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REFORMING REPRESSIVE STATE APPARATUS – THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE Reforming Repressive State Apparatus – The Central European Experience Published by the People in Need with the support of the International Visegrad Fund, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, and the Opens Society Institute Prague 2008 Printed by KPR Printing House ISBN 978–80–86961–47–7 (English version) Editors: Igor Blazevic, Scott Hudson English translation: Mark Alexander, Robin Cassling; Easytalk Agency Acknowledgements In June 2007, People in Need (CZ), in cooperation with its partners at the Pontis Foundation (SK), the Polish Helsinki Committee (PL) and the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HU), staged a seminar called: “Reforming Repressive State Apparatus – The Central European Experience” under the auspices of the Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Karel Schwarzenberg. The seminar was organized with the support of the International Visegrad Fund, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, and the Opens Society Institute’s “East East Program.” People came from across Central Europe to this seminar, as well as members from the civil society in several democracy assistance target countries such as Belarus, Moldavia, Georgia, Ukraine, Serbia, and Burma. This publication contains the presentations that were given at the seminar so that it could be studied, analyzed and used by those in attendance and those who were unable to make it. Table of content Introduction 7 Igor Blažević Opening Panel: Reform and Lustration, Discontinuity and Continuity 11 Steering Between Legitimacy and Professionalism 12 Jiří Schneider The Challenge of Judging People by the Previous Regime’s Files 14 Ján Čárnogurský The Czech Experience: the State Security’s Dissolution and the Lustration Law 17 Jan Ruml Why the Normative Order is the Priority, not Economics 22 Vojtěch Cepl The Hungarian Experience: Failing to Make Accountability Happen 25 Ferenc Koszeg Workshop 1: Dismantling or Reforming the Intelligence Services 29 Have We Succeeded? 30 Jaroslav Spurný Starting from Scratch 32 Oldřich Černý Overcoming Identity Crisis through New Challenges 34 Juraj Kohutiar Make Parliamentary Control Meaningful 37 Andor Šándor Turbulent Developments in Slovakia after the Split 40 Ivan Šimko Workshop 2: Reforming the Interior Ministry and the Police 45 Main challenges: Political Interference and Corruption 46 Milan Žitný Police: a Protected Island of Communist Heritage 49 Ferenc Koszeg Police Reform Still a Long Way to Go 55 Jan Ruml The Slovak Case 59 Ivan Šimko Workshop 3: Archives 63 The Slovak Institute of National Memory 64 Miroslav Lehký What Happened to the Secret Police Archives in Poland 67 Zbigniew Nawrocki Ongoing Controversies with the Polish Archives 71 Irena Lasota The Fate of the Former GDR’s Archives 74 Tomáš Vilímek The Importance of Founding the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes 78 Pavel Žáček Workshop 4: Reforming the Army 83 The Effect of International Developments 84 Ivan Gabal NATO Membership as a Driving Force for Reform 86 Bánk L. Boros Transforming an Obsolete Colossus into a Modern Army 90 Stanislav Koziej Establishing Civilian and Democratic Control over the Army 93 Ivo Samson Short Sighted Planning and Long-Term Consequences 97 Jiří Šedivý Introduction 7 Igor Blažević, People in Need Every country that has made the transition to democracy from some form of INTRODUCTION authoritarianism has had to figure out what to do with the repressive apparatus that was left behind when the former regime crumbled. Following the democratic Velvet Revolutions that spread across Central Europe in 1989, each of the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) has had to determine what the best course of action would be for reforming the inherited armies, interior ministries, police units and intelligence services, so that they could become institutions that benefited a democratic state rather than propped up a single party or strongman. Even though nearly 20 years have passed, there are debates that have continued about how these reforms were handled in each of these respective countries. It may still be too early to pass historical judgment over what was done, but that does not mean that meaningful lessons can’t be learned from analyzing and comparing what was done and what the outcomes have been like in these countries that experienced such radical transformations at the end of the Cold War. The “Reforming Repressive State Apparatus – The Central European Experience” seminar was structured around specific topics connected to reform: Lustration, Intelligence Services, Interior Ministries, Archives and Armies. Each theme touched upon one of the complex areas that needed to be transformed by outlining what was done, what wasn’t and how things look in retrospect. Naturally, there are times where these topics overlapped, especially when you look more closely at the experiences of each individual country. As a result, try and take each section as part of a whole, rather than as a singular symptom that has been pulled out for scientific research. A prestigious group of politicians, journalists and academics have been brought together so that those presenting and in attendance could assess the record of what took place in Central Europe since the Iron Curtain fell. What had worked? What had failed? What opportunities had been missed? How much continuity do institutions need? Not only did these questions help to shed light on how far things had come in this corner of the world, but they also helped to generate useful recommendations and insights for pro-democracy activists in countries either in the earlier stages of transformation or trying to cast off an authoritarian regime. Opening Panel: Reform and Lustration, Discontinuity and Continuity 8 By the end of 1989, decades of Soviet power over Central Europe seemingly evaporated over a matter of weeks. Dissidents, ex-political prisoners, and human rights activists went practically overnight from smuggling samizdat and writing manifestos to being thrust into political power. These former ‘enemies of the state’ were now put in charge of running the government and transforming the institutions that had previously oppressed them and their fellow countrymen. However, removing the leaders from INTRODUCTION power would end up seeming relatively easy when compared with dealing with the mess that they ended up leaving behind. By taking over the state’s indoctrinated bureaucracy, the new democratic leaders were forced to deal with what to do with the personnel and structures that had been in place for decades. What should be done with them? Who was worth keeping and who was a threat? Which institutions should be consigned to the dustbin of history and which ones were essential to the functions of a modern state. Which was more important: continuity or discontinuity for establishing a legitimate and effective governmental institution? Could the state’s repressive apparatus be reformed or dismantled? The opening plenary addressed these questions by taking a cursory look at the reforms that were made in general and at the various lustration laws that were passed to deal with some of these complex issues. Czechoslovakia passed its first lustration law in October 1991, followed by other countries in the region, including Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria, etc. However, the topic has remained controversial for ethical, practical and judicial reasons. Has the concept of lustrations passed the test of time? Is lustration, like democracy, always imperfect, but at the same time the best tool among those available for blocking the previous regime from re-gaining power? Workshop 1: Dismantling or Reforming the Intelligence Services Authoritarian governments by nature use force as a means of maintaining order over their society. As a result, the secret police, along with a tangled web of collaborators and informants, has often served as the main tool of repression for these regimes. Governments in general are expected to maintain order and stability as a means for fulfilling their half of the social contract, but at what cost. In the former Soviet Bloc, the various regimes spent far more time policing its own citizens, rather than protecting them from the various external threats. In many cases, this was usually done under the name of gathering “intelligence.” Apparently, history is not without its sense of irony. After 1989, the democratic leadership in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland followed different paths. From today’s perspective, who made the right choice? Did the reforms in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia go far enough? Or they have gone too far? What role did the secret service networks play in Mečiar’s consolidation of power in Slovakia? Did secret service networks facilitate in some way the return of the 9 former-communist parties to power in Poland and Hungary? Over time, new perspectives and questions have been realized about how the countries of Central Europe went about reforming or completely dismantling the intelligence services that had existed under communism. Should these reforms have happened immediately after the democratic breakthrough? Would it have been INTRODUCTION better, let alone possible, for it to wait? Was the reform or dismantling of the secret services driven more by the need for justice, than on the need to develop a culture of constitutionality, law and order and efficiency? Has there been enough parliamentary oversight over intelligence agencies? What