Image Courtesy: mynation.com
C3S Issue Map IV
Building a Viable Indian
Defense viz. China: An Analysis of the Integrated Theatre
Commands
Tanvir Jaikishen Member, Chennai Centre for China Studies (C3S) S e p t e m b e r 1 9 2 0 1 9 About the Author
Tanvir Jaikishen is a consultant and entrepreneur. He holds a master's degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science in International Health Policy. His passions include the study of International Relations, Geopolitics, Defense and Greco- Roman history. He is Member, C3S.
About C3S
The Chennai Centre for China Studies (C3S), registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act 1975 (83/2008 dated 4th April 2008), is a non-profit public policy think tank. We carry out in depth studies of developments relating to China with priority to issues of interest to India such as geopolitical, economic and strategic dynamics of India- China relations, Chinas internal dynamics, border issues, Chinas relations with South Asian countries, prospects of trade, the evolution of Chinese politics and its impact on India and the world, ASEAN and SAARC relations, cultural links, etc. C3S attempts to provide a forum for dialogue with China scholars in India and abroad and give space for the expression of alternate opinions on China related topics. We also provide a database for research on China with special attention to information available in Chinese language. Additionally, events, lecture discussions and seminars are organised on topics of current interest.
What is an Issue Map?
C3S has launched its Issue Map initiative. The reports under this series analyse the status and developments of current scenarios in detail. They attempt to aid the reader to get a more comprehensive idea of the issue being addressed through a detailed illustration in the form of images, data and facts
Issue Maps are available for download as PDFs. Introduction
On the 15th of August, 2019, the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi announced the creation of a Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) position [1]. The role of the CDS will be primarily to coordinate between the three armed services - the Indian Army, Indian Navy and Indian Air Force in order to ensure better synergy between the forces, streamlined procurement and planning and improved operational readiness in case of future conflict. The recommendation for the creation of the post of CDS has been made as early as 2001, by the Group of Ministers (GoM) and its creation underscores a genuine desire to improve the overall fighting capability of India’s armed forces *2+.
Over the last two decades, there has been increasing clamour towards re-organizing India’s armed forces into Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs) with each theatre command responsible for a particular threat. Bureaucrats and defense personnel, both serving and retired and defense analysts, among others have long called for the creation of ITCs, each headed by a Commander who will be responsible ultimately to the CDS. This would enhance the lethality and the agility of the Indian armed forces, enabling it to better fight both localised conflicts as well as full-scale war on more than one front if needed.
There are several advantages in reorganizing the Indian Armed Forces into ITCs. Some of these include Better training of forces: ITCs can train forces based on the specific nature of the threat and type of terrain Streamlined Procurement and Budget Allocation: ITCs can request budgets after a careful assessment of the type of equipment required basis the nature of threat and type of terrain. ITCs can also be made responsible for their own procurements, thereby shortening the acquisition and induction process of latest platforms. Better synergy between platforms: A case can be made that in the modern military context, terms like the “Army”, “Navy” and “Air Force” are outdated and any attempt to wage war in a silo is impractical. An ITC would ensure integration of land, naval and air assets under a unified command structure, enabling greater interoperability between different land, sea and air platforms, thus improving the odds of a favorable military outcome.
The question that remains is not whether the Indian armed forces must shift to ITCs but how quickly and in what manor. Conventional wisdom would dictate that it would be prudent to model the ITCs on similar lines as other western militaries, with accommodation made for unique theatre specific requirements in the Indian context. However, the author argues, that the Indian armed forces are currently not in a position to reorganize to ITCs, at least in the conventional sense. The Current Indian Armed Forces Command Structure: A Snapshot The Indian Army has seven Commands, the Indian Navy has three Commands and the Indian Air Force has seven Commands. The tables below list out the various Command locations and headquarters. Indian Army Commands[3]
Western Command Chandimandir
Northern Command Udhampur
South Western Command Jaipur
Central Command Lucknow
Eastern Command Kolkata
Army Training Command Shimla
Southern Command Pune
Indian Naval Commands[4]
Western Naval Command Mumbai
Eastern Naval Command Visakhapatnam
Southern Naval Command Cochin
Tri Service Command Port Blair
Indian Air Force Commands[5]
Western Air Command Delhi
South Western Air Command Gandhinagar
Central Air Command Allahabad
Eastern Air Command Shillong
Training Command Bengaluru
Southern Air Command Thiruvananthapuram
Maintenance Command Nagpur
Other[6]
Strategic Forces Command Commissioned in 2003 The responsibility for managing a conflict with China lies with the Northern, Central and Eastern Army Commands. The Indian Air Force’s Central and Eastern Commands would likewise assume responsibility for conflict with China. Should there be an outbreak of full- scale war, the primary challenge will be to ensure coordination between the leadership of the three army commands and two air force commands. A secondary challenge lies in the fact that the Northern Command, located in Jammu & Kashmir holds a dual responsibility for managing a conflict with Pakistan in the region. The Northern Command in Udhampur is separated from the Eastern Command by a distance of over 2600 kilometers[7]. The warfare of today is far more dynamic than the wars fought in the past and will require real time data gathering, processing, analysis and action. In today’s battlefield environment, victory can only be achieved through the ability to use large volumes of battlefield data in order to make decisions in real time and execute battle plans accordingly. In such a scenario, having three different Army commands, each with full autonomy and limited coordination will render any advantage offered by data completely redundant.
India has fought four wars with Pakistan since her independence. Indian and Pakistani troops continue to exchange fire across the Line of Control and as a result India has spent the last 70 years developing the war plans against Pakistan which can be executed given military preparedness and political will. The Pakistani military is conventionally weaker when compared to the Indian military and hence it is entirely possible to manage a conflict with Pakistan under existing command structures. India and China, have fought only one war (1962) resulting in a military defeat for India, followed by a few skirmishes. China, which has a larger military budget than India has a military force that is both qualitatively and quantitatively superior. In 2019, India’s defense budget stands at United States Dollars USD 62 billion[8+ while China’s is estimated to be around USD 175 billion*9+. China has spent the last three decades building the required infrastructure that will enable it to build up rapidly and launch a large scale invasion of India in a short amount of time.
The PLA, despite having not fought a war since the Sino - Vietnam conflict of 1979, has evolved into a modern fighting force that is capable of holding its own and arguably prevailing against most Western militaries, including the United States. The PLA leadership has constantly strived to restructure the armed forces to deal with evolving threats in line with China’s growing geopolitical ambitions. The most dramatic change came about in 2016, when the PLA restructured from 7 military regions to 5 Integrated Theatre Commands, with each command being assigned a particular region or threat [10]. The next section will briefly look at the five Chinese theatre commands in order to provide the reader with an understanding of the current PLA military structure. The People's Liberation Army Command Structure: A Snapshot
Image Courtesy: DW The People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of China is divided into five Theatre Commands. The table below lists out the five commands and areas of responsibility by Command.
Eastern Theatre Command[11] Headquartered in Nanjing and encompasses the areas of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi and the East Sea Fleet
Southern Theatre Command[12] Headquartered in Guangzhou and encompasses the areas of Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Hong Kong and Macau
Western Theatre Command[13] Headquartered in Chengdu and encompasses the areas of Sichuan, Tibet, Giansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang and Chongqing
Northern Theatre Command[14] Headquartered in Shenyang and encompasses areas of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Shandong and Inner Mongolia
Central Theatre Command[15] Headquartered in Beijing and ecompases the areas of Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shaanxi, Henan and Hubei
These five theatre commands or PLA Battle Zones have replaced the former seven military area commands in Beijing, Nanjing, Chengdu, Ji'nan, Shenyang, Lanzhou and Guangzhou from the 1st of February 2016. According to Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun the shift from MAC’s to Theatre Commands was made with a view to “improving the joint operational commanding institutions, forming the joint operational system, better safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests, and maintaining regional stability and world peace.”[10]
The goal of each Theatre Command is to prepare for conflict in the respective areas of responsibility. The Western Theatre Command has been set up to deal with future conflict with India and as such merits a closer view in terms of manpower, platforms, equipment and resources that have been allocated.
The Western Theatre Command comprises of the 76th Group Army, the 77th Group Army, the Xinjiang Military District (Urumqi), The Xizang Military District (Tibet) and the Air Forces.[16]
The 76th Group Army located in Xining comprises of the following forces 1 Special Operations Brigade 4 Armored Brigades 2 Infantry Brigades 1 Artillery Brigade Engineering/NBC Brigade 1 Support Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade 1 Air Defense Brigade
The 77th Group Army, located in Chongqing comprises of the following forces 1 Special Operations Brigade 2 Armored Brigades 4 Infantry Brigades 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Engineering/ Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) brigade 1 Support Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade 1 Air Defense Brigade
The Xinjiang Military District comprises of the following forces 1 Special Operations Brigade 1 High Altitude Mechanised Division 3 High Altitude Motorized Divisions 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Air Defense Brigade 1 Engineering Regiment 1 Electronics Warfare Regiment 1 Helicopter Brigade
Xizang Military District comprises of the following forces 1 Special Operations Brigade 1 High Altitude Mechanised Infantry Brigade 2 Mountain Infantry Brigade 1 Artillery Regiment 1 Air Defense Brigade 1 Engineering Brigade 1 Electronics Warfare Regiment
The Air Forces of the Western Theatre Command comprise of the following divisions and their corresponding platforms
4th Transport Division 1 Transport Regiment with Y-8/Y-9 aircraft 1 Transport Regiment with Y-7 aircraft 1 Transport Regiment with Y-7/ Y20 aircraft and Mi-17v5 Helicopters
6th and 33rd Fighter Divisions 2 Bomber Regiments with H-6K aircraft 1 Bomber Regiment with H-6H aircraft
Lanzhou Base 2 Fighter Brigades with J-11 aircraft
Urumqi Base 1 Fighter Brigade with J-8H aircraft 1 Fighter Brigade with J-11B aircraft 1 Attack Brigade with JH-7a aircraft
Xian Training Academy Five training brigades with JL-8, Y-7 and Z-9 aircraft
Others 1 Survey Regiment with Y-8HI aircraft 1 Mixed Surface to Air Missile (SAM)/ Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Division 1 Mixed SAM/ADA Brigade 1 SAM Brigade 4 Independent SAM Regiments[16] It is important to note here that China’s Western Theatre Command has been structured and equipped based on the theatre specific requirement. In a future war with India, the structuring and the resources allocated to the Western Theatre Command will enable it to effectively manage the conflict without the need to seek resources and men from other Commands. China’s military modernization and defense spending has allowed the country to produce defense equipment of good quality as well as in large quantities to ensure that each Theatre Command is self-sufficient.
The Indian Armed Forces currently lacks the manpower and the equipment (both qualitatively and quantitatively) to create Integrated Theatre Commands that are self sufficient. The next section will touch upon the proposed ITC structure for the Indian Armed Forces and the fundamental roadblocks that prevent such a restructuring.
Independent Theatre Commands in the Indian Context
It has been opined that the 17 commands of the Indian Armed Forces be brought together under three ITCs The Northern Command that will assume overall responsibility for conflict with China The Western Command that will assume overall responsibility for conflict with Pakistan The Southern Command that will assume responsibility for India’s maritime interests
While the integration into ITCs along the above lines is prudent from a certain standpoint, the author argues that such a restructuring at least in the short term is unviable. Taking the examples of the militaries of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, currently the most powerful militaries in the world, the ability to successfully divide their armed forces into ITCs is contingent on the availability of sufficient manpower, equipment, platforms and a robust research and development base.
The Indian Armed Forces suffer from chronic manpower, equipment, platform, and funding shortages across the three services. Current Research & Development (R&D) is still found wanting and has resulted in India becoming the world’s second largest arms importer *17+. The Indian Army currently faces a shortage of armor, artillery, armored personnel carriers, night fighting capabilities, modern rifles, bulletproof jackets and ammunition among other resources. The Indian Army unlike its western and Chinese counterparts remains a manpower centric force as opposed to a platform centric force, thus placing a huge strain on budgets which are typically allocated towards providing sustenance for, training of and billeting troops instead of towards capital acquisitions.
The Indian Air Force has a sanctioned strength of 42 fighter squadrons which is considered the minimum requirement in the event of an all out two front war. Currently the IAF possess around 31 squadrons and is only expected to reach the sanctioned strength of 42 by 2035[18]. The Air Force is made up of primarily vintage fighter aircraft notably the MiG-21, Mirage - 2000, Jaguar, and Mig-27 aircraft. Plans for a fifth generation fighter aircraft remain on the drawing board for the immediate future and induction of large numbers of fourth generation fighter aircraft is expected to take around a decade.
Rafale Fighter Jet Image Courtesy: defensenew.com
Latest generation platforms like the Rafale fighter aircraft and the Apache AH-64E attack helicopters currently being inducted are being placed in equal numbers in air bases near China and Pakistan. While this allocation may be prudent during peacetime, should future conflicts arise with either one or both of India’s neighbours, it is likely that air assets may be moved to different air bases in another theatre of conflict, based on the severity of threat and given the lack of significant numbers of fighter aircraft to sustain a single theatre without the need for additional support.
The Indian Navy which has made significant strides towards indigenisation of platforms and their respective components aims to possess 200 modern ships by 2027.[19] The Naval Air Arm, boosted by the recent acquisitions of MiG-29s and Poseidon surveillance aircraft, still lacks modern multi-role helicopters and anti submarine warfare helicopters. The Indian Navy’s submarine fleet remains depleted due to poor planning, delayed production timelines. The Indian Armed Forces currently does not possess the bandwidth to allocate limited air and naval platforms to one particular theatre of conflict. In the event of a localised conflict on one front, it is possible to allocate dedicated air and naval platforms to ensure a decisive victory, but in the case of an all out war situation in one or both fronts, resources will need to be allocated based on area of requirement and urgency of need. An argument can also be made that air and naval platforms need to remain theatre agnostic in order to ensure judicious usage. For example, an Israeli made Phalcon airborne early warning and control system (AEW&C) can be equally effective in conducting surveillance on both the Pakistani and Chinese borders without necessarily being allocated to one specific theatre. Likewise fighter and bomber aircraft can be equipped with countermeasures and weapons systems that enable them to carry out offensive operations in both Chinese and Pakistani theatres. Naval warships are developed keeping in mind the latest offensive, defensive, stealth and propulsion technologies are not made with a view towards engaging Pakistani or Chinese naval vessels only.
The same logic can be applied to punitive strike weapons like missiles and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). These platforms must remain theatre agnostic with deployment based in locations that will enable them to survive a first strike while ensuring maximum lethality when launched. An example of such platforms includes BRAHMOS cruise missiles. There are variants of this supersonic cruise missile and the deployment of each variant is rightly based on functionality of variant type. While the Indian Army has already inducted Block I and Block II BRAHMOS regiments, it is now in the process of inducting the Block III “steep-dive” variant which can destroy targets behind mountain ranges.[20] The army plans to base this regiment in the north-east of India, to counter China, but the same missiles can also be placed in other theatres of operation that require steep dive capability.
A case can however be made for theatre specific planning and equipment/platform procurement for the Indian Army. For example, a war with Pakistan would require adequate numbers of artillery, T-90/T-72/Arjun tanks and weapons that can fire in over 50 degrees Celsius of heat in Rajasthan to minus 50 degrees Celsius in Siachen. A war with Pakistan would assume an offensive character and as such would require equipment and platforms that support offensive action across the Line of Control and the International Border. A conflict with Pakistan would require equipment that is suited to the deserts of Rajasthan, the plains of Punjab and the high-altitude terrain of Kashmir. In contrast, a war with China would be of a defensive nature and would require that soldiers be trained and acclimated to high altitude warfare and equipped with gear that allows them to function in sub-zero temperatures. Tanks and artillery has to be light and portable in order to be transported by land or air to battle zones at high altitudes. There is also a need to ensure border road construction projects are completed on time in order to ensure faster supply lines. The overall goal of a conflict with China would be to ensure India’s territorial sovereignty is maintained by repulsing Chinese assaults to behind the Line of Actual Control and the International Border.
It is thus prudent to conclude that the creating ITCs along the lines of their western or even Chinese counterparts is not practical given India’s unique threat assessments, geography, and strategic requirements. What is also clear is that the current command structure and structuring of forces is not optimal to fight a modern war. The next section will look at current changes being made to the force structures of the Indian Army and how the command structure of Indian Army can evolve in order to prevail decisively in a future conflict.
Countering China: Creating New Command Structures to suit the Indian Context
The Indian Army seeks to move away from a Corps based structure towards Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs). Each corps typically has three divisions and each division has three brigades. IBGs are essentially brigade sized elements which comprises of infantry, armored, artillery and air defense units.[24] IBGs will take only 12 to 48 hours to mobilize as opposed to mobilization of an entire corps which can take days if not weeks based on existing logistics. IBGs are constituted and equipped based on the three T’s which are threat, terrain and task and thus each IBG will require different equipment, weapons, and platforms. IBGs will also be offensive and defensive in nature with equipment, weapons and platforms being once again different for offensive and defensive IBGs respectively. [21]
The current command structure must also evolve to make effective use of these new force structures. A good case study is the Indian Navy’s Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC) inaugurated in Gurgaon in 2014. The role of the IMAC is to collate and process data from naval and coast guard stations, ships as well as merchant ships (through automatic identification systems) in order to create a real-time live image of the 7500- kilometer Indian coastline. [22]. While the army currently possesses the capability of real time battlefield imaging, the author proposes that the Indian army create two Unified Theatre Commands – one for managing conflict with China, the and the other with Pakistan. Each of these Unified Commands will be responsible for collecting and processing data specific to its theatre of conflict in order to create a real-time battlefield image. This will allow more streamlined and efficient decision making in order to ensure a decisive victory in a short span of time. This is important given that China has worked diligently to improve mobilization time for the PLA through a network of roads near the border and development of robust supply lines.
The author proposes that each of these Unified Theatre Commands be further divided into sectors with a sub-command assigned to each sector. Currently, the ultimate responsibility for managing conflict with China lies with the Northern, Central and Eastern Army Commands. The author proposes these three existing commands be designated sector commands with the following functions - Capture, collate and transmit real time battlefield data to the Unified Theatre Command - Work with newly formed IBGs to draw up battle plans and conduct exercises to validate these plans - Assess the evolving threat in each sector in order to ensure optimal availability of manpower, equipment, platforms and weapons
The author does not call for the decentralization of command structures. Modern warfare cannot be waged by top-heavy centralized decision making alone. The role of the Unified Theatre Command will be to define the overall “war doctrine” at a strategic level, while delegating actual tactical battle planning and execution to the various sector commands. The wars of the present and the future are “information wars” and it is important to collate all the data across multiple sectors in order to create a real-time image of the war across the entire battlefront. Thus the role of the Unified Theatre Command will be to - Create a real-time image in order to visualize the war across the entire battlefront - This will enable military leadership to transfer manpower, weapons and resources to from one sector to another in real time, or deploy reserve forces to a particular sector based on the outcomes of individual battles - Create a strategic roadmap for a possible future conflict with China, thus allowing for smarter defense procurements and allocation of manpower - Identify, develop, test and validate future weapons and technologies in electronic warfare, cyberspace and artificial intelligence domains in order to prevent the PLA from crippling civilian and military infrastructure prior to battle.
An argument can be made that a war with China will very likely be a two-front war or a two and half front war, with Pakistan and various insurgent groups acting to destabilize the country from within. In this two-front war scenario, it is opined that Pakistan and China can be looked at, not in terms of two separate theatres of conflict but as one large theatre. Given the fact that China supplies Pakistan with large quantities of defense equipment, and that interoperability between the two armed forces is improving over time, the use of newly raised IBGs under existing Indian command structures is more than adequate, given the sector specific nature of each Indian Army and Air Force command. The author is however of the view that both China and Pakistan while sharing some common goals, have different political and military objectives. A war with China would likely create a second front with Pakistan, who will seek to annex Jammu and Kashmir. A war with China could be fought for a variety of reasons that range from China’s desire to assert regional dominance through limited conflict to an all-out war to annex Arunachal Pradesh. The author strongly believes that irrespective of a one front or a two-front war, Unified Theatre Commands are still essential to fighting future information wars.
Creating a Robust Army Air Arm
During the Kargil War, one of the key takeaways was the lack of agreement between the Indian Army and Air Force in terms of air support. The army requested use of helicopter gunships, only to be refused by Air Force which was in favor of precision air strikes. While this did not ultimately impact the outcome of the war in a significant war, in a broader conflict, disagreements of this nature can be the difference between victory and defeat.[23] The author proposes that the Army Air wing be allocated the primary use of close infantry support air assets such as rotary wing helicopters, drones and other weapons platforms.
Take for example the current procurement of attack helicopters. India has ordered 22 AH- 64E Apache helicopters of which at the time of writing eight have been delivered. Ten are to be sanctioned towards airbases facing Pakistan, the other ten being sanctioned to bases facing China with the last two kept in reserve [24]. After a prolonged turf battle between the Indian Army and IAF, the Ministry of Defense sided in favor of the IAF in terms of ultimate operational ownership of these Apache helicopters. As a result, the Indian Army now seeks to place an order for a paltry 6 Apache helicopters for its Air Wing [25]. Likewise, when observing the induction pattern of the Light Combat Helicopter indigenously developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, it is noted that both the Army and Air Force have placed orders resulting in duplication of platforms [26].
The author agrees that the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force has every right to procure the same platforms citing specific threats and mission requirements unique to each service. However, duplication of procurements as a consequence of “turf battles” between the Indian Army and Air Force is counterproductive in the long run. Thus, the author is of the opinion if the newly created IBGs are to be have the necessary firepower to prevail against a conventionally superior Chinese military, the Army’s Air Arm must be given ultimate ownership of rotary wing air assets and other close quarters infantry support air platforms.
Countering China at Sea: The Naval Dimension It is fallacious to assume that Indian Navy’s Western and Eastern Commands are theatre centric. While, from an administrative point of view, it is convenient to assume that the Western Naval Command is responsible for managing conflict with Pakistan and its Eastern counterpart is responsible for managing conflict for China, this structuring is outdated given the threat assessment of today. China has established a naval presence in ports at Chittagong, Hambantota, Gawdar and Djibouti among others. It is not essential to physically place the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships in each of these ports to constitute a threat. The use of these ports as listening posts and fuelling stations coupled with China’s increased naval activity in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) will require that all of the Indian Navy’s Commands work in close cohesion with each other in order to remain vigilant towards China’s increasingly assertive naval posture in the region.
In the aftermath of 26/11, the Indian Navy was put in charge of ensuring net security of India’s maritime boundaries. This was done as the Coast Guard at the time lacked the requisite manpower and equipment to perform the task on its own. This resulted in the Navy pivoting away from a key goal of becoming a “blue water force” towards a more coastal defense type role. In the last few years, the Navy and the Coast Guard alike have made huge strides towards improving capabilities in order to protect India’s coastlines. This has allowed the Navy to re-focus on the overall goal of winning future naval conflicts in wartime, while protecting India’s naval interests and vital maritime trade routes in peacetime.
The PLAN currently has around 300 warship hulls. This includes 23 destroyers, 59 frigates, and 37 corvettes and 76 submarines, including ballistic missile submarines armed with long range nuclear missiles, nuclear-powered attack submarines, and diesel electric attack submarines. The PLAN currently has more warships than the United States Navy which is estimated to have around 287 warship hulls[27]. In comparison, India has only around 140 warships and around 220 aircraft with another 56 ships on order.[28] This numerical disparity may seem alarming to a casual observer but quality of warships play a far more decisive role than quantity. China lacks the major power projection platforms required to carry our long-range, expeditionary operations. China currently has only one carrier, and no amphibious assault ships. It has no cruisers, or a surface ship larger than a destroyer and no principle ships to protect carriers and other platforms from missile attacks. The Jingdao- class Type 056 Corvette and the Jiangkai-II-class Type 054A frigate ship types currently make up around 2/3s of the Chinese naval fleet. he Jingdao-class Type 056 Corvette are small lightly armed ships and can only perform submarine hunting missions off the Chinese coast while the Jiangkai-II-class Type 054A frigate lacks the ability to defend aircraft carriers[27]. In contrast, while the US Navy has only 287 warship hulls, it possesses 11 carrier groups and numerous surface combatants that can carry out long range expeditionary missions at short notice. The PLAN is rapidly making strides to address these qualitative gaps by building a second Type 002 carrier as well as simultaneously constructing two Type 003 carriers. China is also constructing one Type 075 amphibious assault ship and at least four Renhai-class Type 055 warships, which can be classified as guided missile cruisers.[27]
The Jingdao-class Type 056 Corvette Image Courtesy: Navy Recognition
China currently has maritime disputes with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam in the South China Sea, and also with Japan and South Korea. China’s increasing militarization of the South China Sea has resulted in the need for the PLAN to maintain a continuous and robust presence in the area. As such, in a future conflict with India, it is unlikely that the PLAN will dispatch all of its surface and underwater combatants against the Indian Navy. The Indian Navy must focus on competing qualitatively instead of trying to match the PLAN in numbers. In order to decisively dominate an adversary in any future conflict, the PLA and the PLAN have developed robust Anti Access/Area Denial (AA/AD) platforms that can be used to deter intervention by both Asian and Western navies. The University of Sydney’s United States Study Center has warned in a study that the PLA has developed long range missiles in sufficient numbers in order to overwhelm Western and Asian military bases in the Western Pacific in a matter of hours.[29]While the contents of this study can be debated, what is clear is that in the absence of strong naval platforms, the PLA has focused on AA/AD capabilities to protect against future naval conflicts.
There is no strategic or tactical rationale in combining the Eastern Naval Command into an ITC with the army and air force. Instead the Eastern, Western and Southern Naval Commands need to work with greater synergy in concert with the Southern Air Command to develop AA/AD platforms that will deter a PLAN invasion of the Indian Ocean in any future conflict. The naval commands must be given the overall responsibility and the autonomy to purchase surface to ship missiles, coastal batteries, and naval air assets that include multi- role helicopters, fighter jets and anti-submarine helicopters to create a robust AA/AD infrastructure. The building of surface combatants and submarines is important, but adequate resources, funding and planning must be given towards creating sufficient AA/AD capabilities. To assign technologically superior air assets such as Rafale and Suhkoi jets only to airbases responsible for China and Pakistan while deploying Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas jets to southern air bases is counterproductive given the nature of the current PLAN force capabilities. To de-prioritize India’s maritime defense in favor of trying to win a land war could lead to catastrophic consequences for India.
Conclusion India needs to take a pragmatic look at her current state of defense preparedness when planning for any future conflict. It is important not to be haunted by the ghosts of the past, but at the same time learn from errors of the past. It is discouraging to note that more than five decades after the 1962 war, not all the lessons have been learnt and for the ones that have been learnt, steps taken to prevent against making the same blunders have not been fully implemented. There still remains a great divide between political aspirations and military realities and the level of dialogue between the political decision making class and military leadership needs to be more frequent. Any attempt to create an ITC that mirrors Western equivalents simply as a show of strength domestically and internationally can have disastrous consequences in any future conflict that may arise.
There is a need to develop defensive and offensive capabilities taking into account India’s political goals, willingness to spend on defense and a clear, fact based threat assessment of the future. India is not a country with designs of hegemony over the sovereignty of other nations. India seeks only to maintain the territorial integrity of her borders while providing security and stability to the region. It is along these lines that the Indian Armed Forces of tomorrow need to be shaped and prepared and not in a one-size-fit-all solution.
References
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Glossary of Terms
AA/AD - Anti Access/Area Denial ADA - Air Defense Artillery AEW&C - Airborne Early Warning and Control System CDS - Chief of Defense Staff GoM - Group of Ministers MAC - Military Area Command IAF - Indian Air Force IBG – Integrated Battle Groups IMAC – Information Management and Analysis Center IOR - Indian Ocean Region ITC - Integrated Theatre Command LCA - Light Combat Aircraft PLA - People’s Liberation Army PLAN - People’s Liberation Army Navy PRC - People’s Republic of China R&D - Research & Development SAM - Surface to Air Missile UCAV – Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle USD - United States Dollars