacuation of the settlements was necessary to attain the agreement, how central was the role of the United States in making the decision? Pressure from the United States was a necessary

2 Memorandum of Conversation, September 7, 1978, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980. Eds. Alexander R. Wieland &Adam M. Howard (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2014), doc. 34.

291 component. While Israel was highly interested in reaching a deal with Egypt, it hoped to do so while maintaining the settlements. It was up to the Carter administration to make it clear that this could not occur. This required a series of public altercations, climaxing in the united stand Egypt and the USG took at the Camp David summit.

The Carter administration enjoyed bargaining credibility no other administration enjoyed before (or since) for two important reasons. The first was that reaching a peace agreement was a prime strategic goal of the U.S. at the time and failure would incur serious costs for the U.S. internationally and for Carter domestically. By personally overseeing negotiations and hosting the Camp David Summit, the President put his reputation on the line. As Kenneth Stein put it,

“no American president before him was willing to put his political life on the line for the achievement of Arab-Israeli agreements.”3 This put Carter at great risk but also engendered significant credibility as a mediator.

The second was that the relevant Arab state was coordinated with the U.S. and (mostly) cooperated with their strategy. This was a unique situation. Typically, the Arab interlocutors disagreed with the U.S. on the objective of the negotiations or the identity of the interlocutor.

The combination of those two elements established solid credibility for the administration. Israel knew that if the Camp David summit failed Israel was likely to shoulder most of the blame and pay a hefty price. Additionally, since the attainment of a peace agreement was perceived as a high strategic interest, the Carter administration would receive the support of Congress and the media as well as a significant sector of the American Jewish community. Israel would not have the protection it was accustomed to. Israel had a strong strategic interest in attaining the peace

3 Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 43-44.

292 agreement with Egypt but without the mediation leverage the United States attained a deal may not have been made. It was the conflation of factors which led to the Israeli decision to evacuate the settlements in Sinai.

The Interaction of Units

Beliefs and Preferences; U.S. Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict during the Carter administration towards the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Carter administration prioritized the Arab-Israeli conflict as its primary foreign policy focus in the 1977-1979 period. This changed when developments in Afghanistan and Iran in the 1979-

1981 period relegated it to a secondary status. It has been argued that the administration was willing to muster unprecedented focus on peace primarily due to concerns for the influence of the conflict on the stability of the international oil market.4 This was certainly a consideration.

However, the traditional interest of containing Soviet influence continued to play a major role in

U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Often, the two intertwined as concerns that Soviet influence would extend into the Persian Gulf.5 National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski explained in his memoirs, the main goal was: “to obtain a comprehensive Middle East settlement

4 Herbert Druks, The Uncertain Alliance: The U.S. and Israel from Kennedy to the Peace Process, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 20011), 65; Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 157-169; Steven Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 318-319. 5 Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Brown, September 7, 1978, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, eds. Kelly M. McFarland, Adam M. Howard, (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2015), doc. 9.

293 without which the further radicalization of the Arab world and the re-entry of the Soviet Union into the Middle East could not be avoided.”6

The importance of this factor increased by the end of the Carter years as the US returned to a bellicose policy towards the USSR globally. The remaining vestiges of détente were shattered late in the Carter administration as the U.S. and Soviet Union disagreed on “rules of engagement” in the third world.7 Thus it is not surprising that the breakthrough in the Israeli-

Egyptian peace process was exploited by the Carter administration to remove the USSR from substantive negotiations and curtail Soviet influence in the region.8

On the face of it, the Carter administration had a very different worldview from the

Nixon-Ford administrations. It professed loftier goals such as a commitment to human rights.9

To most scholars this inclination was based on deeply held principle and influenced his decision- making.10 There is a counter-argument that in practice Carter’s policies were based on the same calculations as his predecessors.11 A related debate emerged regarding Carter’s policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process. The President had a stated sympathy for the cause of Palestinian

6 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), 54. 7 Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1994), 622-689, 965-1008; Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 282-284. 328-29. 8 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 113; William Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 61. 9 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 567-576; Spiegel, Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 319. 10 Douglas Brinkley, “The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The ‘Hands on’ Legacy of Our Thirty-Ninth President,” Diplomatic History Vol. 20, No. 1 (Fall 1996), 505–529; John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Burton I. Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter, Jr. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993); David F. Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, “Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2003), 113-143; Robert Strong, Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Press, 2000); Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power. 11 Itai Sneh, The Future Almost Arrived: How Jimmy Carter Failed to Change U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Peter Lang, 2008).

294 self-determination. 12 However, ultimately Carter jettisoned his verbal commitment to the

Palestinian cause in favor of pursuing Israeli-Egyptian peace, once it was clear the two were incompatible. As prospects for an Israeli-Egyptian peace improved. The Carter administration felt that an attempt to include the PLO would jeopardize the prospects of success and sought to keep Arafat out.13 The defenders of the President have argued that circumstances did not allow him to advance Palestinian self-determination.14 An opposing school of thought claims that

Carter never intended to advance Palestinian self-determination. Rather his commitment to human rights was a façade.15

Reality is more complex. Carter was sympathetic to the Palestinian cause but not overtly committed to it. He was unwilling to jeopardize core U.S. interests to promote Palestinian concerns. The administration believed that no permanent settlement of the conflict was possible without involving the Palestinians. But just like their predecessors, they discovered that involving the PLO was more likely to scupper or delay a resolution of the conflict in the short- term than promote it.

12 Abraham Ben-Zvi, From Truman to Obama: The Rise of and the Beginning of the Decline of US-Israeli Relations, (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Achronot, 2005), 142-145; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 37; Bernard Reich, The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship (New York: Praeger, 1984), 45-46; Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Year’s in America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 164. 13 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Carter, undated, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, eds. Adam M. Howard & Adam M. Howard (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2013), doc. 202. 14 John Dumbrell, American Foreign Policy: Carter to Clinton (New York: Palgrave, 1997), 30; Erwin C. Hargrove, Jimmy Carter as President: Leadership and the Politics of the Public Good (Baton Rouge, LA, 1988), 128; Jeremy Pressman, “Explaining the Carter Administration’s Israeli–Palestinian Solution,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 37, No. 5 (2013), 1117-1147. This is also the general tenor of the memoirs of the main U.S. negotiators. See Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 273-275; Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 273-319; Vance, Hard Choices, 204, 229. 15 Naseer H. Aruri, Dishonest Broker: the U.S. Role in Israel and Palestine (Cambridge, MA: South End press, 2003), 62-64; Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, The : A Testimony (London, 1986), 364; Donald Neff, Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy towards Palestine and Israel since 1945 (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995), 118; Cheryl Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 223-224; Fayez Sayegh, “The Camp David Agreement and the Palestine Problem,” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 8, No. 2 (1979), 3–40.

295

The stated and actual policy goal of the Carter administration was moderate. A

Palestinian entity short of a state linked to Jordan.16 The goal was not arrived at through an evaluation of the morality of the different options. Rather this middling solution was preferred by both Egypt and Jordan and was closer to the Israeli position than an independent Palestinian state.17 Carter’s continued insistence on linking the Palestinian issue to the Egyptian track was at first an attempt to gain enough mutual ground to successfully reconvene the Geneva Conference.

The position was not primarily a moral one. A more sympathetic policy towards the

Palestinians was a necessity for maintaining U.S. influence in the Middle East once the PLO had been recognized as the representative of the Palestinian people. Indeed, Kissinger had reached the same conclusion and tested his ability to bring the PLO to the negotiation previously.18 The administration believed that unless the roots of the conflict were resolved, conflict would repeatedly remerge, threaten the oil supply and facilitate Soviet influence. In this they were no different from the Ford administration. As John Lewis Gaddis has noted, the difference between

Kissinger’s strategy and Carter’s was not large in substance, it was considerable only in appearance.19 What set Carter apart was optimism that a deal could be reached. The President generally had an optimistic view of conflict resolution.20 Therefore, Carter believed in a comprehensive agreement which would resolve the entire Arab-Israeli conflict once and for all.21

16 Memorandum of Conversation, July 19, 1977, FRUS VIII, Doc. 52. 17 Sadat made it clear to Carter in their first meeting that this was preference. See Memorandum of Conversation, April 4, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 25. 18 James Stocker, “A Historical Inevitability? Kissinger and US Contacts with the Palestinians (1973–76),” International History Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2017), 316-337. 19 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 344-345. See also Vance, Hard Choices, 163. 20 Ben-Zvi, From Truman to Obama, 144; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 38. 21 Memorandum of Conversation, February 20, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 15; Quandt to Brzezinski, April 18, 1977, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, 24, Carter Presidential Library (hereafter CPL).

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Accordingly, the step-by-step process was jettisoned in favor of the attainment of full peace agreements between Israel and all the Arab states.22 There was a strong belief in the administration that a stable peace agreement would need to be based on Arab unity.23 It is in this context that the participation of the Palestinians is best understood. Not as a sop to human rights but as an attempt to genuinely resolve the roots of the conflict in the pursuit of regional stability.

Considering the commitment of the administration to comprehensive settlement, it is both ironic and significant that Carter oversaw what was essentially a separate peace between Israel and

Egypt.

To promote a comprehensive permanent settlement, the Carter administration advocated a simple trade of all territories occupied by Israel for full normalization. Carter had no patience for a scheme of “defensible borders” if it involved an Israeli negotiation position claiming sovereignty beyond the 1967 borders. The President was similarly impatient with Arab attempts to exchange land for partial political and diplomatic guarantees. The USG insisted clearly and consistently that full peace and recognition should be exchanged for territory.24 This simple but effective formulation went a long way towards persuading Sadat to offer full peace to Israel and towards convincing Begin to quickly relinquish any claims of sovereignty in Sinai.

Another factor which helped the Carter administration negotiate effectively was the unity of purpose between the various decision-makers and bureaucracies.25 The State Department and

NSC agreed with the overarching approach towards the peace process. The Pentagon was not

22 Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 38. 23 Qaundt, Camp David, 37. 24 Quandt to Brzezinski, April 19, 1977, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, 24, CPL; Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting, June 10, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 40. 25 For a good summary of the process of foreign policy decision-making in the Carter administration and the manner in which it remained centralized, see Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 48-78.

297 particularly involved in formulating policy. The President treated the bureaucracy with respect and considered their opinions. In-fighting regarding the peace process was uncommon.26 It also greatly helped that the premises of Carter’s foreign policy were similar to those the State

Department trumpeted.

There are those that argue that the administration fell prey to internal disputes rendering its foreign policy incoherent.27 There were notable differences of opinion among his advisors.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance firmly believed in détente. Meanwhile, Brzezinski trumpeted a more hard-nosed approach designed to limit Soviet influence.28 However, when it came to the

Middle Eastern peace process the spirit of team work reigned supreme.29 All the primary decision-makers believed in attaining a comprehensive agreement and giving the Palestinians a larger role in the resolution of conflict, while maintaining Israeli security.30 There was never any doubt that Carter and Vance (in that order) took the lead in shaping the peace negotiations.

Brzezinski was relegated to a secondary role, possibly because he was distrusted by the Israeli government. Vice President Walter Mondale rarely had substantial policy influence. The administration pursued a unified and coherent strategy. Of all the President’s surveyed in this study, Carter had the most complete control of foreign policy. He led and shaped the foreign policy debate.

26 NSC to Vance, July 1, 1977, RAC Project Number NLC 25-132-6-1-1, CPL; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 88; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 39; Spiegel, Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, 319; Qaundt, Camp David, 35. 27 Betty Glad, An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, his Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power; Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), 185–86. 28 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 600-608; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 346-347; Vance, Hard Choices, 46. 29 Glad, An Outsider in the White House, 27-28. See also Douglas Brinkley, “The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter”; Strong, Working in the World, 205-206. 30 Memorandum of Conversation, February 17, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 9

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U.S. Beliefs and Preferences: The Policy of the Carter Administrations towards the Occupied

Territories and the Settlements

The Carter administration believed firmly that a peace agreement between Israel and the Arab states should be based on the 1967 borders with only minor modifications in the West Bank.31 As

Jeremy Pressman convincingly shows, a map found in the Carter Presidential Library gives some indication of what the administration meant by that. Israel would be expected to return to the

1967 borders aside from retaining the Etzion Bloc, the Latrun salient, and a few other minor changes.32 Regarding Jerusalem, it maintained the traditional USG stance that the status of the city should be determined in negotiations but the city remain united.33

In an attempt to alleviate Israeli security concerns, the Carter administration built on the separation Kissinger had pioneered of sovereignty or recognized borders from security borders.34

As Brzezinski put it, “a formula combining mutually acceptable borders (and hence only limited changes in the 1967 lines) with security outposts beyond such borders had to be contrived.”35

This was part of an early and conscious decision to pressure Israel on territorial issues, while pressuring the Arab states on the nature of peace.36 Carter used this concept more effectively than Kissinger had, mostly because he phrased them clearly and stated them openly without any of the obfuscation or trickery. The administration had little tolerance for an Israeli claim of sovereignty beyond the 1967 borders as part of a permanent settlement agreement. Presence beyond the 1967 borders would not include sovereignty and would be temporary.

31 See for example Telegram from Secretary of State Vance to the White House and the Department of State, August 2, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 64. See also Qaundt, Camp David, 10. 32 Pressman, “Explaining the Carter Administration’s Israeli–Palestinian Solution,” 1130. 33 Vance to the White House, August 2, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 64. See also Qaundt, Camp David, 10. 34 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 84; Vance, Hard Choices, 173. 35 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 84. 36 Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting, June 10, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 40.

299

This position led to an increasingly strident and public stance against Israeli settlement activity. Kenneth Stein accurately noted that a “profound disagreement over the future of the

West Bank and the settlements there was fully established by the end of the Camp David negotiations. They bitterly infected U.S.-Israeli relations until Carter left office.”37 In one particularly notable incident, Vance went further than any U.S. official ever had in public, saying that settlements were illegal, and “therefore they shouldn’t exist.”38 The substance of the policy was softer than this would imply. In fact, the USG did not support dismantling existing settlements. Rather their future was to be the subject of negotiation. Similarly, the administration supported the Israeli claim that Jews had the right, in principle, to live anywhere in the occupied territories. However, the right was dependent on the outcome of talks with the relevant Arab states.39

It is also important to note that for all of the bluster of the administration it removed the threat of sanctions or a freeze on aid as a punishment for settlement construction from the table.40

Historian Daniel Strieff criticized Carter on this point, noting “his inability, or unwillingness to pressure the Begin government on settlements in the occupied territories or adequately understand the Likud premier’s ideological approach toward the West bank set important precedents for his successors in office.”41 However, the inability of Carter to pressure Israel into ceasing construction in the West Bank was not the product of incompetence or lack of will.

Rather it was a question of strategic realities. There was no logical interlocutor for the West

37 Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 202. 38 John M. Goshko, “Vance Bluntly Decries Israeli Sinai Settlements,” Washington Post, February 11, 1978, A8. 39 White House, May 12, 1980, Special Advisor to the President Moses, 21, CPL. 40 Washington to Director General, August 3, 1977, 4155-3/A, ISA; Carter press conference, August 24, 1977, 5988- 13/FM, ISA. 41 Daniel Strieff, Jimmy Carter and the Middle East: The Politics of Presidential Diplomacy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 17.

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Bank and the rivals vying for it were of minor strategic significance. The USG estimated that a peace agreement could destabilize Jordan.42 Israel and Egypt did not take Jordan seriously and so was willing to move ahead without the Hashemite Kingdom.43 In addition, the USG estimated that the West Bank was overwhelmingly pro-PLO and that the Jordanians did not speak for them.44 Hussein’s weakness ultimately forced him to become an opponent to the process.45

The PLO was still not strong enough to credibly replace Jordan as the interlocutor. Israel was dead set against direct talks with the organization which it considered to be a terrorist organization.46 More surprising to Carter (due to his inexperience in Middle Eastern affairs) was the discovery that the Arab states were not enthusiastic about PLO participation or a Palestinian state under the PLO. As he noted in his diary, Egypt and other Arab states merely “pay lip service” to an independent Palestinian state.47 Syria, Egypt and Jordan were each in their own way attempting to undermine Arafat and his organization.48 This discovery coupled with the difficulty the administration had in convincing the PLO to moderate their demands and cease supporting terror attacks, exasperated the Carter. Getting Arafat on board was more trouble than it was worth.49 From the perspective of the USG neither Jordan nor the PLO was worth the delay and effort necessary to entice them into the peace process.

42 Quandt to Brzezinski, April 18, 1977, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, 24, CPL. 43 Memorandum of conversation, March 21, 1978, Begin USA 4349-7/A, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, July 19, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 271. 44 Brzezinski to Carter. June 24, 1977, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, 41, CPL. 45 Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 44. 46 Memorandum of Conversation, March 2, 1979, FRUS IX, doc. 184. 47 Carter, White House Diary, 161. 48 Memorandum from William Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, September 19, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 103. 49 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Carter, undated, FRUS VIII, doc. 202.

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Using blunt means such as sanctions or suspension of aid made little sense when there was no clear partner for peace negotiations. If Israel were to freeze settlements in the West Bank, it would be unlikely to benefit the peace process. At some point Israel would return to construction and a significant and costly confrontation with Israel would have no discernible end.

In the case where there was a clear, capable and willing interlocutor of strategic significance,

Carter proved supremely capable of pressuring Israel into concessions. No President has managed that achievement since.

Israeli Preferences and Beliefs: Territorial Policy under the Begin Government

The victory of the Likud in the 1977 elections was a major shift socially, economically and politically for the State of Israel. But the difference in policy towards the peace process was not as large as it appears. There is no doubt that Prime Minister Menachem Begin adopted a different political lexicon. He stressed the link of the Jewish people to the land as well as the traumatic experiences of the holocaust as central in explaining Israeli policy. Correspondingly Begin was more suspicious of the outside world. This stood in contrast to the more pragmatic language of his Labor Party predecessors, who primarily stressed security concerns. This has led some scholars to claim that Begin’s policy presented a sharp break from the past. The new policy, we are told, stressed the sanctity of the land over the institutions of the State and military solutions to the exclusion of diplomatic ones.50 This is not an unfair reading of Begin’s ideological

50 Peleg, Begin’s Foreign Policy, 51-93; Shmuel Sandler, The State of Israel, The Land of Israel: The Statist and Ethnonational Dimensions of Foreign Policy (London: Praeger, 1993).

302 inclinations. He once wrote that the pursuit of peace agreements with the Arab states was “an evil desire originating in denial, born of illusion, and fated to end in terrible bloodshed.”51

There is a counter-argument that the policy of Israel did not change substantially in practice.52 This approach is more convincing. Distrust towards the rest of the world had typified the Meir and Rabin governments just as much as the Begin government. However, just like his predecessors Begin put an inordinate amount of weight on the importance of bilateral relations with the U.S. and cultivated them carefully. In addition, he proved just as willing to engage in diplomacy as the Labor Party. Perhaps more so. Indeed, the two plans presented by Begin to

Carter in December 1977 were the first serious peace initiatives drafted and approved by an

Israeli government since 1967. Israel was surprisingly flexible on the Sinai Peninsula under the new Likud government. Much like Rabin before him, Begin focused on removing Egypt from the circle of belligerency in a bid to remove the existential threat to Israel.53

Israel insisted that the Rafah salient be maintained to keep Gaza isolated from the

Egyptian military just as the Labor Party had. The Likud differed in its lesser attachment to

Sharm El-Sheikh, which Israel was willing to give up in its peace plan presented to Carter in

December 1977.54 The Egyptian ability to stop Israeli shipping from going through Bab El-

Mand, further south, had taken the immediacy out of the demand to retain control over Sharm.55

On the Golan Heights, there was no serious test to the Israeli position that it was willing to

51 Aryeh Naor, “Hawks’ Beaks, Doves’ Feathers Likud Prime Ministers Between Ideology and Reality,” Israel Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Fall 2005), 158. 52 Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel and the Peace Process, 1977-1982 (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994); Navon, A Plight Among Nations, 146-166. 53 Memorandum of Conversation, September 19, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 105; Memorandum of conversation, December 16, 1977, 4349-6/A, ISA; Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel and the Peace Process, 21-22. 54 Memorandum of Conversation, December 16, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 177. 55 Memorandum of Conversation, February 4, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 211.

303 negotiate but ruled out a wide withdrawal, since Assad was unwilling to negotiate.56 The differences between the territorial positions of the two governments were minor and guided by strategic considerations as much as political and spiritual ones.

The major exception was the policy of the Likud government towards the West Bank.

The Israeli government was quite clear, at least in public statements, that it would not return the

West Bank in full or in part. The claim was based on two arguments. The first, was that the West

Bank had been a crucial part of the biblical kingdoms of Israel and Judea and contained some of the holiest sites in Judaism. The second was that Israel had liberated the West Bank in a war of self-defence. Therefore, it had never legally belonged to Jordan, and Israel through a just war had returned a lost territory.57 In private talks the Begin government evinced a reluctant willingness to open negotiations with Jordan and did not rule out partial withdrawal.58 However, it is hard to take these intentions seriously. GOI intended to retain the West Bank in its entirety.

Rigidity on the West Bank was tied to ideological precepts. The Revisionist movement from which the Likud Party sprang had consistently trumpeted the idea of a “Greater Israel.” The boundaries of this imagined sphere are based on a divine promise to Abraham in the Book of

Genesis: “to your seed I give this land from the river of Egypt to the great river, the river

Euphrates.”59 However, the Revisionist movement gradually abandoned the claim over areas

56 Memorandum of Conversation, October 4, 1977, FRUS IX, doc. 124; Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel and the Peace Process, 20-21; Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations (New York: Random House, 1981), 12. 57 Menachem Begin, “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin upon the presentation of his government,” June 20, 1977, Israel's Foreign Policy - Historical Documents 1977-1979, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook3/Pages/1%20Statement%20to%20the%20%20Kne sset%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Begi.aspx {accessed: June 11, 2017} 58 Memorandum of conversation, February 17, 1978, 4173-4/A, ISA. 59 Genesis, 15:18-21.

304 outside of and particularly the east bank of the Jordan River.60 Begin underwent a complex process by which he matched ideology with political reality, altering policy goals in a more minimalist direction without relinquishing abstract ideological rights to the idea of “greater Israel.”61 For example, he stated that annexation was unnecessary since the

West Bank belonged “eternally” to the Jewish people.62 Although stated in ideological terms, this was a practical position. An annexation would demographically alter the State of Israel and eventually undermine its Jewish character. It would also not be recognized by the international community and paint Israel as the main obstacle to peace. Ultimately the human mind finds ways to match ideology to reality, the two in this case were not opposed but rather intertwined.

There were strategic arguments for rigidity in negotiation on the West Bank. The pay-off from a Jordanian agreement was not high. The removal of Jordan from the circle of belligerency did little to remove the threat of a war on two-fronts. Progress on either track would require a great deal of time, effort and political capital. Since Egypt and its military were the existential threat to Israel, peace with Jordan was desirable but a lower priority. In addition, Begin argued that a withdrawal from the West Bank could place Israeli population centers at risk. He was concerned that without the presence of the Israeli military, the result would be “thousands of terrorists in charge of Judea and Samaria.” 63 The concern was not just in regard to terrorism. The

Prime Minister was worried that relinquishing the West Bank would place Israeli cities and its

60 On the process by which this occurred, see Nadav Shelef, “From both banks of the Jordan to the Whole Land of Israel: Ideological Change in revisionist Zionism,” Israel Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Spring 2004), 125-148. 61 For an overview of this process, see Naor, “Hawks’ Beaks, Doves’ Feathers,” 155-169. 62 Menachem Begin, “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin upon the presentation of his government,” June 20 1977, Israel's Foreign Policy - Historical Documents 1977-1979, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook3/Pages/1%20Statement%20to%20the%20%20Kne sset%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Begi.aspx {accessed: June 11, 2017} 63 Memorandum of Conversation, March 21, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 232.

305 strategically crucial airport within the range of artillery and rocket fire.64 Begin also stressed the ties between the USSR and the PLO. He was concerned that the West Bank could turn into a

Soviet base, and noted that “a flight from Odessa to Bethlehem is less than two hours.”65

The Likud believed just as firmly as its predecessors had, that maintaining the West Bank was a crucial security interest of the State of Israel. The Likud manifesto for the 1977 elections evinced this duality of purpose. In an ideological vein, it stated that “the right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is eternal.” It continued ,however, that a withdrawal from the West

Bank “would inevitably lead to the establishment of a ‘Palestinian State’, threaten the security of the civilian population, endanger the existence of the State of Israel, and defeat all prospects of peace.”66 Agricultural Minister and Head of the Settlement Committee Ariel Sharon wrote, “My two principles…were to protect our population centers and to insure the right of Jews to live in historical Israel.”67 The security and ideological elements in Begin’s attachment to the West

Bank were intertwined and mutually reinforcing.

Indeed, the territorial conception of the Likud was not that different from those espoused by the maximalist factions of the Labor Party: RAFI and Achdut Ha’avoda. It is no coincidence that it attracted the most well-known maximalist, Moshe Dayan, appointed the first Foreign

Minister of the Begin government. Begin and Dayan were not ideologically identical, but shared some bedrock principles. Indeed, the MAPAI elite had long feared that the former general would

64 Washington D.C. embassy, December 15, 1977, 4155-6/A, ISA. Memorandum of conversation, December 16 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 177. 65 Menachem Begin, “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin on his visit to the US,” July 27, 1977, Israel's Foreign Policy - Historical Documents 1977-1979 http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook3/Pages/25%20Statement%20to%20the%20Knesset %20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Begi.aspx {accessed June 11, 2017} 66 Quoted in Colin Shindler, “Likud and the Search for Eretz Yisrael: from the Bible to the Twenty First Century,” Israel Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1-2 (2001), 103-104. 67 Ariel Sharon, Warrior: the Autobiography of Ariel Sharon (New York: Touchstone, 2001), 367-368.

306 make common cause with GAHAL/Likud due to their ideological similarities.68 In his account of negotiations with Egypt, Dayan wrote “we were not always at odds, and indeed, on most issues we held identical opinions.”69 However, disagreements when they arose were quite unpleasant.

The Foreign Minister believed that Palestinian autonomy should be deeper and more consequential than Begin did. He also believed that settlement construction should be restrained during sensitive moments in the negotiations so as not to sabotage the process, while Begin practiced less restraint.70 However, in the early days of the Begin government they found a common policy.

The autonomy plan was a product of Dayan and Begin’s shared view on the West Bank.

Revisionist thought going back to its founding father Vladimir Jabotinsky had long believed the

Arabs in the Land of Israel possessed legitimate national rights. Therefore, it was only natural that the Likud platform mentioned the possibility of allowing the Palestinians “cultural autonomy.”71 The initiative to allow the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza autonomy was in tune with the previously discussed “Dayan plan”, also known as the “functional solution.”72

Both kept sovereignty over the West Bank an open question and allowed autonomy on administrative issues, but were designed to avoid an independent Palestinian state. There were differences regarding the implementation of the autonomy plan. Begin wanted to use the autonomy talks to promote defacto annexation after five-years. Dayan along with Defense

Minister Ezer Weizmann hoped to keep the result open-ended to give autonomy talks a greater

68 Memorandum of conversation, April 16, 1972, 5978-2/FM, ISA; Ranta, Political Decision Making, 121-138. 69 Dayan, Breakthrough, 153-154. 70 N/a, “Dayan confirms: I will resign if requisitions for settlements are decided upon,” Davar, October 12 1979, 1. 71 Naor, “Hawks’ Beaks, Doves’ Feathers,” 166. 72 Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel and the Peace Process, 66; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 24.

307 chance of success.73 However, the proximity of the territorial position of the Begin government to the Israeli mainstream helped the Likud win power and maintain popularity.

Israeli Preferences and Beliefs: Israeli Settlement Policy under the Begin Government

Begin claimed the right to settle all parts of the West Bank. The Herut movement, which was the faction of the Likud Begin controlled, championed a philosophy of settlement construction throughout the occupied territories and vowed to triple their population.74 However, all Israeli governments made the general claim that Jews had a right to settle anywhere in the Land of

Israel. The differences between the parties was over the wisdom of settling in certain areas at certain times. The Labor Party believed in restraint to encourage peace. 75

These arguments played out in the Begin cabinet. The differences in settlement policy surrounded two distinctive issues. The first was whether to settle in the heavily populated parts of the West Bank. Weizmann and Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Yadin sympathized with the

Labor Party principle of keeping Samaria open for a future peace agreement. At first the Begin government showed restraint. However, over time those who supported settlement in the heavily populated areas won out. The 1979 WZO Settlement Department plan was designed “to lower to a minimum the danger of a Palestinian State in Judea and Samaria.”76 The combination of

Sharon at the helm of the Settlement Committee and Matityahu Drobles at the Settlement

Department worked to scatter settlements throughout the West Bank, mostly on hilltops and at

73 Memorandum of conversation, July 19, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 271; N/A, July 28, 1978, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski material, VIP visit file, 6, CPL. 74 Herut Movement, January 1977, National Convention 12-13-13-1/H, JAB. 75 See for example Rabin speech, July 31, 1974, 6721-37/C, ISA. 76 Danny Rubinstein, “Settlement Department suggests surrounding Nablus with 11 Israeli settlements,” Davar, July 26, 1979, 1.

308 road junctions for the optimal amount of control over the territory.77 The Department of State estimated that by 1980 Israel claimed ownership of 27% of the territory in the West Bank and that in the first three years of the Begin administration, its population had more than doubled from 6,900 to about 14,000.78 By the end of the Begin era, the distinction between the different areas of settlement would become increasingly meaningless as the entire West Bank was crisscrossed with a tapestry of small settlements designed to disrupt Palestinian statehood.

The second major dispute was over the timing of settlement construction in relation to the peace process. The Carter administration was more combative on the issue than expected and there was concern expanded construction could derail the peace process. Since the attainment of a peace agreement with Egypt was a central national interest, resistance within the cabinet to mistimed construction was considerable. The two extremes in this regard were Weizmann and

Sharon. The Defense Minister was committed to the peace process and enjoyed a close personal relationship with Sadat. Sharon also believed in the importance of the peace process and famously called Begin at Camp David to support the evacuation of the settlements.79 However, the Minister of Agriculture insisted that the construction of settlements in Sinai and the West

Bank during negotiations would improve the Israeli bargaining position.

Begin was torn between the impulses. One the one hand, he bore the brunt of external pressure and was genuinely committed to the peace process with Egypt. However, the Prime

Minister was also committed to extensive settlement in the West Bank. The Prime Minister increasingly tried to resolve this dilemma by issuing vague promises and exploiting any possible

77 Akiva Eldar & Idith Zertal, Lords of the Land: The War over Israel’s Settlements in the Occupied Territories, (New York: Nation Books, 2007), 59-61. 78 Saunders to Vance, April 14, 1980, RAC Project Number NLC 17E-27-2-7-3, CPL. 79 Ezer Weizmann, Battle for Peace (New York: Bantam USA, 1981), 370-371.

309 loophole to knowingly mislead the USG. The Prime Minister was equally dishonest to Gush

Emunim. For example, he vowed that he would not uproot settlements to attain peace with Egypt and would leave talks if the issue was even mentioned.80 His legalistic mind was remarkably adept at milking the most beneficial interpretation out of any agreed language or formula. When all else failed, Begin resorted to cheap trickery or out and out lies. By the latter period of the

Carter administration, the Prime Minister had lost all credibility on the issue. After one Israeli announcement of the construction of a new settlement, Carter asked sarcastically in a handwritten note “what was Begin’s latest ‘promise’?”81 The issue placed him in a psychologically and politically difficult situation.

The Environment: The Strategic Setting

The strategic balance in the region during Carter’s term is best understood through a division into two distinct periods. The first period, starting with Carter’s ascent to power in January 1977 and continuing until early to mid- 1978, was identical to the one faced by its predecessor. The

Carter administration inherited the assumption that if the Arab-Israeli conflict could be resolved,

Soviet influence in the Middle East would be curtailed. Egypt occupied the role of the most important Arab state and therefore Sadat’s willingness to enter the U.S. orbit became the focus of

Carter’s policy. The USG pursued progress on the Egyptian track even when it meant abandoning the preferred vehicle of the Geneva Conference and shortchanging beliefs on the

80 Zertal & Eldar, Lords of the Land, 62. 81 Brzezinski to Carter, April 19, 1978, RAC Project Number NLC 17B-9-50-3-7, CPL. For distrust in the Carter administration towards Begin on the matter, see also Vance, Hard Choices, 206.

310 centrality of Palestinian self-determination. It was also willing to incur significant setbacks in its relations with Israel to reach a deal which was agreeable to Egypt.

The strategic situation in the region changed fundamentally in 1978 with the weakening and eventual overthrow of the Pahlavi regime in Iran. Iran, Turkey and Pakistan had traditionally acted as a northern tier of American allies containing Soviet influence and protecting the oil supply. The replacement of a pro-American regime in Iran with a hostile one undercut one of the major pillars upholding the security of the strategically crucial Persian Gulf.82 The situation was exacerbated by the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan and gains by Soviet proxies in Yemen and

Ethiopia.

Carter declared that “any attempt by outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”83 This formulation was referred to as the Carter Doctrine and it called for a “regional security framework”, which was an initiative to establish close ties of cooperation between regional actors short of a formal alliance.84 Increasingly the center of gravity in regards to U.S. strategy in the region moved towards Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.85

Israel was not well suited to contribute strategically to the Persian Gulf containment effort. Jerusalem tried to sell itself as a useful and loyal ally capable of supporting operations in the area.86 However, the USG was not buying that narrative. To be sure, Israel built on the

82 Telegram from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, January 23, 1979, FRUS XVIII, doc. 179. 83 Excerpts from Carter speech, “We must face the world as it is,” Washington Post, January 24, 1980, A12. 84 Brzezinski, Principle and Power, 426- 469. 85 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, May 16, 1980, FRUS XVIII, doc. 80. 86 Memorandum of Conversation, September 18, 1980, FRUS IV, doc. 398.

311 impressive military overhaul overseen by the Rabin government and the Pentagon felt that Israel remained capable of defeating any combination of Arab enemies.87 However, for political reasons, as long as the issue of Palestinian self-determination was not resolved, Israel could not ally with or support the Gulf States.88 Therefore, Israel did not feature in military plans to protect the region, because “bases in Israel and the Sinai are not appropriate for increasing our military presence in the region.”89 Its only role was a diplomatic and political one, namely to make the concessions necessary to keep the peace process going. 90

Instead of becoming more integrated into the region, Israeli isolation continued apace.

The Arab states, particularly those that opposed the Israel-Egyptian peace process, increasingly resorted to proposing unbalanced anti-Israel resolutions in the United Nations. This placed the

Carter administration in an uncomfortable position. The European Community adopted a negotiating stance closer to that of the Arab League, culminating in the Venice Declaration of

June 1980 which called on Israel to negotiate with the PLO.91 With Europe distancing itself from

Israel, the United States increasingly found itself forced either to veto resolutions or take a stand against most of the international community. Carter wrote in his diary “it was not good for them to have to rely almost exclusively on the U.S. for their security.”92 Under these diplomatic and political circumstances, the Begin government was of little use in furthering wider strategic U.S. interests.

87 Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting, February 27, 1978, FRUS VIII, Document 220. 88 Hunter to Brzezinski, October 29, 1980, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, 37, CPL. 89 Memorandum from William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, November 28, 1979, FRUS XVIII, doc. 34. 90 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Carter, January 30, 1980, FRUS XVIII, doc. 51. 91 Venice Declaration, June 13, 1980, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf {accessed: April 28, 2017} 92 Carter, White House Diary, 298.

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To make matters worse, in practice Israel was acting to scupper the Carter Doctrine.

Israel and its supporters in Congress did their best to block U.S. efforts to arm Saudi Arabia.93

Weizmann conceded that Israel was working against U.S. strategic interests by emboldening

AIPAC’s struggle against the sale. He later wrote “the Carter administration contended – with considerable justice – that plane deliveries…were part of a regional defense plan and of U.S. global strategy. In attempting to block arms supplies to Saudi Arabia, the Jews were widely perceived as supporting petty Israeli interests over global American interests.”94 The matter left

President Carter and his administration with a bitter aftertaste.95 While Israel was still a regional power, it was proving a liability to Carter’s global policy.

In the meantime, Egypt’s strategic utility was also eroding but to a lesser extent. The new centrality of the Persian Gulf meant Egypt was no longer the linchpin of USG Middle Eastern strategy. However, Egyptian participation in upholding the Carter doctrine was essential. An

NSC report observed that Egypt is the “only major regional state whose geopolitical concerns mesh with ours and who is, at the same time, willing and able to pursue these joints interests.”96

Sadat was eager to play this role. He wrote to Carter that “Egypt remains the only power which, if properly helped, can oppose attempts to destabilize and to impose communist domination in our region.”97 The Pentagon believed that Egypt was the best location for bases in the rear of the

Persian Gulf. Approval was sought and received for U.S. basing rights in the Egyptian peninsula of Ras Banas on the Red Sea. In addition, the President believed Egypt was a promising site for

93 On the congressional battle over the sale of warplanes to Saudi Arabia, see Daniel Strieff, “Arms Wrestle: Capitol Hill Fight Over Carter’s 1978 Middle East “Package” Airplane Sale,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2016), 475-499. 94 Weizmann, Battle for Peace, 288. 95 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 247-249; Carter, White House Diary, 194-195. 96 N/a, 1980, RAC Project Number NLC 128-6-19-1-2, CPL. 97 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State and the White House, January 26, 1980, FRUS IX, doc. 327.

313 joint exercises designed for the security of the region.98 Egypt had a role in the regional security framework.

There were limits on Egyptian participation. Sadat had become increasingly isolated in the Arab world. Due to the scuffle over the peace process, Egypt broke diplomatic relations with several Arab states. In addition, it was suspended from the Arab League and the headquarters of the organization were moved to Tunis. At this point, Cairo had become a dividing rather than a uniting factor in the region. The Egyptian military was also in bad shape. The pro-American policy of Sadat had alienated the USSR and they proved increasingly unwilling to provide parts for Egyptian weaponry. Sadat told the President that his military had been unable to replace its losses going back to the 1973 War.99 The USG was aware of the sorry state of the Egyptian military but domestic political constraints prevented it from fulfilling Egyptian military needs.100

Finally, the Carter administration was concerned that Sadat’s military was needed at home to maintain stability. To entice the Carter administration into selling it more advanced weapons systems, Cairo played up its willingness to play the role of a “regional policeman” and to counter Soviet influence.101 Rather than entice the United States into speeding up arms sales, this alarmed the administration. Stansfield Turner, head of the CIA, warned “it will be difficult to turn Sadat away from his concept of being a Middle East policeman, but there are real dangers in our encouraging that role. There is a danger that he will ignore his domestic problems…he could

98 Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting, April 23, 1980, FRUS XVIII, doc. 74; Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, July 22, 1980, FRUS XVIII, doc. 87; Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, May 16, 1980, FRUS XVIII, doc. 79. 99 Memorandum of Conversation, April 5, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 27. 100 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown, January 12, 1980, FRUS IX, doc. 323; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 247-249; Carter, White House Diary, 194-195. 101 Memorandum of Conversation, September 17, 1979, FRUS IX, doc. 287.

314 end up generating the same kind of problems that we have just seen in Iran.”102 The Carter administration believed Egypt was not stable enough to be a cornerstone of its regional policy.

The combination of Egyptian strategic importance with its increasing isolation stressed the importance of the peace process. The USG felt Sadat was dependent on progress for his survival. As Vance wrote in his memoirs, ”once Sadat had taken this enormous political risk, his survival, and probably the pro-Western orientation of Egypt, depended on progress towards peace.”103 Paradoxically, Sadat’s weakness had become a strength in garnering the goodwill of the United States.104

The bottom line was that global developments, along with the success of U.S. policy in shutting the USSR out of the region, lessened the strategic utility of the region. Syria had long been irrelevant to the strategic calculations of the United States. Jordan opposed the peace process but proved powerless to stop it. Similarly, both Israel and Egypt had been rendered less strategically central by developments in central Asia. However, the depreciation was not equal.

A more stable and less isolated Egypt was a significant interest for regional security. Therefore, great efforts were made to elicit greater concessions out of Israel to help Egypt reintegrate into the region. Israel, on the other hand had become so ostracized and isolated globally that it was difficult to conceive of a beneficial role for it within the Carter Doctrine. Much like the

Eisenhower Doctrine before it, Carter’s move towards a regional security structure saw Israel become a hindrance.

102 Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting, February 1, 1979, FRUS IX, doc. 166. 103 Vance, Hard Choices, 194. 104 Vance to Carter, March 25, 1977, RAC Project Number NLC 128-11-19-2-5, CPL.

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The Environment: The Domestic Political Situation

The Likud won the elections for the first time, winning 43 seats and thus ending Labor Party hegemony. The initial coalition Begin put together was narrow, numbering 62, a majority of two members. The lynchpin of the coalition was the now pro-settler NRP which held 15 seats.

Several members of the ruling Likud party were dyed-in-the-wool proponents of “Greater Israel” and opposed the evacuation of any settlements or the recognition of Palestinian self- determination on principle. Therefore, this was easily the most pro-settlement government yet. A few months later the Likud negotiated a coalition agreement with the moderate Democratic

Movement for Change party (hereafter DMC), which was the third largest in the Knesset. As part of the coalition talks, DMC and the Likud agreed to base their settlement policy on the Labor

Party plank.105 The more moderate party gave Begin a cushion to maneuver.

Over time, the Likud lost its cushion. The DMC split in September 1978. Seven members

(out of 15) remained in the coalition, lowering the number of seats in Begin’s coalition to 69. It would continue to erode and by November 1978, the coalition had dwindled down to 65 members. Although the coalition had weakened and was increasingly dependent on the NRP, the peace process continued. By mid-1980, the coalition dwindled to a mere 61 seats after the resignation of Weizmann and other defections. In January 1981, Begin finally admitted defeat and called elections for June. 106 Despite the constant erosion in the standing of the coalition and its inability to support the peace process unilaterally, the Begin government made the most far reaching concessions of any Israeli government yet.

105 Memorandum of conversation, June 13, 1977, Faction 48-2-2/E, JAB. 106 Gershon Kieval, Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories, Westport, CON: Greenwood Press, 1983), 159.

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Paradoxically, Gush Emunim lost some of its influence in this pro-settler government. It was invited to become an official settlement movement under the WZO umbrella. Gush Emunim affiliated groups were incorporated into the relatively limited official settlement plans conceived in the early days of the Begin government.107 The Begin government had some success in its effort to co-opt Gush Emunim and it lost some of its influence as a result.

In the United States, the Carter administration took more notice of domestic political developments than the Nixon-Ford administrations had. As a Democratic candidate, Carter was more sensitive to dissatisfaction in the Jewish community and among notable Jewish donors.

Correspondingly, AIPAC proved highly active, particularly on arms sales to Arab states.108

During the Carter administration, the “Israel lobby” was tested seriously on the settlements for the first time. When it became apparent that Israel was being pressured to evacuate the settlements in Sinai, the “Israel lobby” did not come out in support of the Israeli position on

Sinai settlements. Most American Jews and pro-Israel activists felt uncomfortable opposing a peace process which was central to U.S. policy in the Middle East. In addition, it put AIPAC and the Jewish community in the uncomfortable position of opposing a historical peace process.

Therefore, they did not pick up the gauntlet and defend the Israeli policy. Ultimately, Congress completely supported the U.S-Egyptian position that all Israeli settlements in Sinai should be evacuated. As in all the periods surveyed, U.S. domestic politics did not consequentially influence U.S. policy on the settlements.109

107 N/a, “Three groups of settlers go to Nebi Salah and Beit El: will settle in a police station and a military camp,” Davar, November 2, 1977, 2. 108 Siegel to Jordan, October 3, 1977, Chief of Staff, Jordan, 35, CPL; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 108; Strieff, “Arms Wrestle,” 475-499; Qaundt, Camp David, 134. 109 Rafiah to Evron, February 7, 1978, 4173-4/A, ISA; Rafiah to North American Division, February 8, 1978, 7380- 10/A, ISA; Hertzog to Dinitz, February 8, 1978, 7380-10/A, ISA.

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Multi-Leveled Interaction

Reconvening the Geneva Conference: The Importance of Arab Unity

Carter believed the step-by-step process of the previous few years had played itself out. The

USG pursued a comprehensive peace agreement.110 This was coupled with a belief in the administration that a stable peace agreement would need to be based on Arab unity.111 Therefore, the USG pushed for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. In theory, this meant greater

Soviet participation in the peace process. In practice, the strategy was designed to limit the

Soviet motivation to interfere in the process, while giving them minimal influence on substantive issues.112

The issue of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories had already become an important item on the international agenda during Ford’s tenure. The Arab states kept it there.

Two months after the administration came into office, Egypt initiated a Security Council resolution condemning Israeli occupation policy. The Carter administration attempted to get

Egypt to remove reference to the settlements from its proposed resolution. Egyptian Foreign

Minister Fahmy told U.S. ambassador to Egypt that if pressure to change the resolution continued, Sadat’s scheduled trip to Washington D.C. will be cancelled.113 The resolution passed 131-1 as the U.S. abstained.114 The State Department noted that settlements

110 Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 38. 111 Qaundt, Camp David, 37. 112 Quandt to Brzezinski, April 19, 1977, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, 24, CPL; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 213. 113 White House memorandum, March 29, 1977, RAC Project Number NLC 1-1-3-74-5, CPL. 114 Associated Press, Israeli Settlements Censured 131-1 at U.N.; U.S. Abstains “, Washington Post, October 29 1977, A8.

318 had become a particularly potent point of criticism in the Egyptian press. This was doubly true when the settlements were built on Egyptian territory.115 The Arab states placed the issue on the agenda before the Carter administration had the opportunity to formulate a policy.

In May the Labor Party lost the elections to the Likud. The elated Prime Minister elect told NBC that the West Bank was the “land of liberated Israel” and many settlements would be established.116 An NSC report concluded that due to the policies of the new Israeli government, the prospects of reaching an agreement were low.117 Not everyone in the administration was pessimistic. Brzezinski felt the extremism of the Likud’s position would provide an opportunity to split Israeli public opinion and to create a divide between GOI and the American Jewish community. He believed many in Israel and most of the American Jewish community would blame Begin for any harm to bilateral relations resulting from productive U.S. pressure.118

None of the Arab states made the freezing or cessation of settlements a condition for restarting the Geneva Conference. Far more pressing was the question of Palestinian representation. The Arab states stated that they could not pursue separate agreements with Israel if the Palestinian problem was not resolved. However, the problem of the identity of the interlocutor continued to bedevil U.S. mediation efforts. The Arab League had recognized the

PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Yet Israel viewed Arafat and his organization as terrorists. In addition, the Ford administration had given guarantees that it

115 Brzezinski to Carter, June 29, 1977, RAC Project Number NLC 15-10-7-9-8, CPL. 116 H.D.S. Greenway, “Likud Leader Visits West Bank, Urges 'Many' Israeli Settlement, Washington Post, May 20, 1977, A1. 117 NSC to Vance, July 1, 1977, RAC Project Number NLC 25-132-6-1-1, CPL. 118 Brzezinski to Carter, May 20, 1977, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, 41, CPL.

319 would not negotiate with the PLO unless it recognized the existence of Israel and accepted UN resolution 242.119 The new administration abided by Ford’s guarantees.120

The difference between the Ford and Carter administrations regarding Palestinian self- determination was more was more one of style than substance. In a town hall meeting in Clinton,

Massachusetts, the President said, “there has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years.”121 The publicity surrounding this statement was misleading as the USG position had not changed substantively. The Carter administration shared the preference of its predecessors for a Palestinian homeland to be established with a link to Jordan.122 One of the major reasons for Carter’s proposal for a Palestinian homeland was a fear that a unilateral U.S. or Israeli attempts to shut the Palestinians out would backfire and weaken the Hashemite regime.123

To participate, the Syrians demanded a unified Arab delegation including the

Palestinians. The united delegation would then unofficially split into teams which would negotiate bilateral agreements. The idea was adopted by the USG.124 In late September, the

Israeli cabinet agreed to participate facing a united Arab delegation, stipulating that Palestinian members not be identified with the PLO.125 Israel hoped for a united delegation to appear for photographs and speeches, but that negotiations would be bilateral.126 Sadat agreed with Israel that if every Arab state had a veto on progress, nothing could be achieved.127 Ultimately, the

119 Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement, September 1, 1975, FRUS XXVI, doc. 227; Letter from President Ford to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, undated, FRUS XXVI, doc. 234. 120 Vance to Carter, March 25. 1977, RAC Project Number NLC 128-11-19-2-5, CPL. 121 Editorial note, FRUS VIII, doc. 23. 122 Memorandum of Conversation, May 9, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 32. 123 Quandt to Brzezinski, April 18, 1977, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, 24, CPL. 124 Memorandum of Conversation, September 21, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 107. 125 Memorandum of Conversation, September 26, 1977; FRUS VIII, doc. 113. 126 Memorandum of Conversation, September 26, 1977; FRUS VIII doc. 118. 127 Memorandum of Conversation, August 1, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 63; Qaundt, Camp David, 80.

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PLO made it easy for Carter to leave them out of talks. They proved unable to satisfy U.S. conditions to recognize Israel. After they committed several terror attacks, Carter told Begin that

“they have by their acts excluded themselves as a party from any talks in the future.”128 This would not be the last time Carter would jettison his commitment to Palestinian nationalism.

First Begin Visit: First Public Spat over Settlements

As Begin met with Carter for the first time, there was concern that settlement construction could poison the atmosphere, stymying the efforts to reconvene the Geneva Conference. The President wasted no time in confronting Begin directly on the issue, saying “the attitude of your government to encourage new settlements could prevent a peace conference itself…It almost seems to close off any chance for negotiations.”129 Therefore, the President asked that Israel delay any announcement on new settlements until after the Geneva Conference convened.130

In an attempt to defuse the issue, Begin tried a different approach from his predecessors.

Rather than stress the security role of the settlements, he appealed to the historical and spiritual foundation of the Israeli claim to the West Bank. The President’s evangelical tendencies led the

Prime Minister to believe this might work. Indeed, in the press conference before the meeting,

Carter had praised Begin’s “deep and unswerving religious commitment.”131 In the meeting, the

Prime Minister said “there are eleven Hebron’s in the United States. There are five Beth-El’s: three Shiloh’s.” The Prime Minister attempted to strike a chord in the context of his religious

128 Memorandum of conversation, March 21, 1978, 4349-7/A, ISA. 129 Memorandum of Conversation, July 19, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 52. 130 Bar On to Dayan, July 19 1977, 4349-4/A, ISA. 131 Yehuda Avner, The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership (London: Toby Press, 2010), 410.

321 upbringing. This elicited a response. Carter noted that “within twenty miles of my own home, there is a Beth-El and a Shiloh.” Begin also invited the President to see Shilo, explaining that

“there are many Biblical stories about it.” Begin continued “imagine the Governor of a state declaring that all American citizens except Jews could go to live in those towns. Can we be expected, as the government of Israel, to prevent a Jew from establishing his home in the original

Bethel?”132 One of Begin’s advisors, who was present at the meeting, observed that Carter’s reaction turned from amusement to hostility.133 The President repeated his concern that future construction may impede the Geneva Conference.134 This ham-fisted ploy to use biblical allusion to sway the President failed and Begin never tried to do so again,

It is unclear whether Begin made a commitment to limit settlement construction during this meeting. According to Vance and Carter, the Prime Minister promised no new settlements would be announced before the Secretary’s visit to Israel in August.135 According to the Israeli record, no such promise was made.136 This was the first of a series of such disputes. When the construction of a new settlement was announced, Vance publicly accused Israel of breaking its word. Begin expressed shock at the accusation.137 Dinitz asked Vance to avoid making the differences public.138 But as usual, the different arms of the Israeli government were not coordinated. That same day, the Begin government announced that it was granting legal status to three existing settlements in the West Bank which had been established by the Labor Party but

132 Memorandum of Conversation, July 19, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 52. 133 Avner, Prime Ministers, 423-424. 134 Memorandum of Conversation, July 19, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 52. 135 Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Carter, July 19, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 54. See also note 5 in Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, July 25, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 59. 136 Bar-on to Dayan, July 20, 1977, 4172-8/A, ISA. 137 See also note 5 in Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, July 25, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 59. 138 Bentzur to Dayan, July 26, 1977, 4172-8/A, ISA.

322 not fully legalized.139 The Israeli government made the decision in order to satisfy Gush Emunim that they were promoting settlement, while technically not breaking any promises made to

Carter.140 This followed a pattern whereby the Begin government tried to avoid violating the exact content of his commitments to the United States while paying little attention to the spirit in which they were made.

The Israeli strategy led to confrontation with the USG. Vance said that the administration was “deeply disappointed” in the development and that “we are of the opinion that the placing of these settlements is contrary to international law and presents an obstacle toward peace.”141 The

New York Times and Washington Post editorials criticized Israeli construction.142 A special session of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee discussed the settlements.

The administration noted with satisfaction that there was a lack of support for Israeli settlement policy in the United States.143 The Israeli Foreign Ministry was concerned at the atmosphere created by the dispute.144 The first round of confrontation showed both sides that American public opinion had little sympathy for Israeli settlement construction.

The Limited Settlement Plan: A Tacit Agreement

To prevent the settlement issue leading to repeated flare-ups, Dayan presented an Israeli offer to limit construction to six settlements within “existing Israeli military cantonments” during talks

139 Middle East to Brzezinski, July 26, 1977, RAC Project Number NLC 10-4-3-9-4, CPL. 140 Daniel Bloch, “Settlement status to Kadum, Ofra and Ma’ale Adumim,” Davar, July 27, 1977, 1. 141 Yuval Elizur, “Israel Legalizes 3 Settlements on West Bank,” Washington Post, July 27, 1977, A1. 142 Editorial board, “Israel's Challenge to Carter,” Washington Post, July 28, 1977, A22; Editorial board, “Israel's Unsettling Settlements,” New York Times, July 28, 1977, 18. 143 Vance to Carter, September 17, 1977, RAC Project Number NLC 128-12-12-12-0, CPL. 144 N/a: Media coverage, August 1977, 6730-5/FM, ISA.

323 with Vance. The Secretary of State recommended that no differentiation be made between security oriented settlements and civilian settlements. He noted that “the Arabs are aware that

Kiryat Arba started with settlers being accommodated in a military installation, and the controversial settlement at Qaddum also involved this device.”145 Though the Carter administration stopped short of accepting the offer, Israel believed the USG could be persuaded to tacitly accept it. Begin told U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis, regarding the offer

“what we ask for is not your blessing but your understanding.”146 The conciliatory nature of the offer was not lost on the President. In a press conference, he stated that the settlements present

“obstacles which I think we can overcome”, and added that due to domestic political difficulties

“it would not be proper to castigate him unnecessarily about it.”147 This was an olive branch from the administration, one they would come to regret.

Encouraged by the seeming tacit approval of the plan to limit construction to 6-8 settlements in military camps, Dayan informed Lewis the plan would be put into action. Lewis said it was “a fertile idea” since it seemed that international law differentiated between civilian and military camps. The Ambassador said if he might speak “off the record,” the real problem was the publicity surrounding the announcements. Dayan replied that according to this new plan, the settlers would have to say that they were soldiers and this should neutralize some of the negative fallout.148 The Carter administration hoped the tacit compromise would keep the issue off the headlines for long enough to make progress towards the reconvening the Geneva

Conference.

145 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, July 25, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 59. 146 Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, August 17, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 82. 147 Pazner to Director General, July 28, 1977, 5988-13/FM, ISA. 148 Evron to Dinitz, August 31, 1977, 4172-9/A, ISA.

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The issue was stirred up again by Sharon. Reports began to circulate in the media regarding a large scale settlement plan drafted by the Ministry of Agriculture.149 Sharon told the press that he foresaw the settler population growing to two million within the next thirty years.150

Lewis contacted Foreign Ministry Director General , who assured the

Ambassador that none of the new plans had been debated, let alone approved, and Dayan’s plan abides.151 A steady drip of provocative statements from Sharon continued over the next few days.

Dayan informed Lewis that the problem was that for political reasons Sharon “cannot be muzzled” and that he was working in tandem with Gush Emunim to pressure the government into a more expansive settlement program.152

A few days later, Dayan visited the United States to present the limited settlement plan in greater detail. The Foreign Minister presented his plan of settlers joining NAHAL and settling in six points. Each point would contain 40-60 housing units where their families would join them later. He guaranteed that in the short term these would be the only settlements constructed. The

American interlocutors were not too concerned with the specifics. Carter did not approve, but observed that it was better than the Sharon plan. What worried them was the publicity surrounding it.153 The USG took Dayan’s statements seriously enough to document them carefully.154 The administration was willing to live with Dayan’s offer as long as it kept the matter off the headlines while efforts to reconvene the Geneva Conference continued.

149 News dispatches, “Plan Published for Settling Thousands of Jews in Occupied West Bank,” New York Times, September 2, 1977, C6. 150 Reuters, “Israeli Resettlement Chief Envisions a 'Security Belt' Involving 2 Million Jews,” Washington Post, September 4, 1977, 7. 151 Evron to Dinitz, Spetember 2 1977, 4172-9/A, ISA. 152 Davar, September 9, 1977; Middle East to Brzezinski, September 9 1977, RAC Project Number NLC 25-132-6- 1-1, CPL. 153 Memorandum of conversation, September 19, 1977, Brzezinski collection, geographic file, 12, CPL. 154 Quandt to Brzezinski, September 20, 1977, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, CF, 35, CPL.

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Begin tried to enforce the deal. According to the Israeli press, Begin and Sharon met with the Gush Emunim leadership asking them to postpone new settlement initiatives for a more diplomatically opportune time and explained the limited settlement deal.155 The Gush Emunim activists did not accept the deal and two days later, attempted to establish a wildcat settlement which the government blocked.156 The government continued to stand firm and an unapproved camp set up next to Ofra was evacuated a few days later.157 Gush Emunim shelved its opposition and began to cooperate with the plan. In early November, two affiliated groups were permitted to settle in military barracks near Beit El and Nabei Saleh.158 The Begin government successfully co-opted Gush Emunim by using them in their official settlement plans. Resistance was temporarily broken.

Sadat’s Trip to Jerusalem: A Breakthrough and a Voluntary Moratorium

Israel showed restraint on the settlement issue and unofficially froze settlement activity for two months, to allow one of the most dramatic processes in the annals of the conflict to play out. On

September 16th, a secret meeting took place between Dayan and Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister

Hassan Tuhami to discuss a possible Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement.159 In a speech at the

People’s Assembly, Sadat said he was ready “to go to their house, to the Knesset itself, to debate in order to pursue Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.”160 Begin replied that he

155 N/a, “Gush Emunim leadership split over settlement plan,” Davar, September 26, 1977, 1. 156 Situation room to Brzezinski, September 28, 1977, RAC Project Number NLC 1-3-7-47-9, CPL. 157 N/a, “IDF dismantles encampment established by Shiloh group,” Davar, October 6, 1977, 1. 158 N/a, “Three groups of settlers go to Nebi Salah and Beit El: will settle in a police station and a military camp,” Davar, November 2, 1977, 2. 159 Dayan, Breakthrough, 38-54; Shlaim, Iron Wall, 358. 160 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, November 10, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 145.

326 would be welcomed with the warmest hospitality.161 In November the Egyptian President landed in Israel and gave a speech in the Knesset. An open process of bilateral negotiations between

Israel and Egypt was launched.

The Carter administration believed the visit to Jerusalem was productive in breaking the psychological barrier between the belligerents. However, it was concerned that the product would be a separate bilateral peace agreement which would remain unstable unless other Arab partners were brought in. This would in turn leave the field open for Soviet-led radicalization of the region.162 Therefore, the USG was increasingly vigilant that Israel not derail the process by taking actions which would alienate the other Arab states. The burgeoning Israeli-Egyptian peace process increased the importance of curtailing Israeli settlement activity.

The unofficial self-imposed settlement freeze surrounding Sadat’s visit ended in January.

Israeli restraint and the two Israeli peace initiatives (discussed below) garnered significant domestic opposition. A coalition of forces opposed to the peace process emerged. In the Knesset, these included a minority of Likud members along with a contingent of the NRP. In terms of civil society, Gush Emunim and the Movement for a Greater Israel took the lead in opposition.163

Some of the settlers in Sinai also opposed the peace process. In Yamit, a symbolic strike took place when it leaked that Israel was willing to relinquish the settlement in an agreement.164 This was closely followed by a large demonstration outside the Knesset.165 Finally, the Labor Party came out against the intention of handing over sovereignty of the settlements in Sinai to

161 N/a, “Israeli Leader Says He Welcomes Offer by Sadat for Talks,” New York Times, November 12, 1977, NJ47. 162 Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, November 24, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 158; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 113-114. 163 Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel and the Peace Process, 92-95. 164 N/a, “A strike in Yamit and a demonstration in Jerusalem,” Davar, December 28, 1977, 3. 165 N/a, “Settlement Demonstration intensifies,” Davar, December 29, 1977, 3.

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Egypt.166 While the Israeli public supported the peace process, the specifics of the plan stirred up significant opposition.

Begin informed Ambassador Lewis that due to increasing political pressure he would allow an increase of population in existing settlements.167 To calm the settlers, and as a bit of political showmanship, Begin and his wife applied to join the settlement of Naot Sinai upon retirement.168 The President was puzzled that Israel would undermine the atmosphere created by

Sadat’s dramatic move. He asked for a clarification from the NSC if expansion was in contravention to Dayan’s plan. Carter was informed that Israel was technically abiding by its obligations. 169

The USG responded anyway out of concern that the Begin government would consider silence as tacit agreement. Carter wrote to Begin that as far as he was concerned, there was no difference between building new settlements and “thickening” existing settlements. In addition, the President said that as he understood the tacit agreement, there would be no new civilian settlements for the next year.170 Begin, ever the legalist, summoned Lewis and showed him the record of a press conference where Carter had said that thickening of existing settlements was preferable to the establishment of new ones.171

The Israeli Prime Minister’s legalistic approach to the peace process proved exasperating to Carter, who hoped to capitalize on the spirit generated by Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem. The USG was, as always, more interested in the influence of the settlements on the peace process than the

166 Labor Party spokesman, January 13, 1978, Spokesman 2-937-1977-96, Beit Berl (hereafter BB). 167 Lewis to Carter, January 6, 1978, RAC Project Number NLC 7-8-2-29-3, CPL. 168 Reuters, “Begin may join settlers in the Sinai,” Globe and Mail, January 7, 1978, P1. 169 Quandt to files, January 9, 1978, Brzezinski material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, 9, CPL. 170 Brzezinski to Lewis, January 10, 1978, RAC Project Number NLC 16-101-3-2-7, CPL. 171 Lewis to Brzezinski, January 12, 1978, RAC Project Number NLC 25-48-8-5-9, CPL.

328 specifics of Israeli policy. Tired of the minutiae, the President warned that “it would be regrettable if a serious setback to the current peace process were to be perceived as a result of

Israeli action on settlements.”172 The clash between the two perceptions would continue to bedevil the bilateral relationship. Begin interpreted commitments in the most literal manner conducive to further settlement expansion. Carter, on the other hand, interpreted commitments on construction in terms of their possible influence on the peace process. The result was that the

Carter administration repeatedly felt cheated and lied to, while Begin genuinely believed he was being wrongfully accused.

Two Israeli Plans: Begin’s Peace Initiatives

Sadat’s dramatic trip to Jerusalem in November 1977 created an expectation that Israel would be equally forthcoming. The Israeli government responded by formulating two peace plans. The first plan provided the outline of an agreement with Egypt and the second an autonomy scheme for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Begin brought his proposals with him to the

United States to attain Carter’s endorsement in advance. However, the administration suspected that this was Begin’s intention and resolved not to endorse the plan so as not to tie their hands.173

In bilateral talks, Sadat had made it clear that he would accept no Israeli claim of sovereignty in Sinai. Therefore, Begin’s plan was an attempt to maintain the protective military zone of the Rafah salient and the settlements within it while upholding this Egyptian principle.

The plan suggested an Israeli withdrawal over a 3-5-year period. Egypt would maintain full

172 Carter to Begin, January 19, 1978, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, 9, CPL. 173 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 115; Qaundt, Camp David, 154-155; Vance, Hard Choices, 199.

329 sovereignty in a demilitarized Peninsula. The settlements and two airfields would remain sans

Israeli sovereignty. However, they would be protected by UN troops and “some small Israeli defense forces at selected points.” The Prime Minister noted that he was waiving a traditional

Israeli demand for control over Sharm and a strip of land connecting it to Eilat. In a comment, he would later live to regret, the President expressed his belief that the plan “sounded very reasonable.”174 In his diary that day, Carter noted the proposal “is acceptable to us and the

Egyptians.”175 The Israeli delegation hid some problematic elements of the plan, however, to secure U.S. approval in advance. For example, Israel intended to ask for a “link” between the settlements and the Israeli court system.176 This would have made a mockery of the idea of returning sovereignty to Egypt.

The second plan was an attempt to resolve the problem of Palestinian self-determination through limited autonomy. This is somewhat surprising. Begin held a profound emotional attachment to the West Bank. Therefore, his decision to go further than previous governments and propose Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza is perplexing. There were two motives behind this decision. The first was to advance the peace process with Egypt. In bilateral talks between Sadat and Begin in Jerusalem, the Egyptian President made it abundantly clear that he could not pursue a separate peace with Israel. A realistic plan was needed to advance the Palestinian track. Second, Begin wished to find a solution for the Palestinian self- determination problem without relinquishing Israel’s three major interests: maintenance of

174 Memorandum of conversation, December 16, a 1977, 4349-6/A, ISA; Memorandum of conversation, December 16 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 177. 175 Carter, White House Diary, 150. 176 Director General to Dinitz, December 27, 1977, 4313-6/A, ISA.

330 internal and external security, foreclosing the exercise of external sovereignty, and the right to maintain existing settlements and settle in the future.177

The plan would be reviewed after five years and would leave the question of sovereignty unresolved, without Israel relinquishing its theoretical claim. The military government would be abolished and replaced by an elected administrative council sitting in Bethlehem. However, the

Israeli military would maintain positions in the occupied territories and maintain responsibility for security. Begin told the President that the hills were the center of gravity for Israeli security on the eastern front. The Prime Minister noted that the IDF must maintain responsibility for public order, in case the PLO attempted a takeover from within. In terms of settlements, Jews would be able to settle in the West Bank and Gaza and buy land there and Palestinian citizens of

Israel would be able to do the same in Israel.178

The initial USG response to the West Bank/Gaza plan was tepid. The President was displeased even a symbolic withdrawal was not included. Carter warned, in what would become a recurring point of contention, that “if it was interpreted as ignoring withdrawal and failing to deal with the Palestinian question in all its aspects, this could be a blow to Sadat and it might even bring him down or lead him to resign.” In one of his least tactful moments, Brzezinski warned “it may be seen as a modified Basutoland,” referring to the former British colonial protectorate in southern Africa.179 The USG clearly believed the autonomy plan would meet with serious resistance in Egypt and throughout the Arab world.

177 Protocol of Cabinet Meeting, March 12, 1979, 4273/A, ISA. 178 Washington D.C. embassy, December 15, 1977, 4155-6/A, ISA. Memorandum of conversation, December 16, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 177. 179 Memorandum of conversation, December 16, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 177.

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The Carter administration misread Sadat’s commitment to the Palestinian cause, and not for the last time. While Sadat expressed pro-forma reservations about the Israeli autonomy plan, he found the Sinai plan infuriating. Egypt expected Israel to be so overwhelmed by Sadat’s gesture that they would withdraw from Sinai, no questions asked. Therefore, the Israeli position that the Rafah settlements and two airfields would remain shocked the Egyptian President. As

Sadat explained to the Israeli Prime Minister, “if I tell my people that my friend Begin said there will be settlements in Sinai and some defense force to defend them, they will throw stones at me.”180 He told Ambassador Hermann Eilts that if Begin insisted on retaining the settlements, he might have to resign.181

Unwilling to pick a fight with Israeli interlocutors directly, Sadat appealed to President

Carter to intervene on his behalf with GOI. The President expressed his complete support for

Egypt on this point.182 However, Israel would not budge. Weizman told the press that unless there was Egyptian movement on those two issues, further talks were pointless.183 Seeing that

Israel continued to insist on maintaining the settlements, an increasingly upset Sadat told Vance

“The idea of settling on other people’s land and then protecting them with your own troops not only contradicts peace, but is an attempt to humiliate the Egyptians.”184

Despite U.S. sympathy for Sadat’s position, the Carter administration kept exploring possibilities of compromise on the settlement issue. Vance asked Sadat if he would accept settlements without troops to defend them. Sadat refused as a point of honor.185 As direct Israeli-

180 Memorandum of conversation, December 25, 1977, 4155-8/A, ISA. 181 Brzezinski to Carter, December 23, 1977, RAC Project Number NLC 1-4-8-21-5, CPL. 182 Christopher to Carter, January 12, 1978, RAC Project Number NLC 128-13-4-5-6, CPL. 183 Yonah Shimshi and Nahum Barnea, “The military talks may not reconvene this week as planned,” Davar, January 15, 1978, 1. 184 Memorandum of Conversation, January 20, 1978 FRUS VIII, doc. 203. 185 Memorandum of Conversation, January 20, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 205.

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Egyptian talks continued, Sadat continued this pattern of appearing moderate with his Israeli interlocutors while complaining bitterly to representatives of the USG. This caused much confusion and discord between Israel and the United States. It also goes some way towards explaining why Israel believed that settlement construction was not a major hindrance to peace, while Carter looked at it as a major threat to mediation efforts.

The Carter administration had no choice but to oppose the Israeli plan on Sinai since

Sadat fiercely rejected it. However, they did not hold frank talks with Israel and did not prepare

Begin for the change of direction. The result was an emotional confrontation. Vance confronted

Begin with the new position, but the Prime Minister insisted “no one in Israel can agree to dismantle settlements. Such a government would be overthrown in no time.” Begin insisted repeatedly that Carter had reacted positively to the Israeli plan. Dayan explained that the settlements were needed to create a buffer between the Egyptian military and the Gaza Strip.186

Talks had reached an impasse not over the West Bank as expected, but rather over the Sinai settlements.

Two Debacles: the Rafah “thickening” and the Shiloh “archeological” Dig

The Carter administration was in an uncomfortable position. It had shown tentative support for

Begin’s Sinai plan. However, the policy had been altered due to Sadat’s complete rejection.

Since Israel had been quite forthcoming in the Sinai plan, it could have engendered good will in

USG. However, the Begin government mishandled the situation. Immediately following the unveiling of Begin’s plans, press reports surfaced on Israeli intentions to construct “in a hurry” a

186 Memorandum of Conversation, January 16, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 194.

333 settlement line southward from El Arish.187 These were essentially “phantom settlements” made up of caravans and water-towers in the desert.188 The Israeli government was attempting to prejudice negotiations by creating facts on the ground.189 A few weeks later, the Settlement

Department of the WZO announced that it had plans to build 5 new settlements in the Rafah salient.190

The U.S. response to these moves was initially muted. Israel reassured the USG that no new settlements were planned, but rather the idea was to “fill in the gaps.” This was a lie. The motion approved by the cabinet called for the creation of new settlements and the USG soon discerned this from leaks.191 In talks with Vance, Begin promised not to establish new settlements in Sinai. Dayan interjected that there were some settlements that had been approved by the Rabin government and on which construction had begun. These may be completed as part of the policy of “thickening” existing settlements.192 The Carter administration did not want to risk a confrontation that would stop the momentum of the peace process and let the issue go.

It appears that the Israeli cabinet took the acquiescent attitude of the Carter administration as a sign of weakness. Later in the same month, Gush Emunim announced it would be laying down the cornerstone of a new settlement in Shilo, located in the heart of heavily populated Samaria.193 The President wrote to Begin asking him to keep his word and not

187 Daniel Bloch, “Sharon initiated rushed settlement construction in Sinai,” Davar, December 18, 1977, 1. 188 Weizmann, The Battle for Peace, 142. 189 Sharon, Warrior, 368-370. 190 Tuvia Mendelson, “Most of the planned settlement in the south – in the Yamit area,” Davar, January 3, 1978, 3. 191 Situation to Brzezinski, January 5 1978, NLC 4-7-3-9-8, CPL; White House, January 5, 1978, RAC Project Number NLC 1-5-1-17-6, CPL; Lewis to Carter, January 6, 1978, RAC Project Number NLC 7-8-2-29-3, CPL; Sharon, Warrior, 368-370. 192 Memorandum of Conversation, January 16, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 194. 193 Situation room to Brzezinski, January 25, 1978, RAC Project Number NLC 1-5-2-33-7, CPL.

334 allow the settlement to go forward.194 Israeli spokesmen insisted that the Gush Emunim members had been approved to conduct an “archaeological dig” in the area.195 The actual settlers readily told reporters this justification was a sham.196 The independent Israeli newspaper, Ha’aretz wrote that “such conduct does not become a self-respecting government.”197 The New York Times said

Israeli maneuvers “portray Israel’s leaders as tricksters determined to drive huge tractors through the loopholes of solemn policy decelerations.”198 The transparent rouse had become an international source of mockery.

Despite this Begin stuck to the ridiculous story in talks with Ambassador Lewis. Lewis replied that the only way to fix the problem was to evacuate the settlers, but Begin refused.199

Vance did not accept this answer, and sent a message to Begin that this was “inconsistent with

Israel’s commitment.”200 The two cases of Israeli dishonesty portrayed the Begin government in a very negative light. They removed the onus from the USG for its change of policy towards the

Israeli Sinai peace plan. Begin’s government was increasingly seen as the unreliable party.

Another important consequence of this affair was the loss of trust in Begin’s intentions.

When Carter had first heard news of the nascent settlement in Shiloh, he wrote in his diary that while Begin wishes to uphold his word, “he’s too timid to remove them.”201 However it was soon clear Begin was brazenly lying about the Shiloh settlement. Correspondingly, Carter began to

194 Message from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to the Ambassador to Israel, January 27 1978, Memorandum of Conversation, January 16, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 209. 195 H.D.S. Greenway, “Dayan Says Military Will Run New Settlements,” Washington Post, February 2, 1978, A21. 196 William Farrell, “Israel Insists Aim at West Bank Site Is Archeological: Site of Ancient Town,” New York Times, February 6, 1978, A8. 197 Middle East to Brzezinski, February 3, 1978, RAC Project Number NLC 10-8-5-9-8, CPL. 198 Editorial board, “Those Creeping Israeli Settlements,” New York Times, February 2, 1978, A18. 199 Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, February 14, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 214. 200 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, February 25, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 219. 201 Carter, White House Diary, 167.

335 develop doubts in regards to Begin’s sincerity on the issue.202 The distrust was further fanned when the NSC and State Department agreed Israel was intentionally violating its self-imposed construction limitations.203 In regards to Israeli settlement construction, Ambassador Lewis complained that his major problem was how to “separate fact from fiction.”204 The resentment engendered by Begin’s trickery and dishonesty played a significant role in Carter’s decision to launch an unprecedented public campaign against Israeli settlement policy in coordination with

Egypt.

The Carter-Sadat Strategy: A Successful Failed Cooperation

The Israeli government was sullen and uncooperative, while Sadat was threatening to end talks over the settlements in Sinai. The Carter administration came up with a new strategy to break the logjam. Vance and Mondale identified two issues on which Israel was sensitive to pressure: the settlements and the application of UN Resolution 242 to the West Bank. The USG asked for the cooperation of the Egyptian government on both matters. In an interview later in life, Carter explained he saw Sadat as “something of a soulmate. He and I began to develop a strategy.”205

According to the plan, Sadat would take a hard line on those issues and paint Israel as the major obstacle to an agreement. Eventually the U.S. would come in with a compromise agreement closer to the Egyptian position. Israel would be forced to accept it or be blamed for the failure of

202 Brzezinski to Carter, April 19, 1978, RAC Project Number 17B-9-50-3-7, CPL. For distrust in the Carter administration towards Begin on the matter, see also Vance, Hard Choices, 206. 203 Brzezinski to Carter, April 19, 1978, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, CF, 35, CPL; Vance to Tel- Aviv, July 7, 1978, RAC Project Number 16-112-3-19-7, CPL. 204 Lewis to Quandt, May 24, 1978, RAC Project Number NLC 10R-11-7-1-1, CPL. 205 Aaron David Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (New York: Bantam, 2008), 165.

336 the process.206 The plan did not come off. One of the major reasons, was that the Egyptian

President never took settlements in the West Bank, or Israeli withdrawal from that territory, as seriously as the USG. His lack of emphasis on the issue in bilateral talks removed the pressure from Israel and undermined the combined strategy. However, the U.S. pursued the agreed strategy for several weeks before it realized Egypt was not following through reliably. 207

To turn the screws on Israel, the USG planned to neutralize American support for the

Israeli position. Experience had made them increasingly aware of the influence of AIPAC on

Congress. The administration had already sparred with the American Jewish community over a joint Soviet-U.S. deceleration of principles for the Geneva Conference, which many Jews felt was too supportive of Palestinian self-determination. Israel and its supporters had gotten the better out of that tussle.208 The Carter administration did not want a repeat.

A series of meetings were held with leaders of the American Jewish community and pro-

Israeli senators.209 As per the coordinated strategy, this was timed to coincide with meetings between Sadat and key legislators on Capitol Hill. In those meetings Sadat said that Israeli policy on the settlements humiliated Egypt.210 Efforts to convince the Jewish community had mixed results. One the one hand, the left-wing American Jewish organization Breira (choice in Hebrew) came out against Israeli insistence on keeping the settlements.211 The Israeli embassy in

Washington, D.C. reported that the Jewish community did not support the Israeli position on

206 Memorandum of conversation, March 21, 1978, 4349-7/A, ISA; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 242-243; Quandt, Camp David, 176. 207 Eilts to Vance, August 21, 1977, RAC Project Number 16-108-1-6-8, CPL. See also Qaundt, Camp David, 177. 208 Siegel to Jordan, October 3, 1977, Chief of Staff, Jordan, 35, CPL; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 108; Qaundt, Camp David, 134. 209 Rafiah to Evron, February 7, 1978, 4173-4/A, ISA. 210 Rafiah to North American Division, February 8, 1978, 7380-10/A, ISA. 211 Washington to hasbara, January 25, 1978, 6841-5/FM, ISA.

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Sinai settlements.212 However, according to a Harris poll, 74% of American Jews believed that

Israel should not give up settlements.213 The major American Jewish organizations did not officially turn against Israel. But it is fair to say that ambivalence within the community was widespread enough to neutralize fierce support for the Israeli position.

In Congress, the efforts of the administration were more effective. Support for Israel remained rock solid but support for settlement policy was anything but. A concentrated effort was made to turn Israel’s strongest supporters against it on that issue. Carter approached Hubert

Humphrey to that end. The former Vice President had been one of Israel’s most steadfast supporters and was now hospitalized with terminal bladder cancer. Humphrey drafted a letter to

Begin two days before his death calling on him to make concessions on settlements.214 The administration also successfully lobbied active members of Congress. Speaker of the House

Thomas "Tip" O'Neill; Senate minority leader Howard Baker; Democratic Representative Lee

Hamilton and Democratic Senators Abraham Ribicoff, Paul Sarbanes and Howard Metzenbaum all evinced opposition to Israeli policy after talking to members of the administration.215 Even

Senator Henry Jackson, perhaps Israel’s most steadfast friend in the Senate, told associates that he had been completely convinced by Sadat.216 It was apparent that Egypt might not be cooperating, but the administration continued its public relations push because it was making significant gains.217

212 Washington to Jerusalem, January 27, 1978, 6841-5/FM, ISA. 213 Harris poll, March 29, 1978, 6727-9/FM, ISA. 214 Hedrick Smith, “Humphrey urged Begin to be flexible in talks,” New York Times, January 24, 1978, A5; Foxman to Burton, January 27, 1978, 6841-5/FM, ISA. 215 Rafiah to North American Division, February 1, 1978, 7380-10/A, ISA; Dinitz to Dayan, February 3, 1978, 7380- 10/A, ISA. For the talk with Lee Hamilton, see Rafiah to Evron, February 3, 1978, 7380-10/A, ISA; Rafiah to Evron, February 7, 1978, 4173-4/A, ISA. 216 Hertzog to Dinitz, February 8, 1978, 7380-10/A, ISA. 217 Qaundt, Camp David, 202-205.

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Israel was alarmed. Begin sent a personal letter to Jackson explaining the Israeli position on settlements in detail.218 The Foreign Ministry warned that even the friendliest journalists were picking up White House talking points.219 Israel was losing the public opinion battle. 53% of the

U.S. public believed that Sadat had made more concessions for peace while only 11% said the same about Begin.220 Israel knew the U.S. had the upper hand in the information war.221 The

Israeli government, feeling besieged, responded with ineptitude. It insisted on conducting a technical discussion designed to catch Carter in previous statements showing tacit support for

Israeli positions.222 The Begin government was similarly ineffective in bilateral talks. Dayan came to the U.S. to practice damage control but offered nothing new in bilateral talks. He certainly didn’t help matters by saying that he admired Gush Emunim members “more than

Israelis who emigrate to Canada, or Zionists who don’t go to Israel.”223 What Israel was unable to do was to formulate a coherent response which would convince even its sympathizers that the settlements were worth the constant and unceasing threat they seemed to pose to the peace process.

Israel began to consider compromise. The military planned for the evacuation of settlements in south Sinai, in return for allowing the settlements near Rafah to remain.224 Begin told Lewis that no new settlements would be built in Sinai, including those that had been decided upon by the Rabin government. He also guaranteed that no new settlements would be constructed before April and then only in military camps as per the previous bilateral

218 Begin to Jackson, February 27, 1978, 4173-4/A, ISA. 219 Pazner to Arad, February 3, 1978, 7380-10/A, ISA. 220 Ben- Elissar to Begin, February 9, 1978, 4173-4/A, ISA. 221 Pazner to Arad, February 8, 1978, 6841-5/FM, ISA. 222 Bar-on to Evron, February 8, 1978, 4173-4/A, ISA. 223 Henry Scott-Stokes, “Dayan, visiting New York, gives Israeli side of settlements issue,” New York Times, February 9, 1978, A4. 224 Efrat to Begin, February 9, 1978, 4313-6/A, ISA.

339 arrangement.225 Dayan seems to have suspected the battle over the settlements in Sinai was already lost. He told Atherton that he believed that if the settlements were the last obstacle to a peace agreement, they could be relinquished.226

Confident that he was winning, Carter was ready to move on to the next stage of his strategy. He hoped that “American Jews, Congress, the people here, the Europeans, and responsible Arabs give him time to change the political climate in Israel.”227 Vance believed that the arguments within the Israeli cabinet over the settlements were symptomatic of a positive reappraisal of policy in Israel.228 The consulate in Jerusalem reported that Begin was losing credibility domestically due to his “erratic settlements policy.”229 Correspondingly, the President was determined to use Begin’s visit in March to impress on him the need to freeze all settlement activity and accept a framework for the West Bank and Gaza based on resolution 242.230 In one particularly confrontational moment, the President launched the following (clearly pre-planned) diatribe:

The Israeli position, as I understand, is that even if there were a clear statement by us, and if it were accepted by Egypt, against total withdrawal in the West Bank and against a Palestinian state, Israel would not stop new settlements, or the expansion of settlements; Israel would not give up the settlements in Sinai; Israel would not permit an Egyptian or UN protection over the Israeli settlements in Sinai; even with military outposts, Israel would not withdraw political authority from the West Bank and Gaza; Israel will not recognize that Resolution 242 applies on all fronts, including the principle of withdrawal; Israel will not give the Palestinian Arabs, at the end of the interim period, the right to choose whether they want to be affiliated with Israel, with Jordan, or to live under the interim arrangement. This is

225 Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State and the Embassy in Egypt, February 27, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 221. 226 Memorandum of conversation, February 23, 1978, 4173-4/A, ISA. 227 Memorandum of Conversation, February 4, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 211. 228 Vance to Carter, March 9 1978, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, CF, 35, CPL. 229 Brzezinski to Carter, March 10, 1978, RAC Project Number 17B-8-44-2-6, CPL. 230 Vance to Carter, March 9, 1978, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, CF, 35, CPL.

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my understanding of the present situation. If I am correct, the likelihood that the talks can be resumed with Egypt is very remote.231

This verbal assault had its desired effect. Brzezinski wrote in his memoirs that after that comment the Israelis looked “absolutely shaken.”232 Dayan recalled that while the portrayal of the Israeli position was basically correct, “it could not have been expressed in a more hostile form.”233 The talks ended with no agreement. To all appearances, the ambush had failed as the

Israeli position did not change. Carter, however, did better than first impressions would indicate.

After all, the strategy was not based on Begin changing his mind. Rather the idea was, as Vance put it, “to encourage the positive forces in Israel now working in the direction of constructive decisions.” Carter believed this process was well under way and divulged to his co-conspirator

Sadat that he believed Dayan and Weizmann were coming around and the Israeli political process would lead to a change in the Israeli positions.234

GOI was going against public opinion by jeopardizing the peace process. Most Israelis wished to see talks with Egypt succeed. In addition, there was little support in the public for settlement construction if it might endanger peace talks. A poll showed that 47.7% were against establishing new settlements while negotiations were ongoing, while only 29.1% supported it.235

A strong contingent amongst the Israeli public felt that Begin was not going far enough to assure the success of the peace process. In early April 1978, 25,000 demonstrators turned out in the central square in Tel Aviv against Israeli settlement policy.236 There was, however, also strong

231 Memorandum of Conversation, March 22, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 234. 232 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 246. 233 Dayan, Breakthrough, 126. 234 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt, March 24, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 236. 235 Brzezinski to Carter, August 14, 1978, RAC Project Number 1-7-5-29-7, CPL. 236 N/a, “Israelis rally to urge return of land to Arabs”, New York Times, April 2, 1978, 3.

341 counter pressure on Begin to make fewer concessions to Egypt, particularly amongst the circles closest to the Prime Minister. As mentioned, these circles included parts of the Likud and Gush

Emunim, among others. While representing a minority of the Israeli public, the fact that they included many of Begin’s fellow travellers distressed the Prime Minister.237

Opposition to Israeli policies on both sides of the political map was significant but did not threaten the Begin government. While the shenanigans surrounding the Shiloh settlement did not impress the general public, the Prime Minister advanced a foreign policy which was supported by most. The government projected an image of willingness to make peace while maintaining a reputation for toughness in negotiations. Carter and Sadat’s moves had softened up

Israeli public opinion and the positions of his close advisors. However, ultimately Carter and

Sadat were forced to acknowledge that they could not replace Begin or force him to capitulate.

Rather they would have to negotiate with him directly. But it was clear Sadat and Carter had the upper hand.

Camp David: Confrontations and Concessions

Israel and Egypt focused on the autonomy plan during bilateral negotiations in mid-1978. Sadat was being asked to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians and the Jordanians. Therefore, he did not possess full authority to make concessions. For example, during talks with Weizmann, the

Egyptian President made far-reaching concessions. The next day, after meeting with Palestinian representatives, Sadat backtracked on everything he had agreed to.238 In talks held in Leeds

237 Yifrach to Begin, January 1, 1978, 7380-10/A, ISA; Kiryat Arba Council to Begin, January 1, 1978, 7380-10/A, ISA; Strasbourg to n/a, January 1978, 7380-10/A, ISA. 238 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 26, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 240; Memorandum of conversation, April 26, 1978, 4338-8/A, ISA.

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Castle, the Egyptian delegation insisted on Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank but no agreement could be reached. Dayan said that withdrawal to the Allon Plan lines could be considered, but to Egypt this was a non-starter.239 One of the problems, Egyptian Foreign

Minister Kamel, said was that “At the end of five years the whole place will be ‘infested’ with

Israeli settlements.”240 Despite useful and open exchanges at Leeds Castle, talks were again at an impasse.

Carter feared the deadlock would lead to conflict in October, when the Sinai II agreement expired. Therefore, a dramatic move was needed. The President invited Begin and Sadat to trilateral meetings at the Presidential retreat of Camp David.241 Hussein was also invited to attend but he refused to attend.242 This meant that the United States and Egypt would have to represent the interests of Jordan and the Palestinians in the hopes that they would join the process later.

The State Department advised that the most important priority was to find a position at

Camp David which Sadat could live with and would buttress his position in the Arab world.

Finding a solution amenable to Israel was not considered a high priority since, it was believed fallout from pro-Israeli forces could be contained.243 The NSC and the State Department estimated that Begin had the least to lose from the failure of the talks. Therefore, it was crucial to threaten Israel that there would be repercussions which would shake the very fabric of U.S.-

239 Memorandum of conversation, July 17, 1978, Ben-Elissar 4173-10/A, ISA. 240 Memorandum of Conversation, July 19, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 272. 241 Jimmy Carter, White House Diary, 210; Letter from President Carter to Israeli Prime Minister Begin, August 3, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 283; Letter from President Carter to Egyptian President Sadat, August 3, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 284. 242 Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, August 28, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 17. 243 Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Undated, FRUS IX, doc.6.

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Israeli relations.244 This advice was followed. Additionally, Brzezinski suggested that if Israel was responsible for the failure of Camp David, the U.S. would say so publicly and refuse to defend the Israeli position in the United Nations or the Geneva Conference.245 The Carter administration clearly wanted the summit to succeed, but not at the cost of isolating Egypt. If this was a danger, the USG was fully prepared to blame Israel.

The U.S. delegation expected the major problems to arise from the West Bank/Gaza portion of the summit. There was a sense, mistaken as it turned out, that the Sinai settlements would not be a major obstacle. It was also believed that one of the most important elements in protecting Sadat’s flank was the question of the West Bank settlements.246 Correspondingly, the

U.S. delegation came to the summit believing there should be a settlement freeze in the West

Bank. This would apply to the expansion of existing settlements as well as the construction of new ones.247 The freeze should apply both during negotiations and in the long-term.248 The extent of new settlement construction should be agreed upon mutually by Israel and the new

Administrative Council.249 The American delegation believed that Egypt should not be asked to concede the issue of settlements in the West Bank even though it could lead to the collapse of the summit.250

244 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Carter, August 17, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 12; Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, August 18, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 13. 245 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Carter, August 31, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 21. 246 Telegram from the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the Department of State, September 1, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 22. 247 Draft Text Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Undated, FRUS IX, doc.38; Draft, September 12, 1978, RAC Project Number NLC 128-9-7-4-9, CPL. 248 Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Undated, FRUS IX, doc. 23; Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State and the National Security Council, Undated, FRUS IX, doc. 7. 249 Memorandum of Conversation, September 7, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 34. 250 Memorandum of Conversation, September 8, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 36.

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As the U.S. delegation expected, the Egyptians started out with a hard-line on West Bank settlements. They were adamant that construction be frozen and that some dismantling of new settlements should commence during the interim period.251 But there was no follow through.

Kamel said that while in principle all settlements in the West Bank should be dismantled, Egypt could not negotiate the details because it lacked authority.252 As if to make sure that the Egyptian delegation could not represent Jordan or the Palestinians, Sadat did not authorize his Foreign

Ministry to consult with other Arab actors on their negotiation stance.253 The members of the

Egyptian delegation complained that Sadat was not interested in the fate of the West Bank.

Kamel resigned for that reason.254 The issue of settlements in the West Bank/Gaza did not take central stage. Egypt had only an abstract interest in territory it did not claim and had no real mandate to negotiate over it.

The major dispute at the summit was over settlements in Sinai. The opening position of both the U.S. and Egyptian delegations was that they should be removed.255 Begin stood firm, exclaiming “my right eye will fall out, my right hand will fall off before I ever agree to the dismantling of a single Jewish settlement.”256 However, his advisors immediately gave ground.

Weizmann undermined the security argument and explained that the settlements in Rafah were not important militarily but only psychologically.257 Dayan suggested to Carter that perhaps it would be possible to persuade the Egyptians to allow Israeli settlements to remain temporarily.258

251 Memorandum of Conversation, September 8, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 37. 252 Memorandum of Conversation, September 7, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 35. 253 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem (New York: Random House, 1997), 133. 254 Kamel, The Camp David Accords, 361-369; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem: A Diplomat's Story of the Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1997), 132-152. 255 Memorandum of Conversation, September 7, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 34. 256 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 263. 257 Memorandum of Conversation, September 7, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 34. 258 Carter, White House Diary, 231.

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Both were significant deviations from Begin’s line and revealed the weakness of the Israeli position which joint U.S.-Egyptian pressure eroded.259

Carter immediately grasped that the Israeli advisors were the key to altering Begin’s position. He wrote in his autobiography that Dayan and Weizmann were both pliable and

"certainly more effective in changing Begin’s mind than I ever was.”260 Indeed, Dayan and

Weizmann did much of the work.261 To persuade Begin to change his mind, Weizmann and

Justice Minister Shmuel Tamir asked Sharon to call the Prime Minister and voice his support for removal of the Sinai settlements, assuming they were the only remaining obstacle to peace. The militant Agriculture Minister surprised them by doing so. This did not change Begin’s mind but it may have eased his concerns over a possible Knesset vote, since Sharon was the most formidable pro-settlement proponent in the Likud.262 The continuing U.S. pressure, in complete support of the Egyptian position, was taking its toll on the position of the Israeli delegation.

Although there was significant movement on the part of Dayan and Weizmann, neither

Sadat nor Begin had moved an inch. It was clear which side Carter would take. He wrote in his autobiography, on the Sinai proposal there was “no significant disagreement except for on Israeli settlements – and no disagreement at all between myself and Sadat.”263 Sadat informed Vance and Carter that he had decided to return to Egypt without an agreement. He was persuaded to stay.264 Reading between the lines of Carter’s account of the crisis, it appears that Sadat had

259 Qaundt, Camp David, 223. 260 Carter, Keeping Faith, 356. 261 Dayan, Breakthrough, 171-172; Weizmann, Battle for Peace, 369.. 262 Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel and the Peace Process, 130. 263 Carter, Keeping Faith, 395. 264Carter, White House Diary, 237; Vance, Hard Choices, 224

346 given the U.S. flexibility on the Palestinian issue in return for a guarantee that Israel would be pushed to give up the Sinai settlements.265

The joint U.S.-Egyptian plan of attack soon pressured Dayan into offering a way out. The

Foreign Minister put forth the idea that while Israel could not agree to forsake the Sinai settlements at Camp David outright, the decision could be made with the consent of the cabinet and Knesset later.266 With the help of Dayan and Weizmann, Begin was persuaded to put the matter of the Sinai settlements up for a vote in the Knesset before negotiations for the final peace treaty commenced. The Prime Minister acquiesced but said he could not guarantee personally voting for the motion.267 This maneuver allowed Begin to evade responsibility for the painful decision. Israel had in effect agreed to evacuate existing settlements.

The question of a settlement freeze in the West Bank/Gaza remained a sticking point. The matter was resolved, although not to mutual satisfaction. The details are a source of controversy.

What is clear is that a settlement freeze was agreed to. However, there was a misunderstanding over its length. The position of the U.S. delegation was that a moratorium should be in force throughout autonomy negotiations. The Israeli delegation held out for a three-month freeze. A compromise was reached on September 16th, the day before the summit ended. The text agreed upon stated “after the signing of this framework and during the negotiations, no new Israeli settlements will be established in this area. The issue of future Israeli settlements will be decided and agreed among the negotiating parties.”268 That much is clear.

265 Carter, Keeping Faith, 393. 266 Weizmann, Battle for Peace, 371. 267 Editorial note, FRUS IX, doc. 51. 268 Note Prepared by President Carter, Undated, FRUS IX, doc. 50.

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Verbal agreements accompanying the text were made but accounts as to their specifics differ. Notably, the text does not make it clear if the freeze was supposed to take hold during talks over the Sinai agreement or those regarding West Bank/Gaza autonomy. According to

Carter’s account, Israel agreed to freeze construction throughout autonomy negotiations. Dayan and Begin claim that the length of the freeze was tied to the Sinai talks. This made a significant difference. The Sinai talks were scheduled to be completed within three months. Meanwhile, the more complex West Bank/Gaza autonomy talks could last over five years.269 The U.S. assumption seems to have been based on the context of discussion, which was after all the fate of the West Bank and Gaza and not Sinai. There was also disagreement on whether Begin had agreed to provide a letter on the matter. Carter and Vance claimed that Israel had agreed to provide a letter on the settlement moratorium, while Begin and Dayan claimed that all that had been promised is that the Prime Minister would give an answer the next day.270 Both questions were the topic of bitter acrimony at the end of the summit and beyond.

In his memoirs, Vance hints Begin was dishonest.271 Meanwhile, Dayan alleged that the

U.S. knew its interpretation was incorrect and decided to pressure Israel anyway.272 However, the most likely explanation for the discrepancies is that Begin took advantage of the general fatigue and lack of focus to establish the sort of legalistic loopholes he excelled at creating. The inability of Vance and Carter to nail down enforceable and clear language was a serious mistake for which they, and Sadat, would pay dearly. Their experience with Begin should have taught them that he respected nothing but the written form, with no regard for spirit or context. The

269 Dayan, Breakthrough, 184-186; Qaundt, Camp David, 247-248. 270 Carter, Keeping Faith, 248; Dayan, Breakthrough, 186; Qaundt, Camp David, 247-248; Vance, Hard Choices, 228-229. 271 Vance, Hard Choices, 228-229. 272 Dayan, Breakthrough, 187.

348 agreement might have been made in the context of a conversation on autonomy but for Begin that was meaningless. His interpretation was confined to the written text, which was ambivalent.

The next day the Israeli delegation provided a letter on the West Bank settlements obligating Israel to a three-month freeze. Carter was upset and asked that it be changed but did not insist on seeing the final draft.273 This was another mistake. One cannot escape the conclusion that the repeated lack of attention to the moratorium in the West Bank indicates that it was a significantly lower priority for the Carter administration than the Sinai agreement.

The Camp David summit was a success in as much as two frameworks for future negations were signed on September 17, 1978 at the White House. The framework for a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt saw Israel agree to a complete withdrawal from Sinai, including the two airfields. In exchange, Egypt proffered full recognition to Israel, an end to economic boycotts and guaranteed freedom of transit. A few issues were not fully resolved, including the Sinai settlements, but these were addressed in separate letters. Begin wrote to

Carter expressing his intention to put withdrawal from Sinai and the evacuation of the settlements up for a vote within two weeks. Sadat wrote Carter a letter expressing the Egyptian position on settlements which was that all settlements must be removed as part of an Israeli-

Egyptian peace agreement.274 In exchange, Israel would receive security guarantees and normalization of relations.275

The first agreement was entitled “a Framework for Peace in the Middle East” but dealt only with general guidelines for autonomy talks in the West Bank/Gaza. The guidelines were

273 Note Prepared by President Carter, Undated, FRUS IX, doc. 50. 274 Editorial note, FRUS IX, doc. 51; N/a, September 17, 1978, Brzezinski material, VIP visit file, 6, CPL. 275 See full text including accompanying letters in Quandt, Camp David, 381-387.

349 vague and badly developed. They called for negotiations, which would include Jordan and representatives of the Palestinians to resolve the “Palestinian problem in all its aspects”, first regarding the transitional period and then over the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. An interim transitional arrangement was slated to last no more than five years. In that time, the military government would be withdrawn but the Israeli military would remain in charge of both security and public order. Israel accepted that Resolution 242 applied to the West Bank and

Gaza. The interim form of Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories would last for a period of no more than five years. No later than the third year, negotiations over the final status of the West Bank/Gaza were slated to begin. The agreement pointed to Palestinian self- determination but said very little about the future of both areas.276

The events of Camp David raise some large questions. First and foremost: why did Begin agree to evacuate the settlements in Sinai? The record shows that Begin fought for the Sinai settlements in earnest but was forced to surrender them by the high-profile context and alignment of forces against him. The pressure on the Prime Minister was enormous, the profile of the Camp

David talks was unprecedented. The close cooperation between Sadat and Carter meant that

Israel was sure to be blamed for the matter. U.S.-Israeli relations would suffer accordingly.

According to Dayan, Carter said “failure of the talks would be catastrophic for relations between

Israel and the United States.”277 American interlocutors had made similar threats before.

However, the stakes were high enough at this point that the threat had significant credibility.

Begin’s position was eroded by the lukewarm backing of his main advisors Weizmann and Dayan. They did not feel as strongly as the Prime Minister that the retention of the

276 See full text in Quandt, Camp David, 376-381. 277 Dayan, Breakthrough, 173.

350 settlements was a major strategic interest. Indeed, Weizmann even said so.278 Therefore, if Begin stuck to his position, his advisors were likely to blame him. Considering the domestic support for peace with Egypt, if Begin was the main obstacle to peace, obstructing the process could incur significant political costs. At the end of the day, the absolute crucial importance both the United

States and Egypt attached to the issue relentlessly chipped away at an already uncertain Israeli position, forcing Begin to acquiesce. It is also important to remember that the attainment of peace with Egypt and their removal from the circle of belligerency was a central strategic goal for Israel.

Another important question is: why was the issue of settlements in the West Bank/Gaza handled with such ineptitude by both the U.S. and Egypt? The lack of attention to detail on the part of the United States delegation cannot be explained through the overall incompetence of

Carter or Vance. The President was known for his detail oriented negotiation style, while the

Secretary of State was a seasoned foreign policy professional.279 Rather, the problem was that the

United States was not negotiating on its own behalf. Carter was negotiating on behalf of Sadat, who was supposed to be negotiating on behalf of either Jordan or the Palestinians. Sadat, for all his rhetoric about representing Palestinian interests did not stand up for either Jordanian or

Palestinian interests. Carter wrote that negotiations over the West Bank/Gaza document were easier than expected since “fortunately, Sadat was not particularly interested in the detailed language of the framework.”280

278 Memorandum of Conversation, September 7, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 34. 279 On Carter see Miller, Much too Promised Land, 158-159; Quandt, Camp David, 31; Strong, Working in the World, 118-119; on Vance see Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 11-12; Carter, Keeping Faith, 53; Glad, Outsider in the White House, 20; Sneh, Future almost Arrived, 64-66; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, 38-41. 280 Carter, Keeping Faith, 396-397. `

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It is hard to believe that if a Jordanian or Palestinian delegate had been present, such a vague formulation would have stood. Meanwhile for Israel, as Dayan wrote the autonomy framework was a “matter was substantive and of supreme importance.”281 Therefore, Israel was completely focused on attaining the best outcome at the bargaining table and managed to get the agreement it wanted. Something it was unable to do regarding the Sinai settlements.

Aftermath of Camp David: The Failed Attempt to Include Jordan and the Palestinians

The framework agreements did not tie up all the loose ends regarding the settlements. As mentioned, there was a dispute over the length of the construction moratorium in the West

Bank/Gaza. This led to a public and ugly spat. Carter publicly impugned Begin’s integrity.282

Ambassador Lewis tried to clear the matter up with Dayan but was unsuccessful. He reported to

Carter that “Begin is feeling extremely beleaguered by Gush Emunim demonstrators and the desertion of his oldest personal allies. He is very unlikely to budge at this moment of political hypertension.”283 Lewis asked Begin to take on a commitment to avoid building settlements for a three-month period of negotiation after which new settlement construction would require the approval of the new administrative council. Begin absolutely refused. He added that if he acquiesced “there would be a revolution in my own party”284

281 Dayan, Breakthrough, 183. 282 Memorandum of Conversation, September 20, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 58; Dayan, Breakthrough, 187. 283 Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, September 26, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 62. 284 Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, the Mission to the United Nations, and the White House, September 27, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 64.

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That was the end of the attempt to clear up the misunderstanding regarding the settlement moratorium. The administration decided to lessen the pressure on settlements.285 Theoretically,

U.S. pressure at this point may have forced Begin to acquiesce. A poll taken after the summit showed that 52% of the Israeli public was against constructing new settlements while talks were ongoing. Carter saw those figures and must have known Begin would have domestic difficulty in withstanding further pressure.286 However, the matter was dropped. This is indicative not only of post-summit fatigue but also that now that Israeli-Egyptian peace had been achieved, the matter was low on Carter’s list of priorities.

Begin tried one last bit of trickery, and made a move to separate the vote on approving the Camp David frameworks from the one over the Sinai settlements. Only after pressure from the United States and the Labor Party, did Begin agree to unite the votes.287 Even then the Prime

Minister hesitated to speak in favor of evacuating the settlements. It was clearly a painful situation for him. The Knesset approved the agreement by a majority of 84-19. However, The

Likud party was not united behind the move and voted in favor by 28 to 19. The Labor Party, out of a sense of patriotic duty voted for the agreement and helped Begin carry the day.288

The most serious and damaging fallout from the accords, as far as the United States was concerned, was the ensuing isolation of Egypt. At first both Egypt and the U.S. believed Jordan and Saudi Arabia could be persuaded to support the process. However, they soon discovered that the tenor of inter-Arab dynamics made this impossible.289 The Arab League resolved to suspend

285 Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Begin, September 28, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 65; Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, October 6, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 75. 286 Brzezinski to Carter, September 21, 1978, RAC Project Number NLC 17-7-9-16-7, CPL. 287 Yosef Waxman & Avraham Tirosh, “Begin agrees to unite the vote on the agreements and on evacuating the settlements,” Maariv, September 24, 1978, 1. 288 Avraham Tirosh, “The Knesset approves the agreements this morning,” Maariv, September 28, 1979, 1. 289 Telegram from the Department of State to the United States

353 diplomatic relations with Egypt; Egyptian membership in the Arab League and transfer organizational headquarters from Cairo to Tunis.290 Egypt was fast becoming pariah of the Arab world. There was concern the Soviet Union could use resentment against the agreement to re- establish influence in the Levant. Additionally, the isolation of the country that had always seen itself as the center of the Arab world could destabilize Sadat’s regime.291

Negotiations over the final agreement took longer than expected. The freeze was

(according to the Israeli interpretation) slated to expire on December 17th. However, the State

Department noted that Israel had, under the pretext of “thickening” existing settlements, established new settlements in Gaza and near Ma’ale Adumim.292 After three months Israel resumed construction openly. There was concern that this was one of the factors stopping Jordan and the Palestinians from entering the process.293 Talks with Palestinian representatives indicated that they were indeed concerned about the issue.294 But, the USG was stuck in a vice since a head on confrontation with Israel could undermine an agreement with Egypt.295 It appeared that the worst fears, that continued settlement construction would undermine the peace process were coming true. Yet little could be done to ameliorate the problem.

Observer Mission in the Sinai, September 20, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 57; Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, July 24, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 274. 290 Editorial Note, FRUS IX, doc. 236. 291 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Carter, November 30, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 141; Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, April 27, 1979, FRUS IX, doc. 241. 292 Brzezinski to Carter, December 11, 1978, RAC Project Number NLC 1-6-8-27-5, CPL. 293 Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, October 30, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 112. 294 Telegram from the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the Department of State and the Embassy in Israel, September 30, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 69; See also Middle East to Brzezinski, February 6, 1979, RAC Project Number NLC 10-15-4-1-9, CPL. 295 Memorandum from William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, October 27, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 107.

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The settlements contributed to the outcome but there is no reason to believe that the

Camp David framework would have led to wide Arab participation without them. The real Arab concern was that no clear pathway to Palestinian self-determination arose from the Camp David framework and that it did not include Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.296 It was also clear that some notable Palestinians wished to join the talks but were deterred by possible PLO reprisals.297 There were no guarantees that Israeli restraint, which would require significant political pressure to attain, would bring Jordan or the Palestinians into the peace process. In retrospect, it seems unlikely.

After lengthy and difficult negotiations over the final Israeli-Egyptian agreement, a full peace treaty was signed on the North Lawn of the White House on the afternoon of March 26,

1979. It restored the exercise of full sovereignty over Sinai to Egypt based on the framework established at Camp David. It was agreed that Israel would evacuate all the settlements in Sinai by 1982. The treaty included a section on Gaza and the West Bank, calling on Israel, Egypt,

Jordan and Palestinian representatives to negotiate the “resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.”298 However, as it was now becoming clear Jordan would not join, it called on

Egypt to negotiate if necessary.

The peace agreement was approved in Knesset by a majority of 95-18 in the longest debate in the history of the legislative body. Some members of the Likud, NRP and Arab parties

296 Telegram from the Department of State to the United States Observer Mission in the Sinai, September 20, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 57; Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, July 24, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 274; Memorandum of Conversation, September 29, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 116. 297 Turgeman to Evron, May 29, 1978, 4339-7/A, ISA. 298 For the full text of the peace agreement, see Quandt, Camp David, 415-426.

355 voted against the agreement.299 And so the conflict between Egypt and Israel ended with a full peace agreement.

Autonomy Talks: A Case of Fraud?

Israel agreed to pursue autonomy for the Palestinian inhabitants of Gaza and the West Bank.

However, there are genuine questions as to the seriousness of the Israeli effort. Begin certainly showed more eagerness to attain a peace agreement with Egypt. In addition, Dayan and

Weizmann resigned because they were concerned that autonomy talks were not conducted seriously.300 Also notable was the appointment of Minister of Internal Affairs of the

NRP as head of the Israeli delegation. This is a statement against the process twice-over. First, because it indicated that Gaza and the West Bank were an Israeli internal affair. Second because

Burg was a supporter of the concept of a “greater Israel.”301 However, it was not so much autonomy that concerned Begin but what it may turn into. On one occasion, the Prime Minister told Carter that in order to move forward, “Israel must have iron-clad guarantees that there will be no Palestinian state.”302 Rather than viewing Israel as opposed to the autonomy concept, it is perhaps more accurate to describe Israel as supportive of autonomy as long as it did not lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state or to a cessation of settlement construction.303

299 N/a, “Over a long night, the Knesset approves the peace agreement with Egypt,” Davar, March 22, 1979, 1. 300 On Weizmann see Ya’akov Erez & Shraga Makel, “Your way is not mine – Weizmann will tell the ministers in todays meeting,” Maariv, May 25, 1980, 1; Weizmann, Battle for Peace, 383-390. On Dayan, see Dayan, Breakthrough, 303-320. 301 Sandler, State of Israel, 202. 302 Memorandum of Conversation, March 2, 1979, FRUS IX, doc. 184. 303 This is the approach in Vance, Hard Choices, 253-255.

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A larger problem was the absence of a relevant interlocutor. The autonomy talks had been designed to entice the Jordanians and non-PLO Palestinian representatives into negotiations. Egypt was supposed to represent them until they joined. 304 Carter was pessimistic and told the Egyptians that “on the West Bank and Gaza there is little that can be done now without Jordan and the Palestinians.”305 Indeed, without including either of the parties with a theoretical right to the West Bank, a successful outcome was unlikely. As Ambassador Eilts explained: “frankly am at a total loss as to how Sadat can conclude a full peace treaty or something less on the West Bank by himself…Nothing that he negotiates in the West Bank gives any form of legitimacy.”306 The Israeli attitude towards the talks reveals the depth of the problem. There was concern in Jerusalem that “if the real partner ever joined…there will be a demand for further concessions, to reach an agreement. This we will not be able to do or we will be completely skinned.”307 There was simply no way a negotiation in which one of the sides was not represented could succeed.

To further complicate matters, a few months after the talks began, the administration started to gear up for the Presidential elections. The President faced a tough primary challenge from Senator Edward Kennedy, who was ahead 57%-21% in early polling.308 Saunders advised the President to put the negotiations on hold and resume them only after the elections.309 The advice was not taken but was indicative of the attention the administration paid to the unfolding autonomy talks. Instead of handling the talks personally, or through the Secretary of State, Carter appointed representatives. First appointing Robert Strauss and later replacing him with Sol

304 Memorandum of conversation, July 19, 1978, 4173-10/A, ISA. 305 Memorandum of Conversation, October 11, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 77. 306 Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, August 19, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 13. 307 Aumann to Kimche, November 28, 1980, 6841-6/FM, ISA. 308 Reuters, “2 polls find Kennedy preferred to Carter in Presidential tests,” Washington Post, January 8, 1979, A2. 309 Saunders to Linowitiz, March 19, 1980, RAC Project Number NLC 5-4-1-16-4, CPL.

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Linowitz. Another indication of the low priority given to autonomy talks was the unwillingness of the U.S. to use its financial resources to facilitate negotiations.310 The coming elections also meant that pressuring Israel as the administration became increasingly difficult.311 The feeling in the Jewish community, not unjustifiably, was that the Carter administration took the Egyptian position in negotiations. The President’s Special Advisor for Middle East Affairs estimated that

85% of the mail received from the Jewish community was negative. This was particularly dangerous in terms of obtaining donations for the campaign.312

For all these reasons, the autonomy talks were doomed to fail. Ambassador Strauss said bluntly, “The autonomy talks are a fraud.”313 In frustration, Sadat occasionally stopped the talks but Egypt repeatedly returned to the table. The talks continued through late 1979 and 1980, mostly because their cessation would expose Egypt to more visceral attacks and further isolation and be regarded as an admission of defeat.

The settlement issue was not the primary reason autonomy talks failed, but it was still a significant disagreement. The official position of the Egyptian government was that settlements were illegal and should be evacuated. There is little doubt that the Egyptian Foreign Ministry and most of Sadat’s advisors firmly believed this. Foreign Minister Kamal Aly wrote to Burg passionately that the position of the Begin government could not be accepted by Egypt “or any government which respects international law or considers itself as part of the international legal system which was born in order to prevent the recurrence of the atrocities of the Second World

310 Summary of Discussion and Conclusions of a Senior Level Meeting, April 24, 1980, FRUS IX, doc. 355. 311 Vance points to elections as one of the main reasons the talks failed. See Vance, Hard Choices, 254-255. 312 Memorandum from the President’s Special Advisor for Middle East Affairs to President Carter, January 3, 1979, FRUS IX, doc. 159. 313 Memorandum of Conversation, October 11, 1979, FRUS IX, doc. 295.

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War.”314 The official position benefitted Egyptian standing in the Arab world and was doubtless genuinely felt by most Egyptian officials.

The Egyptian President on the other hand was disinterested. Carter noted that Sadat had never mentioned the West Bank settlements as a major issue.315 State Department officials took to reminding Sadat to bring up the issue of West Bank settlements with Begin since he neglected to do so.316 Linowitz said he was concerned. In recent negotiations Sadat had said “settlements were not important” and that resolving the issue could be put off for years.317 Israeli officials noticed this and complained that Carter was more concerned about settlements than Sadat. 318

This undercut the already weak negotiating hand the American and Egyptian delegations had to play in the autonomy negotiations.

This left the U.S. and Egyptian delegations at the autonomy talks with little leverage over

Israeli settlement policy. Not surprisingly the Israeli position toughened. It began to insist that municipal authorities regulate day-to-day life in the settlements to prevent a situation wherein the administrative council held authority over them. By 1980, the Begin government’s position was that “Israeli citizens, inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be under the jurisdiction of Israel.”319 Israel also demanded a mechanism for the establishment of new settlements and expansion of existing ones.320 The USG was concerned this meant anywhere an

314 Aly to Burg, June 8, 1980, 6841-5/FM, ISA. 315 Brzezinski to Carter, November 26, 1979, FRUS IX, doc. 307. 316 Telegram from the Consulate General in Jerusalem to the Department of State, Secretary of State Vance in Rome, and the Embassies in Israel, Egypt, and the People’s Republic of China, May 28, 1979, FRUS IX, doc. 251; Memorandum of conversation, May 17, 1979, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, 25, CPL; Memorandum of Conversation, June 11, 1979, FRUS IX, doc. 254; Memorandum of Conversation, January 17, 1980, FRUS IX, doc. 324. 317 Memorandum of Conversation, March 20, 1980, FRUS IX, doc. 346. 318 Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State, the Consulate General in Alexandria, and the Embassy in Egypt, July 4, 1979, FRUS IX, doc. 264. 319 Israeli autonomy talks delegation, April 15, 1980, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, 37, CPL. 320 Zamir to Ben-Elisar, November 27, 1978, 7394-36/A, ISA.

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Israeli lived, Israeli jurisdiction would follow. Therefore, if individual Israelis were to live in large Palestinian cities, theoretically it would extend Israeli sovereignty into there as well.321

This was another point on which no agreement was reached.

The major point of disagreement continued to be the question of a moratorium on construction during negotiations and after an agreement was to be reached. The American delegation tried to attain agreement for a clause which would require approval from the autonomous body for new settlement construction. To obtain Israeli approval, the U.S. delegation suggested that existing settlements be protected from a decision made by the body to dismantle them. It was hoped that this would establish a de facto moratorium on settlements without the politically tricky process of having one declared officially.322 However, if the USG thought they had found a loophole through which they could get Israel to agree to a settlement freeze, they were mistaken. The Israeli Justice Ministry alerted the Israeli delegation that the

USG was trying to hinder future settlement construction through this measure.323 In desperation,

Quandt suggested that Israel be allowed to keep a certain percentage of the public domain lands and there it would be able to build settlements. But he admitted in internal correspondence that without Egyptian support Israel would never accept the idea.324 The United States was fighting

Israeli settlement policy alone. As the elections were approaching, the fight was increasingly waged with one hand tied behind its back.

321 Memorandum of Conversation, April 15, 1980, FRUS IX, doc. 351. 322 Clift to Mondale, April 22, 1980, RAC Project Number NLC 133-1-2-18-1, CPL; Clift to Mondale. April 24, 1980, RAC Project Number NLC 133-1-2-18-1, CPL. 323 Sabel to Tamir, April 14, 1980, 6841-5/FM, ISA. 324 Memorandum from William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, June 15, 1979, FRUS IX, doc. 257.

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Elon Moreh, Shiloh and Downtown Hebron: Burying the Allon Plan

The Begin government had been surprisingly restrained in its settlement construction policy up to the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement. Even the settlement of Elon Moreh, established during Rabin’s tenure, had not been officially approved. That began to change following the signature of the peace agreement. The Israeli cabinet approved Elon Moreh and the

Shilo settlement, making a mockery of its previous insistence that the latter was an archaeological dig. 325 The Settlement Department also approved a settlement to be established on the other side of Nablus, named Karnei Shomoron.326 In late 1979 the Settlement Committee announced that it planned to build “ten to fifteen thousand units per annum.”327 This would ultimately change the demographic balance in the West Bank. Finally, the Begin government allowed settlers to live in downtown Hebron, a completely Palestinian town in which Jews still owned property. The process was increasingly accompanied by an aggressive land expropriation policy which treated lands with unclear legal ownership as “government lands” on which it could construct settlements at will. 328

Begin was open about the new policy and stated soon after the peace agreement, the policy of the government was “to fill Samaria with Jews.”329 GOI had lost previous public relations battles over the settlements and did not want to see that repeated. Therefore, preventative steps were taken. The staff of the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C. held meetings with editors and Senators. Members of the the Conference of Presidents of Major

325 Davar, April 22, 1979; Pazner to North American Division, June 5, 1978, 4339-7/A, ISA. 326 N/a, “Budget for settlements in Samaria – also for a settlement near Nablus, Davar, March 4, 1979, 1. 327 State of Israel Press Bulletin, November 15 1979, 8325-5/FM, ISA. For the original plan, see Drobles Plan, October 22, 1979, 10202-11/FM, ISA. 328 Huberman, Against all Odds, 167-168; Supreme Court Ruling 390/79. 329 Shlomo Ginosar, “Begin rejects criticism of Dayan,” Davar, April 25, 1979, 1.

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American Jewish Organizations were invited on a trip to see some of the settlements. This included a tour of Elon Moreh with Ariel Sharon. Theodor Mann, the chairman of the organization said after the trip he believed the settlements were legal and contributed to Israeli security.330 After returning to the U.S., he less emphatically stated that while the settlements were legal, Elon Moreh was a provocation and Israel should be more careful in its actions.331

These efforts at damage control in the U.S. failed. Following the official legitimization of

Elon Moreh and Shilo, several pro-Israeli Senators and Representatives warned Israeli officials that these decisions harmed bilateral relations.332 Meanwhile, Senator Byrd told Evron that the settlements were jeopardizing the standing of Sadat and the peace process.333 Evron, realizing he could not convince them otherwise, asked that the matter not be debated on Capitol Hill but rather that conversations continue in private.334 Hostility to the unrestrained Israeli policy was fed by the media. A Washington Post editorial exclaimed that “Israel is losing what is unquestionably its chief asset in the United States – its claim to be right.”335 It was becoming quite clear that while Israel could count on the support of their allies in Congress and the media on most topics, they would not support Israeli settlement construction policy. Opinion on Capitol

Hill and in the media, would have been supportive of a tough stance by the administration against increased settlement construction.

330 N/a, “Chairman of the Presidents: settlements are legal and not an obstacle to peace,” Davar, June 15, 1979, 1. 331 Mordechai Barkai, “Mann: settlements are legal but should be constructed with great sensitivity towards their location,” Davar, June 18, 1979, 2. 332 Rafiah to Director General, June 7, 1979, 4339-7/A, ISA; Evron to Director General, June 7, 1979, 4339-7/A, ISA; Evron to Director General, June 14, 1979, 4339-7/A, ISA. 333 Evron to Director General, June 14, 1979, 4339-7/A, ISA. 334 Rafiah to Director General, June 21, 1979, 4339-7/A, ISA. 335 Editorial board, “The Debate on Elon Moreh,” Washington Post, June 24, 1979, G6.

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The response by the Carter administration was feeble. The Jerusalem Consulate was concerned that the USG was not responding strongly to the change in Israeli policy.336 Consul

Michael Newlin noted that Elon Moreh was in complete contradiction with the traditional map of settlement and that the message Israel sent was that settlements could be established “anywhere, anytime.”337 There was little hope that U.S. rhetoric would curtail construction. Edward Sanders,

White House advisor on Middle Eastern affairs, advised Carter not to confront Israel frontally on settlements as it would stiffen Israeli resistance and boomerang.338 That advice was not necessary. The Carter administration was increasingly pessimistic and intentionally taking a hands-off approach.339

Resistance to the decision in Israel was more significant than the unimpressive response proffered by the Carter administration. The new expropriation policy had pushed Palestinians to take the issue to the Israeli Supreme Court. The Court ruled that Israel could expropriate lands, if the settlement served Israeli military needs. In the case of lands expropriated for the Beit El and

Ariel settlements, the court found in favor of the government as the judges believed the lands served a legitimate security purpose.340 The court came to a different conclusion regarding Elon

Moreh. It found that the land had been requisitioned for political reasons rather than security ones. Therefore, the settlers had to be removed.341 Ultimately the settlers were removed forcefully to another spot nearby.342 The Carter administration played no role in this debate. All

336 Brzezinski to Carter, April 12, 1979, RAC Project Number NLC 1-10-4-6-9, CPL; Brzezinski to Vance, April 12, 1979, N RAC Project Number NLC 2-18-6-3-1, CPL. 337 Brzezinski to Carter, June 5, 1979, RAC Project Number NLC 128-10-3-8-7, CPL. 338 Sanders to Brzezinski, June 19, 1979, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, CF, 36, CPL. 339 Memorandum of conversation, May 17, 1979, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, 25, CPL. 340 Supreme Court ruling 606/78. 341 Supreme Court Ruling 390/79. 342 Amos Levav, “The Caravans evacuated from Elon Moreh will rise on Har Cabir,” Maariv, February 4, 1980, 1.

363 minor limitations on settlement construction, such as they were, were imposed by internal Israeli constraints.

A Sour End: An Act of Betrayal or Gross Incompetence?

In the last two years of his Presidency, Jimmy Carter faced a tough primary and general election campaign, a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and a hostage crisis in Iran exacerbated by a botched rescue attempt. The last thing he needed was for Israeli settlement policy to take central stage.

However, the Arab states initiated a series of UN resolutions designed to test and embarrass

American and Egyptian foreign policy and undermine the already stagnant peace process.

During the Democratic primaries, Jordan put forth a resolution calling on Israel to cease settlement construction, including in Jerusalem, and rescind existing settlements.343 The State

Department attempted to get the clause on rescinding existing settlements removed from the resolution but was unable to. Vance recommended that the U.S. abstain, but Carter ordered that if mentions of Jerusalem were removed the resolution should be approved.344 The order was misunderstood. The delegation managed to remove a clause relating to the holy sites in

Jerusalem and believed this was enough to justify a vote for the resolution, which passed unanimously.345 After it had passed, Carter was dismayed when he saw the resolution included several references to the occupation of Jerusalem and to rescinding the settlements.346 The

President was forced to make a public announcement stating the U.S. did not believe that

343 UNSC resolution 465, March 1, 1980 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/465(1980) {accessed April 17, 2017} 344 Brzezinski to Carter, February 29, 1980, RAC Project Number NLC 128-10-3-8-7, CPL. 345 Vance to Carter, February 29, 1980, RAC Project Number NLC 128-15-2-21-8, CPL. 346 Editorial Note, FRUS IX, doc. 339; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 441.

364 rescinding existing settlements “was neither proper nor practical. We believe that the future disposition of existing settlements must be determined during the current Autonomy

Negotiations.” He also admitted that the vote in favor of the resolution was a mistake.347

The Israeli government and American Jewish groups were both upset. Lewis reported that Israel saw the U.S. vote as “an act of betrayal.”348 The administration was concerned it would lose Jewish donors as a result. Strauss admitted there had been “obvious political damage.” The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee held hearings on the matter.349 Republican candidate Ronald Reagan referred to the affair as one showing “gross incompetence.”350 Although Carter seemed inept and disloyal to Israel, the affair did not seriously damage him at the polls as he went on to defeat Kennedy in the Illinois primary soon after. However, it was symbolic of a wider trend in U.S.-Israeli relations. Even when no private pressure was applied by the United States and no progress in the peace process was possible, the symbolic public relations around the settlement issue would now serve as a constant irritant to the relationship.

Conclusion

The stark comparison between the fates of Sinai and the West Bank is striking. Egypt as a strong unitary state supported by the United States could negotiate the return of its territories. In Sinai all settlements were evacuated and Egypt re-established sovereignty in the full sense of the word.

347 Carter statement, March 3, 1980, Weddington, 62, CPL. 348 Lewis to Vance, March 4, 1980, RAC Project Number NLC 133-1-2-14-5, CPL. 349 Vance to Carter, March 12, 1980, CIA Computerized Release, 128-15-3-3-7, CPL; Terence Smith, “Furor over the UN vote,” New York Times, March 7, 1980, D15. 350 UPI, “Reagan calls UN shift a preposterous situation,” New York Times, March 9, 1980, 34.

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However, neither Jordan nor the PLO could convincingly withstand the internal and regional political pressure that accompanies participation in the Middle Eastern peace process. In addition, due to their lesser strategic utility, U.S. motivation to squeeze Israel to curry favor with them was not there.

The reasons for the American focus on Sinai at the expense of the West Bank are strategic and obvious. Egyptian utility continued to be high in the 1977-1979 period. It was still seen as the key to keeping the USSR out of the region and as a crucial asset due to its leadership position in the Arab world. Not surprisingly, it is in this period that the Carter administration put the most significant pressure on Israel to curtail its settlement construction in the West Bank and to evacuate the settlements in Sinai. Indeed, the Carter administration invested so much personal prestige in the Camp David Summit, that it was clear to the Israeli delegation that if they were to shoulder the blame for failure, there would be a heavy price to pay.

The level of pressure fell off significantly after the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement had been achieved. Egypt was now irreversibly locked into the American orbit. If anything, Sadat was overeager to promote U.S. interests in the Middle East. The Carter administration now had to protect Sadat’s regime, which required a consistent but less herculean effort than was required to remove them from the Soviet orbit. Additionally, the entire Levant region had become less strategically relevant. Paradoxically, the success of U.S. strategy in the region had removed the

Soviet threat to the point where it was now lower on the list of priorities. The focus moved to the

Persian Gulf, where the security situation had deteriorated. Egypt had an important, though lessened, strategic role to play in the new environment. Israel on the other hand had no role to play. Correspondingly, the Carter administration continued to generally support the Egyptian position but no longer put much effort into it.

366

The difference between the two areas is often explained through the ideology of the

Likud. It has been written that Begin was more committed to the West Bank than his predecessors and less committed to Sinai.351 This is true but is not the primary reason for the outcome. At the end of the day, there is no reason to believe that the Labor Party would not have agreed to a similar deal if Sadat had been as serious about reaching full peace. The Rabin government had shown a similar Egyptian orientation in his negotiation strategy and had been willing to, just like Begin, reach a grudging agreement under American scrutiny and pressure.

There is also no indication that the Labor government would have handled the West Bank negotiations differently. The bottom line position of both governments was similar. They both ruled out a return to the 1967 borders and preferred not to negotiate a division of the West Bank, but were willing to consider any plan put before them. The negotiation outcomes would likely have been similar since both governments were subjected to the same systemic pressures while formulating similar strategic objectives.

The nature of the successful process in Sinai tells us something about the unsuccessful process in the West Bank. First, it is important to note that Israel has always been more sensitive to concessions in the West Bank, not only because of the historical legacy of the territory but also because the existence of a hostile enemy entity in the West Bank would expose its population centers more than a withdrawal from Sinai, which is relatively far from population centers.352 Israel was becoming increasingly concerned with rocket fire and terrorist attacks in addition to the threat of invasion. The security problems in the area were soluble, just as all the

351 Bar Siman Tov, Israel and the Peace Process, 20; Kieval, Party Politics in Israel, 139-144; Peleg, Begin’s Foreign Policy, 97-106; Sasson Sofer, Begin: An Anatomy of Leadership (London: Blackwell, 1988), 178-179. 352 Public Diplomacy Division, April 30, 1972, 5978-2/FM, ISA. See also Martin Van Creveld, Defending Israel: A Study of Her Borders and a Plan for Peace, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004), 23.

367 problems in the Sinai were. However, the will to resolve them and make the necessary concessions was not there for any of the parties concerned.

Sadat’s genuine desire for peace also played s significant role in overcoming Israeli hesitancy. The security value of the settlements was rendered less relevant in Israeli eyes by the trust he instilled in the major Israeli-decision makers that he was not interested in another war and would abide by a peace agreement. Once a true peace agreement had been obtained, the exact location of the defensive line seems far less important than the salience and legitimacy of the peace process. By the time serious negotiations were underway in Camp David, Israeli security experts no longer believed “defensible borders” were as important as genuine peace to

Israeli security.

The difference between the West Bank and Sinai was not determined by domestic politics, at least not on the part of the United States. The “Israel lobby” clearly had an overall influence on the Middle Eastern policy of the administration. Carter moderated his approach to

Palestinian self-determination considerably after receiving pushback for his speech in Clinton,

Massachusetts and the joint U.S.-Soviet statement. However, when it came to settlements there were few domestic political restraints on Carter’s policy. Israel was simply unable to convince its supporters in the United States of the logic of their settlement policy, particularly when peace with Egypt was within reach. When Sadat and Carter united to convince Congress that Israeli settlement policy was an obstacle to peace, they were surprisingly successful. After this victory,

Carter felt free to support or at least abstain from UN resolutions condemning Israeli settlement policy even in an election year.

The one time he paid a domestic price was towards the end of his administration when the U.S. voted for an anti-settlement resolution by mistake. Criticism in that case seems more

368 related to the general perception of Carter’s ineptitude (already rampant after the failed handling of the Iranian hostage crisis) than the substance of policy. When the President needed domestic political support for policies deemed to be in the national interest of the United States, he received it. Israel got almost no backing in the United States, when it seemed its settlement policy was disrupting the Israeli-Egyptian peace process.

Domestic factors had limited explanatory power in the Israeli case as well. The Likud government was dependent on the NRP, the most pro-settler party in the Knesset for its majority.

The coalition included the moderate DMC but they never held the numerical ability to bring down the government, while the NRP did.353 Members of the junior party formed an alliance along with members of the Likud. Indeed, representatives of both parties voted against the agreement. However, the support of the opposition gave the government an overwhelming victory. In the end, the collective sense of the national interest won over narrow domestic political concerns.

Ultimately, the territorial conceptions of both governments were never tested regarding the West Bank. The question of who the appropriate interlocutor for the West Bank had yet to be resolved. Jordan and the PLO were shunted from the process for strategic reasons. Jordan proved to be weaker and less trustworthy than expected. King Hussein clearly had an interest in entering

U.S. backed negotiations over the West Bank and to shunt the PLO aside. However, the

Hashemite kingdom proved too weak to defy Arab public opinion. The PLO had also been unable to gain recognition from Israel or convince Egypt to take them seriously. The U.S. therefore did not put much effort into bringing either of them into the process.

353 Memorandum of conversation, June 13, 1977, faction 48-2-2/E, JAB.

369

Serious negotiations over the West Bank would not be held until after Jordan disengaged its involvement from the West Bank in July 1988. The problem has remerged since Hamas won the Palestinian Authority legislative elections in 2006. Another problem, related to the first, was the strategic weakness of the claimants for the West Bank. Neither Jordan nor the PLO, could by any stretch of the imagination, compete with Israel for strategic utility. Jordan was too weak to design an independent foreign policy and avoided the peace process so as not to weaken its standing in the Arab world. It did not have the military capability to protect itself from its neighbors, and could not contribute to regional stability in a meaningful way. The PLO for its part enjoyed greater international legitimacy than a decade before but was a sub-state actor with limited military capability, despised by most Arab states and not recognized by Israel. In addition, it suffered from a terrible image in U.S. public opinion. Advancing the interests of either one of these was not worth the headache of a head-on clash with Israel. Therefore, the

Israeli commitment to withdraw from the West Bank was never fully tested by the US.

The evacuation of the Sinai settlements came about due to a conflation of factors.

Attaining peace with Egypt was a high priority for Israel. Guaranteeing the pro-American orientation of Egypt was a priority for the United States, at least in the 1977-1979 period. In addition, Egypt and the United States could agree both on the nature of the emerging alliance between them and the general shape of a permanent settlement with the State of Israel. In addition, the lessened strategic utility and increasing isolation of Israel rendered it more prone to respond to pressure. For the first time since the settlements were constructed, Israel agreed to a limit on construction, then to a moratorium on construction, then to an evacuation of an entire area of settlements. All under a government supposedly ideologically committed to settlements.

At the end of the day, strategic realities forced Begin to agree to far-reaching compromises. This

370 was in many ways a perfect storm. It is no coincidence that Israel never again evacuated settlements as part of a mediated peace process (it only did so unilaterally).

Evaluating the Analytical Framework during the Carter Years

Mediation: The Carter era involved intense “heavy” mediation between Israel and Egypt pertaining to the settlements. It notably did not include any mediation between Israel and other actors on the issue. The two parallel tracks of Egyptian peace and autonomy talks, involved the same actors but different circumstances. In the Egyptian track, mediation was held between Israel and the relevant actor and therefore requitement was possible. On the autonomy track, the U.S. mediated between

Israel and an almost irrelevant actor. The Israeli negotiation had no impetus to make concessions.

They were concerned that any concessions would be pocketed for the “real” negotiations.

Therefore, Israel held firm.354

In retrospect, it appears that all of the parties involved in the autonomy talks were doing so for “devious reasons.355 Egypt and the United States both wished to prove to the Arab world that they were concerned with the welfare of the Palestinians. The main goal of the talks was to signal to the Arab world. Neither side truly believed that results would be forthcoming. The talks continued apace mostly because their cessation would expose Egypt to further isolation.356 Israel on its part continued talks to avoid a rupture with the United States and to signal its “toughness” to the relevant Arab actors (Jordan and the PLO) in anticipation of substantive negotiations. In this

354 Aumann to Kimche, November 28, 1980, 6841-6/FM, ISA. 355 Oliver Richmond, “Devious Objectives and the Disputants' View of International Mediation: A Theoretical Framework,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 6 (November 1998), 707-722. 356 Memorandum of Conversation, October 11, 1979, FRUS IX, doc. 295.

371 manner, it appears that mediation between the U.S. and an actor without a direct stake in the settled territory are similar in dynamic to bilateral bargaining.

Meanwhile, on the Egyptian track, the USG mediated in pursuit of clear and pressing interests. The Carter administration felt that a resolution to the conflict was essential to protect the oil supply, contain Soviet influence and maintain the stability of the Sadat regime. In addition,

Carter had put his personal and political prestige on the line. Failure would incur serious domestic and international costs. This put the administration at risk but also generated significant credibility.

The President could not simply walk away from the commitment he had made, by negotiating personally and with great intensity, to finding a Middle East solution. The Carter administration had made it very clear to Israel that in case of failure it would be blamed. The combination of the manner the administration had tied its prestige to the success of the Camp David summit and the clear national interest at stake played a significant role in establishing U.S. credibility as a mediator and attaining a successful outcome.

Bargaining: Bilateral bargaining took place at the highest level. Carter and Begin bargained directly over settlement policy. In addition, bilateral bargaining took place within the context of an emerging peace process and was therefore of particular importance. The increased importance of the participants and the situation was translated into some influence on policy. Begin’s settlement construction policy was initially quite restrained. However, that influence was temporary. Israel would restrain its construction minimally, mislead as to what it was doing and shake off any limitations as soon as the pressure was lower.

Israel for its part was determined not to appear weak in anticipation of either the Geneva

Conference or the autonomy talks. It attempted to signal its toughness to the Arab world. It

372 attempted to signal a deeper attachment to the settlements in Sinai than it possessed. It also projected an image of complete unwillingness to compromise on the West Bank, while in secret negotiations it was willing to consider minor withdrawals.357 As usual, what the bilateral bargaining process mostly achieved was ill will and irritation. This seems to be an integral part of the dynamic. Since both sides were attempting to signal opposite images to external actors, disagreement was more likely than agreement.

Issue Specific Power:

As always, neither side had a convincing outside option. The U.S. alliance with Egypt took on more weight. However, Israeli agreement to return Sinai was essential for achieving all major

U.S. foreign policy goals in the region. After peace agreement was reached, Israeli concessions were necessary to bring the other Arab actors on board. The Carter administration believed that

Sadat had gone out on a limb in pursuit of a pro-American policy and commitment to the peace process. This meant that if talks failed, the stability of the regime could be at risk.358 Therefore, the inside option was particularly uncomfortable for the United States. However, as in the Ford era, this increased bargaining power rather than lessening it as it increased commitment. It appears that in asymmetrical bargaining, an uncomfortable inside option may increase the bargaining power of the stronger state.

The Israeli government, as always, had no alternative to their reliance on the United

States. It was concerned that if it were perceived as sabotaging a central U.S. national interest, it could do irreparable harm to bilateral relations. Israel was more comfortable with the inside

357 Memorandum of conversation, February 17, 1978, 4173-4/A, ISA. 358 Quandt to Brzezinski, April 18, 1977, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, 24, CPL.

373 option than it had been under Rabin, regarding the West Bank. In fact, it did everything it could to maintain the status quo in the area. The government viewed the West Bank as a complete territory to be maintained rather than an area to be instrumentally divided.

While the security value of the settlements had diminished, settlements were now envisioned as a means of territorial control. Israel reasserted control over its settlement policy in the West Bank. The goal of the government had changed. The government considered permanent control over the area to be in its interest. Therefore, it built settlements to increase its control mostly on hilltops and at road junctions.359 This made its public statements of commitment to maintaining the entire West Bank highly credible.360 The change in comfort would indicate that changes in perception and ideology can alter bargaining parameters even when strategic circumstances have not changed significantly.

In Sinai, the Begin government shared the lessened control of the Rabin government. At times, Israel tried to show more commitment to settlements in the Sinai, by “thickening” them during negotiations (an example of an attempt to invest sunk costs into the area).361 However, the ruse was easy to see through. Israel was no longer convinced of the security utility of the settlements and could not fake its commitment. Defense Minister Weizmann even admitted that the settlements in Rafah were not important militarily but rather were psychologically important.362 Therefore, Israel pursued a strategy of peace with Egypt. Once the security value of

“defensible borders” went down, the value of a full peace agreement with Egypt went up correspondingly.

359 Zertal & Eldar, Lords of the Land, 59-61. 360 Menachem Begin, “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin upon the presentation of his government,” June 20, 1977, Israel's Foreign Policy - Historical Documents 1977-1979, 361 Memorandum of Conversation, January 16, 1978, FRUS VIII, doc. 194. 362 Memorandum of Conversation, September 7, 1978, FRUS IX, doc. 34.

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As in the late Nixon and Ford eras, U.S. commitment to obtaining Israeli territorial concessions and possible settlement evacuation increased. This trend continued apace in the

Carter era (at least up to 1979). As already explained, the USG increasingly believed that its major regional goals were tied up in attaining an Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement.

The belligerent parties increasingly respected the commitment of the mediator. U.S. dissatisfaction with its inside option increased its commitment to altering the status quo. This allowed it to utilize its increased power credibly.

Overall, the U.S. increased its bargaining power regarding the Egyptian track even further. It also increased its bargaining power in terms of the Jordanian-Palestinian track since it needed their participation to protect its interests in Egypt. However, it was unable to bring those interlocutors to the table. Israel in the meantime retained the lower bargaining power of the

Rabin administration regarding Sinai. However, it increased its bargaining power over the West

Bank considerably by changing its goal to territorial absorption.

The Settlements as a Bargaining Issue:

In this period, the Israeli government treated the West Bank as indivisible and Sinai as a security problem to be resolved. In Sinai, Israel was fully aware that it had a losing bargaining hand. The settlements had been built mostly in the Rafah salient to make it difficult for Egypt to launch an invasion into Israel by utilizing the Gaza strip as a springboard.363 This purpose had been rendered moot by two developments. First, an increasing number of Israeli experts now believed that after the experiences of 1973 the settlements were no longer of significant military utility.364

In addition, Sadat had managed to genuinely convince the Begin government that he was serious

363 Public Diplomacy Division, April 30, 1972, 5978-2/FM, ISA. 364 Supreme Court Ruling 390/79, October 22, 1979.

375 about reaching a peace agreement. Genuine peace would protect Israeli security far better than some small settlements in the desert. This removed a lot of the uncertainty and insecurity which had rendered bargaining over the settlements difficult in the past.

If so, the Sinai settlements had lost their major rationale. What was mostly feeding the

Israeli insistence on keeping the Rafah settlements was the fear of audience costs. The Prime

Minister had made a commitment that he would not evacuate the Rafah settlements.365 In a particularly transparent attempt to establish audience costs, Begin applied to become a member of the Naot Sinai settlement and announced he would retire there.366 However, these maneuvers fooled no one. The rationale undergirding the settlement project in Sinai was gone and it had difficulty justifying why settlements in the Rafah salient were more important to its interests than genuine peace. Israel could not fake a commitment to an issue that was increasingly peripheral to its national interest. Its attempt to commit to control over the settlements without sovereignty and later without military protection failed. This is in line with Fearon’s prediction that partial commitment sends a signal that one’s bargaining position is weak.367 When confronted by a coordinated U.S.-Egyptian position that the settlements must be removed, Israel gave in.

In the West Bank, Israel signalled its commitment strongly. It did so partially by encouraging the process of indivisibility. In bilateral talks and public statements, the Begin government showed an emotional attachment to the West Bank. It also stated that the goal of its settlement plans was to change the demographic reality in the territory. In addition, Israel managed to make a far better case as to its security needs in the region. Neither Jordan nor the

PLO had shown the same willingness to make peace that Egypt had. Therefore, Israel could

365 Zertal & Eldar, Lords of the Land, 62. 366 Reuters, “Begin may join settlers in the Sinai.” 367 Fearon, James, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February 1997), 87.

376 make a valid case that it was concerned about invasions from the east, terror attacks, artillery barrages on its airport and other threatening scenarios.368 The Egyptian and U.S. interlocutors did not doubt Israeli commitment to the West Bank both because it was deeply felt and because it was genuinely related to Israeli security concerns. This is one reason (although certainly not the only one) that Israel got the upper hand in talks on the West Bank both at Camp David and at the autonomy talks.

The combination of an emotional attachment and the security rationale went a long way towards establishing a status of indivisibility in the eyes of the Israeli government. The government was very hesitant to discuss partition or subdivision of the area. It also was clear that the West Bank would not be traded for full peace or security arrangements. However, there was still some weakness in its position. Begin and Dayan were willing to consider minor withdrawal.369 With the proper pressure and circumstances, there may have been some give in the Israeli position. This shows more than anything that indivisibility is a spectrum more than a binary state.

The domestic coalition supporting an indivisible approach the West Bank continued to grow during the Begin years. At times Gush Emunim jeopardized the nuances of Israel’s desired settlement policy, for example in its unsanctioned settlement in Elon Moreh. However, their influence on the divisibility of the territory was not tested. The government may have disagreed with Gush Emunim and their supporters over the exact timing and placement of settlements but they agreed fully on the goal: the full integration of the West Bank into the State of Israel. It is

368 Menachem Begin, “Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin on his visit to the US,” July 27, 1977, Israel's Foreign Policy - Historical Documents 1977-1979 http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook3/Pages/25%20Statement%20to%20the%20Knesset %20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Begi.aspx {accessed June 11, 2017}; Memorandum of Conversation, March 21 1978, FRUS VIII, Doc. 232. 369 Memorandum of conversation, July 17, 1978, Ben-Elissar 4173-11/A, ISA.

377 unclear how solid this policy was and if it would have stood up to a highly motivated U.S. mediation effort.

In the meantime, Israel deepened its hold by establishing settlements everywhere, particularly on strategically controlling hilltops. It had also developed a system of significant land expropriation to guarantee further construction. The attitude towards the challenge posed by the settlements began to change towards the end of this period. While in the past settlements had been treated as a reversible obstacle to peace, now increasingly there was a sense that settlements were irreversible or likely to become so. It appeared that Israel was intent on absorbing the West

Bank.370 One year into Reagan’s term, Jerusalem Deputy Mayor Meron Benvenisti memorably said that in terms of de-facto Israeli annexation of the West Bank, the time is ''five minutes to midnight.''371

Defection or Cooperation:

Israel showed an unprecedented willingness to reach specific and explicit deals with USG. It made a pledge to limit its construction during the run-up to and in the period immediately following

Sadat’s dramatic journey to Jerusalem. It agreed to limit construction, voluntarily, to six settlements within existing Israeli military camps.372 It also reached a written and full agreement to a moratorium on settlements during the negotiations following the Camp David agreement.373

And of course it signed a treaty which obligated it to evacuate the settlements in Sinai (this

370 Memorandum of Conversation, June 18, 1980, FRUS IX, doc. 379. 371 Anthony Lewis, “5 minutes to midnight,” New York Times, November 1, 1982, A19. 372 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, July 25, 1977, FRUS VIII, doc. 59. 373 Note Prepared by President Carter, Undated, FRUS IX, doc. 50.

378 however was not addressed in the treaty itself but rather by accompanying letters).374 The Begin government was willing to formalize its policy on the settlements on several occasions.

It also evinced a surprising willingness to break agreements voluntarily. This occurred most spectacularly when Gush Emunim settled in Shiloh after Israel it had made a commitment not to establish new settlements. This may have been motivated by domestic resistance to settlement construction. The Israeli public generally supported the peace process and found Israeli violations unnecessary and counter-productive. However, Begin’s closest allies in the Likud party and Gush

Emunim (a group he respected and had close ties with) resisted these compromises. A notable exception was the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement and its accompanying letters. Israel completely fulfilled this agreement and evacuated all its settlements in Sinai on time.

A second motive was also extant. Israel signalled its toughness as a negotiator to Egypt and other Arab states. Agreements to limit settlement construction preceded negotiations with

Egypt. The Israeli government was concerned that it would be pressured into evacuating settlements in Sinai. The impetus to “thicken” settlements in Rafah was a transparent attempt to alter bargaining power.375

Repeated defections took a toll on Israeli credibility in the eyes of the Carter administration.

By mid-1978, the USG assumed that commitments made on the issue of were untrustworthy.376

Begin presumably knew this but it did not stop him from trying to play similar tricks in Camp

David. Admittedly, the Prime Minister did his best to ameliorate the damage of his transgressions.

Begin consistently did his best to find a way to break the spirit of agreements without transgressing

374 See full text including accompanying letters in Quandt, Camp David, 381-387. 375 Sharon, Warrior, 368-370; Weizmann, The Battle for Peace, 142. 376 Brzezinski to Carter, April 19, 1978, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, CF, 35, CPL; Vance to Tel- Aviv, July 7, 1978, RAC Project Number NLC 16-112-3-19-7, CPL; Lewis to Quandt, May 24, 1978, RAC Project Number NLC 10R-11-7-1-1, CPL.

379 on the exact wording. However, the domestic gains and increase in bargaining position were more important to the Prime Minister than the implications of the “shadow of the future” to U.S.-Israeli relations. Israel seemed to believe that even if it was caught cheating repeatedly, the damage to its credibility would be surmountable. This is surprising because, as seen above, the USG had a strong interest in the peace process in this period. Therefore, Israeli moves to sabotage the peace process would be expected to damage the tenor of bilateral relations.

On the face of it, this behavior goes against the idea of a bilateral “special relationship.”

Begin’s phrased commitments to the U.S. in a manner designed to create loopholes. He then proceeded to exploit every loophole. This was done both in the case of the agreement to only build only in military camps for a year and in his agreement to freeze settlements till the end of negotiations. Occasionally, he even resorted to bold lies as in the case of the Shiloh “archaeological dig.” None of this is indicative of the spirit of trust and openness expected in a “special relationship.”

But the willingness of the U.S. and Israel to suffer ruptures in their relationship over the issue would seem to confirm the idea that bilateral bargaining is merely a “dry run” for mediation.

Even when an important peace process was underway, neither side took it particularly seriously.

Israel defaulted on agreements because it knew the consequences will be negligible and the U.S. reacted with relative equanimity, saving its ammunition for mediation. Notably, Israel obeyed the

Israel-Egyptian peace agreement to the letter, dismantled all its settlements and withdrew from

Sinai in 1982. It played no games when the process was of the highest strategic importance to all of those involved. By contrast it showed a lack of honesty and goodwill in the autonomy talks, believing (correctly) that neither the U.S. nor Egypt were particularly concerned about a process which lacked any substantive chance of success.

380

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This dissertation applied an analytical framework, based on the literature on bargaining and mediation, to the role of settlements in U.S.-Israeli relations while asking primarily to explain when and how U.S. policy influences the likelihood of Israel substantially moderating its settlement policy. It found that the willingness of the United States to put effort into mediation efforts depended mostly on regional elements rather than bilateral ones. It also found that Israel responded and showed willingness to evacuate settlements in accordance with its strategic interests and vulnerability to U.S. pressure.

The conclusion will continue by examining the motivation of the two sides from the empirical cases. Then it will analyze the insights gleaned from utilizing the analytical framework. In a third section, it will analyze bilateral U.S.-Israel relations in the context of settlements. It will then bring all these strands together with an overall conclusion ending with some policy recommendations.

381

Actors Motivation

U.S. Policy towards the Settlements:

U.S. policy towards the settlements was utterly pragmatic. Studies analyzing U.S. policy towards

Israeli settlements published so far focus on the legal status of the settlements in the eyes of the various administrations. A lot of attention has been paid to whether the settlements were perceived as legal or illegal.377 These issues may have occasionally occupied the attention of

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs staff members and other bureaucrats, but they had very little impact on the top decision-makers. Presidents and their top advisors were far more interested in the implications of settlement construction for their wider strategic interests. Settlements were of no importance in and of themselves. In a world full of flagrant violations of international law, the construction of a few small villages numbering several hundred people was of very little interest to the U.S. on a moral level. The U.S had made the support of questionable human rights violating regimes (for example, the Pinochet regime in Chile or the Mobutu regime in Zaire) an integral part of its policy of containment. Israeli violations, though significant and worrisome, were minor in comparison.378

There were only two reason settlements appeared on the radar of top U.S. decision- makers during the analyzed time-frame. The major reason was that at times the existence of settlements or their construction was an obstacle to negotiations which the United States

377 Daniel Kurtzer, “Do Settlements Matter? An American Perspective,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 16, No.3 (Fall 2009), 89-95; Donald Neff, “Settlements in U.S. Policy,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Spring 1994), 53-69; Zaki Shalom, “The United States and the Israeli Settlements: Time for a Change,” Strategic Assessment, Vol. 15, No. 3 (October 2012), 73-85. 378 It should be noted that Israeli occupation practices got notably more oppressive in the 1980’s. See Trapped Fools: Thirty Years of Israeli Policy in the Territories, (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

382 considered central to its interests. When Israeli settlement construction got directly in the way of key interests, or even threatened to do so, key decision-makers took a notable interest in the matter. For this reason, the issue first took on an importance during Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” period. This was the first time in the post-1967 era success in negotiations was deemed essential to shutting the USSR out of the region. It was also the first-time negotiations reached the kind of detailed resolution in which these small settlements appeared to be actual impediments to the peace process. When this occurred, the United States had strong motivation to either curtail settlement or bring about their evacuation.

A second, but more minor, reason primary-decision-makers took notice was that Arab leaders complained about Israeli settlement policy and saw American inability to curtail it as evidence of bad faith. This was a major concern at different times and was often cited by U.S. officials as a reason to alter Israeli policy. This more minor concern this did not inspire the U.S. to make sustained and costly efforts to influence Israel. Instead the U.S. used two methods of lower cost to deal with the problem. The first was to encourage Israel to keep the issue out of the headlines and avoid publicity for their efforts. This was the default policy utilized when there were no serious negotiations on the horizon. The second was utilized when negotiations were imminent. In that case the U.S. made a show of opposing the settlements vociferously. This was done through an exaggeration of American opposition to settlements in bilateral talks with Arab states, combative public statements, and abstention or approval of UN resolutions opposing

Israeli settlement policy. These showy tactics were seldom accompanied by substantive pressure on Israel. Rather they were intended to signal credibility as a mediator to the Arab states and facilitate future negotiations which would further the regional strategic goals of the United

States.

383

Israeli Settlement Construction:

The strategy behind Israeli settlement construction consisted of a rational reaction to the dilemma it found itself in at the time. The major decision-makers in the government determined

Israel needed “secure borders” designed to deter an attack by its Arab neighbors and to improve the odds of victory if deterrence failed. In addition, Israel determined that full peace treaties leading to the normalization of relations with the Arab states were needed to stem their hostility.

The settlements were conceived to help Israel attain both seemingly paradoxical goals.

Settlements served to condense the time-horizon for diplomacy by utilizing settlement construction in the occupied territories as a form of coercion against the Arab states and to influence substantive negotiations in favor of Israeli positions. This is what Eiran and Mnookin refer to as a “fading opportunity.”379 It hoped to prejudice negotiations by sinking costs and establishing domestic audience costs in regard to the strategic areas it believed were necessary to establish “defensible borders.”

Belief in this strategy was irrevocably shaken by the 1973 War. To begin with Israel no longer believed it could force the Arab states into negotiations against their will. Egypt and Syria had shown they would rather fight than come to the table on Israeli terms, even when the balance of forces favored Israel. This meant that settlements lost one of their principle rationales. The second plank of the pre-1973 strategy was also seriously damaged. The Syrians had no difficulty bypassing the settlements and their inhabitants had to be evacuated. Voices in Israeli security

379 Robert H. Mnookin and Ehud Eiran, “Discord behind the Table: The Internal Conflict among Israeli Jews concerning the Future of Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza,” Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1 (2005), 34- 35.

384 increasingly argued that the settlements had little military value.380 The Israeli government continued to claim settlements played an important security role, but fewer people agreed. Just as importantly, the U.S. and the Arab states no longer took these arguments seriously and their salience in negotiations was undercut.

Despite this failure, the security/negotiations narrative was still promoted by the government. However, it had always been challenged, even at its prime by a narrative of emotional attachment and political indivisibility to the West Bank. Gush Emunim was not formed until after the 1973 War, but its antecedents (and many of its notable members) were already visible in Israeli settlement policy from its inception. The settlement of Kfar Etzion and

Kiryat Arba had more of an emotional and historical rationale than a security one from the start.

It is also fair to say that even in the calculations of security oriented decision-makers, historical and cultural elements were always part (albeit a secondary part) of their decision-making process.

After 1973 the emotional component gradually became stronger. This happened first through the sustained attack of Gush Emunim against a post-1973 official settlement policy which had lost its impetus. When Begin came to power in 1977, his government co-mingled security and emotional concerns in the West Bank. Perhaps the best way of looking at the status of the West Bank is as a divisible good slowly taking on the properties of indivisibility. As

Goddard and Lustick show quite convincingly, indivisibility is a process and not an event.381

Attempts to attach emotional significance to settlements in other territories by Gush Emunim and

380 Supreme Court Ruling 390/79. 381 Stacie Goddard, “Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy,” International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 1 (January 2006), 35-68; Ian Lustick, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

385 other actors (such as far-right Likud MK’s) failed. It is notable that the Israeli government had an increased interest in exaggerating the importance of the settlements in Sinai both emotionally and in terms of security but was unable to do so. Neither the Egyptians nor the Americans were convinced and even Israeli decision-makers such as Dayan and Weizmann were forced to admit that their importance was overstated.

Theoretical analytical conclusions

Issue Specific Power:

The United States enjoyed far greater resources and capabilities than Israel in general. But this is not always relevant. In terms of issue specific power, Israel maintained a decided advantage most of the time. This was particularly evident in the 1967-1973 period. Neither Israel nor the U.S. had a genuine outside option. If a peace settlement in the Middle East was in the interest of both actors (and it was) Israel was unlikely to find a more sympathetic and powerful mediator, while the U.S. could not obtain Israeli territorial concessions from another actor.

The reason for the Israeli advantage in issue specific power was the difference in the relative comfort of the inside option. The Israeli government pursued “defensible borders,” a policy for which it did not need the approval or help of the U.S. In theoretical terms, Israel had a highly comfortable inside option (or so it believed) and it could use settlement construction to bring the Arab states to the negotiation table. In the meantime, the Eshkol and Meir governments believed they could shape the contours of a future settlement by constructing settlements in strategic regions. Early on, the U.S. was not fully convinced that the status quo was uncomfortable. Some elements in the Johnson and Nixon administrations believed that the

386 pursuit of a peace agreement was essential to increase U.S. influence in the region. Others believed that support for Israel, as an ally in the struggle against pro-Soviet regimes, was a more promising strategy. In addition, the United States was far less interested in the region. When the

Paris Peace Accords ended its official involvement in the Vietnam War, USG priorities began to change and the Middle East took central stage. This meant that Israel enjoyed an advantage in every element of bargaining in the 1969-1973 period.

The balance shifted significantly after the 1973 War. Israel lost confidence in its pre-war strategy. It now increasingly valued a full peace agreement, since it learned from bitter experience that security depended on finding a status quo which the Arab states found satisfactory more than on the exact location of defensible borders. Accordingly, Israel lost a great deal of its control over the settlement issue. In order to attain its preferred outcome, it now increasingly depended on the goodwill of others.

The U.S., for its part, became increasingly uncomfortable with the status quo. Oil prices tripled and inflation was severe. U.S. foreign policy would increasingly take Saudi Arabian concerns into account and demanded progress. The USG realized that to prevent a repeat of the oil crisis, negotiations had to maintain momentum.382 According to Habeeb’s formulation, a less comfortable inside option would be expected to disadvantage the United States.383

However, this does not seem to have been the case. Instead it added to its commitment to resolve the conflict.

382 Briefing Paper for President Nixon, October 31, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, eds. Nina Howland, Craig Daigle, Edward C. Keefer, (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2011), doc. 307. 383 Habeeb, William Mark, Power and Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak Nations Bargain with Strong Nations, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1988), 14-22.

387

The level of commitment of the United States seems to be the linchpin which determined the outcome. As the greater power, it has a preponderance of resources and influence. The problem was that in most situations it was unable to utilize its larger resources or to threaten to do so credibly. After the oil crisis, its commitment was no longer questioned. Kissinger and

Carter also proved willing to stake their reputations on the peace process by personally engaging in intensive negotiations. The new reality changed the balance of issue specific power. The U.S. could credibly use its greater resources to further the peace process and attained its major goal of a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt.

The importance of commitment was on display when the strategic situation changed again. Instability in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan placed the Gulf area at the center of strategic calculations. Correspondingly, the Carter administration evinced low interest in the autonomy talks and in further progress in the peace process. The level of U.S. commitment to a peace process which required the evacuation of settlements was the most important determinant of the fate of the settlements.

Bilateral Bargaining:

Bilateral bargaining between Israel and the United States was not meant as a serious attempt to influence Israeli settlement policy, nor could it be. Israel could not make serious concessions unless the relevant Arab actors were involved. This requires their direct participation in the bargaining.384 The effort needed to cajole Israel into making concessions was likely to be

384 I. William Zartman, “Bargaining and Conflict Resolution,” in Edward Kolodziej and Roger Kanet, Coping with Conflict after the Cold War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 271-290. See also Dean Pruitt, “Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks,” International Negotiation, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1997), 237-250.

388 substantial and the return meagre. Even if concessions from Israel were attained, the Arab interlocutors were likely to pocket concessions made and demand further ones, rendering the enterprise unprofitable to Israel.

Bilateral bargaining did not take place to resolve the issue. Since there was no substantial likelihood of the parties reaching an agreement, the role of bargaining was to project an image to potential Arab interlocutors in a way that would promote their interests. To the United States, there was a considerable advantage to building up credibility as a fair and useful mediator in the eyes of

Arab actors. Therefore, even when the United States did not believe it could curtail Israeli settlement policy, it had reason to appear to try. The alternative was to appear to be doing nothing, which could be perceived as a form of tacit support for Israeli policy. Ongoing efforts to pressure

Israel into curtailing settlement construction (hopeless as they might be) assisted in that general effort to present the United States as a credible negotiator and not merely as “Israel’s lawyer.”

Israel also had reasons to agree to bargain, despite its dislike for being pressured on this point. A blanket unwillingness to discuss the matter or take U.S interests into account, risked alienating supporters in the United States as well as the administration itself. It could also use bilateral bargaining to its advantage. Once bargaining had commenced, Israel had an incentive to present its negotiation positions as more uncompromising than they really were to gain bargaining leverage for mediation involving the Arab states.

The two sides had incommensurable goals in bilateral bargaining. Israel wished to look tough and uncompromising to project the right image for mediation. The United States wished to seem as if it genuinely opposed Israeli settlement policy. Therefore, when bargains were attained, they were normally tacit ones. The U.S. preferred an appearance of Israeli restraint to no deal at all, while Israel preferred to appear to have ignored U.S. protests while avoiding an

389 open rupture with the USG. Therefore, tacit bargains involved Israel communicating forms of self-restraint either directly or indirectly.

The tacit deals, with no exceptions, fell apart amid mutual recriminations. Part of the problem was the inherent instability of tacit agreements in general. A tacit agreement tends to be stable when there are natural boundaries to the agreement on which expectations may converge.

A clear focal point is necessary. The tacit deals made over settlements were too vague for expectations to coalesce around meaningfully. The geographical boundaries, difference between civilian and military settlements, and difference between settlement expansion and establishing new ones was never made clear. Unfortunately, tacit agreements were the only ones within reach in the context of bilateral bargaining. As Schelling put it, when there is no choice “even a poor signal and a discriminatory one may command recognition in default of any other.”385

Mediation:

The literature on mediation asks in general terms whether it is better for mediators to be biased or unbiased. There is no scope for comparison here, as the U.S. was always heavily biased, in the sense that it held very strong interests in the outcome. What the empirical case shows clearly is that the bias of the mediator is conducive to a settlement, only when it is biased against the disputant in possession of the stakes of mediation. It is very difficult to convince the disputant benefitting more from the status quo to negotiate in good faith. They have more to lose from a conflict resolution process. Therebefore, the stronger side is unlikely to want to engage seriously

385 Thomas Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (New York: Harvard University Pres, 1960), 76-80.

390 in a mediation effort and even less likely to make significant concessions. A significant amount of pressure and coercion is needed to convince them to make consequential concessions.386

When the mediator prefers a payoff structure closer to the status quo they will engage in lighter mediation. Meanwhile, when the payoff structure preferred is unsatisfactory to the mediator they are more likely to use bargaining leverage. Ultimately, the mediator has less of an incentive to put a large amount of effort and resources into altering a payoff structure from which it draws benefit. Successful conflict resolution requires a change in the status quo. Therefore, the dissatisfaction of the mediator with the status quo is an essential factor. Indeed, there is strong evidence that the most manipulative and leverage based forms of mediation are the most likely to succeed.387 Therefore, the crucial factor in the success of the United States in the case of Israeli settlements was not bias in and of itself but rather motivation to alter the status quo and the resources to do so. In other words, to compel Israel to withdraw, it is helpful if the United States evinces a bias against the Israeli position.

Bias alone did not determine the amount of effort and resources invested in mediation. In the case study, it became clear that the level of its strategic interest in the outcome is equally important. This determines the level of commitment shown by the mediator. As discussed in the analytical framework, commitment can be demonstrated in two ways. The first is by tying prestige to success. The more associated the administration becomes to the mediation process the costlier the signal sent to the other actors. For example, when the official conducting talks is a

386 Marieke Kleiboer, “Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 1996), 368. See also Zeev Maoz & Lesley Terris, “Credibility and Strategy in International Mediation,” International Interactions, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2006), 431. 387 Beardsley, et al, “Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes”; David Quin, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kathleen Smarick and Victor Asal, “Power Play: Mediation in Symmetric and Asymmetric International Crises,” International Interactions, Vol. 32, No. 4 2006), 441-470.

391 high-ranked politician associated with the administration, the cost of failure will be higher than if the official is a bureaucrat associated with the State Department. The more credibility is put on the line through a high public profile, the higher the potential domestic audience costs for the mediator. The second is by promoting a clear national interest. The interest of the mediator in attaining a deal would not be doubted by the other interlocuters when the U.S. had a clear interest in attaining an agreement.

If the U.S. had put its credibility on the line to promote a central national interest, Israel and the Arab states would have had little reason to doubt the willingness of the United States to utilize its preponderant power. In particular, if the interests of the mediator are aligned with one of the sides, its willingness to pressure the other party would be more credible.388 As can be seen in Table 1 below, only when the U.S. is both biased towards the position of the relevant Arab state (the state which owns the territory on which settlements have been constructed) and has a high strategic interest in furthering the peace process, was it likely to accompany its verbal criticism of Israeli settlement policy with substantive pressure on Israel. The predictions may be generalizable to other cases of great power mediation in enduring rivalry, but it is beyond the scope of this study to test its wider validity.

388 Alexander George & Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 559.

392

Direction of Bias / Bias towards Israel Bias towards Relevant Arab

U.S Commitment to the State

Peace Process

High Lack of Substantive Pressure Substantive Pressure /

/ Verbal Criticism Verbal Criticism

Low Lack of Substantive Lack of Substantive Pressure

Pressure/ No Verbal / Verbal Criticism

Criticism

Table 1: Elements Determining U.S. Mediation Success

Defection or Cooperation?

The shadow of the future element is particularly strong in U.S.-Israeli relations. With rich cooperation and the weight both sides give to future interaction, a mutually beneficial arrangement would be expected to emerge.389 Therefore, it is surprising to see how often Israel cheated and dissembled regarding its settlement construction. The answer may be in a limitation

389 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, Cambridge, MA: Persus Books, 2006), 182.

393 of game theory. The concept of shadow of the future assumes a payoff structure wherein the two players receive equal payoffs. In the prisoners’ dilemma game, the payoff for cheating and cooperation is symmetrical. However, the motivation of Israel and the U.S. are seldom symmetrical. Israel had more at stake. It gained more from defecting than the U.S. would. In addition, since the issue was more peripheral to the U.S., the threat of an American retaliation was not always credible.

The shadow of the future concept may not be applicable for other reasons as well. It does not consider audience costs and the ties between different games. If Israel were to cooperate, it would attain a certain payoff in relations with the United States, but it would also suffer audience costs. It had committed itself to the right to build settlements publicly it would suffer domestic political audience costs if it were to freeze settlements or restrain itself in some notable way. It would also send a message to the real bargaining partners, the Arab states, that it was a weak negotiator and that its commitment to the settlements was shallow.390 This would almost guarantee that a settlement freeze would be just the opening bid in the real talks. Therefore, the shadow of the future offered Israel opportunities for cheap payoffs domestically by appearing to be a government which honored its domestic commitments and cheap payoffs vis-à-vis the Arabs by improving its reputation as a tough bargainer. In this case the long shadow of the future merely guaranteed a series of payoffs from defection.

The theoretical literature on cooperation accounts for this possibility. Axelrod noted in his seminal work The Evolution of Cooperation that in most cases tit-for-tat is the best strategy in a prisoner’s dilemma type game. However, the most efficient strategy theoretically would be to

390 Barry Nalebuff, “Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), 313- 335.

394 earn a reputation as a bully able to squeeze the most out of other players. This normally does not pay off as the counterpart will heavily punish the would-be bully before that reputation can be established.391

Bilateral bargaining between Israel and the U.S. allowed Israel to escape this trap. By engaging in most of its bargaining with a partner evincing a shallow commitment to the issue,

Israel could bargain to increase its reputation without suffering major consequences. The relatively small penalty it payed from a less committed partner was worth the reputational effect

(not to mention the benefit in terms of domestic politics). Thereby it could afford to build up a reputation as a tough negotiator deeply committed to its assets in preparation for more consequential bargaining through mediation with Arab partners.392 In other words, both parties knew that bilateral negotiations were not a consequential arena. Therefore, they were forgiving of the indiscretions of the other side.

Israel understood that since it would not make genuine concessions in bilateral talks, the

U.S. would compensate by making harsh public statements or voting for (or abstaining on) resolutions criticizing settlements. The U.S for its part understood that Israel could not appear weak and yielding in bilateral talks and did not take its unwillingness to cooperate as a consequential affront. Gradually bilateral talks became an arena for a well-rehearsed pantomime, the rules of which are implicitly understood.

391 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 152-153. 392 , Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 399-404.

395

Final Thoughts and Policy Conclusions

Bilateral Relations “Special or Not”?

Interaction over the issue of settlements was anything but indicative of an emotionally resonant relationship. The initial reaction of the United States was a desire to keep the issue out of the public eye.393 It never brought the issue up in public forums and avoided discussing it at high levels.

However, this changed dramatically in the latter days of the Ford administration. Kissinger realized that progress on the Syrian track towards a second disengagement was unlikely to be made, but wanted to create the impression that he was doing all that he could to promote it. With this goal in mind, he consistently exaggerated the importance of the settlement issue to anyone who would listen.394 The trend of open confrontation was exacerbated under the Carter administration. While the actual settlement policy of the USG as represented in internal memos and negotiation stance was quite moderate, the tone taken in public statements and UN votes was far more extreme.395

This in no way comports with the idea of a special bilateral relationship which is preferred to U.S. relations with other regional actors and problems are resolved to mutual satisfaction.

There is also no indication that the mutual biblical and religious heritage influenced U.S. policy in a material manner. The USG reacted negatively to Israeli construction in Hebron and

393 Katzenbach to the Embassy in Israel, September 29, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, eds. Harriet Dashiell Schwar & Edward C. Keefer (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2004), 1486-1487. 394 See for example Memorandum of conversation, March 31, 1975, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA; Memorandum of conversation, May 14 1974, Kissinger Transcripts, DNSA. 395 Vance to Carter, February 29 1980, RAC Project Number NLC 128-15-2-21-8, CPL; John M. Goshko, “Vance Bluntly Decries Israeli Sinai Settlements,” Washington Post, February 11 1978, A8.

396

Jerusalem, the two holiest cities to Judaism and both of which feature prominently in the Old

Testament. In fact, Secretary of State Rusk took a personal interest in both issues and issued formal complaints at a time when the Johnson administration usually ignored Israeli settlement construction.396 Developments regarding Shiloh were similar. While it was a town of biblical importance, which Begin had mentioned in talks with the President, the USG still found attempts to construct a settlement there infuriating.397 The USG did not find reassurance in the fact that settlements were constricted in areas of biblical significance. If anything, it found it more disquieting as the Israeli emotional attachment rendered it less likely that they would be evacuated

Cultural sympathy over settlements and the existence of a frontier society also proved irrelevant. Sympathy for and understanding of Israeli settlement policy was exclusively articulated in support of its security claims. In no case was admiration for the settlers and their mission evinced by American officials in any of the documents examined. If this was a factor, no evidence of it could be found. There were also no documented cases of any U.S. evangelical groups attempting to influence U.S. policy towards the settlements. There was nothing “special” about dyadic relations in this regard.

However, this does not mean emotional resonance does not play a role in wider bilateral relations. It is notable that the continuing spats over settlements did not take a toll on the health of

U.S.-Israeli relations writ large. If one thing has become clear through the empirical case studies, it is that bilateral bargaining is meaningless unless understood as a process designed first and

396 Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, April 8, 1968, Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant to President Johnson, January 5, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968, eds. Louis J. Smith & David S. Patterson, (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2000), doc. 137; Rusk to all posts, July 5, 1967, Rusk to all posts, July 5, 1967, FRUS XIX, doc. 344. 397 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, February 25, 1978, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. XVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967, eds. Harriet Dashiell Schwar David S. Patterson (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2000), doc. 219.

397 foremost to influence wider strategic goals. Bilateral bargaining was designed to signal intentions for the more consequential process of mediation involving the relevant Arab actors. Ultimately, neither Israel nor the U.S. took bilateral bargaining seriously. Defections and public confrontations were a nuisance but never a threat to the salience of the relationship. The settlements provided an easy outlet for the U.S. need to put on a show of pressuring Israel. Construction was not supported heavily by the American Jewish community, so there was no serious domestic price to pay. In addition, Israel was not harmed (and even benefited indirectly) from bilateral bargaining over the settlements. Therefore, the cost in terms of bilateral relations was minimal. The bickering between the two was, and remains today, a well-choreographed show for the benefit of an audience.

This would hint at a complex and multileveled bilateral relationship. The strength of the alliance was such that constant irritation over the issue did little to alter the salience of the wider relationship. The willingness of both sides to use the issue to promote other interests without undue concern for the integrity of bilateral relations may indicate the strength of the “special relationship” rather than its absence. Future events would certainly indicate that this is the case.

Spats over the settlements have resurfaced consistently for 40 years now, but the strength of bilateral ties is still robust. The idea that a strong “shadow of the future” would create a mutually beneficial situation is accurate. It simply manifests in an unexpected manner. Sometimes the closest states are those that are willing to accept a divergence of opinion and, in this case, a divergence of interests.

398

The Important Role of the Arab World

The conclusions reached thus far underscore the crucial importance of the Arab states in obtaining a deal curtailing Israeli settlement construction. First, and foremost, bilateral negotiations between Israel and the United States could not bring about Israeli concessions.

Therefore, willing and full participation of the relevant Arab interlocutor was an essential element in obtaining progress. The divide between the PLO and Jordan over the right to speak for the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank undermined negotiations. If the relevant party was not part of the process, attempts to pressure Israel were doomed to fail.

In addition, the strategic utility of the relevant interlocutor also has material influence on the outcome. It seems that the military and political capabilities of the potential Arab partner make a significant impression on both Israel and the United States. In the 1970’s the United

States made great efforts to mediate the Egyptian track because it was felt that their capabilities and influence were crucial for the promotion of U.S. interests in the Middle East. Israel was far more willing to make concessions to Egypt as it wished to remove them from the circle of belligerency. Sadly, it seems that the weak Arab actors are ignored, while the powerful and influential interlocutors are taken seriously.

The Minor Role of Domestic Politics

An important point arising from this analysis is the minor role domestic politics had in determining outcomes. Israeli coalition politics and the activity of the “Israel lobby” certainly do not help in efforts to reach a deal, but they do not present an insurmountable obstacle either. AIPAC was relatively irrelevant. To begin with, Israel was never able to drum up serious support for its

399 settlement policy in the United States. This was due to its inability to formulate a coherent argument for why settlements were needed, particularly when they were constructed during peace talks.

Congress was seldom involved in the issue. This was doubtless related to the fact that open confrontation on the issue was rare. However, the one time they were substantially involved was in the build up to the Camp David summit. Carter and Sadat met with representatives and asked for their support. The representatives notably took a firm anti-settlement stance. This included some of the most pro-Israeli representatives.398 While Congress remained very supportive of Israel generally, its members were concerned at the Israeli habit of constructing settlements during crucial negotiations and felt that the policy was counter-productive to both the Israeli and the

American national interests.

This may be partially an outcome of the period examined here. By 1967, AIPAC had become an efficient and powerful actor on Capitol Hill, but it had yet to attain the levels of power and influence it would be noted for in later decades. AIPAC gained significant influence in the

1980s, after the period covered here.399 However, as this study shows, support on one issue does not necessitate support on others. It is quite possible for the Israel lobby to fight for Israel on some issues (such as arms sales) and not on other issues. Indeed, there is evidence that U.S. public opinion is not supportive of Israeli settlement construction even though overall support for Israel is strong.400 The trend identified here may indicate that the “Israel lobby” is hesitant to take on

398 Hedrick Smith, “Humphrey urged Begin to be flexible in talks,” New York Times, January 24, 1978, A5; Foxman to Burton, January 27, 1978, 6841-5/FM, ISA. 398 Rafiah to North American Division, February 1, 1978, 7380-10/A, ISA; Dinitz to Dayan, February 3, 1978, 7380- 10/A, ISA. For the talk with Lee Hamilton, see Rafiah to Evron, February 3, 1978, 7380-10/A, ISA; Rafiah to Evron, February 7 1978, 4173-4/A, ISA; Hertzog to Dinitz, February 8 1978, 7380-10/A, ISA. 399 Michael, American Policy Toward Israel: the Power and Limits of Beliefs (London: Routledge, 2007), 94-112. 400 Jonathan Rynhold, The Arab-Israeli Conflict in American Political Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 21.

400 issues which are not in the purview of Congress. There are indications this is a problem still for the Israel lobby. A strategy paper from the Wexner Foundation, a pro-Israeli group in the United

States, noted that “the settlements are our Achilles heel, and the best response (which is still quite weak) is the need for security that this buffer creates.”401 This is not to discount domestic politics completely, but it appears their role regarding settlements has been vastly overrated.

Israeli domestic political obstacles to an agreement are more difficult to dismiss. The coalition system in Israel is fragile and governments are genuinely reluctant to make concessions for fear of domestic political consequences. When pro-settler parties have a large share of the coalition seats and they ally with members of the ruling party, Prime Ministers will think twice about even considering an evacuation of settlements. This is true in regard to the Golan Heights and even more so in regard to the West Bank. The problem is exacerbated by the penetration of state organs by pro-settler sympathisers, a process that has increased apace since the 1980’s.402

However, there are indications in the case study that this is surmountable. The makeup of the coalition had little influence on the outcome. The NRP was the junior coalition partner throughout almost the entire period surveyed here. In the early period, they evinced a moderate territorial position, yet no concessions were made. The NRP, over time, became increasingly supportive of settlement expansion. They also held the decisive votes and could have brought down the government if they had so desired. In addition, the Likud ruling party was highly supportive of settlement expansion and some of its members did not support the peace process with Egypt for

401 Wexner Analysis, “Israeli Communication Priorities 2003”, April 2003, http://www.adc.org/index.php?id=1789 402 Oded Haklai, “Religious—Nationalist Mobilization and State Penetration.” Lessons from Jewish Settlers' Activism in Israel and the West Bank,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 40, No. 6 (June, 2007), 715.

401 that reason.403 Despite these domestic political conditions, Begin was able to pass the Camp David accords and peace agreement with the support of the opposition and his government did not fall.

The same goes for extra-parliamentary pressure groups. Gush Emunim and pro- settlement activists have had success in expanding the Israeli settlement map. However, they were unable to prevent the withdrawal from Sinai even though advocacy groups were involved in attempts to prevent the evacuation of the Sinai settlements. It could, however, be argued

(probably correctly) that the influence of Gush Emunim was not truly tested because the deal did not concern the West Bank which was the area they cared most passionately about.

Overall, in the period analyzed, the empirical evidence points to a surprising lack of influence of domestic politics on the ultimate outcomes. While domestic political costs figured into the calculation, and at times were used for bargaining leverage, they did not have significant independent influence. Israel managed to easily pass a motion to evacuate settlements in the

Knesset even when the composition of the coalition would seem to preclude this possibility. In the Israeli case this may not be that surprising, since Israel was not required to evacuate settlements in the West Bank and therefore it can be argued that its domestic resistance to a deal was never truly tested. In the United States, there was only one case wherein the legislative arm was involved in a scuffle over settlement policy. In that case, in the leadup to Camp David,

Congress supported the executive in its belief that settlements should be evacuated. U.S. domestic politics restrained the executive in terms of votes in the UN but never influenced the basic contours of policy.

403 Memorandum of conversation, June 13, 1977, faction 48-2-2/E, JAB; Ilan Peleg, Begin’s Foreign Policy, 1977- 1983: Israel’s Move to the Right, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 107-109; William Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Berkley, CA: Brooking Institute, 2005), 237-240.

402

These are still very real problems that must be dealt with in future. In the pursuit of a deal

Israel should consider switching from a proportional representation system to a regionally based system or a Presidential system so the government is less dependent on pro-settler junior coalition partners. However, changes in the strategic situation have a more decisive influence and can overcome domestic obstacles.

Prospects for Future Conflict resolution

Israel has been willing to negotiate and compromise when it feels that the status quo threatens its interests and it is reasonably assured that its security concerns would be addressed in a future agreement. In other words, there must be a push and pull factor. Israel must be unhappy with the status quo and see a way out that can improve its position. This is currently not the case. The

Israeli government hopes to resolve the conflict, in theory, but it is not at the top of its agenda. It is currently enjoying both relative security from Palestinian attacks and economic prosperity.404

Israel must withdraw from the West Bank (or most of it) for a peace deal to be reached, but it does not currently have an incentive to do so.

The United States, for all its occasional criticism and bluster, is clearly also comfortable with the status quo. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at the top of its international agenda anymore and therefore, it is focusing its attention elsewhere. In addition, influential regional actors such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia have lost interest in the conflict. Arab states are showing

404 Ben Caspit, “Why Israelis are happier than ever,” September 23, 1205, Al-Monitor http://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/israelis-happy-optimistic-survey-economic-situation-security.html {accessed: July 18, 2017} Steven Cook, “Despite Eveything, Israelis Never had it So Good,” , June 7, 2016 {accessed: July 18, 2017} http://www.newsweek.com/despite-everything-israelis-have-never-had-it-so-good-465521

403 an increased willingness to cooperate with Israel and the United States regardless of the status of the conflict.405 Although the region is unstable, Israel faces a region too divided and distracted to fundamentally threaten its existence. Whether rightly or wrongly, neither Israel nor the U.S. feels a great incentive to alter the status quo regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.406

This must change so that a situation conducive to conflict resolution can emerge. If the

United States and Israel are satisfied with the status quo, the U.S. is unlikely to put pressure on

Israel. Correspondingly, GOI will be just as unlikely to make concessions. To be more amenable to compromise both must feel that the status quo undermines their strategic interests and that a future resolution could improve their prospects. In other words, it must attain what Zartman called “ripeness.”407 Sadat put a great deal of effort into creating the right mindset in Jerusalem and Washington, D.C. first through the 1973 War and then reassuring Israel with the visit to

Jerusalem and a genuine willingness to make concessions on the nature of peace and normalization. This process altered Israeli interests and perceptions of its security enough to generate significant support for the peace process. When the time came to compromise, the opposition helped the government survive in the name of the national interest.

The United States must not be afraid to be biased against Israel and cooperate with the

Palestinians and the Arab world in its mediation efforts. One of the keys to the success of Camp

David was that the Carter administration had made it very clear that Israel would shoulder the

405 Haaretz Staff, “Israel, Saudi Arabia Are Reportedly Negotiating Economic Ties,” Haaretz, June 17, 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/1.796215 {accessed: June 18, 2017}; Zena Taahan, “Egypt-Israel relations 'at highest level' in history,” Aljazeera, November 20 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/11/egypt-israel-relations-highest-level-history- 161107083926863.html {accessed: June 18, 2017} 406 For more on this view, see Martin Kramer, “Israel and the Post-American Middle East: Why the Status Quo Is Sustainable,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 95 (July/August 2016), 51-57. 407 I. William Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,” in Paul Stern & Daniel Druckman (eds.), International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War (Washington D.C.: National academy Press, 2000), 225-250.

404 blame for failure. It did so by cooperating with Egypt for a long time while convincing public opinion in the United States that support for Sadat’s position was in the American national interest. When framed successfully in this manner, pro-Israeli forces avoid clashing directly with

USG. For example, the Obama administration managed to frame the nuclear deal with Iran as a national interest. Therefore, AIPAC was unable to resist it successfully.408 In future efforts to resolve the conflict, American administrations may have to heavily favor the Palestinian position

(that Israel evacuate all or most of its settlements) while putting U.S prestige behind that position. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to work unless there is a strong and pressing national interest behind efforts to resolve the conflict. Currently, this is not the case.

The Palestinians with the support of the Arab world must figure out how to first shock

Israel out of its comfort (hopefully using diplomatic rather than military means) and then reassure it into making concessions. Legalistic and moral arguments will have no influence on either Israel or the United States. Ultimately, the strategic context, and not emotional or domestic political constraints, will determine whether the settlements continue to expand or are curtailed.

In addition, for any move towards peace to work the interests and political circumstances of all relevant actors need to be considered. Settlements are not an Israeli issue or a matter to be resolved bilaterally. The resolution of this problem and the conflict in general are a regional problem and must be treated as such.

Matters of internal Arab politics also must be taken into consideration. The split within the Arab world over who is the legitimate interlocuter for the West Bank seriously hampered any prospect of successful talks. Unfortunately, the Palestinians face a similar dilemma today. In

408 Karoun Demirjian and Carol Morello, “How AIPAC lost the Iran deal fight,” Washington Post, September 3 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/09/03/how-aipac-lost-the-iran-deal- fight/?utm_term=.7e1871010ff6 {accessed: July 18, 2017)

405

January 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections but FATAH would not relinquish its authority. Hamas took over the Gaza strip militarily the following year. Since then the two territories have been governed separately. Although several attempts have been made to establish a unified government, they have all failed. It is difficult to imagine how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be resolved until this problem is successfully addressed. Israel uses this division as an excuse to avoid substantive negotiations, just as it used the division between Jordan and the

PLO in the 1970’s. Just as importantly, neither Israel nor the United States are confident in the ability of FATAH (their preferred negotiations partner) to reach a deal and fulfill it as they lack full authority and legitimacy.409 Similarly, Syria cannot be a partner until it resolves its civil war and is represented by a legitimate government in full control of the country. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.

This does not bode well for the Palestinians. Even if they somehow united, the

Palestinian Authority would not have enough strategic utility to attract the U.S. to mediate seriously on their behalf and evince the sort of bias which helped Egypt attain a peace agreement in 1979. There is some hope for the Palestinians in the Arab world. In 1973, the Saudi willingness to put its oil policy behind Egypt underscored the strategic need to resolve the Arab-

Israeli conflict.410 A similar sense of unity of purpose in the Arab world would be necessary today. If the United States was made to feel that its standing in the Middle East was genuinely undermined by the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it would be more proactive.

There are some signs, however, that the Arab world is losing interest in the Israeli-Palestinian

409 Khaled Elgindy, “Lost in the Chaos: The Palestinian Leadership Crisis,” Washington Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 4 (2015), 133-150. 410 Briefing Paper for President Nixon, October 31, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, eds. Nina Howland, Craig Daigle, Edward C. Keefer, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2011), doc. 302; Memorandum of Conversation, November 1 1973, FRUS XXV, Doc. 307.

406 conflict.411 This is a dangerous development. The full attention and support of the Arab world is needed to redress the strategic and political imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians.

Another unfortunate development is that some Arab and Islamic states support FATAH and others support Hamas. This encourages a split which undermines the Palestinian negotiation position.

To attain the minimal amount of trust necessary for Israel to make concessions, the

Palestinians must abandon terrorism at least in the long run. Violence can be useful to bring the other side to the negotiation table. However, the insecurity engendered through violence can be detrimental to reaching a deal. Israel, tends to view all matters through a security lens and its historical experience has made it pessimistic in its expectations and outlook. Recent Israeli experience with the security fallout from withdrawals in Gaza and Lebanon has not been reassuring either. It has always viewed the West Bank through a security prism and continues to be concerned as to the repercussions a retreat from the area would have for its national security.

Palestinian leaders must take a page out of Sadat’s book and reassure Israel that territory evacuated would not be used for terrorism.

Finally, in terms of U.S.-Israeli relations, a few important lessons have been learned about the song and dance of bilateral confrontation over the settlements. It is tempting to look at the issue of settlements as a legal or moral issue. But in terms of resolving the conflict, interests and effectiveness in attaining peace are far more important. Bilateral relations are strong enough to handle disagreements over policy and strategy. Reaching the point where the U.S. successfully

411 See for example John Bell, “Israel-Palestine: Is it even relevant anymore?,” Aljazeera, March 2 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/03/israel-palestine-relevant-anymore-150302072026022.html {accessed: June 18, 2017}; UN Press Release, “Despite Other Middle East Crises, Intensifying Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Must Not Be Ignored,” United Nations, October 19 2016, https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12558.doc.htm {accessed: June 18, 2017}

407 pressures Israel to evacuate settlements is difficult. There must be a realistic chance of peace, a willing Arab interlocuter, a significant U.S. national interest at stake and Israel must feel secure enough to make concessions. Pressure on Israel without those conditions may be useful for fostering goodwill amongst third-parties but will be useless in terms of attaining peace.

However, when conditions are ripe, the United States should be ready to take a biased position against Israel and ruthlessly use all resources at its disposal to credibly pressure Israel. It should not fear damaging the robust “special relationship” as a result. If timed and applied correctly, the result will be peace and nothing is more special than that.

408

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