Events Leading to the Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962 | 1

EVENTS LEADING TO THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT OF 1962 | 1 IDSA MONOGRAPH SERIES NO. 58 FEBRUARY 2017 EVENTS LEADING TO THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT OF 1962 SUNIL KHATRI 2 | SUNIL KHATRI Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). ISBN: 978-93-82169-71-0 Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Monograph are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute or the Government of India. First Published: February 2017 Price: Rs. 300/- Published by: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg, Delhi Cantt., New Delhi - 110 010 Tel. (91-11) 2671-7983 Fax.(91-11) 2615 4191 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.idsa.in Layout & Cover by: Vaijayanti Patankar Printed at: M/S Manipal Technologies Ltd. EVENTS LEADING TO THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT OF 1962 | 3 CONTENTS PREFACE .......................................................................................... 5 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 9 Chapter I NON-ALIGNMENT: AN INDIAN RESPONSE TO THE COLD WAR ...................................................................... 14 Chapter II THE MACHINATIONS OF THE DALAI LAMA'S BROTHERS ................................................... 31 Chapter III THE AMERICAN GREAT GAME TO WEAKEN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM ................................... 36 Chapter IV THE CIA'S COVERT OPERATION IN TIBET ........................................................................................... 43 Chapter V THE PURPOSE AND OUTCOMES OF THE CIA’S COVERT OPERATION IN TIBET ................................................... 49 Chapter VI THE IMPACT OF THE CIA'S COVERT OPERATION ON SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS AND THE REGION ........................................................................... 62 CHAPTER VII THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT 20 OCTOBER 1962—21 NOVEMBER 1962 .............................. 87 Chapter VIII THREE EXISTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT .............................. 101 4 | SUNIL KHATRI Chapter IX KALIMPONG IN THE CIA'S COVERT OPERATION IN TIBET .................................................................... 119 Chapter X THE PRC’S IMPERIAL LEGACY .......................................................................... 124 Chapter XI CHINESE CHEQUERS: ONE-UPMANSHIP ON THE BOUNDARY QUESTION .................................................. 132 CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 155 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................. 163 EVENTS LEADING TO THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT OF 1962 | 5 PREFACE It was in March 2015 that the author set out to search for evidence for the Dalai Lama’s older brother, Gyalo Thondup’s assertion made in his autobiography, The Noodle Maker of Kalimpong: The Untold Story of My Struggle for Tibet (2015) in which he has written that the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 was one of the outcomes of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) covert operation in Tibet, which commenced in 1956. The fact that very little has been written about that operation made the task of searching for evidence somewhat challenging. Apart from Thondup’s account, two other accounts1 written by persons directly associated with the covert operation in which that operation is covered in some detail are available. For some reason, this operation has not received the sort of attention that it deserved. One reason for this could be that very little material pertaining to the operation has been declassified, despite intentions to the contrary. Accordingly, not much is known about it. Alongside, the initial phase of the Cold War in which the operation was set is a difficult period for researchers, especially those seeking a balanced perspective. The CIA's covert operation in Tibet occurred during a period in which the Cold War appeared to be waxing. Beginning with disturbances in Poland and Hungary in 1956, it reached a crescendo in 1962 with the Cuban missile crisis. It was during this period that, after having had bitter quarrels with its ally the Soviet Union, the PRC was seen to be moving over to the American-led Western bloc, having already burnt its boats with India and, consequently, non-alignment. In the alignments that emerged after the end of World War II, the Western bloc could somehow not find a suitable role for India which was in keeping with its aspirations. As a result, in spite of strong historical ties, Western concerns and interests often appeared to be clashing with those of India and vice versa. Naturally, these clashes led to an estranged relationship between the two, resulting in India's proximity with the Soviet Union, whose policies and actions, in comparison, appeared 6 | SUNIL KHATRI more friendly and benign. This study attempts to examine this estranged relationship, and how it limited the degrees of freedom available to India in formulating its policies, especially in respect of Tibet and the PRC. It appears that this estranged relationship was carried over to the covert operation in Tibet. The CIA, either on account of Thondup’s assertion or otherwise, most probably the former, through an ex-functionary, Bruce Reidel’s book, JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War (2015), has made a quiet admission to the effect that the ‘covert operation played a role in Mao’s decision to invade India’. However, in an attempt to water down this admission, the Sino-Indian conflict has been portrayed as an ‘unanticipated consequence’ of that operation. Reidel is shy in providing citations for his qualified admission. He even chooses to make an indirect reference to some of the CIA’s declassified documents on the Sino-Indian conflict (referred to in this monograph) through citation of Anuj Dhar’s book, CIA’s Eye on South Asia (2009), which purports to summarise these declassified documents. Reverting to Thondup’s assertion, it has become possible to extend and connect the dots. What emerges is that his assertion appears to be true and correct. Although, there is no direct evidence to establish his assertion, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence available to nail the Americans for providing at least a catalytic agent in the form of the CIA’s covert operation in Tibet to sow seeds of discord between India and the PRC that would cause a rupture in Sino-Indian relations, culminating in the 33-day armed conflict of 1962. The case against the Americans also draws strength from the intent of the covert operation which is clearly spelt out in their National Security directives of 1954- 1955, referred to in Chapter I of this monograph. As it has been described by the Dalai Lama, the covert operation was a ‘cold war tactic’ to weaken International Communism. While this monograph attempts to establish Thondup’s assertion, it also looks at the three different interpretations that have emerged so far, for lack of a better description, by the three schools that attempt to offer an explanation for the events that led to the Sino-Indian conflict. These schools emerged at a time when very little was known about the aims and purpose of the covert operation. Moreover, the Cold War EVENTS LEADING TO THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT OF 1962 | 7 was then still in full swing. Unlike the Great Game, the Cold War was not fought according to rules prescribed by gentlemen, and for gentlemen. This war was fought according to Doolittle’s rules in which the means employed became irrelevant. Naturally, scholarship on the subject during the period was affected by what may be described as ‘the imperatives of the Cold War’. From the clear dogmatic self-serving historical perspectives provided by Mao et al. to explain the events leading to the Sino-Indian conflict which, surprisingly, the Chinese still appear to be clinging to, there appeared, at the Indian end, what some have described as outbursts of Chinese betrayal to account for the events. What emerges in this monograph is that the CIA is the originator of the Forward Policy school, which was to be taken to new heights by a one-time journalist Neville Maxwell in his popular account on the subject, India’s China War (1970). Maxwell was to remain a one-book wonder. What also emerges is that a few Indian military personnel who belived they had an axe to grind, or felt that they owed an explanation (to their country?), have chosen to take refuge under the shade provided by the protagonists of this school. This monographs attempts to show why the explanations provided by all three schools are baseless, and fail scrutiny in the light of the facts that have now emerged in respect of the CIA’s covert operation in Tibet. Notwithstanding what has been stated in this Preface, the findings arrived at in this monograph could be treated as being in the nature of a preliminary expression of opinion. By extending and joining the dots what at least definitely emerges is a skeletal structure of an explanation. For this skeletal structure to take final form, some muscle et al. needs to be added. Hopefully, the CIA and other organs of the US government should soon lift the covers off the covert operation in Tibet. Indian researchers

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