THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty

of

California State University, Hayward

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts in History

By

Peter R. Perry

June, 1991 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE LABOR MOVru~ENT

By

Peter R. Perry

Approved: Date:

~J ~. /qCj/

:2 \ ~~ \CUL-­ \

ii PREFACE

Theodore Roosevelt was an important Progressive symbol. Many saw him as the quintesser!tial reformer of his age. An inherent conflict between the desire for humanitarian social reforms and the need for orderly change sometimes left Progressives at odds with labor.

Roosevelt's stand on labor issues perhaps best exemplifies this paradox. At times he championed workers' struggles for decent working conditions. At others, he quickly dispatched federal troops to quell labor disturbances.

I will examine thre~ separate incidents that help reveal Roosevel t's attitude toward the workers' movement.

The anthracite coal .strike of 1902 shows Roosevelt at his best. In that crisis, he seized the initiative by bringing )abor and capital to the negotiating table. He proved to be a successful mediator in what contemporaries saw as the most significant strike in American history.

Scarcely one year later, Roosevelt rejected labor's appeals and effectively ended the closed shop in the Government Printing Office. At the same time, he still defended the union's right to exist in the government service. Finally, the Goldfield miners strike of 1907­

1908 offers a less flattering view of the President.

111 Here, Roosevelt quickly dispatched federal troops to maintain order at the request of the Nevada governor before determining whether they were actually needed. The troops strengthened the operators' hand. The strike was broken and the miners union was destroyed in the process.

It is easy to see that Roosevelt had an ambiguous relationship with labor. Despite his disparate stands, I will attempt to demonstrate that there was an ideological consistency to Roosevelt's actions. He supported a worker's right to join a union and hoped that employers would recognize that unions could play a responsible role in society. To him, this was merely a matter of justice and fair play. However, Roosevelt could never tolerate unions that challenged his authority. Like many other

Progressives, the President feared militant sectors of the labor movement. He was convinced that they were violence­ prone and could never act in a responsible manner. This conviction guided Roosevelt's actions, since the maintenance of order was paramount to the President.

Perhaps Roosevelt's comment to Labor Commissioner Carroll wright expresses this thought best: liThe first principle of civilization is the preservation of order. without order there can be no liberty and the foe of order is the foe of liberty."1 Roosevelt's activities during the

iv anthracite strike, the Government Printing Office dispute, and the Goldfield conflict need to be seen in this context. Only then can we truly understand the paradoxica 1 relationship between Rooseve 1t and the labor movement.

v TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE: iii

CHAPTER ONE: THE ANTHRACITE COAL STRIKE OF 1902 1 CHAPTER TWO: THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

AND THE OPEN SHOP 26 CHAPTER THREE: THE GOLDFIELD STRIKE, 1907-1908 49

CONCLUSION: 72

NOTES: 77

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY: 91

vi CHAPTER 1

THE ANTHRACITE COAL STRIKE OF 1902

The origins of the 1902 coal strike can be traced to the settlement of a dispute in the anthracite mines two yearsear1i er. In the fall of 1900, one hundred thousand miners walked off their jobs in the anthracite regions of

Pennsylvania and Wyoming. This was unsettling news to

Senator Mark Hanna. He feared the strike would jeopardize

McKinley's re-election campaign. Hanna worked feverishly to settle tne dispute before November, using the good offices of the National Civic Federation (NCF). Dangling the spectre of a William Jennings Bryan presidency, which presumably would be hostile to business, in front of a reluctant group of coal operators, Hanna convinced them to grant some concessions in exchange for a temporary labor peace. The miners receiveu a ten percent wage increase, a promise of arbitration on local issues, and other nominal improvements. However, the operators refused to recognize the miners' union, the United Mine Workers (UMW).l The crlsis was averted, but the underlying problem remained unsolved.

Seventy to eighty percent of all anthracite fields were owned by six railroad corporations. 2 To a man, the presidents of these companies were in no mood for further

1 2 compromise when the agreement expired in April, 1901. The

UMW looked forward to the expiration as an opportunity to gain further improvements in working conditions and win formal recognition from the operators. They had reason to be confident. During the strike, their ranks had swelled from 8,000 to 100,000 members. 3 UMW president John

Mitchell also hoped that his ties with Hanna and the NCF would payoff again. But the repeated efforts of Mitchell and the NCF to arrange negotiations with the operators failed. The operators consented only to extending the wage scale for another year but adamantly refused to deal directly with the union. The stage was set for a showdown in 1902.

In March, 1902 the union attempted again to meet with the operators to negotiate over wages and conditions.

It demanded a twenty percent pay increase, an eight-hour day, and universal recognition of 2,240 pounds of coal as a basis for pay.4 (Miners were paid based on tons of coal mined, but the operators had different definitions of what constituted a ton of coal). Hanna stepped in to finally secure a meeting between Mitchell and the operators, but the result was merely a thirty-day cooling-off period.

The UMW called a meeting in Hazelton, Pennsylvania on May

14, 1902 to determine whether to strike. Mitchell did not want the miners to go out. He feared a strike would be 3 long, hard and difficult to Wln. He also hoped that:

...the operators would see the folly of their course and make concessions, which woul d have preserved the mineworkers and their famil ies, as well as the general public, f~om the hardships and horrors of a protracted conflict.

But Mitchell failed to convince the rank and file, who no longer shared his optimism that the operators would come to their senses. They voted to strike on May 15 if an agreement was not reached. Mitchell and Hanna tried desperately to make a breakthrough. The UMW reduced its wage demand to ten percent, its work day to nine hours, and offered to submit all remaining issues to arbitration. 6 Such flexibility had absolutely no effect on the operators. They were supremely confident that a strike would be easily crushed, and they looked forward to the opportunity to break the union.

Theodore Roosevelt, ascending to the presidency upon McKinley's assassination in September, 1901, observed the situation. There is no evidence in Rooseve 1t's personal papers to indicate any alarm at the onset of the strike. Further, newspaper reports carried no comments from the President about the dispute. Nevertheless, his speeches and writings from the period demonstrate that

Roosevelt hac many opinions on the proper relationship between labor and capital. His perspective was common to many middle class reformers of the time. He mistrusted 4 the very wealthy and feared the great masses. Great corporations, he thought, needed to behave in a more rational manner, reflecting a responsibility to the greater society. Roosevelt felt this was essential to stop the spread of socialism. Workers had legitimate rights, and one of them was to join unions. However, if unions were to occupy their rightful place in society, they must moderate their demands and avoid violence at all costs. Roosevelt often tended to place unions and business on the same plane, treating both as though they had similar power and responsibilities. For example, in a speech before Congress in 1902, he specified the roles of labor and capital in the following manner:

Each must refrain from arbitrary or tyrannous inter­ ference with the rights of others. Organized capital and organized labor alike should remember that in the long run the interest of each must be brought into harmony with the interest of the general public; and the conduct of each must conform to the fundamental rules of obedience to the law, of individu~l freedom, and of justice and fair dealing toward all.

Roosevelt was serious about these guidelines. During the course of the 1902 anthracite strike, he would come to

judge the combatants by applying this framework.

John Mitchell was a labor leader who fit beauti- fully into the Rooseveltian mold. While he wanted workers to have a more equitable share of the pie, Mitchell never challenged existing social relations. He saw labor and capital as mutually dependent partners in production. fhe 5

UMW leader wanted little more than formal recognition for

his union and yearly collective bargaining arrangements

with the operators. 8 He prefered the quiet methods of the

NCF to the raucous tactics of labor militants. He stood

in stark contrast to the radical Big Bill Haywood of the

Western Federation of Miners, who called for revolutionary

change In the system of production. 9

On the other hand, the operators came to represent

all the things Roosevelt detested in big business. They

were greedy, narrow-minded, and cared little how their

actions might affect the country. They consistently

rebuffed all of Mitchell's and the NCF's efforts to negotiate reasonable so I utions. Their condescension and

arrogance eventually isolated them from nearly the entire

nation and earned Roosevelt's wrath as well. Perhaps

their attitude can best be summed up by George F. Baer,

president of the Reading Railway System and chief spokes-

person for the operators. In a letter to Mitchell

rejecting one of his requests to negotiate, Baer wrote

bl untl y: "There cannot be two masters in the management

of business."IO The operators wanted no partnership in

production. Instead, they fought tooth and nail against

any reform, no matter now moderate.

The operators' obstinance drew fire from the press

as the strike grew near. The New York !i~~~, hardly a 6

pro-labor paper, had this to say:

Tne attitude of the anthracite mine operators is much to be regretted. From the inception of the trouble...they have behaved in a way to encourage the belief that they were desirous of having a strike and were ~1epared to do all in their power to bring it about.

In the same editorial, the Ti~es referred to Mitchell as a sound, conservative leader who would have acce?ted minimal concessions to avoid a strike. Even a journal as senteel as The Nation was reluctant to criticize Mitchell directly. Although it freely condemned the UMW rank and file as militant and irresponsible, the journal found it difficult to support openly the operators' stand. 12

However, the Ti~es seemed confused about the significance of the strike. On May 16, it wrote that " ...the most serious labor struggle in the history of the country is about to begin. II13 Three days later, it predicted an early collapse on the part of the miners, asserting the strike could last no more than thirty days.14 It is safe to say that few predicted a walkout that would last through summer and into the fall and a strike that would cause widespread fear about the coal supply. Rooseve 1t's attention to other matters in May of 1902 indicate that he gave little thought to such a possibility.

Three weeks into the strike, Roosevelt's attitude changed. The strike had not collapsed, and the chairman 7 of the New York Board of Trade, Oscar Straus, was callins for the President to appoint a commission to investi9ate and. arbitrate the dispute. IS Straus was a prominent member of the NCF, and his request reflected the continuins efforts of the organization to arrange an early settlement of the strike. Roosevelt responded by directing Labor Commissioner Carroll Wright to report on the struggle and propose solutions. Wright produced an even-handed document, citing profit concerns of the operators and injustices suffered by the miners. 16

Roosevelt then sent the report to Attorney General

PhilC\nder Knox, asking whether it should be made public.

Knox advised C\sainst publication and stated that the strike fell outside of the President's jurisdiction.

According to Knox, the President lacked the constitutional authority to intervene in a private dispute between labor and capital. The Attorney General apparently felt that publishing Wright's report might put pressure on the

President to intervene. Roosevelt was concerned about the strike but was not ready to act. He heeded Knox's advice, and for the time being, the report remained unpublished.17

The strike wore on, and Roosevelt C\gain turned his attention elsewhere. In July, Mitchell reluctantly convened a meetin9 to respond to a rank-and-file demand

A for a sympathy strike of bituminous miners. 'i ] 0 r kinsin 8 concert with nanna, the UMW leader succeeded in convincing the miners to develop a strike fund for anthracite workers as an alternative to walking out. It was well known that

Roosevel t abhorred sympathy strikes. Whi 1e Mitchell did not single out the President in his address at the meeting, he reminded his audience of the importance of maintaining public support: "The effect of such action would be to destroy confidence, to array in open hostility to our cause all forces of society, and to crystallize public sentiment in opposition to our movement.,,18

The press hailed Mitchell's role at the convention as a sign of maturity and responsibility in the labor movement. Interestinsly, Roosevelt remained aloof from t:1e fray even during the miners special convention.

Nothing can be found in his papers and he is not quoted in the press. Neverthe1ess, he couId not have been bl ind to

Mitchell's growing stature. As the strike continuea into

August, McCl ure 's Magaz ine publ i shea a glowinC} account of the union leader, praising him for " ...carrying the respect of both Wall Street and the mines.,,19 Meanwhile, the UNW's offer of binding arbitration remained on the tabl e, s ti11 refused by the operators.

By the end of July, the press began to show concern about the coal supply. After criticizing the miners for violence and the operators for being unwilling to settle, 9 the New York Times oot to the heart of the matter: "Not a ------' pound of coal is being raised, and the little surplus stock in the market is dwindling to the famine point.,,20

Roosevelt shared this fear, and during August, he finally took a more active interest in the strike. On August 21, he cabled Attorney General Knox, asking: "What is the reason we cannot proceed against the coal operators as being engaged in a trust? I ask it because it is a question continuall y asked of me. ,,21 Although Knox again counseled restraint, the cable indicates where both popular and Presidential sympathies lay. In a letter to

Q14ay several weeks later, Roosevelt revealed that he was trying to assess independently the miners' strength. Quay had led him to believe that the union would soon end the strike, but Mitchell told him that the miners remained firm and had no plans to return to work without an agreement. Roosevelt was frustrated with his sources of information. It appeared to him that the strike was not about to end. 22 The union held firm while the operators refused to budge. A short2ge crisis loomed, and the

President lunged uncertainly into the fray.

Al though Roosevel t finally sanctioned the release of Wrisht's report at the end of .Z\ugust, he directed that

Knox's recommendation of Presidential restraint be attached. This indicated that the President had grown 10

frustrated with the length of the strike but was still unclear about precisely what he could do to end it. The public, however, had its own ideas, and Roosevelt began to

feel pressure. People were fed up with the operators'

intransigence. As the strike continued through September, the horrors of an impending coal famine were discussed in both the streets and the press. The price of anthracite coal rose dramatically. Normally $5-$6 per ton, it had climbed to $15-$20 per ton in eastern cities. By the end of the month, coal was difficult to find at any price.

School openings were delayed. Smaller industrial plants either reduced operations or shut down entirely. In New

York City, pneumonia and other diseases were reported to be on the rise. 23

Roosevelt's papers reflect the growing intensity of the problem. He was besieged with calls, letters, and telegrams from associates, friends and the public at

large. A letter from a confidante, Republican Senator

Henry Cabot Lodge, perhaps best exemplifies the general mood:

The demand that the government take the coal fields is risinq louder all the time. It is a perilous cry. When cold weather comes it will be far worse. You have no power or authority of course -- that is the worst of it. Is there anything we can appear to do? Is there any form of pressure we can put on the opera­ tors who are driving on ruin? .. Why, sane, sensible conservative men are urging us to decla~e in our platform that the coal fields must be taken. 4 11

Roosevelt's frustration was evident his response to his

old friend: "There is nothing, so far as I have been able to figure out, which the national government has any power to do in the matter.,,25

During the last three days of September, Roosevelt

consulted with a number of advisors, one of whom was

Massachusetts Governor Winthrop Crane. :c:arlier in the

year, Crane had mediated in a strike of Teamsters in

Boston. By pulling both sides to the table, Crane's

persona 1 intervention provided the impetus for a

negotiated settlement. Crane's experience provided

Roosevelt with a format for dealing with the anthracite dispute. 26 Though the President remained uneasy about his

jurisdiction in the matter, the time had come for concrete

efforts to avert a crisis.

When Roosevelt brought together the opposing forces

in the famous meeting of October 3, it was the first time

in American history that a President had attempted to

mediate a dispute between labor and capital. Wright's

report had convinced him that valid issues existed that

deserved arbitration. Risht and wrong were not key issues

for Roosevelt at this stage. His task was to restore

order and get ~ining restarted in the coal fields. Roosevelt made his position clear at the outset of the

conference. He could not impose a settlement. He would 12 not sit to hear each side present its claims. Instead, he appealed to both parties to put the needs of the country ahead of their own desires.27

Roosevelt's obsession with order was already eviaent. This theme cropped up in many of his speeches and writings from the period. His letters to friends in late September and October indicate that he feared not only a coal famine, but worried that it would cause a general strike. To Roosevelt, that represented a catas­ trophe just short of civil war. 28

But if Roosevelt was concerned only with order, he would have merely acted as past presidents had done in previous labor disputes. After all, Cleveland had sent troops to crush the Pullman strike in 1894. McKinley had done likewise in a miners' strike in Idaho five years later. Yet Roosevelt chose a different path. Be was astute enough to realize that public support for the miners continued to grow. But he also genuinely struggled to find a solution that would promote long-term stability

In the mines. As he wrote to Lodge:

Most of my correspondents wish me to try something violent and impossible. A minor but a very influential part desire that I send troops at once without a shadoVl of warrant into the coal districts, or that I bring suit against the labor organization; the others demand that I bring suit against the operators, or that I under the law of eminent domain, or for the purpose of protecting the public health, seize their property, or appoint a receiver, or do something else that is wholly impossible. My great 13

concern is, of course, to break the famine; but I must not be drawn into any violent SZgP wnich would bring reaction and disaster afterward.

Roosevelt was not the type ever to completely abandon the option of force. However, he clearly wished to avoid it in this situation.

The October 3 conference was an eye-opener for the President. The coal barons heaped scorn upon Mitchell and demanded that Roosevelt send federal troops to end the strike once and for all. Mitchell calmly reiterated his request for arbitration and stated his full confidence in the President to choose an objective panel. Roosevelt was stunned by the operators' arrogance and impressed with

Mitchell's civil manner and flexible approach. He wondered for the first time whether the employers were primarily responsible for the strike. 3D

Although the conference failed to produce a settle- ment, it set into motion a series of meetings and negotiations over the next two weeks that eventually led to a resolution of the crisis. Meanwhile, Roosevelt had captured the public imagination by bringing the union and the operators to Washington. The New York Times of

October 4 reported the public's fascination:

The President's house had not been the scene of such excitement since the days and nishts of the Spanish War. All day from early this morning there was a crowd in Lafayette Place waiting for the result of the conference between the President and the coal presidents and John Mitchell of the United Miners. 14

The sidewalk in front of the temporary White House and for a hundred feet north and south of it was crowded during most of the day. Across the street along the park there was a big crowd peering up into the windows of the second story for hou in the effort to see the President and his visitors.31

Yet with that fascination came the responsibility to reach a settlement. Ironically, many who never conceived of a mediating role for the President in June or July now looked to him as the last hope in preventing a coal famine. The failure of the conference only escalated calls for Presidential action. There was no turning back.

In the days immediately following the conference,

Roosevelt remained unsure of his next step. By October 8, he was chafins at the bit. In a letter to Wright,

Roosevelt expressed his desire for a " ...constitutional amendment, conferring upon the United States the power of supervising and regulating all great corporations doing an interstate business."32 Without such authority, he supported Pennsylvania Governor Stone's move to callout state troops to offer protection to any miner who wished to return to work. He also added an interesting caveat: the State Legislature should examine the steps necessary to seize control of the mines from the operators. 33 He now felt urgent action was needed to end the impasse. If it meant offering protection to strike-breaking miners or removing control of the mines from the operators, so be it. Roosevelt's views had sharpened in a hurry. 15

From the operators' point of view, Stone's move failed miserably. They had guaranteed that armed protec­ tion would bring miners willingly back to work. The miners, however, remained off the job and vowed to continue their strike. The operators were now thoroughly isolated. The New York State Democratic Party convention called for nationalization of the mines. Representatives of 50 cities and 11 states met in Detroit on October 9 and demonstrated support for the miners. They called for the President to place the mines under federal receivership. Some Democrats even asked that Mitchell run for governor of Illinois. 34

Roosevelt finally decided to play his trump card.

He met with Knox and Secretary of War Elihu Root to lay out his plan. He would get Governor Stone to request federal assistance. Roosevelt then would send troops under the command of a trusted military leader answerable only to tne President. The coal fields would be seized and production would begin again. Simultaneously,

Roosevelt would appoint Labor Commissioner Wright to lead another panel to investigate the causes of the strike and lssue awards. Jurisdictional issues had now become secondary to Roosevelt. Reviewing his plan later with an advisor, the President wrote: "I do not know whether I would have had any precedents...but in my judgment it 16

would have been imperative to act, precedent or no precedent, and I was ready."35

Historians debate whether Roosevelt's plan was the key to settling the strike. Exactly how federal troops were going to mine coal remained unclear. Some scholars assert that the operators never even knew of the

President's ideas to seize the mines. Others say that

Roosevelt sent Root as an emissary to J.P. Morgan to alert him to the plan, with the expectation that the financial magnate would help bring the operators to their senses.

Roo t, howe v e r, den i edthat he dis c us sed Roo s eveIt's PI an with Morgan. 36

The evidence indicates, however, that the operators must have known about the plan. On October 9, the union newspaper, the UMW ~Q~~~~l, reported in detail on

Roosevelt's scheme to use federal troops to seize the mines. 37 If the union knew and saw fit to publicize the plan, the operators must have had similar knowledge. This prospect, coupled with the failure of Governor Stone's action, forced the operators to settle.

Morgan met with the operators and urged them to come to an agreement. On October 13, they submitted a plan for arbitration to Roosevelt. Not surprisingly, it had no place for any labor representation on the arbitra­ tion panel. Mitchell refused to accept a board without 17

any figures sympathetic to labor. Roosevelt thought

Mitchell's concerns were justified. Demons trating a creative flair, he succeeded in getting the operators to agree to an enlarged committee with a union man designated as an "eminent sociologist." Roosevelt described the f ina 1 negotiati ons with the operators in a hi larious letter to Lodge:

It took me about two hours before I at last grasped the fact that the mighty brains of these captains of industry had formulated the theory that they would rather have anarchy than tweedledum, but that if I used the word tweedledee they would hail it as meaning peace. In other words, that they had not the slightest objection to my appointing a labor man as 'an eminent sociologist " and adding Bishop Spalding on my own account, but they preferred to see the Red Commune come than to have me make Bishop Spalding or anyone else the "eminent sociologist" and add the labor man...}\nd accordingly, at this utterly unimpor­ tant price, we bid fair to come out of as dangerous a situation as I have ever dealt with. 38

Roosevelt's pragmatic approach to this last impasse succeeded in getting a panel that Mitchell could support with enthusiasm. The UMW accepted the proposal and the strike ended on October 15.

The settlement was hailed by many as a triumph for the President. The UMW succeeded where other unions before had failed. The pUblic's support for the miners helped generate a new admiration for labor organizations.

The Anthracite Coal Commission set up by the

President issued its rulings after conducting several 18 months of hearings. The awards were a mixed blessing for the union. The panel authorized a pay increase that averaged ten percent. It reduced working hours in most cases from ten to nine hours a day. It granted the operators an increase in the price of coal. Most importantly, it denied the UMW formal recognition as the miners' bargaining agent. Mitchell argued that the union had won ~~ fact~ recognition by virtue of its participa- tion in the Washington conference and the subsequent negotiations and hearings. Other UMW leaders bitterly disagreed. On this point, the Commission rulings sparked widespread debate within the labor movement.

Mitchell gave Roosevelt full credit for settling the strike. The New York Times also praised his negotiating skills and impartial stand. Even The Na tion recognized that Roosevelt had provided a nece s sary service to the country.39 The President proudly promoted the settlement in speeches across the country. He had secured two important planks for his re-election campaign in 1904: the Northern Securities case had provided him with the banner of trust control; the coal settlement would help promote him as a fighter for the legitimate rights of labor.

The significance of Roosevelt's role should not be understated. He broke precedent and established new 19 ground. For the first time, the President had called representatives of labor and capital to Washington in the midst of a critical dispute. For the first time, the federal government attempted to mediate the settlement of a labor conflict. An arbitration panel was set up with both sides pledged to accept the results. And the

President threatened to use federal troops to seize and operate a major industry. These were thoroughly novel prospects, to say the least. They implied, among other things, that justice might actually be on labor's side.

The government's traditional isolation in economic struggles had been challenged. It had now become a third force in relations between labor and capital. The impact is even more significant when one remembers the role played in labor disputes by Roosevelt's immediate predecessors. Had Roosevelt followed suit, the miners may well have faced hostile federal troops. To his credit,

Roosevelt recognized the needs and sentiments of the time.

He also displayed a talent for leadership that enabled him to weave his way through jurisdictional questions and chart a new course for the federal government, and he understood the impact of his actions. In the original draft of his statement to the October conference participants, Roosevelt wrote that " ...no precedent of

interference in strikes will be created. II He deleted that 20 comment from his final text. 40 He recognized that, at times, it would be necessary and proper for the government to intervene.

Historians disagree about the reasons behind Roose- velt's actions. Some feel that the President acted primarily to preserve the political fortunes of the

Republican Party and to stem the socialist threat. Others emphasize the danger of a coal famine. Still others feel that Roosevelt sensed a personal challenge to his authority from the operators. One prominent historian even wrote that Roosevelt acted in order to undercut

Hanna's presidential aspirations. Some popular writers credit Roosevelt's strong sense of justice and decisive leadership.41 Most of these arguments have some credibility.

Roosevelt's fear of socialism is well documented.

During the strike, correspondents expressed concern to the

President that the Socialists would profit from the crisis.42 Yet the Socialist Party played a limited role in the strike. It left the leadership of the struggle to

Mitchell and local UMW officials. The Party focused its efforts on distributing propaganda materials and organizing socialist locals in mining districts to prepare for upcomlng congressional elections. 43 Roosevelt's letters give no indication that the Socialist Party's 21 activities during the strike concerned him. The President's correspondence also shows that he resented the operators for their arrogant display at the

October conference. Roosevelt was not a man who took challenges to his authority lightly. The operators' attitude certainly made it easier for him to act against them. He ultimately felt that their actions were stupid and short-sighted. However, historians who emphasize this effectively belittle how Roosevelt struggled to find his bearings during the crisis. His letters, even to trusted friends, place more emphasis on the danger of a coal famine than on any personal vendetta against the operators. 44

Some feel that the danger of a coal famine was greatly exaggerated. There is evidence, for example, that bituminous coal remained in good supply.45 Yet, Roosevelt truly believed that a famine was imminent. The concern is everywhere in his letters beginning in late September.

His thoughts are best expressed in a note to Morgan representative Robert Bacon:

If when the severe weather comes on there is a coal famine I dread to think of the suffering, in parts of our great cities especially, and I fear there will be fuel riots of as bad a type as any bread riots we have ever seen...It is a dreadful thing to be brought face to face with the necessity of taking measures, however unavoidable, which will mean the death of men who have been maddened by want and suffering. I feel that 22

whatever I possibly can do to avert such a necessity I must do; and I must not cease in my effor-;s while even the slightest chance of success remains. 4

The state of the coal supply is certainly debatable. But there is no question that Roosevelt thought a famine was imminent and worked to prevent it.

It is difficult to understand the contention that

Roosevelt sought political advantage over Hanna. Although the press frequently referred to the Senator as a

Presidential candidate ln the 1904 election, he and

Roosevelt had developed a close working relationship, at

least on the coal issue. Hanna participated in meetings with the President and served as Roosevelt's emissary in negotiations with Mitchell. Roosevelt treated him more as a trusted advisor than a potential adversary.47

However, the President was too much the politician to be guided solely by reforming zeal. He saw that a long conflict spelled trouble for the Republican Party. If he had seen the strike as a golden opportunity to make changes, he would have acted decisively at a much earlier stage in the dispute. After all, the strike began in May.

The dye was cast immediately between reactionary and

intransigent coal operators and a moderate, flexible union. Carroll Wright's report at the strike's outset gave the President ample reason to press the operators to

improve working conditions. An ardent reformer would have 23 seized the opportunity provided by the strike to push immediately for a settlement that would have granted formal recognition to the UMW as well as improvements in working conditions. Yet Rooseve I t reacted cautiously at first, weighing jurisdictional questions with political considerations. It was August before he took an active role in the conflict.

Roosevelt's actions were, in my judgment, based on both ideological precepts and practical considerations.

The President had made his views clear concerning the relationship between labor and capital in a Progressive society. His role in the anthracite strike merely reflected that vision. Each side had rights and responsi­ bilities. Those who refused to recognize them earned

Roosevelt's disgust. Roosevelt's suspicion of the wealthy elite was illustrated by his mistrust of the coal operators. Their stubborness and greed made the industry a perfect target for intervention. The government would have to make sure that the employers behaved in a responsible manner.

Roosevelt also believed that workers had the right to organize, especially if their unions were moderate.

Under Mitchell's leadership, the UMW was a model of a conservative, responsible labor organization. It constantly demonstrated a willingness to make concessions. 24

It preferred to rely on civic-minded organizations like the NCF to promote its causes. The UMW wanted labor peace

and asked to be recognized as a partner in production. It

used the strike only as a last resort. What more could

Roosevelt ask of a labor union? The obstinance of the operators and the compliance of the union made it easier for Roosevelt to remain true to his convictions. The danger of a coal famine made it

imperative that he act. Fear of a winter without coal made the public more receptive to an innovative solution

to the crisis.

Roosevelt reacted far differently to other labor

disputes during his administration. He refused to get

involved in a bitter strike in Colorado in 1904. He

dispatched federal troops that were used to crush mining

strikes in Arizona in 1903 and in Nevada in 1908. These

strikes involved miners' organizations that were far more

militant than Mitchell's UMW. We will examine one of

these disputes in more detail later. Such events demon­

strate that it is difficult to label Roosevelt as a friend

of labor.

Yet, in 1902, the forces involved combined with the

needs of the moment, and Roosevelt made history. In the

woras of one historian: "He preached, partly by instinct, partly by design, what the self-conscious middle class, a 25

~afe majority, believed."48 The settlement of the strike strengthened the hand of Progressives who sought negotiations as a way to secure labor peace. The

President successfully established himself and the federal government as a buffer between the radical left and the selfish rich. In the process, he set a new standard for others to follow. CHAPTER TWO

THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

AND THE OPEN SHOP

When Rooseve 1t intervened in the Anthracite Coal

Strike of 1902 and met with both the coal operators and the mine workers' union, his action effectively recognized the legitimate right of labor organizations to bargain with capital. His efforts to help mediate the strike won accolades from the labor movement and enmity from intran­ sigent capitalists and their allies in the press. Most saw the anthracite settlement as a victory for labor. But scarcely a year later, the case of William Miller and the

Government Printing Office (GPO) effectively evened the score.

The President was vacationing in Oyster Bay, New

York in the summer of 1903 when controversy erupted in the

Government Printing Office. A foreman had been fired because he had been expelled from his union. His appeals to the Civil Service Commission and the Roosevelt administration set the stage for the President to address the volatile issues of the union shop and relations between labor and management. perhaps because there was no strike in this case, historians have not examined

Roosevelt's actions here as thoroughly as they have

26 27 addressed his role in other labor issues. l But the episode is significant. The President's action in the

William Miller case vividly demonstrated Roosevelt's opinions on the rights and responsibilities of labor unions.

The GPO had been a closed shop since its inception in 1860 when the government purchased its printing plant from private hands. The printing trades were well organized and the government did not challenge their ability to represent all who worked in the facility. The closed shop first became an issue in 1897 when a group of electrotypers refused to pay union dues. Three years

1ater, another recalcitrant employee refused to join the

International Brotherhood of Bookbinders after his six­ month probationary period in the GPO had passed. In both cases, Public Printer Frank Palmer forced the men to submit to the union to keep their jobs. Palmer, the facility manager, had no desire to challenge the closed shop policy and risk a confrontation with the unions. 2

The GPO hac gradually developed into a large and un ..; ie I dy bureaucracy. Al though Congres s was supposed to supervise the workings of the agency, most of its efforts

.."ent towards securing appointments, promotions and contracts for members' friends and political allies. In the words of one historian: "AI though Congress maintained 28 a constant interest in such matters as personnel and paper contracts, it manifested little concern for the efficiency and economy of the GpO."3 In effect, the GPO under Palmer enjoyed nearly complete administrative independence.

Roosevelt was not comfortable with this situation.

Never one to tolerate inefficiency, the President expressed his concern about cronyism and patronage rampant in government service. In 1902, he called for government appointments to be based solely on merit. He also criticized the operations of the GPO, particularly in his annual address before Congress:

There is a growing tendency to provide for the publi­ cation of masses of documents for which there is no public demand and for the printing of which there is no real necessity. Large numbers of volumes are turned out by the government printing-presses for which there is no justification....The excessive cost of government printing is a strong argument in support of the position of those who are inclined, on abstract grounds to advocate the government's not doing any work which can with propriety be left in private hands. 4

Even before the Miller controversy, Roosevelt was clearly unhappy with the state of affairs in the GPO.

William Miller joined the GPO in 1900. As an assistant foreman, he established a uniform system of recording work and developed cheaper bindings. He a 1 so earned the wrath of the unions by his outspoken criticism of their practices on the shop floor. He claimed that his own union, the Bookbinders, resisted the innovation 29 necessary to improve productivity. Many in the union felt that Miller's changes would lead to a reduction in the work force. The differences led to a series of conflicts between Miller and the Bookbinders between September, 1902 and April, 1903. Finally, the Bookbinders had had enou9h and expelled Miller from the union on May 12, 1903.5

Public Printer Palmer immediately suspended Miller

from his position at the GPO and fired him five days

later. Once again, he sought to avoid a clash with the

Bookbinders over the union shop issue. The incident would have probably died here in the GPO as others before it, except Miller fou9ht back. He filed a complaint with the

Civil Service Commission and appealed to Attorney General

philander Knox. Knox sent a copy of the appeal to Roose­ velt and to Secretary of Commerce and Labor George

Cortelyou. At the behest of the President, both Cortelyou and the Civil Service Commission began an investigation

into the complaint.6

The Civil Service Commission issued a ruling two months later on July 6. Civil Service Rule XII stated that no person shall be removed "except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the public service.,,7

Palmer had argued that Miller's disputes with the union had created dissension in the ranks of the GPO and hindered the efficiency of the agency. The Commission 30 disagreed, stating that Miller's expulsion from the union had little impact on his ability to perform his duties.

It ordered Palmer to reinstate his assistant foreman. 8

But Palmer vacillated, fearing that Miller's reinstatement would cause a strike. In a letter to

Roosevelt, he attempted to justify the termination of his assistant foreman:

In view of the feeling of antagonism which had grown up between Mr. Miller and employees in the bindery, and because of the belief that he had lost the respect and confidence of those with whom he had formerly been associated, and because his continuance in the office after his expulsion would have resulted in the withdrawal of the entire force of bookbinders here for an indefinite period, thus paralysing the work of the office, ~ deemed it my duty to authorize his dismissal.

It is at this point that Roosevelt got more actively involved in the dispute. Appalled by Palmer's submission to the union, the President ordered Cortelyou to conduct interviews with both Palmer and Miller.

Miller provided Cortelyou with a scathing critique of

Palmer's incompetence and union obstruction of his efforts to increase efficiency. Palmer made little attempt to refute Miller's charges during his own interview.

Instead, he focused on his desire to maintain labor peace in the GPO. l 0

After completing his interviews, Cortelyou offered influential advice to the President. He suggested that

Roosevelt instruct Palmer to comply with the Commission 31

ruling, pending the completion of Cortelyou's investisa- tion. The Secretary thought this would be the best way to avoid a strike. A presidential directive backing the

Commission's ruling without passing judgment on Miller would make the union think twice about walking out.ll

Roosevelt accepted Cortelyou's advice. In a reveal ing reply, the President wrote of his apprehension over the impending conflict with labor, but asserted that he had no choice:

I think your suggestions excellent....The Lord knows that I do not want to get into a needless conflict with a labor union, especially in the year before a Presidential election. But on the other hand I can not possibly submit to any such position as that taken by the labor union in question and acquiesced in by Public Printer Palmer. His letter is extraordinary. He admits in effect that he has turned over the disci­ pline of his office to an outside labor organization and that he dismisses from office on the complaint of that organization any man whom the organization has ~oted t? censure or dis~ipline for his con1~ct within l.t; ...Th1.s I regard as l.ntolerable tyranny.

Roosevelt then notified Palmer that he must reinstate

Mi ller at once.

Although Roosevelt also told Palmer that

Cortelyou's complete investigation would ultimately determine Miller's fate, it appears that Roosevelt had already made up his mind. He certainly had no confidence

in Palmer and was already looking for a way to get rid of him. He asked Cortelyou to examine Palmer's management of

GPO affairs and assumed that the Public Printer's 32

inability to handle his unions also meant that he probably had no control over financial and administrative affairs either. 13

But there was another reason why Roosevelt exhibited little patience with Palmer and moved so quickly on the Miller case. The administration was gradually becoming mired in a scandal involving another government agency, the Post Office. In May and June, the press was awash with stories of mismanagement, inefficiency, and corruption in the nation's postal system. Some newspapers called for Grover Cleveland to return to the political fray to oppose Roosevelt in the 1904 election. 14 The

President's political stock was falling when the press picked up the Miller case in July. When the New York

Ti~es ran a story on July 28 citing Miller's account of inefficiency and mismanagement at the GPO,IS Roosevelt was already convinced that a quick resolution was essential.

Although the President was clearly concerned about his political fortunes, the Miller case presented him with a dilemma. He could not ignore the closed shop issue as

McKinley had in 1897, primarily because union control appeared to many people to be the central cause of the glaring inefficiencies within the GPO that were now coming to light. To stand for both a union shop and for proDuctivity reforms would be seen as a contradiction. 33

And given the growing outrage over mismanagement in the public sector, the President really had no choice but to promote actively the need for administrative changes. The

Miller case, therefore, brought the President onto a collision course with organized labor over one of its most cherished principles, the union shop. With the presidential election just a year away, Roosevelt faced the possibility of destroying the strong ties with labor that had been built amidst the tension and drama of the anthracite coal strike.

To his credit, Roosevelt reacted in a manner consistent with his views on labor-capital relations. He remained adamant that labor unions had a right to exist and that workers had every reason to want to join them.

He once wrote:

If I were a factory employee, a workman on the railroads or a wage-earner of any sort, I would undoubtedly join the union of my trade....I believe in the union and I believe that all men who are benefited by the union are morally bound to help to the extent of.thet~ power in the common interests advanced by the unJ.on.

Yet Roosevelt also supported an open shop policy. In his view: "The non-unionist, like the unionist, must be protected in all his legal rights by the full weight and powe r 0 f the I a w."I 7 Roosevelt's belief in the open shop was revealed to United Mine Workers members in the settlement of the anthracite dispute. Despite his clear 34

sympathy for their cause and his intervention that effectively granted legitimacy to their struggle, the President still agreed with the ruling of the Anthracite

Coal Strike Commission that left Pennsylvania mines open to both union and non-union workers. 18

Roosevelt also felt that unions must act responsibly. In his view, this meant that they must reject violence, abide by the law, and honor the letter and spirit of any collective bargaining agreements they signed. It also meant that they must accept the presence of non-union workers in their midst. Roosevelt saw this as merely a matter of fairness to both sides, part of his

Square Deal doctrine.19

Unions must also never usurp the power of the government or challenge the authority of the President.

Roosevelt believed that labor was duty bound to honor federal and civil regulations even when they ran contrary to union policies. 20 He could never recognize that the

Bookbinders had the authority to override civil service regulations in the GPO and force the termination of a man who did not wish to be a member of the union in the first place. Ultimately, he saw the issue in stark terms: labor was attempting to dictate policy to the government.

Roosevelt, of course, would not stand for this. He wrote to a friend: "Once and for all I intend to settle the 35

question of the trades-unions usurping governmental

functions.,,21

In August, Roosevelt issued a presidential decree that extended the open shop to all executive departments.

Now several thousand union members were affected in addition to the 500 members of the Bookbinders union.

Roosevelt acted as soon as he began to be appraised of the results of Cortelyou's ongoing investigation into the GPO.

As the President expected, the examination was uncovering evidence of poor administration and unnecessarily high costs. 22 Roosevelt fired off an angry letter to Palmer

and stated that the Public Printer must shoulder the blame

for the sorry state of affairs at the GPO. The President told Palmer of the need to rectify shoddy practices and then added in a tone that scarcely hid his contempt for the beleaguered administrator: "It seems to reflect most seriously upon any Government officer that it should be necessary to make recommendations of this kind... I shall

be pleased to hear from you anything you have to say in

the way of explanation or defense in this matter.,,23

Roosevelt's directives to Palmer drew favorable

reviews from the nation's press. Newspapers first picked

up the story in July when Miller's appeal and Roosevelt's

preliminary ruling became public knowledge. According to

one survey, Republican, Democratic and Independent 36

newspapers generally supported the President's stand for the open shop.24 When Roosevelt would not budge in the face of strike rumors, even long-time critics of the

President offered praise for his stand. The anti-labor press saw this as a sign that perhaps Roosevelt had finally recognized the evils of trade unionism. One editor wrote: "As long as he was dealing with strikes against other people, he, by implication, seemed to be the champion of unionism, but when its intolerance was shown to have permeated the government service he woke up to this menace to free institutions."25

Although Roosevelt never wavered in his support for workers' right to join unions, the Miller case clearly helped generate support for the President in the business community. Capital had been wary of his administration.

The Northern Securities case, the Anthracite settlement and the establishment of a federal Bureau of Corporations produced many enemies for Roosevelt on Wall Street. There were even rumors that he would be abandoned by business interests in the 1904 campaign. 26 Roosevelt's stand for the open shop in government service brought some back into the fold and neutralized others. David Parry, for example, President of the influential conservative business organization, the National Association of

Manufacturers, gave Roosevelt his enthusiastic support.27 37

Roosevelt also received effusive support from

Henry Cabot Lodge. His friend assured the President that he had taken the correct course. The senator was also convinced that the position would reap dividends during election time. Lodge analyzed the political impact of the Miller case in a letter to Roosevelt:

Your position and your action were both so fair and so absolutely right that I do not think the labor organizations will undertake to make a public issue upon it, and the amount of secret opposition which they can get up I do not think would cut any figure in a Presidential election. It would be confined to a comparatively small number of agitators, and I do not think would appeal to a great body of sensible labor union men and other Republicans. The country will certainly not forget your attitude in regard to the big corporations. That is impressed on the pUb~~C mind, and will give us great strength at the polls.

Lodge's prediction of labor's response was only partially

correct. Many unions did make a public issue out of

Roosevelt's action, but their efforts proved to be utterly

unsuccessful.

Rumors of a strike at the GPO circulated through-

out washington in July after Roosevelt instructed Palmer

to reinstate Miller. Roosevelt doused the fire

immediately with harsh talk that made its way back to the

Bookbinders. He threatened: "If those labor union men

strike not one jack of them will do another stroke of

government work whil e I am President.,,29 The union then

took a different tack. They claimed that Miller's 38 personal habits made him unfit for government service.

He was accused of being a bigamist and charged with sexual harassment of women at the GPO. These new charges were presented by the union to both Cortelyou and Palmer.

Cortelyou said that Palmer had the authority to evaluate these accusations. However, Palmer vacillated, hoping to wait for Cortelyou to complete his investigation before having to pass judgment. Thoroughly frustrated with this impasse, some workers began again to consider a strike.

But union leaders took Roosevelt at his word and did not want their men to lose their jobs.30

The union was growing desperate. By focusing on

Miller's character, they left only the chance for a partial victory. Even if Miller was subsequently removed due to the personal charges, it was entirely conceivable that the Administration would still uphold the principle of the open shop. Firing a man because he was morally unfit for government service would hardly send a message that the union shop was safe in the GPO. Roosevelt fully recognized this when he agreed to let Cortelyou's investi­ gation run its course before revealing his final opinions on the state of the GPO.

The union next appealed to the Washington Central

Labor Union for assistance. with the approval of the AFL, the federation mailed a circular to 500 unions across the 39 country requesting passage of a resolution that criticized

Roosevelt for reinstating Miller. The petition was mild in tone, calling Roosevelt's action "unfriendly" towards organized labor and requesting that the President reconsider his action. 31 Many unions supported the petition, but others did not. They were reluctant to criticize, even mildly, a President who was seen as an ally of the labor movement.32

The Bookbinders and the Central Labor Union then turned to the AFL and asked Samuel Gompers to intervene in their behalf. The subsequent efforts of the AFL leader were half-hearted at best. Gompers believed that he had cultivated a close relationship with Roosevelt, and he did not want the Miller case to jeopardize it. Even thouoh the union shop was at stake, one gets the sense that

Gompers belittled the significance of the GPO matter. 33

Gompers did request a meeting between the

President and the AFL Executive Committee. But the Miller case was only one among several issues that Gompers cited as a reason for the meeting. His letter to Roosevelt contained only a perfunctory reference to the dispute:

"Then, again, the controversy in the case of William A.

Miller, who was dismissed from the public service and re­ instated by your order, has been submitted to us. ,,34 The

tone was almost apologetic. There were no comments about 40 the importance of the issue to labor or the ramifications of the open shop question. Gompers had no intention of letting the Miller case lead to a showdown between the AFL and the President.

Roosevelt agreed to meet the AFL delegation at the

White House on September 29. The press fumed and fretted.

The New York for examp Ie, thought the meeting indicated that Roosevelt might reverse his ruling on

Miller:

It is inconceivable that the President needs informa­ tion from the leaders of organized labor in the United States as to what he should do in this or any other case....We confidently hope, for the sake of the President's self respect and the respect in which he is held by good citizens generally, that the whole story of his vacillation and his determination to take counsel of the trades union leaders in a plain matter of public duty is a creation of the lively imagination of one of them, in whom the wish is father to the thought. 35

The Ti~es followed this editorial with a report two days

later that claimed the President might dismiss Miller on moral grounds. 36

The Times had no cause for alarm. Roosevelt had not changed his mind at all and had no interest in passing

judgment on Mi ller's mora I character. While he listened to the AFL's comments on other issues, he made it clear during the meeting that the Miller case was not open for discussion. He merely read a statement to the group that reiterated his position. Refering to Mi ller, the 41

President said:

The question of his personal fitness is one to be settled in the routine of administrative detail, and cannot be allowed to conflict with or to complicate the larger question of governmental discrimination for or against him or any other man because he is or is not a member of a union. This is the only question now before me f~f decision, and as to this my decision is final.

Although Roosevelt had granted a hearing to the AFL, it was now clear to all concerned that the GPO would be an open shop.

After the meeting, the AFL issued a statement.

Although it asserted its support for the union shop, the federation refused to criticize Roosevelt directly.

Instead, it argued that the President's decision was intended to be directed only to government service. In addition, the federation claimed that Roosevelt actually supported a closed shop in the private sector. 38

Gompers hoped to convince his constituents that labor had suffered only a partial defeat. It was true that

Roosevelt's judgment applied only to government employment. The President had no jurisdiction to rule on the union shop in private industry. But it was patently false that Roosevelt favored the closed shop outside of the public sector. Roosevelt's oft-stated preference that workers should join unions never meant to him that they actually had to do so. It was merely a choice that every laborer had a right to make. No matter how Gompers tried 42

to explain it, Roosevelt's statement during his meeting with the AFL represented a clear blow to labor's goal of the closed shop.

Interestingly, Roosevelt let Gompers' statement go unchallenged. In a remarkably ambiguous statement to an associate, he attempted to explain why:

As regards Mr. Gornpers' account of what I said, it of course ought to be known by everyone that I am responsible only for what I myself say, and not for what others say I say....I had an extremely frank talk with him and the rest of the Supreme Council afterwards, in which I explained what my unofficial and private views were in a way that they could not possibly misunderstand -- although of course there is always a possibility of misrepresentation where there is no misunderstanding....hThat Mr. Gompers said of my attitude amounts of course to a misrepresentation chiefly in the way of suppression of essential truths. But all this aside. Exactly as verbal statements cannot be allowed to alter a written contract, so Mr. Gompers' memory ...cannot be held to alter, add to, or detract from, what I said to him reading from a written ~ocumen~ whicfgwas published at once as having been sald to hlm; ...

In the midst of this murkiness lay the calculations of a shrewd politician. In essence, Roosevelt said that he expected this to happen. He would not worry, because the confusing statement came from Gompers, not him. It was unnecessary for him to publicly defend or criticize the

AFL leader's comments. All he had to do was to stand by his own statement he made to the AFL and subsequently released to the press. This tactical maneuver gave

Gompers the opportunity to save face while Roosevelt lost 43 nothing. He had made his point perfectly clear on the

Miller case. He had already made his opinion known on the closed shop in private industry during the course of the anthracite settlement. There was no need to pick a fight over an issue that lay outside the scope of his presidential authority in the year before an election.

Roosevelt made additional efforts to soften the blow of the Miller ruling with labor. He expressed his support for two key legislative goals of the AFL at the meeting. He told them that he would support efforts to pass an eight hour work day bill and restrict the use of injunctions against labor. He also promised to investi­ gate the case of Ephraim Clark, a jailed merchant seaman who had become a labor cause celebre. This helped mollify the AFL. The organization again avoided direct criticism of the President when its members met in November for their annual convention. The convention passed a resolution in support of the union shop in all areas but requested only that Roosevelt examine affidavits from

Bookbinders to consider whether Miller's character was appropriate for one in government service. 40

The convention bound Gompers to continued efforts to get Miller removed from office. However, for all practical purposes, the case ceased to be a major issue from the moment Roosevelt read his statement to the AFL 44 council on September 29. In February, 1904, Gompers p~esented Palmer with formal documents accusing Miller of wife-beating, bigamy and fraud. Once again, Palmer did not respond. Gompers, for the record, made a last appeal to Rooseve 1t. The President instructed Pa lmer to decide whether the charges of moral misconduct warranted dismissal. The Public Printer then went to Cortelyou for advice. Miller had proved to be an inval uable informant for Cortelyou's ongoing investigation of the GPO, and the Secretary did not want to lose his source of information.

In June, Palmer finally saw fit to declare that the charges filed against Miller were irrelevant to his ability to perform the duties required by his job.

Gompers accepted this decision as final and the case was closed. Cortelyou's investigation concluded that the GPO was poorly administered and plagued by unduly high costs.

He recommended that Palmer be fired. Given his contempt for Palmer, it is surprising that Roosevelt did not comply immediately. But when the Public Printer was charged with favoritism in securing contracts for new printing equipment, Roosevelt finally fired him in September,

1905. 41 The federal service has remained an open shop ever since Roosevelt's action in the Miller incident. The case also sparked Congressional investigations into the 45 practices of the GPO that ultimately led to a series of reforms in its administrative methods.

Roosevelt was proud of his role in the GPO affair.

In his mind, it demonstrated the fairness with which he approached relations between labor and capital. As he prepared for his re-election campaign in 1904, Rooseve 1t listed it alongside the Northern Securities case and the anthracite settlement as among the most significant events in his first term. He advised his supporters that all three indicated "...that corporation and labor union alike have been protected when they have been within the law, and yet have been held to a rigid accountability to the law, and that equal justice has been dealt to all men-­ and this not as a figure of speech, but in actual fact.,,42

Roosevelt saw his role as a taskmaster, and a rather successful one at that. In a letter to his son just prior to the election of 1904, the President took on the tone of a school teacher: " ... my action in the so-called Hiller case...gave to trades-unions a lesson that had been tausrht corporations that I favored them while they did right and was not in the least afraid of them when they did wrong.,,43 This was precisely how Roosevelt saw his role: an impartial activist who guaranteed a Square Deal for all.

President McKinley had ignored the union shop 46 issue when it surfaced in the GPO in 1897. Roosevelt did not have the luxury to do the same in 1903. The Post Office scandal created public awareness of trouble in the government service. Miller's indictment of both the

Bookbinders and Palmer linked the union with disturbing tales of mismanagement and inefficiency. Roosevelt realized that any investigation of the mess at the GPO had to address the closed shop issue. It was a risky situation. Roosevelt had to do something to stop the tidal wave of stories about corruption and mismangement in government. Yet he was sure to clash with labor if he took action. Their support in next year's election could not then be guaranteed.

However, Roosevelt approached his task with relish.

Utterly convinced that he was right, he rode forth to do battle against union "tyranny" in the same manner that he had fought corporate "lawlessness". He stood fast to his principles, even if they yielded ambiguous results.

Throughout the Miller case, he constantly reminded colleagues that he supported a union's right to organize.

Yet he never gave any indication that he understood the impact that an open shop had on a union's ability to represent its members. He naively assumed that labor would come to compete with capital on an equal footing in an open shop environment, despite the monumental financial 47 and political advantages enjoyed by business.

Despite Roosevelt's assertion that the Miller ruling applied only to government work, anti-labor forces utilized it to aid their cause. The momentum gained by labor after the anthracite settlement now shifted to the employers. The Miller case, for example, gave a healthy boost to the campaign of the National Association of

Manufacturers to promote the open shop across the country.

While labor continued to organize effectively, the closed shop became even harder to attain. 44

Labor was caught in a difficult spot in the Miller ca s e. It could never agree to the open shop. Yet moderate leaders like Gompers and AFL Vice-President John

Mitchell were uncomfortable with the closed shop in the

GPO since it violated civil service regulations. All these leaders could do was attempt to save face without defying the law or President Roosevelt.

Roosevelt was shrewd enough to allow them some room to maneuver. It paid off for him as well, as labor support for his re-election remained strong. At the same time, he reaped big dividends in the business community.

Many business leaders were satisfied that Roosevelt had finally stood up to the unions.

The President staked out a position that enabled him to successfully portray his actions as consistent with 48 the framework of the Square Deal doctrine. Unions had a legitimate right to exist in modern American society. Workers were free to choose whether they wished to join them. Both labor and capital must act in a responsible and orderly fashion. William Miller regained his job, but

Theodore Roosevelt emerged as the big winner. Chapter 3

THE GOLDFIELD STRIKE, 1907-1908

In the anthracite coal strike of 1902, Roosevelt proved to be a succes s fu 1 mediator in the prolonged dispute between the United Mine Workers and obstinate coal operators. For the first time, the federal government had played an active role in promoting a settlement that essentially acknowledged the right of labor unions to represent their workers in negotiations with capital. In the Miller case the following year, Roosevelt defined the

limits of union authority in the government service and took a stand in favor of the open shop. Several years

later, Roosevelt found himself embroiled in another labor controversy. This time he quickly dispatched federal troops to Goldfield, Nevada in the midst of a bitter

strike. The employers used the troops to break the union and crush the walk-out. The events at Goldfield give us

another opportunity to examine Roosevelt's perspective on

the labor movement.

The Goldfield dispute provides Roosevelt

scholars with a far greater challenge than the coal strike of 1902. There is simply much more information available

about Roosevelt's actions during the saga of the

anthracite industry. The President's papers and letters give a clear glimpse of what was going on in his mind

49 50

during the 1902 crisis . The strike had national

. ramifications, particularly in the Fall when the danger of

a coal famine seemed quite real to many people. As a

result, the press coverage was extensive, and as the

strike lingered on into September the editorials were

plentiful. The Goldf ield strike was entirely different.

The dispute was restricted to a mining town in Nevada. It

became a matter of national interest only when Roosevelt

sent in the troops. With the exception of telegrams to

Nevada's governor that were made public during the strike,

very little can be found in Roosevelt's letters and papers

about Goldfield. Newspaper coverage was more sporadic.

It is more difficult to determine what was behind the

President's actions. We must take what we can from

Roosevelt's material and try to understand the events and

forces in the Nevada strike.

The growth of the Goldfield mining district

coincided with the defeat of the Western Federation of

Miners (WFM) at Cripple Creek, Colorado in 1904. Workers

deported by the Colorado state militia during the conflict

made their way to the next mining site. Miners embittered

by their experiences in Cripple Creek formed the core of

the workforce in the mines of Goldfield. l Schooled in

class conflict, these miners also proved to be the

backbone of a new, militant labor federation formed in

1905, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), which 51 would not prove to be a force for moderation. In his opening address to the Founding Convention of the IWW, William Haywood summed up the purpose of the new organization:

We are here to confederate the workers of this country into a working class movement that shall have for its purpose the emancipation of 2he working class from the slave bondage of capitalism.

Haywood was also a well-known leader of the WFM. His union was incorporated into the IWW as the "Mining

Department" in August, 1905. By that time, the Federation had already been active in Goldfield for over a year, appealing to gold miners with its own brand of class consciousness. Miners who were known to have been strikebreakers in Cripple Creek had been quickly run out of town by WFM members. 3

WFM Local 220 stood in stark contrast to the

American Federation of Labor (AFL) affiliate in Goldfield, the Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners Local 1761. A smaller AFL affiliate, the Federal Union also organized in the Fall of 1904. The AFL unions were smaller and lacked the militancy of the WFM. While the AFL unions were concerned with maintaining recognition and securing contracts from employers, the WFM openly challenged the hegemony of capital and promoted socialism as the ultimate solution for the working class. A conflict was inevitable, not only between the WFM and the mine operators, but between the radical and conservative unions 52

as we 11.4

Radical forces grew with the arrival of the IWW in

Goldfield in 1906. By Sprinq, the IWW had absorbed the

Federal Union, and their organizational efforts increased.

The IWW organized workers across craft lines, mixing mine workers with waiters and bartenders in the town saloons.

The leadership of WFM Local 220 cooperated with the IWW.

By the end of summer, traditional craft unionism had clearly been supplanted in Goldfield by organizations that had a revolutionary perspective on labor relations. 5 The disputes that began in September 1906 and lasted into the

Spring of 1908 reflected the character of these unions and the challenge that they posed to the mine owners.

In September, 1906, miners walked off the job, demanding an eight-hour day and a raise from four to five dollars per shift. The strikers held firm and the mines remained idle into December. Finally, the operators

capitulated. The settlement demonstrated both the operators' desire to get back to business and the

undeniable strength of the union. The IWW and all of the

town workers it represented had merged under the banner of

Local 220 during the course of the strike.

The amalgamated union became more aggressive. It

ordered all local businesses to accept the eight-hour day

as standard. The demand was promptly accepted. For

workers who had commonly toiled twelve to fifteen hours 53

per day, this represented a tremendous victory. Unions held frequent meetings on company time and demanded and received termination of workers it found objectionable. 6

IWW organizer Vincent St. John offered the most colorful description of labor relations in Goldfield at the time: The highest point of efficiency for any labor organization was reached by the IWW and the WF of M in Goldfield, Nevada. No committees were ever sent to any employers. The union adopted wage scales and regulated hours. The secretary posted the same on a bulletin board outside of the union hall, and it was the LA~. The ~mploy~rs were forced to come and see the un10n comm1ttees.

Whether this 1S an entirely accurate picture is open to debateo But one historian who conducted interviews with participants in the Goldfield drama agreed that the union dictated terms to employers on a regular basis: "'There was never any conference, or any evidence of an idea that the employer had a right to be consulted."B With the exception of a handful of AFL building tradesmen, the IWW soon came to represent nearly the entire workforce in

Goldfield. By the beginning of 1907, Local 220 effectively controlled the town. 9

IWW organizational strength was again demonstrated in a rally held in solidarity with European workers on

January 20, 1907. Virtually all mines and businesses were shut down during the festivities. Vincent St. John addressed the crowd, and a series of resolutions was 54 passed by acclamation. The throng called for the release of labor leaders Haywood, Pettibone and Moyer, who were being held in jail on charges of murdering the Governor of

Idaho. They denounced the Supreme Court as a tool of capitalist greed and called for its members to be elected by popular vote. The workers sent greetings to their fellow toilers in Europe and called for an end to the capitalist system. lO

This rally, and the increasing boldness of the

IWW, made the owners uneasy. Tensions rose a short time

later when the WFM posted a list of 386 Cripple Creek

strikebreakers and gunmen that were expected to come into town. The unions appeared conf ident tha t they were masters of their own fate. Although the IWW and WFM were

feuding on a national level, they were still cooperating in Goldfield. It would prove to be a fragile unity, and the employers would soon seek to exploit the differences.

The counter-attack began on March 14. The employers formed the Goldfield Business Men and Mine

Operators Association and immediately passed a resolution

stating that IWW members were no longer welcome in the mines. They shrewdly drew a distinction between IWW and

\'V' FM me mbe r s. The 0 wn e r s shut down mine sand busin e sses the following day. Three days later, the mines were re­ opened to WFM and AFL workers. The IWW remained excluded.

Sensing an opportunity to gain new membership, the AFL 55

Local supported the tactics of the Association.ll

The leading strategists for the Association were

George Wingfield and Senator George Nixon of Nevada.

Wingfield was the richest man in the state and President of Consolidated Mines Company. Senator Nixon was his

business partner and held the title of company vice­

president. Consolidated was the largest mining firm in

the area.12

Although they had re-opened the gates on March 18,

the IWW exclusion clause had effectively left the mines

inoperative. The operators hoped that gradually the AFL

would woo recalcitrant miners away from the clutches of

the IWW, and they did not protest when the AFL sent

additional organizers into Goldfield. The strategy

gradually paid off. Although the AFL did not win many new

adherents, more moderate members of the WFM began to call

for the separation of the miners union from the IWW. The

mines remained closed through mid-April. Some WFM

members, anxious to return to work, intensified their

efforts to purge their union of the IWw. 13

A settlement was reached on April 22. The miners

union was given jurisdiction over all men employed in and

around the mines, including timbermen, engineers,

blacksmiths and machinists. In exchange, the WFM pledged

not to strike unless two-thirds of its members called for

a walk-out.14 Although the agreement seemed favorable to 56 the WFM, the Association had begun to crack the militant unity of the miners and the IWW.

Labor peace lasted until August. Consolidated

Mines then announced that it would set up "change rooms" to prevent what was commonly known as "high-grading." It was an open secret that miners often left the property with valuable gold ore stuffed in their work clothes.

Consolidated was the first company to challenge this practice. The miners reacted by walking out. A settlement was reached on September 18. The change rooms would remain, but with some modifications. Other mining firms had closely followed the strike at Consolidated.

The operators all agreed that the settlement would not eradicate high-grading. More importantly, the latest strike demonstrated that the miners remained as militant as ever, despite the diminished presence of the IWW in the mines. lS

The Panic of 1907 finally gave the operators an opportunity to launch a full-scale assault on the miners.

The largest bank in town, the John S. Cook and Company, experienced a run on deposits in November. To make matters worse, smelters refused to pay cash to the mines for ore shipped. The chief officers of the Cook Bank were

Nixon and Wingfield. On November 14, the Bank and the operators announced that miners would be paid in scrip instead of cash. Although the cash reserves of the 57 operators remained solid, the move was justified as necessary to protect their investments. The miners asked for security to back up the scrip and a date for resumption of traditional payment methods. The operators refused. The miners walked out on November 26, and the strike divided the town. The newspapers, businessmen, and the AFL supported the operators. Town workers and County officials supported the miners. This time the owners were pre?ared to make this the final showdown. 16

At the outbreak of the strike, President Roosevelt was ?reoccupied with other matters. He was preparing his yearly address to Congress and focused on matters far beyond the mining caves of Goldfield. A review of his papers indicates that the Panic and the Brownsville inquiry were his rna jor concerns. These issues continued to occupy Roosevelt even after he dispatched troops to

Nevada. 17

On December 3, Wingfield, Nixon and several others met with Nevada Governor John Sparks on behalf of the

Association. They asked that Sparks request federal assistance to handle the strike. Without checking first with local authorities, Sparks wired to Roosevelt the following day and asked that a detachment of troops be put on alert for use in Goldfield. Roosevelt reacted quickly. He fired off a telegram to Sparks the same day, advising the Governor of the appropriate legal procedures 58 to follow when requesting federal assistance. Roosevelt assured him that he was prepared to send troops immediately.18

Sparks filed his formal request on December 5.

There is no evidence that Roosevelt consulted with advisors or made any attempt to ascertain independently the dangers in Goldfield. Instead, he wrote to his Acting

Secretary of War the following day and directed him to ready a detachment of soldiers. The letter contained the following advice: "It is far better to avoid conflict by sending too many troops than by sending too few to run the risk of inviting bloodshed.,,19

Since little information is available from the period, it is helpful to examine Roosevelt's autobiography for clues of his intentions. In his book, Roosevelt admits that he acted on the basis of Sparks' reports. He was given the impression of a town divided into two hostile armed camps, "...with an unusually large number of the violent and criminal element always attracted to a new and booming mining camp.,,20 Roosevelt was clearly concerned with maintaining order. But he was especially motivated to believe Sparks because of the unions involved. He detested the radical wing of the labor movement. The mere mention of the WFM and IWW made his blood boil. Earlier in 1907, Roosevelt had made his feelings well known about leaders of those organizations: 59

Messrs. Moyer, Haywood, and Debs stand as representatives of those men who have done as much to discredit the labor movement as the worst speculative financiers or most unscrupulous employers of labor and debauchers of legislatures have done to discredit honest capitalists and fair-dealing business men. They stand as the representatives of those men who by their public utterances of the papers they control or inspire, and by the words and deeds of those associated with or subordinated to them, habitually appear as guilty of incitement to or apology for bloodshed and violence. If this does not constitute undesirable citizenship, then there can never be any desirable citizenship...those preachers of violence...are themselves the worst foes of the honest laboring man. 2l

In the section on Goldfield in his autobiography,

Roosevelt reminded his readers that the leaders of the WFM

had advocated "anarchy" and had been indicted for the murder of Idaho's governor. He stated: "With the Western

Federation of Miners I more than once had serious trouble."22

One previous experience with the WFM left a

lasting impression on Roosevelt and influenced his actions

at Goldfield. The bitter dispute in Cripple Creek in

1903-04 produced a number of unpleasant memories. In the

early stages of the battle, Colorado Governor Peabody

asked Roosevelt to send troops to strengthen Peabody's

hand against the union. Later, after the operators had

taken the offensive, the union asked Roosevelt to send

troops to protect them from attacks and deportations. In

both instances, Rooseve I t refused. 2 3 But he did so only

after deliberate consultations with advisors. Labor

Commissioner Wright was most influential in this 60

situation, and told the President not to intervene.

Instead, he suggested that Roosevelt appoint a commission to investigate the strike, " ...and then let the matter

rest, it will take care of itself much better than it can be cared for.,,24

Roosevelt's papers indicate that he thought a great deal before making his aecisions in the 1903-04

c r i sis. 2 5 He co u 1 d not beart0 h 0 nor are quest fro m the

WFM, but he was equally repulsed by the actions of

Governor Peabody. And although Roosevelt ultimately

followed Wright's advice, he was never truly comfortable

with his decision not to intervene. A letter written by

Roosevelt in August, 1904 is particularly revealing:

If the newspaper reports are true, Peabody's action is unpardonable. He has deliberately sanctioned the criminal usurpation of state sovereignty by an irresponsible mob. If I had power I should interfere at once, putting down mob work with equal firmness and severity, whether it was committed by the Federation o f Mine r s 0 r by the Citi zen's 2'~ 1 ianc e. I w ish the r e was some action we could take.

This was Roosevelt the taskmaster again. When he sensed

instability, he was not content to sit on the sidelines

and wait for events to run their course. The President

much preferred to jump into a fray and impose order upon

the antagonists.

In Goldfield, Roosevelt reacted instinctively

prompted by his fear of unrest. Preoccupied with other

issues, he immediately assumed that Sparks' description of 61 conditions in the town was correct. Given his prejudices against and past experiences with the WFM, Roosevelt believed that the miners were once again up to no good.

This time, he would act to prevent another prolonged episode like the one at Cripple Creek from developing.

Press coverage initially reinforced Sparks' argument that troops were necessary to prevent anarchy.

The December 7th issue of the San Francisco Chronicle reported that miners had accumulated a cache of arms and that the sheriff sympathized with their cause. An editorial praised Sparks, stating that rioting was

"probable" since the town was " ...wholly at the mercy of an armed mob." The Ne~ ~Qrk Ti~~~ repeated the same claims in a similar story.27 Interestingly, dispatches printed in both papers from reporters on the scene often differed from accounts produced from the press rooms. For example, dispatches filed for the same period in both the f~~Qni~~ and the ~i~~~ reported that the miners were working to keep the peace. 28

Immediately after the troops arrived on December 7, the operators fired the next salvo. They reduced wages by one dollar per day and demanded that workers renounce their affiliations with the WFM. With troops now on hand to keep the peace, the operators felt secure enough to press for advantage. The miners protested vigorously. They accused Roosevelt of acting out of "personal hatred" 62 for the union and called for class solidarity to combat this latest assault. 29

The union newspaper, Miners' Magazine, reprinted articles of support coming mostly from the labor press.

One editorial from the De.!2~er EX~~~ was especially critical of Roosevelt:

The action of the President in sending troops in advance of violence is unprecedented. The action of the mine owners in reducing wages immediately upon their ~rr~~al makes the President a party to that reductl.on.

Although the AFL supported Roosevelt's action, it became increasingly clear that many in the labor movement did not. Throughout December, Miners' print ed excerpts from the labor press that were highly critical of the President. 31

Although one can find no clear indication in his papers, it appears that Roosevelt was affected by labor's criticism. By December 11, Roosevelt began to have second thoughts about the troops. In a telegram to the Commander of the Goldfield garrison, Roosevelt reminded him to observe strict impartiality in keeping the peace. He urged him to use caution and ended with an interesting caveat: "Better twenty-four hours of riot, damage, and disorder than illegal use of troops."32 I twas uncharacteristic of Roosevelt to put anything above the need f or order.

Several days later an uncertain Roosevelt decided 63 that the situation warranted further investigation. He put together a committee of three men from his administration for the job. The investigative panel consisted of Lawrence G. Murray (Assistant Secretary of

Commerce and Labor), Herbert Knox Smith (Commissioner of

Corporations), and Charles P. Neill (Commissioner of

Labor). The investigators arrived in Goldfield on December

15.

Some historians think that Roosevelt reluctantly appointed the committee to placate his critics. 33 No doubt there is some truth to this. But the situation is a bit more complicated. Roosevelt sent his team to

Goldfield before major newspapers criticized him. A review of the San Francisco Chronicle, for example, finds that the paper barely mentioned Goldfield for the ten-day period between the seventh and the seventeenth of

December. Th e !':!~~ r.2!:.~ T i~es publ i shed an ed i toria 1 on

December 11 that supported the need for troops. But for the most part, other issues occupied the minds of the

Diaest, weekly paper's editorial board. -~--- a sampling of the nation's press, was also interested in other matters during this period. In late December,

Coll ier's magaz ine ran a photographic essay that clear1y supported Roosevelt's actions. 34 Roosevel t was subjected to criticism, but it is safe to say that he was not deluged by protest. unfortunately, his papers do not 64 offer any clear insights into his thinking at the time.

But in the absence of any real violence in Goldfield, Roosevelt no doubt gradually realized that the troops served the operators' purposes more than anything else.

Once the troops arrived, the operators' motives were too blatant for him to feel entirely comfortable.

Roosevelt grew increasingly restive as the days passed. On December 17, he dashed off a telegram that displayed his impatience:

I sent the troops at your request because from the tenor of your telegrams ... it appeared that an insurrection was imminent against which the State authorities would be powerless. The troops have now been in Goldfield ten days and no insurrection has occurred....As the legislature of Nevada has not been convened I am bound to assume that the powers vested in the peace officers of the State are adequate and that if they choose to do so they can maintain order them selves. Under these circumstances, unles s there be forth\vith further cause shown to justify keeping the troops at Goldfield, I sh~~l direct that they return to their former stations.

Roosevelt became angry after he received a preliminary report from his investigators on the twentieth. The team disputed Sparks' claim that civil authority had collapsed in the town. In their view, local officials were capable of maintaining order. In essence, there was absolutely no need for federal troops. To make matters worse, operators' wage reductions had led to

increasing bitterness. 36 Roosevelt immediately informed

Sparks via telegram that he had just received word from his representatives in Goldfield: 65

Their report...satisfies me that there is no disturbance threatened which the Government of Nevada ought not to be able to control if it start to work with a serious purpose to do so, but that no effort is being made by the Government of Nevada to take the steps necessary in the matter....Federal aid should not be sought for by the State as a method of relieving itself from the performance of this duty.... I have accordingly directed the troops to return to thei~ former stations on Monday, December thirtieth next. 7

Roosevelt's anger was apparent here. He had been duped by

Sparks into believing that Goldfield was in chaos. When he realized the true situation, he became anxious to extricate himself as soon as possible.

But Roosevelt could still not bring himself to come to the aid of a besieged miners' union. By December

20, it was clear that the WFM was losing the strike.

Union attorney O.N. Hilton complained to the President that the operators refused to meet with the miners. He pledged that the union would continue to keep the peace.

Finally, Hilton conceded defeat and asked that the

President intervene with the operators to help arrange terms for a return to work. 38 Roosevelt ignored the request.

Sparks, however, was not convinced that the miners were defeated. He wired Roosevelt and asked that the troops remain for an indefinite period. He explained that a state of war still existed in Goldfield and appealed to

Roosevelt's well-known hatred of radical organizations.

Sparks then told the President that calling a special 66 legislative session would be counter-productive, since he doubted Nevada lawmakers would support his request for the continued presence of troops.39

None of this sat well with Roosevelt. He fired back a sharply worded response, rebuking Sparks for dragging his feet. He then issued an ultimatum: the

Governor had five days to convene the Legislature. If he failed to do so, the troops would be withdrawn immediately. But amid the bluster, the telegram contained a fascinating caveat: "CircuITIstances may change and if they do I will take whatever action the needs of the situation require so far as my constitutional powers perrnit.,,40 His fear of radical unions still got the better of him. Despite mounting evidence to the contrary,

Roosevelt still feared that with organizations like the

WFM and IWW, violence was possible at any time. Furious with Sparks and anxious to remove the garrison, the

President remained too uneasy to commit to an unconditional withdrawal.

Sparks relented at the end of the year and agreed to call the Legislature into session. Roosevelt received the final report from his investigators on January 4,

1908. It echoed their preliminary findings in even stronger terms. The report criticized Sparks for calling in troops when local authorities were capable of keeping order. It also attacked the motivations of the operators 67 as well:

The action 0 f the mine 0 per a tors warran ts the be 1 i ef that they had determined upon a reduction in wages and the refusal of employment to members of the Western Federation of Miners, but that they feared to take this course of action unless they had the protection of Federal troops, and that they accordingly laid a plan to secuIe such troops and then put their program into ef fect. 1

The report effectively demolished any remaining hope Sparks had to retain the troops indefinitely. It did, however, suggest that the troops remaln until the

Legislature could take steps to set up a state militia to handle any future problems. Roosevelt agreed, again reflecting his cautious approach. Apprehensive about continued unrest, the President refused once more to order a unilateral withdrawal of the soldiers.

Sparks took the brunt of the criticism after the report was released to the press. For example, the San

Francisco and a representative survey published in the Literary Digest all targeted the

Nevada governor as the chief culprit. with the exception of sections of the labor press, it appears that

Roosevelt's role was conveniently ignored by many at this stage. 42 This all meant little to the miners at Goldfield.

By now, they had been defeated decisively. It made no difference that the Nevada Legislature condemned the operators' actions. The union's repeated efforts to bargain with the owners fell upon deaf ears. A State 68

Police Bill was adopted at the end of January, and Nevada

troops began to replace the federal garrison the following month. The last of Roosevelt's troops left on March 7.

The miners returned to work a month later, on terms dictated by the employers. The debate among historians about Goldfield has

centered upon two main issues: The "armed camp" dispute and Roosevelt's intervention. Scholars disagree whether

the town resembled a hostile, armed camp in the months

preceding the November strike. Some cite arms stockpiled

by both sides as evidence that a clash seemed imminent.

Others readily acknowledge the existence of weaponry but

insist that Goldfield was relatively peaceful.43 There is

more of a consensus on Roosevelt's role. Historians agree

that the President deserves criticism. The differences

are mainly a matter of degree. Some have blasted

Roosevelt and claimed that Goldfield demonstrated his true

anti-labor sentiments. Others have agreed that sending

the troops was a mistake, but credit Roosevelt for

removing them quickly when he realized they were only serving the operators' interests. 44

It is fascinating to read how Roosevelt himself

justified his actions almost seven years after the events.

In his autobiography, he acknowledged that both the unions

and operators committed acts that were indefensible.

Sparks is criticized only for wanting to keep the troops 69 too long, not for requesting them in the first place. But

Roosevelt's analysis of the situation in Goldfield before he intervened provides us with the most telling insights:

The State of Nevada in the year 1907 was gradually drifting into utter governmental impotence and downright anarchy. The people were at heart all right; but the forces of evil had been permitted to get the upper hand, and for the time being the decent citizens had become helpless to assert themselves either by controlling the greedy corporations on the one hand or repressing the murderous violence of c e r t aJ-~ 1 awl e s s 1abor 0 r g ani z ationson the 0 ther hand.

Roosevelt clearly wished to be remembered as the one man who brought order to the town and protection to its inhabitants caught between two immoral extremes.

Ironically, Roosevelt praised the report of the investigative team as even-handed, without mentioning its conclusions. Evidently, in his mind, the salient point was his decision to appoint the investigators, rather than the judgments they rendered. Their report so thoroughly contradicted his own assessments, that it is no wonder he chose to avoid its conclusions.

Strong-willed leaders rarely admit their mistakes.

But Roosevelt knew he had acted hastily shortly after dispatching the troops. To his credit, he attempted to extricate himself from a messy situation. However, this does not relieve him of well deserved criticism.

Preoccupied with other issues, he acted before he knew all the facts. He readily accepted Sparks' analysis because 70 he assumed the worst when radical unions were involved.

His antipathy towards the WFM and IWW prevented him from ever being able to look objectively at the events in Goldfield. The troops were allowed to remain well after he first badgered Sparks about the responsibilities of state government. The garrison stayed for nearly three months after Roosevelt realized that it was merely serving the needs of the operators.

Roosevelt tried to portray his Goldfield actions as similar to his role in the anthracite strike several years earlier, claiming that in both he was only trying to maintain order and render impartial justice. But

Goldfield was more complicated. The anthracite situation became cut-and-dried for the President. A moderate union, led by a responsible, conservative leader, was pitted against powerful, greedy and incredibly obstinate employers. At risk was the nation's coal supply as winter grew near. The President met the challenge, helped mediate a settlement and averted a dangerous crisis. In

Goldfield, the dividing line was blurred. The operators had previously made some concessions. There were known divisions among the workers. More importantly, the unions had a militant history and a radical leadership. There was little at risk except the living and working conditions of the people in an isolated mining district in the Far West. Given the forces involved, Roosevelt chose 71 to believe anarchy was inevitable and assumed that order meant justice. In Goldfield, he was wrong. For workers there, it meant the death of their union. CONCLUSION

From these three events, one can see that Theodore

Roosevelt's labor record is decidedly mixed. His role as a mediator during the anthracite strike won him widespread support in the workers' movement. Labor's enthusiasm for the President was tested during the Miller case, but many mainstream leaders were reluctant to directly criticize him. Despite his stand against the closed shop, Roosevelt continued to openly declare his support for a worker's right to join a union. His role in the Goldfield strike spelled disaster for mineworkers there. Even the most conservative leaders of the AFL were hard pressed to publicly support an action that effectively destroyed a union, albeit a rival one.

Each incident brought forth a different Roosevelt.

The anthracite crisis saw a measured, diplomatic effort.

Ultimately, the President helped set in motion a series of events that led to a settlement of a long and bitter strike. In the Miller case, Roosevelt intervened much sooner.and more decisively. By combining threats with political finesse, he kept the unions in check. Goldfield brought a knee-jerk reaction from Roosevelt. Troops were sent at the first sign of disorder. Once again he acted decisively, but this time without knowing the facts.

72 73

However, these three incidents also demonstrate an ideological consistency behind Roosevelt's actions. The

President operated from a certain sense of justice and fair play. He truly believed that unions had a right to exist, and to negotiate with capital. He promoted a worker's right to join a union more forcefully than any previous President. While he may have feared and despised the leaders of radical unions like the Western Federation of Miners, he never wavered in his stand that workers must be free to join an organization of their choice. His support of the open shop can be seen in this context. To

Roosevelt, it was merely a matter of fairness. A person was free to join - or not to join - a union. This principle was more important to him than the impact of the open shop on the labor movement.

In Roosevelt's world, unions had responsibilities as well. An ideal union was moderate, sensible and accommodating. It did not challenge the existing social order nor usurp governmental authority. Roosevelt's actions in labor matters were clearly influenced by the unions involved. He reacted with sympathy and understanding with John Mitchell's United Mine Workers primarily because the union went out of its way to demonstrate its faith in the President and the system of collective bargaining. In the Government Printing Office, the Bookbinders Union earned Roosevelt's wrath mainly 74 because it attempted to dictate personnel policy to the federal government. The Western Federation of Miners was deemed undesirable by virtue of its social and political creed.

In fact, Roosevelt was not well disposed toward anyone who did not share his view of the need for responsible labor management relations. He had just as much disdain for greedy and shortsighted coal operators as he did for labor militants. While Roosevelt certainly feared the radicals more, he recognized that inflexible anthracite operators inflicted as much damage by driving workers into the militants' camp. Neither was part of the Progressive social order. Both lacked the vision necessary to participate successfully in a just and stable society.

It took a shrewd and capable politician to mold this society and Roosevelt relished the challenge. He was keenly aware of the public pulse. He intervened in the anthracite strike after he recognized that the time had come for action. Public sympathy lay with the miners.

The operators remained obstinate. A coal famine loomed.

Conditions were right for the public to support a new initiative even if it meant granting de facto recognition to a labor union. Roosevelt was also intelligent enough to allow labor room to maneuver even when he opposed them.

The Miller case represented a brilliant victory for 75

Roosevelt precisely because he successfully opposed one of labor's key platforms without rupturing his ties to the movement. He allowed Gompers' misleading statements about the President's ruling to go unchallenged. At the same time he promised to support another key provision in labor's agenda, the eight hour work day. Roosevelt was even quick to sense an error in judgment. Soon after he dispatched federal troops to

Goldfield, he recognized they were not needed. He began to cajole and threaten Governor Sparks to get his own house in order. Yet Roosevelt still allowed the troops to remain a full three months. His fear of violence led him to keep the troops long after he realized they were serving the employers' interests.

It is this quest for order and stability that drove

Roosevelt more than anything else. Roosevelt saw the preservation of order as his primary responsibility as

President. He gave the UMW a Square Deal in the anthracite strike. But more importantly, the settlement he helped broker prevented riots he believed would surely have followed the impending coal famine. He stood firm on the open shop issue in the Government Printing Office.

Yet to Roosevelt, that was not the heart of the matter.

It was ultimately a question of authority. A civilized society could never allow the authority of government to be usurped. In Goldfield, Roosevelt thought the issue was 76 clear enough. Radical forces - or "foes of order" - were involved. Justice would have to be enforced from the barre 1 of a trooper's gun.

Ultimately, one needs to look at Roosevelt's labor record in this context. Moderate elements in the labor movement could claim with confidence that Roosevelt had done more for workers than any previous President.

Militant leaders could quite easily assert that he was no different from his predecessors. His record is ambiguous enough for both to be justified. However, one can still find a unifying theme that ties the President's contradictory stands together. In the end, right or wrong, Roosevelt followed his own principles, which were guided always by the need for stability and order. NOTES TO PREFACE

l. Theodore Roosevelt, Th~ £~~£~ ~f !~eod~re Rooseve 1 t. Roosevelt to Wright, October 8, 1902, Reel "4"12":-----

77 NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. For a more detailed explanation of the 1900 strike, see Robert Cornell, The Anthracite Coal Strike of l.2..Q~. (New York: Catholic University of America Pres~ 1957), 45-56. See also Selig Perlman and Philip Taft, !i~~to£.Y Qi Lab0 r ~~ !.b.~ Q.~~!.e d ~!.~!.~~ l.~2..'§":'l2..l~ V0 ~ i, New York, 1935, 36-39.

2. George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1900-1912. (New York: Harper-and-Row,-19SST,--134:------

3. Perlman and Taft, 37-38.

4. Carroll D. Wright, "Report to the President on the Anthracite Coal Strike." U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Washington: Government Printing Office, (1902),1150.

5. John Mitchell, 2~g~~i~Q ~~~or, Its f~Q~~~~ f~~EQ~~~L ~~Q IQ~~l~ ~~Q !.b.~ f~~~~~!. ~~Q £~!.~~~ Qf American ~age Earners, (Philadelphia: American Book and Bible House, 1903), 373.

6. Wright, 1150.

7. Theodore Roosevelt, "The President's Message at the Opening of the Fifty-Seventh Congress, December 2, 1902." From The Roosevelt Policy: Speeches, Letters and ~!.~te f~er~ 8.~l~ti~g to C0!:.£Q~at~ ~~~th anQ CIQselY Relat~~ TOEics, edited by William Griffith, (New York: Scribners and Sons, 1919), 189.

8. John Mitchell, "The Coal Strike", MCClure's Magazine, 20:1, November 1902,221.

9. Haywood's union eschewed collective bargaining and relied on "direct action" of its workers in the mines to force concessions from the operators. For a more detailed description of Haywood's Western Federation of Miners, see Laura A. White, The Rise of the Industrial Workers of the World in Goldfle1d~-Nevada~--UnpubfIshed M:-A~ThesTs.--Unlversity Of-Nebraska ,--f912~ 28-37.

10. George F. Baer to John Mitchell, February 18, 1902. Quoted in Wright, 1177.

11. New York Ti~es, May 6, 1902.

78 79

12. See The Nation, 73:1924, May 15, 1902, 379, and 7 4 : 1 9 2 5, Ma y22 ,-1902; 4 0 1. The e d itoria 1 s des c ribe divisions within the UMW, and note that Mitchell did not want to strike. He is only criticized for promising too much and relying on the NCF. No comments are made specifically about the operators' stand.

13. New York Times, May 16, 1902.

14. Ibid., May 19,1902. 15. Ibid., June 5, 1902.

16. Wright, "Report to the President". Wright's report provided a detailed analysis of conditions in the industry and helped Roosevelt understand some of the main issues in the strike.

17. Cornell, The Anthracite Coal Strike of 1902, 110. Roosevelt worried that pUb11cation-~ wright~s report would be interpreted as an endorsement of its analysis.

18. United Mine Workers, Minutes of th~ Special Convention to Consider the AnthracIteStrike~ July 17-19, 1902. Indianapolis, 19~ 39.

19. Lincoln Steffens, "A Labor Leader of To-Day and What He Stands For", McClure's Magazine, 19:4, August, 1902, 355.

20. New York Times, August 1, 1902.

21. Theodore Roosevelt, Letters of Theodore Roose­ velt, Vol. 3, edited by Elting E. Morison, John M. Blum, an~John J. Buckley, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951),323.

22. Theodore Roosevelt, !he !:.~~!:~ Q! 1:heodo£~ 412"-.----Roosevelt. Roosevelt to Quay, September 19, 1902, Reel

23. Cornell, 1 74 .

24. Selections fro~ the Correspondence of Theodore ROQ~~~~! ~~~ !:!.~~E.Y Ca£ot 1.Q33.~ .!.884::.l.~~, edited by Henry Cabot Lodge, (New York: Scribners and Sons, 1925), Lodge to Roosevelt, September 27, 1902, 531-532. 80

25. Ibid., Roosevelt to Lodge, September 27, 1902, 533. 26. Letters, Vol. 3, Morison, et al. Roosevelt to Crane, October 22, 1902, 359.

27. Roosevelt, ~~Eer~. Notes of the October 3 conference and subsequent events. Roosevelt to Carroll Wright, October 8, 1902, Reel 412. 28. Letters to three of the President's closest advisors during the strike reflect this concern about an impending coal famine and subsequent unrest. See Selections, Lodge, ed., Roosevelt to Lodge, October 7, 1902-,-sT7=-5 3 8 • See a 1soLe t t e r s, M0 r i son, eta 1 ., e d s . , Roosevelt to Hanna, October-3-,-1902, 338 and Roosevelt to Winthrop Crane, October 22, 1902, 362.

29. Selections, Lodge, ed., Roosevelt to Lodge, October 7, 190'2;"537-=538. 30. Roosevelt, Papers. Roosevelt to Joseph B. Bishop, October 5, 1902, Reel 412.

31. New York Ti~es, October 4, 1902.

32. Roosevelt, ~~~E~. Notes of the October 3 conference and subsequent events. Roosevelt to Wright, October 8,1902, Reel 412.

33. Letters, Vol. 3, Morison, et al. Roosevelt to Robert Bacon, October 7, 1902, 344.

34. New York Times, October 7, 1902. The Secretary of-the -fIT1noIs-State Democratic Committee issued the call. 35. Letters Vol. 3, Morison, et al. Roosevelt to Crane, October 22"-,-1902, 363. 36. Cornell implies that it is unclear whether the operators knew. See The Anthracite Strike, 216 -12 7. For the view that the operators were aware of the plan, see Mowry, Era, 138. See also Henry Pringle, Theodore Roose­ ~~lt, ~ ~i2g£~~Y, (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1931), 192-193, and I.E.Cadenhead, Jr., Theodore Roosevelt, The Paradox of Progressivism, (Woodburi,-N-=-~: Barron's Educational Series, 1974), 83. 37. UMW Journal, 13:27, October 9, 1902. 81

38. Selections, Lodge, ed. Roosevelt to Lodge October 17, 1902~~40~541.

39. New York Times, October 17, 1902. The Nation, 7 5: 1 9 4 6, Oct-ober-1-6-,-1-9 0 2 . The Nat ion's editorial continued in its critical stand toward-t-heli."'i1ion. Whi Ie it did not praise Roosevelt directly, its tone clearly implied that his intervention was an unfortunate necessity.

40. Jonathan Grossman, "The Coal Strike of 1902 ­ Turning Point in u.S. Po1icy," Monthl y Labor Review, 98: 1 0 (1975), 27.

41. For the view that Roosevelt acted to preserve capitalism, see Philip S. Foner, Histo£Y Qi the Labor Movement in the United States, vol. 3, (New York: Interna­ tional"Publishers, 1964), 98. Edwin Berman in Labor Qi~putes and !~~ President of the Qnit~~ States.,-rNew York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 56-58, states that Roosevelt acted to prevent a famine. For the view that Roosevelt sought to undercut Hanna and show the operators who was boss, see Robert Wiebe, "The Anthracite Strike of 1902: A Record of Confusion," Mississippi Valley Histori­ cal Review, 48:2 (1961), 244-245. For descriptions that credlt-Roosevelt as a reform leader, see Joseph B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, Vol. 1, (New York: Scribners-an~SOns,--1920T~ and--Jacob Riis, Theodore Roosevelt: The Citizen, (New York: The Outlook Co., 190"4");-376-377: --Bcith-Bishop and Riis were personal friends of the President.

4 2 . For e x amp1 e , see Roo s eve1 t, !:~e r s . Will i a m Whitman to Roosevelt, October 2, 1902, Reel 412; Selections, Lodge, ed. Lodge to Roosevelt, October 11, 1902-,-S3g:-

43. Ira Kipnis, The American Socialist Movement, 1'§'.2.2=.1.2.l.~, (N e w Yo r k: COllim-b"1-a-ufiTve-rs i ty-Pr e s-s-,-T'952T:'" 139-141. A review of the Party's national newspaper, ~2~~1 !Q Rea~Q~ from May to October, 1902 reveals that the Socialists provided strike support but hardly played a leadership role.

44. See, for example, Selections, Lodge, ed. Roosevelt to Lodge, October 7, 1902-,-537-538. Letters, Vol. 3, Morison et al., Roosevelt to Crane, October~2, 1902, 357. 82

45. Robert Wiebe, "The Anthracite Strike of 1902", 244.

46. Letters, Vol. 3, Morison, et al. Roosevelt to Robert Bacon, October 5, 1902, 340.

4 7 . Roos eve 1 t, .!:~~E..~. Ge 0 r 9 e Cortel you toMark Hanna, October 6, 1902, Reel 412.

48. John Morton Blum, !he ~~public~~ ~oo~evelt. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 60-61. NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. Unfortunately, Roosevelt's major biographers paid scant attention to the Miller case. See, for example: Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, a Bi~9..!:.~Eb.Y... (New York: Harcourt~-Brace-and-W-o-rlcf;-Inc.~ 1956), I.E. Cadenhead, Jr., Theodore Roosevelt, The Paradox of Progressivism (Woodbury;-N:Y":: -"Barron-'s-F:duca= tional Series, 1974), George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1900-1912. (New York: -Harper-and R0 w-,-195 8)~--J-Ohn-M-.-BTuITl';"T h ~ E.~ u b 1i can Roo ~e v ~l!. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954). Blum and Cadenhead did not address the case. Mowry and Pringle mention it only in passing to cite Roosevelt's support for the open shop. I was unable to uncover any scholarly articles on the case.

2. williard B. Gatewood, Jr., Theodore Roosevelt an~ th~ ~rt of Co~!rov~£~y". (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), 143. Gatewood's work provides us with the most thorough explanation available of the details surrounding the Miller case. Given the dearth of secondary materials on the subject, his work provided much needed background information.

3. Ibid., 140-141.

4. Theodore Roosevelt, "The President's !"1es sage at the Opening of the Fifty-Seventh Congress, December 2, 1902." From The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. 15, edited by Herman Hagedor~ (NewYork:-C:h"arles Scribners and Sons, 1926), 167.

5. Theodore Roosevelt, Letters of Theodore Roose­ velt, Vol. 3, edited by Elting E. Morison, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 514n. See also Gatewood, 145-146.

6. Gatewood, 147.

7. Theodore Rooseve 1t, Addresses and Presidentia1 !i~~~~9.~~ 1902:..l~!. - (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1904),273.

8 . Ibid., 273.

9. Theodore Roosevelt, The E~~E~ ~i !~~odore Roosevel t. Palmer to Roosevelt, Jury 7, 1903, Reel 34.

83 84

10. Gatewood. See 148-149 for a detailed discus­ sion of Miller's charges towards Palmer.

11. Roosevelt, E~~~~. Cortelyou to Roosevelt, July 11, 1903, Reel 34.

12. Ibi£., Roosevelt to Cortelyou, July 13, 1903, Reel 331.

13. Ibid. Roosevelt wrote: "It looks to me as if Palmer has -ne>real control over his establishment, and in that case it is of course possible that there is the wildest extravagence of expenditures under him."

14. Literary Digest, 26:19-26 (May-June, 1903). In the May 16 edition the Br~oklYQ Eagl~, Bo~to~ E~~! and Hartford Times were cited as supporters of Cleveland's candIdacY~--In New York, The World and The Sun were regarded as sympathetic to the former President-.- Other newspapers in New York, Alabama, and Virginia were also mentioned as joining a Cleveland bandwagon.

15. New York Times, July 28, 1903, 6.

16. Theodore Roos eve 1 t, ~~ ~ utobi..2:l~b.Y. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1913), 520.

17. Ibid., 521.

18. G. Wallace Chessman, Theodore Roosevelt and the Pol~ti£~ ~! Po~~~. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1969), 93. See also Roosevelt, Letters, Vol. 3. Roose­ velt to Cortelyou, July 14, 1903;-sr~ In his letter, Roosevelt stated that the Anthracite Commission ruling for open shops in the mining industry should be applied to the public sector as well.

19. See Roosevelt, Letters, Vol. 3. Roosevelt to James Clarkson, July 16, 190~518~519. Roosevelt writes: "... 1 will not tolerate discrimination against a man because he does not belong to the union any more than against him because he does belong to it...The labor unions will have a square deal and the corporations will have a square deal, and in addition all private citizens sha11 have a square deal."

20. See, for example, Roosevelt, Letters, Vol. 3. Roosevelt to Cortelyou, July 13, 1903, 516. 85

21. Ibid. Roosevelt to Osvald Garrison Villard, Ju 1y 25, 190T~--5 31.

22. Gatewood, 151, 168-169.

23. Roosevelt, f~ers. Roosevelt to Palmer, August 22, 1903, Reel 331.

24. Lit~~~~y Qi~st, 27:10, (September 5, 1903), 278.

25. Louisville Courier Journal, cited in Literary Digest, 27 :lO(Septe-ffiber-S-,-1903T;-279.

26. Gatewood, 139.

27. Roosevelt, Pa~rs. James Clarkson to Roose­ velt, July 29,1903, Reel 35.

28. Selections fro~ the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918, Vol. 2, edited by Henry Cabot Lodge, (New York: Charles Scribners and Sons, 1925). Lodge to Roosevelt, September 13, 1903, 55. For another example of Lodge's enthusiasm for the Presi­ dent's action, see Lodge to Roosevelt, September 24, 1903, 57.

29. Roosevelt, Letters, Vol. 3. Roosevelt to Clarkson, July 16, 1903, -519.--

30. Gatewood,160-162.

31. Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and his Time, Vol. 1. {New York: Charles Scribners and Sons, 1920-)-,-250. See also Literary Di~st, 27:14 (October 3, 1903),413.

3 2. ~ i t ~~~~y Qi~ s t, 2 7 : 1 4 (Oc tobe r 3, 1 9 0 3 ), 4 1 1- 413. For example, the Federated Trades Council of Milwaukee claimed that the petition would only benefit the Democratic Party. The Knights of Labor refused, saying: "The President is one of the best friends that organized labor ever had in the White House." The ~~~g~~~!ed Journal of the Iron, Steel and Tin Workers praised Roose­ velt as the "heart and soul of the labor movement."

33. Samue 1 Gompers, Se~~nty I~~E~ .2.!. ~if e and La ~.2!...L An ~~ t 0 ~iQg!:.~y , Vol. 1. ( New Yo r k : E. P. Du t ton and Co., 1925), 527-536. In his memoirs, Gompers ignores the Miller case entirely. He spends nearly ten pages 86 describing his relationship with Roosevelt, discussing his contributions as an "advisor" to the President. He mentions occasional disagreements with Roosevelt on labor 'issues, but makes no mention of the GPO.

34. Roosevelt, !:~~£~. Gompers to Roosevelt, September 24, 1903, Reel 37. Two days earlier, Gompers had told the press that the AFL Executive Committee had not even bothered to discuss the Miller case while in session. See the Ne~ York Times, September 22, 1903, 1.

35. New York Times, September 22, 1903, 8.

36. Ibid., September 24, 1903.

37. Roosevelt, Letters, Vol. 3. Cited in Roose­ velt to Lodge, September-30-,-f903, 607.

38. American Federation of Labor, Report of !he Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annua 1 Convention of the American Federation of Labor, November 9-23, 1903. (was"Filngton-;---Tne-N"ationa1 -TrTb-une-co.-;-1903 )~89=90.----

39. Roosevelt, Letters, Vol. 3. Roosevelt to Lemuel Clarke Davis, October 5, 1903, 617-618.

4 O. Gate wood, 1 62- 1 64. See also AFL, Proceedings, 87, 142.

41. Gatewood, 165-172.

42. Roosevelt, Pa~rs. Roosevelt to Elihu Root, J une 2, 1 90 4 , Reel 334 . Roos eve1t pIac e d the Mill e rcas e in a similar perspective in another letter the prior year. See Roosevelt, Letters, Vol. 3. Roosevelt to Lyman Abbott, September 5, 1903, 591-592.

43. Theodore Roosevelt, Letters to Kermit from Theodore Roosevelt, 1902-1908, edited~Y-wITl-rrwin, (New York: Charles Scribners and Sons, 1946), October 26, 1904, 79.

44. Gatewood, 136, 174. While AFL membership continued to grow through 1904, employers often refused to yield on the closed shop issue. NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. Laura A. White, The Rise of the Industrial Workers of the World in Goldfield, Nevada. Unpublished M.A. thesis. University of Nebraska, 1912, 8. See also Russell R. Elliott, "Labor Troubles in the Mining Camp at Goldfield, Nevada, 1906­ 1908," Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 29, November 1950, 370.

2. Proceedings of The Founding Convention of the Industrial Workers of the World, (New York: Merit Publishers, 1969), 1. 3. White, 4-12.

4. IQig., 5-6. See also Elliott, 369.

5. Elliott, 370.

6. For a more thorough description of the 1906 strike and the events immediately following, see White, Rise, 28-37 and Melvin Oubofsky, We Shall Be All: A History of the Industrial Workers of the World, (New York: Quadrangle, New York Times Book Co., 1969), 121-122.

7. Paul F. Brissenden, The I.W. W.: A Study of American Syndicalism, (New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1957), 201.

8. White, 37.

9. Oubofsky, 120.

10. Philip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States, Vol. 4 (New York: International Publishers, 1965),94.

11. Oubofsky, 122; and Elliott, 373.

12. Earl Bruce White, "Might is Right: Unionism in Goldfield, Nevada, 1904-1908", Journal of the West, 16:3 (1977), 76.

13. Foner, Vol. 4, 94-96. 14. Elliott, 374-375.

15. Ibid., 375-377.

16. Ibid., 375-378.

87 88

17. Theodore Roosevelt, The Papers of Theodore Roosevelt. See, for example, Roosevelt to Senator Warren, December 15, 1907, Reel 414; Roosevelt to Charles Bonaparte, December 23, 1907, Reel 414; Roosevelt to Bonaparte, January 2, 1908, Reel 414; Roosevelt to George C. Lee, January 12, 1908, Reel 414. 18. Roosevelt, Paoers. Roosevelt to John Sparks, December 4, 1907, Reel 347.

19. Ibid., Roosevelt to Acting Secretary of War Oliver, December 6, 1907, Reel 347. 20. Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography, (New York: Charles Scribners and Sons, 1920), 376. 21. Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, Vol. 2, (New York: Charles Scribners and Sons, 1920), 62-63. 22. Roosevelt, Autobiography, 377. 23. For a more detailed description of the Cripple Creek Strike, see Philip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement, Vol. 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1964), 395-400. 24. Roosevelt, Papers. Carroll Wright to Roosevelt, June 21, 1904, Reel 45. In essence, Wright told the President that if he publicized the appointment of a commission, the issue might then gradually fade from public view.

25. Ibid. See, for example: Roosevelt to Wright, June 16, 1904, Reel 413; Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, June 28, 1904, Reel 413; Roosevelt to Wright, August 4, 1904, Reel 413; Roosevelt to Wright, August 5, 1904, Reel 413; Roosevelt to Wright, August 13, 1904, Reel 413; Roosevelt to Wright, August 22, 1904, Reel 413. 26. Ibid., Roosevelt to William H. Moody, August 24, 1904, Reel 413. 27. San Francisco Chronicle, December 7, 1907, 1-2, 6. New York Times, December 7, 1907, 2. 28. San Francisco Chronicle, December 5, 1907, 2. New York Times, December 7, 1907, 2. In the same edition of the Times, a dispatch reported that the local Sheriff disputed claims that he was unable to control the situation. 29. Miner's Magazine, 9:233, December 12, 1907, 6. 89

30. Ibid., 9:234, December 19, 1907, 5.

31. .I.l2.iJ;l. See, for example, 9:235, December 26, 1907, 8-11. This issue was particularly full of press clips critical of Roosevelt.

32. Edward Berman, Labor Disputes and the President of the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 66. 33. For example, see Foner, History, Vol. 4, 97. He argues that Roosevelt reluctantly agreed to the commission in response to an "outpouring of protests sent to the White House." 34. New York Times, December 11, 1907, 10. Literary Digest devoted its December 14 issue to a sampling of press reactions to Roosvelt's message to Congress. The December 21 issue focused upon the financial situation and the President's decision not to seek a third term. The first reactions to Goldfield appear in the December 28 issue, and merely contain two cartoons depicting Sparks bringing order to the town. 35. Roosevelt, Papers. Roosevelt to Sparks, December 17, 1907, Reel 428.

36. Elliott, 382. 37. Roosevelt, Papers. Roosevelt to Sparks, December 20, 1907, Reel 428.

38. Miners' Magazine, 9:235, December 26, 1907, 8.

39 . Roosevelt, Papers. Sparks to Roosevelt, December 26, 1907, Reel 428. 40. Ibid., Roosevelt to Sparks, December 28, 1907, Reel 428. 41. Congressional Record, sixtieth Congress, Session One, 1486. 42. The San Francisco Chronicle, in its December 31 issue, had actually criticized Sparks before the final report was released. Colliers 40:17, January 18, 1908, 6. Literary Digest 36:2, January 11, 1908. For a critical account of Roosevelt' s actions, see Max S. Hayes, "World of Labor", International Socialist Review, 8:7, January 1908, 439-440. (Reprint edition published by Greenwood Reprint Corp., 1968). Hayes wrote that Roosevelt withdrew the troops only to avoid labor criticism in an election year. For a popular analysis 90 of events written one month after the report was released, see Winfield Hogaboom, "The Last Stand at Goldfield", The Overland Monthly, 51:2, February 1908, 111-119. Hogaboom was an AP reporter sent to cover the strike. He supported the need for troops through the bitter end.

43. For examples of the "armed camp" view, see Brissenden, 197 and Foner, Vol. 4, 96-97. Dubofsky takes a different view. He agrees that both sides were well armed but insists that Goldfield was not in a state of war, and that local officials were quite capable of handling the situation (We Shall Be All, 122-124). E.B. White wrote that the town was relatively calm, at least until the operators initiated their "change-room" policy in August ("Might is Right", 80).

44. See Foner, Vol. 4, 96-97 for a highly critical analysis of Roosevelt. George E. Mowry credits the President for rectifying his mistake by removing the troops. (The Era of Theodore Roosevelt. 1900-1912), (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), 140. Edward Berman also praises Roosevelt for removing the garrison once he realized it was not needed. In his view, Roosevelt erred because he did not seek objective advice prior to sending the troops (Labor pisputes and the President, 64­ 65). Interestingly, some noted biographers of Roosevelt did not feel Goldfield was significant enough to warrant mention in their works. For example, Henry F. Pringle devoted nine pages to the anthracite strike of 1902, but none to Goldfield. (Theodore Roosevelt. a Biography, New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1931). I.E. Cadenhead, Jr. also omitted any reference to the Nevada incidents. (Theodore Roosevelt. The Paradox of Progressivism, Woodbury NY: Barron's Educational Series, 1974). Given the title of Cadenhead's work, one would assume that Goldfield offered an ideal topic for discussion.

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