Military Retiew I Hmq.Mm,Rqxmnwmoftheamv

Military Retiew i Hmq.mm,rqxmnwmoftheAmv ... .,... PrsPsred by i. USARMYCOMMANOANOGENERALSTAFFCOLLEGE VOLUMELXIX0 JANUARY19S9* NO 1 ., Pm&slonal Bullsth 100.S91 . COPlTEN7.S 2 Preparing for the Pasi by Chaplain (COL) Cecil B. Curre& US ArmY ReSerVe “i ‘ WlltatyRevlswStaff (xlm31PlwQw.clwaes 14 ti@narn hrsurgency or War? aLmwnc%# by tieutenent Colonel James R. Ward, U@JWWC(dOIW+LYIHINW@I US &ny Resewe, Refired . 24 Vietnam Baggag& g?zw The Honmobilization O~tion Rti#AnlEdtw by Brigadier General Michael W. Davidson, MI.D,hf.G4an@QY 0a3n .%ax Kentucky National Guard . Mrsi”*D. Shsnnen “’9a4a&Fa6fwss 33 Perspectives on US Involvement in Vietnam: Mr.@aiiea A. MiWIWXIIll .4r&Tdoa@l . 34 Wietnam: What It Was Really Like Lalin Anwkarr E&Ions by~ames Martin Davis EiucT...vsomn Lkimlamcmkma?cslksvaamw+s 45 O~cewhiw 1966-1971 cwssnAmY,s+@shE@w by Ca@n 7P) James Jay Carafano, US Army Em2,w&:m 53 ~ SoIdler Ponders the Pride by beutenant Colonel J!m Johnson, eyc4-d9r0f!it9asaelay01wsAfw US Army, Ratirad call EvvLwa Gsnsrsl,uilwela!e3Amy 6~ f%mhat Nurses Sti9faratrlrl - Yov Wo~’t Be Alone. OfHat, by Co/orle/ Sharon /. Rich/e, US Army wiu!amJ.rA3ehapll ‘ a@slfl?JGelEd, UnitadalskaAmY .. lhsA@tsntGeiwJ 74 Lessons Learned or bst sir Ca$alW and Nrmobili@ ~ by Shelby L. Stanton 8? T~@ Battle of the la Dwmg Valley by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth R. Pierce, US Army 9$ Insights by L4chael A. Palmer too Summaries the best from otherjournak ‘ 102 Letters ~ 106 Hews 1’ I to7 From My Bookshelf by Gener.4 William R. Richardson 108 Book Reviews contemporary reading for the professional ,. \ rmEls”eofMtiuvRcwwrevls*wuemam. %tmsaymatneat~fo,?btth,u kap ‘py, divisive chapter of am history recede mto oblivion.” Others say, “Soldwn tiiust never fctger It.“ 1 hold to the latter opmton. If anythtng, we have not thought nearly enough abut the meaning of Viemam to our Army and our nation. As an mstmtion,~dw US Amy has overcome the trauma d the Yiemam War. h ha. met the pustwar challenges and corrected the weaknesses IV tmmmg, dcctrine and equlpmenr modemtza uon caused by prolonged involvement m that demanding conflct. As a war-flghtmg organrca- . tton, the Army ts combat ready. Some cnmcs say that It E m barer shape now than it h= ever been m during peacetime. %Idwm and units are superbly tmmed, war.flghtmg dcctrine ts sound, mcdemtzmon of equipment continues and Army leaders fw+s on the fumre. Why then should Mhny Re”wtu resurrecr the bugbears of Liemam? The obvious reason. is that the thoughtful analysis of such a umque confhct instructs sold}ers and prepares them for fu ture war. Although Viemam was a ddflcult and dkferent war, m lessons are relevant to tcday’s mdltary challeng<. Ita potermal as a case study on the human element of war and mmal aspects 1 of combat s unhmlted. Moreover, Its le.sQtM are all the more cnt Ical when you consider that we are rapldl y hecommg a military force wmhour combar exp+mence. For example, this year’sclx at the US Army Command attd General Staff College has only’ 3.5Memam veterans m a student lmdy of 807 US offmers. These studerm are tommormw’s serum leaders. Another reason m momentary reflecr on Viemam ,s tbe ambq+o.s nature of the wv and the misconception.s ctmcerrtmg Amenca$ part m It. Setmtg Whncal conslderanons aside, rhe Uet - nam War offers a wealrh of mfi-mnanon on rhe fimtre of combat m the 21w century. Like the war, the lessons are emgmatlc and dltlcult to gmsp. Even some veretam of rhe confhcr are snll conf&d as to what It all meant. The mosr bewddered, however, are the ycmng IJfhcms. who never served rhere. Many O( them, wlthou~ the slightest blr of thoughtfld analysis, blame the press, poimcmns and the collapse of pubhc wdl for US failure. As the mosr astute critozs have pmtwwl’our, however, there is enough blaine to go around for every,one. Notvmhmttdmg the controvemal nature of the subject, we present d-m issue m stimulate re , flecnon on a crmcal peticd in our miiitaw I-&tow. It goes wlthout saying that none of thaw ar v’ ucles reflects official mdlta~ pobcy. They are merely the producrs of tbe mquirmg minds of a group of authors who care enough alxmr our profession and our natmn m think cntlcally about . war and its meaning. Lkmg Vhnam as a case study, they addrex strategy: tactics, Ieaderahlp, mobdtzmon and the human elemenr of war. Evetvthmg pres+mredhere ISrelevant m cmueni~ ‘J’ my problems facing mdltaw leaden. What better way to ponder these pmfessmnal challen~s. than to asses. them m the excruciatingly demandmg envmmmenr of the Vlemam War? ‘$ I suspect many of you wdl dsagree vehemently wirh some of the VWW5presmted here. That’%;J: >11~lghu that~ the Wy lea~mg GAS place. All we ask E that YOUcorroder each author’s dles~,. carefully, wegh hls views ad npinicms with those of YOUIown and crmcally test the validlty uf hls arguments. If you duagree with what’s d here, wrote us. We accepr Iemera, short cotmrer pmnt pwces and full-blow amcles of rebuttal. Keep m nmd that our goal ren’iains an enlight ened dmlo.gue. ~mtg our readers. Finally, as YOU pem5r these pages, remember that You qre am&tg gentlemen here. 3 mm’ ‘ r i ,, ( m ! ,,-. I ,! l-- Articies to Watch for: 1. Preparing fiw the Paat , Chaplain (COLJ Cecil B. Currey. US Army Reserve 8“ t Vietnam Baggii~W.-The NonmobijizationOption I Brigadier= General Michael W. Davidson, Kentucky National Guard ‘ ., . .. m 1“ Viatnam: Insurgencyor War? [ Lieutenant Colonel James R. Ward, US Army Reseme, Retfr,gd I i. I I . .. ! We nead reader feedback. Pleae%use tfljs C@ to com ment on thfs issue and to indice!e subjects of greatest interest to you for future issues. -. ! ~ . ,’ --- Articles to W&clw for: I 1 Low-IntensityCon$iict The Institutional Challenge . William J. Olson , .3 � The Strategic Imperatives for the United States in Latin A!pterice . Gene$al Fred F. Woerner. US Army S3 I From Small Wars to Counterinsurgency: US Mi tary intawentiona in Latin Arnarica Snca 189Jll Larry Yates 1’ , I ;, .. -. ~&gH&y~##fJ~~:swo— -. ,‘-,‘-11~111‘“--.. ml: : BUSINESSREPLYMAIL’ ‘ FLRSTCL4SS‘ PESMIT NO. 12062 WASHINGTON,IX. “ POSTAGSWIIl. BE MID BYDEPARTMENTOF ASMY -; . t . Military Review ‘-!! WAmyGnumsndsnd GeaeralStafFColIege ~ ; lbrtLemmmr@Eaaeas 4602%91O -?’ ;. ,’ . 3/ ( ‘EPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ‘lLITARY R~VIEW (USPS , ~=830) U S ARMY COMMANO 8 GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE Wsm’x ..9 ,f,~ ,A,D ‘rp~R!FJfb, o, ,.c ~fik$, , FCY+T LEAVENWORTH KANSAS 6602769 ~o .,, [.,. ~,,, u ,!. ! ,,? 8,,, ., ,* OFF:CIAL BUSINESS ‘EhAL~ FOR PRIVATE “s[ ~300 ,4 .,, ,(, 1 Low-Intensity Conflict: The Institutional Challenge William J. Olson !S! 1 . Ti-Ie Strategic hnperativesf orthe lhite~ States in Latin America”” . N THE early years of America’s struggle m form of small war, a g:erritta operation in 1Vietnam, an important man spoke out which we have a long record against the Indi against a trend he saw developing there. ana. Any well-trained organization can sh~ft Edward G. Lansdale, the original “ugly the tempo to that which might be required in American: was this nation’s greatest expert thii kind of situation.” on unconventional and errilla warf&e. An General Lymair L. Lemnitzer, .ArmY intelligence agent, he ha T successfully maater Chairman of the JCS from 1960 -1961,,resist minded Ramon Magsaysay’scampaign against ed pressures from the new Kennedy adminis- Hukbalahap guerrillw & the Philippines and had then beeq reassigned to Vietnam. He wrote these prophetic words: “The harsh fact . is that, despite the use of overwhelming Wespite the srseofoverwhekirse amounts of men, money zmd materiel, despite zbronnisof men, money arrdim+krie~ales. the q~tity of well-meant American advice pite thequantityof weU.m’eantAmericars and d&pite the impressive statistics of casrral adm”ceanddespitetheimpressivesrirtisrics [ties inflicted on the Vietcong, the Commu of casmdtiesintlictedon the Vetcorrg, nist subversive insurgents . still retain the . the CmismurdstsedrversiveIir.sugenfs . sdflmerintheirritiariveto actat initiative to act at their will in the very areas . of Vietnam where Wemamese and American dteirwillin the veryarws of Wetmmr where WetmmsesearrdAnrericarr efforts efforts have been most concentrated.”! What have ken mostconcentmted.” he observed in 196+ would become increas-. ingly true as the years passed. The reason for the failure of American ef 1 forts in Vlernam is clear. The military man tratiwr to consider new approaches kr Vet. agers of that era did not understand the kind nam. The young president, Lemnitrer said, of war facing them. \They believed conven was “oversold” on guerrilla warfare. Taylor> tional approaches to combat, so successful in agreed. “All ttus ctoud of dust thar’s coming all theaters of operations during World War II out bf the white House really isn’t neces- i and in which they were trained and prepared, mry.”~ “BMin~ as usual” was the watchword could easily subdue an ill-equipped and ill of the day as mditary managers ptorred tactics rmined guerrilla force in Viemam. General in Southeast .Ma with an “Alice in Pent?, George Decker, Army chief of sraff from gonland” ap~oach. ..,3; 196C-1962, calmly observed that “any good Except for James Gavin’s earty quiet soldler can handle guerrillas.” His successor, that American troops be restricted to co ,ral General brie G. Wheeler, top soldier of the enclaves in Viemam, no American, ge@d Army from 1962-1964, announced that “the publicty protesfd any military policy ‘or:.de essence of the uroblem in V]emarn Is, mih cried the knkrupt tactics used there. Nor dld rary.” Generat Maxwell D. Taylor was Chair any American generat resign m protest, no man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from matter how much he might later ~h:ve 1961–1964.

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