Military Retiew i Hmq.mm,rqxmnwmoftheAmv ... .,... PrsPsred by i. USARMYCOMMANOANOGENERALSTAFFCOLLEGE VOLUMELXIX0 JANUARY19S9* NO 1 ., Pm&slonal Bullsth 100.S91 . COPlTEN7.S 2 Preparing for the Pasi by Chaplain (COL) Cecil B. Curre& US ArmY ReSerVe “i ‘ WlltatyRevlswStaff (xlm31PlwQw.clwaes 14 ti@narn hrsurgency or War? aLmwnc%# by tieutenent Colonel James R. Ward, U@JWWC(dOIW+LYIHINW@I US &ny Resewe, Refired . . 24 Vietnam Baggag& g?zw The Honmobilization O~tion Rti#AnlEdtw by Brigadier General Michael W. Davidson, MI.D,hf.G4an@QY 0a3n .%ax Kentucky National Guard . Mrsi”*D. Shsnnen “’9a4a&Fa6fwss 33 Perspectives on US Involvement in Vietnam: Mr.@aiiea A. MiWIWXIIll .4r&Tdoa@l . 34 Wietnam: What It Was Really Like Lalin Anwkarr E&Ions by~ames Martin Davis EiucT...vsomn Lkimlamcmkma?cslksvaamw+s 45 O~cewhiw 1966-1971 cwssnAmY,s+@shE@w by Ca@n 7P) James Jay Carafano, US Army Em2,w&:m 53 ~ SoIdler Ponders the Pride by beutenant Colonel J!m Johnson, eyc4-d9r0f!it9asaelay01wsAfw US Army, Ratirad call EvvLwa Gsnsrsl,uilwela!e3Amy 6~ f%mhat Nurses Sti9faratrlrl - Yov Wo~’t Be Alone. OfHat, by Co/orle/ Sharon /. Rich/e, US Army wiu!amJ.rA3ehapll ‘ a@slfl?JGelEd, UnitadalskaAmY .. lhsA@tsntGeiwJ 74 Lessons Learned or bst sir Ca$alW and Nrmobili@ ~ by Shelby L. Stanton
8? T~@ Battle of the la Dwmg Valley by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth R. Pierce, US Army 9$ Insights by L4chael A. Palmer
too Summaries the best from otherjournak ‘ 102 Letters ~
106 Hews 1’ I to7 From My Bookshelf by Gener.4 William R. Richardson
108 Book Reviews contemporary reading for the professional ,. \ rmEls”eofMtiuvRcwwrevls*wuemam. %tmsaymatneat~fo,?btth,u kap ‘py, divisive chapter of am history recede mto oblivion.” Others say, “Soldwn tiiust never fctger It.“ 1 hold to the latter opmton. If anythtng, we have not thought nearly enough abut the meaning of Viemam to our Army and our nation. As an mstmtion,~dw US Amy has overcome the trauma d the Yiemam War. h ha. met the pustwar challenges and corrected the weaknesses IV tmmmg, dcctrine and equlpmenr modemtza uon caused by prolonged involvement m that demanding conflct. As a war-flghtmg organrca- . tton, the Army ts combat ready. Some cnmcs say that It E m barer shape now than it h= ever been m during peacetime. %Idwm and units are superbly tmmed, war.flghtmg dcctrine ts sound, mcdemtzmon of equipment continues and Army leaders fw+s on the fumre. Why then should Mhny Re”wtu resurrecr the bugbears of Liemam? The obvious reason. is that the thoughtful analysis of such a umque confhct instructs sold}ers and prepares them for fu ture war. Although Viemam was a ddflcult and dkferent war, m lessons are relevant to tcday’s mdltary challeng<. Ita potermal as a case study on the human element of war and mmal aspects 1 of combat s unhmlted. Moreover, Its le.sQtM are all the more cnt Ical when you consider that we are rapldl y hecommg a military force wmhour combar exp+mence. For example, this year’sclx at the US Army Command attd General Staff College has only’ 3.5Memam veterans m a student lmdy of 807 US offmers. These studerm are tommormw’s serum leaders. Another reason m momentary reflecr on Viemam ,s tbe ambq+o.s nature of the wv and the misconception.s ctmcerrtmg Amenca$ part m It. Setmtg Whncal conslderanons aside, rhe Uet - nam War offers a wealrh of mfi-mnanon on rhe fimtre of combat m the 21w century. Like the war, the lessons are emgmatlc and dltlcult to gmsp. Even some veretam of rhe confhcr are snll conf&d as to what It all meant. The mosr bewddered, however, are the ycmng IJfhcms. who never served rhere. Many O( them, wlthou~ the slightest blr of thoughtfld analysis, blame the press, poimcmns and the collapse of pubhc wdl for US failure. As the mosr astute critozs have pmtwwl’our, however, there is enough blaine to go around for every,one. Notvmhmttdmg the controvemal nature of the subject, we present d-m issue m stimulate re , flecnon on a crmcal peticd in our miiitaw I-&tow. It goes wlthout saying that none of thaw ar v’ ucles reflects official mdlta~ pobcy. They are merely the producrs of tbe mquirmg minds of a group of authors who care enough alxmr our profession and our natmn m think cntlcally about . war and its meaning. Lkmg Vhnam as a case study, they addrex strategy: tactics, Ieaderahlp, mobdtzmon and the human elemenr of war. Evetvthmg pres+mredhere ISrelevant m cmueni~ ‘J’ my problems facing mdltaw leaden. What better way to ponder these pmfessmnal challen~s. than to asses. them m the excruciatingly demandmg envmmmenr of the Vlemam War? ‘$ I suspect many of you wdl dsagree vehemently wirh some of the VWW5presmted here. That’%;J: >11~lghu that~ the Wy lea~mg GAS place. All we ask E that YOUcorroder each author’s dles~,. carefully, wegh hls views ad npinicms with those of YOUIown and crmcally test the validlty uf hls arguments. If you duagree with what’s d here, wrote us. We accepr Iemera, short cotmrer pmnt pwces and full-blow amcles of rebuttal. Keep m nmd that our goal ren’iains an enlight ened dmlo.gue. ~mtg our readers. Finally, as YOU pem5r these pages, remember that You qre am&tg gentlemen here. 3 mm’ ‘
r i ,, ( m ! ,,-. I ,! l-- Articies to Watch for: 1. Preparing fiw the Paat , Chaplain (COLJ Cecil B. Currey. US Army Reserve 8“ t Vietnam Baggii~W.-The NonmobijizationOption I Brigadier= General Michael W. Davidson, Kentucky National Guard ‘ ., . .. m 1“ Viatnam: Insurgencyor War? [ Lieutenant Colonel James R. Ward, US Army Reseme, Retfr,gd I i. I I ......
!
We nead reader feedback. Pleae%use tfljs C@ to com ment on thfs issue and to indice!e subjects of greatest interest to you for future issues. -.
! ~
. ,’ --- Articles to W&clw for: I 1 Low-IntensityCon$iict The Institutional Challenge . William J. Olson , .3 � The Strategic Imperatives for the United States in Latin A!pterice . . Gene$al Fred F. Woerner. US Army
S3 I From Small Wars to Counterinsurgency: US Mi tary intawentiona in Latin Arnarica Snca 189Jll Larry Yates 1’ , I ;, .. -.
~&gH&y~##fJ~~:swo— -. ,‘-,‘-11~111‘“--.. ml: : BUSINESSREPLYMAIL’ ‘ FLRSTCL4SS‘ PESMIT NO. 12062 WASHINGTON,IX. “ POSTAGSWIIl. BE MID BYDEPARTMENTOF ASMY -; . t
. . Military Review ‘-!! WAmyGnumsndsnd GeaeralStafFColIege ~ ; lbrtLemmmr@Eaaeas 4602%91O -?’
;. . . ,’ .
3/
( ‘EPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ‘lLITARY R~VIEW (USPS , ~=830) U S ARMY COMMANO 8 GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE Wsm’x ..9 ,f,~ ,A,D ‘rp~R!FJfb, o, ,.c ~fik$, , FCY+T LEAVENWORTH KANSAS 6602769 ~o .,, [.,. ~,,, u ,!. ! ,,? 8,,, ., ,* OFF:CIAL BUSINESS ‘EhAL~ FOR PRIVATE “s[ ~300 ,4 .,,
,(,
1
Low-Intensity Conflict: The Institutional Challenge William J. Olson
!S! 1 . Ti-Ie Strategic hnperativesf orthe lhite~ States in Latin America”” .
N THE early years of America’s struggle m form of small war, a g:erritta operation in 1Vietnam, an important man spoke out which we have a long record against the Indi against a trend he saw developing there. ana. Any well-trained organization can sh~ft Edward G. Lansdale, the original “ugly the tempo to that which might be required in American: was this nation’s greatest expert thii kind of situation.” on unconventional and errilla warf&e. An General Lymair L. Lemnitzer, .ArmY intelligence agent, he ha T successfully maater Chairman of the JCS from 1960 -1961,,resist minded Ramon Magsaysay’scampaign against ed pressures from the new Kennedy adminis- Hukbalahap guerrillw & the Philippines and had then beeq reassigned to Vietnam. He wrote these prophetic words: “The harsh fact . . . is that, despite the use of overwhelming Wespite the srseofoverwhekirse amounts of men, money zmd materiel, despite zbronnisof men, money arrdim+krie~ales. the q~tity of well-meant American advice pite thequantityof weU.m’eantAmericars and d&pite the impressive statistics of casrral adm”ceanddespitetheimpressivesrirtisrics [ties inflicted on the Vietcong, the Commu of casmdtiesintlictedon the Vetcorrg, nist subversive insurgents . . . still retain the . the CmismurdstsedrversiveIir.sugenfs . . . sdflmerintheirritiariveto actat initiative to act at their will in the very areas . of Vietnam where Wemamese and American dteirwillin the veryarws of Wetmmr where WetmmsesearrdAnrericarr efforts efforts have been most concentrated.”! What have ken mostconcentmted.” he observed in 196+ would become increas-. ingly true as the years passed. The reason for the failure of American ef 1 forts in Vlernam is clear. The military man tratiwr to consider new approaches kr Vet. agers of that era did not understand the kind nam. The young president, Lemnitrer said, of war facing them. \They believed conven was “oversold” on guerrilla warfare. Taylor> tional approaches to combat, so successful in agreed. “All ttus ctoud of dust thar’s coming all theaters of operations during World War II out bf the white House really isn’t neces- i and in which they were trained and prepared, mry.”~ “BMin~ as usual” was the watchword could easily subdue an ill-equipped and ill of the day as mditary managers ptorred tactics rmined guerrilla force in Viemam. General in Southeast .Ma with an “Alice in Pent?, George Decker, Army chief of sraff from gonland” ap~oach. ..,3; 196C-1962, calmly observed that “any good Except for James Gavin’s earty quiet soldler can handle guerrillas.” His successor, that American troops be restricted to co ,ral General brie G. Wheeler, top soldier of the enclaves in Viemam, no American, ge@d Army from 1962-1964, announced that “the publicty protesfd any military policy ‘or:.de essence of the uroblem in V]emarn Is, mih cried the knkrupt tactics used there. Nor dld rary.” Generat Maxwell D. Taylor was Chair any American generat resign m protest, no man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from matter how much he might later ~h:ve 1961–1964. In the years just ahead he would claimed to disagree with standing operating increasingly oc~py an ever more importamt procedures. No fidl generals, no lieutenant @itical rote as an elder military statesman in generals, no major generals, no brigadier gen American deatings with Vlemarn. He spoke erals. } They all seemed to agree with the ap. out even more clearly of hrs dkrrste for any preach called for by “General W~lliam special approach to this new form of conflict. Wesrmoretand. At the Waldorf m New York Counterinsurgency, he believed, “is just a CTty in April 1967, Wesrmoreland described
MILITARY REVIEW. January 1989 ~ 3
,,. j
America’s milita~ ~licy in Vietnarm “In ef ble. He uses blood ,~stead of ,brains. ‘ . fect we are fighting a war of atmnrrn. The ~he United States was strategzicallv bank. only alternate ISa war of annihdation.”+ No &pt in Vletrram.”5 Certainly no-Army leade~ fellow general took hlm to task. It W* Dave has ever taken upon hunself, nor has the gov R. Palmer, then a herrtenant colonel (and ernment of the nation ever attempted to as. now ,a lieutenant general), who spoke out, certain, any responslbdmy for the military de ‘criticizing Wes~oreland for hls hmited lmag bacle in Vlemam. ) manom “. . . attrition is not a strategy. h is Neither then nor since has any ot%ctal roil. irrefutable proof of the absence of any stmt itary spokesman or afiy Army school pubhcly egy. Aco nrnramler who resorts to artnrrqp ad adrwtted that its trammg progmm, its stmtegy” mmsh[sfadure tocmrceiveof an,akernativg. .x its tactr~s m V~etnam were m error. No !ie tmns from warfweas an art and accepG It. . leader $as, publicly suggested that the ArmY on the most nonprofessional terms imrigina fought the, wrong war in the wrong way, thus . .= ., ,.
.’ 4 .. January 1989. MILITARY REVIEW . . , .* . . PREPARING
rnahng the results there a foregone conclu Lieurenanr Colonels W1l\tam Corson and sion. Colonel David Hackworth, the most Cd Bernard, and Majg Jean Sauvageot. decorated soldier of the Vlemam era, who fi Race went to VIemam mioally as an Army mlly resigned his commssion m protest, blt officer in the mid- 1960s. Assigned as an ad. terly commented that “We had all the assets wser to a district chief in ?huoc Tuy Prov- to win thw war. . . . No doubt we could have won if we’d had commanders who know how to use rhe.$e asser5.”6 EuceptforJanresGavin%early It is not that leadefi then were not offered qw”eturging/ha&Americantroopsbe alternatives. Time and again they were msm”ctedto coastidenclavesin %iemam, warned of the consequences of their obstina no Americangenemlpubliclyprvtested cy. Gne of this century’s most insightful theo any militarypolfcyor decrr.~ the reticians of guerrilla warfare, Robert Taber, bankrupttacticausedthere.Nor did any wrote his bcok, The War bf the Fkw, in 1965, just at the time President Lyndon ‘B.Johnson. American genetzdresigninprvtes~ no matter how much he mightMer was beginning to send massive numbers of have CfainledtodisagreewithsSamYng American troops to !hemam. The Army pur Operatingpmcedums. cbed large quantmes of tlis &ok for mter ml pinpoint dkmbunon, yet m leaders paid scant h9ed to Taber’s wammgs. Guerrilla war fae, Taber said, is “the single sure methcd by ince, he saw clearly that there was a “gener which an unarmed population can overcome ally poor American preparation for dealing mechamzed armies, or, failing to overcome, wdr Southeast Asia.” Everi worse, few were them, can stalemate them and make them ir capable of any “understanding of rev&mon relevant.’” ,He insisted that there % only one ary social movement ,“ and the Army seemed means of defeating an insurgent people who not to care. II Wdbam Cmson was a Marine’ will not surrender, and that is exterrmnation. officer, for a time in charge of that force’s There. i* only one way to control a temtory Combined Action Platoons program in the I that harbors resistance, and that E to turn .Ir Corps sector of V{emam. After his hasty re mto a desert. Where these means cannot, for tirement, he lamented that the American whatever reason, be used, the war is lost.”8 mihtaw effort “was not and IS not war, iL”iS % Robert Thompson agreed. This British gencmde.’”z ‘... , ., expert on counterguemlla warfare m Malaya Bernard was a Province Semor Ad$i$ec be wrote that ;where a guemlla force erqoys sup fore reassignment as a student to the Ar&J’s port from the people, whether willing or Command and General Staff College a@+xt forced, It can never be defeated by military Leavenworth. In 1969 he noted wirH @ter- rrrearrs, however much it is harassed and at ness that “ommous and far reaching is the tacked, shelled, mortared, and Immbed by srr cavaher disregard of. . . US commanders for perior forces of infantry and artdle~, air and the dictates of the ‘pacification’ pro~, m sea power.’” At a later time, Thompson ob their headlong rush to ‘kdl VC Wietcongl’— served that “while there have been plenty of stall touted as the obJective. . . . The tools of younger Americans, both military and ci the Wetcong are primarily rron-mibtary [while vd[ian], who have had a good understanding those of the United States] overwhehnmgly of the war, they have made no impression at are mditary. . . This basic failure has in all on the system.’”o Some of those younger sured that the enemy becomes stronger each voices belonged ro men such as Jeffrey Race, yedr, despite heroic hsts of KIA [k!lled” in
MILITARY REVIEW* January 1989 5
. ,, , (1 One of thiscentury?snrosrina&sttidtlremptickmsofgsrerrjlhwarAm, Robert TaberjWE hisimok,The Warof & Fle+ jII 1965. Gue&’ e, Ta&.r=”d, jS “the single sw method by whichan srnartnedpoprrktioncanovexome meckanfzed* m“es,or, Ms& to overcome them, canstalematethem,ad make them inelevant.
!, action], weapons captured, VC eliminated, American mdltary ~actics. “It is unreahstic and kill ratios, The US contimies to concen. and, therefore, analytically unfeasible, to look , &ate the bulk of . . . resources and military at anything in ~lemam from stictly a milit~’ might on controlling the terrain and Iockng p6int of view. .’. . Everything we did fiad] a for massed enemy formations. The VC con plitlcal impact and the war was basicalty pQ . tinues to concentrate ita talents on contml btical.”” ting the people. Each succeeds,’’” These comments, and literally hundreds Sauvageot served repeated tours in Viet like them which could be added, have been nam. For a time he was a member of Lam. quoted not because theu warnings were dale’s country team there. He became one of unique, but because they bespoke the con the Army’s top. experts on that beleaguered stant sentiments of many mid.levet officers country. Some years ago, he told me that who recognized the inadequacies of America’s “there is, I think, some kind of correlanon milmry tactics and smategy m Vietnam. NQ between the inordi~te use of firepower . . . one heeded their clarion call. Insisting on its and the loss of legitimacy for the government own rectitude, the Army resented such indi that we were supporting. . . . When you kill viduals and condemned crittcs of whatever a lot of the wrong people, noncombatants, as background, suggesting that they spoke from a foreigner in that country, you are handing lack of information or experience, or for per *e Communist enemy for,free a lot Oi propa sonal gain. Thousands of critics were muted ganda.” He wrote dorens crfrepxts that went and dozens forced into retirement. Yet what through channels to higher headquarters in happened m Wemacn was clear. tier KK re. which he spoke plainly ‘of /he failures of tirement, Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard
6 Janua~ 19890 MILITARY REVIEW
. .. So&y drey tak abouthow to use heficoptess,how to usear/mor, howcom. m-”cations = employed, how to msupplyin thejmgfe.. . . Unfortunatel~.arone of these dungshave arsy relevanceusa mal10w.im%msivesituation. . . . What the Army doesn’t understandeven yet is thatitlostthe mat a leveiit doesn’t even see.”
may have said it best. “We invented a form of. Two years later, 40 hours of the 10-month war which only we could fight snd whl~h was i course were devoted to the study of low> irrelevant to long-term political objec+lves. intensity conflicts (LICs). By 1980 only eight ,. .Ocsr heritage to our ally was a form of hours of msttuction were still offered, al ; warfare he could not sustain.’”s though currently the school requires 33 hours V’ Because it never seemed able to achieve m and offers five electwe corsrs& in that subject. m-ategic objectives in Vietnam, &e militmy h other mllltary schools, the subject was was not particularly keen on emphasizing the completely dropped from courses of .instidc nature of guerrilla warfare even in the midst tion. Notwithstardng the recent surge~ofac of that conflict. After the fall of Saigon, it tivity exemphfied by the creation of&e $ - quickly relegated the theory and practice of cial Operations Command (Joint) at Ml, 8 dl guenilla warfare to a minor role. When J at Air Force Base, the JFK Special Warfare ‘” tended the Command and General Staff Col Center at Fort Bragg, the Center for Low- lege in 1975, little official .wrennon was fO Inte~iry Ck@ict (Joint) at Langley Au Force cused on the nature of revolutior& warhre. E?meand several force mucture changes,}it ap Few hours in the curriculum were devoted to prs that “the US Army still does not regard u, despite the fact that Jean Sauvageot was by guerrilla warhre, insurgency and counterinsur “ then a member of the faculty there. There gency as being unique and is unwilling to devote was little time given him during the school substantial resources to preparing for our mcist day, and he had to offer sessions in the afrer likely form of involvement.’”; k remains to . ncon and evening on a voluntary attendance be seen, if this increased attention to LIC/ basis. counterinsurgency will amount to any sig
MILITARY REVIEW e January 1989
) the war at a level ir doesn’t even see. . . . The worst problem ISthat it will on[v be an, other couple of years before anybocly WA real insight into whm went wrong in Viemam will be out of busincs...’” Despite the unwillingn~ of the Army to focus carefully on any form of combat oiher I than the conventional combined arms tactics it wdi use in Europe to parry any thrust west. wrwd by Warsaw Pact Wwers, its inrhliry to address unconventional threats is recognized at the highest levels. In the winter of 1984 85, General Wallace H. Nutting, former commander of US forces in Latin America , and the US Readiness Command, testified , before Congress abour the military’s capability , to engage unconventional enemies. “AS a na. Yllsemis, I think,somekirrdof tion,” he said, “we seem not to well under. correlationbetween the inom!inateuseof wand dus form of conflict, nor are we well or iitepower. . . andtheIosaof l~”dmacy fim gamzed to cope wmh it.” The general mis thegovermrrentthd we weit supporting. .qmke. The nation IS more aware than IS its . . . When you kilfalot of the wmngpeo. military leadership. At least he recognized pie, nonwmbatafm, as a fom&r2erinthat that “this is the central strategic Issue facing cosmtrx you arehandingthe Cbnrnunist the United States today.’’” enemy for free alot ofpmpagano%.” A former administrator at the Army War College, now reined, spoke correctly when he once admitted that “the Army has been ducking m responsibilities. . . . 1 dunk that nifkant improvements in actual capabiln-y. because of Vlemam, our longest and mpst A concomitant problem has been caused traumatic war, and one we can truly say we by a lack of experienced teachers at such mill. lost, we’ve got to look reside-not for scape- tary sehmls. Those ,who once had some ex gears, not or winch hunts, hut m an oblec- , ).. . pertise in counterinsurgency activities and tive, responsible wa% wlrhoutbmses.’”” who taught h theory and practice to others Regnant voices within the Army today, have now gone on to other as.w~ents or m- however, seem to echo neither this retired to retirement. “So today they talk about how. colonel’s hope that we might learn something to use helicopters, how to use armor, how from the Vietnam debacle, nor Nutting’s comcnumcations are employed, how to resup concern that the military must lean how to ply rn the jungle . . . . Unfortunately, none cope w]th indigenous insurgenciea. A more of these things have any relevance in a real m-ident voice hm been heard throughout the low-intensive situation. They fought a’ mid land. A popular natioml Sunday supplement intenaity war and called i{ a low intenstve magazine” cried out m 1983 that “In US one. SO, of course, when they speak of les rnihtary circles, COL Harry [G.] Summers sons !earned, then that’s where the . . Jr. is regarded as the man of the hour. . . . lessons learned came from. ‘What the Arcriy we] is the author of On Stmteg-y,a book that doesn’t understand even yet is that it lost explains why we !ost the war in Viemam. , . . 8 January 1989 � MILITARYREVIEW I Copies have been sent to everf member of Ccmgres+, and in the upper echelons of the Pentagon, it is considered ‘must readhg.’”’” Summers’ view is one of the more curious, and dangerous, expressions of opinion that hav~ appeared in print to explain what hap. pened to America’s fortunes in Vletnarm Hs s~m volume was first produced by the Strate. gic Studies Institutej of the US Army War College and. then la~er issued by Presidio Press. A selection by the Military Book Club, the book was the subj& of a New York‘hrres wire service article by Drew Middleton and has been reviewed favorably in Army publica tions such as Mifitrny Review and Armor mag azine. The latter publication proclaimed that Summers’ book “cutdd be the most impmtant “ At&his retimmen~Br&adier analytical military literature p’reduced by a GeneiafDorrgksKinnardmay have saidit member of our Armed Forces since Alfred besL ‘We inverrtedafornrof warwhich Thayer Mahan wrote his great treatise on onfy we couldt7ghtand whichwasinele. seapower, almost a century ago.” varrtto long-termpoliticalobjectives. It k little wcnder that some within the md. . . . Ourheri@ge toourallywaaaform itary might pmise this effort. Writing as the of warfimshe coufdnot srrstairr.” complete’Army apologist,+irmmers has rt+rr rected the old and discredited view that the mihtmy failed in Southeast Asia because of a lack of will on the home front. Central to his hls dAike for the “usel .. MILITARY REVIEW * January 1989 9, . r @were facing Soviet hordes bursting through h~ inmoduction to d-k fmt edition of Sum. Europe’sFulda Gap or the Hof Corridor. Thk mers’ work, Smith described Grr Strategy as milimry spokesman notes with approval that “one man’s critical amlysis” which became . “somewhat controversial even before its publ$ation.” Its contents, the general wrote, “can be contested,” for the book “by ~no Summers asserfs thatAnrenca means represents the ultimate judgment, nor sbotddhave fwusedi(s attentionrroton is it without flaws. But it exists. . . .“ theguenilb warrhdreSouth,butrather Smith continued his observatiorx “I have I on North Wetnamwhichwasthereal . . said that this book is not perfect or all: enemy. He afiirmshis&dike for the inclusive and orhers will share that view. . . . ‘us&ss’et%rts expendeddmirtgtheb. It is very much one man’s opinion. . . . Some en-canem on suchpmgmms ss pacification, may feel that it puts too much blame on po. mttionb@ing, internalsecrm”ty Iitical and social shortcomings, and not rundconstruction,[and]heut.mlization enough on the substantial faults which the Operations..,. Ckmnterinsurgenc~in war revealed within the armed forces them Summers’ vikw,consumedboth tie selves. Still others may find it unsubstarrtial, andeneigy betterusedin o%ectassauhs or unappreciative in dealing with counterin agarbstNorthWetmun. . surgency and the tachcal war. And my own special concern is that it seems not to stress enough the enormous force, depth, and con the Army swept away coontermaurgency doc sequence of the moral judgment which many trines as a result of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War gcecl Americans made against the war itself despite their continued relevance m the Gri even when they were serrsitive to the decen ent. He sighs with relief at the recollection cY. valOr and commitment of most who that the Army War College de-emphasized fought in Vlemam.”2’ counterinsurgency irrstn+tion. Such a posture Smith’s disclaimers to the contrary, the makes clear that he understands neither con Army tcdrry seems to have adopted Summers’ ventional nor revolutionary warfare. views as the perfect explanation for what Nor is Summers bashful about explaimng went wrong in Vietnam. The danger is that what should have been done in Vietnam dur hav:.~ dorre so, having determined that the ing the 1960s. A strategic offensive against . problems there were caused only by an insuf. the North, he believes, was clearly in order. ficient application of traditional combat American troops should have been thrown power, the Army is released from any necessi , 1 irrto battl north of the demarcation zone and ty for further contemplation of its mistakes. It the 17t Parallel. The waste of lives would paid too much attention to internal defense and developmerv. k knows d-h because it has I have $ en great. Widening of the war would haye been inevitable. The erstwhile author been told so by an ‘expert.’ It will not have to cum strategist seems unshaken by }he ramfl recogmze that cormterinsufgency will rernam cations of such actions. That these things di~ for the foreseeable finure as “the central stm. not happen was a result, he avers, of flabby tegic issue facing the United States toda~.”zz pciitical wills by civilians at home. It can prepare for the future by returning to The best assessment of these hopelessly those halcyon days of the past when it did w ~ flawed ideas was set forth by Lieutenant Gen well against the Gerrmms and Japanese by in eral DeWltt C. Smith Jr., a former comman tensive applications of komba~ power. dant at the War College and now retired. In Did the Army pay too much attention to January 1989. MILITARY REVIEW lLmsdWobservedduKditoo oumyofdrosein tiremifitarybelieve thatthey “cango in someplaceandshoot up ev&yt&ksgmrdeveryone... expect someone like me to show upon the scene mrdgoover it m“tham~”c wandmrd causeeveryone to smileandsa~ We love you Amen--,’ andthenwme up . andkissuson the cheek. Human aaiumisn‘tlike&a&” %J internal defense and development in Viet Four paragraphs out of a 31-page repcrr.~, nam ? A Icok at the documents is revealing. written by Malor General Frederick ,,C.aW&y Every senior officer leaving Vletnarn was to and, commanding general of 11 Field Force fde a report detailing his actions and attitudes Vemarn from 1 July 1967 to 1 AugrAt $968, for the period of time covering his service emphasized paciflcat ion efforts. 23 Br@#ier . there. A review of reports in the archives at General Carleton Preer Jr., deputy sen& ad Fort Leavenworth (inchding debriefings of viser for 111Grrps, dedicated only seQenlines . . four corps, 10 divisional and two brigade of. a ‘107-page report to civic action for the commanders) shows that such men placed al peried 1 May to 30 November 1969. Three of most exclusive emphasis upon corwentmrrd as those seven Imes dealt with the Iaurdy con pects of the Vlemam War. Generally no more tract for the unit widows’ associanon.w Briga- s than one short paragraph in an otherwise dier General D. P. McAufiffe mentioned nei lengthy report wds devoted to nationbuilding. ther pacification nor any related subject.” (The report of Lieutenant General Melvin Too much emphasis upon countwkrsurgen- Zais, for a time commandmg general of XXIV CY?Perhaps the best example of a military Curps, was an exception.) commander’s lack of appreciation for the sub . \,, MILITARY REVIEW o Janua~ 1989 ., b’ jeqt comes from the debriefii report of Ma-( as the years paased, about either Vlemam or ‘ jor General Salve H. Matheson, comman ding wars of mnonal liberation. general of 1st Brigade, IOlst Airlmrne (A@ The Army’s view of its military mission has I mobile) Division. been unfocused tn recent years. It rhDM.&ly j “On 10 June 1967 the brigade began the misunderstood appropriate ways to fight lim evacuation of people and livestock from Song ited wars or wars of national liberation with Ve Valley. There were approximately 8,465 the TMrd World during the Metnam era. Past ‘&ople and 1,149 animals. The people were mistakes have remained unacknowledged. told that they could rake what they could car- The old refraii tha: the Army failed in Vlet W,. . . ARVN [Army of the Republic of narn because ~f political softness at home has ., Metnam] was to have driven the livestock; come to be an enduring theme song witk ] however, they considered the job degrading +e htgher ranks of the military. The fact is and began to shoot the cattle so [the Vlet-f that the milirary disaster in Vlemam grew otit names.] had to be replaced by Americans. ? of ineptitude at the ton Stated simulv, the . . . On leaving the village, crops were Army” madq top man; mistakes. At “some burned to prevent enemy use and to discour point, for reasons then believed to be good, ATerica’s Army will once again be sent into ,, .’ ‘\ battle. It will be unfortunate if it has closed its eves to the lessons of Vlemam and atzain ‘ The O%ngerk,thatlsavingdone ‘ faces”a debacle. lf those same errors are n~t to so, frawkt,g determinedthatther.rmbfems be repeated, their sources must be identifkd, drese WI&caused only by & i&&iicient understood and corrected. Instead of prep% , appfieationof tzrwltionafwmbat power, ing for the, past over and again, the Army theArmy& releasediivm anynecessity must learn from it and finally begin to pre Xiorfurdsercoln+empkionofits mistakes. pare for the fimrre. . . . It wiffnotbsivem recognizedustcorer. Just as Edward Lrmsdale’swords opened thk terinssugency wifiremainfbrdreforesee. essay, so also is lt fitting that they close it. abletistssmaa“the centmfstn~”c issue Reminiscing alxrut his own career, Lam&de s%cirrgthe UnitedStatestoday.” mused not long ago that the mdirasy has sel dom “ January 1989. MILITARY REVIEW , % .. PREPARltiG 0 \ I ful as people there give up all their old ways. Thev eo in and kilI these mode. civiliam, in The ~ldretiaindmt tbetiy a vifia~e ayd expect some&e ‘like me to show l%iledti!lletmmrbemuse ofpddcai up on the scene and go over it with a magic sotlnessAthome haswme m be aneq wand and cause everyone to smi[e and say doringtheme smrgm”ddotheb@qr ‘We love you Americans: and then come up ranksof themibry. The fhctis,fhatthe and kiss us on the cheek. Human nature isn’t’ mili@ry&ferirr tletvamgmwoutof lie ~t~zs inepe”tudeatthe tip. Sfatedsimpl~ tfte The elder sratesmW of cormterinsmgency Army made @o OMIlyltli.9@keS. continued. “When we go into a foreign coun try using just military potier, we can never win unless we kdl everythii in sight. 1 hope that at some point we would start understand. towards their goals. Our own efforts [usually] ing that these rebellions are essentially politi turn people against us.’’” They will continue cal movements aimed toward political goals to do so as long as our military continued to , and they use the military or+ to help them prepare for the past. % I I . I NOTES’ “1 1 MG Emma Geav I.arsdah, “WI Mm’Ca we ucaa16!aMFlew 15 BG Gm@s SI”r!ad, TIM Ww Managem (Hamw3r, NH tinlvemny la..’? .%+wgn,Mwm(c.s*r 1934) 70 Pressof NewEcglmd,1077), 44 2,Thw.qwIesaredtavmfrom me excallemm by CQL JohnD 16 Wagne&3”, 454S Wwhetsteu, ,,[email protected]?emymrm,. M L / MILITARY REVIEW e January 1989 . ‘k b “ The authoragarhposes lke questionof wlredrerthe eonf%ctin Wetnammu an it&rgency or. wnventionalwar.He fiodi that itindeed mtsboth anddrat USleaders driledtamcognketi dualnatureof the wni?kz Tireresuh+ he sa~,j we.- an hap. pmpriatesiratkgyanda rnisdkctimilkary eflbrt h hindsighii he oifets tbrusiepatich wuki have pmdrrcddrarnaticdyCM i%nmtdb. HE CONTINUING debat~ on Vtet- forces of the government. In the final offen v ‘narn, ss reflected in the article by Ma- sive stage the guerrilla units that bad evolved jor Michael L. Brown in the February 1987 is- into main force units in an earlier stage pre- sue of Military Review, will never reach a con> sumably had further developed and been sensus as long as the proponents of buth the transformed into mobile regular formanons “war school” and the “insureencv school” oversimplify what actually happen&1 in Viet nam. The Vietnam Ww was too compIex a We canlook atthe kietnanrW=... cunflct for single or simpIe solutio~ to be a~ . plicable. “Vietnam defies simpfificatiom” said ~as .&&oth anrrrsrrrgencyand an invasion. . . . el er eorrfdhavesucceededakme asloog Ikmglas P&e in the firsr sentence of the pref- @ as tie Um%edStates.wrpported$orrtk ace of his book, War, Petie, anti tfre Wet $?emanr.Torretherthevwetesufticiendv Cong. That sentence maybe the only univer- effectivein tinrelo fke the USgov sal statement about the Vlemam War that ernrrrentinto widrobvingk%fortes tiwrn does not need to be qualiid in anf tiay. Wernanrandreducingrni(i~, political Cerrair+, it is clear to everyone that in andeconomic support 1975, during the final months of the war, conventional North Vietnamese Army .. (NVA) divisions employing conventional of. ferisive tactics won the decisive victory. k is able to launch a sustained offensive against also apparent that the immediate contribu- the government, which—if the theory has l’/ tion of the YietcO~ insurgent forces to this been followed correctly-had been weakened final victory was relatively negligible. But this by subversion and the protracted insiugency; :, does not mean that Hanoi’s overall strategy in [n December 1963 at the Lao Dong jl%ky the war was conventional in mture or that Plenum in Hanoi, following the coup and our efforts in aying to develop a counterirw murder of South Viemam’s President @go surgency cafiablliry were in error. . DInh Diem, North Vlemam’s Ieadem +&u. The Memarn %.r in the beginn@ was a laced that rh? last stxge of the war in %Ar classic exampIe of “people’s revolutionary Vtemam would soon Ixgm. To errsure victory warfare.” dewised by Mao Tse-trmg and mo& and also co secure control by the North of the fled by Hano& cornmonist leaders to suit con- fiml outcome of the war, Hanoi’s lead~n de ditions in Vietnam. Theoretically, people’s cided to provide support in the fiml offensive . revolution~ watfare calls for the Cmnrrrrmist stage of the war in the form of NVA divisioos Party to recruit and organire insurgent forces which would invade South Metrmm by irrfd of peasant origin and to expand and strength, tration through Laos atid Cambodia. me en these forces in a staged buildup as the NVA rmiq sent to the South would augment figh&g increases so that in the last stage of the Vietcong main force units in conducting a the war they can defear the regular milit~ sustained offensive against the regular mihtmy . ~ MILITARY REVIE!W *January 1989 15 * ( I c6me of the war for almost a decade,~and in { effect became the catalyst for the 1 e-scale participation of the NVA. That vic3 ry was, of comse, contrary to our intentions, k oc- ‘‘ curred because our strategy of attrition was,in effective m reducing Hanoi’s will to continue resisting and because we weakened South Vlemam’s ability and will to resistfby strbstan ~ally reducing US support after the Paris &reement in January 1973. The Vietcong was not a major factor in the final victory by the NVA, because our strategy of attrition had been successful in eroding Vletc~~g strength and because our pacification pro gram, by reducing enemy access to peasant manpower in South Vietnam, had prevent@ ! lisDecember 1%3 at the Lao the Vetcong fmm rebuilding that smength. DongPartyPlemun in H2u504following The Vlemam War began as an insurgency . dsecoup andmutder of South Wet. but gradually developed into s more conven namkPresidentNgo Dinh Diem, North tional war after large numbers of convention Vietnam%leaderscalcsskuafthattheM al forces from North Vietnam enteted the stz%eof the win Sogt.lSTZetnam would conflict. P~or to the Tet offensive in 1968, soon begin.... IW?A um”~sent to the the war was largely fought on the enemy side Southwosddaugment e.Weteongmain by Vletccrng main force units and guemllas, fome ‘w”& in conduc& “ ustainedOftim wmh steadily increasing participation by NVA fiiveagainstthe mgmbrmilitaryfomes of units. From its earliist origins the war was es the South tletoanresegovemmen~ sentially a politlcal struggle, because the main objectiv of the Vietcong was, the conmol of the rum+ population and not be capture of territory or the decisive defeat of South Viet ‘ forces of the South V.ernamese government. nam’s militaw umts. Although initlaIly the ~ This decision to augment the resurgent forces conflict was Mentialry pohncal in mnrre, the in South Vietnam was made within the character of the war changed in 1968 w~en framework of rhe strategy of “people’s revolu the Communists failed to generate a popular tiorwy warfare.” At that ome Hanoi had no uprising in support of their cause during Tet. way of knowing that the United Stares would By mld-1968, the combined effects of attri later decide to commit US forces m suppmt tion and pacification had so weakened the of South Vlemam. Vietcong that the center of gravity of enemy The entry of US forces into the Vietnam strength and initiative shifted to the NVA War kept the Vietcong insurgents from units with the three rmrrhem corps areas of achieving a srmteglc victory in 1965 or, at Sourh Viemam. The NVA was never a signif the Jatest, 1966. That victory could have icant factor in the IV Corps tactical zone of been won by the Vietcong with relatively the Mekong Delta, where the war remained mirumal help from the-NVA. The commit an insurgency until South Vietnam fell. The ment of .US forces to the tiemam War from nature of the war in the three n@em corps 1965 to 1972 postponed the eventual out areas changed when the strategic balance of 16 Januaty 1989 * MILITARY REVIEW . communist forces shlfied from the Vietcong fi%en~ to the NVA dwisions. nc ~W. gency continued, but the fighting became more conventional as the NVA struE&cI, not for the control of the rural population of South Vietnam, but to drive the United States out of the war. l%en the NVA could establish a permanent presence for itself with in South Vietnam arid prove to the South Vietnamese that an tdtimate comtmmist vie-~ tory was inevitable and continuing resistance, futile. Americans who served in Vietnam with US forces that were largely targeted against NVA units ‘never had the opportunity to see how poweriid and pervasive the influence of the Vtetcong was fn most of the rural mess of South Vietnam, particularly prior to Tet of 1968. It was easy for them to misinterpret the mrure of the war in the early years and to un derestimate the importance of the Vietcong fiqency in Hanoi’s strategy. Americans in volved in pacitlcation or serving in the D&a, on the other hand, saw the widespread im pact of the Vietcong rmd little of the threat psed by the NVM. Sir Robert Thompson, a leading proponent of the “insurgency schcd~ erred when he insisted in his 1969 book, No E@ from Metrramthat the “war. . . remained and then gradually t~k over. _IIIe insurgency M basically an inaurgency~ because after mid and the invasion became interdependent after 1968 that was no longe~ true. By then the the Umted States entered the war with ~S strategic center of gravity had shifkd from the forces. Nemher could have succeeded Ar@as Vietcong to the NVA. “ long as the United States supported:S uth For purposes of analysis; despite the ~sk of Vie m. Together they were sufflcientl ! . ef oversimplification, we can louk at ~e Viet fecnT e m tune to force the US gove~bnt ‘ nam War as two separate but interlocked into withdrawing its forces from Vlemam and conflicts-as both an insurgency and an inva reducing military, poliucal rmd economic sup sion. However, both the Vietcong insurgency port to South Vlernam. ,,. in the South and the NVA invasion from the The leading proponent of the “J@r sc$mol,” North were initiated and controlled by the Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr., in his book, ~ communist Ieadem in Hanoi. The two con Grr Strotegy: A Criical Ar@@ of the Wmram fkcta had one manager, the Politburo in Ha War; has reviewed the Viatnam Y% in the noi, which merged and coordinated both light of the classic principles of ~a and tie conflicts very effectively into one war. The theories of Carl von Clausewmr, the German insurgency preceded the invasion. The inva philosopher of war. While.thii book contains ~ sion forces initially supported the insurgency some’ very useful insights and tl@ught- M[L[TARY REVIEW . January 1989 17 3 ,’, ~~ ( me GmprrsrnhI%] wagedahighfypofitiealandkqgefyunwnventionaf I S& aI#Qstow wnventionaffomea, and@ey heldthestm~”c initrkti”ve thrmrghoutalnrostthe entirewar. . . . A simtegyofakritionis,atfres~a cunndktive ~1 stmtegy demandingstra~”c resultsfiwmasen”esof tactieafoffmisiveengagements. .It does not work very weffagainstan enemy adeptatavoidingwmbat wheneverita advervaryhohfsthetacti”eafinitiative. protiokhg conclusions, on the failure of our gency was nothing more than a “tacticaI strategy in Vietnam, I fiid myself totally at screen masking North Vietnam’s real objec odds with some of the statements Summers nves.” has made: I c~ncur with ~i conc$sions that In cialming that the Vietnam War was con. South Vietnam’s eventual defeat was due to a ventional, Summers ignores the fact that failure of strategy. According to, Summers, “people’s revolution warfare” is a strategic this strategic fadure stemmed fmm our misin. concept for waging warfare. Hia book’s bibli. terptetation of the nature of the war, and US ogmphy, unfortunately did not list an excel forces, which were never defeated tactically lent hk by Rear Adrrtiil Joseph C. Wylie, ii Vietnam, should have been deployed with USN, tided Mditmy .%gtegy: A General The greater strategic effectivenes~ against the ory of Potuer Control. Wylie states in thii @k North Vietnamese. But I do not agree with that there are “three generally recognized ma. his view that “thevieinarn War was in the fi jor theories of war strategy and one newly nal analysis a conventional war best under emergent.” These are “the continental, m~. stood in terms of conventional military sUm time and air theories, and the Mao theory of egy.” Nor do I agree that, the Vietcong insur wars of national liberation.” The admiral 18” ‘i January 1989 � MILITARY REVIEW goes onto say that “the Mao theory is by far *e most sophwticated of the current theories ofwaL . . . i~ purpme is @itical and. . . its sysfe& of measurea [for accompliih~ its put. pose] include political, ~ird, and economic [w well as military] mmrrre.s.”. WyIie also s.ggestrthat strategies can be cla.@ied operatiomlly as either sequential or cumulative or as a combination of both. h-r a sequential smwegy, reaching the f~ objec tive dependa upon the attainment of a series of successive objectiv= leading up to it. Ex ~P1es Of =quenrial s@=te@ k .World War II are our island-hopping campaign across the Pactlc and our drive to Germany from the Normandy beaches. Our World War II sub marine campaigns in the Pacific that de stroyed perhaps as much as W percent of Ja pan’s corrirnercial shipping are m example of a cumulative strategy. In that case our cmnu lative strategy complemented our island- hopping sequential strategy. Continental stmtegies, which no~ally follow the Clause witr concept of trying to destroy the enemy’s armed forces and his will to fight, are gener. ally sequential in nature, wh~le air and mari time conqepts of waging warfare, either as 5trategies in their own right or in tactical sup. port of sequential strategies, are cumulative in their impact. The Mao concept of people’s revolutionary warfare, however, is milirzidy c~ulative and politically sequential. Wylie quesrrons whether we ,can militarily oppese a cumulative strategy of the Mao type with a sequential strategy. How can there be a great decisive battle against widely dispersed guer rilla forces, united front organizations and un derground political cadres? United States seired and held the tactical ini The Vlelnatn War” was dfierent from any tiative for most of the time that its ground other war we fought, not becaust of the ter f@ces were. involved in the war. But cd strat rain, climate or cultural differences, but be. egy of at*lOn was ineffective against an ene- Q cause the strategy of the CormmrnisW made it my willing to accept an inordinate level Of so. They waged a highly political and largely casualties, ready to fight a protracted waI for unconventional struggle against our conven decades if necessary, and able to find sancti tional forces, and they held the strategic ini ary by merging with the population or ctoss tiative throughout almost the entire war. The in~ the bor,der into Laos or Cambodia.. A MILITARY REVIEW * January 1989 stmtegy ‘Ofattrition is, at best, a cumulative Wlieri American, troops first landed at Da stmte~’ demandh@ stmteglc results fmm a se Nang in 1965, the Communists had control ries of iactical offensive engagements. It does of. at least two-thirds of the rural ~pulation ‘ not work very well against an enemy ad+pt at of South Viemam, but peasant disaffection - ,, avoid@ combat whenever m adversary holds from the Vletcorw increased steadilv as the the tactical initiative. tempa of the war”in~ensified and it acceler- “ The npture of the Vietnam War changed ated rapidly after Tet. Thk communist 10SSof considembly after Tet of 1968 because the, political control over large segments of them. ‘South Vietnamese peasant population, the ral population was due in part to the incre~ I people whom Vo NguY~ Giap in his book ing security ge,neratd for the South Vlernam s PeopWs War, Peopkk Array described as “the ese by the US military effort, in part to the essential force of the revolution,” virtually impact of the paciflcanon program and the dried up as a source of strategic reserves of growing strength of the government of South manpower for the “people’s war.” In a fast- Vlemam and its military forces, and in part to moving conventional war, South Vletnamk the dimirrkhing’effectiveness of the Vietcong peasant population could not have been political apparatus as the result of artritiom counted cm as a stmteglc reserve force. How and lack of Vietcong/NVA success on the . ever, as long ‘as the Communists could main barrlef~eld. “tain political control over them in the pro As long as US forces were in the field in tracted unconventional war ,that was fought Vietnam in strength, the NVA rarely engaged in Viemam, the same purpose was served. them iri convennonal combat; US fuepowe~ and mobility were simply too overwhelming. The NVA generally avoidt~ sustained COIQ. The *Amok risetactical bat by deploying in concealeci and dispersed, isskrktiveordy to tbe degseenecessary tactically defemiye positions in heavy jungle+ to mainlairsthe moraleof tlseirsssp. and by seeking sanctrawiea in Laos and Cam portemandto weardown American kxxba. US “search and destroy” tactics were patienceover time. . . Tlsiswascomple- . not effective because they involved too much mented by highlydecentmiimdeffortsof searching in relation to the numkxm of NVA tireMetconggsrerrMs lfsatcswted tke units found that could be destroyed: The climateofgenemfinsecurkyin tirecorm NVA took the tactical initiative only to the tryside,whichisstssrrskept the US and degree necessary to maintain the morale of ~ south Vetmsnreseforcesdkversed their supporters and to wear down American if patience over time in a protracted w=. This was complemented by highly decentmliid ef forts of the V~etcong guesriilas that created the climate of general insecurity in the corm tryside, which in turn kept the US and South Viemanrese forces dispersed to provide protec. tion for the Wpulation. American forces were needed in 1965 and ~ 1966 to prevent the Vietcong (with NVA as sistance) from taking over South Viemam. ~ But our troops were much more effective , against the NVA divisions than they were against the elusive Vietcong guerrillas. Not ,$ . 20 Januav 1989 � M}ITARY REVIEW , . only was the mountainous jung~ terrain of South Metnam ideally suited for guerriila war fare, but the Wetcong also had the advantage of ethnic identity with the local population and the ab&y to exploit the issue of nation. aliim against the Americans. Also they en joyed some very clear rditarr advantages. In terms of the principle$ of war, these advan. rages included intimate knowledge of the ter rain and an abundance of intelhgence sources, flexibiky ~ selection of the tactical objective and i? the use of deception, “sur prise, economy of force, simplicity of plan, concentration of force in the offensive, and enhanced secut%y in their ab@ to dkperse and hide among the local population. . Antiguerrilla military operations can be come most effective by decentndiiing intelli gence and operations as much as possible and by applying relentless, continuous pressure on the guerrillas, allowing them no chance to test or seize the tactical initiative. This re quires large numbers of mobile antiguerrilla for es who can mix with the b-d. population an t distinguish friend from foe. Such tasks war in its different stages and the political and can be performed better by well-trained 1+ military strategy and objectives of the enemy; forces than b~foreign troops. Had we understood more precisely and in Al Counterinsurgency measures against “peo of its complexity what the enemy was hying plek warfare” involve more than counterguer. to do militardy and polmcall~ we could have rills activity by militasy fore It was not the tailored our strategy to counter his ‘efforts guerrilla warfare so much aT the subverswe more effectively. We were not outfoughq &t pohtical, warfare that our troops could not is apparent from the kill-loss ratios ,:and .@r handle. US forces had never before been re many tacncd wctones. But our tacncal, Y1ito quired to combat an enemy who could or ries were not strategically decisive they ~ chestrate so well clandestine political organi not meaningfully focused on defeating t@~n zations, propaganda, agiranon, intimidation, emy strategmally. !. esplcmage, subversion, terror, sabotage and .Frop-ithe vantage point of hindsight, fit us a.ssassinanon-all to political ends. Even if we “look at how US forces could have heen tar had previously experienced such political war geted more effecnvely against the NVA. By fare and were as ruthless as the enemy, which mld-1968 the United States had conipleted we were not, we as Americans could not cope the balance ot its Ioglstic and rmop buildup, with th~ kind of political warfare because of South Vlernarn’s army and Regional and POP ethc, linguistic and cultural differences. ular Forces had reached a combmed strength The eventual communist victory in Viet of more than 8C0,U20 men, and the weigkrof nam was due to many factors, including our enemy strategic power had shifted from the failure to appreciate fully the nature of. the insurgents in the South to the 1. ~A invaders MILITARY REVIEW * January 1989 21 ,, The Unkd$s%etes wasin a position to fomeNo@z Ketrsam to wi”dzdraw it%imops timo Souds kfeimtm.. ... FiIs$the UnitedStatesshorddhaveminedarui blockadedNm@z MetrramkharbomirzmrfertoiozpedethetlowofszqrplieaizztoNorth We@xusz&m the Soviet Unionandl?astxxnEurope.Seeond,it wasnecessaryto cut the FZoCfd@dz tmilbypfacing USimopsactvssLaos.”... l?sis was nzikilykasibfein ~“d-1~ butit waszzolo~erpot%%dlypowible. from the North. Tl& was the time when the bombed evesy valid military target in North United States should have reinforc@ success Vlernam as effectively and relendessly as we by seizing the strategic initiative. In the stnrg finally did in December 1972. And fourth, gle against the insurgents, we did seize the the United States should’have called up Re initiative by improving and accelerating the serve and National Guard units to rebuild our pacification program; which further weak strategic reserves in the ,United States and to ened the Vietcong. But in the contlict ag.siiic demorrstmte to Hanoi and Moscow a clear re the NVA, we failed to take the strategic ini solve to achieve our goals in South Vrernarn. tiative when the mili~ opportunity existed. All of this was mihtmily feasible in mid-1968, By mld-1968, the United States was m a but it was no longer politically -pible-the . position to force North Viemam to withdraw Unit+d States was ready to give up on Vtet its troops from %udI Viernanr by cutting the nam tf we could negotiate a “peace with hon. lines of supply from North to South Vietnam. or” and get our prisonem of war home. ,,, This could have been. done if the United It would have been politically and militari States had taken four decisive steps. First, the ly feasible to undertake the strategic initiative United Statea should have mined and block described above in early 1967, when our troop aded North Wemam’s harbors in order to im strength m South Vietnam ,first exceeded pede the flow of supplies into North Viemam 400,000 men, a strength ddequate for the from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. task. After Operations C& Falls an~ Jurrc Second, it was necessary to cut the Ho Chi tion C~ty were completed, the .Vletecrrig had Minh tmil by placing US troops across .Laos been sufficiently weakened and the Southe and into North Viemarn just north of the de Vietnamese. forces had been strengthened militarized zone. Third, we should have enough to enable the United States to turn . . $ 22 January 1989 � MILITARY REVIEW , . I r’ lNSUR(iENCYMfAR over to South Vietnam the smuggle against the Vietcong insurgency. At that time the Wetor’y . . Manans Wm Army of the Republic of Viemarn (&VN) wouldhave mg . nl”sl?dstatesm should have been beefed up with combat have twostaa@#* : asfrategyto en. eWr’ienced American advisers ad ~i ~ ablethe SouthVetnanreseto defbt the the task of coping with the Vietcong. 3 IIetxmgirrsutgencyanda strategythat Instead, snore than 50 ARVN battalions wouldenabletheAnre+m times m were assigned to pacification operations, a stoptheNorth Ketnrtrneseiniihation mission for wh~ch they were not trained and andinvasionof South IZetnam. in which they were largely ineffective. That assignment impaired the ARVN’S morale and virtually destroyed the ability of those ARVN’ battalions to serve as maneuver units in con would have required a politically sound smte-’ ventional combat. South Vlemarn’s territorial gic vision similar to the nation-building and troops, the Regional and Popular Forces, pacification programs that evolved by 1967 should have been assigned the mission of pro 71. Also a land refofi progmm YESnecessmy viding security ~for the pacification program similar to the one the government of South instead of ARVN, and should have been Viemam fmlly enacted on 26 March 1970. If maimed, equipped and strengthened for that we view the Vletriam War along the simpler task, p.s they were later in IV Corps. With lines advocated by the pro~nenrs of the ~war %.rth’Vietnam’s tronps assigned to cope with ‘ school” or the “insurgency schcol,fi we would, the Vietcong insurgency, the US forces could of course, see no need for more than one then have been deployed against North Viet strategy. nam’s invasion forces with much greater spa. The main lesson to be learned about 10W tegic effectiveness. intensity conflicts from our Vetnanr experi. Mcrory in the Vlemam War would have re ence is the importance of determining as ear; quired the United States to have two slqte. ly and precisely as possible the ,.. ‘MILITARY REVIEW . Janursy 1989 ‘ 23 ,’ ,, . . . . “PacedWI”tha pressingneed for troopsafterthe Tet offe=”ve of 1%% PmsidentJohnson authoti the oiobii%ttionof about 20,LW0Guad &d Reserve sddiem. They fought . . and served ~ particuhrlythose who deplbyed d..=rved with t6& owrt units.But - the musim * miniscuk,g smalliiacti”onof tbe 21/2+ri solalerswho sqrvedin Met. oam. Z%d sem”ceand theirSIICCCW,however, fimther.callhm+oquestiondie decisionto .:. “ avoid ,a suhstan~ Gum+ and Reserve mobilizationfbr thp nq”or deployments of the .’ l%5Wk$8peliod:’ I “ ...... “1 * NE OF THE more curious F&y de The cost of that failur. was appallingly high Ocisions of the Vietnam War was Pre-si in lives and in batdefikld setbacks. dent Lyndon B. Johnson’s determination not As the Active force was bearing the iniual to mobilize the National Guard and the US brunt of unpreparedness, US policy rrhlcers Army Reserve (USAR) for deployment. The decision was curious because the Guard and Reserve had a long history of wartime sewice, Z. ifairnpactoncmrentpblicy had performed well in combat a decade earli er in Korea, had beeq the object of prepara m-, no otherskeletonin the clo=t oflesaonslearnedfrom Ketmunlooms tion rmd reorganization for mobdization dur kugerthanthisnonmobiiizatioade. ing the Kennedy and Johnson years, and be civion. . . . Uwe eannotdo drantatieally cause just abou~ everyone except the betteron tirentobiliration issuethanwe president anticipated a major cdl-up. In its impact on current policy makiig, no dYdforWetnanr,we willhiiveputbaff other skeleton in the closet of lessons learned of oor.. . capabilitybeyond ourteach, from Vlemarn looms lager than this nOnrnO bilization decision. The United States has now piaced half of its war-fighhng capabdity found, qmte simply, that we could not sustain in the Guard and Reserve and that propor even the limited war effort m Korea without tion is increasing. If ,we go to war, our Guard the manpower avadable in the Guard and Re and Reserve are expected to carry half the serve. ;. load. If we cannot do dramatically better on About 19,00 officers, mdst of them lieu the mobdization issue than we did for Vlet tenants and captains in the combat arms, nam,.we will have put half of our war-fighting were called up rather quickly .dS individual capability beyond our reach. members of the USAR. In addkion, 109,OW our current mobilimtion plans are remark enlisted men and women, primarily in spe. ably similar to the mobdiition of Guard and cialist pos~tions, were activated from the> Reserve forces that occurr .’ MILITARY REVIEW * Januav 1989 25 ,, ‘.( I I We didaopoorfyisstie fit monthsof theKosean.Warbecause thebedk ofoeufohs, bothActive arrdReserve, were neithermen~, pls~icailynorlogisticsdlyprepasedfortyar.ThatwasaleadedipMhste bybotb a“vilianpolicy makersandmilitaryofficers.The costof thats%ihstewas a-y highis-sffvesandin battlefieldsetbacks. “i ~: a mix of irdviduals and units deployed after in the initial commitment of major US forces an initial training period. After solving the to ground combat in Vietnam occurred in the predicable problems of whom we had, who spring of 1965. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and was fit to fight, and getting them into com McNamara recommended mobilization of the . bat, by and large the system worked. Reserve Componer-m both initially and on a In the early 1960s, many of the speclflc cohtmuing basis thereafter. The final deci problems identdied in large-scale Reserve slon making was highly centralized with the Component call-ups were systematically ad president and a few close advisers makmg the dressed. The Kennedy administration and its final determinations. The recommer+ion of energetic secretary of defense, R6bert S. the secretary and the Joint Chiefs to mobilii McNarnam, began a ~eries of reorganizations significant Reserve*Component assets contin designed to.streamhne the force structure and ued mto the final stages of rhe actual commit enhance mobilization. In 1965, the secretary ment decisjon, but was not ultimately developed and implemented the Selective adopted. Reserve Force program. This program tmget The fiml polic~ which emerged in 1965, ed units likely ro be mobilized. Prloriry re was to send ground forces into combat but to sources were force-fed into Selecnve Reserve not mobilize the Reserve Components. The Force units to correct personnel, equipment additional forces needed would be raised 1 and rrainiig shortfalls.~ The units were de $wough a more gradual buildup of the Active “J signed to, and in fact did, provide a ready force tbmugh individual draftees. That deci mobiliratlon bqse. sion auuears to have been made bv he rmesi The intense decision making that resulted dent &“part of his general reluc&ce t; put , I Januaty 1989 � MILIT~RY REVIEW J l’hetltssdpolic~whichefnesgedin 1%5, ma m sendgrvrmdtbmeainto t-* combatb’utb qotmobilize the Reserve (Xnpmsenm. The ad2Wmalfosces needed wosddbe raiseddrmugha snsiregsadsralbuildupof theActive fen% dqtnsghind.iv@ual .&fiees.... me mestient viewed ea)hJz UDthe:GuadandReserve asa , pofitiealaormdtier, one thathe ap~~dy k not willingto breach. the mtion on a warame footing. The presi of the 1965-1968 perrod. dent viewed calling up the Guard and Re The decision not to mobilize the Guard serve as a @itlcal sound barrier, one that he and Reserve for Vietnam was a mistake. appmently was not wilhng to breach. 5 Avoiding a Reserve Component calI-up ; Subsequently, there was a limited but suc avoided a public support litmus test for the @ d Guard and R-e call-up for Vietnam, developing Vietnam W= policy. That was an Faced with a pressing need for rmps after the issue wh{ch should have been squarely Calm- Tet offensive of 1968, Johnson authorized the fronted, not side-stepped. It is one ..thii+ to mobilization of about .ZO,OWGuard and Re draft an individual 18-year-ol$ to send MILiTARY REVIEW * January 1989 27 ~ ,. ( ., , rional policy by additional mearw.+he use of tionally mtegrares Actwe, Reserve and Guard war-makhg force. If American national secu-. forces into a single war-fighting force. Active .. rity POkY rnrhg “is soundly developed and and Reserve Component units’ train, equip broadly based, there will ~ot be a political and deploy together. Gf the nation’s 28 corn- ‘ ,“ sound barrier to overcome In calllng up bat divisions, 18 are either completely or par. Guard and Reserve forces. tially made up of Nanonal Guard umts. Al IrI the conduci of the war Itself, forfeiting most three-quarrers of the support capabdity . the ‘use of our Reserve Components hurts. m the entire Army force structure is in the Wars are won by milita~ units, not by indl USAR.6 Guard and Reserve umts now have . . . vidurds.-Unit cohesion sustains men in com speciftc war-fighting missions on specific map bat. The Johnson indw,dpal draftee opnon sheers. Their role is no longer, If it ever was, for kletnam, arong with a one-on-one theater to jump mto a foxhole beside an acnve duty replacement policy, sent and left Americans soldler. Rather, their mission is to deploy, as alone m the face of a etermined enemy. umrs to an already determined sector, in a Like. the Brmsh ferntonas,? US Reserve and given theater of operanons, and to provide Guard units~ormallv kave years, sometimes combat ~wer that will otherwise be alxent. generations, of unit coht%on. That valuable Guard and Reserve units tire an integrated, resource went untapped. mission essennal part of our war plarmmg and GLUforce stmcnrre was damaged by not us defense preparedness. ing our Reser+e Component forces. Before A large part of the Army’s current focus, Vlemam and since, Reserve and Guard sol. for example, is the defense of Western Eu- I d~ers have served because they have a deep rope. Abut a third of our active duty force is sense of purpose to defend their country: We stanoned there, In the early stages of a NATO lose sight of the fact that every major war in wart Ime b!Iildup, the Guard and Reserve are our nation’s history, eicept Vremam, has been smrcmred to provide shghdy more than half fought largely with citizens turned soldiers.’ of the early deploying. umrs. These are the I Gur Reserve Com~nenrs are the present ver$ type urmrs, such as engineers with a bridge- sion of that national rradmon. Leaving the Iaymg capability, that have to be on the Guard and Reserve out of the national de ground before any sizable force can move, .‘ fense’during wartime will erode their sense of shoot and commumcate.9 The simple fact is p-e a+ dis-slpate rheu sense of mission. that our prolected defense of Western Europe During Vietnam, Reserve Component units mandates a substantial and early mobilizanon were often viewed as safe hhvemj for some of the Guard and Reserve. who sought to avoid combat service. That The genesis of the Total Force pobcy is a image haunts us still. matter of folklore among senior Army offlceq. The experiences of mobdizing for Korea It was not just a budger mre. Among the study “ and not mobdizingfor Memam tell us a lot group that ch~ted the Total Force approach, about our present abdity to mobihze Reserve there was a feehng that a fundamental shortfall component forces. Korea shows that the sys in Vlemam was a lack of rmdersrandmg and tem will work. Vlemam shows that we must support for &e war among the Americm pee. have the policy-making skill and detetmma pie. A Totql Force soucrore, meld~ the Ac tion to use it. tive and Reserve Component forces, would The cost of error on the issue of mobiliza have the effect of makii it very dfilcult, if tion has increased dramatically since the Vlet not imposs$le, for America to go to war again rmm er~In the early 1970s, the Akmy with~ut the broad support Implicit m“a major adopted a “Total Force” concep~ that opera Gum-dand Reserve call-up.’0 , 28 January 1989 * MILITARY RE~lEt$ ,. G JReseie (hmponentsjforsghtand”kawd -4 ~“csskuly those . who deployed andserved m“thdseirown smr”tiBut themusterwasminuscule, a smallsiacti”onof the 2% miUion soldiesswho servedin Viefnaru. Theiraervikeandtheksuccess, however, fhrthercallirstoquestionthe decision to avoidasubstantial@anfandRes&ve mobilkationfor the my-or deploymentsof the 1%5-l%8periool $ ‘~ “ 4 The Total Force policy has made that hap son announced even the very small muster of; pen. We cannot now go to war on any sus Guard and Reser+e forces for Metnam in the 1~ tained scale without our Guard and Reserve same speech in whtch he withdrew from con forces. We cannot go to war on the sly. sideration for reelect~orrto the presidency. ‘j, ~ Whether our senior leadership will muster the That the policy-making baggage” of Vtet insight to use our Reserve Components IS a nam now bmdem ow = of Reserve ~w threshold concern among our operational war nent assets is evident in the Amp debatewver planners. It is an issue that deserves a much the role of Guard and Reserve uni~ @ma- wider audience. tamed maining in Central America. Tht de . Asking senior policy makers to use Rese~e bate has pitted critics of the overall US policy Component military assets is asking a lot. in Central America against the president in.,’ There has been, and there twill remain, a federal court over the isme of who wil~decide great and proper reluctance to mobilize Guard where National Guard units train. It is an un- . and Reserve forces for war. However, mobili seemly squabble and a clear signal that our zation is also a deterrent and not geceasarily pdicy-makhg proces k sputt&iL~ bad!y km an acceptance of war. the use bf Reserve and Guard aasets. : The politics of mobilizing Reserve Compo There are compelling military and national. , nent forces are compIex and often controver security reasons for Reserve Component sial. It i$.probably not coincidental that John training in central America. Such prcmoblli. . . . . ,, ., MILITARY REVIEW * January 1989 29 ‘ ( -m,) ,,. ,,, Guard and USAR units rotating through on Zh’atweamiifigaiiug /Reserve trainhg missions.’2 CbmpmsenttmininginCenfmfAmerim] That we are litigating such an issue in fed ~ in ibderalcorutk not ahopefidsign. eral court is not a hopehl sign. The issue of . .. Zfweamstminingto firsdthe Reserve Component trainirig in Central filicyasaking abilityto useorrrReserve America is a policy-making dress rehearsal, a Cbmponem%in apeaeetime tminingsit. drv run without easuakies, for the dtilculti= uation,we have to questionhow well th&accompany mobilization of Guard tid = willhandletheikse of Grrarriand Reserve units for combat. If we we stmining Reserve foxes goingto war. to find the pcdicy-makng ability to use our Reserve Compm-rencr in a peacetime training situation, we have to qrresricm how well we zation, prewar work ISamong our best tmin will handle the issue of Guard and Reserve ing oppormnitia. The ultimate test for a Re forces going to war. serve Component unit is to pack its gear, A deployable Guard and e.wrve force is a move overseas, set up in an austere environ valuable foreign policy option% r a president.: ~ ment and perform its mission. Meaningful In 1961, a call-up of 120,0C0 Guard and Re misskms such as those in central America al serve Soldlersoccurred in connection with the low our Guard and Reserve unit commanders Berlin crisis. That muster was as much a for to build and maintain soud military orgam eign policy statement as a military decision.’3 zations. The heat, dkt, stress and fatigue of It was a smong, just short of war, statement of such traiining are not the stuff of travel ralve. The Berlin call-up accomplished be posters. It is serious and purposeful work, goal of helping to deter aggression. We must however, and that 1swhat answers the expec rise well above our Vtemam errors and our ~tions of our young soldiers. current policy-maldng ambiguity if that op American national security interests are tion is to be realistically availab~. furthered by Reserve Component training in Well short of mobilization, a strong Guard central America. When we prowde medical and Reserve IS a peacekeeping asset. In Eu and den-ral care and the construction of rope, the Soviets know with some accuracy schools and toads-the specific results of what forces we have on the ground. They Guard and Reserve training in Central know what forces they have available. What Amerrca--we are nationbuilding. That pre. they canner calculate. with any certainty is vents war. Such rraming is a good opportuni our ability to reinforce our forward-deployed ty to avoid facing the deployment of infantry forces with our Guard and Reserve units. If and armor ururs there a decade from now.. our adversarm know that we are williig and In keeping with the Total Force policy, our able to deploy our Reserve ‘Components, mi]itaw command for Central and South peace is more likely. If we are demorrmably America, US &@hem Command, relies on unwilling or unable to mobiliie and deploy, , Guard and Reserve assets for many critical as aggression is more likely. That translates into pects of us ongoing, &y-to-day mixion. All a here and now peacekeeping role for our of the pnmechate air defense of the Panama Guard and Reserve soldiers. Cad is provided by the Ak National Guard That peacekeeping mission becomes in whale most of the Southern Command in creasindv imuortant as we oursue INF rmtheater airhfi E provided by the Air Na (intermQlate-&ge nuJear fOrc&)-rype arms tional Guard and Air Force Reserve. Much of reductions. Each such nuclear cutback makes I Its civic actionhationbuilding are done by more critical both our actual and our planned 30 January 1989 � MILITARY REVIEW .. . AvokEnga Reserve Canponent ealkp avoidkdapublicsupport litmusteattbrthede-dop~ WetrMI WmPficY. Z7mtwasanissuewhich’ . shouldhave keen aqum+ confivnti notstiedeh Itk one * to ~ anindividualItI-yeaPoklmsend a war,andqw”keanotherto callupsizableReserve. Chnponent uoitsthat cut acmsa the econom”c, Pcditid=d SOM stm~ : in mostAmen”kancommm”tiea. ,. MILITARY REVIEW s January 19S9 J “1 category-the Guard and Reserve face in creased re-sponsibllity in connection with our NAIO commitment. We can now field a Guard division for @out one quarter the cost of an active duty division. Budget restraints will inexorably en- Lwge the Guard and Reserve, bo$ its force . structure and m mision. Whin limits, and with the proper supper t and leadership, en kuging the Reserve Component force is solrnd JiY1%1, acall.upof 120,000 Gd ~ militarily. But that trend, which is already . and Reserve sohiiersoccdh comec well along, increases the requirement to un tionwithrheBerhhcri+a.... It wasa strong derstand and use those on-call forces proWrly. just shortof war,statementof,maolve. The Vemam nonmobkmon brings home 27reBerlincall-trpaccompliahed the a timely m~agd, ‘senior military and civilizur goalof helpingto deterawgmssion. leaders must have the policy-malchg skill tid determination to use our Goard and Reserve forces. Nonmobilization was a poor option for Vietnam and is now hardly an option at all. If conventional force commitments. As we the justification is com@ling, our Ieadersklp . move into lean budget years for defense, more must have the grir to mobke and go. That units and more combat missions will pass willingness and abdiry wdl help keep the from the Active force into the Reserve Com peace or, failing that, field our forces m best ponent structure. If American trcwp strength we are able. Absent such Wlicy-makhg m- in Europe is substantially cut—an issue that insight,we &p the risk of makmg fully one-half has at least moved out of the “sacred cow” of our wdighting capalility~acc.essible. % NOTES 1 T B Fehrenbach, Thm KI”6 .1 War (New York The M,CM,IIWI Wa Cdlqe, 19?+, 3-!5 C.ampany.Ks&3),14S 8 MG CQ”ald B, IT,ck D$r6.30r,Army NwcmeJG“@.r6,The Gumd 2 Jnmm F Sciw@d, P&k” and CWeCflO”T/l. .%% YE81(W8ShW3’ Americas AmIy cm Cal: 1988.S9 GIRW Ec.ak (6s%.3.8.3. of me US @n,GC.ORaoltheCh!ef olM,lmw HB+MY,1972) 122 Army,Am.glOn,Vk 19s4), 12S,US Dwmrirnent.1 *. Army,The unmd 3 Ibd 123, Walk, G Hermes, rruce rem EJIOtie F@O”g F,vn? Smte.Afmy P-WE SlalmmentW 88, WF.WWJO”,DC, 11-16 iwath!rgton, CC @e ofthachlel .lM,lmry H.to!y. 15681,2W3-G4 9 a,,ef,”g by LTG Ore” R $WIddO”, MA Commander, Nat,onal 4 US Cq&inenl of DefenseAnnualRer.xi, F@ Year !9S6, Omi: GuamBum.. Res.aurcaManagementCQn!wmm, Odando,FL 2 Nov&n- FWmndGuamBum.., Washmgm.,DC, 23-GG E+,lsm 5 The Pentagon Papers The 0.3fense Dnpamnent H,stcw of Unreti 70 L@um by HWIYG summersJr, US mm!’ war C@We Re-sefve Stafes C6wson+m.bng on WeDWfn,The %“50r [email protected],o” (G-x$.”, CmncuwenfNw’cmaISexnty lss.ns Smnmu Iwesh.g!on, DC 29 A@ MA.S8a.w. Pros, 79711,4.299 . 19@a] S US Dewrltnent .1 the Anmy,AfterActen BeP3fl Mob$[uabo”of R- ?7 SIWW andP,st& us,MoMz.sbo”.S4 sw FOW, &smtmt Ch,ef of SiaHh! FOIC3De.elwment, Waslm-qmn, 12 Brwmg by GEN Fre5eti F wmmer J,, USaOUTHCOM C.3m Cc,lw.1.l !m3nder,tijul.mi Generak A%xcIsbOnof the Un,i6dStates Co”f@mm, 7 JWm@ Warkeyilnd Ja$?Jh H l%!nn”s, Mobr!!zatim of the Amw Washington,ml 2 FebwW 19e4 N88LI”.9Guti and t+, Army Resewe H,stoncal PersPecWa end the 13 Starkeymu P,$!on,s,2cL21 weblml *U7 ,Cm,s$eG4mce, PA. S!latqlc stud,., Insmule.us Army ( \ BngakerGmrral Mukrel W. Dcmiwm KentuckyNatrmal Gumi u AdIuram ,’1 GmemL Cmmmwakk of Kmtruky Dqmrnm (j Mitaiy Affm Hem h KmmckyA. Nd Guani rkeArmy Nd Gruid and orka refarrdsrare m. He recawci a &rckkm’sdegree,a muter’s degree,a faw &gree and a %D,.~h Um_~h&. Heh&tnh Amy Sti Fm; 1 mrk an ahrme Ringernfarm-jcmpuny qfrfy rstCawrlryDIemm(AmnOhle)m I&mm andwakrkeRererwandAcmeSpaul Forcerunas \ J * 32 January 1989. MILITARY REVIEW . . . * . 1’, . ‘.,, ,,. ,. ,. ‘James Ms&.ig Dsmns . . ( “’””. “ . ““ .. 1 . . HE SMALL man who e&e Up to me ter we return d, 13ack’ then, we never at. -?”was abut rny age qd he was wearing tem~t~d .ro hiiw titmeanttobe ina. . horn-rkt-md gkes. Without so much as a combat one, 10,00 ? males away from our ,h:Up, thii TO+ whom I had never me~ s t ‘ fanil‘) ‘and ft$ends, trying to stay alive. Most ed fiifJquestioris at me abut Yietnarq. e pewpie did not care then, nor did they have” questions were patronizing and rh . ,.. mru$iun bkm$ we halwlto w M’tiw . . J . .,.“ . ,,. ., gtiage~ &e horror wd be l@nor. l%e~e was srantlj’on edge hll day long .rmd mos~:h$the ‘ < $s so~much I had forgotrexi: thS,brbiiing sun, the ~ni@t. It meant forever being tangled in~$irit suilxating humidity, die sr%%of the fire ants - a. minute” vines, immobilized in ele#@t ., grass and surround+ by the moffle?l voiges pf ~ : !“ and the ielentlcss t@sance +he mos@toes andtheleechess’g “’ ~~ . yo~” soldiers in .&e heat; muttering under . . Combat p2t@s. mearit unbem%ble weari- their%rearh. ness, un@enchable thi~t, tl+tigu~ drip@g “ It was the odor of burning charcd ~oming. ~ we ~i& perspiration, ckngi$g to the bed% fmrn &e villages ad the f+grance of the rain . : and arms and. Ieg$ burnirig with cuts and .tier the monmxw, both of which were fii-’ ‘ ,,SC rchea, It meant mud and marshes, dkt. t&ed&r&h,$nostils 4akcd ir@de with rid d~t kicked Up by the choppers (heli+pter$. .: ,, d @t, and mactiete=ryl monskm-ts. ft was )otaI-exha@ion after 18 hours of “busging It W= fie sight of rottkig .vegetatioh as we, . brush,!’ and mental fatigue from being q9n- , scanned the trails, always on the move, al . . .,,. .,. ,, ,., . . MILI+ARYIEVIEW � JL1UWY+989 , . “ 35 ,’ ,“ % ../ . . .-, . . L, .“’ T ‘. .,, ...... “...... “ .’ ~, . . (? .’4...... ,. ,.4 homqi because of what’we had been &Iou& ‘ . AetlreemailcolumnoftiMWrrred we knew tha~ life would never be quite so >. . peat,nothoughtmegiventooifrturing these harci’again, ,,. Whit about the atmeities?” is the ne~t . enemysoldiers,7hefirefreevtheAnreri- eanacrrtinhalfthefivebedieathatanly recurring question. :YWere there atrocities memantsb@e hadbaencarryingAK-47s.. eornrnitted i Vieniarn?““I often wonder .- Inatantanaouely,fhaAmericanasceopadtip where the d Ie who ask this questiofi were ~~ thedekumenteand’venisheddeep inte the during the war. .Anvork who thinks there “ .,. jungle..... ffow,therrgh,couldthiiffietnanr’ were no atrocind committed in Memam has L . veteranevartellMSwifeafmotthi$kmident? no ;dea what this war was all about. There Howcouldheeverfookintothefaceofthat were,,atrocities Cpmmmred every’day but they beaufifirf,gentfeanddelicatecreatureand . $&e comml[ted by the Vletcopg. and ~he . ~ ‘” z tq toexpfaintoher@hathehaddwre. North Vktn~mese soldiers. Teachers, govern I ment. offtcials and land owners were assassi. -i. ,., . . \ .;.. ” e. .-s+ nated on almost a dady hams. Hamlet chiefs . .. ‘-. ,.* “. ,1 were publicly executed and entire’ villages “wayssearching for booby &ps ,a’ndrnp wires. were left with only wo en and children after ?. ‘ It was lxhg,mtsetable in body and spirit. ~ all of the men, Wen pressed mto serwce , More slgnifi 36 January 1989. MILITARY REVIEW ‘). Teacheq governmentofficialsandlandownerswereasssssi~atedenalmosta ‘f dailybaws,Hamletchiefswerepufdiclyexecutedandentireuillegeswereleftwithonly womenanilchildranafteralloftie menhat!beenpressedintosemiceorrituallyslaught. wed,Movietheatersantirestaurantswembom,hed,womenwereRped anddisfigured. , . . . Id cohbat soldiir this is the most naive of all the .kil~ng. We invented, our own I}nguage ‘forit. questions: Like World War II and Korea, In polite society, how can we talk abowt, Vietnam was a wa+it was not a game of laser “wasting the enemy”; how can we ,@+s’ tag. Killing is the most brutal, yet the most .“greasing‘Charlie’?” basic, aspect of war and no one knows that In Vietnam, an cmconventlonal s’d+r better thrm the soldier. ‘CMcourse we kdled. from Omaha was clandestinely inserted, W@ Thev were kilhng us, so we killed them. That his intelligence team, mto the jungle&& fact should never have to be discussed—lt from any Amenc~n fire base. Hii mission was “ should sirsaplybe understmd. So forgive us for to kdl or capture some North Vlemamese scrl not talkltig about killing, for these experi cfiers and to retrieve their dWrrm:nts for in. ~ ences are impossible to relate to other people. telhgence purposes. He knew that If he Were We had, but of necessity, brnken an ancient captured, he would not be killed-at least not . taboo-that of killing another human being. at first. Where he was operating, if captured, . Even though it is’a tab that has been bro torture and mutilation was the enemyt nor. ken m eve~ war since the beginning of time, mal procedure: Tbe North Vlemarnese had It ISstill sdmethmg we choose not to confe& no compuncoon against these krrrds of atroci Even in Vietnam, we never talked about ties. This was how they waged war. ! ~, MILITARY REVIEW o January 1989 37 , ,-, ( ,., —.. .,— -— .,. , ., .x.. “ . . To civili~ all kii is evil.. Perhaps it is. But ~e never thought what we &d was evil. Neither did the North Vietnamese; Ixrrh sides understood. We needed the information. Qur lives and the lives of OW’buddies and even the lives of innocent Wetnameae civilians de- , penrkxl on that information, The ndea of war are so different. How ean someone who has never played the game for real ever rrnder stand the complexity of those, rides. Brcaum t we knew rhat no one could ever understand, . when we returned home, we did so in ~Ierr&. The next question we mww field is ‘Lllid Amerbns idi other &ne-?” I haVe never understood how we, as a cerebral na tion, have let Hollyworxl and some -ems of the rnedii seire the exeeption and paw it off as the rule. What is it abut these nvo in stitutions in their lust for the box office and fbr the headline that requirea them to diitort and defame the memory of honest young men who served in lherrrarn? Why do we permit them, ar the expeme of otu natioml integrity, to rake fiction and gmphIe&y pomray it as facr? Few soldiers I know are aware of a single , irrstanee where an Amencarr soldier ever in The Americmrs set up rhci- -rnbush along tentionally killed a fellow”.sMer in combat. a trail upon-which the North 14etnamese Those dings just did not happe~ur lives Army (NVA) felt safe, As the srrrd cohrrnn were too precious. CkcasionaUy, one soldier of NVA streamed past, no thought was given would shmt or stab &other in a fight over . to capturing these enemy soldiers. The fire money, over a woman, or over some other from the Americans cut in half the five trivial, thing, just w happens everywhere. bodies that only moments before had been Thii invariably happened not in Crrmkat, but carrying AK-47s. Instantaneously the Ameri in Saigon or at a large base I+up, and the cans scoqred up the documents and vanished pq=mmr was %vays.tried for his offenses. deep into the jungle. Incidents like this in ,Sadly Americans did kill other Americans . Vietnam were commonpla&.. In Worid War in Vlernam. Our own artille~, air support, H and Korea, they were ako eonrnror@ace. rockers or napalm took Ameriran lives But it How, though, could this’ Viemarn veteran was, invariably, accidental. To those who ever rell hfi wife about rhii incident? How have seen it firsthand, war is a great many could he ever look into the f%ceof that beau thiigs, but the one thing it is not is orderly. tiful, gentle and delicate creature and try to Artillery and rocket fire ate never precise, ” explain to her what he had done without and mortar rounds and automatic weapons making her think her husband was not the are shays indiseriminate. Everyone who baa same man she had married. ever been in a fire fight knows that soldiers .. 1 38 ‘ January 1989 � MILITARY REVIEW like it ernot,oomfmtisthemostM?nsa momentinamen’sMa,R isbardto esptain,butonoeina firefight,eurfaatsarouaoaltyeraasdbgtboaatfonsofMatinstant. Wehoarhstter,weseefmttar,wothinkbotferondmfeelmrti~ webase ~ everfeltbefore.OurWesaUowatiio*heme oowfroWfbyinstinct andbytfwfeffexesofsuruival., > M are killed, ‘and wounded by friendly fire .in absolute fear, and inevitably, in unspeakable every war~’ cruelty and death.. : ~, Thii consequence of combat is one of the In Vietnam, we learned firsthand&e r.eati uglier aspects of war, but as long as men en ties of war. As our fmt contacts empte$ and gage oth~t men in mortal combaf, these rockets and mortar rounds burst aroufrd~, things are going to happen. Every combat sol we Ieamed together about terror and abs+&te dier will admit ro wimessing negligence, but helplessrms. We smq@ed to stay alivekskx there are few soldiers who have ever wit we could. We had been n-aid for war,’ but nessed fratricide. our tminii did not make the bullets go away “Combat—what wap it fike~ We used to or the nausea inside us disappeaz It ordl kept say that “war is hell-but contact is a son of i us from mnning when month% before we . bitch.” Even +at bit of Vle~ graffki is an ‘ would have run. “ understatement. Every soldier will tell you Nonethelex, for aII its horror and =11its ug. ,.\ there is nothing romantic about war and cer Iiiess and all its waste of human life, war cog ‘ tainly there 1s nothing glamorous about it. rinuea, unexplainably, to capture o~r senses . Wars &e lessons in excemive suffering and ex Wd our feelings. For like it or not, combat is treme pain, m overwhelming boredom &d the most intense moment in a man’s life. Ic is MILITARY REVIEW � Janua~ 1989 . We werethesonsoftheMgenemtionthatforrgMhiWorldWarIL Theirswee a rrrgged,disciplined,unspoiledgenerationtfratcameofageduringtheDepressionand Iearnerfthhneceasityofsacrificeandthemeaningafdoingwithout. . . . Ourgeneratfon waethegenerationthathadnotimefarresponsibilityandhadrefrrsadtogmwS@ Wewere ampered,spoiledand vmiadrrlgedbythosesometougheldermenwhohad t foughtinWorldWarII ladwhowantedtogiveuseverything!heyneverhad, ,1 hard to explain, but once in a fire fight, our dlfterent. It can be no other way. For combat fears are usually erased by the actm~ of that develops m I penon such a dfferent way of F instant and, for a shore period of time, our Iivmg, of Iookmg atd,fe and of living with entire bmies become ahve. We hear better, death. After wimessing our first casuah Ies, we we see better, we think better and we feel knew we would never be the s~me again. better than we have ever felt before. Our When we saw the wounded and the dead, the babes and our actions become controlled hy blood and the litters, and we beard men cry insmrct and by the reflexes of surwval. As the ing out m pare, we knew we were now com adrenahn nrshes through our bodies, fear is bat soldiers. We had become members of”; replaced by an ovenvhelmmh dewre tm hve. God-awful fratermty. It was a fratermty The Japanese have a saying, ,“You only live whose dues were too high. It was a fraterni~ twgce-once when you are born and once that should never have been allowed to exist. when you have looked mto the face of But we knew It was a fraternity that “would death: War N,’after alI, ;s much about hvmg never be dkbanded in our lifetim~xcept in as It is about dying. the minds of dreamers. War changes a man qnd combat makes hlm What were our so1&er5 like?” This fi- 40 January 1989 * MILITARY REVIEW nal quesnmr is perhaps the one that bothe us the most, not b+sse of either the qu$. tion itseIf.or the answer, but because of the attitude of some of the people who ask it. This attitude goes back 20 years. Among some of the c@ege students who successfully avoided the war and among some of the press who reported it, but dld not have to fight if, there was an elitism, an arrogance and a .snobbkhness that flew in the face ~f our na tional democratic ideals. Many of my genera tion considered themselves better than the soldlers who had gone to Vlemam. They con sidered themselves “too good” to have to go. They were superior and, accordingly, some. how exempt. To the people who avoided mihty service or succeasfidly escaped the drafi, it was impor tant that our soldlers be made to appear h% different and s;mewhat less valuable than they. After +1, if we were all Sreated equal, then those who dld not go would suffer by comparison. They had a vested interest, born out of self-protection, to fmter the difference Whileetillyorrthfulappaerkrg,wehed -, ~ between “we” and “they.” . grownoldeewetravols?dalmostinatanten. So in an effort to protect the egos and the oouslyfromadeleecencetomiddleageattfie . image of those who refused to go, it became a crackofa bullet,AndwekedIeetarrrimto. “ face-saving device to create a derogatory ster eermeetplaceecalledOakToandKkeSenh, , eotype of the Amwican soldler. @ soldlers VCVelleyandttrelaDrang,Toy!dhrh 1$ began to be portrayed as poor and underedu andtkeParrot’sBeak. cated and not quite as good m the orhem back . . ,. .’ home. To have the image of an Army com posed of ghetto blacks, hillbillies and high school dropouts made it much more socially ates in Vlemam was much higher than’ i - was accepmble not to become apart of the Army. in World War 11, as was the’ number Q!.Kol- Granted, disadvantaged whites, as well:= Iege graduates or soldlers with some c&f@ge. blacks, served in our Viemafn Army, as did In fact, at various times, large segments &our hillbillies, farm boys and high school drop Army were composed of coilege graduates outs. But so they did in World War 11 and who lost their deferments foklowing gradua Korea as well. Such has always been the case tion and as a matter of course became sol in our modem-day armies. diers. In Uemarn, 1 served with lawyers, engi- . But the idea of an uneducated, illiterate, neera, business majors, accountants and steel socially unacceptable army was only a notion workers. while adr&tedly the combat arms arid not a reality. The staristies themselves may nQt have represented a true ptcture ~of were no help, ‘so they were never mentioned. the y h of the dam by and large, the Army Gverall, the percentage of high school gmdu asawh mos certainly did. u > MILITARY REVIEW . January 1989 ,. /. ,. L&e it or not, our soldiers were just cmcli far more to do with convenience than it did ~, eveqday Ameriw guys from all walks with morality. ., of life and relatively representative of our Togo into the military means accepting re American youth of the time. Our Army ~nsibllity. It means} in any era, the ne.ceasi- j would have been more representative if so ty of sacrificing comfort. To go into combat may mean the necessity of making the ulri. mate sacrifice. To many baby bmmers, spoiled and made. ,. Amongmwgeneration,distiflatioiw aanaewbodrawnbetweenthosewko sofr, it was somehow unseemly and corn-. wentto Vietnamandtfmeawkodidnot. pletely unnecessary to give up our comforts, IIImymind,thediirenae isnetsomusk and ,it seemed sacrilegious to t~lnk that we oneaf ckwsoredueation.Tked~renee is could be asked to lay our lives on the line. tkatonegrouprekuedto hwrytheiradulthood ,The “me generation” became a reali~ in the andtkeotkerallewedtheevelutienaty 1960s. proaeastotakeplace. We were the “Pepsi generation,” very much int@reedom and not yet mto respcmsi bility. Spoiled as we were, we hated incon- . ~ vemence and we believed that responsibilities many at home had not avoided military serv were stall for our parents. To go into the ic~ The reasori so many attempted to get out Army w= ro hurry responsibility, and to go to of military seMce had more to do, I believ<, war was the ultimat~ inconvenience. That ‘ with who we were and how we had been kind of resporr.wbili~ was for adults and we raised, than it had to do with the nature of were still children. The generation that , the Metmrm War. There was a difference be-. refused to take out the garhge became the rween our generation and the generation that geneTtlon that refused to go off to war. served in World War 11. Our draft age youn Among our generation, dktinctions can meh were baby bcomers. We were the sons o now be drawn between those who went to 6 the GI generation that fought in World War Vtetnam and those who did not. In my mind, II. Theirs was a rugged, dr.saplmed, unspoiled ths difference is not so much one of class or generaticm that came of ge during the De education. The difference is that one group pression and learned the 1 ecesmy of sacrifice refused to hurry their adukhood and the other and the meaning of doing without. To them, allowed the evolutionary process to take rmmibili~ and hard work were a part of’ .place. life and education, and the good life was a As demeaning and dehumamzing as the luxury. Because of the times, they grew up m process had been, the Army, in very httle a hurry and ov 42 .’. Jammy 1989 * MILITARY REVIEW , , :f;? a confidence that our generation had never thr new feeiing that would keep us going ~ known. We discovered a pride in each other when all else t%iled. - that we never knew could exist. We dscov We were no longer young boks and we had ‘ ered, like our f&hers before US, that we were lost our innocence. WMle still youd$tl ap. no longer childrert and srraiigely our pride in pearing, we had grown old as we traveled al .‘ that achievement and in each other contin most instantaneously from adolescence to ued to evolve. Thk new feelurg was ddflcuh middle age at the crack of a bullet. And we for us to understand, but we strongly felt a had lost our innocerice at places ‘died D& combirrdon of sympathy and devotion, and To and Khe Sanh, VC Valley and the Ia !: . loyalty and enthusiasm for those around us. Dmng, Tay Ninh andke Parrot’s I%&. We had lost our selfishness. and it would be } Tcday Vietnam is an experience no~e of us $ ., MILITARY REVIW” � JmUWj 1989 43’ ~ *’. ( ...!. \ 1 will ever be able to recapnrre+nd yet it is an men ? 1.thought of Geodwin who lost an eye; experience no one can eve+ take away. We of Feit, who will limp for the rest of hM bfe; of $’ learned thgs about ourselves no classroum Wdder, who is survived by a wife and two sets could ever teach. We learned, in combat, of rwinx and of Llewllynn, who twice ‘saved : ‘ that the measure of a man is not governed by my life. ‘ ,. his status in life, hk educational achieve How could he appreciate that, for me, ments or his opinion of himself. The measure serving wA these men was a prwdege I never of a man in the eyes of his fellow soldiers is deserved, and that from their example, 1 gove~ned by a simple equation—when it learned so much about hfe and even more comes down to the firndarnental situation in about hvmg. These men are special to me !- VCJlvinglife and death, till those around him and a Me piece of each of them will always .be able to trust their lives to him. “ be inside me. Recentl~ another mari came up to me with We went to war and we shared it queationa on his mind. A letter from his fami together-the same sights and sounds, the ly doctor, years before, had kept hrm out of same feelings and fears, and the same tastes “ the Army. He, too, wand to know what our and smells. We shared love and respect, loyal. , soldiers were lie. He wanted some admission ty and trust, and we shared unspoken prom from me that would acknowledge that he, ises always to look after each other. and others Fike him, enjoyed some higher, No maner who we were, or where we were moral exemption tim Viemanr service. I was from, we learned to accept each other and . fi{ite to the man, but I could not offer him count on each other for life tself. It was a re the peace of mind that he was now seeking. lationship rhat transcended race, natiomlity He wanted to talk about our Suldlers, but or education. While serving together, for the how could I cell him in a few short words fi~t ume m our hves, we dkcovered a com what they were really like. What would he mitment &yor’+dourselves. It was the ulti ever know of young soldiers under fire, crawl mate dncovery for those of my generanon. ing on their bellies to save their wounded Our cede of conduct was never to think of b.dcbea, or of veteran soldiers tahng time out ourselves, hut to think about our buddies from sleep or relaxation to patiently tei+h the fvsr, because thet were thinkkrg about us. mechanics of survival to soldlem recently ar Our first commandment had been to perish if rived m the country. What would he know we must, but to save our buddies first. in about the joy of sitting on top of sandbags Vietnam, we discovered the cement that’ with a group of guys whose hysterical humor “bi~dsmen together. mad~+the possibility of dying of laughter a That simple, pr-tcious memory of belonging Wrtlme risk, or about the searing, razor-sharp and of prufe in each other is now a pkrt of parrr of losing a cherished friend in combat. who and what we are. We are all special be He wanted to draw comparisons, but they cause of that experience, and because of that were comparisons he could never understand. experience, we will forever be Joined at the Row could he ever compare himelf to’ such SOUL .IMI16Mark ?lWUE m a@meY-irf-kIwm On&r, Nebnda He rectwd a ‘B.A. from h UmwrrIr)of Nebmh and a J D frmi lncbu UiuwmIQ Crmng rheMmurnrWar he d uuh the 4ih Infaw Drurwirad wmkaiwth elmem i of rk 75rh Rmgm as a Lmg.nrngerecmrnmxmce pmoi’mluq mwllrgwueream Iauie?i?rt5sm (’ [ 1 . ,.. - . 44 Janua!y 1989 = MILITARY REVIEW .. “, PERSPECTIVES Captain (P)James Jay Carafano, US Army r. ,. N THE recent renaissance of militmy his, 1tory cm the Viemam War, 0 e ‘element 1s Thevalue eyetamoftheofficer vgnored. There are no sigmflcan t new studies corpewasunpraparadtocope with the warln that examine ofhcer performance and at~i. Vietnam.(%iticaargnedMacaaff.intarect, tudes. As a result, many of the prelimlmry notealffeccaatvioa,ttietdominatedboth conclusion reached during &e early 1970s re. ettitudeeandperformance.Officereregaided main largely unchallenged. These critics dutyocfiile moretbanaaodewordforthG found significant flaws m the. officer corps. advancematiofperconalconcerns me origins of the problem, their scholarship suggested, were deeply rooted in the irrstitu tiomd values of the Army. For example, Eclw~d L. King wrbte m his 1972 link, The was unprepared to cope with the war in Vier Death oj tfreArmy: nam. Critics argued it w@ self-interest, not “derhaps the Army became trapped m selfless service, that dominated bed-i attitudes Vtetnam because of pervasive ethical laxness and performance. Officers regarded duty as at all levels over the precedhg fifteen years. little more than a code word.forthe advan~,- ; This moral laxness creared a new breed of rnent of personal concerns: 14 ~ Army officer. The tone of the Army became These sweqping conclusions;have not been one of swbtefige, public deceptton, and pro taken to task, principally because judlciah$ motion of self-interest.”1 historians have yet ro sift rhtough and d@st TIM conclu.won was apparently coti~mred the mass of primary source material coyrcem by an Army stqdy copd.cted m 1970 which ing the war. A recently edited collectio$ of concluded there was “a significant difference letters, depmmental records ‘and oral $&o between the ideal values and the actual or op ries at the United States Military Academy at erative value5 of the Officer Corps.”z West Point provide a ghmp~e of the. revtitons Criticism especially focused on the West to come concerning officer attitudes and the Point motto, “Duty, Honor, Country,” since conceprof duty. w was recognized as the centerpiece of the The letters in the collection were v&itten Army’s professed vahre system.’ In particulm. to the academy by ofllcera serving in South- “ attention centered on the perceived perver-’ east Asia from 1966-1970.A Despite the &~ sion of the offlceq’ duty concept. Although verse quality rmd content of the material,. a there was no general consensus on the origins consistent theme is evident. A positive orien I of the problem, many saw the results as se# tation toward duty performance is a constant +} evident. The value system of the o~icer corps throughout. the letters from officers in ..” MILITARY REVIEW ? January 1989 . 45 ‘ .. . —— ., 1’ . ... t “, range of duty assignrnerits, In one dramatic Iery, plus cocadiiate the insem’on and air A. account, for example, a field artillery lieuten er for the rn@evacs [medkd evrrcuations].’~ ant &rving as a forward observer with an in The emphasii in this letter, as in othera, fantry company wmre was on competence and performance, ~tift. “The Ccanmander was seriously wounded cation from personal courage, hope of reward, and I ~ook charge of the company. It went advancement or recognition are neither t.hrcwgh my mind what [a frim~ had told me stated nor implied: Thk attitude toward duty performance was not limited to combat operations. For exam- , Whflsomfetfim infhemiddle pie, an engineer officer wrote about con. ofa niffhfaffaaf&thisoffiaarauddenfy stnrcting a bunke~ , maiiid amfacaapfadfheraiqmnsihiiiiof “You cannot irnagiie the enthusiasm arid Ieadiogmeninaemfx+f.Hisfimf C6ncem”waa pride I took in thii project. ., . My one R. 1 hisova competencetoML Tfdekind gret is that we rotated out of the [demij@r of inffospaafifmfhinkiqfisa peeitiveiqdicafer ir.ed rone] before the finish~ touches could 1 ofa ~ngu$heamy dutycenaept. be completed.’” ‘Another described an engineer operation “While working on Bridge 19-16, myself and my platoon really got to know what it hefore I lefi [for Vietnam]. He had [seen] an was like to have ? goal and to be interested in article where an artillery FO [forward observ your work. . . .1 personally had a special goal er+had to rake charge of an infanny company of finishing the bridge before my DEROS and 1 had better study up on infantry tactics. Hate efigible m Arm km overs=].’” Weii, I never thought it would happen to me The collection is replete with similar exam. ,b~t it did.’” plea of dedication and commitment. WWe under fiie in the middle of a night The condition-and purpose for with these attack, this ofHcer suddenl~ reafized and ac letters were written particularly highlights the cepted the responsibility of Ieadlng men in sigo~lcance ~f the views expressed. The De. combat. Hk %t concern was hk own corn-, partment of Hfitory at West Poinr collected petence to lead. This kind of introspective the letters as part of a projict tided “The Ad thinkii is a positive indicator of a strring and venture Boatd.” Colonel Thomas Or&s, de healthy duty concept. I partment chief, recalled the purpose of the Thrmrghout the letters, authors e’xprearthe” projec~. greatest personal sati.+action when dwuasing “our effort was aimed at showing the ca. r. the performance of duty. A young lieutenant, ders that a ~ilitary career was challenging describing the sudden resporrsibfirie.s of the and exciting and that it carried great responsi. . first few moments of a battle, wrote bdities for a commander. In other words,, it ‘“I had my radio with me at the lUC [tacti was a ‘great adventure.’ You must remember cal operatiomr center] and proceeded to put it that during part of rhrs time we had a bit of a on my back ad relay me.wages to the 105 motwational problem with cadets, who were [mm] howitzer battery. 1 coordinated with the frustrated with growing national attitudes 2, air observer and instructed him to fire 175 about the war in Vtemam.” [mm gun], ~ [artiUery] dd 155 [mm artilleq] Members in the department actively solic defensive mqgets. Then I began to adjust Blue ited officers in V1emarn to write about their Max [Cobra gunships]. i had to continuously experiences. ~ey d~layed rhe letters in the relay messages for both ,rhe mfarrtry Ad artil-’ rotunda of Thayer Hall, West Point’s main . 46 .lanuary 1989 c MILITARY REVIEW .1/ ?hetattersintheaolleotfonworew@faIItotheaaadmnybyofffaarssawfng . inS@ftaastAsiafmm f900-1970.L?es#fte@edmrsa quafii andaontentofthe : material,a conskfentthemeisawidsnt.A positiveorientationtewarddutyperformmme 14 isa conefsnttfwoughonftheIefterahem officereina with?rangeofdm~ignmeh, .’ ., .; “, . academic buiIding, with maw designed to at. siog. The fact that an officer eyen toiir$rne tract cadet interest. Griess felt that if cadets to respond to such a query set hlm apart:@n were presented with a fair and jective view others. In short, one woutd expect that &se of officer life, they could mor easily deal who ~ponded would offer a relatively .Opti with the pressure of being at th J academy and mistic view. preparing to enter the @y.’ Another problem with attempting to reach The question, of course, was if it was pessi. any consensus of officer attitudes durinlg the ble to obtain an objective view from the let war was the variant nature of combat duties o ters. As to the shortcomings of the collec m Vlemam. As hktorian Jeffrey Clarke ~ints tion, one was obvious; it did not represent all Ouc officers. Those who vohmteered to wqite Iet “Throughout the conflict, different leve~ ters to the acadsmy were no doubt predis. of enemy activity necessitated differen$ re- . posed toward a positive view of their ,profes sponses from region to region and even from ,. — . . —.— —- —- MILITARY REVIEW * Januaty 1989 DUE TO A LACK OF PHOTOGRAPHIC cONTRAST “ ~~ .1 BETWEEN TEXT AND BACKGROUND, THIS PAGE DID NO’1’REPRODUGEW=I-I-. ;* i ----- ,, ( . . province COprovince. It is almost impossib about what will happen when the enemy IS to genek+ii on the nature of the war b as% not vtilble .or is abstract, as in training areas on personaI experience.’”o In addkion, prac. in the US or Europe. I don’t ihink che tices even withbr combat unirs could vary present state of d~cipline will hold up.’’” T& greatly. view, however, represents a dktinct change Despite these recognized limitations, the km the earlier letters. West Point letters offer meat, utility in evalu A more skeptical approach to the material ating officer attitudes T%ere ~wasrio standard might be to suggest that resporidents simply format of reply. Respondents wrote about ignored the negative aspects of service and whatever they felt was appropriate. In fact, ‘their own attinrdes toward duty. Thk, how one of the srrengths of the collection k+its dh ever, cannot be inferred from the character of the letters. Their tone ISsrmighrforwatd ~d factual with little that suikes bf overt propa mse who volunteeredtowrite ganda or false bravado. in ordy one letter dld Iettefeto theaomhmywerenodoubt an officer describe his duties m traditional predisposedtowarda positkemewoftheir military heroic image~. In tits letter a car profession.ThefeetthetMIofficereven rain recalled his first meeting with hk mer-t tooktintetoreependtosucha querysethim “I could see that I gathered their attention aprt hem [email protected],onewouldexpect with my brief temarks as there was not a (tat ttmsewhorespondedwouldetfero sound iir the room—nor a cigarette lit—I .feletiwelyoptimisticview. brought to life remembrances of Nathan Hale, of Gordon at Khartoum, of Thomas at Ch[ckamauga, of MacArthur at Bataan.”” Thii description was unique. CMcers did versity. As a result, the letters represent the nor write of their duties in the larger abstract spcmtaneous views of more than 103 officers framewbrk of mditmy rradjtion or patriotism. of various ranks on whar they believed were Gn the ottier hand, most letters were not the most impmant issues for the young men simply cold, dispassionate summarieseof les at West Point to understand. sons learned, although some of them certain [t is curious that in a collection of letters ly fit into this motif. Rather, many appeared concerned with condinons in the Vlemam very sensitwe to the realities of war and the era Army, there are no discussbs of drug stress of combat. Gne offIcer, for example, abuse, racism, fmggings, war crimes, wide discussed the problems of dealing with men spread ethical conflicts or other problems during a controversial wac popularly associated with the moral brealt “The men s~nsed me the other day sir. down of the Army officer corps. Gne possible After a cla$ I duew open the floor to any reason for thii is that most of the letters are questions. And the men started into the phi- from the period 196r5-1969 when it is gener Icdophy of the war. Why is the US involved, ally agreed that such probIems were less what do they hope to gain, how is patriotism acute. It is only in the later letters that signs and freedom involved?’”3 of an army in crisis me seen. For example, in Another wmte.abmrt the self-doubt of KE” a 1971 letter an ofilcer wrote: fi t experience of leading men in combac “I am very disturbed by the state of disci ‘I had only been a company commander pline in US mops, even though they do a forK ree weeks and thk was a rude day for J grand job when bound together by a common me to break rn. As I sit here and look at the threat, the enemy . . . however, I worry Silver Star I received for thatday, I wonder if . 40 ‘) January 1989 * MILITARY REVIEW “1hedonlybeena oempanycrwrananderferthreeweeksandthiswasa rude” wayformete b&skin. As1sitbarsandleekattheSilverStarI receisedferthatday, I I wonderiftherawaeaernstftiirfI1shouldorcouldha~edonetooreventoursaeualties. I’llpmtwrblynekrsrreallyfmow.T’ there was mmething I should or coufd have Iy that they ‘were honest and srraightforwar~ ,, done to prevent our casualties. I’ll probabIy appraisals of individual experiences, never really know?”b In addition, the letters offer no suggestion “i+ Still another offered a, f%ankassessment of of a “careerrst” menrahty on the pan of OffI one of his fellow offlcem cers. llw.s again is’sruprisii, in light of much~of “He leav~ in a blaze of glory. He faded to the research conducted. Richard Gabrkel did show up for a briefing he was supposed to give Paul Savage, for example, ur their 1978lxmk, “ [the] General . . . yesterday. His excuse is Crisis in Command, argue that ca&e&m that he was having a machete chrome-plated among officers stood out as a serious prob~ist.. in Saigon for the chief of staff. I’ll be glad i% effective duty concept would nor dnty.re. when we get a new CO for B Company.’”5 quire thar officers arrempt to do the right Thii same oftlcer recalled the harsh condi thkrg, but that they do it for the right rea tions of base camp sons. Gabriel and Savage defined careerism as “I feally feel sorry for our troops. After four the product of an attitude in which o~icers days of no rain, which is very unusual, we were most concerned with protecting them. o had about one.half inch of dust everywhere. selves and advancing their career regardl~ of About 2 1/2 hours ago it started pouring the impact on duty performance. These au. down rain with very heavy winds. f’m sure thors suggest that the operative values at work our men must be dmy, cold and miserable.’”* appeared more su~esrive of the managerial The character of the letters suggests strong- atnrudes of the business world than those re MILITAFiYREVIEW � January 1989 49 ‘ ., ( ,.!, . fleetedin theWest Po-kwmotto.” ~‘ was acknowledged that some officers dis., The letters do provide ‘a few exianples of played “careerist”” attitudes, there is no evi ot%cervseeking specific as+ignmenrs. Some ei dence in the collection that careeriyrr was en I ther asked about coming to the academy as demic to the system. Rather, the material instructors, or recommended othe~ for teach. suggesrs thar whatever the reason officers I ing assignments. h fact, in the 1960s and eat- sought specific assignmerm, their perform- .. Iy 1970s, popular perception gtew that certain ance in those assignments remained consist- assignments at West Point”could be helpful in ent with a pxitive duty concept. promoting one’s cmeer. Of those who taught Irwrr related issue, some critics suggested military history from 1963-1970, for example, that an officer’sdual responsibilities to superi- Fight eventually reached the rank of general OrSas well as to the ethkal standards of rhe officer. Interviews with offkers who taught at profession and society were incongruent and West Point, however, suggest that the success it was this stress which tore the fabric of the of members of the facuky was not the result of duty concept. Joseph’ElIii and Robert McQre, ,. privileged assignments, but a reflection of the for example, in their critique Of the academy, specific recruiting policies of individual de. SchoolforSoldiers: West Point und the Profession parrments that sought to obtain the best or% ofArrrrs, wrote that the academy: cers available. Cries-s considered the selection ,, . . . never resolved the tensions and con of officess to be one of his primary _ibfi tradictions between their obligation to obey ties. During his @rmre, the qtrali~ of the miii orders, their obligation to follow persorrd eth tary history r%rrftyincswed and, commensurate ical principles, and their obligation to serve with it, the SCNUSof &e deparnnent.18 the national intermt.”? On reflection, one officer in the depart Josiah Bunting, an Army officer and mem. ment further suggested that concern over as- her of the history department at West Point, recreated this essential moral dilemma in The Liorrhmds, a 1972 Viemam war novel. Bun R is curioustftsfhi a collection ting’s fictional hem found hirnsdf confronted with an uncompromising choice: obey his of k!fffxssoncefwedwifbeonditfoosinthe Vimam.enmy, Meream nodiifiassimts commander and pm-suea policy that was mor- , ally and professionally wrong or oppose the . ofdrugabuse,racism,frsggings,W, crfmas, commander and risk damaging hk own ca wid~md efftiaalGRIMM orofher teer. $wob[ernspo~larly wesociafedwithfhemrir. Some remarks in the VIermmr letters do re alhwakdom ofMehrrnyoffissrcrops. flect a tension between individuals and supe # tiers. Occaatons arose when officers were con- f%mted with unpopukit orde~ tie heuten signments among officers resulted from the ant wrote, “I don’t mind telling you I’ve increasingly inflexible officer management miFed opinions about this w~maybe be svstem instituted durirw the Vietnam era. The cause I’m so far down &e chain and somemf r.&ed system, in atre;pting to establish ca the roles are hwd to play by.’’” Another offi. reer patterns, limited the time during which cer complamed about the priority and re officers were eligible for certain assign wurces accorded the construction ,Qfthe com ment. 19 AS a rdt, individuals took a more .. tnadng g$neral’squartew. personal and active role in seeking positions “Evidently, he war@ to move in soon and that would serve as prerequisites to greater we have lots of work to do. The quarters will rank and increasd responsibility. Although it have running water? flush toilers, air condi .. .. 50 “= Jarrua!y 1989 � MILITARY.REVIEW .+ “\ tlsoasionsarosewhwtficms wwe’aonbted withimpopulsrorder$. .1 0n8 Iieotenantwrote,”1don’tmindteliin$youihromixedopinioneaboutWawar– s “ maybebeaauseI’msofardosmthechain@d someoftheruleearehardtopleyby.” ,, ., , v, 1 tioned bedrooms, e{c. It i&,completel~ pan. the “Adventure, Board” and soliciting Iett m eled in plywood—top grade-finishkd m concerning the war. With US rroopi s ill clear varnish, tile floors, concrete patk$, the fighting in Vietnam, he ptepared the first a. works.” terial used in the department for teaching / e Incidentk ;when officers were at @~ with hktory of the war. He did not a;oid con ‘b @icies and decisions are revealed. Tlv+ dra versial issues. For example, Palmer’s cou e matic confrontation between loyalty an mO ‘notes criticized the US Army’s rehance n rality, howeve?, is not to be found. f technology and fire~wer.z’ Palmer also ~ t~ In reflecting on the attitudes exprer$ed by a course text which included a chapter 1 n offlcem, and in particular criticisms of +recifk Vietnam. In it he evalrgtted the overall mili- ; policies or tactics, one former instmct~r con mry straregy of the war and concludd l+ cluded: “One thing should be made alrsohdy 1 “YOUcould be critical and that would be clear: Attrition is not a strategy. It is irrei&tt the badge of loyalty. Critical becaus? what able proof of an absence of a strategy. ,A so& you saw going on was dysfunctional ~o the mander who resorts to attrition admits, hk m“ilitary establishment and its strer&h. I fiailure to concewe an alternative. Hi t$rns think criticism emanated from that ~ausq. warfare from an art and accepts It on,~~e Just bknd slavish support of the war eff+t w~s most nonprofessional terms imaginable,’ He really kind of foolish.”zz uses blood in heu of brains. . . . the U. S.’was In short, he suggested that tensi~n be strategically bankrupt in Viernam.”u tween the conflicting loyalties of duty was not He repeated these conclusions in am even nwessarily destructive. more uublic forum in 1978, in hB book, }Sum. An example of this kind of healthy p%fes mom if dre T~e~ 25Palmer’s self.gerierated “ sional self-criticism can be found among the commitment to analyze and critique the material in the West Point collection. Major Army’s performance in Vietnam stood out as 13ave R. Palmer, one of the first officers with an example of those professional Army or% combat experience in Vietnam to”teach in the cem who were able to reconcile the commir department, undertook the @k of organizin~ menrs of loyalty and duty. “ I MILIT*Y REVIEW o J~U8fy i9a9 51 * ,. ( consider a wide enough sampling of soorces. “Atfritionis nota atraterjy. Previoui studies have also focused mo heavily ftis irmfutable”proofofanabsenceofa atrat. on the character of the Army in the later agy,A oonrmandsrwfromsoriatoattrition years of the war and as.suryed too easily tit admitshisf@ra tosmroeiveanalternative. these conditions were an outgrowth of atti ffetrrrnswarfarafromanattandacoepfs tudes in the Army prior to 1968. In addition, it onthemostnonpmfessionaftermsimagin. if condklons later in the war did somehow able.tieUzwsbloodin iieuof hmins.” weaken the moral’ fiber of the officer corps, we should seek to identify what factors con ., tributed to this change. Were these factors evident m previous wars? since officer per. I In summm, the wew of’officer am’rudes tn formance and Ieaderdup in battfe are ,impor the West Poi& collection concerning the duty tant elements crf combat power, it is e.ss~ntial concept does not reflect the conclusions of that we fully understand how the Viemam the Army} critics a decade ago. How could War affecred an~$.shaped the officer corps. such a diverse collection fail to reveal at least The West Point collection Wggests that the indkators of the ills identified by previous re pat answers of earlier research are insufficient search? Perhaps these other efforts failed to and further research and revision are needed. NOTES 1 E&rard L I@, me Ge,m of the Ann”, A Pm Mn!?em (N.. York 5 Tc,cmpam!a. Sax@ Revlew Prw% 1S721,75 Gthm Crib.aue$tnduded Ward Just, 8 Tc,Xh”fie, 7 SqIEmbar 19s9 h!?!farvMen (NWJVoa Krc@. 1970], Harms Johnsonet a, &my mAn. 7 7C,cram., December19sS I qmli (N6w Vodc Ms.! &’@s, 1972), RJch8n5Ga&wl and Paul L Saw 8 TC,SQwmn, t7J”ne 79S4 w., Cn.Y.sm Commend Mmnwwgm?m.t m the Ac’ny (New vow Hi! ma 9 W, Gness.29CMXW 7986 Wang, *972X ShIaH H Lc.3v, CMlmted lnslde .4JIw”cz+,.M,frtmyMa. . 10 JeffreyCtarke, 0“ Slm!eW and tn. V,O1”&mWar,, Paranmfers Chine (New Yaw Random House, 19731, R1ciIwcS-We, Flower of me llMnter, 192s)44 ~90. ~. .9mmo~. .fth. Us mv m wemam Fan Fran.% CA. ,, Tc, !.my,84Q,I 1971 I?mnwlls Press,197’2) 12 Tc, Es@sm, ii.l”ly19a6 -2 s?!@ on M,frfaryPm@sYmdkII {Cwlmle aamac~, PA US Army 13 1!2 R@k,, 25 January?967 * WaI CC&W, ~970], !,1 Gaiwal .9,6 Savase, C71SJS.S&94, aD2SW4 the 74 ?C,LambeR.3Man-h19& wm cdlsgw studyas dennmveand ra!ti tmevdyon !!sCnndum.msTim 15 TC,Srmlh 16Aug”et19E6 srmti was m citedby I-cay, Dda.ted, 3?4-X Recentwwti am$.w 16 JC,Smm, 26 AugustT9s6 ,. thisWI.. S.90Im8n GanQ,Bwtire A H!smwot How #men.m @mJm !7 G.bnelmdswage .,.$)-.,‘---- “!U!.----- !r- .“!. Led Us info Welwm and Made USFrgnt t% We” We Lkd (Nw Y.* W]. ,8 rc, Pwner, s-6; Fh”t,I %2 Nye, &5, WccUmansee, 7-10, and !!am Morrow, 197S), 30>5 Cmc,””a!”s, SeJf-Dm[mmOon The Dmm. Gness,r9APnl 1970me 1 August1970 regrabrn 8J70Oec.9yof me U S Amy D.nng the WemamEm (New Yom 19 TC R,”!, 4 S%0alsoW !rmhle”t 01the !$s”. ,“ W,ll(amL Ha”se,, w w N@wl, mat), Isa-a &ne”c.ak Ann” t“ C“,,, A Stud” m Cw{.MrlrtwyRelabmw (SA1WIW6, 3. ?tuay on Mrlrmrv%J&sJonekm, 30, V.wimons.?1lh!s aq.rnen! MD JcJhnsHcukmsUnWersOPress,1973),?7W6 can S=3twnd In K Bnxa Gallowayanti Rotwl Eawe JohnsonJr, West 20 ElhsflmiMcOm,S&X 207 tint Anm/wa,sPowerFmtemxv (New Y.ti Smm .M SC+USW,,197S), 21 rC. RvtxM. 21 M’drch1967 Rchmd U R,”, Ivwy .=c+7Ms.sA %ch > C@rm (P) ]mra J.; Camfarw is asrwred. Headqarrrerr arui HaIAwT&m Cmqxmy VII Corps, Wert Gcmrany He mewed m MA. jimn Geweram UIUwrriryad i a gdurre of rk US Mhcay Auzdany (USMA). He Iuu k!d Z>d*Y&mzE,*&%*2$%& S3 MKIbarrq cmmrmdm, Fmt S& Okkrlwmc and m ammnr[ PTGJersor,De@. nmrr ofHsmy USMA, [ 52 January 19890 MILITARY REVIEW 1, .& PERSPECTIVES A SQLDIER PONDERS Lieutenant Colonel Jim Johnson, US Ariny, Retired Copyright @ 19S9 EADED for Travis Air Force Base, American and the VC, who met abrirptly on , HCalifornia, on mv way back to Vlet a trd, face to ~aping face, where the VC w nm, I ~icked up a soldler hkchhkkg outside first to recover-h-is tits. He Iek our man urr. Fort Oral. As he came out of the darkness in conscious and bleeding. With a premonition to the car, the dome light revealed first hk red hair and then hk marksmanship badge. ~. He had qualified as a sharpshooter-better In19S5... WMWM*Dmisi9n than marksman but less than expert. He was coulds@keloosejustonefangerbeftefion a big alf+knerrcan kind of kid, who had fi andpartof onorogimentformobileofwra. nishedhigh school and had been accepted at fione@t]thrashthmughthefmdrfiesand the Univemity of California-Berkeley, where alor3theoonals,tryingtomakeconteotwifh he intended to major in nuclear physics. But theelusiveVC... sBecause movingthe drawn by the call ef service, advennqe and troopsleftcriticali-llationswndefended, the GI Bill, he had decided to try the Army e~enthoseo~eratfoneweterestrictedto z first. He had just finished basic and advanced otieoriwodaysata time. individual training, where he had learned to ., shoot, to creep and crawl, to toss a gremde, 74 to perform simple first aid and some other useful things besides. He too was flying io of his impending loss of inrwcence, I felt ~ ., twinge of regret for the hkchhiking. soJd&x. . ‘~%%%~~~1%~$~%’;otr bet! But there seemed to be no point in negat]ves, . Fort C&f’sdrill instructors had done thei;job w I kept my own counsel. I wrshed dx+boy lucky. . . and quick. well. He could hatdiy wait to get “into action. :;<’! The soldler knew he was ready for whatever I was on my way to Saigon to join a Stydy the fiture might bring. team, contmumg a personal journey of learn. Knowing somethkrg of the wale, guile and urg. I hoped 1 would soon begin to unravel a excellence in arms that this fresh-faced boy puzzle. Events and perceptions of events would encounter personally, I was less cer would form and re-form, focus and #focus, tain. I recalled the Metcong (VC) rifleman, and a door new to me would swing open. Be- ‘ “under heavy fire from our rifles and gunships, yond that door I woufd my to part the fog of who had used just five shells to shoot fwe as. war. In the course of the next three week, I saulting riflemen at 2(!O meters. Each round would form lasting impressions about roks, ~ \ had chdled a neat, clean orifice within inthes mis.wons and stmtem in that shadowed con- of ea# man’s belly button: I thought of the flict. would begin-;o see why we seerried to , ,-. \ MILITARY REVIEW * Januav 1989 5s, ., I ,, ( I 1’ ~ombetsupportandomnt!ataem!isesupportwereaboutaatbinandspareos ARWWSskinnysoldiers.AttVf4troopsfrequentlyoperatedoutsideaiqrartilletyfire surmotl. . fan.Rosuuuh!. . . wasmeblsmatiosl. . closeairSUDUORwasseldom.heiicootersware ,, fewandusetiitactioalintelligenceW&Sa ii%ity. make so htde credtble progress there. traveling. Consequently 1 had come to know -. I had spent a year studying the Vlemamese the corps’ 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions language, history and culture at the Defense about as well as I knew’ the 21st and in that Language Institute at Monterey, California, way had become familiar with much of the and another year with the Army of the Re paddy-land below Saigon. pubhc of Memam (ARVN) in the paddies of Two years of study and operations had the Mekong Delta. About six months of the eqmpped me with a full bag of useful facts, year with ARVN had been with a battalion techniques and tricks. Like most of my peers 1“ .’ -f the 21st Infantry Division. We operated had srrrwved, had gotten in a lick or two against the Vlemamese Communists or VC against Chadie, and h~d learned some things or, as they. were variously known, the Grng, that worked and some that dld not. KnowI. Charlie, Sw ~harles and other less attractive edge levied its price, however. The price was appellatiohs. a discomforting loss of certainty. The more I Another six months had been in the learned of the many Asian mysrene.s of Met ARVN IV Corps tactical operations cen nam, the less’ I truly understood, and the ter (TW). TheR we ccmnhated helicopter more doubdirl I became of pat solutions. and au support and other US participaticmin Now, I had spent a few months back in the ARWV operations. Working out of the corps Srates in a staff job, doing some public speak. 10C, I had spent about one.thti of my rime ing for the Army, meeting the people .“of 54 January tV39 � M&lTARYREVIEW .. .. ““’’=% “- street.” I had met realtors, repairmen and rug merchants. I had heard theix qoea tions and noted their resetiations, The inter- Iude had served aa a time for sifting through events, impressions and relationsh@s-a time of intellectual ptoce@ng. Now, unknowingly, I was ready to chnb onto a new plateau of underarandmg. When I first peeped over the edge of that plateau, it was a marvelous day. By marvelous I mean awe.irtapiig, SVondroua. I had seen combat po-wer in action before, but nothiig compared to that of the 1at Cava@ DivXlOn (Amobile), often called the lsr AirCav. Thii narmtive properly begins in late 1965 .fda Army Chief of Staff Genemf &srnld K. Johnson, He wished to do some restructuring af US Mantry units in Vietnam, but that was not within the chief of staff% authority. Be cause Secretary of Defense Robert MeNsrnam and his whu ki~ were dkciples of systems analysis, they deemed the talented general with hk yeara of experience imdequate to mafm the decision. Instead, their system de manded that he form an ad hoc team and produce an objective study that would prove ~eo~tiafl~, ARM batiafimrawere s the need for some relatively minor adjust mobileinmissionandtargetedonlargeW ments in infantry wea~rra and organimtion. fermatiooa.TerriferiaifemaawrohseRegion. , Accordhgly, in January L966, the Army atMdPeNhrFe*&~~ werefefmrtrlle 14 , staff rounded up a pkme load of infantry maj NcWWwdWand@ticttie hamieta ors who had prior experience in ~letnam and arrdsillegee.In raaiii, enemysafrabiiitiea : L ~sen~ ihem to Saigon. The head of the study tiedmo@&RVHtroops,sewrrliastheRi2F%,?’ team gave each member, including me, a feterritariaidefensereiee. ream of checklisii, the designation of a banal. ““ *. ion to observe, and 60 days to get out and , :$#+<,‘ . gather certain objective data. From corn. pleted forms, I imagine, staff officers devel. and well in the Ia Dmng the preview, ‘No. oped numbers, wrote a study, got a dec~lon vember. Its courteous troopers cooperated fish and eventually shipped more suitable ~w~ y with the viskor who had been dumped into “ and equipment. their midst, and in a week I had dr$ ob. My check she~ts applied to the I’st Air served their tactics and had properly corn. s Cav. To get from Saigon up to Bong Son, not pleted my forms. firr fmm the coast in the Central Highlands, Finishing a 60.day task in just a week or w and to find my assigned unit took just a few was almost certain to raise questions of creck days. The unit was one of the Cav3 excellent bility, and it did: Afier convincing the team’s airmobile bartahons, which had fought hard drrectors in Saigon that my checklists were . MILITARY REVIEW � January 1989 firlly done and that 1 had no other service to friendly artillery fired in ARVN’S support, No render, I was on a fight back to rhe.West hehcopter overflew the fight. The battalion’s Gast within three weeks of arrival. But those soldiem fought honestly and weU, but as sure three weeks put my previous two years of ly as the monsoon rises and the rains fall, study and operation mto perspective. During brave men were frilly overwhehned by sheer I the week with the Cav, pieces of the puzzle numbers. A score of ARVN soldiers surterv came together. dered, h-re perhaps roo easily. Just 26 chas My prior experience had been with ARVN tened srd&,ers hmped or were led from the 1 ~ ,- where the meat lay pretty close to the bone. heat of battle and into frigid Mars’ harsh judg- , \ Combat support and combat serwce support ment of disrepute. The 26 were saved, to try were about as thm and spare as ARVNk skm agai,n another day, by t,be arrival of two . riy soldiers. ARVN troops frequently operated friendly A-lE attack lmmkers at 1630. outside any wtillery fire support fan. Resup Charlie tried the same tactic on the ply was problematical, close am support was A~VN .Zd Battallon, 31st Infantry a few seldom, hehcopters were few and useful tacti months later. T& time two, Just two, US cal intelligence was a rarity. helicopter gunships flew cotier, and, they dra The case of the once proud ARVN 1st matically improved the outcome, It was not a Battalion, 31st Infantry may dlustmte the great victofi perhaps, but when ARVN quit pant. In retalianon for m eadier ambush and the field, both his unit integrity and martial decimation of a VC heavy weapons company honor were fully intact. the VC mouse-mapped and massacred its sol. Those battalions’ experiences wete not diers on 12July 196+. dady occurrences. Neither were they atypical. Expecting action that day, the battalion Theoretically ARVN bartahons were mobile 250 alert, properly deployed men made con in mssion and targeted on large VC format tact ar 0903. Two waifing VC battalions, to- ions. Territorial forces such as Regional and Popular Forces (IWTF) were to handle static security duty and protect the hamlets and vii- Mwism wantedto sealallVCforcesin Iages. In reality, enemy capabilities tied most a contactarea,whichwaaeaeilydenewith ARVN troops, as well as the RF/PE to tern. theheii~eptetawltotillyde~oythe enemy torial defense roles. forcesonthefield,,,, Aflteeeffmt,it In 1965, for example, the ARVN 21st Di- ‘ I seemed,MW wascontenttaferrnanepen vision could shake leose yrst one ranger( bat box,ta lettheatwilatdehelicoptergmrshfps talion and part of one regiment for mobile I ‘ andanyobtiinalrletacticalairsuppert(and operations. Treops would thrash through the artillerywhenpresent)dothekilling,letting paddies and.along the canals, trying to make theremainingVCesoapewithdarftness. contact with the elusive VC, and if they dld there might be some action. Because moving the troops Iefi critical installations undefend- ~ ed,. even those operations were restricted to taling 800 men and including 81mm mortars, cme or two days at a time. deployed to the battalion’s front, right and The DELTA Aviation Battalion, which ‘ rear. They effectively’ pinned the ARVN may have beer, the world’s best at the time, troops mto the flat, flocded paddies. A third provided the entire ARVN. IV Corps with Main Force unit of 1,.200 well-rehearsed in helicopters. Many of the DELTA Battalion’s surgents assaulted ARVNk experienced, self helicopters were tted up in command and corrfldent soldiers%rm their left flank. No ., control, or utility functions. To suRport. . com 56 ‘ January 19.S9 . MILITARY REVIEW tWaiiyAnterioanadsissratotVCorpsuniteoftenfeftfmpotentardfmtrated, Taetioaladsiseraspentbet,humiddaystiptoingalongsanalbanks,expectingto hear thetelltalepopthatwouldp~cedobyoneone.hundradttrofa eeoondtheexplosionofa cripptingbootlftrap.... SsattewdacrossthecountrysideinsmalloutpostsIackhg manpower,mofrififyandsupport,sometimesdiscouragedangfoften bered,theycouldfind nowaytesorrfacttheonemyrmlawi%?pickedthetimeandplace. . ‘I? bat operations in 1965, the DELTA Battalion cessfid encounters invohyd the DELTA Avia furnished up to 24 tran~ort helicopters, if tion Battalion. -The VC p~obably kept traqk memory properly serves, and two gurrshlp pla of ARVFU losses, which were usudy ma~$id toons on a few occasions and with some prior by a lack of combat support, ‘ ‘ planning. DELTA Battafiori could provide m - With the prospect of sour defea~&.$r at two gun platoons and 10 or 12 tranqmrrs of hand and sweet victory a dim dream,, -@anY combat support once or Wice a month. Like Aniencan advisers to IV Corps urm<~$ften the corps’ overextended soldiers, American felt impotent and frustrated.’ T~cncal a&ers combat support choppers could be made /spent hot, humid days tiptoing along canal avadable in small numbers for limited peii Lx&, expecting to hear the telltale pQp that ‘X3.5. would prec=i+eby one one-hundredth df a sec When ARVN’S soldiers and DELTA’s ond the explosion of a cripphng booby trap. a choppers were wedded in combat operations, They spent other miserable days m the mud the results could be superb. Major Dan and water of the paddies, whert every s~ep Myers, of the IV Corps operations section, was opposed by the mud’s sucking vacuum, documented some 38 ARVN victorres, large and where, fittle by htde, smpers wok their and small, in that period. Virtually all suc toll in blcod and nerves. Scattered across. the . . > MILITARY REVIEW * Januaw 1989 57 , ., ,,. ( when present) do the kMng, leming the re maining VC escape with darkness. ARVN was content to win battleq advisem wrmted to nut up the score. We advisers spent’ more than one full night, illuminated and certified with degrees from “Chivas Regal University: trying to an- ~ ‘alyre the comparative strengths of the com batants. ~ese were bull sessions, of course, but they were serious. We grappled with day- to-day problems and sought understanding of a strange war and wen stranger peo~e. Two ‘ Aftirorrgfrilfi~oetnumherodtfm points we agreed on were intelligence and WC,theothersideharfgoodinformm-on mobdity. andwedidnot.Havinginformation,tfieWC Although ARVN oum.mbered the VC, eeuldsafelyrnaeethofrferoes.lackinginfer. the orher side had good information and we nmtion,wewereforcedintoa defensivefree. did not.’ Having information, the VC could I ture.Wfwnwe made oootaetwitfr tbe enemy, safely mass their forces. Lacking information, whomwehadtrampedsomanymilestefiod, we were forced into a defensive posture. . wemightfindthathehadusowtgrmned. When we made contact with the enemy, whom we had tramped so many miles to find, we might find that he had ~ outgunned. With greater mobility we could have over countryside in small’ outposts lacking man come. the VC’S latent strength of superior in ~wer, mobility and support, sometimes dis formation. The ARVN 7th Infantry Division ccmaged and often boted, they could find no and later the 21st Infamy DivKlon and oth. way to contact the enemy unless he @eked em had proved that. We hardly dared to think the time and place. of large ~numbers of great, new gadgets like Other advisers, whether lucky or unlucky helicopters; instead we often dreamed of depending on the point of view, had plenty of swamp buggies and similar low-tech modes of . . contact. They, too, fe!t the frustration of im trbvel. potence, but for entirely different reasons. A pant of little agreement and even Ietw ~ese Americans advised the few units that understanding was ARVN’S willingness to were employed in helicopter. assault roles. fight. We knew he would fight when neces Their concern was not a lack of contact or saq. But would he carry the fight to the ene even of victories. my? it was a question of leadership; ARVN Their problem was that ARVN would not So[diemwere as gcod as their leaders. But how fight hard enough. Advisers warmed to seal all gcd were the leaders? A few advisers, as if in VC forces in a contact area, which was easily a state of animated shock provoked by a clash done with the helicopter, and rotally destroy of cultures, were totally”repul.sql by the Viet the enefgy forces on the field much as the namese. These few could find literally noth ~~ VC had destroyed the 1st Battalion, 31st In fig good abut their counterparts or the units fantry Division. All too often, it seemed, they advised. On the other hand, moat of us ARVN was content to form an open box, to felt that our individual counterpart was okay. let the available helicopter gunships and any As a rule he knew his job and was willing to obraimble tactical air support (and artille~ do it. Many of us found our counterpart, \ 5e.. - JariuaIY19S9 � MILITARY REVIEW whom we were to advise, to be our best teacher. I suspected that d-re more we knew about him and hw situation, the more we ap. preciated his forbearing patience; and the more we realii that his specislired knowl edge and battle judgment exceeded our own. To us, the junior advisets, the chain of rmnmand above orri ievel often seemed sus pect. Accommodation with the VC was sometimes suspected. Cknrprion was a given. Still, we knew that out superiors generally saw their counterparts in a favorable light, in abofst the same way that we saw ours, Moreover, our superiors harbored identical reservations about the hierarchy above them, } a variation of the old fiier-pointing game. Ce@rdy the ARVN leadedrip was bound by conarrainrs American advisers could hardly ToUS,fhejunioralsfsets, dwem. ‘With&e weekly coup d’&at a part of ffmahainof aommandaboveowlmfotin the poli@l landscape for a period in 1964, seemedeusftaoLh~im witkfbe” the natipnal government fek a strong need to yCwwm&W-*d. Commfion mini&e casualties and keep the army paci w’* a given.Still,wpfmewfkf our fied. lvfany military men believed rhar one sapariofegeneml~-tieif W*P reason for Ngo Dinh Diem’s fall was excessive ina favorablefi$bf,inabouffbesameway casualties. I could only conclude that airy re tha!wesawaura. luctance to fight on ARVN’S part was a mat . ter of national policy, and one that, given the circumstances, was nor irrational. It may ., have appe”hredto fall outside the military eth. Grark woodcutter freshly landed at the comer ‘T~ ic, but events wordd bring even that obsefia- , of Canal and Bourbon streets @uring Mardi tion into question. Gras. I stood around with my mouth hang$ng i Why we focused on ARVN’S leadership open for the first day or two. HeKc~pt@s quotient so exclusively and in such a negarive filled the skies. Direct &sppo~t,srtillery @v way is unclear to me now. Certainly ARVN eled with the infantry. C1OSSau srrpp&&as leadership represented, at least m ~lcers, an on station day and night. Hot chow +cu- inept If not Immoral force. k was also me Iously appeared once or twice a day. At-mqu thar we Americam were on so%ngeground, and nition to waste! Late one afternoon, rocket peop~e tend m be suspicious of drar which they fire wounded a couple of troopers in the kot~ do not undersmnd. Thii may be a part of the tom of a ravine, and to evacuate them before puzzle that 1 will never resolve to my saris&c darkness fell was out of $e question. % the ‘, tion. What I knew for fact, as I flew toward battalion commander imjerted a surgeon with “ ~ &mg Son and the 1st Au Cav, was that the his. little black bag, by helicopter to heIp ARVN officers I had know personally from them through the night{ House calls in corn. “ aspirant to general, bad been courageous, com bat: Marvelous! mitted and generally competent. The troopers did lack ‘practical miliraty b-w Joining the Cav, I wits like an innocent formation about their enemy just as ARVN . ,, “59 , MILITARY REVIEW . January 1989 , I ,. \ J JoiningtheCav,I wasfikearIilrnoki%tOzarkwoodmriterfrasfrfyorrded atthecornerofCanalandifrrurbonStraefadurfnuMardi6raa.I steedammwfJ “fftmv , nrooffrhangingoponforthefirstdayortwo.Hoiioo-@rsfilledfheskies.Oirsotauftpoi artiileryfrrweledwfthfheinfantry.Closoait%rrpporfwaseriatafiondayandnighf..., Comparedtothepondemusandoftenfutileoperationsf hadknown, alltheCav’soperationswera.fikea ballet. did. But no matter. Compared to the ponder- The NVA was also a regular force. It orra and often futile operations I had known, fought best in substantial formations. It was all the Cav’s operations were like a ballet, a tied to its ov.% umbilical cord. Its natural + strikiig symphony of precision fire and effort fimm fok the noouiation was hmited. It, too, less movement, a mamal mastery Ov& enemy was best smtd ~or the rugged terrain and the and terrain that any foot soldier could only sparsely populared Ca-tral Highlands. admire. Mobihty and flexibility were so great The Cav (like the rest of the US Army) “ that the division had no need to mamtam a and the NVA were worthy opponents. %th conventional reserve. The Cav’s troopers beat sides were composed of battle-toughened sol- the bush md when a unit made c~ntact, heli dlers. Both were employed in their best roles, copters kmded and more tioopers piled on. were well led md well, supplied. Er-qoyingab- Artille~, gunships, tacrrcal air (TACAIR)— solute alr superloriry, the US troops finally they worked the kdlmg field m bold effective proved themselves robe the better force. strokes like an artist at his canvas. Marvelous! If fighting the NVA was rhe proper role for At fnst I felt a bit cheated. Where had all the United States, what was the besr role of the resources been srx mrmths earher? How the Government of Vietnam (GVN ) ? we could have used those tools of war down ARVN . . I focus cm ARVN because, in the Delta. you may recall, uniforms led not only the Soon 1 got over anY mitlal envy of the army bur the GVN as well. ARIfN had hvo Cav’s firepower, its support or its fantastic or three wars that should have been fought. k abhy to maneuver. I saw that its proper mw . had to protecr the pptdation from the mili sion~was naturally different from ARVIW ap tanr advocates of a competmg ideology; It had propriate role. The Cav’s best service was and to mobdire the people in its own behalf; and would be to focus on the North Vletrramese most of all, it had to defeat the Vietcong. The Army (NVA) units that were infiltrating Vietcong? Perhaps 1 should use the plural— South Vletrrarn. To handle the NVA proba ~etcongs. bly required better tools and the highlands The primary and mosr Importxnt Vletccrng certainly presented mofe challenging terrain. was the Communisr ko Dcmg Party, which 60 January 19@S �MILITARY REVIEW . PERSPECTIVES ,, wasknmvnbydiverse names andrnaskecfby sion was to destroy ARVN agd other GVN various front organizationa. me Lao Dong military, paramili~ and political forces. was more than a political party, however. It Although much like regular units, Main mobiiized and organized the population. It.. Force units were geniral~y capable of living collected taxes, raised armies and adminis. off the VC’S tax base. Non-nalIy their soldlers tered a civil and criminal justice sy$tem. were indigenous to their general area of oWr Deceptively denominated as “cadre: the ations. They were strongest where the VC Lao Dongwas ineffective, legitimate, local had won political ascend~cy and where re ‘ government where the VC enjoyed territorial sources such as tecnrira, fod and tax revenues primacy. Inconrrol, itwasrhe power equiva were the most plentibl. lent of the oldccro kcmmrypofitical appa- ‘:. The VC boasted of more than strong and rams, where Chicago Mayor Richard DaleY’s dedicated organizations. It seemed clear that machine, the Democratic Party, and the moral energy in Vietnam favored h~m. If that county bureaucracy were, like stalks of rice, was rme, there was good reason. In the minds practically indistinguishable. Where itlackec. of marry lletpamese and others, the Vietcong control, the I+o Dong’s underground shadow ~robably represented a primal force. To them, government calculated to supplant the GVN he was the standard bearer of a P&ple fight by militant political organizing and precise ing for its own territory. That feeling was an military action. elemencd human impulse that simmered far The Lao Dong was protected by a second beneath the surface of the shallow stream of Vietcong, which accompanied the tax collec doctrinal soph~ms of the time. Much like the tor and province chief on their appointed Chinese Communists who bartered the US rounds. Individuals, squads, platoons and companies were called Self-Defense Forces. q Self-Defense units might wear unifbrrns or SoonI goloverany not. They might have been iaaued weaports or inMalM~ofWe&vi... iMwWiB “ ~ ‘ they might have made their own. Ompermision wssnaturallydifferenlfrom Protecting the party incltided interdicting MW’S appropriaterole.?ha&w’s heatsar+ the GVN’S cornrnunicatiom with the peasants sicewesandwouldbeto tows antheHmth .W of “liberated zones.” Self-Defense unirs held the VietmameeeArmy@NA)eoitethatme . folk that normally whittfecl the punji stakes and’ intilhting SouthVietnam. ~ .& filled the Imttie grenadea and set out both afong ,: . “f the trails and canals. These units rarely smcd ,. and fought. They would, however, harass ~ : ~, advancing unit from daylight until dark and sel Eighth Army in 1950,’tbe Vletrramqe @~ dom lose a weapm or a man. munists not only syrrddii moral strerrg~ A third formal stmcture, beguihngly called they also represented an equally evil force. “Main Force,” stcmd rmder the umbrella term, The dichotomy was a difficult intellectual Vtetcong. In the Lao Dong’s strategy of pro concept, one that could be seen and felt and tracted war, it was the most expendable part internalized but not easily explained. of the VC organization. It incorporated com Recause the VC were with and part of the o panies, battalions and regiments that fought populace, defeating them, especially the po~ in formations of up to a few thousand men at iincal infrastructure, was clearly a chore &.; a time, supported by weapons companies with accomplished by the GVN. ~VN had the mortars and heavy r-nachineguns. Under the law, the legitimacy and the administrative direction of the politi@ Ieadershlp, m, mls talent, it seemed to me, to beat the VC in his MIL\TARY REVIEW . Janua@ 19S9 61 ‘ I ,,. ( . namese as dedicated to the pursuit of the war as were we, their allies? If not, why not? Who, i wondered in particular, had the mis sion of artackmg the heart of the VC pditieal appms, the ho DOng party, At Fhrg Son I filled m the blanks on the checklists and struggled to make sense of what I knew and believed. Pondering the kinds of rkrgs mentioned above, my faith in the decency of our cause in Viemam never wavered. 1 had seen how th~ people lived un der VC control. I knew about the tender mer-, ties of the VC’Ssystem of justice. On our side I had seen little that was either illegal or im. moral. Ours was, as US Representative Thomas J. Ridge said on CBS’ “Nightwatch not long.ago, “a noble cause.” I had some tea- son to quesnon, as you may see, the correct. ness of oirr course. I recalled S. L. A. Marshall’s The River and the Gacmtfet, his classic account of the 2d In. fmtry Division’s ordeal, when two great ad vancing armms met in Korea on the day after Tha@sgiving, 1950: ‘!4 ~sVC]moM~mdandoNaniHd the “qeployed in line to the south of the rii+er, v~ultion. It collectedtases,raisedarmies the Umted States Eighth Army was an open andadministereda civilandcriminaljustice bmk. Its battle objective and hour of move system,... inffremindsefmanyVietnam. ment had been published to the world; war eseandothers,theVietaerrgfrmbablyrepre comespondenrs had described in intimate de- senteda frrknalforce[andltmasfedof more rad the strength and Iocatlon of its forces. thoustrongandde/t&!tedorganizations. Concentrated m“nght maneuver m~, guard ~It seemedclearthatmoralenerffyin ed by an entrenched screen, north of the riv VietnamfavoredMm. er, the Chinese Communist Army was a phantom which cast no shadow. Its every mam secret-its strength, its position, and its intermon-had been kept to perfection, and principal home in the Delta and m other pop thereby It was doubly armed.” ulated areas marnly along the coast. Acrually, One of the victims of the phantom, mar. in earlier years under Diem, the GVN had tyred by a lack of mformatickr and tea little . . dealt the Lao Dong some heavy blows. fire support, was Company B, 9th Infantry Whether’ ARVN in 1965 had appropriate Regiment. Of the entire Eighth Army, it was p~ amf adequate resources E one sub “first to fight and last to yield its forward ject of this essay and a question that deserves ground.” re-evaluations i% the record. Having toiled forward during the week be Were friendly mtilons amdear to us as the fore Thanksgiving against a light screen of enemys’ were to them? Were the South V1et unidentified guerrillas, Company B’s 129 able ,62 January 1989 * MILITARY REVIEW . , PERSPECTIVES “ G ., Lxx&d men began a series of small but desper ate batdes against a more formidable fce fmm out of the shadow. Its platoons attacked on Hill 219 from ]015 until darkness fell, and then they deferatjed their positions until the following noon. During the numbing 26 hours, the infantrymen got brief support from two quad..5O macbing, none from 6,..,. none from artillery, and one two-sortie air- strike. At the end 34 men, incIuding the fighting wounded, btike pnract by regimen tal order. According to Marshall, none had rnaliigered and none had snrmndered “As an example of eoumge, unity oFaQtion in the face of terrible odds and the ability of. native Americans to survive calamitous 10S=S and give back hard blows to their enemies, there is nothhg better in the book, though “ we look all the way back to Bmrker Hill.” . As it was in Korea, so it was in Vtetnarn, ,and I think, so it is in any war. A winning armY needs either the advantage of informa \ tion or the greater flexibility, which is sired by $’ fiiwer and born of mobility. .1., Ready to leave Bong Son, with”4 httle Ihe VietnameseCemmunietsnotenfy pack on my back and an M16 slung over my eymboliid moralstrength-they alserepre. . shoulder, I was walking toward the airstrip. sentedanequallyevilforse,Thediatmfemy AS I humped along toward a cluster of “&rts, I waea diffictdtifltelleatualconoepfjenethat , \ noticed ahea~ alongside the runway, a hw, a couldbeeeenandfeftandintefnafizedhut ~~ single tier, of. . . something. As I came clos- 1 neteasilyexplainett. . . . defeaiingthem, ~ er it looked to be a foot high, a few feet wide especiallythepolitisalinfraetruoiura, I and maybe 50 yards long. In i&e durance ‘it woeclearlyachorebeetaccontpliified$9t&; k , I looked lie a low, olive green mmp or plat- Wff. ASYfihadthelaw,thelegitimacy~, , . , form resting on the red dut off the runway. amrltfibadminietrativefalent,itseemedto ~ Then I saw that the adjacent tent sported a me,tobeattie W , $6’!’ Iargered&oss. . . and I wondered. ,. Fk-w& I cotdd see. The “platform” was a row of men, a Ime of uncovered bodies. They lay side by side, wearing fatigues as they had some were shredded and missing parts, as come in km the field, amanged in a single they Iayrhere in the deep red dust. Each uni repine @ with bae heacb to he east. W1-ute, form bore the Cav’s outsized shoulder patch. . black, yellow, brown . . . all young . . . all I passed down the row, 56 cold bodies, and Arrierican. A dispropmtionate nrmrbw of sec- saw every gray face. A basketball player from ..... ond Iiewerrads bars indicad that more than a New York? A fkre farmer from Ohio? Mih fewwgre fieshfko mthe~~eunifom ing engineer from Illinois? Roustabout from were caked with dirt and blood, and Kansas and cowboy from Utah? ~d, y@, I MILITARY REVIEW * @auary 1989 Os, , : .;. ,. (“ really needed two? Myfaii inthedeasrrcyofouroeii Dld ARVN and the GVN have the vision inVietnamneverwavered.I hadseenhow and courage to see a difflcrrlt job thtough to ‘ thepsopiefivarimrderVCcontrol.f fmew the end? I certainly did not know. 1 did feel aboutthefendermeroissoftheVC’Ssyatam that their final capability iay within thenrsel efjustice.Onourside1hadseenIiia that ves. We could fumiih certain tools and lim waseitherillegalor immeral, ited assumncs their performance was some tiing we could not control. We could control the terms of our own ~ participation. We needed to define our objec a young red&aired physicrst-to-he from. Cali tive, clarify for ARVN (and for ourselves) fornia. . . who was only a sharpshooter. just what we would do and, conversely, what A part of the puzzle camedar to me as I it was that he muse do. If ARVN needed sat on my pack by the Srnp and waited for an more dedicated resources, we should have aircraft. Gur self-cotildence roughly matched provided them. The time had come in Janu the young, Fort Grd soldler’s. And I tlink it my 1966, lt seemed to me, to specify our com fair to say so too our sophistication. Gur ef mitment to the GVN and to limit, in time fort to that point had lacked. . . lacked . . . and ojrjective, our commitment for ourselves. , wbt ? Not substance. But what? Definition? + Would that have changed the outcome of I Focus? the war, which, after all, was finally dec~ded If it was mue that the decisive objective between two regular armies? As I look back I was elimination of the Lao Dong Party and its tcday, I trufi do not know. But parts of the ~ structures, US forces were fighting in a sup puzzle are clear. Certainly we cannot fight porti g role, and the Cav’s troopers were wars without clear objectives. h is also true merel$buying time. How much time and for that wuming armies have winning strategies, what? Was it mutually understood that and they tend to enjoy, either from their ARVN had a central role? Was ARVN strategy or from technology, a wurnmg edge equipped for his cemral ~ole? Was a complete in}ome decisive aspect of battle. We should strategy at work for us as well as for the ene n~er again be slow in war to properly arm my? Had we sad&d just one horse when we the soldiers who must fight the decmve fight. / NOTES ,. 1.uaewam beam fmstratmalter a & short nmntshow ti$dAFW S. Years .Itew.rd I found ,! t.sc,nm!ng that (%&l VWt,am C, sa!d,es w-alan., so Mm? l?ng pan? t. mi?d,I had bee. assm.sf! an Wes&norelard$.nnti h. ftqer dnmard He md,c%tfdm Im Ccaktint %wm=siw and+i.cv lti. rd. wamtor named-h, whntwht.. a h. cwnmparu werecapableandho..ti, burhe tentiwr subo$c%mtasm w Tham hen We. %Idlenw with !m!anby.niis .m’Swrd,fferml nap for C-31.ss wm. 1s.pwse w d! Ilk. 1. minkour w.n garden (s me w$t 15 yams He hed b=+mwvundedwm. and h. one sat.1 fatiguestare tendedti W Ilo”mn,w ,“ tie “e,ghhofhcd Or, P9rhw, we d!&Wi r-m “.* pitchti holes,dd!y rnm,ndemcdnear mksas Em@ !0, h,, .nders+anaas mm ad me ca.wle m ARVN$ c&3. 01cwnrnanaas w 4 PM IUCRTlwnh was not raallyexcepmm.1 Maw AIWN SQIdlersLw.ld IMuW!Iw dni CIWysOm.301 usmusthaveM“ mv”g haveseN#wlthdIWrcUo. many@mw 4 wwncms US@ dmmgu.hw mess wwslmm Main Form ..,!s w 2, A. .ftwrw. n.!mnd !n!e!lgeoca ssrwca ma ‘i.e. preny well d= C41[lngthem w mm% s&oy-adS& Ngo DlnhDlem9fat+ tall(m1963 HerscAtafa BG.S fimrrrlwl.lrritd of Cnr&muis at@u@’ofrheUS Army Ccmnramiand Garmrl S@f Co~@ KJSACGSC). Dranrganus ur Wv ofrhe Rebublwof Mmam and wasan obwrtm d dre]St CawrIV ~wrtm (Ar ~ ,. ) I 64 January1989. MILiTARY REvIEW ,* 1. PERsPEcllvEs . . . Iwowkireud abotusorneoftketiy nurses serving with our fighting units saw rkiws drat k@end And fm most of thcw peOViemarn at its very worst. Not even the com plq that was enouglr because tkq didn’t km bat soldie. experienced the pati and an@sh enorrgkrooskme anyduhgelse. ..:lcowfdget day after day Aer day. So, very few realire away wkk~brul never roklrkerrrahur the that many of these nurses suffe~ the same af rest ofiL 1 tereffects of the war, the same post-traumatic Lwnnant CmIonelSatlVGmham,AN,Novemter1987 stress, as do w many other combat vetemns.’ Yet, our combat nurses came home in silence. 66 HOSE people” to whom Graham’ In the years since, questions have occasion T referred were 4,150 active dutv ally been asked, es@ally by those of .s who~ Army nukes who did not serve in Vlemarn~ have not had combat nursing expe ience. After a year at the US Army War College “What was it like?” “HOWdid you han“i Ie @’ and a very close assmiatior. with seven nurses We wanted to know the answers. We had who sertwd in VIetmun, I know that “those read Lynda Van Devanter a+d Christopher people” also include combat veteran cif[cers Morgan’s controversial book, Home Befo@ from all branch= who did serve in Vtemam. Morning,’ and watched the TV progrank Those people who simply could not possibly “China Beach.” Bur we knew that these did understand or appreciate Graham’s %$ rest of not show the true picture and we still riee$ed it” can easily lx extended to nearly all Ameri. to he= from those who knew the anawers~,~~, cans. Army nurses who served in Ylemarn sur Opportunity knocked in AugusI, 1987 @th vived a unique experience and as q group have my attendance at the US Army ‘WarCollege. not come fimvard m tell their story: The school granted me permission to do an Most Americans are now aware of post- oral history on seven active duty nrsr-m who I tiaumatic stress syndrome. All too many have had served in Vietnam between 196$ and had personal contact with a relative or friend 1969. Each of these nurses, currently assigned “~ MO served in Vietnam and has had trouble to senior pesitions, felt it was time to speak coping with thar experience. But not very our. Their names have been changed to pn+ my Of“AR people” redir.e that except fur tect their privacy. During their individual in those relatively few combat ioldiers who en terviews, each nurse shared his or her most gaged in repeate# and intense combat, those vivid memories, demanding experienc~, cop ? MILITARY REVIEW � January 19@9 , 65. :. .( New was everything from an escorted, ‘ ExaepttarttmearelativelyfawOmnbet ctigne tomring,. helicopter flight to the saldierewhoengagedmrepeatedandManse hospital, to a Central Intelligence Agency I , combat,thesenureeeeatingwithour (CJA) prop plane rhar dropped you off in the fightinguniteaewVietnamatitev wont. middle of a deserted field. Such was the case ttataventheoambateatdiareexperienced” for then Lieutenant Graham, who up until thepainendanguiebdeyafterdeyafterdoy. this point had kept her sense of humot. While at the inptocessing s&ion, she was k+ -. sued new fatigues and jungle boQts. “I put these things on and the pants were at l~t J ing suategies, and advice for those who must two feet too long. The pant legs were hang carry bn. By fiily breaking the si[ence, they iw *e arms were Imngiag I was sweaty; I allow “us to journey with an Army nurse was hot. I really didn’t want to be there. I was through a “year” in Vietnam. a mess and then I closed the door to see the Starting with their arrival in-country mirror. . . . Upon top was a pster that was throu~, their homecoming and the afieref very popular at the time. It showed thii Army fwrs, the interviews fbmsed on those individ. nruw in srarched fatigues, with her hair done uals’ “hard to deal with” feelings and experi and her lipstick jest perfect, and it said, ‘The ences. Their honest, emotional and often most beautiful woman in the wof[d, the tearful responses provide us with a glimpse of Army nurse.’w ‘~therest of it.” Graham got a good laugh out of that one, and continued laughing on the CIA prop Hn-coMfl~‘ plane when the window fell out and wisps of Gne went by ship, the others by plane. clouds came up through the hole in the floor. Gne had over a week to wait, the others ar But the laughter turned to tears on the de rived in less than .24 hou . s the door serted atileld and the tears turned to anger opened, the air condition” g of the cabin of when she formal she was at the wrong hospi. the aircraft soon diwipaF d and we felt the rd. “I don’t care where I’m supposed to be, I hot, moist, drink, smelly air basically from the am here and I am stayrng.’”o jungle all around. We ddn’t know that, be $ Gnce on site, it dld not take long for the cause yQu can’t see at 2 AM in the morning. nurses to join in the team spirit. camaraderie You have the feelirygthat this will probably be and cohesiveness wkre words used over and the last nme you see civilization “for a long, over again doring the interviews. They de long time.’” scribed a positive working relationship, but I Graham echoed those same sentiments, heard more. “. . . whate~er was happening but for a different. . reason ‘~. . . ..the door . somewhere else, it didn’t matter. I was very opened and thii young captain in toll combat aware of that when they sent me the home gear and two or three troops got on the plane. town paper. Initially, I got it and read it all. fi~y explained that they were rakii ground Then it would come and it would sit for days fire and that the plane would not be shutting and days, but I never opened it and finally down its engines.’” Lteutermnt &lonel Pam. threw it away. When I really thought about ela Davis ran across the tarmac in high it, it was &cause nothhg in there had any heels, Cl= A uniform and a guy on either imprr~ce to me. It dk-in’t relate co me at side trying to ‘hasten her speed. “I don’t recall all. The people I cared about, the people who being frightened. I was probably in culture meant the m6sr to me, everything, my whole shock . . .“s Me, was tight there.’’” 66 Jsnuafy 19S9 * MILITARY REVIEW . DIU@ ffmTetoffensiveef196B,Hansenwasfmftowe~jmmedi~otirwhom @freight“WejusfwwfmdtmfilWmm deedexfmusfedorwersnewtofsuppffss:Thenwe efmtodtcslowdon beosusswedidn’thaveanmtng steriletowok with” / Graham was talking about somerhhg more run w, they’ll land the Chinook ~elicopters] ; than a colkgial relationship. She was talking in the middle of the comwund and take the 14 about a famiIy that supported each other. nurses and the most seriokly injured patients That support was greatly needed, given the out.’ What I didn’t know was that the La& circurnsr+ces and the task at hand. fire on the ori-.er side of the base camp &s the Chinooks, aII 10of them.’’” incoming Rounds “1 think that’s the flit night that”~ r$ally Spartan living conditions were deemed as thought that I could have gotten inj@,by nothing more than inconveniences or hassles one of those rounds, when I heaid it’whjstle easily handled. Nor so with incoming rouixis. overhead. . . . Rockers area rather impe&m Davis explained: al thin% you figure that if they get you,. they “During that night we took over L20 don’t have your name [on them].. If hit by a rounds into both the hospital compound and piece of shrapnel, it was just your time. ‘It was the entire base camp of the 25th Infantry. just when small arms fire began to come into “ There was a huge fire over to the north of us CMIIP nmvandthen, that you felt, ‘WOW!’ on post. Having been there before, some of Th&’s real personal because they’te aiming at the orher muses looked to me. In my strong you.’’” est voice I said, ‘Don’t worry about i~ they Lieutenant Colonel Donald Hansen expe. won’t iet anytiimg,happen to US.If they over rienced the same personal threat on a field . ., . MILITARY RkVIEW� January1989 67 ~ ( II And the response I“gave him was that once “... Whatewerwashappening they c.me to +e emergency room . . . our somewhereelse,itdidn’tmatter.I wasvery profmional commitment said ,that we had to awareofthatwhentheysentmethehome. care for them, and that we would care for towspaper.Initially,I gotitandreaditall. them as best we could. If they didn’t want Thenitwouldcomeanditwouldsitfordays that or they didn’t expect that, then they arrddays,but1naveropenedit need not come to our door. ..’”7 andfinallythrawitaway?’ To care for patien~ “as best we could” took ,.. on a special meaning during mass casualty sit I uanons. “People had to be taken care of in a pruderft use of resources.’’” Hansen was in mission. Someone had turned the coordinates counny gne week and off duty when he wan around on a fdendly fire mlssiom. “. . . they dered into the OR (operating. room): “ ., were dropping them on us instead of putting when I got in there rky were wmk~ng on ~ them where they were supposed to. . . . It guy who had arrested [suffered a heart attack] didn’t get real close but they were walking a couple of times. They were thumping on hk them up the smeet, off the road toward us.’’” chest about the third time when somebody Stationed at the 85th EVAC (evacuation . . . leaned in the door and said, ‘They’ve hospital) as a lieutenant, Lieutenant ~onel prst hit the embassy.’ Everybody said, ‘Yeh, . Elizabeth Miller’s unit was moved because of a right.’ ‘No,’ he said, ‘forget thii case. We have threat. Seventy-two hours later, the site was plenty more to go.’ The marathon started at hit by a mortar round. “~ey said that we that point.’’” probably would have easi ~lost 70 percent of One of four nurses Aterviewed who served our physicians”and male nt rses because it hit during the Tet offensive of 1968, Hatwen was right where their tents sat . . I can hom!stly put to work Immediately for 40 hours straight say that at 24, I came t& ‘“ps with my own “We just worked untd we. were dead exhaust d=fi,,u, ed or we ran out of supplies. Then we started ,/ to slow down because we didn’t have any- incoming CasMaities ding sterde to work with.’”o I Lieutenant Davis was m the emergency “We had a piece of butcher block paper mom (ER) when two badly wounded trcops that ran the whole width of the triage area, from the Amencal Dwmon weqe brought ux with names of people waiting to go to surgery ‘The Metcong came upon them and gouged on It. 1 thhk finally, the reabry sunk in . . their eyes out with bamboo sticks. The the chief of anesthesia started to do some of screams of the-se young men as they lay in the the mage and tell the people that there was emergency room seemed to penetrate the no way we could work on them. Even though whole base. Anger then came through. Not in a normal situation these guys possibly just the frustmtion and helple sness, but real could have been saved. We ddn’t have the anger, and it was’frightening. found myself supplies, the manpower, or the OR space to having to watch the tmups, theL tors and work on therm That was the hard cold fact myself, when the%’$emamese came m so that that It came do~ to the second day of the we wouldn’t do things we would be”sorry for offensive.”zl later.’’” - Colonel Rhoda Owen also served in the She went on to” describe a confrontanon OR. “We did something like 22 amputations ‘‘ with an American soldier. He wanted to in less than 12 hours, all on Amemrms. They ~OW why “. . . we would rush A much for were multi-amputations of arms and legs on 1 the Vlemamese as we dld for our own troops. .! 68 January 19SS u MILITARY REVIEW . ~ PERSPECllVES 22 dfferent patierm’”z Hansen lost track of hIs exact numbers, but vividly remembers the scene: “They brought a deuce and a half [tmck] in that was full of bcrdk.s. The MPs went m to my to bring out a bunch of officers who were stuck in a BCQ ‘ kachelor officers’ quartem]. They got mto the street and they cross-fired claymores [anoper wrmel mines] into the deuce and a half and they joat towed it in behind another deuce and a half with all of the babes still on it. There were probably 12 or 14 people just in the one load. Only a couple of them were dead then; a lot were really hurt. ..’”3 , You Won’t Be Alone Each nurse expressed the pain and frusma tion of working on a soldier only to have him get well and return again the next week. The “Helookedupatmeandsaid, only thiig worse was to have hlm come in ‘well,howdoesit look?’I hadtotellhim,” e first time and know that he was going to ‘Itdoesn’tlookgood,butyoutvon’tbealone.’ Fle. It was Hansen’s most dtiicuk experience. Thatwasreallyaliwehadto offerhim.” .. “Spending time with the expectants. .”. . 1, “. . .youwon’tbealone,”maywellhave think it was real hard for me to see somebody begntheoniycomfortDaviscouldefferher that could have been my brother, same age, patient,butit.wasnotaninsignificantgift. not a whole lot younger than I was, that was . talking tome and we knew that tkey were go. ing to die. . . . A&r it was all over, it was hke that door shut, and you did somethmg hIs mother. 1 [tearful] had forgotten some of ‘~ else. I never held still the whole time I was this, I’m sorry.”Z5 there . . . if 1 stopped, I would have to think. “Along about six o’clock that mght. & I just didn’t want to think.”u He called it de drd. I strmd there and wept . . . I wa,s rjevb. nial, and it worked for awhile, only to be re tated. I can remember thkrking thae ~okmdy /. placed by anger when he got home. else knew he died, but me. Somewher$ he It was -the part never told by Graham and had a mother and a sister or some farri!j&&u the part she had yet to resolve. She has cm know, tiho were probably talking abbut him ried the memory longer than the patient’s en and expecting him home. . . . There were tire life span of 18 years: “He was really in lots of incidents s~milar to that, but that one pretty bad shape. All day he was very alert. probably strFYsm my mmd the longest because He was awake through most of thii, but there there really wasn’t anythnrg I could ho for . was really very little we could do for him. The him.,~Z6 ORs were very busy with the heavy casualties The feelings of helplessness tid hopeless and he would have been a long case to do ness were shared by the other medical si+f. anyrhmg fo~ that is if we could have done In the OR, llmm looked on at the terror and anything for him which we really couldn’t. frustrrmon in the eyes of the physlciarw “. . . He was very ill. He spent all day calling for because with all of this training that they . MILITARY REVIEW . January 1989 ,& # , .. . had, and all the knowledge that they had and they don’t tmdetsr&d. They really ~’t un all that we could give, we still eoukfn’t give derstand what you are trying to tell them. thii man a chance.’” And you will be very impatient with Yhem , She recalleda 19-Y&rdd who never made about it.’ M he was absolutely right! Incred “ it to the OR. “I remember trying to wrap his ible as it may seem, I was impatient rmd be head so that his brains would not be lying on came upset when they didn’t understand. At the litter. He looked up at me and said, the same time, it redly didn’t matter to me Well, how does it look?’ I,had to teU him, ‘It whether they dld or not. Thcw two emotions . doesn’t look good, but you won’t b alone.’ were there at the exact same time.”w %t was really all we had to offer him.”m Regan&ss of the mytiad of feelings experi “ . . . you won’t be alonev may weif have enced, eventually that last day arrived and all ken the ordy comfort Davis could offer her of them got on a plane bound for home. patient, but it W* not an ins&if@nt gift. h Some were grqeted by family, others by meant that someone else would be there to friends. Some spoke of their experierim, oth support you and see you through. She did thii ers studiously avoided the topic. Some were many times for the patients who came fieated as returning vacationers, others like dtrough the hmpital, and once for her best returning heroes. Some went to the “Walf~ friend. othem have yet to go. ~ood-bys CIosum “ With 12-hour shifts, no days off each wmk Vietnam did not end with the long flight (or perhaps just one), and nonstop casualties, home. Colonel Gail Fryman carried it to her one might pndct that returning home would next assignment at the Mechcal Field Service be a joyous event with no looking back. Not School (now the Academy of Health Sci we! ence?). She incorporated the “Iessons Some were prepared for the sadness which learned” into the basic training classes she accompanies Ioss and sepamtion, but few an. taught. ticipated the ambivalence. Graham described As more and more nurses returned from her first confrontation with such feelings and Vietnam to teach at the school, Freeman the help she received from a Special Forces found an ever expand~ group of people with helicopter pilot. “The ambivalence ,was in whom she could converse: “So, we talked ~ cre&ble. I wanted to go, but I dkfn’t want to about it to some extent. But in Icding back go. 1 waa excited almut going, but I was tild at that, it seems to me it wasn’t the Fact that to go, really a&aid to go. And when I thought you wanted to or didn’t want to. It was the about what I was afrtid of, it was that 1 real fact that you knew if you needed to, there ized that I had changed a Iot and I really was someone there that you could talk to wasn’t sure how I w% going to manage that. I akout it.”>l $ ~ a very differ ent person. There was no Hansen now wishes that he could have had ~ dgment as to whether it was better or the same experience: “I think if we could . .,- ~wmse, just different.’’” have bad a chance to talk to the new people “1remember saying that and trying to ex going over . . . I rhii that we may have had plain that to him. Based on his experience, a chance to feqi our experience had been since this was his second tour, he said, %& worrhwhk for at least one other person.”32 let me tell you something. When you go Hansen’s ordy opportunity to share his experi- ‘ home, you are going to fmd that you are go ences came unexpectedly. ing to be very impatient with people, because It was a year after his return and he &s on I 70 January 1989 � MILITARYREVIEW , ‘. I ,“ PERSPEfXfVES \ a hunting @r with his brother, who aiso had been ro Vtemrarn. “He saw something and fud . . . I just hit he deck and rolled and came up and pointed the weapon at him. Then both of us sat down and talked about what it was lie there.’n3 Hansen could not explain the unspoken ~greemenr with his brother not to talk about Vietnam rhe pre vious year. Bur he did have rhoughtx on why he has never dwwsaed the ropic t%iththose of tmwho’have never been ro ~ermqn. ‘“YOUare probably the fmt person I have talked to rhar has not. . . I’in just real uneasy talking about it. . . . There is still a feeiing that you wouldn’t rmderswd . . . there are rome rhiigs rhar lAppened that were funny but there are dfierenr mo . They are not funny now. I mean, the g out the feehng that they were funny 9 I think abp~t it. But then, I look at it in the context of.&ay and that was kind of birarre . . . if You wereri’t there you couldn’t understand why things happenwl the way they did.”w Questioned m to whether he rhoughr these feelings were unique to the Vietnam War, Hansen answered: “My uncle was in Korea and he was at the [38th] ParalIel. After I “iiehadlosthi$rigMarmmidway came back, he talked tome about it. He nev M~en biseltmwandhisSfiouldorantihe er said anything about it before. He was kmd hadIeefbiifase fmmjustbefowhisWesto “v of curious to find whar experience I had, juetaboveMSGbin. . . ifiadtotum qoickly compared to whar he had. I think that is kind andIasoagsinettbawsiloutsidebecause : i of true for people who have been through a I neariyfainted,., a mtetypeofbebavior. + war where you see the casualtim of war . . . tookovarandI justbegantodotie Winy,r . .. [m] we saw iv not because we saw the PPle thatneededtohedone.” 1. get hit, we saw the wounds. We saw how de , !$k . rmuctive the war was. I think that is real hard b. 4. to have mmebody understand. InteIlectua$+ I know you can understand ir, but I have a really Lxrther me. I had put thii all our of my hard time bringing that out in a feeling level. head. Bur, I went to a movie. I went ro see This is a test for me.’’” ‘Deliverance’ . . . there is a scene in it &here Hansen described the d=nnect between *IS body is coming down the river and it has “ knowing something intellectually and know. been going through rock and whatever, so ing it on a “gut” level. Hii problem was with the MU are gut of joint . . . . Thar night I orher people understanding h~ Vlemarn expe was sitring in that movie and had to leave b- rience. cause It was instant dc?j~vu. I can remember “when I first came home, I said it didn’t being back in rhe emergency room in MILITARY REVIEW � January 1989 71 * .$ ( ,,. , ‘ ., assessment that maybe her reactiorr was con. ‘Sally,lotmetellyousomething. netted to Vlemam. It had been more than 10 WhenyQ!Igohome,youaregoingtefmd yeara and she thought she had adjusted well. thatyouaregoingto beveryimpatimrtwith She did not take action to deal with it urd peopla,basausotheydon’tunderstand. an opWrnmlry arose at her next duty station. Thayreallyaan’tunderstandwhatyouara “There were a number of women who had tq!ingtotellthem.Andyoowillbevery been in Vietnam. We got together and real- I impatientwithHrmn.abeutit.’ ired that”we needed to work some tilngslout. In 1979 or 80, we had a couple of meetings I that were kind of on our owm and then “the chaplains fkom the Academy sort of adopted us and qxmsored a weekend seminar. “They ‘ -Memam. . .“ brought in an outside facilitator and we did a “1 went Iook&g for something in rhii one lot of healing there, sharing with one an- big ER. There was a curtain iq the back and I other. Some of the things that I remember went to get something out of the cupboard: I today are things that I had not thought about pulkd the curtain up and on the floor was a or remembered until our meeting then. I ksxly. His one leg was disartiadrrted, so that think that we’ve made a better transition, when you looked at him, one leg was down from s1! As: we went through and from all and one leg was back up over his head. I that we benefited and gained during the didn’t know what I was looking at, at first war.”” . . . . I got what I wanted and left and was DWIS speculated on the differences in ad ‘ down the mad there doing things before I re jusonent between those who stayed and tbe alized what I had seen. I just didn’t ~ve tim” that left military service. ~“We’re the ones to stop and thii about it . . . didn’t th J who stayed in the militmy . . . we have con- about it again ever in ccmscious life, until tinued to retain the purpese for doing what that night in the movies. And seeing that, it we did. . . . The folks that got out, sort of Wasinstrmt . . . . I could not stay. I had to were on their own and they had to identify, leave. I couldn’t even explain what the prob within themselves, why they dld what they Iemwas .’. .“ls did. Maybe they overidenrifi+ with the pee “ hirially lkis could riot explain “the pmb ple yelling ‘baby killers: and intemahzed a Iem” either. It had been over 10 y,eamsince whole lot of guilt that really does~’t belong to she had left Vlemam. The call came from a them.’’” medical department activity ER. “I got there Biit what about now, for those ~till having rapidly went into the room where the trCNJP problems? Davis continued, “I thii that the was “md saw him lying there. He had lost his Wwzranr W6men’s MemoriaI can ~elp . . . I right mm midway “between hs elbow and his think there are a lot of women otit thete, , shoulder and he had lost his face frciii just bc whether they’re using denial or sti%limation or low his eyes to just above his chm ..: I had whatever . .‘. [they] could~~efit by recog to turn quickly and lean against the wall out nizing that they are not alone in the feelings ide because I nearly faipted . . . a mte type that they have. I think there area lot of us in of behavior took over and I just began to do the Muse Gxps who went.to Vemam, [who] “( the things that needed to be done. . . . That never recognized that there are pmbIems and afternoon, when it was over and for a number that having pmblerns doesn’t mean that you of weeks the+, I was really depres.sed.”47 are weak or inet%cient or ineffective. It just Davis was caught short by another nurse’s means that you’re human.”a 72 January 1989 * MILITARY REvIEW ‘7 a PERsPEcm/Es ,. ‘ ,,,, $’ Acknowledgment of an emotional c&po l%is is real hard.”4J nent to time served in Vretnam was ciearly Ws respnse told me why it has tak rem in the answem to the question of wheth en so long to speak about her combat n@ng er they had visited the V!ernarn Memorial. experiences. Her armver was a quick and&l. . Owen goes frequently with rI friend who had nite “No!” When asked if she ~d iqty plans served with her in Vietnam. “We have gone to go to the memorial in the fiture, the tears down thete and traced some of the names of started. She finally whispered, “No, ~I can’t the patienb that she was particularly attached go.”% ~}w Free- ~~kd: “I 80 back periodi These seven nursqs broke their siIence cally beeause I’m just drawn back. . . . I USU. about nursing in Vletoam in hopes that their ally go hack at odd rimes, lie late at night or memories mighr better prepare nurseswho.,, very early ~ the morning because rhqe are will he called upon in the future. In edking fewer people.”+’ and sharing the transcripts with my CISSS: ~ For W. of the nmses, it was the to~i~ mates, I heard more. The voices from the question “of the entire interview. H past ahd subsequent successhd eareersofthese not answer for awhile as tears rolled do his active duty nurrea echoed a message 1 heard cheeks. “I went down there &out 2 n+pt~y at the War C%llege. “Yes, we bear ago. My wife and I went down. It w ‘% scars of the Yletnsm War, end yes each of us tough. I know some people on [th t, wall] deals tith it differently. But, we have moved there. Most of them 1 don’t remembe on and have giown from our pain.” %&$ P“”” , , Ncms 3 Inlewiewwisn I.lwten.xd C.@zmdS8EyGmlmm, 22 Nt+ber 1SS7. 1s. Hm$q -R 10 Uan=w=z. !9. ML, 7, 2. Nam.s of active dmy Army Nurse COIPS OINCWStiave been 20. [w., a -mw=Mrp_. Offkfnihe=aw@ oftil_Aa rl. sad.,9. -2W!aUSArmjMU%wyHlslmVI -,Car&!-a 22, Intetvlew with C.almel RW.9 qwe% ’76 Novernber 1s87, t.f~ S. l-%iienanl tie) G8nn!sF&WC - MaWI Stli& 7 A’myF&ma C@9BmdI, TM% W2shlmSWI.CX%N24.4“’ 2%”Hansam,twr?qx 1*> I 4. S&rt H, Saw@. Jamcm0. Will and .Qwph P, M onoy, Fosr 24, W, !&Is rtaum&eswoMU.enwn9AnnYh$ws8@PsweblL&. 2s. emmm, !falw@. irl. -0! CcmS@7Qd Clfti Psyc!wm, S3[May !E@ 70+07. a I&M.,w-m 5 lymda WnOw9ntwami [email protected], fkm7e@#ofeMw 27. D& bsn=ql, 32 Ing lNmvYmic V&mwrScc.&, W&3]. 2s. W&, Q-G2 6 I.tetiw with Ueuienani C&no! Eugene mown, ~ Nov3mIxM a. Ordf.am,transaig 25, ws7,1mrwiPt 10. so. {SM.,2s. 7 olrdudi,tm$u!#t7. %. bbrml Gal Fcs=sm.t’arsutpt 25 a i- WmiUwlenm+oakc+ml P.31n0!aOams,16+..amber I*7, S2. H.ws6n,Qari6wiptS7, ~ 5. 22. M&, 25, s. Graham, G-alwY7pta S4 ibid.,27-m 10. m, 16. 2s. W&, Z-29 11. lw, aE22 , SS Graiwn,trwulPL w-31. 12 G=aW&rrensMM.s7. 8’ S7. Dawis,bMwIP!.41+2 ra. ltd., 42-43 33 ILW.4S 1987.-t !>2S 49 UJm.,4s+ 1s. lntcwmw wnh Ueumnant Cal..el flhsm~ Miller. + NwmmLmr 41 OwlamnlcnpLa, 1SS7,6m2cq+i S7-S8. 42 R%3q.uarrapis7. 18 Gaki%[email protected]. , ~ 43 HE-ssn,ua!?s5m31 17. ltd. 44, G@h8m,harw@, 27 MILITARY REVIEW s JmUSIY 19S9 73 , ,,. ( ,, I Shelby L. Stanton Fome development and modernkation am nevenkmlingC&-S fir our Army. New technologiesare constantlyofikxingmo~ &le weapon systems and mom efficient means ofperform. ing wmbat and support missions. The authordho3 thatone snch qmbility has yet to be developed to ia iizilpotenti He stateathat&e combatpower andflexibilityof %r cawd# and %rmobility”envisioned by e f-ighted Howze Boaml in “ 1%2, bas only tin parddly L “ Lemons learnedin &h klbolwuryof Wetmlmillm”ilatehispoin& ,., 1 .?4!”,, I . I pmmMLTMong&mm tential of influencing Armywide programs for bat implementation of airmobiIity in aircraft procurement and organizthional the pat 25 years cm-kitutes one of our mtioris structure--begins with the Howre brd. greatest acccenpl&rnenG in military mcdem Howe was armed with a s~mpie directive imion. 1Advances in airmoblle doctrine have from Secretary of Defense Robert S. reset the pace end style of warfare in a men. McNamara-to search for ways to replace ner similar to the mechanization of cavalry ‘. jest before WorId War Ii. The premise uf air . moblliry, however, has been hampered by in Cavakyexfsts todenythe enemy adequate organizational and doctrinal assimi thatiaknao Ofsuceess—srup+whife lation into the present force strucrore. The pe~endly foxes withthemeans Army’s fahe to folly appreciate the natural to active theaarnemsult... theHowze fusion between cavalry and airmobllity was Boardimrovatmavfewedaedalcavahyai exemplified by the restructuring of the 1st .. the resurrectionof thebohf,A&ioglight Cavalry Division (Akraobile) into a heavy tank formation following the Vietnam War. Ca*; theaerialrwclcetarriileryas the m,oderrrequivaknt of thehorsearcflfery;~~ The opportunity exists to revitalii au as. andairnrofrife Murfryas thesuccessor sault cavalry and airmobiliry as integral fight ofmormted ridetroops. ing instmmerm for our mtiorad arseml. OnIy now are the Army and Maine Corps on the threshold of introducing aircraft types and I weapon systems once considered essential by conventional ground transportation with air the airmobile prophets of both services. craft. Bur Ho= insrmct&l the board to te Sometimes you must reach back m time in or. main focosed on advanced airmobiie methodo der to stay ahead end this reminder applies in logy. He was convinced that airmobile tech t&lay’s s@rch for proper employment of air. niques offkred”an opportunity to restore and’ mobile farces on the battlefield. Thk quest enhance the capabilities of traditional Amen must be pursued, however, with a CIW” and carr light cavalry. During the Civil War, cav honest understanding of the organizational alry leaders such as Jeb Stuart, George Arm- i development and limitations of airmobility strong Custer, Philip H. Sheridan and & within the Army’s recent past. than Bedford Form-x excelled in operatib~: . callii for pursuit, screening, raiding, .expk-ii Theoretical Progression: tation and flexible response. The board pem The H@wze Baati bers rightly viewed thii same agility as’~g In 1962, the future of airmobility was de crucial to whet would later be celled +e~,&ir- liberated by a farsighted panel of aviation, Land battlefield. But they realii that dme parachutist and cavalry experts, collectively fighting principles vanished afier heavy armor known as the Army Tactical Mobility Re advocates dominated and eventually sup. , quirements Board, but remembered as the -planted the cavalry branch, a fate sea[~ by Howe Board after board president Lieutenant .&e Army Organization Act of 1950 which , General Hamilton H. Home.z The hffitory of combined armor and cavalry into one branch, airmobility can be traced back much further, designated as armor. In accord with Gavin’s writings, the Hoti -. of course, and inchrdes the progressive writ ings of such theoreticians as Lieutenant Gen E!oardviewed cavalry as a conceptually dtier eral James M. Gavin.’ But officially sanc ent arm of mobility thaii armor. They graspsd tioned, practical airmobility-with the po- the cavalry mobility differential, wh~ch ‘is 75 r MILITARY REVIEW . Januav 1989 ( i based on sl&ck effect through firepower that cation systems, and high resolution radars alsu screens both tire; and information. Cav should be given htgh development pnorrty. o alry ,exists to deny the enemy that tahsman of As the board predicred, the Mohawk later succes-surprise-while providing friendly failed to meet expectations in VIemam. Army forces with the means to achieve the same investigation of the committee’s more ad result. Whale the tanks inherrted the mantle vanced target acquisition suggestions, how of the dragoons, the Howze Board innovators ever, was delayed by the Viemam War and viewed aerial cavalry as the resurrection of did not start in earnest until Project MAS the bold, slashing l~ht cavalry; the aerial STER (Mobde Army Sensor Systems Test, rocket artillery as the modem equivalent of Evaluation, and Rewew) wa$ initiated at Fort the horse arrrllery and airrnobile infantry as Hood, Texas, m late 1969.7 Modem battle the successor of mounted rifle tnxms.’ field survedlance systems, however, still fall The Howze Board far short of Howze Board expectations in the premwd its airmobde field of drone and robcmstic apparatus. and afi cavalry con The Howze Board dewgrted tentative air cepts on national de mobile and air cavalry organir.atiom with em fense considerations phasis on the “application of Army aircraft to and aerial warfare the traditional cavalry role of mounted com principles with a con bat; that of reconrrmxmnce, ‘security, and tar tinuing degree of get acquisition.’” Three types of brigade-size modern validity. For air cavalry units were specifically designed to example, the board “fight horn a mounted pimtion and perform assumed that the the traditional role of cavalry in exploitation, United States would pursuit, counterattack, delay, a$d flank pro continue to back up m global commi&&ents tection.’” irh strong forces in readiness, both deployed The air cavalry combat brigade was con ‘ ~rward and mainmined as reserves, among cewed by the Howze Bard as a swift, offense- various strategic locations. The board recog oriented tacttcal headquarters containing two nized that the bulk of US forces would have to five air cavalry squadrons. The brigade was to be jointly prepared for either nuclear or de.sgned to seek out and destroy or neutralize nonnuclear war. Gf extreme itrterest in light enemy forces, especially armor and mecha of recent aircraft developmental trends, the nized force-s,by aerial firepower. In addition, bored recommended several families of deep- the ar cavalry combat brigade was firlly capa penetration survedlance planes and drones, ble of aerial maneuver m performmg a wide powerful multitask helicopters, and vertlcati range of trdtlonal cavalry missions,’0 short takeoff and landiing (VST13L) aircraft The board recommended that one au cav for some of its proposed elements. 5 al~ combat brigade be deployed to Europe, The How-ze hard also recognized that oh where it would also be available fpr opera servatlon amcrafi could be supplemented by tions m North Africa and the Middle East if many orher types of target acqmsitlon equip reqtured. Two air cavalry combat brigades ment to achieve continuous srrrvedlance on would be stationed m the Continental United the battlefield. .In a radical depmture from States to permit respcmsve and flexible con. the 1960-era Army inveirrnent in Mohawk tingency fore’k.sas trade-offs for the armored reconrrawance alrcmfr, the board stated that cavalry regiments., small drone systems, poxtmn-fmmg and mvl The combmed arms air brigade was pro gation systems, visual airborne and target lo posed by the Howze Ikrard as a larger,. more 76 January 1989 � MILITARY REVIEW ‘. .. AIR CAVALRY adaptable orgaruzation to “flesh out” the am General }iowze reabzed the conceptual dif ca@y combat brigade. The combined arms f{cuklea of the RAID concept, because it Wa.S air brigade would give -a co% or army corn. not cost-effective compared to reafistic com mander a decisive combat tool for rapid e bat “tasks of many Army diwslons. As a smke, economy of force, mobde reserve and cheaper and more flexible alternative to the fire brigade actions. No cost was estimated. . fixed RAID organization, he suggested the at. The arrnair brigade was viewed by tfii tachment of an avIa&m brigade (group) to a Howse Board as the eventual successor ro the regular Infantry division when necessary combat arms air brigade and would constitute “flexible airmobife infantry division” [au. a seff-srrstaining unit of all arms smaller than thor’s term]. T_IMsoption allowed rhe tailoring a di ision. The armair brigade wotild contain of air assets for given n,issions or when re 449 !aircraft and could fight its way into an duced reliance on ground transport was need- area, smze It and hold n for a hm[ted rime. ed. Such a conf[guranon, of course, would The board was convinced that the tactical lack the roral integrated airmobile striking mobility of divisions could be enhanced by power thai a purely awmobile or air assault cfi aerial means, because ground vehicular mo- vis{on offered, I] bility was already developed to tie extent The air assault division was >Ianned by i that no fqrther substantial gains in mobhy the Howze Board as a formation with the in- appeared feasible othenwse. The board de, trinsic aviation assets necessa~ to maneuver a freed tactical mobility as “the capability to large pornon of its infantry forces by air, and apply combat resources in decmve. ways, at provide aerral firepower srrppurt as well as for- decisive points, to achieve decisive results, ward command and cormol. Although the dt and the flexibility to do so with maximum wsion enjoyed a certain degree of organic aer surprise. ”il Several new and modlfled ial resupply capability, It would depend on an division-level Grgamzations were generated by air tmmport brigade to establish aw hnes of the board to mcreaae batdefleld tactical mo- communication in a combat. theater. , bihty by allocating programmed and foresee- The airmobde diti,on was erivisioned by able aircraft types, the Howze Board as the outgrowth of the atr : The reorganized airmobde infantry divi- assault division. The alrmobile division would Is’ sion (RAID) was proposed by the Howze perform usual dwmon mls.s!ons, bur would be Ekmd as an infantry division with the neces- more fully airmobile than the air assault dn@ sary, organically assigned aircraft to provide slon and would be equipped with .~pon.s”bf essential airhft and log~stic services. Enough greater lethality. aviation re.sources would be placed at the di- The reorganize rmiversrd division w~“k CP vision’s disposal to furnish a h~gh degree of wed as the ultimate divisioml upgraduy@’fre sustained, aerial-dehvered combat power. reorgamed universal dw%ion would apparently The RAID would featum~superior reconnais- be a vehlculm-bawd formation WA improved sance and target acquisition techmques, in- aerial antitank armament and an all-weather trinsic aerial fire support, and be capable of aircraft strike capacity. For example, the Jxmrd simultaneously airlifting one-third of its com- envisioned this division as having improved ~ bat personnel for distances up to 1(X3kilome- aerial antitank dmect.fu-eweaprs, bght aerial ters. The committee foresaw great problems dehvered antitank mine-s and ~rrable weap in keeping internal communications going ens, hdicopterdeliverable napalm kombs; imp- within ttus potentially far-flung diwsion, but roved smoke dispensers, variable delay anti- hoped that the communications load could be personnel mines, special application laser reduced without Iosaof control. 11 devices, and so forth. No cm was estimaprf. MILITARY REVIEW . January 1989 . . 77 ‘ ,( .,. To supplement d-re ArmY’s air assault and tion squadron fm testing and special equipment airmobiie- dhision forces, the Howze Board evaluation. Each of the other four 4uadronS proposed three types of aviation brigades. wouldserviceone S&ciai l%rces group. Squad. Tiyese woufd give the Army enough aircraft, runs at group Ievei wouId provide tactical air k in structured organizations, to support the movement and some aernal fire support, the ground forces throughout a global environ abiity to move supplres and equipment by air, ment. ~% the pm.ntial for airbne ~chological opera .\ The universal cobs tactical aviation brie tions and a specializedair-dropor air.landing ca gade was conceived by the Howre Ecrard to pabiity forrenmte areas.w enable a corps commander to move his re The Howze hid concluded its srr+dy in serves rapidlfi reinforee the airlift of commit August 1962. It recommended sweeping force ted dtvNions and displace corps artillery by restructuring w ich, if implemented, would air. For maximum economy of force, a corps have replaced #most of the Army’s conven of three or four divisions yould be supported tional formations with advanced airmobile by one universal corps tacti~l aviation bri and air cavalry units. Wartime exigencies gade. soon blocked further development of the This brigade could freely r&arrange its basic board’s more ambitious suggestions. The elements to provide air transpmt for particu ixmrd’s find~s were eventually relegated to lar missions if the need arose. In thii manner, the dark, rmisry attic of Army h~tory, and its brigade aviation resources could be divided to 1962-vintage stampings unfortunately con. permit separately operating infantry brigaiies a signed the text to a curiously remote comer of K@ degree of airmobile independence. Basi bypassed Army developmental consideration. cally the uriliirion of the universal corps rat. ticai aviation brigade closely resembled the Experimental Progression: Navy’s methed of organiz& task forces. ~n~~~~ TEAM , Des@ed by the Howze Board to give the The Army’s reaction to the Howze Board air assault division or corps the ability to form was limited to the creation of a “top priority” an aerial line of communication “logistic airmobile test force and evaluation group, tail,” tohe air transport brigade would also projecr TEAM (Test and Evaluation of Air pmvid supplemental airlii for combat opera mobiliry) at Fort Benning, Georgia. Despite tions o1 air transport within rear areas. its priority, the testing force was seriousiy rm The bowci recommended that the air tmns dermined by competing demands for aviation port brigades be integrated with die combat and personnel resources m response to several units to provided aerial logistic support for global crisis situations. This experimentation, field armies. 1+Activation of these brigades however, led to the incomplete testing of two would be phased to match the activation uial organizations: the Ilth Air Assault Divi. dates of the air assault divisions and universal sion and 10dr Air Transport Brigade.’6 corps tacticai aviation brigades The test air assault division served as a The speciaf warfare aviation brigade was a skeletal proto~ for the air assault division five-squadron organization conceived by the su~ested by the Howe Board. The division Howzc lbard and intended to supply a wide existed m a unique organimtion and was nev. range of aircraft types for special warfare oper er intended to be deployable. Available air atioiw. craft were used in an effort to derennine max The board recommended that the brigade imum utili ation for existing or modified headquarters be located at Fort Braeg, North weapon sysL MS, iifantry lift rmd artilie~ dis Carolina, along with one special warfare avia placement. 78 &mJary 1989 * MILITARY REVIEW ‘. Airtxxrie Dtis!on dimna the 1964 Carolina Mimwvera. ~?%?~ . T~:~~Irigade crashed after its support atiembly ~ ‘- .,= . -- . : :... -- .. ., .+..,.< Shelb.%nm The~owze Boanf]was convinced thattbe tactiealmobilityofdivisionscould be enhancedbyaerkdmeaoe, berausegtvund vehicukrmobilitywasa.beadyde. ‘ veloped to tbe extent thatno furthersubstantisdgaine in mobifityap+&asible otherwise,The boarddefined taetieidoiobilityas“the capabilitym appfycombat wsoumes in decisiveways,atdeeisivepobiis, toachievedecisiveresults,andthe .ti ffexibi@ m do so withmaximum Sill’pli$e.” .,. . .. . “~ In February 1963, the llth Air Assauft Db talion).” The division aviation group c&~d vision (Test) was activated in drastically re of ome surveillance and escort battalionj,~$vo duced strength at Fort Benning. Lhrrrng May assault hehcopter battalions for infaitt$,~ift, 1964, the division began fidl expansion to one assault support helicopter battabon for ar. ward its programmed goal of three air assault tillery and cargo bft, and a general support brigades. Although dkision strength eventu company. ally reached 14,542 personnel, It exwed only The orderly development of a satisflactoq as one air assault brigade (with an additional division testing progmm was greatly hampered “ parachutist capab~lity), one airmobile brigade by aircraft and aviator shortages as well as the and a deliberately mixed artille~ contingent Army’sown tight schedubi squenre. In CctgP (one aerial rocket artillery battahon, three ber and November 1964, the Ilth Air As 105mm howm.er battaliom and a Lmde John eauft Dkision (Test) was hastdy assembled [airtransptable in the Chinook] missile bat- under adverse weather conditions t! p:~e MILITARY REV{EW o January 1989 79 P . ; ,, ,, - [ *. I the viability of division-level airrnobility. In plies. Where it became necessary to maintain this respect, the test was successful. During forward tactical points by air, general aviation the spring of 1965, tie llth Air Assault Divi- [ resources were collected from Air Force and ,i sion was used to form the basis of the 1st Marine assets as well as the 1st Aviation Bri. gade on a tempmay mission basis. ~,: ‘. Combat Progression: Thep-ion ofa mobife cavaliy Wetwam eddidunent without proper conmru. . The Viemam War offered the Army its m“eatingalriliiyconstituted a serious I%pse first chance to develop combat air cavalry and ti Ann y O_ei”omdjuo&nen~ airmobile organizations and determine their es-y b &ht ofHowze lkmd ~. worth in actual battle situations. 18Ho~ze @a on this very subjecti Ye~ throug B&d pre&ctions about the value of airrno houtthe war the diwkion Experienced a bility were largely verified. At the same time, SW tih~-d=- dmirig the the more advanced Howze Board designs were , &unbo&n incumion as “hand to mouth not adopted because of the Metnam War’s pe on an emergency ba%.” culiar rrature and the Army’s own failure to fidly grasp air caval~ principles. Although known officially as an ait caval. Cavafry Division (Akrnobile), which was dis ty dlvidon for only a short period of time, patched on an emergency basii to Viemarn. ” the functional role of the 1st Cavalry 13ivi. The Army never formed an air assault divi sion (Amnobile) is best explained using this sion in V~emarn because the au cavalry dlvi. descnpnon. The division actually represented siop concept pruved more combat-effective. an entirely new ~ of fighting organization Additionally, terminology such as “air assault” when it was molded from the test-bed air as ~ a politically unacceptable division-level sault dwmon. Although the division pos 1 title in Vietnam, where the Army was en sessed many characteristics of the projected : couraged to use titles having pacification Howze bird-type anmoblle division, the air overtones. Thus, the terms “cavalry” (having cavalry division took immobility a step fur frontier pacification implications) or “airmo ther by integrating its intrinsic aerial resources blle” (having iieumal trarrsprtabilky implica with light cavalry doctrine. tions) were deemed rhore suitable to the S=dected by Generals Westmoreland and ‘ Army’s image at the time. . Creighton Abtams as an Army-level shock “Lie the test air a.s5aultdiwsion, the loth force, capable of countrywide (or theater , Air Tranqmrt Brigade was formed in Febru mchmve) emplo’jment, the 1st Cavahy Divi ary 1963 as an experimental platform. The sion gained a premiere repmmion for consistent brigade was raised in urcrements correspond battkfleld success. Sever-alfacton were reqxmsi ing to the proportional sire of its aamciated ble for this result. The internal cnm~ition of . air assault division. the division was certainly important. At the The Army did not r-me an aw transport height of m seMce in ~emam @rwary l%?), + brigade in V1emam because the envisioned, the di=lon contained 20,346 wkliem and 418 purgly air lines of commti,cation for Artny aircraft (primarily concentrated in its organic dlvmions were established only rarely. Ilth Aviation Group), 193 “HueY”utility heli Throughout the confl~t, Air Force cargo copter, 78 Cobra attack helicopters, 47 Chi- ‘ planes, motor transport,’convoys and inland nook cargo helicopters, 86 bght observation hel waterway craft deliyergd most military sup icopters, six Mohawk reconnaissance aircrafi six 80. January1989. MILITARYREVIEW - ‘. . Bird Dog observation aircraft, and two Beaver “ both Khe Sanh and the A Shau, provided a rstility aircraft. lq cavalry screen over the western 111Corps Tat. : More decisive, perhaps, was the prof&slon tical Zone to safeguard the capital of Saigon w al “First Team” spirit and c@rnand interpre in 1969, and gave a modem demonstration of tation of aviation, infantry and artiile~ ma cavalry exploitation during the invasion~of neuver in relation to cavalry tactics. Thrs fun. Cambda in 1970.z0 .,. . .t damental understanding, coupled with the These achievements advanced the “pi “tary hard-working dedication of the “sky troop science of air cavalry usage to its pinnac i e in ers,” propelled the formation to excel @ the Wetnam. ‘The linkage between the pote@y of multiple dimensions of division-scale air cav battlefield air assault, the maneuverabili& of alry combat. The 1st Cavalry Division per. aicmobile assets and the dash of cavalry ap fected the art of alr assault during its 1965 Ia peared manifest. Unfortunately, the &m~ Drang Valley Campaign and hounded the en failed to exploit ths bonding and the Wiq~ emy during its 1966 coastal campaign of sus. power of the air cavalry division was discarded ~ . . tained pursui~ k applied wide+anging cavalry afier the war when it was converted mto an coverage to clearing operations in Binh Dinb amnored division. . - Province during 1967 and sho~ed flexible re Thk is not to say that the 1st Cl+valryDiyi sponse in deploying to I Corps for the Tet 68 sion was without problems. my type of cav. counteroffensive. The division reestablished ,+alryhas Iimitariona that invite diimter if Mis, [he technique of division cavalry raiding at osed in combat. Im.addkion, dtwsion ,airciatl :, . . .. MILITARYREVIEW o January 1989 I .81 ‘,.\. -. ,.. b, -’\ ,$ -j ,. . could simultaneously, airhft at best only one- Army Southeast Asia Signal Training Facility third of the formation and thii factor could be had to be used to keep the division’s advance further affected by adverse weather or mainte command post communicating. While in nance diffwukies. The dwision had r-mair de Binh Dinh Province, the division even at fense artillery its airfields and pipelines were tempted to establish a supplemental carrier pi blatantly vulnerable to enemy air attack geon service to mitigate these glaring signal (which fortunately never materialized). And inadequacy-s!zz . its internal communications apparatus was Late m the war, the 10lst Akbome and woefidly insuflcient fo. the far-ranging natore 23d Infantry (Americal)\ divisions achieved of its operations. the status of airmobile divMons. The 10lst .P The provision of a mo~de cavalry establish Airborne Division started its tmnsition to an ment without proper communicating abihry ‘~irmobde structure in July 1968, but this reor constituted a serious lapse, in Army organiza ganization was not completed until July 1969. tional judgment, ‘especially in light of Howze At that rime, the 411-helicopter 10lst Avia Board warmngs on thi~ very subject. Yet, tion Group (formerly the 160th Aviation throughout the wrw the division experienced Group) was added as an integral corqponent a signal ni tmare-described during the of the dlvmon. The 23d Infantry Division Cambaban T‘ncursion as “hand to mouth on (Americal) converted to an airrnobile confi~ an emergency basis.”z’ Its perfoqnance would uranon with the addition of the 16th Avis. have bee% crippled without lavish 1st Signal tion Group in March 1969, but ‘kmlymustered Brigade augmentation. For example, during 234 helicopters that July. ‘the division’s movement from I to 111Corps In rmth, bqh divmons fell short of Howze Tactical Zqrre in late 1968, the entire US bard aumobde dw,sion mterrtiocrs, although I .NR CAVALRY “ their rganically assigned aviation groups cer . . tain gave them better aircraft control and The Howze Boanf% tlmd report me pensive aiimobile capabilities. The smed theAir ~vaky CbntbatBrigade cup4 “t was their late-war marrsition periods. aaone ofi~ most originalanddecisive& By 1969, diminished combat’ requirements, mobile &wk at the corpslevel The b~ade manpower bulence and shortages of skilled wasenvisionedasaswiiifymobtieaerial ‘ personnel r eterred the creanon of any truly sttikeforce.... Unforhrmr*lB,tirepetfbrm . integrated airmoblle division on the battle awe of drkAir Cavalrycombatbrigade , field. The esprit of the Ist Cavalry Division, corddnot be ascertainedin theopm firmly rooted in the tradkion of the pr~war ationaflabmatory of Wetnarrr. test air assault division and solidified by early - Viemarn combat, was never duplicated. Fmm 1969 until their departure from Viet. rum, hth he 23d and 101st dktiions were The I-towze Board concept calling for a essentially areasecyrity dMsiom consolidated “flexible airmobde infantry division” was in I Corps. Furthermore, division operations achieved by three infantry divkions (lst, 4th became increasingly defensive in the waning and 25th) in Vlemam. These infantry divi stages of US involvement in Vietnam, and sions retained their ROAD bam. and basic awation re-sburces were often used to support maneuver battalions; includhg armor and South Vietnamese training or operational re mechanized componerm. Each divtilon’ con . quiremenrs. The mobility and shock ac$on tained b aviation battalion, which averaged that typified wide-ranging 1st Cavalry Eiivi only 82 helicopters, and became rehant on an sion operations were not required. attached aviation group ftx au-rnobde rmns <, . > , . “Z5tfrInfantry Diikm wexibcg the. Fihol Rubber Plantation northeasi of Cu IX - ———_ dwiaga searah-anddestoy mfaakn, 16 May 1966. The Howze Boanfconceptcallingfora Wk.xibleA&mobileIn6mtry Dihion” wasachievedby duee inthntrydiwkfons(ls~ 4drand2~tb) in Wetnam. I . . . The FlexibleAirnmbileZnt%trydivisionsenjoyed theen~ous advantage, ,, for-obileprnposee, of beingemployed asmea securz”tydivisionsin Wmmm. ... Even atita~idorsxxilevet the 1stAwiuionBrigadewoufdhave beefi hard. J pwseed to srrstmkthe airnrobifityof theseditiione iftirey hadbeen mom mobife or opemtingover widerfiwnts. ., ,. port and assault landings, aerial fireuower makdv m the vicumv of Cu Chi and War support and helicopter resupply. .The neces Zone C. Even at its reinforced level, the 1st sary aviation assets to performkhe bulk of dus, Aviation Brigade would have been hard- duty were provided by the Ist Aviation Bri pressed to susram the armobility of these di gade’s 12th, 17dr and 164th aviation groups. vlslons if they had been more mobile or oper In July 1969 these groups contained 575, 523, ating over wider fronts. 23 . and 232 helicopters, respectively. In Vietnam, the 1st Aviation Brigade The flexible airmobile infantry divisions served as a Howze Bard-type expanded uni. enjoyed the qnormous advantage, for amno versal corps tactical aviation brigade at the bde purposes, of being employed as area secu field army o! ,theater level. The main purpose rity dwisions in Vietnam. The 1st Infantry of the 1st Av[ation Brigade was to supply ser. Dtyision was r~nsible primarily for a slice ial resoorces to both US Army, Vlemam, and of temtory north and east of Saigon, the 4th many conti~gents of ARVN . To accomplish Infantry Division was cotilned basically to this task at the height of its wartime ser Central Highland operations west of Pleiku, vice, the 1st Aviation Brigade contained 641 and the 25th Infantry Division operated ftx;d.wi?g aircraft, 441 Cobra attack heli- January 1989 * MILITARY R&$lE~ Am EAVALRY “ copters, 311 Chinook cargo helicopters, 635 enlightened Howe Board concept of creating observation helicopters “and 2,.202 Huey util special corps cavalry raerves, Purrlam’s exper tLYhelicopters. The brigade contained nu iment was stifled in Vlemam. The prmnsional merous aviation groups and battalions, as 9th Ak Cavalry Brigade was finally disbanded well as several independent air caval~ squad rons. Within th~ framework, the aviation bn. The 10lstAitbome Divkion excbaoged gade not only provid!d a general airmobile itsparentheticalairmobileidentification capacity to several US and allied dw[sions but forairassmrk Thischangetefleeted also rendered airmob~le flexibility, on a Athty wnsensus thatthe termti smaller scale, to many separate infantry bri mobilty impliedtbe srirsplemovement of gades. The brigade rendered widespread au trvopsandeqdpmen~ whereasairassatdt transportation, airfield conuol and aircti li arson serwces throughout Vlemarn. The, bri. s~~@d increasedmobilityandfirepower designedfor ofinsive aetioperations. gade’s air cavalry squadrons permitted area re connaissance (with limited strikinq ability) for specified regions. The 1st Avia~ion Bri. gade was supported by m own aircraft main to firrrmh aircrafi and pilor replacements to tenance group, the reinforced ad highly spe units fighting in the Laotian sector during cialized 34th General Support Group (Avia Operation lmrr Son 719.?’ tion Support). In the years immediately following the The Howze Board’s firial reuort suecified V&ham War, the Army’s airmobile capabili the air ca@ry combat brigad~ as o~e of its ty was dra.mcally curtailed. The 10l~t Air most original and decisive ainnobl[e tools at borne Division was retained as the only the corps level. The brigade was envisioned Armywlde airmobile division. On 4 October as a swiftly mobile aerial strike force that 1974, the 10lst Akbome .Dwision exchanged would conduct classic cavalry mi~ions. From its parenthetical airmobile identification for< October 1970 to April 1971, one ad hoc au air assault. This change reflected Army con cavalry combat brigade was created in Viet sensus that the term airmobihty imphed the , nam by Major General George W.- Pumam simple movement of troops and equipment, l+ ]r., a former Howze Board member who be whereas air assault suggested incremed mobdj came the commander of the 1st Cavalry Dwi ty and fuepower dewgrred for offens;ve aeriaF sion. operations. The 101st Adorne Divis@ -@ The 9th Air Cavalry Brigade (Combat) Assault) contained 422 helicopte’r$ nd (Proyis,oml) was formed. Unfortunately, the 17,961 personnel, orgaruzed mto three ‘b1: n- ‘ performance of this alr cavalry combat bri rry brigades, an aviation group, division w%l- gade could not be ascertained in the opera- Iery and a support command.’5 t~onal laboratory of Vlemam. The brigade was The 10lst AAwme Dhmon (Air Assault) sent into Cambodia to support South Viet was characterized by the Army as a mobile namese units fighting along the Karnpong smke formation capable of conducting ~rapid Cham-SnouI front, but resrrictioms on its use, strategic deployments in mmlmal time. Al- . smngent rules of engagement, and a lack of though the division enjoyed a flexible capa {magmation by South Vietnamese com bility to mass, disperse and recycle forces ray manders prevented the brigade from acting in Idly throughout the battlefield, die divisio~ a bold, decisive manner. Although the air was not labeled as cavalry and did not neces cavalry combat brigade complemented the sarily employ cavalry tactics. For example,, .. MILITARY REVIEW . Januafy 1989 85 . . . ,, “( \ ., , k the division mi.sion statement of 31 August chines, smvedkmce systems and wea~ns that 1977 charged the 10lst with the responsi board members only dreamed about when bility “to deploy rapidly worldwide wmh pri they recorded their brilliant organizational ority to the NATO area to destroy enemy schemes almost a quarter of a century ago. forces and to control land area, including The board recommendations still merit seri populanons apd resources, m combmed oper ous consideration in formulating modern ations or in unilateral military actions by em force structure, and a contmumg need exists ploying the unique ~pability of the air assault to fuse tradkional cavalry doctrine with such resources.’’” novel aircraft and weapon systems. The Army The Howze f30ard still serves as a clarion need only look to the experiences of the Ist call to modernize the Army wdr au cavahy Cavalry Division in Vlernam to see the po specialized units. The Army and Marine tential value of restoring the cavalry role to its Corps are being equipped with aerial ma modem force structures. % NOTES 1 .4 .“mmmy 01 ,%rnywm.l(le dWelOPme”t:Ilmugh {he V,etnwn rnmls am .Y.””cdfromme USATMRBF,nalRWQII, 31 Jul62 Thealtbwr War M availeble,“ LmurenartGe,ad JohnJ. Tolson,kre,%amma,, deP%ndtiheswlyo, tine. G (Prqm and Bu@f], AnnexH (Oiqwlwe &mmlMrly, 19.S1-7977Wa91m@”, DC L!.3Pw!rm”t.10. Aflll”. 19T3) Fo- SiNciwa), .4n.ex I (LongRangeC.mcemsana rwq.uemeti). and m,s LMnlphl.tWnws sum lb ganwmtJMncntlml a$.pmacilto me subject, Amex KiTeciIW CQnca$ismu Re.q.,remen!sl ard Swfadm64#vms$,mtid unwmewa, 1i USAIMRB AnnexK, Tacbc#CQIWWIS& R6qu,rmmenls 2. In A#fll 1962, Sacrelmy of Cmfema R+?bmS McNam.srad,mcted 72 Cmmmrltm11LtI to Pm,derd uSATMRB,SubI Reysfi of [email protected] L&3Amw to reamme and waluate is mnu,mmems1., !hrd warfare wiles andSzgn,scsrd.4mml@wunents,31 MaySz &lW,”PLmg PwUOJlalm$ilass 0“ W& tilzq!to” 07w “eludes 13 IJSATMR8 Dmfl of Pm$deni l,WUCI,O”. to S!eenr& and Rwmw The Army“arm-j LIrJulwanlGe.eti Hah,!in” H How., m emly Pn3P C.amrnmea.4 J.. 62. mm of .mfmewiy ma me mmmmdtng w..m of tamthe US .s!mt%,. 14 USATMRB F,”al fle~fl, 3< J“I 62, Amex L L09K1,c3COIW%I!S #.!my CQIPS(STR4C) and the sw AIrtorne Cc@ at Forl Bragg,to head antiRm,uIrwnenls ~. *. AJ-I.WW@ Mobil,?yRequirementsSc4fd, IIemdtm dt6d W usAT. 15 USATMRB final Rmti, 31 Ju!y 1962, .4n”exJ, SmcJd Wtiarn MnR “ C4nc@s andRqmamems 3 MWJCGeneral Jams M Gwns lammmrx.mda CW.IW, end I 16 US C4nll”e”td Arm?COKI171,”0AnnualH,SD”CUS“mma,y F,*.,x CM.t Mean Hms%w apF.3aredI. &mor, v.!, LsIll, No 1s, ma proved V.9iv642 Feb6c, 121-28 ,1511unle”l@J1“me de,e~mmt .31smnch!~ d.n!q me “M,sta PSI. 17 Theoqanuat,on and b,s+my01me 1Ith AI, Assa”iiDiws,on[ssm? $ KoreanWar W.X! nlsnm.i m She>byL Slant,., An.91coI”of e D#kmton(NwatO, CA PmSd10 J 4, A b“el OWW,MI of the hlsto”~ mtwede”b and WQIUI,O”of .s,”., Press 198T) CiMP2 CWRIWwth PWJa4@Jm@!as15on tie KoreanWsr, GwIe@ G... s mm. 18 D#8.Is of lhes OWan.aton$ m Vmtmamwfihdale~of S8WIC8,au. tiuiions and the snrvw of me How. Saati IS found ,. cimpw, ? of thcm,ed SW3ngth,,and b,,,! cnmb.! na,rat,ve, c.” be ,eferanCed ,“ ShelbyL Sianbm’[email protected]. Owmmn,Presd)oPm%, 1SS7 ShelbyL, S!mton, WemamOrderof S9me, rev M (M,lhoxd, NY K,,., 5 W, PrestdentUSATMRB t. Smr6@ o! me &my, sub,. O.lhm RePnn&%!IaPMDW+, 1w] Planforfletiunol Taa,ml Mtibiy %qu,mmenls 5 May 6Z 19 154Cwa!ry Dmwon,ODwaDonalRwon, 15Feb69 6 RESTA CQmmt!w Lb to Pme&ienlUS#,TMRB,Sub+Pre%n!a%,on W C.nlw 8$@C4tOn1. thw CamPmgmt%the them. of ShelbyL Slant,”, tiafc.n” 01e Dtvwmn The Cast $,”gle SJUrC3for me cruLYaJ[8 Drang CamPa,gn,$ J 0 CMemfm, Pl@ku[Nw York St Maims Pm%, 1Sss) 21 Stanton,Anatwn”ole 0.s0,7 ?S6 ZZ LTGChmie3R MY.,, WOM&,lI.Shld,e3.Dw.wn.LeveI @lm”O/C~ 00”$iW@m@on, CC, DeLIarhm”to?b, Amy, $982),45 2Z me oL7+TaL!on.of Amy dMs(onsI“ V(eman, Wlh mlphas,, on me .Hed .1 !he,rtermom! assq,manls, (s d,saissed !, Shelby L S!anlcm,, The m.. and Fw of m Anmncan Amy (Nova!., CA Prestd,oPreas,I ,.,.! ,.W, 24 1s! CaVLUV0,.?s,0., OP+mOo”tiRePon, 13 May TI ‘mUIattached%~ WI C.svahyB“gade(PmvIsron.91],@nb.stAfIwAchon RePoft 2SMw 71 25 101s!.43tam. Drmwon1976H,s[.ncti “m,n~, Mar 77 - 26 701SI &mome Drw,on, F,scel 1977 H,f to”cwl Sumnmry, 15 Feb Jun62 , 7a 9 10 U“1633.m,w,se ,1.164, og.”,zauona, m!.,, role, anti Cvnlpre. Sk&y L Smrorr u - &iIrM of V[emam nWWZJMHe rccmed a B S , an MA. andaj D fmm LmusumaSrcurUruwmIcy.Hermxdml?mam.!r hrhslst Ilmakom 508rhlnf~ 46rhSLW=UIForm Cm@n> and 201hCon&zIEngnum . Bngak He LStheaurfunofxwmzlbwks, nrcludmga amm.fanafymoftk 1stCa\ L@DImrunqx=mnmum Memuzm,Anaromy of a DmsIon J i 86 “ January 1989. MILITARY REVIEW /“ ( ‘. ,! ... .9. 7’ f * k HE BATTLE of the Ia Drang Valley sea level, in the southwestern comer of the T’was actually a series of engagements be area of operations (AO), straddling the tween the US 1st cavalry Division (Awmo Cambodian-Vietnamese border. The only. bilej and the B-3 Front, North Vietnamese passable roads traversed the eastern an~ Army (NVA) from 18 October to’24 Novem. northern frkiges uf the ~0. Much of the val, ber 1965. Many consider~ k to be the US “ ley was covered with thick jungle vegetation Army’s first battle in VIemam. It was certai and trees as high as 100 feet. Even the “open” nlythe first battle between a US division oper areas had \hrubs and trees over 6 feet high. ating under a field force headquarters and The sudden mists offered a sinister aura, three NVA regiments operating under a front where dady heat and nighttime cold kept you headquarte~. It may also have been the last perpetually and increasingly on edge? The ar battle between NVA and US forces of equiv ea was eerie-imagine the “Valley of Death,” alent size. and you picture the Ia Dmng. The objecnve of this arncle is not to re In this area, partlcu[arly at the base of the hash all the details of the battle of the la. Ch. Pong MassIf, the NVA had built a base Drang Valley but to conduct a battle anaIysis camp sanctuary that was unknown to US using the historic methodology. The battle forces and untouched by Army of the Repub analysis metlmdology is a systemic approach lic of Vlemam (ARVN) forces. The primary to research that uses a format which includes { NVA forces operating in this area were tbe B, defining the sub]ecc reviewing the setnn~ 3 Front commanded by General Chu Huy examining the tactidal situation; and assessing Man, ‘wh three regular regimerm (the 32d, the significance of the action. It is ultimately 33d and 66th) supported by local Vietcong iri the assessment phase that the analysls take-s battalions as well as front-level mortar and place, and the analysis is expected to answer antiaircraft units. Each maneuver regiment speclflc questions. In this parncular analysls numbered about 2, 2LXIfrontline infantrymen the quemons center o~rhe tenets of AirLand and sappera. Them primary weapon was the Battle docmne as defined m the 1986 edition Soviet AK-47 aasault rifle. of US Army Field Manual (FM) lLX1-5, Op The 32d and 33d regiments were veteran erations. Based on the tenets of AirLand Bat fighters against the ARVN and Man was a tle, I wdl reach some conclusions about the verwan of the fnxt Indo-Chinese War against battle of the Ia Drang Valley and provide the French., These umts had been in the val some lessons learned. ley since early September, rehearsing, devel Having defined the subject, the Battle of oping ambush sws, and pre-Wsitioning and the Ia Ehang Valley, the analysls must next stockpdmg ammimmon, medical suppbes and examme the battlefield itself and also develou food. Their tacncs were cute simde. Theu some description or comparison of opposm frost ploy was to ‘lure arid ambu~h.” They forces. Starnrw with the battlefield, the Ia‘c would attack a small outpost or ARVN force Drang Valley Is”the valley through which the and maintam pressure on it with one unit, river (Is) flag flows and is drained by the 1a wh!le another unit waited m well-prepared Kreng, la Puck and an extensive network of cmsltiom to ambush the rehevme force. Then small streams flowing west and southwest other tacnc was called “hugging:; that was to across the Cambodian border into the Me get as cluse to the opposing force as possible kong River. The battlefield area covered and rely on close-m, almost hand-to-hand 1,5LXIsquare miles of what appeared to be flat fighnng to negate dreit opposing force’s fire. rolhng terrain dominated by the Chu Pong power advantage. They generally liked to Ma,ssf, a rugged mcruntam 730 meters above fight at night and rehearsed at night before 88 “ January ld89 * MILITARY REVIEW =e lstca+~~ion hadtin tmisdngfortwoyearsasthe llth tiAssatdt . Ditiion atFortBemrirtgunderKinnanf’sdirection.TM newArmy divkionwaswefl trainedandequippedupon activation as the 1stCavalryDivision(Airmobile)on 1Jtdy 1965. It arri@in ,Wetnamin incsemems duringAugustandSeptember1965. . conducting operations. They always planned 1965. It armved m Vietnam m increments .-. and rehearsed an organized withdrawal and during August and September 1965. The dl- ;4 would counterattack or leave stay-behind vision had three brigade headquarters, eight forces to permit an orderly wd-drawal. The infantry battahons, an alr cavalry squadron, troops were highly disciplined, WA excellent an aerial rocket art dlery battery, three dl$?t morale and esprit de corps, well fed, well sup support artille~ battahons, an aviatlon~com plied, and in, excellent phystcal cond,tion.z pany and the normal combat suppqrt$and Although Man expected to fight ranks with combat service support associated wi+:rhe his hght infantry, hk forces had not fought Reorganization Object,ve Army Dlv@n. Americans. The dnmon was authorized 10,000 troops, . The Americans they would soon meet were 435 hehcopters, basic infantry weapons (M1o m the US 1st Cavalry Dwision (Ammobile), rifle, M60 machmegun and M79 grenade commanded by Major General Harry W. O. launcher) and state-of-the-art comm~nlca Kirmard. The 1st Cavalry Dlvlsion had been tions equipment. Thu was clearly the US . training for two years as the 11th Air Assault Army’s “high tecW dwtslon of the 60s. Dwislon at Fort Berming under Kinnard’s dl The 1st Cavalry had some problems when rectiom This new Army division was well ordered to deplo~ it had 2,700 men not el{gi tmmed and eqmpped upon actwatlon as the ble for deployment. The dwislon lost bun- D 1st Cavalry Dnwon (Airmobile) on 1 July dreds of pdots, crew chiefs and mecha~ics MILITARY REVIEW E Janua!y 1989 89 , ,. ( cess (at least p~chologically) from Ak inihal . ~eNVA] worddattacka failure. -. . srrd outpost or AR YNforce aod main Since there were msut%cient ARVN forces tainpm?sstueon it with one rmi~ while to exploit their success, General William C. another rmi”twaited in welf.prepared Westtnorekmd made the extremely risky deci positiom to ambushthemlievingforce. sion to employ the Ist Cavalry Divi.ion on a Theirother tacticwascalled“hug@g”; classic explohtion and pursuit mixion agmmt thatwasmget ascloseto the opposing what appeared to be two battered NVA regi fome aspossible~d ndy on close.in, ments withdrawing to CamIxda. The 1st Cav aknostband-to-hand@hting to negate alry’s mi.sion was to search and dmtm+md theiropposingfo=ek *power. the 32d and 33d regiments and kdl or capture as many as possible before they reached any sanctuary. The stage was set for the US Army’s fii batde of the Vlernam War. It k a~ hem who could not easily be replaced in 1965. Ad that we can begin the analysis.’ ditionally, the rrcmps tiere Issued the M16 ri MarI withdrew to his well-deveb’~ Smc. fle only 10 days prior to departure and had a ruary in the Chu Pong Massif. Here he re hurried familiarization with this new weapon. grouped, reorganized, reequipped and rested After arriving m-couriny, the division was his troops, while he waked for the arrival of struck with a peculiar strain of malaria for the fresh 66dr Regiment and additional artil whkh there was no known mearment at the lery and antiaircraft units. Later assessments time, costing 1,000 additional Ioases. And al indkated that his new mission was relatively though well trained in airmobde tactics, the simple. Fkst he w .90 “ January 1989. MILITARY REVIEW . j:,\ The heficoptergaveKkman.ftheabilkyto . . . shitlfomea&dcombatpowepat # almostnsisrd.bogghgspeed,He corddputboth iieldadleryarsdaerkdmcke SIYTY lery m“tb~taccmacyanywhem on ahnostamomendsnotice.He co$dreinfh~ withtnxyxs&@r thanarsyorseever expen”encsdin tbe bisslmyof modem warth&#, psychological lmpl~cations requiring some Iieve Plel Me in the earher engagement. Man type of victory-no matter how limited. He felt he could strike and wmhdmw muchbfawer knew &t he was capable of explomng any than aoy sizable relief force could be mount. breakthrough at the camp and was confident ed. He was now concentrating three regi that his subordhate regimental comm%dem ments against a very .oInerable and isolated clearly understood his intent. camp. By training and disposition, his forces A@litY. The ability to act faster than the were extremely agile, and he felt he could enemy.”b It took the ARVN four days to re. “read the battlefield and exploit local suc- MILITARY REVIEW o January 1989 91 ,, k cess quickly. operational control. His intent was absolutel~ -Depth. “Exmsi~ of operamms in space, clear to his suimrdmate commanders, and his time, and remurces:’7 Clearlk Man had pre tiks had carefully reh>arsed such operations. * pad h~ bardegtrmid. He knew how to ma Clearly, there was unambiguous unity of pur neuver to Ylei Me and his withdrawal routes pose throughout his force. Unfortunately, were well established. He had effectively Man made one critical error-he did( not know the capabdmes or retention of his ene. my. lri fact he dld not know that his opFo nent would be Kmnard, who had an entirely . fkfarsk]intent was absolutely clear different mission than defense. ders,andhis ikshis SsrbonfinateComman After searching due west of the Plei Me ‘ usubhadcadslly nehd such ope~ camp and not finding the elusive NVA ations.ClearlBthese wassmamb~osss forces, Kward decided to shdr hls operatiom WU.fYofp~ ~~hout hisfo~e. to the sou west—right into the Chu, Pong he didnot know the Unfortunately.,, Massif. He t ad replaced his 3d Brigade with capabilitiesor intentionof hisenemy. the 1st Brigade and was hoping to find the in ikcthe +notknowthathk oppo battered remnants of the two NVA regi. nent wouldbe Kinmmi, who hadarrers !, ments, bckmg tlmr wounds and withdrawing ‘ ~ tidy dh%erentmissionthandefense. Into Cambcdm In this minal phase, we can examme Kinrqard’sthought process in relatioq ,. to the tenets of AM-arrd Battle. cached his resources and he had more arrivirrg Initiative. Clearly, with the 66th Regiment. His forces and re Knjmard intended to ~F-; sources were concentrating to sustain the mo set the terms of the ,., \ mentum he needed to wipe out Pldi Me. He battle. He was on the ~&& ,-_ ‘i@.~’ . ‘ would provide for air protection with addi offensive and felt he ‘> !~ .,. rkmal antiaircraft+ units and by his “hugging” could destroy the ene: $,i.<+_. f tactics. He viewed hls rear area m the Chu my with hls superb i,.. , ..v$ Pong Massif as weIl ‘concealed and well pro diwsion. If he could *_#” tected. Additionally, well-established sarrctu find the enemy arie.swere available in Camkxxha and his hnes forces, he had the ~~d- q of communication were generally safe. mobiliry and flrepow- ~#w’+ ‘ ‘“ Synchronization. ‘The arrangement of er to flx and destroy W.—==== O. Klrrrr-ald --, . battlefield activities in time, space, and pur. them. H: was taking great risk and knew that pose to produce maximum relative combat the umt which made initial contact would be ~wer at the decisive point.’” NVA tactical seriously outnumbered, but felt he could rein docmne in the attack of a fortifiqd PositIon force WA fire.almost immediately and then lent itself ideally to synchronimtldn: Man’s] pile on rrcmpsbefore the enemy could rea t. , J&e”, felt that he could determine the time of at &@tY. The helicopter gave Kmna tack. He would begin with probing tactics, abdtty to act faster than the enemy. Hebdd then increase the pressure until he found a shift forces arid combat power at almost weak point in the defense. He would then mind-boggling speed. He could put both field pour through that weak point, overrun the artille~ and aerial rocket artille~ with great camp and kdl or capture everyone in n. He accuracy anywhere on almost a moment’s no WISprepared to combat air power with the ar. tice. He could reinforce with troops faster rival of addkional front-level assets under KS than anyone ever experienced in the history . 92 “ Januay 19a9 o MILITARY REVIEW } Man irnnredktelysawars oppor~”ry togainan-ense vktory.... He exemisedgnsatagiklyandtook tbe ittitkitiveby acceptingrisk,the riskdue to the factthathisentke fo~e, especkdlyhisfivnt.leveitnortiand antiaircratltreks, . wensnot h apositionto supporttheattackon X.l?aY. ,, of modern warfare. He had the communma from the am, repmmon his field artillery, ,r: rion capability and t e troops trained in calls SUPPIY hls rroops and reinforce wmh maneqyer for fire. He could o,ui1 kly concentrate cm this forces almost anywhere cm the barrlefi+d.”~,s weal and battered enemy and explolt hn vul plan called for fixing the enemy and ~~r%ng a nerabilities. Cavalry tactics were such that commitment, as well as interdicting u on+ they c(xwdered “~lction’’-the accumulation mmed forces en route to Camkxla. &~ear of charice errors, unexpected difficulties and areas were relatwely safe, but he still pr&ided the confusion of battle. Ktnnard, by nature, an infantry battalion to secure hls artillery dwposmon and trammg, knew that he had to and his forward command post. He had aw continuously “read the battlefield,q decide strips bmk so that he could be resupplied from quickly and act without hcsitition. Saigon by the Air Force to hls base at An . Depth. Here again the hebcopter and the Khe, and he also mamtamed sut%cient hell- cavalry’s training in its use naturally extended copter lift assigned to move those suppJIti, to opmmons m space, time and resources. The the fronthne troops. He was mkn~al$ pre - helicopter gave him extended range of vision pared for bold and decisive action, aid he for reccmnalssance, allowed him to prowde had personally trained hls hand-picke$ br accurate aerial rocket artillery, ad)ust fire igade and battahon commanders wi.t,h these MILITARY REVIEW e Januarj 1989 93 v ,$. . ... ( an economy-of-force type operation. It can be argued that in planning, each op- ‘ posing commander was well withh the um. brella of the tenets of AM-arrd Battle. There was no appatent viqlatiqn” or misuse of initia t ive, agillt y, depth ‘and synchronization. However, aa the battle develops, some things become very ewdent. Man did not expect to fight the battle in hia own sanctuary-nor did he expect to fight an American division. Ad ditionally, he knew nothing of how the Americans would fight. Grr Kinnarcf’s pmt. he expected to be facing two beaten-up NVA I regiments conductirrg a withdrawal. He did not expect to face more than 4,2W froptline troops, supported by mortam and antiai;cmft “I~ batteries, well supplied and not withdraw ing-but moving. to-attack.’ It is at thk stage The agihy ofKinmudb thought that the “fog & War” reigns supreme. Here ‘ ‘pmeess andtheagi@ of the cavalry the commander with the best agility gains the organizationilaelfqoicklygave him the initiative. [t is the commander who can fight ini~tive. He nsinfimxd 1.7 GwaIi-y hls fight-rhat is, setting the terms of battle m“th2-7 Cavalry and elements of 1.5 and not allowing the enemy to recovefiwho (k&y. The enemy hadseen enough, will be the winner. Both Man and Khnard andbeganrelocating.l@natd otdened exercised great mental agility as they attempt 2-7 Cavaky topursue. ed to galq .&e initlatwe. As the battle, unfold ~ ed, the unexpected mok over. Frost, one battalion-size umt of the divi same qualities sion, 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry (1-7) airhfted .synchrimization. Two years of trammg m landing zone (LZ) X-Ray and made almost together wkh all the modem technology had immediate contact with advance elements of tarrght the cavalry how to arrange activities in the NVA force moving on Plei Me; Lieuten time, space and purpose. Kinnard had the ant Colonel Harold G. Moore (the squadron forces and combat power to produce maxi commander) at first thought this was a stay- mum re.sukaat the decisive point. Syn&roni behind force of about one battalion, covering ration for the cavalry did not depend on ex the enemy withdrawal. Man Immedlat++lysaw plicit coordination. Them tnnnmg and com an opportunity to gain an immense victory by munications capability were such that. qmckly armihdatmg an American unit that synchronization could take place during. .he s!gmflcantly oumumbered, with the addi heavy conflict. Addltwnally, the com tional poxubiliry of defeating in detail ~y re mander’s intent was clea+find the NVA reg hevmg forces that would have to arrive piece iments and destroy them. Clearly, the con meal. [n this he exercised great agility and I cept wself of searching with a battalion— took the mitlative by accepting risk, the, risk piling on a brigade and supporting at the due to the fact that his entire force, eapeclally , decisive time and place with the entire dwi his front-level mortar and antiaircraft units, I siona, field force and Army fre support was were not m a posmon to support the attack t . ‘,I 94 JanuaV 1989. MILITARY REVIEW i > on X-Ray. The brkade commander. Colonel Thomas Brown, a& Khrrard quic~y sensed that this was much more than a battered stay-behind force andmmgnimd rbatrhe enemy intent was not to delay bat to annihdate the 1-7 Cavalry. All avaifable fire~wer was quickly reoriented to X.Ray and available forces begar+ moving” air and ground assets to support that fight. The ability of rhis small force to hold, and the tremendous and immediate firepower brought to bear was a shock to Man. The agility of Kit-mad’s thought process and the agility of the cavalry organization itsdf quick: IYgave him the initiative. He reinforced 1-7 cavalry with 2.7 cavalry and elements of 1-5 Cavalry. The enemy had seen enough, and began relocating. Kimrard ordered 2-7 Caval ry to pursue. The pursuing unit fought an other battle that took place at !2 Albany as Man was attempting to cover his withdrawal. The fight at LZ Albany was bloody as the AUavaibsbie fiiepower was qrriekfy United States suffered 151 dead and 121 reon’enredto X.Ray andavaikbleforces wounded, while the enemy lost about 450 beganmovirrgair.dgrmmda sseb to killed. Kinnard then ordered the 2d Brigade supportthattight Tireabifhyof this to relieve the 3d Brigade and to con~inue to dfome @ hold atrdtbe trwmerrdowa pursue. Gver the next few days the 3d Bri wsd-edbte firepowerbroughtto gade mopped up a few battered retits of bearwasashock tokfan. ,. the 32d, 33d and 66th regiments as they were t wirhdmwing into Cambodia. Although Kln ,. nard wished to continue the pm-suit, he was .i ordeoxl to hold. By 24 November 1965, the units to fight outnumbered-ar lem~ s~v+m battles of the Ia Dmng were over. The 1st to-one overall and much greater at botb X- Cavalry killed as marry as 3,(X)ONVA regu Ray and Albany-and win. ~ $. lars, with an unknown number of wOur@cl, Green, untmted American soldiem fqhght and, in fact, decimated the NVA force.’0 ‘ oumumbered against what E@nard Fall &lled Clearly, Kinnard used the agility of the “the best hght infantry in the world,” and cavalry and his own ability to synchronize won. The mental agility of Kmnard, the abd both combat power and logis~c support (550 iry to synchromze combat powei, and the tons of supply a day and 50,000 gallons of agility in organization of the cavalry gate him avtation fuel) to seize and maintain the initia the inmative, allowed hlm to fight his battle “ tive on the battlefield. Addkionzdly, he never on his terms and win. He searched and he had to commit more than one brigade at a destroyed—and that was his mission. ne time, thus exercising wisely the economy of tmining, discipline and leadership of both the his force. The agility of his fofces and his abil. 1st Cavalry Division under Klnnard and ity to synchronize co’mbat power allowed his NVA forces under Man had been ourstrmd- “k MILITARY REVIEW * January 1989 ..4 Green, untestqdzlmericansoldienifoughtoutnumbered againstwhatlle~ Fflcailed “the bestlightiofbntrybrthe worfd,”andwon. The mentalagiiityoflGnmud, the abilityto syrrchmnizecombatpower, andthe agiikyinorganization ofthecavalrygave him theirsidative,allowedhim @fight hskbattfeon hk termsandwfn. mg. But m the final analys:s, orgamzaticm clearly mrerdependent, with gaining and and atrmohdlty gave Kiru-md the agility t-iec. maintaining rhe initiative clearly the most essary to wrest the initiatwe from Man. And fi~~t tenet. An edge or advantage in one It was the initiatwe that ultimately made the or all of the other tenets may give you that, difference. mwiarive as did rhi 1st Cavalry’s agility and What then do we learn fi~m this first bat ability to synchronize its actions. Man had tle m Vietnam? First and foremost, a com the abdity to synchronize his combat power mander musr be capable of gaining and mai and he had grear depth in rime, apace and re ntaining the initiative, for without it he can sources. He was willing to take risks and had not win. To gain the inltlatlve, the great mental agdity. The physical agility ad cchrnander must have both the mental and vantage, however, went to the cavalry-and organizational agility to gain an advantage in that was enough to gain the initiative. relative combat ~wer in depth (time, space We also Ieamed that technology can pro and resources), at the decisive Pmt. In the vide just the edge in agdq that is needed. battle of the la Drang, it was the great agility However, technology is not enough. Com provided by the 1st Cavalry’s organwatlon rnandem at every level must be confident and that gave them the edge Kinnard needed. trained ro know how and when to apply that It ISalso evident from% Stud},of this battle technology. If Kinnard had not been abso. that the tenets of AM-a d Battle doctrine are Iutely confident in hk abdiry ro rapidly rein- 1 January 1989. MILITARY REVIEW “ . IA DRANG force with both firepower and troops, his -. actions would have been closer to stupidky The trainhg, dkipfirre, d-am acceptable risk. Such was the caie with ~dl&emf@ of bodrthe Iattivaky ’ - . Man, who was ignorant of the capabilities of Div&ionuoderIGnmmfandNVA fixes the American forces. His willingness to take underMan hadbeen outi@mfing. risks without knowing thow capabilities was, Butht thelfval- organization in fact, ‘Rdiih and c~t hlm three first-rate andairmobifitygaveKhmardthe agiffty regiments. Thus, I suggest that while initia nee=sary to wnwttheinitiativekm tive, agility, depth and synchronization char Mm. And it wastheinitkdve that acterize successful operations, there are other uffirnatefymadetfrediflixence. key operating rquiremenm) FM l&5 calls them “AirLand Battle Imperatives.” The im perative that seriou.dy affected Mmr is stated as “Cmcentrate combat power against enemy sions to be drawn. Ultimately, the question of vtdnerabilities.” PM 100-5 further explains, why the US forces won and NVA forces lost “to know what his vulnerabilities are, the was answered to a certain degree. Such analy commanders must study the enemy, know and ses, done in even greater depth, offer the po take into account his strengths, find hk in tential to answer many more questions. The herent m.dnerabiIities, and know how to cre-’ point here is that the professional soldier can ate vtdnerabtlities which can be exploited to conduct continuous study of curmm. doctrine deeiswe effect.’’” Thii was Man$ great failure by read% and anrdyring battles of the past, and can be considered the cause of hw defeat. thus continuoudy reinforcing the understand Thii article ikstrates the analysis of a bat- ing of current doctrine. My conclusions from . de within @e framework of the tenets of Air. the study of this battle find that inkiative is Land Battle. A swies of facts such as composi the critical tenet of AuLand Battle, and that tion of opposing forces, geography and envi. agiIity, depth and synchronizat iori are the , ronment, missions of each force, dates and means of gaining the initiative. It is my opin times, were ‘examined using the FM K?O-5 ion that the study of other battles, using the . definitions of the tenets of AirLand Battle, analysis metlmd, will ako point to initiative ,~ Thii method then allowed for some conclu as the most vital tenet of Aid-and Battfe. % . .i .$ Noms +. ““ .’, ~ 13WW c, nemna.-m M cavwyard w In 9C3W wow, 18 Wfnglon, CC,awm-nmemPnrwg OHza, 1S561.<5, --24 MwelFLwl fess; h AMedc.k R& Pales lrrs-we.s, d a M.. 10 ~ f: - E Hel!.3fd Wll!am A si~ (L.swmrb=,i@ UnMWUIYPi=s of 7, lixl, 17 Snnea9.1s?$),srs-M 8 !W z IW., S39-15. . . 9 LTGF!811YW 0 ffirmam,A Vdozv t. Um18Dmca’ Tlm l&$~o\ 3. IbM.,S07. . ~ ~Y (-M WS71.7~77. 4 tbm, ala-l? 10 WI ,sS-s0, 5 US awmrrmti of the ArmMFI.!4 Man.d {W] l=. ‘JP~w 11 FM w&s,.23-24 LiemmmtCdmISIKmaEdIRPimz Sd@MrkraC+HWOVEiuammrCam. nuttee,CornhrtSwdrslmwte, USArmyCamrrandandGerwd S@ CaOege, Pm kwenuwrh, &rrwzr.He -“wI m M.A h OH ~ u~m-my andtragradwue dwA&F-SCL#CdlPgS Hehassmeciins@f micom. d@iimsddl@+rtryDtiwwrr%rlnwuiEur@: Fl&rsrs, US Amy Tknrrnasmui Z?atni2 CamtrU@ oruid Hedwzrw 13, US thy Eum@m Currmud MILITARY REVIEW . January 19S9 f N I . . ,. 1 by Michael A. Palmer If Nelson Spoke German Why must the US Army spend so much time models were Englishmen, individuals Who stud mg Edward Luttwak’s “dead Germans”? spoke, wrote and-have been writren about m Rea J ing today’s professional Army pubhcatIorrs English. almost requires a knowledge of the Teutomc Long before the Prussians determmed that tongue. they had to institutionalize Napoleon’s genius General Fretherr Hasso von Germanstem’s collectively in a general staff (another German , Fmgerspitzengefrdd convinces hlm that he must insritrmon the Navy has managed to do wnh launch an immediate counterattack against the out), an Enghsh ofhcer named Horaoo Nelson Sov!et tarrk corps bypassing his position. His in made a name for humelf with a string of naval doctrination ‘In Au@y&ik supporm hk incli vlctones. Although we oflen think of Nelson as mtlon to ‘attack at once, without bothering to a commander who relied on signals— ask for permission from his superiors. lclentlfimrg communications-to gain his victories, qmte the enemy .schwerprcnkt, he inmates an unex the opposite is true. ., pected, concentrated counterattack, klotzen Nelson, as a subordinate and as a :om mcht kleckerm, driving back the enemy. We mander, beheved m the full exercise of initia learn this, of course, from the good general’s twe. He turned a bhnd eye to a superior’s sugnal memoirs, written after his release’ from a at Copenhagen and expected hls subordinates to Soviet prisoner-of-war camp in 1955, 10 years do the same to him. He viewed reliance on sIg after he was taken prisoner in the ruins of nals in battle not as a means to dm?ct an en Berlin! gagement, but as the surest way to reduce the Why study an army that lost two world wars? fighting power of a fleet. He considered central. AdmittedIv. the. German armv epitomizes the Ized control a chimera. mditacy ari” at the operational ‘&d tactical lev Nelson also sought to Increase th @g of els. But must Americacr officers look so far waf-uncertain~-ta paralyze a cerwra i y man Kleld, and force themselves “to become sermht. aged enemy fleer whale his commanders, operat crate in German, ro study historical examples of ing on their own initiative, triumphed. He met decentrahzed command, mw,lon-type tactwr or, with hk subordinates----commanders he termed if one prefers, Auftmgsthk? Has anyone m the . his “band of brothers’’-and developed doctrine, Army ever heard, reid or, pardon me for asking, a personal approach to battle he later termed the “Nelson touch.” He sought “regular disor ‘md’edtheusNaTThere are sever-a advantages to studyurge the der,” a pell.mell battle, and expected his subor US Navy. First, it is our-s. Second, while its offi dinates to ask at all nrnes “What would my sw cers may speak a language that differs from that penora direct, dld they know ,what ISpassurg un spoken in the Army, KS historical Immure is der my nose?” Had Nelson commanded troops, written in-Engl~sh. T1-md, the US Navy has not and had he been German, certainly we would lost two world wars. label h,s ap@oach Auftmgstakrtk. It may come as~a surprise to Army officers, Nelson did no! orlgtnate decentrahzed com but the Navy has pracnced Auftmgmrlctik for wo mand at sea. Centunes before, when the king’s centunes! And the early Navy was neither generals fmt took command of shl s, they ree founded nor named by formetGerman offkers ogmzed that the inabillty to sen f? messengers or Prussian sergeants posing ac such. The Navy’s from ship o? ship at sea, as they could from unit to unit ashore, and the absence of anything ap proaching a sophmcated slgnalhng system, left M&l A Pdnw. a hismnan,. he Cmmn@rT Hum-j n+ alternatt$e &rt to develop doctrine—the . B,amh0)theNacdHfid COW, Wdmgtm, LX Fight$g Inrtrrcctio.pi B~r m the last quarter of . . . ,. .“ . d. .’.6 98 January 19890 MILITARY REVIEW .,, . ‘. INSIGHTS .,. rhe 18th century, numerary signaling methoda Perhaps the epitome of the. Navyk decenmal what were in their dav aurrhkticated communi ized approach canse during the reconquest of the cations systems—replac~d doctrine without Philippines. A planeless Japanese carnerforce bringing any improvement in the decisiveness of decoyed AdrnkalWNiamE Halsey and a sub engagemenra, stannal portion of his Third Fleet away froq the Nelson recognized the problem and, while he beaches of Leyte. lnHawaii, Nimitz,’who’c~, lived, took the Royal Navy back m its roots. sidered interjection into ongoing operatioxti (Perhaps he and his “band of brothers” should counterproductive, monitored the operation. be viewed as a roto-reform caucua?) He cast Despite growing concern at CINCPAC (@m -+’ aside the signal &uk in battle and pmawd vic mander in Chief, Paciftc) that Halsey’s move- ,,\ tory through the ap Iicaoon of doctrine. ments had uncovered the San Bemadmo Stmit American nava f officers learned from Nel and the invasion beaches, Nlmm ressted the son’s example] perhaps more so than his own impulse to inte.#ere. Only afier a Japanese sur countrymen. The US Navy haa prided melf for face force had pawed through the critical strait over 200 yearn in the initiative of its offtcera as did Nimitzatkistact, andthen only byaskmg. diplomats and warners. Ltke NeI.son, Commo Halsey, ‘Where is Task Force thirry-four?~ dore George Dewey at Manila Bay met with hia _fhat the battle wm almost lost sa lesson in captains before the battle and fought it with few itself-that the exercise of initianvecan lead to slgnala. The victory at Santiago de Cuba waa a dkaster aswell,as triumph. Butthe Leyte Cam-. triumph of Ca tam Roble D. Evana’ initiative. paign demonstrates the extent of decentralize. When radio ot$~ered the fa e promise of cenmal tlon, initiative or Arcftmgstaktikpractlcedwithtn iz$d control, Lieutenant Commander Dudley W. the Navy. Halsey, mh!s 1933 Navaf$%r C& Knox, Admiral William S. Sims and others lege therm, ably expressed the Navy’s ideal of hawked the old virtues of. mitiatwe and doc comirmnd: trine. % this day of easy and fast commumcanona, American naval officers won World War ’11” the temptation of a commander to interfere with battles in the Pacific uamg a decentralized ap a subordinate acting independently, M very roach to command, while in Europe, historians great. From rAe inform i ttonavadable, [t mvery Rave demonatmted, the US Army failed to use easy to size up thesmatick in adktant theater. misskm.type tactics and generated less fighting It ia alao easy to size up th,s situation entmely power than ita German adveraag. wrong. The man on the sput m$y have informa Ernest J. King, Chester W. Nimitz, Marc A. tion, not avadable to the commander, that gw~s’ Mmcher and Arleigh A. Burke, to name a few, an ent mely dtfferent plcrure. The @pbordinate eplromized the Navy’s decentralized approach. must be trusted, or {fnot trusted, removed.” Admiral Nimiu concentrated his forces at Mid. Do not be put off by the fact that Nelson, ; way, despite Admiral King’s belief in Waahlng N[mm, Halsey and others were naval officers. tonthata Ja aneaeoffenaive waacoming in the The significant detail is not the schcrne of ma. South Pact ?Jc. Kmg understood. In January neuver in batrle, but the approach to command. 1941, hehadpromul atedas’’the eaaentlalele And It is important to establish that Ger~ahs ment of cummand” t%e ‘inman.e of the s&cm hold no monopoly on command initiatt+e.- ‘ dinate.” Captain Burke, commanding desmOyem .SWWce, not national characteristics’,,lw+mper in the Solomona, fought his battles like Nelson, American efforts to operate like Germans.& the meeting his captains before an operation and es Army can learn from recent studies of Am “’ican t blishing~the doctrine under which they would busmeaa, it can study and learn from th6,,% avy $ ht. Heconcluded after his first engagement: and gain an insight mto how %skter serwce op k ere is no time m battle to give orders.” erates and &dcs. \ $ d For Naval History Sym@siu Papem TheUS Naval Academy history department has tentatively scheduled Its . ninth annual Naval Hisrory Symposmm fc+r18-20 October and has Issued a call for apera on topm relaring to naval and mantiri% history. Proposals for papcras Eould be submitted by I Febmaq 1989 to Associate Professor Wdham “ . ~, R. Roberm, ~Hist:ry Department, US Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD ,). ., 21402-5044. ,, ...., , ,,. .,. . ., MILiTARY REVIEW � January 1989 99,’ ,,, ( Losing and Winning Abroad: Korea things turn out in terms of our strategic goals? and !!ietnam as Wcceases : Winning in Korea, the authors suggest, wodd have meanr occupyurg the entire country. There By Douglas Pike and Benjamin Ward , would have also been ?im ortant and profound” CURRENT, May 1988 effects on SmO-SOyIet ref atlons atd’eti~rmous If one agrees that Clausewirz intended in his economic costs m “contnmme militaw aid and writings to “establish the relevance of political fiaintammg at ‘least a mini~al levei 0/ ecO aims in warfare as a guide” to the conduct of noinic performance m an ‘occupied’ alhed coun- I war, then it is not clifficult when vlewmg US m- W’” involvement in Korea and Wemam to conclude, Whmrg m Vtetnam, they say, could onlj as Douglas Ptke and Benjamin Ward do m thu have been achawed by occupying the North and May 1988 CURRENT amcle, that “these wars dumpmg “dramatic” amounts of economic aid can reasonably be characterized as twm U.S. mto sustaining a noncom munmr Vietnamese successes.” g6vernmenr, So m terms of winning, Ptke and The authors admlr that at first the “notion Ward conchlde that the costs of doing so mill. o tdat Korea and Memam represent U.S. success. tarily “seem, by far, to e~ceed any prospectwe es may strike the reader as ~bsurd. ” But they ar benefits.” . gue that national interest today m defined by ) As for nonmterventlon, the authors say they more than the mihmry dlmensron of war. There can only speculate on the costs, but beheve “the are other complex terms that intervene and cut price was worth paying.” Nonmterventton in across the social, political, economic and cul Korea “would have set a bad precedent in a dark tural spectrum. sine” and would have stopgapped the South Ko When viewed from thm perspectwe, Pike and rk?an economic mmacle of today. [n Vietnam, Ward suggest, the .Umted States emerged from nonmrerv%t Ion would have led to “a powerfid, both wars m fauly decent shape. In Vietnam, Independent-miaded, aggressive communist they say our stmteglc alms were: government.” Q To preserve a noncommumst rectme m Sal. In sum, the polmcal and economic effect of gon. - 0. nonuwerventmn m Southeast Asia “could have @ To stabdlze a regime threatened by commu been dramatic,” accordarg to the authors. They “1 msm. , feel cerram many of the realignments among 0 To preserve the state of mutual nuclear de. countries that have occurted since the Viemam terrence between the United States and the ScI War would not have been possible without US \ . viet Union. intervention. “A less dynamic Asia, a less ex @ To make clear the “cost Extmcred by vm pansive and hence probably more protectionist lent commumst rev&tIon m ~he contempmaV United States would have been distinct ‘ ~ environment.” osslbdmes,” they wnte,”.%one of~hmh would , The authors say the first two a,~”apphed to Rave been attracnvemterms of U.S. strategic Korea as well, m addmon rota third: to signal mteresta. ” the Soviet Umon that tie were as committed to Finally, the authors assert that following our containment in Asia as we were m Europe.. involvement m Southeast Asia, %om the pomr Given drese strategic alms, how well dld we of wew of U.S. national mteresta, the smration do? (there) during the last decade could hardly be In answering th~s’questio;~ Plk~ arid Ward ex better.” In fact, Pike dnd Ward say US policy amine both conflices m hght “ofthree other ques prowded a . d .,. 100 Januaty 1989 * MILITARY REVIEW . ‘. SUMMARIES . Three traits of strategtc hmited wars apply. m Nonetheless, most NAIU planners continue the cases of Korea ai-id Vietnam, according to to concentrate on avenues of approach lying to the authors. First, a wctory for one side does not the north, according to the author, whereas he, necessarily mean a defeat for the other. “Rather sees a penetmtion through Attstna as presgttting It Implies a package of outcomes which, whale NAT(3 commanders with “at least three poswble far from the Ideal, is nonetheless preferable to insoluble problems”: the prospectwe alternates,” they write. ~ey ~ A threatened envelopment of the entire see th~ as having happened in both cases. front along the inter-Gerctmn borde~ Second, containment M easier m achieve ~ Devasratton of lines of commucttcatlon be than expansion and “that makes the buying of tween fronthne trnm and them logistic bases to . ttme an Important poltcy consideration,” Pike the west; and and Ward maintal Ttus also happened m both ~ The loss of a large secrlon of West Germa wars. Third, ther 1 M what the authors call “a ny “with incalculable consequetkes for NATG’s kind of U-shaped curve that defines the desir ~ohticai wdl ro continue orosectmon of the ability of affdiatmg with a containing power as war. ” varying with the assert weness of that power.” In The aurhor concludes that in view qf these the case of the Umted States, it was able to bal c uwmsrances. tbe Austrian armv’s “abilirv to ance m both Korea and V~emam its interest m deter or slow a Warsaw Pact ad~ance through inflttencmg East As Ian ohtlcs and economics. the Danube Vailey is vital for the security of These trams; ih @aut ocs write, “suggesr some CENTAGS southern flaitk and can be ignored of the ways m wh h we msunderstocd” our m by NATO planners only at great risk.” vblvement in Korea and V!emam and t-nay pro But the Austrian Genetal Staff sees this Issue vide “a useful starting point fm the appraisal of somewhat diffkrectrly. Recognizing that ita coun alternative policies for deahcrg with future re-t try ISofficially neutral, and seeing what Luchak gional conflicts.” The goals the authors sugge$t “ calls ‘Llirrle prospect for a successful defense the United States sought to actdeve wtth mdi along Austria’s bordem” the General Staff haa tary ‘mterventlons m both wars were met and adopred a srcategy of “dwwmson.” This strategy were “intimately related. . to the approximate seeks “sImply to dissuade a gotent[al aggresaor by level of intervention that was decided upon. threatemctg to inflct an unacceptably high price That is a success stoty,” they say. --ELH in terms of men, materiel, time, and loss of sur prtse,” Luchak writes. Moreover, the Austrian State Treaty= concluded m 1955 by the United States, the So. Austria and W Security vlet Union, France, the Umted Kmtgdom and Auitna to end a 10-year occupation and pave . “’ EJyJohn M. Luchak the way to Austria’s permanenr neutrahty- V PARAMETERS, September 1988 includes restrictions thar Lttchalt says impede modermzatlon of the Austnxn army. . Despite an obvmus axis of advance for the Prohibited under the treaty, for wtstactce$ & Warsaw Pact through north$rn Austrm mto such weapms as self-propelled or gutd{~ mkaks southern Germany, NATO planners have con and guns with greater than a 30-kdometer range. centrated their combat power m other areas and The author contends that as long ar Eurbfl.is. di given “llrrle conslderatlon” to the Austrian vided mto two mdttary camps, “it E vital&f the route of approach, according to Ma]or ]ohn M. United States and NATCY’ that the Al+tnacr Luchak, who writes in the September 1988 issue army & able to slow or deter a Warsaw Pact at of PARAMETERS. tack rbrough Ausrcia. “But it is difhctdt to see ‘Throughout hktocy tbe territory occu ied by how the [Austrian army] could jws+bly accom present-day Ausma has been crucial to t i e bal plish that without modern defenswe ~lssiles~ ance of power m Europe,” writes Luchak, a re Luchak writes. gion considered “a strategic borderland and According to Luchak’s interpretation of the s crossroads for centunes.” If war should erupt m Ausman State Treaty, de@urtve missiles would Europe, Lctchak says, “no one seriously believes be allowed and”he urges, therefore, that }he that the Sowet Umon would scruple over violat Uruted States “qmetly support . . ~Ausman ef ing Austrian neurrahty if such served its military forts to modermze the [army] and to acquire purposes.” those defensive ml.ssdes compatible with the MILITARY REVIEW o January 1989 . 101 ? ( , intent of the treaty.” remains a more effectwe Arratriacr defense.” He warns, however, that we must be wilhrrg me author reiterates in closing thst IMping co accept “those steps that Vhrra considers to the Austrians 6dfN their respnrwibilities helps be politically necessary” to modernize the Aua us as well. “We may cmt in good conscience tr-ian army, even though they may mean the prrr deny the Austrians the legitimate mems w ful- I chase of weapona from countries other than the filI thetr responsIbdltiea,” he says, “whwh, after United States. “We must not lose sight of the all, coincide with our own mteres~ in Central t. fact,” Luchak w~tes, “that the bottom. line Europe.’’-ELH Exported Misery other than acknowledged war—involving US forces. A natural ques~on arises as to w~y we Like so many citizen-soldiers, Major Michael need such terminology m the fmt place. W. Syrnanski dis lays a good feel for the pulse of The need seems to have started with Korea, public opinion at out our Army in “Hoist with where the United States decided to fight a lim the LIC Petard,” his award-winning writing con ited war rhar, from the ‘point of view of the test essay (Mditav Remew, September 1988). North Koreana (supported by the Chinese), was JThe photograph on page 21, m particular, m reali~ a total wsr for surwval. We repeated supports hk o position to using the Army to this experience m Wetnam, again flghturg a lim chase drug mat?ICoutrode the United States. :ted war, but which m Hanoi’a view waa a total ,. Street scene no indoor plumbing, substand. one for survwal. It alao seems obvious that the ‘ard living conditions, plenty of guns around in advent of nuclear weap+xra had much to do with both government and private hands. if 1 were our decsions m both cases-the United States stuck there in Bolivia and could not emigrate, desired to avoid a spread of the tiar that would processing green coca leaves into whine powder rl~suPeTOwerfi~~~:$;dedthat if pow, for rich Norte Arnermmos would look like my my event, chance to be an entrepreneur. h E called serzing ble, we should get away from trying to’ invent ~ an economic opportrrmty by exporting misery to gecrenc term to cover a multmude of limited mm. another place. sions. We should also avoid tryrng to write one The other place: the paved and curbed streets overall doctrinal “solution.” Lieutenant Colonel of the nch federal city here on the Potomac, Charles W. McInnm counsels against both of where refined white powders are retailed to these approaches in his article, “A Nonsense ove aid consultants, civd servants and their Phrase” (Mditar-y Rernew, May 1988). Likewise, I chd ren. Des crate for relief from boredom, agree wmh hls suggestion that we vmte manuals mo~yb-a~oleinfieirpockem. applying Only tO specific Emda of limited opera LTCRobert Fairchild, ARNG, WaAingron, DC tmns such as counterinsurgency. Moreover, as Mchuus says, we should not confuse combat \,, with war because sound principles of combat ap ply whether our nation ISat war or not. ,, jhfiixedReaction io M Series s Having made these points, 1 belleve we should recogcuze the shortcomings of the word I have been following your sertes on low “urte~lty” ~d +op it m referring to conflicts. urtensity confbct (LIC) with much interest and “Low int rr.nty” w muleading because people get enjoyment. In general, the articles have been killed m $ maimed in sny kind of conflcc the well dpne and thought-provokmg, although my ex ression “isa ~ontmdiction in terms that in reactiocra have been mixed. su fts one’s intelligence. The term also implies a One Impression I have w,that much contfmon form of conflic that m of less importance- seems to exist within our Armed Forces about again a mislead~ and inaccmate expressmn. current terminology concerning cOnfhcts— This IS why I prefer the term “opemtiona short . . . ‘j, 102 Januaiy 19890 MILITARY REVIEW . Lt3TERS .. of war.” At least it recogmzea that combat can The Hand That Fed Them and doe, ocqcr regardless of whether our country h-asdeclared a sta~e of war. The June 1988 msue of Military Rerietu con I was particularly stmrck by Wdham J. Olson’s’ tained its usual excellent fare, but one aspect of article, “organizational Requirements for LIC” Major Jeffrey W. Anderson’s article, “Opera (Miitory Review, January 1988), where he stress tional Art on the Eastern Front ,“ needa an addl. es the need to estabfiih a national baae for the nonal hktorical reference. development of doctrine that applies to all ele He wrote well about Soviet and German ments of the executive fmanch, not simply the methods and noted, too, the tendency of both Department of Defense. He visualizes, sides to emphaaize their own nationalistic as ma moreover, a re uirement for % common tmder tiona and accomplishment. But those who fwed ‘standing exten 1mg from the lowest to the high through the era wdl teli you It was not only as est levels of government and to the American Anderao~ vmtes, “the resources of their country public, the news media, and Congress.” He also [that] gave the Soviets a distinct advantage.” sees an educational program }aaed at the Na One should mennon tbe extent of American aid t tonal Defense Universl or the Foreugn Serwce and gifts td Russia from 22 June 1941 to 20’Sep Institute-a “LIC schoo7 house” capturing expe te-~ber 1945, as documented m the book, U.S. rience from the field, developing concepts and Army in Wodd War 11, The Mtddle East Theater: methods, and mtegmting LIC requuements mto The Persum Comdm and Aid to Russia, by T. H. overall US efforts. Vail Motter of the Gflice of the Chief of MdI. Speaking of absorbing experience ftom field tary History, De artment of the Army, 1952. o erations, I wish that when I was the de uty At consldecaEle cost in American lives and cI uefof staff for operatmns at Department o/’the ships, US resources were dehvered to the Soviet Army m 1964-1965, we had studied the US Umon via the Persmn Gulf, the Soviet Far East, Army’s campaigns in the Phihppines during the North Russia, the Black Sea and the Soviet insurrection there at the turn of the century. Arctic. A total of 17,499,861 long tons of mate We were flounderiry+ around trying to figure out riel were delivered to the Soviets. v,a Iran how to handle the V1emam situanon after Ngo alone, the Umted States delivered 5,000 war Dinh Diem’s assassination and no one had a planes, 191,000 trucks, 995,000 tons of food, clear idea of what to do. plus vast quanritles of combat vehicles, guns, It took too many years of learrmrg the hard ammuninon, and metal and petroleum products. way before we recognized what had to be done, If you check US Army, as well as State De-< A bu then It was too late. Ma)or Edward J. FdI partment fdes, you will even discover that when the United States sent extm soldlers mto hart to ; b4 tik arncle, “The Roots of US Co”ntermwr. gency Doctrine” (Militczr Retwe+J, JanuarY assemble the gifi vehicles more quickly for the ~+ 1988), about the Pbih pines trsurrection would Ruasmns, the Soviet ambassador to the Umted have been of tremen t?ous help to w in sorting States called on the secretaw of state to lodge 3 out our thoughts. protest ofier the presence of the additional i Finally, let me mention Roger Spiller’s article, American troops! ,: . .~ “Ison’s Rum Human Dimensions of Warfare m I write this simply to help keep the ieccyd avadable for a new generation. the 20th Century” (Milmwy Revretu, May 1988). ~t It was outstanding, very ‘timely, right on the COL Theodore t- Se.&k, USA, Refired, mark and remmds us of a basic truth we some Cmm Poirz h? umes overlook—the soldier on the ground M stall the mdkpensable element of success m bat tle, or for rhat matter, m any US mihtary Opera- t Ion undertaken where our national interesta are No Sense Hocking the Wheels threatened. In my forthcoming book, No Second The article by John A. Adams, “Bela~cing ~ Cuba, which focuses on the 1965 Dommlc+m Strategic Mobll~ty and Tactical Capabdlty” Republic intervention, I try to emphasize this (Military Retwta, August 1988), presents a well.. truth. h was our soldlers and Marines on Do reasoned argument for a ‘{heawer” Army with mmlcan sod that made success possible. GEN Bmce Pakner]r., greater ractlcal capabilities. Unfortunately; USA, Rea!red, ‘Adams dld not stop there, but he ‘went on to Akmdrlk, Wbiinia argue that both Army tactical capability ad . .“ MILITARY REVIEW e January 1989 103 ‘ .. ( strategic sealift im mvements could be 6mded at nanonal objectwes. SIX days after hostilities be: the expetie of a few C-175 which, in his view, gan and the day after Isrsel requested US help, are not needed anyway. In perhaps a crude anal- the first C~5 lsnded at Led aiqmrt. Nine days OgY,it =ema he w.mts to hock the wheels of hk later, with airlift having delivered nearly 9,000 car to pa for soupmg UPits engine. tons of reinforcement, Egypt orally ratified a RegJ less of how heavy the Army E now, or cease-fire. h wss nine more days before the first should be, ita ability to deter aggreswon, to limit ship aqived, and it came not from the Conti conflict and, if neceaaary, to successfully wage nental United States but from West Germany. war depends on our recognized capability to rap As expected, sealift accounted for 74 pkrcent of idly deploy that Army and sustain its combat the total resupply effort over the next two operations. This requires h~ghly capable and re months, but it waa the rapid airlift response that liable airlift, sealift and pre-positioned for,ces saved Israel. and a well-thought-out balance of each. Airhfi and seahft capabilities are complemen-, Since 1974, 18 major mobility studies have tary, qnd more of both is needed. The C-17 ro concluded that our movement requirements ex gram will cost about $37.5 billion, but diw ! mg ceed capabihma and that getting there early ‘is that number bv a c)}anned number of aircraft is more im rmnt than fiving later with a larger not how ou pric~ an airplane, and it yields a ,’ force. Tl%mostccmrprehensweo fthese studies, number ( i 173 milhon) Adams has grossly mis /~ the Qmgreasionally Mandated Mobdmy Study applied. (CMMS), completed in 1981, remains the Research, development, test and evaluation, - bench mark for strategic mobility requirements. aircrew and maintenance tmining system devel. ‘It highlighted the need for mom sealift and opment, initial persomel tmining, establishing , ~wasthe-ca~lyst for acquisition of the eight “SL a logtstic system and initial spares are examples ~ 7“ skips now in service. But it also documented of items you must fund whether you buy several a large airlift shortfall. l%e smallest alrhft re amcrafr or many. The cost of a C-17 m rate rO quirement to emerge from the four study sce duction will be less thsn half the $173 mii“Y Ion narios was for a capabihty of 73 milhon ron cited. Tfm means It would take about 25 C-175 miles er day (MTM/D) while the largest ex. instead of 10 simply to offset the equipment ceede j 120 MTM/D. The CMMS also recom cosrs for each dwlsion he would beef up and mended a 20 MTMiR incre= in airlift capaci more still to offser additional personnel and bsa ty, to a total of 66 MTM/D, and specified that at g costs of the new unit. Every day, dime 25 C least half of this additional 20 MTM/D most ac --Y 7s could move over 2,000 tons of that heavier commodate outmze equipment too large for C dwlsion to Euro e. 130 or C-141 aircraft. It is very Important to The article L rther suggests that buying @ note that 66 MTMID was a fiscally constmmed “cheaper” C-5 would akd C-17 develgp~qnt airlift goal, not a reqmrement. The real require costs and save ac uismon dollars. Fret, @17 d# ment was, and remams, much greater. velopment N we? 1 along, and rhe majority ‘of No one denies that serditl, with its large ca those costs can no longer be avoided. Second, pacity, must move the majority (more than 90 acqu’iimon costs are only part of the equation. percent) of the total materiel in any rolonged The C-17 is much leas expensive to operate and confhct. But It should be noted t[ at “fast mamtain, and much more capable of delivering sealifc” still is not very fast, that its dependence the US Army directly to where It Mneeded than on o n sea lanes and harbor facilities limits its any of the altematlves. flexi f ility, and that the cited four-day difference The US Arz Force Auli Master Pkm, in com between tmns-Atlantic airlift and sealifi transit parmg equal 66 MTM/D capacity airlift fleets, tlmcs igrtores movement times ro the porr, ship shows that the fleer with the C17 will cent $16 on-load and off-load times arrd movement time billion 1= and require almost 15,LW3fewer per inland to wherever sealifted forces are needed. sonnel over its Metime than the Ophon that pm On the other hand, airlift has a hmited ca ac- cures the C-5 aircraft. The used B-747 idea makes NY, but is much aster and more flexible tt an even less sense tbsn buying more G5s for a host of sealift. Of the do, only airhft can ra~dly re reasons, including the fsct that the aucmk dpnnot % spcmd anywhere on the globe, even w en sur meet outsuc bft requirements. face transport Munavailable or denied. I further question how European POMCUS US as&stance to Israel during the 1973 Mid defines the minimum airlift force, how the cost , dle East War vwldly shows how airlift supports of achieving 66 MTM/D with C-55 is only $5 \ ,.. ill Jarruary 19890 MILITARY REVIEW -. l.ETIERs :, billion when the requmd 156 C-55 alone (at tions of an AlrLand Battle scenario. I find no $110 million each) exceeds $17 billion, and the fault wirh the article except that there is no pertinence of comparing a 15-year dirhft pro, mention of helicopter air-to,au ractms and their ram with a one-year US Army pr@rement applicability to the Adand Battle, particularly ~rrdget. ButtfisrepIyklongeno”gh. m regard to rear area operations. I enjoyed Adams’ thorrghtld analysis of the I believe the Soviet mdita~ and is Warsaw ... need for a heavier Army, but cannot a~ee thar Pact alkes m a war in Europe would use Hind trading tke mobility of our present force for a and HI attack helicopters to intercept and de heavier force without “wheels” makes acry sense. stroy, i+’”possible, NATO attack hehcopters en COLDorIALindkQ, US4FRerhe40mtwe, Cdibmia gaging Sower bloc infantry and armored units, . particularly in NATO rear areas. In essence, this means NATO hehcopters must have the capabd- Ity to successfully engage and destroy Sowet bloc Forms Are Fine, System k Skewed helicopters anywhere on the battlefield. The Sowet mdirary, no doubt, has promulgat In his article, % Search of a Mentoi” (Mili ed a defmltive doctmre concerning hehcopter tary Review, August 1988), Lewis Sorley has air-to-air tactics and would aggressively use such ~ once aeain rmheld his refutation for stimdatirw tactics m an all-out war in Europe. I hope the critica~ chou~ht on imp;rtant issues facing th~ United States and m NATO alhes have smdied US Army. He returns to a familiar them+the this Soviet helicopter threat and are prepared to neeative effects of oersonnel turbulence-and counter m he~s right. ‘ Speaking of countering a Soviet bloc helico He also raises the issue of officer eff!cien~y re ter threat, it seems the AH-64 Apache would t e port (OER) inflation and the utility of the OER the primary means of response to heavdy suppor~ form. In my opinion, n is not the forms armored and heavily armed Hind and HI heli that ari “brokem” but a failure of the promotion copters. Possibly the best and freest attac [ heli system to consider all available performance copter in the world, the Apache wdl more than measures and an overweighting of factors the hold m own, quahtarively speaking, against So current appraisal system does indeed measure. viet hehcopters, as well as Soviet armor and The system gives great weight to OERS, ground forces. which are subjective measures of performance However, in a European AmLand Battle are often influenced by turbulence and personali na, NATG forces will be oumumbered thrmrgh ties, and little or no weight to peerkulmrdmate out the battlefield. It Is, therefore, Imperative evaluation, resources devoted by an instihmon that all commanders, no matter where they are, to rmicrirtg/develo ing an individual’s potentia! on the battlefield, judiciously use their attack’ and variable stan 1ads in admissionlgmduation helicopter resources. The AH-64, because of itsl~ requirements in both military and cwihan survivabdity, maneuvembdity, speed, firepower schools. and extended standoff range, is Ideal again~t p Excellence and consistency of performance m rnor, air defense arrille~ and grounql fme,ga,nd all endeavo=with allowance for honest mis equally vital against Sowet helicopters., Because takes, performance shortfall and occasional job of its abdlty to destroy enemy helicopt~rs ~ha mismatch—are the criteria that should be ap rapid fmt shot, the AH-64 can then eng e So phed “in search of a mentor.” viet ground forces. LTCh G. viueru, USA, FortBem&?. Geocais Flexlbihty is a key ingredient to “SU%’SSm rear area operations, as well as elsewhere “on the battlefield. The corps commander must under stand how to use hk rotary-wing aviation assets. Apaches Play a hole Too Air.to-alr defensive and offenswe capabihties are not options bur Imperatwes, and must be The article in” the October 1988 Mditcwy Re thoroughly inculcated m the mi,nds, doctrine “ view, “Attack Helicopter Gpenmons m the Ar- and tacrws of commanders from corps dovm to Land Battle: Rear Operations,” by General company. Crosbte E. Saint and Colonel Walter H. Yates HerEerrP.LePora, Cbie6 Hi&oricalS’e~kas, Jr., is well written and providea an incisive look USArmyArmamenr, Munitions& Ch.mzicat ~ $ at the corps aviation brigade in rear area opera c%nmand, Rock Island,Ulirroia, MILITARY REVIEW e JamraIv 1989 105 ~ .“’ ( ,, TANK DESTROYER SAUDIS TAKE CHINESE MISSILES The Bmziban company, Engesa, At least a dozen Chinese- The missiles supplied by the Chi racantly unveiled a prototype of Its manufactured intermed!ate+ange nese are DF-3a, which feature sev. new EE-18 Sucuri tank destroyer, a ballistic mrss!les have been era! different versions with ranges weapon system developed as a P+. shipped to SaudI Arabia where a up to 3,.5oo kilometers. Informed vate venture that features an all ,Iaunch facifity 60 kilometers south sources speculate lhat the version welded hull, a right-side engine of Ffiyadh isreportedlylbeing made purchased by the Saudis is the DF camparfment and a turret mounted operational. Part of the Chmese 3A with a range of between 1,500 attherear of thehull. Saudi deal is a loan of Chinese and 2,500 kilometers. The missiles Powered by the Scama DSI-11, technical parsonnel to man the are fitted with wnventmnal HE war- six-cyiinder, turbocharged d!esel launch base, mamtain the tiquid heads spectatlydestgned by the & engine, the Sucuri EE-18 has one fueled mlasile~ and operate them, If Chinese.-Lfl/itay Tecfmology. reverse and SIX forward gears and necessa~. can achieve a maximum road speed of 100 kilometers per hour with a range of 700kilometerF . ‘Mm armament conaiata of an lfal- FASTEST SWEPT-WING ian OKI Malara 105mm soft recmt gun plus a 7.62mm machinegun The Northrop Corporation haa ln mounted coawally with the mam troduced its fastest swept-wing un gun. manned aercmautlcal vehicle (UAV) The commander and gunner carrying a more powerfuf, 240 both have a day--and night-sight pound thrust turbojet engine than capability and a bufft-in laser range prevmus modala, ~!ch had only finder. The gunner alao has an 190-pound thrust eng~es. Tha new emergency day sight, but it can be UAV, called the BQM-74, can per- overridden by the commander, if re form m!ssfons such as recannais qu!red, The fire-control ayatem in sance, target training, weapons, eludes a digital ballistic computer evaluation, decoy and electronm and a two-plane, gyro-stabihzed cauntarmaasuras. main gun. - Keys to Ids Improved perform- Engesa engmeere ara suggest ance, according to davelopsrs, are ing that the Sucuri EE-18 chaasls the higher thrust engine and Its Mm-of-sight operation. Imagery can be used for a variety of other waap needla-nose design, which gwe the also be stored onboard for later ona, including an antitank guided SQM-74 a 14 percent mcreaae m tR3namlSS10n to a ground atatlon. missile carrier and even as an a’ speed, up to 621 milas pet hour. The new UAV can be launched defense vehicle equ!pped w h In Its reconnaissance role, the from the air or land, or from the guns or mmsi[es.~anek De J ce BQM-74 provides real-time, hlgh decks of ships, and can be \ecov- Week/y, @ 1986. resolution intelligence data during ered by parachute ! SCIMITARS TO JORDAN . Tha Jordarvan armad forces, fol. specially built h!gh-fraquency ra- Also !ncluded under the contract lowing successful field tnala, re dloa wdh a frequency hopping ca are 26 Swordfish !ransmitterl cemly awarded a contract to Mar pabddy over ids entfra set of trans- receivers which wdf replace obso coni Commumcationa Systems of mmmg freguenciea. This providea tete equipment m fixed land ata- Great Sntam worth 6 milhon Bnts.h excellent protection against dtrec fIOnS, in vahrclea and on naval ves. pounds for the supply of several bon finding, intercepting and jam sels Previously, Marconi sold tha hundred Scimdar h!gh-frequency mlng. Low- and hrgh-power ver- Jordanian armed forces a large or. tactical radios. sions of the Scimitar will be provfd der of Scimitar combat radios. The cmntracf covers the supply of ed for use in army vehicles, .. “.! 106 Janua!y 1969 * MILITARY REVIEW Generei William R. Richardson gf Aayou will gather from my selections, I am a strong advocate of the practical approach irr tmining and edcrcatin our officers, Hence, my selections are drati from bcoks that would be in stmctivebrr Lwth the f eel’ of battle and the ‘how to’ ofa young leader’s performance. $9 US ArmyField Manual 100-5, Operat/errs. more Important, translates the Ideas and lcnowl- Thii is the Army’s keystone manual on how edge. of past experiences into a practica~ base to fight. From it flow all the subordinate doctri- upon which the young otlcer can draw. Its”pre nal publications that frame the “how to’! of the sentation of a set of leadership skNs prowdes a youn officer’s profession. Without fully mrder- solid base on which to build whd{ leammg to smn t mg thta base line of how the Army fights, plan, organtze, dmect, supervise and control an officer will have difftcuky commanding and what takes place m a unit. leading it any level. Wmh a fidl gtasp of the meaning of ~irbrrd Battle, as explained here, Infantry In Battle the young offtcer is well equipped to pursue the (brfsrrrryJo.rnal, Incoqmated, 1939). --.’ more detsiled” octrinal publications at each lev- A young officer must be well gtounded in the el of comman I and to acquire a far better under- tactms of ground combat if he is to be success.hd standing of what he should do as a leader m as a combat leader. This book draws on the ex- both peace and war. periences of World War I and presen= ractlcal solutlons to difficult wartime prob rems. It Common Sense Tralnktg: A Working Phllos- resents the officer wwh a reabmc view of com phy for Leaders by L,eutensnt General Arthur S. ~at andrvtmt one shodd do in a nmnberofd~~ Collins Jr., US Arnry, Retmd. ferent ctrcumsrarrces. If cm oftcer E not a good tmmer, he wdi be ineffectwe. ‘Jlus book is a guide to ynderstand- Attacka by General Fwld Msrsbal Erwin Rommel. mg the fundamentals of trmmng and wdl pro- Rommel’s expemnces as a World War I infa vide a foundation officeta can draw on for the ntryofficer provide a set of rich and reward!ng remainder of their careets. It is mstnrctive and examples of the mtens}ty of battle and how @ prsctical. when followed, It will create a strong d~al with the complexes and problems of co+ de of tactical competence within the offi- bat. [f one were m take the lessons learned fmin cer, fo owed by a substantial gain m his own this small-unit hrsrory, he would get a deep ~ erson7 confidence in hls ability to train and predation of what happens on the battlef~ !d ~adsoldia-a. and how one must tram for combat. Some f@i damental principles of training and leader d#M- Small Unit Leadetehlp A Commonserise Am opment flow from this book. ,.. oroach bv Colonel Dandrldge M. Malone, US Army, Retired. Battle Studies Ancient & &lodarn Battle Thts “how to” book supplements whar the by Charles J. Ardam Du Plcq. young officer learns at West Point, in Resetve Understanding the moral element of combat Officers’ Ti-wnwrg Corps, in Officer Candidate is essential for a young officer. This book treats,’ Schcol and m his officer basic course. It draws as none other can, the effectiveness uf the moral from the theoretical approach to leadership, but force m an army. A young combat leader muw , CGmeral W&m R. Ruhmkm US Army Rmmi a frequent conmbuar D Md@ry Rewe., servedm CmnbmedArms Cmm cmmnmder and commandau USArmyCmmnd andGmmalSrLIffCollege,from1979to 1981andu &putYchefofstaffforOF sums andPlain at D@rmmc uftheArmy We remmg cmcommanding gend ofdu’ TWLW and Dwmne Command —S@f) . . grasp the sigoiflcance of the human aspects of primer for the aspwmg officer who wdl someday both the, leader and the led if he is to rise to mad Clausewds classlc, On War. The freest of. greamess. This book gives that opportuni~. ficers are generally those who understand princi ples and km$w how to ap Iy them in differing Principles of Wsr by General Cqrl von Clau.rewm. circumstances. Tlus book \ elps officers acquire A young officer should acqtme a flavor for the that feel and develop a thirst for knowledge on influence of Clattsewm on the science and art of ~os,to apply principles to real battlefield prob war. This small book of principles can be a PLEIKU: The Dawn of HelicopterWarfare in brdliant lob of telhng it bke it is at the platoon Vlemamby J. D. Coleman. 315 pages. St. Marnn’s and company levels. The American infantry sol km New York. 1988.$19.95. d,et is top-of-the-line in every instance m thm Thk su erb battle story provides the best ac story, but the enemy is portrayed accurately too, count oft i e development and combat testing of and comes across as the same tough soldler I re- I US Army airmobile concepts I have read. It member. The author bases hls enemy mforma tmces ammobdlty from the 1962 Howze Board non on captured documents not prewously re through the frost major battles of the 1st Air leased. Cavalry Dlvmon in the Central !{ighlands Readers wdl be surprised at some of the poor around Plelku, South Vietnam, m 1965. decls[ons made at seraor levels before and during J. D. Coleman wrote the offlclal after-action this battle. 1 was especially amazed to learn of report for these battles whale serving as the dwl the few awards gwen to small-unit fighters after sion mformatmn officer. His desc~~ptlon of the ward, especmlly in view of the fact that the en. enemy’s side of the fight, based on captured rec re wnlon recewed the Presidential Unit Cita ords assembled at the time, x exceptional. The ~o~ands”stanedahghcas”al~mte. American battle scenes are some of the most One of the book’s shortfalls is the overly done thrdhng m nnt and the accompanying maps pcmse for the “Fmsr Team” generals of that day, help the tea ! er follow the flow. The author afso somethmg not easdy pstif!ed based on the story provtdes in.wght mm decmoris made by k?y lead as written. Also, in the second printing, It ers on the scene who now, with time to reflect, would be helpful to include more sketches of the comment cm them past actions and orders. small-umt actions so superbly described here. The Pleikci victory proved the effectweness of Tlus book goes m my “top 10” list of Vietnam helicopters and the ammobde concept. For that War reading to date. It E an excmng narmtwe reason alone, this book should be read by al[ of combat that I read at one sitting. A main se seniot .mdltary professlona[s, especially those lecnon of the Mdmacy Mok Club, th~ should WIO have let the US Army’s behcopter edge slip be on evety flghtmg md,tary professional’s book away m recent ears. sjielf. lhe value o? relentless alr reconnaissance and RGJohn C. “DoS’ Babnsen, USA, Refired, the divisional alr cavalry squadronk use of Its Yorkcmm, Vt aerordle platoons (called “’Blues”) are key les sons from this battlefield. The “Blues,” iAclden tally, have been removed fcom most alr cavahy umts today to pay other personnel bllis. Yet A BRIGHT SHINING LIE: John Patd Vamr these highly tcsined soldlers prove$ themselves and America in VWcram by Neil Sheehan. 861 invaluable during the Plelku fight and m many pages. Rand~ House, New York. 1988.$24.95. other places on other days. John Paul Vann has not been well known out There are other sohd combat lessons here for side mdmary and polmcal circles as one of the ]rmor leaders who want to know. what a Viet almost legenda~ fIgures of the Vwtnam War. nam battlefield was really bke. Cdleman d6es a This book wdl remedy that si Vann was I r ‘-. ,. ) .1 \. 108 January 1989 * MILITARY REVIEW .4 BOOKREVIEWS I L a member of that American minority who, m Alrhough Vann had a dark side in his pemon the earhest days of rhe war, had even a yague al hfe, he mdy exemplified the highest ideals of notmn of the issues surrounding South Viet professional dedicanon m hm offlclal hfe. Like nam’s evolving struggle. Among others m that all of ua, he had his weaknesses along with the mmority were several perce tive ]ournallsts. great strengths. We can only hope that there are U.pformnately, the htgher o !ftc!als of the US many John Paul Vanns serwng m America’s ~ mdwaty and civihan agencies, for the most part, Armed Forces and cunhan government agencies had little Idea of the E&es mvohmd and chose today. to ignore the advice of those who did. LTCJofm A. Hacd.away,USA, Raid, Ned Sheehan, a Vtemam War corresporident, Leavenworth, I&was provides one the most msightfal books on that tragic experience. It is not a hktory of the war, but an excmng, If sometimes overly dramatic and harsh, exammauon of some of the real gut IN THE JAWS OF HISTORY by BUI Diem Issues of what went wrong. with David Chanoff. 343 pages. Houghton Nhfflm John Paul Varm m the central character and Company, 13usron, MA. 1987.$19.95. rovldes the focus of the book, although it ISnot Readers deserve m have high expectations ~E biography. As can be expected of. book cm when sitting down to read In tke Jaws of History. such a controversial subject, Sheehan’s wews After all, here are the events that have shaped and prejudices surface from time to time. One the American experience in the decades of the can argue over the degree to which many of tiw 60s and 70s, told from an insider’s point of view. points were true, but Ir M dIfficuh ro take issue From bardes in the streets of Hano, in 1945 to with the basic theme and premise. the smoke-filled rooms of WaahmgFon 25 yeara Vann frost went to Viemam m the early 1960s later, Btx Dtem was there. As an early convert as an Army lieutenant colonel advmng Vlet. to the nationahst cause and South Viemamese namese forces in the Mekong Delta region. It ambassador to the United States, he was a wit was there that he began to grasp the essence of ness to history. the struggle and the strategy that should be fol Unfortunately, any h,gh expectations are lowed qf the Umted States was to effectively help hkely to remain unftdfdled. The story IS mter , South Vtemam retain its independence. Vann’s estmg enough, and, as noted, ,told from an m secwce ended abruptly in 1972 when he was kdled slder’s perspective and all the characters a e~ I m a helicopter crash near Konmm. At the time of present and accounted for—Bao Dal, Ho C & I hts death, Vann was a civiikur equal in rank to a Minh, Presidents Lyndon B. j~hnson and Rich , malor general and was the +iit civihan to actually ard M. Nixon, Lmutenant General Nguyen Van ,4 command US fore= in combat, TMeu and General Nguyen Cao Ky and a host . I Central to Vann’s behef was that an effecnve ofuxher generals. But Diem misses the point i~ I . South Viemamese army and the pkasanss’ alle that he seems more mrerested m ptst iying hiso+~, giance to the central government were essentml ry than m relating Its stgniflcance. .: . .* If a viable South Wemam was to exist. PacLflca Examples abound, but perhaps the moft g)ar t Ion programs that would wm the peasanta over mg are hls frequent attempts to assign blati+or 1 to the Saigon regime were much more tmpor who lost South Vlemam. Throughout h~s mtc@. tant than killing Vietcong and North V1emam tive, Diem provides wwd accounts from hw%h ese. TIIe semch-and-destroy strategy adopted by hfe of how the Vlemamese nationahsts were~n the Americans was, of course, d!rected at the capable of unltmg and developing a coherent enemy mihcary force, yet It was often demmen program that offered a viable alternative to the ml to the cwdian populatmn. Vletmlnh. But somehow the United States The story of this extmordmary man should be should have fixed that. reqmred reading for mdltary and cwdlans in Diem says the Umted States was mcons~stent . volved m the developme~nd implementation m applying a POIICYof either intervention or of US hcy regarding the use of mihtary forces. nonintervention in internal Vletr.amese affaira A Brig r t .SInmng Lie IS the portrayal of a man whdr “brought melf and its Wemamese ally th~ who was wdhng to persevere and fight for hls worst of both posmons.” Worst of all, D!em cre~ beliefs even after he was continually rebuffed by ates a vacuum here. He thoroughly criticizes US some of the hlgh~st offiqials m the US gover actions, or lack thereof, but fails to offer an al nment. ternative course of action which would, have ,,-. ,. ,,. . . MJLITARYREVIE~ � January 1989 109 r . ..’ ( # ,.. I !ed m betterr=ul~. tonalities of Napoleon’s marshals IS lively and This book, however, m not totally without insightful; and his portrait of Napoleon’s ambb merit. Diem’s stories of life in. Vietnam before tlon and drive to wm m su erb. In these aspects, the 1954 artttion make for ingesting readm . this is an excellent piece o ! scholarship. Perhaps t[ e most absorbing are his observation i s Nonetheless, Gmrtplly fails to convince. He about Em eror Bao Daiis attempts to reconcde does not prove, at Ieakt to my satmfaction, that tdtiona 1’mandarin tmining and the brutal re Na Icon’a genius lay primmdy in im rovisation alities of political cofiontation with both the rat r er than planning. Why not? T\ e answer French and the V!emamese CommunistaI It sim seems to lie m the methodology. ply takes more than interesting anecdotes to If one wishes to attack the issue Connelly has produce incisive history. raised, mere descriptions of Napoleon’s battles . LTC Donald C. Snadeker, USA, and campalgrts wdl not suffIce. Rather, to prove ) c3ftice of rbeJointChieci OfS@ Washington,DC his case, the author musr systematically compare -1 planning with execution. He must answer the following types of quesootm What esomate of the situation d]d Napoleon make prior to the BLUNDERING ‘ID GLQRY: Napolaon’akiili. ,battle or campaign? Based on this estimate, WY Campaigna by Own Connelly. 250 pages. ?what plan did he devise? How dld the actual sit ScholarlyResources,Inc., .Wdmmgmn,DE. 1%37. uation differ from Napoleon’s estimate? What $24.95. changes in execution did Napoleon make or fill What is the relationship between planning to make based upon these differences? What and execution in combat? Under what cmcum were the resuhs ? In the absence of such system > stances should a commander alter his plan mar atic comparison, the reader IS left to search for ginally or change it altogether? Does military ge answers alone. nius consist primarily of being able to plan bril Overall, however, the bcmk is of great value. liantly like General Douglas MacArthur at Cmrnelly has rinsed an issue of dktinct hktoncal Inch6n or to improvise brill~antl hke Field sigruflcance for the interpretation of Napoleon Marshal Erwin Rommel at A1-Gaza 1a? Professor as a mdltary commander. He has presented a Owen Connelly, president of the French Histor very useful cortectwe to historians who wish to ical Society and a distingwshed scholar of the reduce the genius of the man Martin van Napoleonic era, forces us to confront these LV Creveld calls “the most competent human being , sue~ in thii provocative work. who ever hved” to a recipe book of codified ma It is entirely appropriate for these quesnons to neuvers. be examined by a%tudent of Napoleon. h was, 1 hope this book wdl revoke a hvely ex ! after all, one of the most famou$i atudenta of the change among students oF Napoleonic warfare emcreror. Carl von Clausewitz. who observed. and force them to determme whether Cutuyelly’s “S{nce ailinformation and assumptions are open thesis wdl stand u ro detaded examu-mtion. It to doubt, and with chance at work everywhere, should likewise aJ d fuel ro the debate among the commander continually finds that things are professions soldiers over the relationship Lie- not as he expected. TIMs is bouhd to influence tween detat I ed planning and flexible ext?crmon. his plans, or at least the assumptions undedymg The book also reminds the reader of the value them. If this influence t.rsut%clently powerful to of Clausewmz’s observation in concluding his cause a change m his plans, he must usually discussion of how to deal with uncertainty and work out new ones. . . .“ chance: .’+Ifthe mmd IS to emerge unscathed Connelly’s thesm is summed up m one sen from this relendeas struggle with the unforeseen, tence: “Napoleon was probabLy the greatest two quahties are indls ensablti fmr, cm irw+lect commander of all time, but his genres lay m ‘ that ewrr m the darhesc L ur, retam.r some gfimmer. scramblig, not in carrying out a preconceived mgs of the inner kgfrtwhich ieadr to rrtcrh; cmd sec plan.” He develops this thesis by describing each ond, .the.coumge to folkw this @rt light wherevff It of Napoleon’s major campaigns and battles from may lad.” operatlom in Italy in 1796 to the final defeat at My reading of Napoleon’s campaigcrs and bat Waterloo m 1815. Ccmrnelly’s summaries of the tles suggests he had both these qualities and one action are clear and concise; his descn tlon of of the secrets of his genius was his abihty to plan the social and political context m whm{ Nape. foresightedly and in detail, combined with just Icon fought is exqtisite; hls portrayal of tile per- the right balance of determination in forcing hu ,! 110 Januaty 199 ~ MILITARY REVIEW i ;. I BOOKREVIEWS plans upun hk enemy and flexibility in adjusting ing budt and shelve approved construction plans a them to the unexpected. for others, but they insnnrted a building motato. LTC Harold IL WmtuII, USA, @mQ Director, rmm on battleships that saved the Western School ofAdvmced.4fiEray ,%rdias,USACGSC powers from. heavier investment in vessels al ready con.wgned to obsolescence by nsscent sub marine and air technology. A more importxnt consequence of the dlplo BRITAIN, AMERICA & ARM!? CON. macy surrounding naval arms limitation, says TROL, 1921-1937 byChristopherH?Il. 295 pag Hall, is that from the eventual amity and accord . e-r.St. Martin’sPrers, New York. 1987.$37.50. that developed between the United States arid For more than 15 of the 20 years between Great Britain during the prolonged negotiations World Wars I snd II, a strong current of arms grew a relationship that permitted, when the control existed among the former allies of the time came, the peaceful transfer of naval su Great War. Bred of e ual parta revcdsion at the premacy from an old, tired empme m decline to enormity of the blood1ettmg, dmilhrsionrnent as a young, lusty nation on the rise. r hopes for a better world died in the victors’ de Thm tlg~tly constructed, thoroughly re mmrds for vengeance at Versailles and helpless searched, well-argued case smdy could serve as a anger at the utter fimlity snd waste of it all, the primer on contempms arms control problems @ovement flourished at the hands of vocal and snd pitfalls. But Hall c% coses to leave specula influential advocates in Lundon and Wsshinz tion to others, preferring not to make manifest ton. the implicit parallels with today’s INF Inspired in part by Impulses of liberal idealism (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) and MBFR and narrower considerations of natlotral self (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) exper mterest that frequently ut the emnvhile alhes iences. At that, the book ISworth reading, since at cross-purposes, the ef ?orts at srmr limitation it offers valuable msght mto the difemmas con focused mainly on naval weiponry. _fl-ie resul fronting those whose thankless task is to hold tant “Washington System,” named for the sme of the world back from the brink. the first conference to produce concrete reduc LTC Patrick ELGormm, USA, i7etinsd, tions m naval sh}ppmg, materially influenced Wiiersprings, Ro.+da the international power balance in the years be. fore World War iI. , This volume tmcks the ebb and flow of mval xrmr bmitarion dip[omacy during the cfii+idden THEY SANK THE RED DRAGON by interwat yeas, shown-ig the combhd effects of Bernard Edwards. 206pages. Humamues Pre.srh-iter.; global economic dfilocatlon, mistmst rmd suspl nanonal, Atlantic Hghl.ands, NJ. 1987.$19.95. If’ cioi among the participating Fowecs and the rise Twenty-fwe years ago, the lare Captain S. W. of the dictators m arms control negonatiom m Roskdl produced a fine sketch of the British Wa.rhmgmn, Whkehall and Geneva. merchant navy during World War 11 in A .$4b. Christopher Hall ably and rersely describes chant Fket in War, based on the exp&ietrc& of the evolution of me British and American posi the ships and men of A1fied Holt & ~. I this tions on naval Iimitanons as the most achlev. book, Bernard Edwards has attem ~ttdd ,,0 do able means of reducing world armaments. He something similar, di-awmg his samp e frq the contrasts the rationale underlying these posl Welsh shipping compames which betwee’$3t em uons with fhose of France, Italy and Japan and owned 164 ships m 1939—and lost 1230 them shows how substantive prowess was. repeatedly by 1945. thwarted by powerful serwce contingents infec Roskdl’s wdl remain the book of choice for ted by parochial myopia and by the exaggerated those mmrested in a brief but scholady o~erwew security fears of some participants. of this aspect of Britain’s war. Th}s does not In the final analysis, reporrs Hall, the results mean, however, that Edwards’ book can be dk- “ of this sustanred multilateml effort were mix@d. mused. However, it does not pretend to reflecr The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, the most deep scholarship, even though the author has successful of the several formal agreements dur done hls homework snd writes well.’ irig the perind, stands tcday as the only pact to What he reminds us w that the Brnlsh ~nd produce verlfled arms reductions. Not only dld Allied war effort depended in the end on the the negotiating powers scrap warships then be- courage and endurance ofithose merchant sea. ,, MILITARY REVIEW . J uary 1989 111 ~ r ., .( @ ? -, men who continued to ship out, often after sur ing the critical lines of communication provided viving one sirrhg} for low wages and-at leasr by the Temeesee snd C.mberland rivets, led to until 1943-a very good chance of dying in one the earlp loss of much of the Confederacy’s of a variety of unpleasant ways. In the course of “heartl~d:’ including fertile Tennessee farm the war, more than 29,000 British seamen were lands, gun~wder and iron malls, and the key in. lost. dustrial center of Nashville. The victory also Edwards tells a number of gripping tales of boosted flagging Union morale and launched ., courage and survival in the teeth of~eat odda the career of a heretofore obscure Union general and notes that when it was all over, there were named Ulysses S; Gmnt. few awards for the men of the merchant serwce. Cooling’s account provides numerous Ies+cma , Reading this workmanlike account raises the learned inte~sqv~~e cooperation, as practiced qrtesnon of whether either we, or our allies, still by Grant and ~oo~, can be critical for successi have enough of the tough, determined mer agmesslve leademhip, as dkplayed by Grant, can chant seamen whose steadiness did so much to make the differen~~ snd finally, superior weap ensure that rhe good guys won the last battle of ons can confer a distinct advantage, as evi the Atlantic. denced by the withering firepower of Union ri Raymond Callahan, DepsrrnrentofHbtoq, fles and repeating carbines versus Confederate Um”vzm”eyofZJeJaware,Newark, O&m shotguns and flintlocks. In addmon to the official records and pub hshed histories, Coohng draws on diaries and newspaper accounts to provide the soldiers’ per FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON: The spectives on the harah fighting typical m the Ifey to the Confederate Heartland by Bqamm West. Cooling also gives more thmr the usual at. “Frsnklin Coohng. 354 pages. The Umverswy of Ten tention to the battle’s sftermath, descnbmg the nessee Prcsc,Knoxvdle, TN. 1967. $2+.95. deplorable medical conditions and the Ucuon’s Historian Benjamin Coahirg provides an m- unpreparedness to handle its first significant , insightful account of the Umon seizure of Forts catch of prlsoneca of war. This balanced, read Henry and D~nelson m Febnca~ 1862 during able account ISvaluable for anyone interested in the CLvd War and clalms this Unipr wctory, the Cwil War and in lessons to be learned in overshadowed by larger batrles later m the war, leadership and watfighnng. wss more slgmflcant than generally recognized. M& PeterS. Kir&vaiter, USA, The till of Fort.v Henry and Donelsbn, guard Fortl?iley, i(eneau . Combat Developments Cm.use To Continue A new contract has been awarded to continue the four-week combat devel opments course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The course, which has tmined more than 1,000 combat developments staff.,officers since Its inception ict Aprd 1985, will be conducted by the BDM Corpmatmn through a military conrmcring officer representanve at the US Army Combmed Amrs Center. Trmrring will again center on the concept based requlrementr system and the supporting processes that guide the development of doctrine, orgamzation, tmining and materiel for the Total Force. For enrollment infonnauon, call -AUTOVON 552-41O!X5176. Nuclear Weapons Qflicer Course Openings Allocations are now being filled for two nuclear weapons otficer courses. The functional area 52 courses are slated for 13 Februaw ro 3 Msrch (course number 89-1) and 5-23 June (course, 89-2). The first week of the course is taught at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, whale the second snd third weeks are held at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. centrally 6mded by the Total Army Per sonnel Agency (TAPA), both courses can be made avadable on a TDY en route or TDY and return basis. To obtain an allocation, contact TAPA, AlTN: DAPC-OPB-A, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0400. 112 JanuaJY 19S9 * MILITARY REVIEW }. “.. ,