The Grand Strategies of Middle Powers: Organizational Determinants and Constraints
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Title Page The Grand Strategies of Middle Powers: Organizational Determinants and Constraints by Stephen M. Worman Bachelor of Arts, Quinnipiac University, 2005 Master of Arts, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 2010 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2021 Committee Membership Page UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS This dissertation was presented by Stephen M. Worman It was defended on March 12, 2021 and approved by Hal Brands, PhD, Professor, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Michael Kenney, PhD, Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh Phil Williams, PhD, Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh Ryan Grauer, PhD Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh ii Copyright © by Stephen M. Worman 2021 iii Abstract The Grand Strategies of Middle Powers: Organizational Determinants and Constraints Stephen M. Worman, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2021 What exactly is grand strategy? Is it a phenomenon that can be observed in practice, and in real time? What causes states to adopt the grand strategies they do? This dissertation tackles these questions head on, by proposing a novel theory which explains the form a state’s grand strategy might take. The “organizational determinants of grand strategy” theory posits that disparities in state and organizational-level resources (in the form of money, manpower, and elite attention) influence the form a state’s grand strategy takes, and governs the rate of change. This dissertation focuses on middle powers, which provides analytic leverage on the notoriously difficult concept of grand strategy. It examines the case of India and its grand strategy around three conflicts: the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the 1971 Third Indo-Pakistan War, and the 1999 Kargil Crisis. Additional three other cases are studied to increase generality of my theory: Australian grand strategy around the Vietnam War, Pakistani grand strategy around the Third Indo-Pakistan War, and Dutch grand strategy around Operation Trikora. This dissertation showcases that the “organizational determinants of grand strategy” theory is able to explain most, if not all, grand strategies considered and is generalizable to others, when appropriate data sources are available. iv Table of Contents Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... xv 1.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Defining grand strategy ................................................................................................. 2 1.2 Understanding grand strategy ....................................................................................... 6 1.2.1 Does grand strategy exist in practice? ................................................................6 1.2.2 Can we know grand strategy in real time? ........................................................8 1.2.3 What causes states to adopt the grand strategies they do? ............................10 1.2.4 Why understanding grand strategy matters....................................................15 1.3 Plan of this dissertation ................................................................................................ 18 2.0 Toward a new theory of grand strategic change ................................................................ 20 2.1 Existing Theories of grand strategic change .............................................................. 21 2.1.1 Externally oriented theories of grand strategic change ..................................24 2.1.2 Internally oriented theories of grand strategic change ...................................26 2.1.3 Problems with these theories .............................................................................28 2.2 The organizational determinants of grand strategy .................................................. 29 2.2.1 The Resource-Based View of the Firm .............................................................38 2.2.2 The Theory ..........................................................................................................42 2.3 Methodology .................................................................................................................. 47 2.3.1 Increasing Inference ..........................................................................................48 2.3.2 Case Selection .....................................................................................................56 2.3.3 Variable Operationalization ..............................................................................60 v 2.4 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 67 3.0 The 1962 Sino-Indian War ................................................................................................... 68 3.1 Indian grand strategy around the 1962 Sino-Indian War ........................................ 69 3.2 Measuring grand strategy ............................................................................................ 73 3.2.1 Pre-1962 grand strategy analysis ......................................................................78 3.2.2 Post-1962 grand strategy analysis ....................................................................83 3.3 Potential Explanations ................................................................................................. 90 3.3.1 Externally oriented theories ..............................................................................91 3.3.1.1 External Threat ...................................................................................... 92 3.3.1.2 Regional Security Architecture ............................................................ 96 3.3.1.3 Summary of externally oriented theories’ ability to describe the case ............................................................................................................................. 99 3.3.2 Internally oriented theories ...............................................................................99 3.3.2.1 Leadership ............................................................................................ 100 3.3.2.2 Strategic Culture .................................................................................. 101 3.3.2.3 Summary of internally oriented theories ability to explain the case105 3.3.3 Organizational determinants of grand strategy ............................................106 3.3.3.1 Pre-war state-level resources .............................................................. 107 3.3.3.2 Pre-war organizational-level resources ............................................. 111 3.3.3.3 Post-war state-level resources ............................................................. 120 3.3.3.4 Post-war organizational-level resources ............................................ 122 3.4 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 129 4.0 The 1971 Indo-Pakistan War ............................................................................................. 133 vi 4.1 Indian grand strategy around the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War .................................. 133 4.1.1 Measuring grand strategy ...............................................................................135 4.1.2 Pre-1971 grand strategy analysis ....................................................................138 4.1.3 Post-1971 grand strategy analysis ..................................................................143 4.2 Potential explanations ................................................................................................ 149 4.2.1 Externally oriented theories ............................................................................149 4.2.1.1 External Threat .................................................................................... 150 4.2.1.2 Regional Security Architecture .......................................................... 153 4.2.1.3 Summary of externally oriented theories’ ability to describe the case ........................................................................................................................... 155 4.2.2 Internally oriented theories .............................................................................156 4.2.2.1 Leadership ............................................................................................ 156 4.2.2.2 Strategic Culture .................................................................................. 158 4.2.2.3 Summary of internally oriented theories’ ability to describe the case ........................................................................................................................... 161 4.2.3 Organizational determinants of grand strategy ............................................161 4.2.3.1 Pre-war state-level resources .............................................................. 162 4.2.3.2 Pre-war organizational level resources .............................................