This volume presents a variety of views from American, Israeli (and other) policy makers and academics and is indispensable in understanding Arnerican- Israeli relations. It is fair minded, tough, and wide ranging. No one who wishes to understand American policy in the Middle East can afford to ignore it. Steven David, Johns Hopkins University, author of Catastrophic Consequences: Civil Wars and American Interests (2008)

In contrast to recent treatments of the US-Israeli relationship which provide sweeping critiques based on superficial and impressionistic judgments, this book provides a welcome corrective in its exemplary and knowledgeable treatment of this important subject. Robert J. Lieber, , author of The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century (2005)

This is the most comprehensive and up-to-date collection of works on US- relations in the post-911 1 age. Gilboa and Inbar have furnished an essential resource for scholars, students, journalists, and decision-makers. Michael Oren, The , author of Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present (2007)

Everyone talks about US-Israel relations but few people research them thor- oughly and analyze them carefully. This book provides a careful and useful view of this relationship in the post-Cold War, post-September 11 world, sinking many myths and focusing on the key questions. It is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand the reality of this important, complex alliance. Barry Rubin, GLORIA Center, author of The Truth About Syria (2008) and co-author with Walter Laqueur of The Israel-Arab Reader (2008) US-Israeli Relations in a New Era

This book examines in depth the fundamental problems, factors and issues in current US-Israeli relations, which will have implications both for the Middle East and for world peace and prosperity. The US and Israel have established an exceptional relationship, which has significant effects on events and processes in the entire Middle East. Israel depends on the US for military hardware, for support against hostile inter- national organizations, and for economic and financial aid. In turn, it is viewed by the US as a strong and reliable ally, and the US has adopted strategic con- cepts that for decades have governed Israel's national security, such as pre- emptive strikes and counter-terrorist strategies. However, politicians and scholars have accused Israel and pro-Israeli organizations of exerting too much influence on US policy in the Middle East. Here, a collection of international experts present original research and findings on a wide variety of critical bilat- eral and regional issues in American-Israeli relations, approaching the topics from both theoretical and practical angles. This book will be of interest to students of US Foreign Policy, Middle Eastern Politics, and International Relations in general.

Eytan Gilboa is Professor of Political Science and International Communica- tion at Bar-Ilan University. He is also a Senior Research Associate at the Begin- Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies and a Visiting Professor of Public Diplomacy at the University of . Efraim Inbar is Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and the Director of its Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies. Religion in World Conflict BESA studies in international security Edited by Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler Series Editor: Ehirn Inbar Radical Islam and International Security Challenges and responses Edited by Hillel Frisch and Efraim Znbar

US-Israeli Relations in a New Era Issues and challenges after 911 1 Edited by Eytan Gilboa and Efraim Znbar

Middle Eastern Security Prospects for an arms control regime Edited by Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler

Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East Edited by Bruce Muddy- Weitzman and Efraim Znbar

The National Security of Small States in a Changing World Edited by Efraim Znbar and Gabriel Sheffer

Israeli Strategy after Desert Storm Lessons of the Second Maj. Gen. (res.) Aharon Levran

The Politics and Economics of Defense Industries Edited by Efraim Inbar and Benzion Zilberfarb

Democratic Societies and Their Armed Forces Israel in comparative context Edited by Stuart A. Cohen

US Allies in a Changing World Edited by Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney

Armed Forces in the Middle East Politics and strategy Edited by Barry Rubin and Thomas Keaney

The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered Edited by Andrew J. Bacevich and Efraim Inbar

Democracies and Small Wars Edited by Efraim Znbar US-Israe ations in a New Era Issues and challenges after 911 1

Edited by Eytan Gilboa and Efraim Inbar

Taylor & Francis Group LONDON AND Contents

First published 2009 Biographies by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Introduction by Routledge EYTAN GlLBOA AND EFRAlM INBAR 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 100 16 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Q 2009 Selection and editorial matter, Eytan Gilboa and Ehim Inbar; PART I individual chapters, the contributors The strategic landscape Typeset in Times by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJI Digital, Padstow, Comwall 1 US management of Middle East war and peace: between All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now defensive realism and offensive liberalism known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in BENJAMIN MILLER any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. 2 US-Israel relations in the post-Cold War era: the view from British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library EFRAlM INBAR Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data US-Israeli relations in a new era : issues and challenges after 911 1 1 edited by Eytan Gilboa and Efiaim Inbar. p. rm. - (Besa studies in international security) PART I1 1. -Foreign relations-Israel. 2. Israel-Foreign relations-united States. I. Gilboa, Eytan. 11. Inbar, Efiaim, 1947- Domestic sources 521480.A571758 2009 327.7305694-dc22 3 The public dimension of US-Israel relations: a comparative 2008022089 analysis 53 ISBNIO: 0-415-47701-8 (hbk) EYTAN GlLBOA ISBNIO: 0-203-88712-3 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-47701-7 (hbk) 4 AIPAC and US Middle East policy ISBN13: 978-0-203-88712-7 (ebk) MITCHELL G. BARD 5 American Jewish demography: implications for US-Israel relations 91 IRA M. SHESKIN 6 American Christian support for Israel PAUL CHARLES MERKLEY x Contents PART 111 Foreign policy issues Biographies

7 A war for Israel? Israel and the war in Iraq DOV WAXMAN 8 The US and the Arab-Israeli peace process: conflict management versus conflict resolution J'ONATHAN RYNHOLD 9 The Jerusalem issue: between President, Congress, and the courts SHLOMO SLONIM Editors

Eytan Gilboa is Professor of Political Studies and Chair of the Communications PART IV Program at Bar-Ilan University. He is also a Senior Researcher at the Begin- Multi-lateral dimensions Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies and a Visiting Professor of Public Diplomacy at the University of Southern California. His numerous publica- 10 Transatlantic relations and the Middle East: beyond policy tions include two books (1987, 1993) and many articles and book chapters on disagreements? American attitudes toward Israel and the Middle East. EMANUELE OTTOLENGHI Efraim Inbar is Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and Direc- 11 India, Israel, and the US factor tor of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies. His area of CHERlAN SAMUEL specialization is Middle Eastern strategic issues with a special interest in the politics and strategy of Israeli national security. His latest book is Israel's 12 Turkey, Israel, and American hegemony National Security: Issues and Challenges since the Yom Kippur War AMIKAM NACHMANI (London: Routledge, 2008).

PART V Contributors Looking ahead Mitchell Bard is Executive Director of the non-profit American-Israeli Co- 13 The future of US-Israel relations operative Enterprise (AICE) and one of the leading authorities on US Policy P. EDWARD HALEY in the Middle East. He is also the director of the , the world's most comprehensive online encyclopedia of Jewish history and culture. His latest book is Will Israel Survive? (New York: Palgrave, 2007). Index P. Edward Haley is W.M. Keck Foundation Professor of International Strategic Studies and Chairman of the International Relations Program, Claremont McKenna College; and Professor, Claremont Graduate University. He writes about US foreign policy with a special focus on the Eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf, and great power relations. He is the author of Strategies of Dominance: The Misdirection of US Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), and co-author of Strategic Foreign Assistance: Civil Society in International Security (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2006). xii Biographies Biographies xiii Paul Charles Merkley is Professor Emeritus of History at Carleton University, Demographic Studies (New York: City University of New York, North Ottawa, Canada. He serves regularly as an advisor on international politics to American Jewish Data Bank, 2001). the current Canadian Minister of Public Safety. He has written extensively on Shlomo Slonim is James G. McDonald Professor Emeritus of American History the Christian interest in and Christian attitudes toward Israel. His at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has written extensively on legal most recent book is American Presidents, Religion, and Israel (Westport, CT: and political aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict including American-Israeli Praeger, 2004). relations. He is the author of Jerusalem in America's Foreign Policy, Benjamin Miller is Associate Professor of International Relations at the School 1947-1 997 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998). of Political Sciences at the University of Haifa. He has served as a visiting Dov Waxman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Baruch College, the professor at various schools including the University of Colorado, Boulder, City University of New York. He serves on the Board of Directors of the and Duke University. His areas of research include conflict and cooperation, Association for Israel Studies and is the Associate Editor of the journal Israel regional war and peace, and nationalism and conflict. His latest book is Studies Forum. His latest book is The Pursuit of Peace and the Crisis of States, Nations and Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace Israeli Identity: Defending/De$ning the Nation (New York: Palgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Macmillan, 2006). Amikam Nachmani is Associate Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan Uni- versity and a Senior Researcher at the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Stra- tegic Studies. He specializes in stntegic affairs of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, and is an authority on the politics of water in the Middle East. His most recent book is Turkey: Facing a New Millennium (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). Emanuele Ottolenghi is Executive Director of the Brussels-based Transatlantic Institute. He taught Israel studies at Oxford University (1999-2006). He is a regular commentator on Middle Eastern affairs for the Italian press. His latest book is Autodafi: Europe, the and Anti-Semitism (Torino, Italy: Lindau, 2007 [Italian]). Jonathan Rynhold is Senior Lecturer in Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and a Senior Researcher at the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies. His recent publications have analyzed American policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the rise and fall of the Oslo process, the separation barrier, the Gaza disengagement and the role of foreign policy in Israeli elections. Cherian Samuel is Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyzes, New Delhi. He served as a Research Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi where he edited the weekly ORF US Monitor. He specializes in Indo-US relations, US domestic policy and the Indian Diaspora in the US. He is co-editor of The Second Bush Presidency: Global Perspectives (New Delhi: Dorling Kindersley, 2006). Ira M. Sheskin is Professor of Geography and Regional Studies at the Univer- sity of Miami and the Director of the Jewish Demography Project at the sue and Leonard Miller Center for Contemporary Judaic Studies. His area of research is Jewish demography. His most recent book is How Jewish Communities Dzrer: Variations in the Findings of Local Jewish 90 M.G. Bard 3 M.G. Bard, The Water's Edge and Beyond (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991), p. 18. 5 American Jewish demography 4 See E. Gilboa, 'The Public Dimension of US-Israel Relations: A Comparative Analy- sis,' in this volume. 5 See P. Merkley, 'American Christian Support for Israel,' in this volume. Implications for US-Israel relations 6 'Gallup Polls on American Sympathy Toward Israel and the Arabsffalestinians.' Available online at www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc~S-IsraeVgaI1upPhtm.See also E. Gilboa, 'The Public Dimension of US-Israel Relations: A Comparative Ira M. Sheskin Analysis,' in this volume. 7 US Census Bureau, Census 2000, Summary File 4 and Sample Edited Data File. 8 A. McFeatters, 'Zogby Poll Indicates Bush is Gaining Arab American Votes in 4 Key States,' Arab-American Institute, 16 September 2004. 9 For a critique of the Said school of thinking, see J. Teitelbaum and M. Litvak (trans- lated from Hebrew by Keren Ribo), 'Students, Teachers, and Edward Said: Taking Stock of Orientalism,' The Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Since 1990, the organized American Jewish community has completed two March 2006, vol. 10, no. 1, article 2. 10 J. Fialka and B. Johnson, 'Jewish PACS Emerge as a Powerful Force in US Election National Jewish Population Studies (NJPS 1990 and NJPS 2000) and more than Races,' Wall Street Journal, 26 February 1985; PACs and Lobbies, 1 March 1989; 50 local Jewish community studies. The major purpose of these studies is to Bard, op. cit., p. 9. provide guidance nationally and locally to Jewish federations, synagogues, and I I 'Pro-Israel and Pro-Arab Interests: The Money,' Center for Responsive Politics. other Jewish organizations about the size and geographic distribution of the Available online at www.opensecrets.org/news/pro-israel.pro-arab. 12 Ibid. Jewish population, its demography and religiosity,.membership patterns, levels 13 Bard, op. cit., p. 289. of , social service needs, media usage, levels of philanthropic 14 Near East Report: AIPAC's Bi-weekly on American Middle East Policy, 5 March donations, and other topics. These local Jewish community studies, taken as a 2007. Available online at www.aipac.orgiPublications/AIPACPeriodicalsNearEast group, report that are aging, well educated, generally of high ReportNER030507.pdf. income, and highly assimilated, with large percentages not being affiliated with 15 'New US-Israel Security Agreement Vital in Countering Common Threats,' AIPAC the community in any way.' Memo, 10 September 2007. 16 Waivers for PLO Sanctions. Available online at www.jewishvirtuaIlibrary.org/jsourcel The purpose of this chapter is to present some of the more important findings US-Israel/bushwaiverplotoc.html. of these studies and discuss the impact of these findings on US-Israel relations. 17 Bard, op. cit, p. 42. Part I examines the political implications of the data collected on the number of 18 'Loan Guarantees for Israel.' Available online at www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/ Jews in the United States, recent and projected changes in the number of Jews in jsourceNS-Israel/Loan-Guarantees-for-krael.htm1. the United States, and the changing geographic distribution of American Jews. 19 J.J. Mearsheimer and S.M. Walt, 'The Israel Lobby,' London Review of Book, 23 March 2006. Data have been collected by both national studies and a few of the local Jewish 20 W. Grimes, 'A Prosecutorial Brief Against Israel and Its Supporters,' New York community studies on political issues and on American Jewish attitudes toward Times, 6 September 2007; J. Goldberg, 'The Usual Suspect,' , Israel. Part I1 examines issues related to political parties and the political ideo- 8 October 2007; D. Remnick, 'The Lobby,' New Yorker, 3 September 2007. logy of American Jews. Part I11 looks at the relationship of American Jews to 21 A. Foxman, The Deadliest Lies: The Israel Lobby and the Myth of Jewish Control Israel. The overall question addressed in this chapter is the extent to which (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 22 G. Ball, 'How to Save Israel in Spite of Herself,' Foreign Affairs, April 1977, vol. 55, changing American Jewish demographics are likely to affect the ability and no. 3, pp. 453-71. willingness of the American Jewish community to influence the US-Israel 23 See, for example, R. Kampeas, 'Soros to Support Dovish Jews Seeking an Alternative relationship. to AIPAC?,' Jewkh Telegraphic Agency, 10 October 2006; A. Barkat, 'New Pro- This chapter relies on data from the National Jewish Population Survey and Israel Lobby as Alternative to AIPAC,' , 12 Octoher 2006. 24 Roiphe, op. cit. from local Jewish community studies because the methodology of these studies involved the most advanced (and most expensive) sampling method: random digit dialing (RDD). Many previous descriptions of the political behavior of American Jews have relied upon the American Jewish Committee's (AJC) annual survey of American Jewish Public Opinion. While these surveys are a valuable source of information, particularly because of their time-series nature, the AJC sample is not nearly as representative of American Jewry as the surveys employed in this study.' One of the principal problems is that the AJC 92 Z.M.Sheskin American Jewish demography 93 surveys only include interviews of those Jews who state that their religion is populous states with more electoral votes. Of the. 269 electoral votes needed to Jewish, omitting many Jews (perhaps 20 percent) who identify as ethnically be elected president, 128 are concentrated in four states with large Jewish popu- Jewish, but who would respond in a survey that they are atheists, agnostics, of lations: New York (8.4 percent Jewish), California (3.3 percent Jewish), Florida no religion, etc. (3.7 percent Jewish), and New Jersey (5.5 percent Jewish). The top ten states for Jewish population have a total of 246 electoral votes. Thus, it is not the number of Jews nationwide, but their geographic concentration in just a few states that Part I: number of Jews in the United States is important. In recent years, three methods have been employed to derive estimates of the This same geographic concentration of Jews helps, in part, to explain the 13 national Jewish population. First, major national RDD Jewish population studies Jews in the 2006 Senate, although, importantly, some Jewish senators were were completed in 1990' and 2000-01.4 The 2000-01 National Jewish Popu- elected from states, such as Minnesota and Oregon, which actually have tiny lation Survey (NJPS 2000) estimated 5.2 million Jews. The authors of NJPS Jewish populations. 2000 suggest that this estimate is probably too low and the reason for that under- Jewish political influence in congressional elections is impacted by geo- estimate is explained by Sheskin and Dashefsky.' Basically, an analysis of NJPS graphic concentration within states. More than 60 percent of the American data shows that Jews were less likely to respond to NJPS than were non-Jews Jewish population lives in just 12 Jewish communities (New York, Los Angeles, leading to an underestimate of the percentage of American households contain- Chicago, Broward, Boston, Washington, , Philadelphia, South ing a Jew and, thus, an underestimation of the American Jewish population. Palm Beach, West Palm Beach, Atlanta, and Miami). Thus, Jews are concen- Second, the American Jewish Year Book (AJYB) has been providing annual trated within certain congressional districts. Witli most elections being decided estimates (since at least the 1930s) of -the American Jewish population by by less than five percentage points, Jews do have the ability to affect outcomes summing estimates for hundreds of local Jewish communities. These estimates in those areas. These same geographic concentrations result in Jews being derive from two sources. For many larger Jewish communities, estimates are elected to State and local offices out-of-proportion to their numbers. available from the same local Jewish community studies employed in this The 2006 House of Representatives contained 30 Jews. Although many were chapter. For smaller communities, estimates are provided by informants in those elected from congressional districts in the Northeast and Midwest with large communities. The 2006 AJYB6 estimated 6.4 million Jews in more than 500 Jewish populations, again, importantly, some were elected from states (such as Jewish communities, but adjusting for some of the methodological drawbacks of Kentucky and Tennessee) and districts in which very few Jews reside. Clearly, simply summing local estimates (such as some double-counting of households Jewish politicians are not being elected 'because they are Jewish,' but rather due who maintain residences in two communities), Sheskin and Dashefsky conclude to other factors influencing voters. that 6.0-6.4 million is a reasonable estimate? Another potential reason why Jews enjoy significant political influence is that Third, a new method developed at Brandeis University8 uses a technique non-Jews seem to have an inflated impression of the percentage of Americans which combines the results of more than 30 national RDD surveys which asked who are Jewish. Almost 40 percent of Americans think that 20 percent or more questions about religion. This study also suggests a range of between 6.0 and 6.4 of Americans are Jewish and about 60 percent think that 10 percent or more are million Jews. Jewish. Only 18 percent think that less than 5 percent of Americans are Jewish? If the 5.2 million estimate is correct, Jews are 1.7 percent of the American It is also clear that nonJews are willing to vote for Jewish candidates and population. If the 6.4 million estimate is correct, Jews are 2.1 percent. It is diffi- that Jewish political influence is due less to overall numbers and more to geo- cult to imagine that the ability of the American Jewish community to influence graphic concentration,. Jewish participation in the democratic process, donations policy toward Israel is in any way influenced by the impact of the difference to political parties, and political activism. The 2000 National Jewish Population between these two percentages. While Jews are only about 2 percent of the Survey suggests that about one-third of Jewish adults were politically active in American population, given the higher percentage of Jews among American the past year (attended any political meetings or rallies, contributed money to a adults and the fact that Jews tend to register to vote and to cast their votes in political party or candidate, or contacted or wrote to a government official). In higher proportions than oth& Americans, it is likely that as much as 4 percent of Washington, 45 percent of Jewish adults are politically active. votes cast in the average presidential election are cast by Jews. NJPS 2000 reports that 90 percent of Jews are registered to vote, compared to 64 percent of Changes in the size of the United States Jewish population all Americans. Jewish political influence in presidential elections derives not from being NJPS 1990 and NJPS 2000 suggest that the Jewish population decreased by perhaps 4 percent of the national electorate, but from the United States Electoral about 5 percent, from 5.5 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2000. The estimates College system, which has the effect of making one's vote 'worth more' in more provided in the American Jewish Year Book suggest that the Jewish population 94 LM. Sheskin American Jewish demography 95 incveased by about 7 percent, from 5.9 million in 1990 to 6.4 million in 2006. it is possible that Jewish political influence could continue, if a core of commit- Both of these changes may well be within the margin of error of the methodolo- ted Jews remains in key states. gies used in each case. Another factor, which should be considered for a minimum of one genera- According to estimates by Sergio DellaPerg~la,'~based upon NJPS 2000, tion, is the effect of intermamage. According to NJPS 2000, 31 percent of about 50,000 Jews are born in the United States each year and about 60,000 mamed American Jews are currently married to non-Jew~.'~As a result of inter- Jews die, for an annual natural decrease of 10,000 Jews. DellaPergola also esti- marriage, the number of households containing a Jewish person increased mates a gain of 5,000 Jews per year due to a net in-migration. Such a net loss of (according to NJPS 2000) between 1990 and 2000 from 2.7 million to 2.9 5,000 Jews per year (the 10,000 lost due to natural decrease minus the 5,000 million and the number of persons living in households with one or more Jews gained due to net in-migration) is also within the margin of error of the method- increased from 6.6 million to 6.7 million persons. Sergio DellaPergola estimates ologies employed. While it is impossible to estimate the number of Jews who that more than ten million Americans would qualify to immigrate to Israel under convert to other religions or who 'opt out' of being Jewish by simply no longer the Law of Return." Thus, while the number of Jews may decrease, the number identifying as Jews, it is almost certainly greater than the number of persons of households containing Jews (or at least persons of Jewish heritage) is increas- who convert to or 'opt in' without conversion. These data suggest an ing. To the extent that Jews in these households maintain some ties to their her- overall decrease in the number of American Jews. itage (particularly in terms of support of Israel) and to the extent to which they Two other factors suggest an overall decrease as well. First, 16 percent of can influence other household members, intermamage, at least for one genera- American Jews are elderly, compared to 12 percent for all Americans. Second, tion (for it is much less likely that the children of intermarriages will maintain for a population to replace itself, mamed couples need to average 2.15 children. ties to the Jewish community as strong as the children of two Jewish parents According to NJPS 2000, Jewish women age 40-44 average 1.86 children each, might when they reach adulthood) may actually increase the influence of Jews. not all of whom are being raised as Jews. Thus, it is likely that the number of deaths in the Jewish community will continue to be higher than the number of Changing geographic distribution of American Jews Jewish births. However, it is also likely that the number of Jews migrating into the country In 1960, 67 percent of American Jews lived in the Northeast; 14 percent, in the will continue to outstrip the number migrating out. Relatively few Jews are Midwest; 9 percent, in the South; and 11 percent, in the West. By 2002, the per- leaving the United States, while Jews continue to arrive in the United States centage in the Northeast had declined to 48 percent, while the percentage in the from overseas. To some extent, the large immigration of Jews from the former Midwest had declined to 12 percent. On the other hand, the percentage in the has counteracted, up to the current time, the loss due to opting out. South had increased to 21 percent and the percentage in the West had increased In sum, while the Jewish population may have been relatively stable over the to 19 percent.I4 past decade (mostly due to the large number of migrants from the former Soviet From 1970-2006, significant increases were seen in the number of Jews in Cali- Union), most obseivers believe that the Jewish population will decrease in the fornia (473,000), Florida (393,000), Georgia (102,000), Arizona (85,000), Nevada coming years. (66,000), Texas (63,000), Virginia (56,000), and Colorado (52,000). These states, The likelihood of a future decrease in the Jewish population of the United fiom 1981 to 2001, because of general population growth, were allocated an addi- States is certainly not without political implications, although, at least in the tional 28 electoral votes. Significant decreases are seen in the number of Jews in short run, the impact may not be all in the direction of decreasing influence. By New York (-918,000) and Pennsylvania (-1 87,000). These two states were alloc- 2050, it is likely that less than 1.5 percent of Americans will be Jewish. On the ated iline fewer electoral votes from 1981-2001. Thus, the significant migration of face of it, such a decrease would imply a decrease in political influence, but for American Jews over the past few decades has not dissipated the political influence the same reason that it may not matter today whether Jews constitute 1.7 percent of American Jews, since when American Jews have migrated, they have tended to or 2.1 percent of the American population, it may not matter if Jews are 1.5 relocate in states with significant numbers of electoral votes. percent of the American population in the future. . Furthermore, the major reason for the decrease in Jewish population is, at Part 11: political party least currently, not natural decrease, but rather the large numbers of Jews who are 'opting out' of their Jewish identity. Most of these Jews are not currently The generally-held perception that American Jews are Liberal Democrats is politically active on behalf of Jewish causes and the losses in Jewish identifica- shown by available evidence to be only partially true. NJPS 2000 shows that, tion are much more likely to occur in areas with low Jewish populations and low nationally, 61 percent of Jews are Democrats, 14 percent are Republicans, 20 numbers of electoral votes." Thus, despite the assumption of a decreasing percent are Independent, and 6 percent are something else. Contributing to the number of Jews and a decrease in the percentage of Americans who are Jewish, fact that Jews are perceived as Liberal Democrats is that Jews are significantly 96 I.M. Sheskin less likely to be ~e~ublicans(by 14 percent to 22 percent), much more likely to be Democrats (by 61 percent to 36 percent), and much less likely to be some- $?-? thing else (by 17 percent to 6 percent), than are all ~mehcans. $ Table 5.1 shows these results as well as the results of eight local Jewish % -T; community studies, which show that the percentage Democrat varies in the eight b communities from 53 percent to 69 percent and the percentage Republican, from 7 percent to 15 percent. Thus, while it is true that a majority of Jews identify as Democrats, and only a small minority identify as Republicans, certainly not all Jews are Democrats. Significant numbers classify themselves as Independents. ? $?- In recent years, some Jewish Republicans have forwarded claims of signific- + ant increases in the number of Jewish Republicans, particularly among younger 2 Jews and Orthodox Jews. On the Republican Jewish Coalition website15 it is stated that 'the last decade has seen tremendous growth in the number of Jews identifying with Republican ideas and the GOP.' The website, however, offers ? $?- no evidence to support this statement. 2 Unfortunately, no time series data are available from which to gage whether A an increase in Jewish Republicans has occurred, but, as will be seen below, there \o is no change between 1990 and 2000 in the percentage of Jews who identify as Conservative (politically). The hypothesis that younger Jews are more likely to be Republicans than are older Jews is dispelled by the findings of NJPS 2000 8 which suggest that nationally the percentage.of Jews who are Republican is no different for younger Jews than for older Jews (Table 5.2). Among the eight Y, local Jewish community studies, only those in Los Angeles (32 percent), Min- neapolis (17 percent), and Bergen (22 percent) support the contention that younger Jews (under age 35) are more likely to be Republican. Hence, while younger Jews in some areas may be more likely to be Republican, such is not 8 'a the case nationwide, at least as of 2000. P or,A Table 5.1 Political party of American Jews

Community Year Republican Democrat Independent Sonzething 8 (?A) (%) (?A) else (?A) or,* Washington 4 Los Angeles 3 Minneapolis St. Paul Bergen San Francisco )z Columbus $ Seattle NJPS All Americans

Source: based on data sets available at www.jewishdatabank.org. Data on all Americans from an .-,2. E Associated Press Poll conducted by Ipsos Public Affairs in June 2007. i$ Note E *In addition, 15 percent of respondents in Seattle answered 'no preference.' G 98 Z.M. Sheskin American Jewish demography 99 The claim of a greater percentage of Republicans among Orthodox Jews 45 percent to a low of 10 percent. As recently as 1972-88, Republicans drew (Table 5.2), is verified by the NJPS 2000 data (24 percent) and is true as well in between 27 percent and 39 percent of the Jewish vote. In addition, voting for a Washington (28 percent), Los Angeles (26 percent), the Twin Cities (Minneapo- Republican candidate does not necessarily mean that a particular individual is listst. Paul) (45 percent), and San Francisco (19 percent). However, Orthodox a Republican. Jews constitute only about 8 percent of Jews nationally, and, while participation The implication of these findings is important for US-Israel relations. If, in in Orthodox institutions appears to be on the increase in the past decade, the per- fact, Republican candidates could never expect to receive more than a small per- centage of American Jews identifying as Orthodox has not changed significantly centage of Jewish votes, Republican candidates might very well ignore the inter- since 1971. Thus, even if Orthodox Jews were to become increasingly Republi- ests of the Jewish community. That Republican presidents have been generally can, they are only a small minority of American Jews. supportive of Israel (and some proponents claim that some Republican presi- Figure 5.1 provides an alternative method to examine claims of a recent dents, particularly the current President Bush, have been even more supportive upsurge in Jewish Republicans. While it is true that the percentage of Jews than some Democratic presidents) is not only related to the potential Jewish voting for the Republican candidate in the presidential election has increased vote, but is also clearly related to the fact that the base of the Republican Party recently, from 11 percent for the 1992 defeat of Bush (the father) to 24 percent (evangelical Christians, as shown by the existence of such groups as Christians for the 2004 reelection of Bush (the son), note that the percentage of Jews voting United for Israel, and others) is sympathetic to Israel. However, one could argue for the Republican candidate since 1916 has varied significantly, from a high of that the support of the American government for Israel, to the extent that it is influenced by the Jewish vote, means that it would behoove the Jewish vote to be 'fluid,' providing more votes for Republican candidates who show support for Israel. As www.rjchq.org states: 'for our voices to be heard on policy issues, Jews must be represented on both sides of the aisle.' The data from the Washington Jewish community studyI6 allows further examination of the relationship between demographics and party. Overall, 69 percent of Jews in Washington are Democrats. This percentage is much higher for females (77 percent) than for males (60 percent). Seventy-one percent of respondents in households with children are Democrats, a percentage not significantly different from the overall percentage. To the extent that children follow their parents politically, this would suggest that the percentage Democrat will maintain itself in the future. No variation is seen in the percentage Democ- rat by household income. Conservative Jews (73 percent) identify as Democrats at about the same rate as Reform Jews (71 percent). Respondents in in-married households (71 percent) are more likely to be Democrats than respondents in intermarried households (62 percent). Since it is Jews in intermarried house- holds who are least likely to be involved in Jewish causes and most likely not to raise Jewish children, this finding also suggests that the percentage Democrat will not change in the future. Households who are synagogue members (73 percent), (JCC) members (77 percent), and Jewish organization members (76 percent) (organizations like Bnai Brith and Hadassah) are more likely to be Democrat than are non-member households (67 percent, 69 percent, and 68 percent, respectively). Donors to the of Greater Washington in the past year (74 percent), and particularly households who donated $100 and over to the Federation in the past year (78 percent), are also more likely to be Democrats. In sum, involved Jews are more likely to be Democrats than are less involved Jews. Figure5.I The Jewish vote for the Republican candidate in presidential elections Overall, 11 percent of Jews in Washington are Republican. The percentage is (source: based on L. Sandy Maisel and Ira Forman (eds), Jews in American Politics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). 2004 data from the Jewish higher for males (14 percent) than for females (8 percent). Thirteen percent of Telegraphic Agency, 3 November 2004). respondents in households with children are Republicans, a percentage not 100 I.M. Sheskin American Jewish demography 101 significantly different from the overall percentage. Again, to the extent that chil- Table 5.3 Political ideology of American Jews dren follow their parents politically, this would suggest that the percentage Community Year Liberal (!?A) Moderate (?A) Conservative PA) Republican will maintain itself in the future. Unlike the percentage Democrat, the percentage Republican does increase with household income, from 4 percent Seattle for households earning an annual income of less than $25,000 to 7 percent Columbus of households earning $25,000-$50,000, 9 percent of households earning San Francisco $50,000-$100,000, 13 percent of households earning $100;000-$200,000, and Washington Los Angeles 15 percent of 'households earning $200,000 and over. Conservative households Bergen (9 percent) do not differ significantly from Reform households (12 percent) in NJPS the percentage Republican. Respondents in intermarried households (15 percent) NJPS are more likely to be Republican than are respondents in in-manied households All Americans (9 percent). Since Jews in intermarried households are less likely to be involved Source: based on data sets available at www.jewishdatabank.org. Data on all Americans from an in Jewish causes and more likely not to raise Jewish children, this finding also Associated Press Poll conducted by Ipsos Public Affairs in June 2007. suggests that the percentage Republican is unlikely to change in the future. Unlike the results for Democrats, no difference is seen in the percentage of Republicans between synagogue, Jewish Community Center (JCC), and Jewish Liberal at a lower-rate than do Reform Jews (54 percent). Respondents in in- organization member households and non-member households and the percent- married households do not differ on percentage Liberal from respondents in age Republican among local Jewish Federation donors in the past year is no dif- intermamed households. Households who are synagogue members (50 percent) ferent from the overall percentage (1 1 percent). and Jewish organization members (53 percent) are not more likely to be Liberal than are non-member households (54 percent and 52 percent, respectively), although JCC member households (62 percent) are much more likely to be Political ideology Liberal than are JCC non-member households (51 percent). Donors to the Table 5.3 shows that nationally (NJPS 2000) 56 percent of Jews identify as Jewish Federation of Greater Washington in the past year are about as likely to Liberal, 21 percent as Moderate, and 22 percent as Conservative. As mentioned be Liberal as are non-donors. above, the percentage identifying as Conservative has not changed since 1990, Overall, 11 percent of Jews in Washington are Conservative. The percent- providing evidence that Jews are not tending to become more Conservative (and age is higher for males (15 percent) than for females (8 percent). Ten percent probably not tending to become more Republican). In fact, just the opposite trend of respondents in households with children are Conservative, a percentage not is seen by the fact that the percentage identifying as Moderate has decreased, significantly different from the overall percentage. Again, to the extent that from 32 percent to 21 percent, with a commensurate increase in the percentage of children follow their parents politically, this would suggest that the percentage Jews identifying as Liberal, hm47 percent to 56 percent. For the six local Conservative will maintain itself in the future. The percentage Conservative communities shown in Table 5.3, the percentage Liberal varies hm47 percent shows no relationship with household income. Conservative Jews are more to 63 percent and the Conservative, from 8 percent to 20 percent. likely to be Conservative (politically) (16 percent) than are Reform Jews Contributing to the fact that Jews are perceived as Liberal Democrats is that (10 percent). Respondents in in-mamed households (10 percent) are less Jews are significantly more likely to be Liberal (by 56 percent to 27 percent), likely to be Conservative than are respondents in intermamed households much less likely to be Moderate (by 21 percent to 37 percent), and much less (17 percent). Since it is Jews in intermarried households who are least likely to likely to be Conservative (by 22 percent to 36 percent) than are all Americans. be involved in Jewish causes and most likely not to raise Jewish children, this Again, using the data from the Washington Jewish community study17 allows finding also suggests that the percentage Conservative will not change in the further examination of the relationship between demographics and political future. ideology. Overall, 52 percent of Jews in Washington are Liberal. This percent- No difference is seen in the percentage Conservative between member and age is much higher for females (60 percent) than for males (44 percent). Fifty- non-member households and the percentage Conservative among local Jewish four percent of respondents in households with children are Liberal, a Federation donors in the past year is no different from the overall percentage percentage not significantly different from the overall percentage. To the extent (1 1 percent). that children follow their parents politically, this would suggest that the percent- Thus, none of the relationships between demographics and political party and age Liberal will maintain itself in the future. No variation is seen in the percent- political ideology suggest that any significant change in the political orientation age Liberal by household income. Conservative Jews (47 percent) identify as of American Jews can be expected in the future. 102 I.M. Sheskin Table 5.4 Political party and political ideology of Washington Jews

Category Percentage (96) Liberal Republican Moderate Republican Conservative Republican Liberal Democrat Moderate Democrat Conservative Democrat Other Liberal Independent Moderate Independent Conservative Independent Total

Source: Sheskin, I.M. (2004) The Jewish Communify Study of Greater Washington. Main Report. Rockville, MD: The Kaplan Foundation (available at www.jewishdatabank.org).Chapter 16, page 20.

Perhaps as important, as shown by Table 5.4 for data from Washington, is a recognition that only 44 percent of Jews (41 percent nationally) identify as Liberal Democrats. Most Jewish communal leaders, when speaking for the Jewish community, generally speak from a Liberal Democrat point of view. Thus, Jewish leaders may not always be reflecting the feelings of large numbers of Jews. Note that in Washington, another 22 percent (9 percent nationally) identify as Moderate and Democrat. Maintaining strong relationships between Israelis and American Jews suggests that it would behoove Israeli spokespersons to study these results. Israeli spokespersons should also recognize that appealing to Americans in general may imply taking a different tack politically than appealing specifically to American Jews.''

Part 111: attitudes of American Jews to Israel Table 5.5 examines four statements read to the more Jewishly-connected respon- dents from the 2000 National Jewish Population Survey. (These respondents repre- sent the 4.3 million of the 5.2 million Jews estimated by NJPS 2000 who responded that their religion is Jewish.) The responses indicate that large percentages of American Jews do see Israel as both important and connected to American Jewry. Only 14 percent disagree with the statement that Israel isthe spiritual center of the Jewish people and only 10 percent disagree that Israel still needs the financial support of American Jews. On the other hand, more than 25 percent of Jews do not agree that Jews in the United States and Israel share a common destiny. That American Jews follow the situation in Israel is shown by the fact that 37 percent of respondents say they are very familiar with the current social and political situation in Israel and 5 1 percent are somewhat familiar. Only 9 percent are not very familiar and 3 percent are not at all familiar (Table 5.5). - .^ -.-- -.. - - - - .. ------*.-.-*---.-, -.A- percentage of households in which a member has visited Israel varies from over trips to Israel and building Jewish identity in the United States. As stated above, one-third in Las Vegas, Orlando, St. Petersburg, Richmond, Wilmington, and local Jewish community studies show a strong correlation between visits to Jacksonville to 55-62 percent in West Palm Beach, Sarasota, Detroit, Los Israel and Jewish behaviors. These results should be communicated to potential Angeles, South Palm Beach, Bergen, and Miami. These same studies show that donors to programs that encourage Israel travel. Clearly, travel of Americans, the vast majority of households, including many highly assimilated households, and particularly American Jews, can act to connect more Americans to Israel in either are planning to send their teenagers to Israel or will seriously investigate positive ways that will enhance the US-Israel relationship. sending their teenagers to Israel. Also of importance, is that visits to Israel by an adult in the household, particularly on a trip sponsored by a Jewish organization, Jewish Federation, or Summary and conclusions synagogue, are shown to be positively correlated with levels of religious practice, The United States and Israel have had a special relationship that is based upon membership, philanthropy, and other measures of Jewish identity. While cause common values. American support for a Jewish state in the Middle East is not of and effect cannot be attributed to this relationship, strong evidence exists that recent vintage; rather, a longer-term relationship is extanL2' Almost all polls visits to Israel, such as trips sponsored by (which had brought show that significant United States support for Israel derives, in part, from more than 120,000 young Jews to Israel by Spring 2007) and other groups, are support from all Americans, not just American Jews. A poll released in May essential to developing a strong relationship between American Jews and Israel 2007 showed that American public support for Israel was at a five-year high.22In and in assuring the continuation of a strong American Jewish community. this same poll, 66 percent of Americans rated their feeling toward Israel as 106 Z.M.Sheskin American Jewish demography 107 'warm' or 'very favorable.' Sixty-five percent indicated that they supported 3 B.A. Kosmin, et al., Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey Israel, while only 10 percent indicated support for the Pale~tinians.~~ (New York: Council of Jewish Federations, 1991). While there is general support for Israel within the United States, American 4 L. Kotler-Berkowitz, S.M. Cohen, J. Ament, V. Klaff, F. Mott, and D. Peckerman, Strength, Challenge and Diversity in the American Jewish Population (New York: Jews are the most likely group to be involved in active political support. The United Jewish Communities, 2003). question addressed in this chapter is the extent to which changing American 5 LM. Sheskin, and A. Dashefsky, 'Jewish Population of the United States, 2006,' in Jewish demographics are likely to affect the ability and willingness of the Amer- American Jewish Year Book 2006, volume 106 (New York: The American Jewish ican Jewish community to influence the US-Israel relationship. Concerns have Committee, 2006). Available online at www.jewishdatabank.org. been raised by some in the American Jewish community about the continued 6 Ibid. 7 For a full discussion of the reasons for the differences between the NJPS 2000 and the ability of the community to impact the American political agenda, because of AJYB estimates, see S. DellaPergola, 'Was it the Demography? A Reassessment of the perception that the Jewish population is small, shrinking, aging, and highly US Jewish Population Estimates, 1945-2001,' Contemporary Jewry, 2005, vol. 25, assimilated. The available data lead to the following conclusions: pp. 85-131; I.M. Sheskin, 'Four Questions about American Jewish Demography,' Jewish Political Studies Review, spring 2008, vol. 20, nos 1 and 2, pp. 2342. While there is no agreement on the number of Jews in the US, or whether 8 L. Saxe, E. Tighe, B. Phillips, and C. Kadushin, Reconsidering the Size and 1 Characteristics of the American Jewish Population: New Estimates of a Larger and that number is increasing or decreasing, it probably matters little in the More Diverse Community (Boston: Steinhardt Social Research ability of American Jews to influence the American political system. Institute, 2007). 2 With most elections being decided by 1-5 percentage points, even a small 9 R. Nadeau, R.G. Niemi, and J. Levine, 'Innumeracy About Minority Populations,' minority can influence an election, particularly in states with somewhat The Public Opinion Quarterly, Fall 1993, vol. 57, no. 3, pp. 33247. larger percentages of Jews. 10 S. DellaPergola, 'World Jewish Population, 2006,' in American Jewish Year Book 2006, volume 106 (New York: The American Jewish Committee, 2006), pp. 599601. 3 While the Jewish population has undergone a major geographic shift from 11 I.M. Sheskin, Geographic Differences Among American Jews, United Jewish the Northeast and Midwest to the South and the West, electoral votes have Communities Series on the National Jewish Population Survey 200041, Report done the same, allowing Jews to maintain their influence in presidential Number 8,2005. Available online at www.ujc.org/NJPS. elections. Jews continue to concentrate in the most populous states with the 12 LM. Sheskin, The Jewish Community Study of Sun Antonio, Main Report (San most electoral votes. Within these most populous states, Jews tend to con- Antonio: The Jewish Federation of San Antonio, 2007), Ch. 6, pp. 85-7. Available online at www.jewishdatabank.org. centrate in a small number of metropolitan areas, making it possible to elect 13 S. DellaPergola, 'World Jewish Population, 2006,' in American Jewish Year Book an out-of-proportion number of Jewish candidates. Also, it is apparent that 2006, volume 106 (New York: The American Jewish Committee, 2006), p. 560. non-Jews are willing to vote for Jewish candidates. 14 I.M. Sheskin, Geographic Differences Among American Jews, United Jewish 4 Jews are most likely to be Liberal Democrats, but are far from exclusively Communities Series on the National Jewish Population Survey 200041, Report so. This finding is unlikely to change over the next generation. Nationwide, Number 8,2005, p. 7. Available online at www.ujc.org/NJPS. 15 Available online at www. jchq.org, the Republican Jewish Coalition web site. younger Jews are not more likely to be Republican, although such is the 16 LM. Sheskin, The Jewish Community Study of Greater Washington, Main Report case in some local Jewish communities. Nationally and in some Jewish (Rockville, MD: The Kaplan Foundation, 2004), Ch. 16. Available online at communities, Orthodox Jews are more likely to be Republican. www.jewishdatabank.org. 5 Attachment to Israel by American Jews continues to be significant. Large 17 Ibid. percentages of American Jews have visited Israel. Attachments of younger 18 L. Kotler-Berkowitz, 'Ethnicity and Political Behavior Among American Jews: Find- ings from the National Jewish Population Survey 200CL01,' Contemporary Jewry, Jews to Israel are not as strong as attachments of older Jews. 2005, vol. 25, pp. 132-57. For fhrther analysis of the relationship between various aspects of Jewish ethnicity and political party and political ideology, see Kotler- The major conclusion from this analysis is that even if the US Jewish commun- Berkowitz. ity shrinks and becomes more assimilated, as long as a core group of dedicated 19 LM. Sheskin, The Jewish Community Study of Sun Antonio, Main Report (San individuals in key states continue to be active, the part of the US-Israel relation- Antonio: The Jewish Federation of San Antonio, 2007), Ch. 11, pp. 19-20. Available online at www.jewishdatabank.org. ship dependent upon Jewish support will continue. 20 Ibid., Ch. 15. 21 M.A. Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East: 1776 to the Notes Present (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007). 22 S.C. Frenkel, 'US Support for Israel at All-time High,' Jerusalem Post, 9 May 2007, 1 The reports from these studies are available online at www.jewishdatabank.org. p. 2; see also E. Gilboa, 'The Public Dimension of US-Israel Relations: A Compara- 2 J. Perlman, The American Jewish Committeee's Annual Opinion Surveys: An Assess- tive Analysis,' in this volume. ment of Sample Quality (Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: The Levy Economics Institute 23 For general trends in support for Israel see the chapter by E. Gilboa, 'The Public of Bard College, 2007). Dimension of US-Israel Relations: A Comparative Analysis,' in this volume.