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1 Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine: Capabilities, Limitations and Possible Response from Pakistan By Masood Ur Rehman Khattak SASSI Research Paper 32 March 2011 Published by South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI), 36 Alie Street, London, E1 8DA South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) 2011 2 List of Acronyms AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System ABM Anti Ballistic Missile AEW Airborne Early Warning BFSRs Battlefield Surveillance Radars C4ISR Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance CSD Cold Start Doctrine C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence CAG Comptroller Auditor General CDS Chief of Defense Staff DGMO Director-General of Military Operations EW Electronic Warfare FATA Federally Administered Tribal FMCP Force Multiplication Command Post FPD Fire Power Demonstration HQ-9 Hongqi-9 ISRO Indian Space Research Organisation IPKF Indian Peace Keeping Force IBGs Integrated Battle Groups IAF Indian Air Force JCSC Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee LORROS Long-Range Recce and Observation Systems MBT Main Battle Tank NCW Network Centric Warfare NBC Nuclear-Biological- Chemical NCOs Non Commissioned Officers OIC Organisation of Islamic Conference PAF Pakistan Air Force RAPID Reorganized Army Plains Infantry Division SAM Surface to Air Missiles SCO Shengai Cooperation Organisation SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute UAVs Unmanned Aerial Vehicles UN United Nations US United States WLRs Weapons Locating Radars 3 Contents List of Acronyms 02 Abstract 05 1. Introduction 06 2. Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine- (CSD) 06 3. Indian Military’s Capabilities for the Implementation 11 Of Cold Start Doctrine 4. Indian Military Exercise from 2004-2010 14 4.1. Exercise Divya Astra- 2004 14 4.2. Exercise Vajra Shakti- 2005 15 4.3. Exercise Desert Strike- 2005 15 4.4. Exercise Sanghe Shakti- 2006 16 4.5. Exercise Ashwamedh- 2007 16 4.6. Exercise Shatrunash- 2007 17 4.7. Exercise Brazen Chariots- 2008 17 4.8. Exercise Hind Shakti - 2009 18 4.9. Exercise Vayu Shakti - 2010 18 4.10. Exercise Yodha Shakti- 2010 19 5. Main components used in Indian Military Exercises 20 from 2004-2010 6. Evaluation of Indian Military Exercises 25 7. Critical appraisal of the Indian Military’s CSD: Limitations 26 7.1. Infrastructure Barriers for IBGs at the Border 26 7.2. Uncertainty in the Limited war 26 7.3. Shortage in Military Weapons and Equipments 27 7.4. Shorter Lines of Communication Advantage for Pakistan 28 7.5. Nuclear Dimension 28 4 8. Pakistan’s Response to Indian Military’s CSD 30 9. Recommendations for Pakistan 34 9.1. Leadership/Military and Political 34 9.2. Regular Military Exercises and Coordination 34 9.3. Assertive Role of the Foreign Office 35 9.4. Technological innovation in Pakistan military machine 35 10. Conclusion 36 11. About the Author 37 12. Annexure 39 5 Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine: Capabilities, Limitations and Possible Response from Pakistan By Masood Ur Rehman Khattak Abstract The South Asian security is in danger because of the Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine. Cold Start is an aggressive military doctrine directed against Pakistan. Under the Cold Start Doctrine, India would launch quick, swift and short duration limited strikes against Pakistan to achieve shallow territorial gains. According to Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine, limited war is possible in South Asia. India has carried out ten exercises since 2004 to 2010 to operationalize Indian military’s Cold Start Doctrine. Indian latest defence acquisitions would cross 200 billion dollar mark in next 12 years; combined with this India is also bringing pre-emption as a component of its war fighting campaign. Irrespective of the number of exercises and defense acquisitions, Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine is still challenged by infrastructural, organizational, and operational barriers. Pakistan’s response has been timely and adequate however continues to adopt practical measures to counter Indian Military’s Cold Start Doctrine. For future deterrence stability Pakistan’s counter measures would require innovations related to force posture, doctrinal development and the overall deterrence relationship. Author is a Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute. His areas of interests are Nuclear Deterrence, Terrorism and Regional Security, FATA and Afghanistan. 6 orientation of the Indian armed forces 1. Introduction from defensive to offensive. Under this doctrine, Indian Army would carry out outh Asian security is challenged swift, quick and offensive joint by the most critical military threat, operations with the support of its Air S the Indian Military‟s Cold Start Force and air elements of Navy while Doctrine, which is based on change in giving no time to Pakistan to respond. It the Indian military‟s force posture and is evident from recent arms acquisitions, employment and deployment patterns. development in the armed forces and ten Lingering issues between the two military exercises in the last six years nuclear powers of the region, Pakistan that India is on course to put into and India, resulted in 1948, 1965, 1971 operation its Cold Start Doctrine against wars and the Kargil conflict and it is a Pakistan. possibility however remote, that any future conflict may obtain a nuclear Former Indian Army Chief General facet. (retd) Deepak Kapoor said that, “The possibility of limited war under a nuclear Thus deterrence in South Asia is delicate overhang is still a reality in South 1 because of changing strategic Asia.” However, there seems to be environment. An assortment of crisis certain limitations in the situations has troubled the relationship operationalization of Indian Military‟s between Pakistan and India. The most Cold Start Doctrine. It is imperative to serious were related to the Brass-tacks examine the doctrinal challenges and Exercise in 1986-87, the Kashmir- development of Indian armed forces. related crisis in the spring of 1990, 1999 This paper has five parts: first part Kargil clash, border standoff in 2001-02 would briefly discuss the Indian and the threat of surgical strikes by India Military‟s Cold Start Doctrine and its on Pakistan after 2008 Mumbai incident. main components, second part would All these crises situations depict that assess the Indian capabilities for the threat of escalation is even more evident implementation of Cold Start Doctrine, than in the past because of the Indian third part would highlight the limitations Military‟s Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) of the Cold Start Doctrine and fourth towards Pakistan. part would focus on Pakistan‟s response to the Cold Start Doctrine. Last part will India introduced Cold Start Doctrine suggest some practical recommendations (CSD) in the backdrop of attack on its for Pakistan. parliament and subsequently its military failure to subdue Pakistan in the 2001-02 2. Indian Military’s Cold Start military standoff. India was unable to Doctrine (CSD) achieve its objectives because of international pressure and threat of A military‟s doctrine provides the basic nuclear escalation. Main purpose of principles that shape the way in which Indian Military‟s Cold Start Doctrine is its forces are employed to achieve to give a punishing reply to Pakistan in case of any alleged terrorist attack on Indian soil with totally different 1 “Possibility of Limited War in S Asia: Indian Army Chief”, The News, November 24, 2009. 7 national objectives. Doctrine reflects a assaults, for rapid thrusts into Pakistan military‟s customary way of fighting and within 96 hours.4 provides a common frame of reference Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and for military officers by identifying their Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities of general missions as well as the basic the Indian Army and air force with concepts about how the armed forces robust command and control at its core will carry out those missions.”2 would be employed to maximum effect. Synergy and integration between the In 2004, Indian Army introduced the Indian forces would be essential Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) seeking to elements of the Cold Start Doctrine modify its approach to war, to fight short (CSD). Joint operations of three forces duration limited conflicts under the are key element of this doctrine. nuclear shadow.3 Indian Military‟s offensive power has been concentrated According to Indian Military‟s Cold into three strike corps, which possess an Start Doctrine (CSD), holding corps armoured division each with mechanized (Pivot Corps) would play a crucial role infantry and extensive artillery support. when these defensive corps would Holding corps operate as defensive corps initiate an offensive. The IBGs will at the border which consists of one seemingly maneuver under the command infantry division each for static defence, of the holding corps, and be deployed in one mobile mechanized division that smaller units that are based much closer could respond to enemy penetrations, to the border.5 In such case, Indian Army and a small number of armoured units would be able to save deployment time. each. It would achieve element of surprise and Indian Military‟s Cold Start Doctrine a quick response to any alleged (CSD) would require reformation of the provocation or terrorist attack. Main army‟s offensive power into eight objective of Indian Military‟s Cold Start smaller division-sized Integrated Battle Doctrine is to undermine Pakistan‟s Groups (IBGs) that would have Military capability and make some mechanized infantry, artillery and trivial territorial gains that could be used armour. The IBGs would be self- in the post conflict negotiations to contained and highly-mobile, with extract concessions from Pakistan. The Russian-origin T-90 MBT and upgraded eight battle groups would be prepared to T-72 M1 tanks at their core, adequately backed by air cover and artillery fire 4 Dr. Subhash Kapila, “India‟s New “Cold Start” War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed”, South 2 Walter c. Ladwig, “The Challenge of Changing Asian Analysis Group, Indian Military Doctrine”, India-Seminar, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers10 http://www.india- %5Cpaper991.html, (accessed on 15th seminar.com/2009/599/599_walter_c_ladwig_iii.
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