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Building-A-Viable-Indian-Defense-Viz Image Courtesy: mynation.com C3S Issue Map IV Building a Viable Indian Defense viz. China: An Analysis of the Integrated Theatre Commands Tanvir Jaikishen Member, Chennai Centre for China Studies (C3S) S e p t e m b e r 1 9 2 0 1 9 About the Author Tanvir Jaikishen is a consultant and entrepreneur. He holds a master's degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science in International Health Policy. His passions include the study of International Relations, Geopolitics, Defense and Greco- Roman history. He is Member, C3S. About C3S The Chennai Centre for China Studies (C3S), registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act 1975 (83/2008 dated 4th April 2008), is a non-profit public policy think tank. We carry out in depth studies of developments relating to China with priority to issues of interest to India such as geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics of India- China relations, Chinas internal dynamics, border issues, Chinas relations with South Asian countries, prospects of trade, the evolution of Chinese politics and its impact on India and the world, ASEAN and SAARC relations, cultural links, etc. C3S attempts to provide a forum for dialogue with China scholars in India and abroad and give space for the expression of alternate opinions on China related topics. We also provide a database for research on China with special attention to information available in Chinese language. Additionally, events, lecture discussions and seminars are organised on topics of current interest. What is an Issue Map? C3S has launched its Issue Map initiative. The reports under this series analyse the status and developments of current scenarios in detail. They attempt to aid the reader to get a more comprehensive idea of the issue being addressed through a detailed illustration in the form of images, data and facts Issue Maps are available for download as PDFs. Introduction On the 15th of August, 2019, the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi announced the creation of a Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) position [1]. The role of the CDS will be primarily to coordinate between the three armed services - the Indian Army, Indian Navy and Indian Air Force in order to ensure better synergy between the forces, streamlined procurement and planning and improved operational readiness in case of future conflict. The recommendation for the creation of the post of CDS has been made as early as 2001, by the Group of Ministers (GoM) and its creation underscores a genuine desire to improve the overall fighting capability of India’s armed forces *2+. Over the last two decades, there has been increasing clamour towards re-organizing India’s armed forces into Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs) with each theatre command responsible for a particular threat. Bureaucrats and defense personnel, both serving and retired and defense analysts, among others have long called for the creation of ITCs, each headed by a Commander who will be responsible ultimately to the CDS. This would enhance the lethality and the agility of the Indian armed forces, enabling it to better fight both localised conflicts as well as full-scale war on more than one front if needed. There are several advantages in reorganizing the Indian Armed Forces into ITCs. Some of these include Better training of forces: ITCs can train forces based on the specific nature of the threat and type of terrain Streamlined Procurement and Budget Allocation: ITCs can request budgets after a careful assessment of the type of equipment required basis the nature of threat and type of terrain. ITCs can also be made responsible for their own procurements, thereby shortening the acquisition and induction process of latest platforms. Better synergy between platforms: A case can be made that in the modern military context, terms like the “Army”, “Navy” and “Air Force” are outdated and any attempt to wage war in a silo is impractical. An ITC would ensure integration of land, naval and air assets under a unified command structure, enabling greater interoperability between different land, sea and air platforms, thus improving the odds of a favorable military outcome. The question that remains is not whether the Indian armed forces must shift to ITCs but how quickly and in what manor. Conventional wisdom would dictate that it would be prudent to model the ITCs on similar lines as other western militaries, with accommodation made for unique theatre specific requirements in the Indian context. However, the author argues, that the Indian armed forces are currently not in a position to reorganize to ITCs, at least in the conventional sense. The Current Indian Armed Forces Command Structure: A Snapshot The Indian Army has seven Commands, the Indian Navy has three Commands and the Indian Air Force has seven Commands. The tables below list out the various Command locations and headquarters. Indian Army Commands[3] Western Command Chandimandir Northern Command Udhampur South Western Command Jaipur Central Command Lucknow Eastern Command Kolkata Army Training Command Shimla Southern Command Pune Indian Naval Commands[4] Western Naval Command Mumbai Eastern Naval Command Visakhapatnam Southern Naval Command Cochin Tri Service Command Port Blair Indian Air Force Commands[5] Western Air Command Delhi South Western Air Command Gandhinagar Central Air Command Allahabad Eastern Air Command Shillong Training Command Bengaluru Southern Air Command Thiruvananthapuram Maintenance Command Nagpur Other[6] Strategic Forces Command Commissioned in 2003 The responsibility for managing a conflict with China lies with the Northern, Central and Eastern Army Commands. The Indian Air Force’s Central and Eastern Commands would likewise assume responsibility for conflict with China. Should there be an outbreak of full- scale war, the primary challenge will be to ensure coordination between the leadership of the three army commands and two air force commands. A secondary challenge lies in the fact that the Northern Command, located in Jammu & Kashmir holds a dual responsibility for managing a conflict with Pakistan in the region. The Northern Command in Udhampur is separated from the Eastern Command by a distance of over 2600 kilometers[7]. The warfare of today is far more dynamic than the wars fought in the past and will require real time data gathering, processing, analysis and action. In today’s battlefield environment, victory can only be achieved through the ability to use large volumes of battlefield data in order to make decisions in real time and execute battle plans accordingly. In such a scenario, having three different Army commands, each with full autonomy and limited coordination will render any advantage offered by data completely redundant. India has fought four wars with Pakistan since her independence. Indian and Pakistani troops continue to exchange fire across the Line of Control and as a result India has spent the last 70 years developing the war plans against Pakistan which can be executed given military preparedness and political will. The Pakistani military is conventionally weaker when compared to the Indian military and hence it is entirely possible to manage a conflict with Pakistan under existing command structures. India and China, have fought only one war (1962) resulting in a military defeat for India, followed by a few skirmishes. China, which has a larger military budget than India has a military force that is both qualitatively and quantitatively superior. In 2019, India’s defense budget stands at United States Dollars USD 62 billion[8+ while China’s is estimated to be around USD 175 billion*9+. China has spent the last three decades building the required infrastructure that will enable it to build up rapidly and launch a large scale invasion of India in a short amount of time. The PLA, despite having not fought a war since the Sino - Vietnam conflict of 1979, has evolved into a modern fighting force that is capable of holding its own and arguably prevailing against most Western militaries, including the United States. The PLA leadership has constantly strived to restructure the armed forces to deal with evolving threats in line with China’s growing geopolitical ambitions. The most dramatic change came about in 2016, when the PLA restructured from 7 military regions to 5 Integrated Theatre Commands, with each command being assigned a particular region or threat [10]. The next section will briefly look at the five Chinese theatre commands in order to provide the reader with an understanding of the current PLA military structure. The People's Liberation Army Command Structure: A Snapshot Image Courtesy: DW The People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of China is divided into five Theatre Commands. The table below lists out the five commands and areas of responsibility by Command. Eastern Theatre Command[11] Headquartered in Nanjing and encompasses the areas of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi and the East Sea Fleet Southern Theatre Command[12] Headquartered in Guangzhou and encompasses the areas of Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Hong Kong and Macau Western Theatre Command[13] Headquartered in Chengdu and encompasses the areas of Sichuan, Tibet, Giansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang and Chongqing Northern Theatre Command[14] Headquartered in Shenyang and encompasses areas of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Shandong and Inner Mongolia Central Theatre Command[15] Headquartered in Beijing and ecompases the areas of Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shaanxi, Henan and Hubei These five theatre commands or PLA Battle Zones have replaced the former seven military area commands in Beijing, Nanjing, Chengdu, Ji'nan, Shenyang, Lanzhou and Guangzhou from the 1st of February 2016. According to Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun the shift from MAC’s to Theatre Commands was made with a view to “improving the joint operational commanding institutions, forming the joint operational system, better safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests, and maintaining regional stability and world peace.”[10] The goal of each Theatre Command is to prepare for conflict in the respective areas of responsibility.
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