The Network Analysis of Co ‑Voting Strategies of the Parliamentary Party
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The Disintegration of Czech Parliamentary Parties: The Network Analysis of Co ‑Voting Strategies of the Parliamentary Party ‘Renegades’ 1 DUŠAN BRABEC Politics in Central Europe (ISSN: 1801-3422) Vol. 17, No. 2 DOI: 10.2478/pce-2021-0011 Abstract: The main objective of this study is to capture and analyse the dynamics of the co ‑voting ties among the members of the parliamentary political party groups in two specific Czech cases, where some members of these parliamentary groups left their former party and joined new political entities. The study is of a quantitative nature, but the main findings are connected to qualitative insights as well. Network approach and methods were used for the analysis. The emphasis was put on the detection of possible rivalling communities in the constructed network of co ‑voting between depu‑ ties belonging to the analysed parliamentary party groups in respective periods. The co ‑voting was treated as a proxy indicator of possible relationship indicating either co ‑operation or rivalry between the deputies belonging to the political party suffering from an internal crisis. The primary outcome of the study was the identification of the co ‑voting strategies and dynamics of the co ‑voting between deputies who stayed in their former party, and renegades who switched. Keywords: legislative networks; the internal crisis of political party; Czech political parties; exit, voice, loyalty, neglect; co ‑voting. 1 This study was supported by the Charles University Research Programme ‘Progres’ Q18 – Social Sciences: From Multidisciplinarity to Interdisciplinarity. The author would like to thank Lukáš Hájek for the initial data preparation. POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 17 (2021) 2 251 Introduction Political parties often suffer from an internal crisis. Such crises can be devas‑ tating, especially when the crisis hits a parliamentary party that is part of the governmental coalition. The main question that this study wants to address is what effect the internal crisis has on members of the party when it comes to voting in the parliament. Especially those party members who were displeased with the party’s situation and consequently left their former party and founded a new one – were they loyal and did they vote cohesively with their other col‑ leagues before the crisis escalated in full? Did they show any disapproval with the party situation before the party split during the parliamentary voting? And how did their co ‑voting with former party colleagues look after they established a new political platform or party? These are the main questions that this study aims to address. For the purpose of this study, I have chosen two specific cases from Czech political history after the end of the communists’ era in 1989. In both analysed cases, (the split of Civic Democrats in 1997 and the disintegration of Public Affairs in 2012) the investigated parties suffered from several severe internal crises that escalated in the middle of the parliamentary term. Both these par‑ ties were part of a ruling coalition, and their split had a major impact on the government. The split of Civic Democrats in autumn 1997 caused the fall of the government and led to premature parliamentary elections that took place six months after the party split. In the case of the disintegration of the political party Public Affairs, the government was able to survive with the support of the Pub‑ lic Affairs’ ‘renegades’ who left the party and founded a new political platform LIDEM (Liberal Democrats). However, this government did not survive much longer as it suffered from other scandals and internal problems of its coalition members. The role of the government ended in July 2013, only a year after the dissolution of Public Affairs. It should be stressed that even though the selected cases have in common the governmental position of the analysed parties, which were undergoing internal crises, there are several things that were specific for each party. The Civic Democratic Party was a successor of the Civic Forum – a political move‑ ment which was the main opponent of the communists’ regime that emerged during the Velvet Revolution (Kopeček 2010: 200). Whereas Public Affairs was a small local party reshaped into a business ‑firm party (Havlík – Hloušek, 2014: 553). Moreover, the Civic Democratic Party and Public Affairs reached different levels of institutionalisation, they differed in terms of member numbers or in experience with previous parliamentary engagement. The study will focus on the voting behaviour of the deputies who were mem‑ bers of these parties (Civic Democratic Party and Public Affairs) in their respec‑ tive parliamentary terms. Emphasis will be put on the co‑voting rates of those 252 The Disintegration of Czech Parliamentary Parties Dušan Brabec deputies who left their party and joined new political platforms or parties and their former colleagues. The goal is to investigate voting strategies of the depu‑ ties who left their former party (in the study also called ‘renegades’). The theoretical part of this paper provides the underlying rationale behind the possible scenarios of voting behaviour that the deputies that have left the party could have chosen. The theoretical framework draws heavily from the EVLN (exit, voice, loyalty, neglect) models connected to the theory of party unity also explained in the theoretical section of the paper. From the methodo‑ logical perspective, the study relies on the legislative networks approaches and methods. These methods were explicitly chosen due to the relational nature of the co ‑voting behaviour between the MPs. The study also draws from the previ‑ ous papers of the author (Brabec 2019; 2020), who focused on the co ‑voting behaviour of the Czech MPs in different periods and under different setups. The parliamentary roll ‑calls were fundamental for the quantitative analysis. The study also connects its quantitative results with the qualitative insights about the dynamic of the crisis that escalated into the dissolution of investigated political parties and tries to investigate which of the suggested scenarios of renegades’ voting behaviour had more dramatic effects. Theoretical background Party Unity The study aims to investigate the dynamics of co ‑voting behaviour of those deputies who were members of parliamentary political party group that split during the ongoing parliamentary term. The fact that these political parties split during an ongoing parliamentary term suggests that changes in the co‑ ‑voting behaviour of those MPs who were dissatisfied with the situation or the politics of the political party for which they were elected could be present. This assumption builds on the theory of party unity elaborated by Ozbundun (1970) and later revised by Hazan (2003). According to the theory of party unity – every political party and its mem‑ bers should pursue uniform acting (at least to some extent), especially when it comes to the voting in the parliament. This argument stems from the underlying concept of ideological cohesion based on the assumption that party colleagues tend to vote together because of their shared views and opinions and concept of party discipline. This suggests that the political party or its leaderships pres‑ sures the members of the party to act as the party requires (Hazan 2003: 3–4). These theoretical frameworks were already explored by other researchers, such as Linek and Lacina (2011), Linek and Rakušanová (2002) and Dvořák (2017) who proved that the members of Czech political parties tend to act cohe‑ sively when it comes to voting in the parliament. However, most interestingly, POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 17 (2021) 2 253 Dvořák (2017) points out that the cohesion of the political party decreases when the party suffers from an internal crisis. Especially Dvořák’s (2017) findings are the key incentives for further analysis of the co‑voting behaviour of members of political party groups that split during the parliamentary term. Compared to the previous research on party unity of the Czech political parties, this study adds another dimension – the identifica‑ tion of specific subgroups inside parliamentary party groups that emerged from dissatisfied deputies. But what was the driving mechanism of the decision to leave the party? Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect Model According to the theory of exit, voice and loyalty presented by Albert O. Hirschman (1970), dissatisfied members of an organisation have several op‑ tions (or strategies) they can choose from. The concept of exit represents an active strategy where a dissatisfied member of the organisation decides to leave instantaneously or thinks about leaving (Rusbult et al. 1988). Voice is also an active strategy where a dissatisfied member of the organisation chooses to remain in the organisation while trying to change the situation he/she is displeased with either with a positive (Luchak 2003) or negative (Turnley – Feldman 1999) attitude. The concept of loyalty could be labelled as a factor (or passive strategy) which is taken by those members of the organisation who wait and support the organisation until the situation is improved (Rusbult et al. 1988; McShane 2006). Another possible strategy of neglect was later added by Rusbult (1982) and her colleagues. Neglect as well as the exit is labelled as a destructive strategy, and similarly to loyalty, it is also considered as a pas‑ sive one. Those members who choose the neglect strategy doesn’t positively contribute to the improvement of the situation in the organisation and tend to put less effort towards the activities that they would do under normal cir‑ cumstances – such as less working effort, reduced productivity etc (Rusbult – Zembrodt – Gunn 1982; Farrell 1983).2 As Withey and Cooper (1989: 522) point out, the concepts represented by the EVLN (exit, voice, loyalty, neglect) model are empirically and conceptually distinguishable, but the boundaries between them may be imprecise.3 2 A study of Aravopoulou, Mitsakis and Malone (2017) provides an extensive literature review on the topic of the exit, voice, loyalty and neglect model, as well as it points out limitations and challenges connected to this model.