DOCSLIB.ORG

Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi O.A

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi O.A ARMED FORCES TRIBUNAL, REGIONAL BENCH, KOCHI O.A.Nos. 70 of 2011 & 118 of 2013 FRIDAY, THE 21ST DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2014/30TH KARTHIKA, 1936 CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHRIKANT TRIPATHI, MEMBER (J) HON'BLE VICE ADMIRAL M.P.MURALIDHARAN,AVSM & BAR, NM, MEMBER (A) O.A.NO.70 OF 2011: APPLICANT: JC-459291W EX-NB SUB CLK SAJEEV MOHAN K, AGED 45 YEARS, RECORDS, THE MARATHA LIGHT INFANTRY, BELGAUM, KARNATAKA-590 009. BY ADV.SRI.RAMESH.C.R. VERSUS RESPONDENTS: 1. THE UNION OF INDIA, THROUGH THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (ARMY), SOUTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI – 110 001. 2. THE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF, INTEGRATED HQRS. OF MOD (ARMY), SOUTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI – 110 001. 3. THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, AG'S BRANCH, ARMY HEADQUARTERS, DHQ.P.O., NEW DELHI-110011. 4. THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING (WESTERN COMMAND), CNANDIMANDIR (UT), ARMY PIN CODE – 908543. O.A.70 of 2011 & 118 of 2013 - 2 - 5. THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING (HQR), 7 INF DIV, PIN – 908407, C/O.56 APO. 6. THE DIRECTOR, RECRUITING, ARMY RECRUITING OFFICE, FEROZPUR, PUNJAB, C/O.56 APO. 7. THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, WESTERN COMMAND, IS GROUP, CHANDIMANDIR (UT) ARMY PIN 904992. 8. THE RECORDS, THE MARATHA LIGHT INFANTRY, BELGAUM, KARNATAKA-590 009. BY ADV.SRI.K.M.JAMALUDHEEN, SENIOR PANEL COUNSEL O.A.NO.118 OF 2013: APPLICANT: JC-459291W NB SUB CLK SAJEEV MOHAN K, AGED 43 YEARS, RECORDS, THE MARATHA LIGHT INFANTRY, BELGAUM, KARNATAKA-590 009. BY ADV.SRI.RAMESH.C.R. VERSUS RESPONDENTS: 1. THE UNION OF INDIA, THROUGH THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (ARMY), SOUTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI – 110 001. 2. THE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF, INTEGRATED HQRS. OF MOD (ARMY), SOUTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI – 110 001. 3. THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, AG'S BRANCH, ARMY HEADQUARTERS, DHQ.P.O., NEW DELHI-110011. O.A.70 of 2011 & 118 of 2013 - 3 - 4. THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING (WESTERN COMMAND), CHANDINANDIR (UT), ARMY PIN CODE – 908543. 5. THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING (HQR), 7 INF DIV, PIN – 908407, C/O.56 APO. 6. THE DIRECTOR, RECRUITING, ARMY RECRUITING OFFICE, FEROZPUR, PUNJAB, C/O.56 APO. 7. THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, WESTERN COMMAND, IS GROUP, CHANDIMANDIR (UT) ARMY PIN 904992. 8. THE RECORDS, THE MARATHA LIGHT INFANTRY, BELGAUM, KARNATAKA-590 009. BY ADV.SRI.K.M.JAMALUDHEEN, SENIOR PANEL COUNSEL ORDER Shrikant Tripathi, Member (J): The applicant, Ex-NB Sub Clerk, Sajeev Mohan K, No.JC- 459291W has filed these two matters. In O.A. No. 70 of 2011, he has claimed for his reinstatement in the Army service with all consequential benefits after quashment of the dismissal order dated 1st June, 2011 (Annexue A28) rendered by the second respondent. By the second Original Application, O.A. No.118 of 2013, he has challenged the proceedings of the General Court Martial, (hereinafter referred to as the 'GCM') and its verdict on Charge No.2 and also the O.A.70 of 2011 & 118 of 2013 - 4 - decision of the confirming authority, whereby the confirming authority did not agree with the finding of the GCM on Charge No.1 and the quantum of punishment with regard to the proved charge No. 2. 2. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, both the matters were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 3. The applicant was tried by the GCM on the following charges: Charge No.1 - under Army Act Section 64(e): It is alleged that the applicant, on 25th September 2005, while performing the duties of the Head Clerk in the Branch Recruiting Office, Ferozepur Cantonment, obtained for himself Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) from one Shri.Gurpreet Singh, a civilian, by way of gratification as a motive for procuring enrolment of the said Gurpreet Singh and accordingly he committed the aforesaid offence. Charge No.2 – under Army Act Section 69: The applicant, on 25th September, 2005 at Firozepur, was found in possession of O.A.70 of 2011 & 118 of 2013 - 5 - certain prohibited ammunitions, detailed in the charge, contrary to Section 25(1-A) of the Arms Act, 1959. 4. The applicant pleaded not guilty to the charges. Accordingly the GCM proceeded with the trial and after concluding the trial recorded the finding that Charge No.1 was not proved, but found that Charge No.2 was proved beyond all reasonable doubts and accordingly held the applicant guilty of the said charge. The GCM awarded the sentence of forfeiture of two years of past service of the applicant for the pension purposes and also severely reprimanded him. The Confirming Authority, namely, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, 7 Infantry Division , did not confirm the finding of the GCM and ordered for revision. Accordingly, the GCM re-assembled on 16th March, 2010 and rendered a fresh order on 22nd March, 2010 after the revision holding that no interference was warranted in its earlier findings. Again the revised verdict of the GCM was referred for confirmation, but the Confirming Authority did not agree with the finding of the GCM, consequently declined to confirm. Ultimately the matter was placed before the Chief of the Army Staff, who found that further trial by the GCM was inexpedient and impracticable, so he decided O.A.70 of 2011 & 118 of 2013 - 6 - to proceed against the applicant under the Army Act Section 20(1), hereinafter referred to as section 20(1), read with Army Rule 17, hereinafter referred to as Rule 17. Accordingly the show cause notice dated 15th December, 2010 (Annexure A23) was served on the applicant, whereby he was called upon to submit his replies within 30 days from the date of receipt of the show cause notice as to why his service should not be terminated. The applicant submitted his reply dated 15th February 2011 (Annexure A24) to the show cause notice. The Chief of the Army Staff considered the reply and passed the impugned order dated 1st June, 2011 (Annexure A28), whereby he dismissed the applicant from the service. 5. Mr. C.R. Ramesh, appearing for the applicant, made two fold submissions. Firstly he tried to assail the finding of the GCM on Charge No.2 and the finding of the Confirming Authority on Charge No.1, including his finding on the quantum of sentence on Charge No.2. Secondly he assailed the show cause notice issued by the Chief of the Army Staff (Annexure A23), including the final decision taken by him in pursuance of the show cause notice. O.A.70 of 2011 & 118 of 2013 - 7 - 6. Mr. C.R. Ramesh further contended that Gurpreet Singh, who had allegedly given illegal gratification to the applicant, was not examined during the trial before the GCM, so the finding of the GCM on Charge No.1 was perfectly correct. But the Chief of the Army Staff, without entering into the merits of the evidence, rendered his decision to dismiss the applicant from service on the basis of the finding of the Confirming Authority on Charge Nos.1 and 2. He next contended that the points raised by the applicant in his reply were neither considered nor in any way answered by the Chief of the Army Staff while rendering the final order of dismissal, so, the entire decision stood vitiated. Mr. Ramesh C.R. next contended that when the proceedings of the GCM came to an end without any logical conclusion due to difference of opinion between the GCM and the Confirming Authority, there was no occasion for the Chief of the Army Staff to proceed under Section 20(1) read with Rule Rule 17 on the basis of the finding of the Confirming Authority. 7. Mr. K.M. Jamaludheen, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that when the GCM proceedings stood redundant due to difference of opinion between the GCM and the Confirming Authority even after the revision, the O.A.70 of 2011 & 118 of 2013 - 8 - Chief of the Army Staff, who had independent power under Section 20(1) read with Rule 17 was perfectly justified to proceed against the applicant. So it was incorrect to say that the Chief of the Army Staff had no power to take the decision for the applicant's dismissal from service. He next contended that the Chief of the Army Staff rendered a reasoned order, so no prejudice was caused to the applicant. 8. We have considered the rival submissions and perused the records. 9. Before considering the rival submissions on merits, we consider it just and expedient to look into the various relevant provisions of the Army Act, 1950, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' and the Rules made thereunder. Section 153 of the Act provides that no finding or sentence of a General, District or Summary General Court Martial shall be valid except so far as it may be confirmed as provided by this Act. Section 154 empowers the Central Government or any officer authorised in this behalf by warrant of the Central Government to confirm the finding and sentence of the GCM. Section 160 of the Act provides for revision of finding or sentence, according to which, any finding or sentence of a Court Martial, which requires confirmation may be once revised O.A.70 of 2011 & 118 of 2013 - 9 - by the order of the Confirming Authority and in that eventuality, it is open to the Court Martial to take additional evidence and after revision form its own independent opinion. In case the court reiterates its previous verdict even on revision and decides not to modify the same, the Confirming Authority, if it is unable to agree with the decision rendered on revision, has no power either to alter the finding or sentence or direct for a fresh revision/ re-trial etc.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Biographies Introduction V4 0
    2020 www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk Author: Robert PALMER, M.A. BRITISH MILITARY HISTORY BIOGRAPHIES An introduction to the Biographies of officers in the British Army and pre-partition Indian Army published on the web-site www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk, including: • Explanation of Terms, • Regular Army, Militia and Territorial Army, • Type and Status of Officers, • Rank Structure, • The Establishment, • Staff and Command Courses, • Appointments, • Awards and Honours. Copyright ©www.BritishMilitaryHistory.co.uk (2020) 13 May 2020 [BRITISH MILITARY HISTORY BIOGRAPHIES] British Military History Biographies This web-site contains selected biographies of some senior officers of the British Army and Indian Army who achieved some distinction, notable achievement, or senior appointment during the Second World War. These biographies have been compiled from a variety of sources, which have then been subject to scrutiny and cross-checking. The main sources are:1 ➢ Who was Who, ➢ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ➢ British Library File L/MIL/14 Indian Army Officer’s Records, ➢ Various Army Lists from January 1930 to April 1946: http://www.archive.org/search.php?query=army%20list ➢ Half Year Army List published January 1942: http://www.archive.org/details/armylisthalfjan1942grea ➢ War Services of British Army Officers 1939-46 (Half Yearly Army List 1946), ➢ The London Gazette: http://www.london-gazette.co.uk/, ➢ Generals.dk http://www.generals.dk/, ➢ WWII Unit Histories http://www.unithistories.com/, ➢ Companions of The Distinguished Service Order 1923 – 2010 Army Awards by Doug V. P. HEARNS, C.D. ➢ Various published biographies, divisional histories, regimental and unit histories owned by the author. It has to be borne in mind that discrepancies between sources are inevitable.
    [Show full text]
  • SUPPLEMENT to the LONDON GAZETTE, N MAY, 1937 3087 Captain Trevor Edward Palmer, M.B., Indian No
    SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, n MAY, 1937 3087 Captain Trevor Edward Palmer, M.B., Indian No. 6676002 Warrant Officer Class II, Regi- Medical Service, late Medical Officer, British mental Quarter-Master Sergeant Reginald Legation Guard, Addis Ababa, Abyssinia. George Callingham, i6th London Regiment Lieutenant-Colonel and Brevet Colonel Edward (Queen's Westminster and Civil Service John William Porter, T.D., Hampshire Rifles), Territorial Army. Fortress -Engineers, Royal Engineers, Terri- No. 3303392 Warrant Officer Class II, Com- torial Army. pany Sergeant-Major Neil Campbell, gth Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Shapcott, M.C., (Glasgow Highlanders). Battalion, The High- Extra Regimentally Employed List, Military land Light Infantry'l(City of Glasgow Regi- Assistant, Military and Air Force Depaft- ment), Territorial Army. "ment, Office of the Judge Advocate General Warrant Officer Class I, Regimental Sergeant- of the Force. Major George Van Sanden Cooke, Ceylon Lieutenant-Colonel and Brevet Colonel Ralph Garrison Artillery, Ceylon Defence Force. Cecil Seel, M.C., T.D., Royal Corps of Lieutenant (Assistant Commissary) Thomas Signals, Territorial Army. Couzens, Indian Army Corps of Clerks, Miss Elizabeth Dunlop Smaill, A.R.R.C., Indian Unattached List, Chief Clerk, Head- . Principal Matron, and Scottish General quarters, Western Command, India. Hospital, Territorial Army Nursing Service. Captain (Deputy Commissary) Viccars Crews, Major (Quarter-Master) Edward Francis Snape, Retired, late Indian Army Ordnance Corps. ist Battalion," The South Staffordshire Regi- No. 5097328 Warrant Officer Class II, Regi- ment. mental Quarter-Master-Sergeant Thomas Lieutenant-Colonel and Brevet Colonel Charles Charles Cross, 69th (The Royal Warwick- Beechey Spencer, T.D., late Territorial shire Regiment), Anti-Aircraft Brigade, Army.
    [Show full text]
  • JCC: East Pakistan Crisis Indian Cabinet Chair: Prateek Swain Crisis Director: Alex Fager
    asdf JCC: East Pakistan Crisis Indian Cabinet Chair: Prateek Swain Crisis Director: Alex Fager JCC: East Pakistan Crisis – India PMUNC 2016 Contents Letter from the Chair…….………………………...……………………...…..3 Introduction………..…….………………………...……………………...…..5 The Situation in the Indian Subcontinent……............……………..……..……7 Setting the Stage…...………………………..……………………….……….…………7 A Brief History of Modern India..…………..……………………….……….…………9 Indo-Pakistani Relations………...…………..………………...….….……….………...10 Domestic Affairs………………………………………………………………….…...12 Current Situation……………………………………….……………………………...13 Committee Positions………..…….………………………...………………..16 2 JCC: East Pakistan Crisis – India PMUNC 2016 Letter from the Chair Dear Delegates, Namaste! I welcome you to the magnum opus of this year’s PMUNC, The JCC: East Pakistan Crisis. My name is Prateek Swain and I will be your chair for the India committee. First, I’ll introduce myself; I will be starting my sophomore year at Princeton and will be majoring in Economics or Woodrow Wilson School of Public Policy (depending on my mood when I have to declare) with a certificate in computer science. I have been debating as well as participating/chairing MUNs since my sophomore year of high school, and have carried on with these endeavors in college. Last year I was the Director for the Korean Reunification Committee at PMUNC, so I’m naturally extremely excited to be chairing this committee and have full faith that it will be a great experience for both you and me. This is certainly not my first crisis, but perhaps the one closest to my heart. Last semester, I took one of those eye opening classes at Princeton on Human Rights with Rebecca (Chair of the Pakistan committee) which set the foundation for this JCC to come into existence.
    [Show full text]
  • India's Limited War Doctrine: the Structural Factor
    IDSA Monograph Series No. 10 December 2012 INDIA'S LIMITED WAR DOCTRINE THE STRUCTURAL FACTOR ALI AHMED INDIA’S LIMITED WAR DOCTRINE: THE STRUCTURAL FACTOR | 1 IDSA Monograph Series No. 10 December 2012 INDIA’S LIMITED WAR DOCTRINE THE STRUCTURAL FACTOR ALI AHMED 2 | ALI AHMED Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). ISBN: 978-93-82169-09-3 Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Monograph are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute or the Government of India. First Published: December 2012 Price: Rs. Published by: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg, Delhi Cantt., New Delhi - 110 010 Tel. (91-11) 2671-7983 Fax.(91-11) 2615 4191 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.idsa.in Layout & Cover by: Vaijayanti Patankar Printed at: INDIA’S LIMITED WAR DOCTRINE: THE STRUCTURAL FACTOR | 3 To Late Maj Gen S. C. Sinha, PVSM 4 | ALI AHMED INDIA’S LIMITED WAR DOCTRINE: THE STRUCTURAL FACTOR | 5 CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................... 7 1. INTRODUCTION .................................... 9 2. DOCTRINAL CHANGE ............................. 16 3. THE STRUCTURAL FACTOR .................. 42 4. CONCLUSION ....................................... 68 REFERENCES ......................................... 79 6 | ALI AHMED * INDIA’S LIMITED WAR DOCTRINE: THE STRUCTURAL FACTOR | 7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This monograph is the outcome of my fellowship at IDSA in 2010- 12.
    [Show full text]
  • Sapta Shakti Command Forever Victorious
    No. 03/2019 AN INDIAN ARMY PUBLICATION March 2019 SAPTA SHAKTI COMMAND FOREVER VICTORIOUS OP THUNDERBOLT (op viJAY 1999) Captain Haneef Uddin, Vir Chakra, 11 Rajputana Rifl es Operation THUNDERBOLT was launched in June 1999 in the Siachen Sector as part of Operation VIJAY. As was the case in Kargil, Dras and Batalik Sectors, Pakistan occupied unheld heights on the Sangarh Ridge with an aim to alter the Line of Control and threaten Turtuk Sector. A company of 11 RAJ RIF was deployed in Operation THUNDERBOLT at an altitude of 18,000 feet in the Turtuk region. Th eir mission was to capture a position in the region which would facilitate the Army to monitor the movements of the enemy troops better. Captain Haneef Uddin volunteered to lead the special mission patrol consisting of one Junior Commissioned Offi cer and three other ranks. Th e party made valiant endeavours to occupy the position on night of 04 and 05 June 1999. On 06 June 1999, advancing in sub-zero temperatures along the razor sharp edge from the South-Westerly direction, the party came as close as 200 meters of the position when it was fi red upon. Captain Haneef Uddin and two other ranks received the brunt of fi re. Inspite of the grave injury, Captain Haneef Uddin, without caring for his personal safety, took position and started fi ring to pin down the enemy to extricate his team members. In the ensuing fi ring from both sides, Captain Haneef Uddin was further hit by enemy artillery and small arms fi re.
    [Show full text]
  • PLA Joint Exercises in Tibet: Implications for India
    FEBRUARY 2020 PLA Joint Exercises in Tibet: Implications for India RAJESWARI PILLAI RAJAGOPALAN PULKIT MOHAN PLA Joint Exercises in Tibet: Implications for India RAJESWARI PILLAI RAJAGOPALAN PULKIT MOHAN ABOUT THE AUTHORS Dr Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is a Distinguished Fellow and Head of Space and Nuclear Policy Initiative at ORF. She is also the senior Asia defence writer for The Diplomat. She is the author of four books: Nuclear Security in India (2015), Clashing Titans: Military Strategy and Insecurity among Asian Great Powers (2012), The Dragon’s Fire: Chinese Military Strategy and Its Implications for Asia (2009), and Uncertain Eagle: US Military Strategy in Asia (2009). Pulkit Mohan is a Junior Fellow at ORF’s Space and Nuclear Policy Initiative. Before joining ORF, Pulkit was an Editorial Assistant with a leading development journal. She obtained her Master’s degree in International Relations from the London School of Economics. ISBN: 978-93-89622-66-9 © 2020 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from ORF. PLA Joint Exercises in Tibet: Implications for India ABSTRACT Since 2015, China has been undertaking a thorough restructuring of its military, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping. This has involved significant changes in the operational structure of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), with the modernisation and optimisation of the military to bring about better jointness and overall efficiency. This paper examines the PLA reforms as they pertain to training and jointness in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Sino-Indian border areas.
    [Show full text]
  • IC 45740 F Col Koharwal Kamal Son of Late Shri Rajes
    1 ARMED FORCES TRIBUNAL, REGIONAL BENCH, JAIPUR (RAJ). O R D E R APPLICANT: IC 45740 F Col Koharwal Kamal Son of late Shri Rajesh Kumar Saxena, Permanent Resident of 94 PUnjabpura Bareilly (UP) Presently R/o 21/GF Vatika InfoTech City, Ajmer Road, Jaipur earlier posted at 7 Guards Att. with HQ 18 Arty Bde (Alwar) (Rajasthan) VERSUS NON-APPLICANTS: 1. The Union of India Through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi. 2. The Chief of Army Staff, Army Headquarters, New Delhi 3. GOC-in-C, HQ South Western Command, Jaipur 4. GOC 18 Inf. Div. C/o 56 APO 5. Cdr. 18 Arty Bde, C/o 56 APO 6. GCM through GOC, 18 Inf. Div. 7. GOC HQ 10 Corps C/o 56 APO ::: APPEAL NO. 1 OF 2011 Under Section 15 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 against the Findings dated 30.6.2010 by the GCM and sentence dated 2.7.2010, as confirmed vide proceedilgns dated 16.12.2010 and promulgated on 27.12.2010 and executed with effect from 27.12.2010 ::: DATE OF ORDER: DECEMBER 13,2012 ::: PRESENT HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE K.C. JOSHI (J) HON’BLE LT GEN SUSHEEL GUPTA(A) Appellant Ex Col Koharwal Kamal present in person. Mr. Ajay Shukla for the respondents. 2 BY THE COURT: (PER JUSTICE K.C.JOSHI): This appeal is directed against the findings and sentence dated 30.6.2010 and 2.7.2010 respectively of the General Court Martial, which were confirmed on 16.12.2010 and promulgated on 27.12.2010, whereby the appellant has been held guilty of ten charges and sentenced to be cashiered, and to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year subject to confirmation.
    [Show full text]
  • Achieving Jointness in War: One Theatre < One Strategy
    Achieving Jointness in War One Theatre < One Strategy Ashish Singh* The creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is a start to defence reforms. This should improve jointmanship in peacetime; however, joint wartime performance needs further reform and improvement. We face three problems: (i) historical lack of unified warfighting strategy formulation at the apex military level; (ii) the unclear division of responsibility and resources between service Chiefs and Commanders- in-Chief (C-in-Cs); and (iii) the differing natures of command and control between the three services, which manifest as differences in structural organisations. Treating India as one unified theatre can reduce these problems. It will allow the creation of a joint structure for strategy formulation at the apex level, resulting in one national strategy to guide subordinate strategy. Also, it will give ownership of all warfighting assets to a single commander who can centralise or decentralise at will, and yet not preclude formation of smaller military entities with collocated headquarters (HQ) of subordinate service formations. Examples from history support the arguments. I believe in Theatre Command; India is one Theatre. – Air Chief Marshal B.S. Dhanoa (Retd.)1 INTRODUCTION Two decades after the idea was mooted, the Prime Minister finally announced the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for the * The author is currently serving in the Indian Air Force (IAF). The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect that of the IAF or the Government of India. ISSN 0976-1004 print © 2020 Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal of Defence Studies, Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • Sainik Covers
    2019 16-31 January Vol 66 No 2 ` 5 SAINIK Samachar Indian Army: Nation Before Self pic: DPR Photo Division pic: DPR Photo Division Annual Press Conference of the Chief of the Army Staff, Gen Bipin Rawat on the occasion of Army Day, 2019 at Manekshaw Centre, New Delhi on January 10, 2019 . pic: DPR Photo Division TheAdmiral President, Sunil ShriLanba, Ram CNS Nath receiving Kovind Admiral at the ‘At Christophe Home’ function, Prazuck, organised Chief of on the the Naval occasion Staff, of 72nd IndependenceFrench Navy Day, at South at Rashtrapati Block lawns, Bhavan, New Delhi in New on DelhiJanuary on August7, 2019. 15, 2018. In This Issue Since 1909 Transforming Indian Army into a 4 more Potent and Adaptive Force (Initially published as FAUJI AKHBAR) Vol. 66 q No 2 26 Pausha– 11 Magha 1940 (Saka) 16-31 January 2019 The journal of India’s Armed Forces published every fortnight in thirteen languages including Hindi & English on behalf of Ministry of Defence. It is not necessarily an organ for the expression of the Government’s defence policy. The published items represent the views of respective writers and correspondents. Editor-in-Chief Ruby Thinda Sharma Senior Editor Manoj Tuli Commands of the 8 Vice President 28 Editor Afaque Ahmad Ehsani Indian Army Inaugurates NCC RD… Sub Editors Sub Maj KC Sahu & Sub Maj Baiju G Coordination Kunal Kumar Business Manager Rajpal Our Correspondents DELHI: Col Chiranjeet Konwer (Offg.); Capt DK Sharma VSM; Gp Capt Anupam Banerjee; Divyanshu Kumar; Photo Editor: K Ramesh; BENGALURU: Guru Prasad HL; CHANDIGARH:
    [Show full text]
  • Armed Forces Module - II Structure and Role of the Forces
    Armed Forces Module - II Structure and Role of the Forces 4 Note ARMED FORCES The soldiers are faced with a variety of challenges including the difficult areas like icy glaciers, sandy deserts, mountainous jungles and the vast seas. They willingly face these challenges and are prepared to make any sacrifice for the Nation. The values of comradeship and brotherhood pervade all ranks of the army. The soldiers lay down their lives for the three Ns - Naam (name or honour), Namak (loyalty to the Nation) and Nishan (insignia or flag of the unit/regiment or Nation). They exhibit valour when fighting the enemy. There is no discrimination on the basis of caste, religion or any other aspect. This ensures team spirit and unity. They usually choose death over dishonour. The forthrightness, integrity and dignity forms the ethos of every soldier. In this lesson we shall learn about the different Commands of the Indian Army in greater detail as well as the Ethos of the armed forces. Before we look at the organisational structure we shall examine the ethos of the Indian Army. Objectives After studying this lesson, you will be able to: • explain the role and organisational structure of Indian Army; • describe the role and structure of Indian Navy and • explain the role and organisational structure of Air Force. 4.1 Role of the Indian Army The Indian Army mainly has the task to protect the territorial integrity of our country and safeguard its sovereignty from external aggression or internal disorder. The army also provides assistance to the civil administration in the event of a natural or manmade disaster.
    [Show full text]
  • Indian Military's Cold Start Doctrine
    1 Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine: Capabilities, Limitations and Possible Response from Pakistan By Masood Ur Rehman Khattak SASSI Research Paper 32 March 2011 Published by South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI), 36 Alie Street, London, E1 8DA South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) 2011 2 List of Acronyms AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System ABM Anti Ballistic Missile AEW Airborne Early Warning BFSRs Battlefield Surveillance Radars C4ISR Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance CSD Cold Start Doctrine C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence CAG Comptroller Auditor General CDS Chief of Defense Staff DGMO Director-General of Military Operations EW Electronic Warfare FATA Federally Administered Tribal FMCP Force Multiplication Command Post FPD Fire Power Demonstration HQ-9 Hongqi-9 ISRO Indian Space Research Organisation IPKF Indian Peace Keeping Force IBGs Integrated Battle Groups IAF Indian Air Force JCSC Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee LORROS Long-Range Recce and Observation Systems MBT Main Battle Tank NCW Network Centric Warfare NBC Nuclear-Biological- Chemical NCOs Non Commissioned Officers OIC Organisation of Islamic Conference PAF Pakistan Air Force RAPID Reorganized Army Plains Infantry Division SAM Surface to Air Missiles SCO Shengai Cooperation Organisation SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute UAVs Unmanned Aerial Vehicles UN United Nations US United States WLRs Weapons Locating Radars 3 Contents List of Acronyms 02 Abstract 05 1. Introduction 06 2. Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine- (CSD) 06 3. Indian Military’s Capabilities for the Implementation 11 Of Cold Start Doctrine 4. Indian Military Exercise from 2004-2010 14 4.1. Exercise Divya Astra- 2004 14 4.2.
    [Show full text]
  • A Cold Start for Hot Wars? a Cold Start for Walter C
    A Cold Start for Hot Wars? A Cold Start for Walter C. Ladwig III Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine The latent conºict be- tween nuclear-armed rivals India and Pakistan makes continued strategic sta- bility in South Asia uncertain. A breakdown of deterrence between the two countries would have serious consequences, including the potential use of nu- clear weapons. Since 1999 there have been two military crises involving India and Pakistan that escalated to the point where outside actors felt the need to intervene to prevent the outbreak of war. A low-level, Pakistani-backed insur- gency in Indian-controlled Kashmir adds to the tense relations between the two nations. Given the nuclear dimension involved, as well as India’s increas- ingly prominent role in world affairs and Pakistan’s domestic instability, stra- tegic and military developments on the subcontinent are of great concern to the broader international community. In response to the perceived inability of the Indian military to react to the December 2001 attack on the Parliament building in New Delhi by Pakistani- backed Kashmiri militants and the subsequent military standoff with Pakistan, known as Operation Parakram (Operation Victory), the Indian Army an- nounced a new limited war doctrine in April 2004 that would allow it to mobi- lize quickly and undertake retaliatory attacks in response to speciªc challenges posed by Pakistan’s “proxy war” in Kashmir. This Cold Start doctrine marked a break from the fundamentally defensive orientation that the Indian military has employed since independence in 1947. Requiring combined arms operat- ing jointly with airpower from the Indian Air Force, Cold Start represents a signiªcant undertaking for the Indian military.
    [Show full text]