“Studies of Military Sociology in the Context of Globalization and Its Contribution to the Transformation of the Indonesian National Defense Forces (Tni)”

“STUDIES OF MILITARY SOCIOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCES (TNI)”

AMARULLA OCTAVIAN

Second Edition

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 1 1/16/14 9:40 AM Towards a society with a superior military

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 2 1/13/14 9:26 PM For my precious ones: Anna, Jordy and Wildan

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 3 1/13/14 9:26 PM Second Edition 2012

Published by UI Press, Indonesia

Editor : Deniek G. Sukarya Text Design : Taja Sukarya Graphic Design : PT. Sukarya & Sukarya Pandetama

ISBN : 978-979-456-517-9 (paperback)

The Military and Globalization: Studies of Military Sociology in the Context of Globalization and Its Contribution to the Transformation of the Indonesian National Defense Forces (TNI)/Amarulla Octavian

Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the publisher of this book.

Printed in Jakarta, Indonesia

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 4 1/13/14 9:26 PM Table of Content Remarks from Prof. Dr. Purnomo Yusgiantoro ...... 6 Foreword from Dr. Iwan Gardono Sujatmiko ...... 8 Preface from the Writer ...... 12 Chapter I Introduction...... 16 1.1. Globalization and Security Issues...... 17 1.2. Military Sociology ...... 19 Chapter II Discourse on Globalization in Military Studies...... 26 2.1. Views on Globalization by Anthony Giddens and Studies on Military Sociology...... 26 2.2. Kenichi Ohmae’s Economic Regionalism...... 30 2.3. Keith Faulks: A Return to the Nation-State Concept...... 32 2.4. Jonathan Kirshner and National Security Issue...... 34 2.5. Empirical Studies by Norin Ripsman and T.V. Paul...... 37 2.6. Summary...... 44 Chapter III Globalization and the Revolution in Military Affairs...... 50 3.1. Globalization and National Security...... 50 3.2. Developments of Revolution in Military Affairs Concepts and Ideas...... 52 3.3. The World’s Military Technology Procurement...... 57 3.4. Globalization and Inter-state Conflicts...... 62 3.5. Transnational Organized Crimes...... 67 3.6. Summary...... 72 Chapter IV Military Transformation: Country Case Study ...... 78 4.1. The Changing Paradigm of Warfare...... 78 4.2. Military Transformation Practices in Europe...... 80 4.3. Military Transformation Experience in Asia...... 83 4.4. Military Transformation Cases of China and the United States: A Comparison...... 91 4.5. Summary...... 100 Chapter V Indonesian Military and Policiy Mapping...... 104 5.1. Reorganising and Rationalizing the Indonesian Military: A Brief History ...... 104 5.2. Influences of Global Dynamics on Indonesia’s Military ...... 120 5.3. TNI Development and Its Long-Term Implications...... 127 5.4. Summary...... 129 Chapter VI Initial Scenarios of Indonesian Military’s Transformation...... 136 6.1. Why is Transformation a Necessity?...... 136 6.2. Global Level Scenario...... 138 6.3. National Level Scenario...... 141 6.4. Summary...... 145 Chapter VII Theoretical Contributions to Military Studies...... 150 7.1. The Search for an Indonesian Globalization Paradigm...... 150 7.2. Military in the Perspective of Sociology ...... 152 7.3. Contribution of Globalization Ideas to Military Sociology...... 153 7.4. The Fall of the Civilian-Military Wall: Critiques for Huntington...... 155 7.5. The Future of Military Sociology Studies...... 159 7.6. Summary...... 161 Chapter VIII Closing...... 164 Bibliography...... 166 Index...... 171

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 5 1/13/14 9:26 PM Remarks Minister of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia Prof. Dr. Purnomo Yusgiantoro

As we enter the twenty first century, the paradigm of how a nation defends itself has shifted. Nation-states, such as Indonesia, are required to synergize their defense ideological foundations with economy, technology, and information. These fields, also called as the triangular force, are the determining factors of global strength in this twenty first century. Sociology expert, Professor Manuel Castells (2010) in his publication The Power of Identity: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture suggested that the triangular force can surpass conventional power since they work based on networks and no longer rely on a country’s domestic capability. Furthermore he explained that the power of a network of elites is able to surpass the boundaries of territory, ethnic groups, religions, cultures, and even the state. Will one day nation states diminish and replaced by a new order called network societies with transnational characteristics?

Not all nation states, including Indonesia, would experience this deterioration of authority. Many of them remain strong, such as the United States. Others have taken ways to establish networks of countries, for example the European Union. The important aspects of a nation-state’s longevity are its economy, technology, and information power and influence. Those who are weak in these fields will eventually find themselves on the sidelines of international affairs. In fact many countries are becoming more dependent on transnational networks societies, even for the purpose of making their own domestic economic decisions.

Keeping in mind our country’s diverse nature, our defense system is conventionally adapted with the characteristics of this diversity in our vast archipelagic geography. In the past, Indonesia’s political policies were formulated and implemented through a centralistic approach and state ideology was the foundation to promote the awareness of the values of patriotism and nationalism. Changes in our globalized world have pushed us to adapt ourselves through relevant transformations in this era of economy, technology, and information. A state’s ideology and the peoples’ welfare are two sides of the same coin, and the last is the key to a successful state defense. As the steward of

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 6 1/13/14 9:26 PM Remarks Minister of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia national defense, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia gradually has Prof. Dr. Purnomo Yusgiantoro embarked on a journey entering the new paradigm; towards the development of a pro- welfare national defense system (Sistem Pertahanan Negara or Sishanneg) in tune with democracy.

The shift of global paradigm has significant implications on the function and role of the military. There are two inseparable dimensions of our defense policy: military and non- military defense. The military itself also has two distinct dimensions, namely Military Operations and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Although we may not witness many deployments of military personnel and armaments from one country to another, globalization has brought along with it a new set of threats that will increase in numbers and scale in the future. Therefore the military will play an vital role through its non-military role, such as addressing cyber war, terrorism, piracy and armed robbery against ships, natural disasters, as well as actively engage in peacekeeping missions under the United Nations.

I therefore welcome and congratulate the publication of this book written by Amarulla Octavian, an officer of the Indonesian Navy, which talks about the context of military sociology and globalization and its contribution to the transformation of the Indonesian National Defense Forces (TNI). This book is one of a few written by military authors that elaborate the function and role of the military in this dynamic age. It is always important and interesting to discuss and elaborate the state of this less-known art from time to time, especially those written by military officers themselves.

Jakarta, March 27th 2012

Purnomo Yusgiantoro

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 7 1/15/14 11:30 AM Foreword Dr. Iwan Gardono Sujatmiko Sociologist, Social and Political Science Faculty, University of Indonesia (FISIP-UI)

On Globalization

Globalization has become an increasingly popular phenomenon, signified by the advancement of technology. Some calls it the death of distance. Through the technology of communication and information, people are aware of events from places far from them in real time and in many places simultaneously. Globalization is also often linked to westernization since, for example, the countries of the former Soviet Union and China have embraced the western lifestyle (Europe and the United States) by visiting McDonalds and enjoying western pop music. Its implications has also been linked to the creations of the World Wide Web and Facebook with members of around one billion people or netizens; a number that could only be surpassed by the population of China and India.

In reality, however, globalization has a history that stretches even further back, and brings with it many aspects of society. In this context, globalization is a process of changing something local to something global. For example millions of years ago the process of human globalization began in Africa (“Out of Africa”) as humans from the continent moved to other parts of the world. As for technology, its spread and development started with the Agricultural Revolution 10,000 years ago from the Fertile Crescent region around Mesopotamia, where countries such as Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iran, Turkey and Iraq established. The England’s Industrial Revolution came next in line and in the last two decades we have been a part of America’s Information Revolution. At the same time capitalism became global, for the pursuit of both natural resources and market and closely linked to colonialism. The later is very close to the concept of imperialism where economic power became and supported political power.

From a cultural perspective, today’s globalization is linked with the spread of many civilizations including Hindu-Buddhism (India), Christianity (Europe), Islam (Middle East), and China. The long process was complemented by the spread of western (Europe) ideologies: capitalism, socialism, communism, nationalism and democracy. During its history, both Indonesia and pre-Indonesia went though a complex and turbulent process,

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 8 1/13/14 9:26 PM such as the cross-cultural process in Java Island as descirbed in Denys Lombard’s book (Nusa Jawa: Silang Budaya, Volume I, II, and III, 2005). As people from Europe (Christianity), China, India (Hindu-Budhism), Middle East (Islam) came to Java and Nusantara, they brought with them influences of their culture and civilization to local cultures, in which the last were forced to adapt to these global forces. It also brought conflict among religion (Islam), nasionalism and communism and found its peak in 1965. ”Nas” (nationalism) and ”A” (religion) came together and fought against the “Kom’s” with an ending of the demise of communism. Afterwards, both nasionalism and religion (Islam) continues to cooperate as well as being in conflict with one another in all aspects of life. This process also included religious minority groups (Christianity and Hindu Bali) and local cultures (adat), such as seen in Papua and Kalimantan.

Conflict, Cooperation, Competition

From a sociological aspect globalization can be understood as “a social process where social relations such as conflicts, cooperation and competitions become even more intensive and extensive”. In this case, military globalization can be defined as a process where interstate conflicts and rivalries become narrorwer; thus a single conflict or war could have the whole world as its theatre, as we have seen in World War I and World War II. In reality, nonetheless, these three processes could link to one another and allowing conflict to have the elements of cooperation. In fact, in the Cold War era, the arena was dominated by two extreme polars (the United States and the Soviet Union). During this era, the conflict of these two”super power” resulted in an arms race; nevertheless both countries still worked closely together (through a hotline) to prevent possible conflict escalation towards Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).

The globalization of our economy and culture has made our world even more complex post-Cold War. Therefore the reason for a military conflict (an act of war) will not rely only on the strive for greater territory. It could arise from politics (territorial expansion), economy (the battle for natural resources) or even symbols. In this regard, there occurs an interlink between tension and competition for natural resources, which is often presumed as the source of conflict in the Middle East. Therefore, it should not be surprising to expect that war and military conflict served as a proxy from multinational companies whose ultimate goal was the endless pursuit of profit.

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 9 1/13/14 9:26 PM Today, the military is also required to contribute in other non-military areas, including economy. Examples can be taken from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Malaysia’s armed forces deployed in Africa as members of the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces, who assist businessmen to establish business network in the black continent. Other countries fully support their military men to participate and compete in international sport events. The military is both the country’s defense force as means during conflict and an organization which engages itself in competitions and cooperation. One form of this cooperation is laid out in the Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) with programs of cooperation with other groups within a society to resolve social issues and participate in a country’s development. There is also military- to-military cooperation through exercises and competition with neighboring countries. In short, all militaries in the world – as an organization – should be champions of conficts, competition and cooperation.

Therefore it would be a necessity to evaluate the success of strategies of conflict, competition and cooperation of a military. Has a military organization together with its units imrpoved its capabilities continuosly through research, pilot projects, or international cooperation? Is its Research and Development (R&D) program only a routine and bureaucratic process or does it focus on breakthroughs for improvement? Have the current indicators positioned the military better and higher compared to previous years? For the Indonesian National Defense Forces (TNI) to fully transformed itself, these questions are important as well as the answers. They will help TNI to prepare itself in facing globalization.

From Indonesia to the World

Globalization is a two-way process where all actors (state and non-state) have entered and influence Indonesia, or also called “external globalization”. On the other hand, Indonesia has come to a point where it also can contribute to the world or “internal globalization”. For long, as an example, Indonesia has participated in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations by sending its Garuda Contingents. Its commitment to world peace and security was strengthened by the establishment of the Indonesia Peace and Security Center (IPSC) in Sentul, Bogor, a facility with the potential of becoming a global center for military activities, including peacekeeping; a symbol of Indonesia’s participation in globalization. Another example is the thoughts of General

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 10 1/13/14 9:26 PM A.H. Nasution in his book “Pokok-pokok Perang Gerilya” (published in 1953, the book focuses on guerilla warfare or small wars) has been translated into many languages and has influenced many strategies on small warfare. From the Indonesian Navy, KRI Dewaruci has travelled the world with the Indonesian Naval Academy cadets onboard. They introduce Indonesia’s cultural heritage and maritime traditions. Such positive activity has not been in the agenda of many countries with stronger economy and technology. These examples show how Indonesia could provide significant contribution to the world regardless of its current limited power and resources. A clear planning and agenda are needed in order to maintain and improve these efforts.

Elaboration of military dynamics in the globalization era is the theme of this book, “The Military and Globalization”, written by Amarulla Octavian, and was based on a monograph he wrote for the Doctoral Program in Sociology at the University of Indonesia. This book is an initial study as well as an introduction on the relations between the military and globalization from a sociological perspective with the hopes of to help readers to have better comprehension of this phenomenon. It is my sincere wish that his dissertation on his analysis on the transformation of the Indonesian Naval Command and Staff College (SESKOAL) could also be published to accompany this book. Hopefully this book could raise interest for scholars to further understand, criticize as well as helping ourselves in preparations in facing our current trend, globalization.

Depok, April 4th 2012

Dr. Iwan Gardono Sujatmiko

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 11 1/13/14 9:26 PM Preface from the Writer

First of all I would like to praise God Almighty, Allah SWT, for the opportunity to write this book, the fruit of labor in which many have contributed in it, both personally and as a team. I wrote this book as an extension of a monograph I wrote as the requirement for completing my Doctoral Program in the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Sociology and Political Studies at the University of Indonesia. Therefore firstly I would like to thank my promoter, Dr. Iwan Gardono Sujatmiko, who has given me his thoughts, guidance, and criticism, all necessary to writing process of this book. I also would like to thank Bayu Asih Yulianto, M.Si., Nia Elvina, M.Si., and Arie Herdianto, M.Si., for their support as a team.

During the writing process I have received ideas and suggestions from my discussion partners such as Dr. Richardi Adnan, my colleagues Colonel Agus Rohman, Indonesian Army, Colonel Sri Pulung Dwatmastu, S.E., M.MS., Indonesian Air Force, Commissioner Dr. Rycko Amelza Dahniel M.Si., Indonesian National Police, and my good friend Tantan Hermansah, M.Si. They have all contributed in complementing many aspects of the book as well as providing needed feedbacks. Hence, many thanks to all of them. I also thank Deniek G. Sukarya, my editor and graphic designer of this book.

Since I could not mention each and every name, I would like to thank my colleagues, seniors and juniors from my campus, the Western Fleet Command and also the Marine Corps, for their time and constructive ideas and perspectives. I would also thank all that contributed to the process of writing until this book could finally be published.

It is my sincere wish that this book could contribute valuable knowledge as well as contribute studies in the field of military sociology. I hope this book can also contribute in the efforts to anticipate predictions and dynamics of future national

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 12 1/13/14 9:26 PM and global security. On the other hand, hopefully it can intrigue other military thinkers, especially in Indonesia, to play a more active role in exploring ideas and suggestions to develop this field. This book was published in several different languages in order to reach out international readers, as well as contributing in the availability of Indonesian books in the global arena.

I am aware of the shortcomings of this book. In this second edition I have made corrections based from readers’ feedbacks I have received since the first edition was published. Constructive suggestions and critique to this second edition would be most valuable.

And finally, this book would not be possible without the love and support of my beloved parents and family. I thank them for their endless love and compassion. To the readers, I hope you will enjoy reading my book, as I pray it will be of use to us all.

Lagoi-Bintan, June 2nd 2012

Amarulla Octavian

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 13 1/13/14 9:26 PM 14

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 14 1/13/14 9:26 PM Chapter I

Introduction

• Globalization and Security Issues • Military Sociology

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 15 1/13/14 9:26 PM Chapter I Introduction Studies on military issues in Indonesia are often more focused on the military’s role within the state, including its civil-military relations or on the history of the military’s relations with the state and the people. As a nation that declared its independence in the last moments of the Second World War and at the dawn of the Cold War, the role of the military in Indonesia in advancing transitional processes in society and in the country has been considered quite significant. Regardless of whether its influence and the changes were considered positive or negative, many cases suggest that the decisions proposed by the military have served as positive energy supporting civilian and bureaucratic elements, which later produced breakthroughs, particularly in the political realm. Although this thesis might suggest a more superior position by the military in comparison to other institutions, history recalls that its engagement has proven to be beneficial and possessed merit, such as during the political transition era in the 60’s and during the 1998 reformation process, when the military also started its own reforms. Whether or not this positive momentum could have continued after 1998, there is still a lack of research on such social phenomena despite the recent political reality. From the latest political dynamics, however, we can see how this organization could still cater to the people’s demand for leadership. The current President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), is a retired Army General and despite criticisms has received the legitimacy from the people to continue his leadership for a second term. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that since the 1998 Reformation, the military institution has taken its part in the reformation process through its organizational reformation. A number of new values had been adopted while simultaneously removing other historical power attributes held for several periods during the New Order, such as the Socio- Political (Sosial Politik or Sospol) Concept in the dual-function of the Indonesian Military Forces (Dwifungsi ABRI), which permitted military personnel to actively participate in legislative and executive bodies.1 The conditions above demonstrate that, besides having a strong historical role in this country, the Indonesian military, better known as TNI, has accommodated required changes within its organization as part of the social and political changes. The fact that

1 As a concept, the Dwi-Fungsi has experienced its own ups and downs from the Old Order, to the New Order, and Reformation Order. In 1958, Gen (Ret.) A. H. Nasution introduced the basis for Dwi-Fungsi, the Jalan Tengah concept, which provided a way for both civilians and military personnel to build Indo- nesia hand-in-hand; there was no civil-military dichotomy. Then in 1966 the concept was implemented through the Dwi-Fungsi ABRI, with Defense-Security (Hankam) as its first function and Socio-Cultural (Sosbud) as the second. The second function then transformed in 1977 into Socio-Politics (Sospol) due to the military’s day-to-day politics.

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 16 1/13/14 9:26 PM the military continues to have a strong influence on civilian-made policies is undeniable. Nonetheless, there is a general sense today that TNI is willing and open to external criticism and feedback from those who hope for a more professional military as well as an organization that implements universal norms of human rights and democracy. At this point, it would be correct to assume that the current position and role of the military in Indonesian politics still draws significant attention from a number of scholars. However, despite several scholars researching the military, seldom do we find scholars delving into the sensitive issues in the military: the transformation of the military institution itself. This transformation should answer challenges not only from Indonesia’s social and political changes, but also from the challenges of global security threats and the domination of security issues, the last of which might be taken from a number of scholars of the globalization phenomenon. The majority of scholars are interested in discussing what other roles can be played by the military in broader society. Even if there were discussions on transformation in military institutions, most are trapped in modernization of technology and organization terminologies. This reality in itself becomes a great necessity to understand further the intense interaction between the military as a state institution with the dynamics of global political economies and the basic challenges experienced by a social organization. The understanding of this transformation process may perhaps be better described through a more sociological point of view instead of legal, political and security studies. Therefore it becomes critical to have sufficient sociological understanding to appreciate how Indonesia’s military institution continues to develop and remains dynamic. Through this perception we can expect a better comprehension of the traditional characteristics of TNI and how transformation patterns should unfold, especially when related to the current challenges of global security. Thus, it becomes necessary for us to observe how far the current progress and dynamics of globalization affect the discourse on military sociology, especially when discussing organization capacity issues such as leadership, technology, structure, hierarchy and doctrine. Ultimately it can be said that effort is the pursuit of establishing a bridge between globalization theories and military sociology discourse.

1.1. Globalization and Security Issues The most appropriate word to describe the relevance between globalization and the military is security. It is the most often discussed term when we review the dynamics of the military institution within the context of globalization. Hence, discussing the issue of security from several aspects becomes the main key in identifying the significance between globalization and military sociology.

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 17 1/13/14 9:26 PM The discourse on military development is connected closely to the dynamics of globalization. Countries around the world have developed their own studies on the development of their military in order to have further understanding of globalization for its high influence on all sectors of life, especially on issues of global security, national interest and security, and public order as well as universal values of human rights and democracy. The issue of security has become an essential agenda for world leaders; hence it becomes a turning point for the state to formulate ways to response the development of global security. The dynamics of military institutions – organization, technology, doctrine and human resources – are intertwined with the way a state views its own security at the national, regional and international level. Hence a thorough study on the dynamics of globalization could be a turning point for the military to evaluate and transform itself into an organization ready to manage future challenges. Discussions concerning security itself are inextricably linked with state and political issues, while globalization and security are closely related to the political dynamics of a country. This would explain why it would be more appropriate to discuss military and globalization issues in the realm of political sociology, since security issues are related to the political concept between a society and a state. This argument would go along with Ayoob’s comment (2005) that the effects of economic issues could be seen as security issues after passing through a political process or a political analysis. He then pointed out that the concept of security should not be placed in a framework of analysis that is too broad since it could endanger the benefits of such analysis. He suggested viewing security as concept connecting order and authority; certainly associated with politics.2 After the Cold War ended, the world witnessed an increase of variations of criminal activity that could threaten security. As the United States found itself without a rival to its global political power, new forms of threats upon national security emerged. One of them is terrorism, the most current security issue post Cold War. In his explanation, Paul (2005) provided an illustration of how political environment changes post Cold War created a discrepancy of organizational readiness between state-owned militaries and criminal organizations as seen in the September 11 attack in 2001 on the World Trade Center (WTC) New York. He then laid out several basic arguments about why the state was ill-prepared and even anxious in facing this type of attack. Such anxiety was caused by how the state viewed its national security; in a static manner. Previously states only considered state actors as immediate and possible threats to its national

2 Mohammad Ayoob suggested taking the concept of security away from the terminology of humanity since he believes that security is a political issue. Even the efforts of a number of scholars to include economy and environmental issues into the realm of security would have the potential to lose the benefits of this concept. It is not because both economy and environmental issues could not influence the security of a state; they would become security issues after becoming political issues – threatening a state’s sovereignty or trespassing state borders.

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 18 1/13/14 9:26 PM security. The decision to attack another state actor would come from a long and hard deliberation on the benefits and loses of such action. This does not apply to terrorism. Paul also explained how terrorists changed the way the state viewed attack patterns. Forts and military bases were no longer the target of attacks as they were in the past since acquiring a territory was no longer the main goal. These terrorists prefer to attack symbols of power and prosperity of a regime or a particular political or economic power. The attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon Headquarters in 2001, the 2002 Bali bomb attack and the suicide bomb attacks in the railways stations of Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005, are hard evidence of how terrorists have changed their methods in ways that have never been expected by the state or even political analysts. Paul’s basic argument is that the state is not prepared to confront criminal transformation patterns that threaten national security post Cold War.3 These two explanations show the strong correlation between the issues of globalization and security. As globalization changed many aspects of human lives, it shifted not only the patterns of political-economic powers, but also the patterns of conflict of interests. These changes have yet to be managed by the countries engaged; and thus bring about threats to a country’s national security. In this context, Ersel Aydinli (2005) provided three important points that should be considered in observing the issues of globalization and security. First, since globalization fuels continuous changes, security has inherited the nature of uncertainty, which pushes security professionals to include changes and uncertainties into each and every analysis. Second, power configuration, the source of most conflicts and disputes has become a threat worthy of attention in order to understand its relationship to national security threats. Third, the duality of the concept of state - traditional state-centric and multistate-centric. These concepts, in the end, do not negate or abolish one another. These views raised questions on the mapping of schools of thought that explain the connection between globalization and security, including their most concrete manifestations from existing relations.

1.2. Military Sociology Military sociology is a part of the science of sociology that specifically discusses the relationship between military and civil society. This study reflects empirical facts that the military, as an institution with the rights to perform forms of organized violence granted by the state, is a living and developing social organization within the society.

3 For further reading please look at T.V. Paul, “The National Security State and Global Terrorism: Why The State is not Prepared for the New Kind of War?” in Ersel Aydinly & James N. Rosenau (ed), Globalization, Security and Nation State, (State University of New York, 2005)

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 19 1/13/14 9:26 PM This approach is a realization of a changing society which prefers having the military under civilian authority or as a part of the society itself; therefore, civilian authority could also intervene in decisions on military affairs. In other words, military sociology is a form of civilian representation in the military sector. It is quite different from geopolitics, an aspect of political economy emphasizing the study of the geographical context of countries in fighting for their national interests. Military sociology, on the other hand, has a wider scope and geopolitics might be just one of its studies. How, then, can one describe the development of military sociology and its thinkers, from its humble beginnings to the present? The military sociology approach is rarely used by Indonesian scholars, although political science scholars, historians and defense and security professionals have conducted many military-related studies. Nevertheless the study would have a different breath if done through a sociological approach. The differences lie in how sociology looks at military issues, especially the institution’s relations with social structures of society and a state. In the context of this study, and having previously discussed the issue of globalization and security, it is time to look for an answer to the following question: how does the development of a security issue, affected by global changes, is connected to military issues, both in its relationship with the community as well as the military’s dynamics? The last suggests its relationship with society and its own institutional dynamics are related to its process of transformation; a logical consequence to global security challenges. It is important to explain the background of this issue in order to answer the question raised by this study: how far can global security issues contribute to military sociology studies, particularly in Indonesia? This question might provide more concrete answers on how Indonesia can face and manage globalization in the area of security, particularly in facing demands for institutional transformation. On the other hand, noting Indonesia’s history of military dominance in its politics, the question is also a sign of optimism that the fundamental changes of Indonesia’s political structure post- reformation have pushed significant changes in the civil-military relations; therefore the cries for transformation would come not only from civilians but also from within the military. Sociology, in particular military sociology, would be able to explain them. A sociological study on this topic would require the analysis of the latest theories on agent-structure dialectics and reciprocity as well as post-modern4 studies. It would provide us with an understanding of how the phenomenon of agent and structure influencing one another in the global community has become very loose. The concepts

4 Scholars such as Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens represent theories on these forms of social interaction, where they are more dynamic, particularly when related to how changes happen, survive and disappear. Their theories would definitely provide a different set of thoughts compared to sociologists who are genealogically separated due to the debate on the behavior of agencies or social structure determination.

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 20 1/13/14 9:26 PM of control and being controlled, influence and being influenced, or cause and effect would have their context. However such processes can not go on for a long period of time. Chances that agents could influence the structure or a that structure can force agents provide possibilities of managing or maintaining this transformation, or even failing it. The relation of globalization to Indonesia’s national security and military transformation should therefore use this perception. This book consists of eight chapters, each one exploring different issues, but the fundamental problem remains the same: the need to answer questions on the correlation between issues of security, globalization and military institution from a sociological perspective. Chapter One presents a general background of globalization and security issues and the introduction of sociological perspective in studying military issues. The introduction in the early part is hoped to help the reader to quickly understand the central issue of this book. Chapter Two will elaborate the discourse on globalization and national security thoughts and theories as well as theoretical debates on how scholars view these issues. At the end of this chapter, readers will see a table of scholarly theories from the standpoint of military sociology. Revolution in Military Affairs or RMA will be discussed in Chapter Three, providing readers with the key issues of global military transformation. RMA is a terminology adapted during the Cold War era and afterwards adopted by many countries worldwide. Many believe that RMA has been a necessity since military modernization became a requirement to ensure national security. This chapter will also provide readers with sociological consequences of the RMA process as it promotes the advancement of industries on military technology and how it transformed the forms of global conflicts and “promotes” the sophistication of Transnational Organized Crimes. Chapter Four will continue the discussion on RMA by giving details of the military transformation experiences of a number of countries, starting from how the idea of national military transformation came to be in the political economy dynamics of each country and how they executed their transformation. Readers will learn from the experiences of European and Asian countries as well as the military transformation of the world’s two major powers, China and the United States. The discussion on the development of globalization and national security connection will continue in Chapter Five as it takes readers to focus on Indonesia’s military institution development over time. History will demonstrate how global dynamics have significantly influenced the military’s organizational development. Domestic social and political affairs also played a role. To complete the discussion of the theoretical framework and the practice of transformation in many countries including Indonesia, Chapters Six and Seven will explain the answers of key questions mentioned in the beginning of the book. Chapter

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 21 1/13/14 9:26 PM Six provides an initial scenario of the transformation process that the TNI could immediately execute. It is called an initial scenario because it contains fundamental arguments on why such transformation is needed. The discussion is divided into two levels, national and global, based on the definition of the global environment and national security issues. The discussion is then translated into a set of theories in the seventh chapter to address academic needs as well as to encourage more studies on military issues using the sociological approach. The use of this approach is not only for the sake of the academic community, but also as a social practice that could further contribute to resolve social issues both in the military and in the context of military institution relations with other social institutions. The last chapter will provide readers with conclusions from all previous chapters. Answers from the books important and essential questions will be summarized in this chapter. The discussion will show how studies on globalization, national security and military sociology prove the military is the most adaptive social institution in the face of global change.

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bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 24 1/13/14 9:26 PM Chapter II

Discourse on Globalization in Military Studies

• Views on Globalization by Anthony Giddens and Studies on Military Sociology • Kenichi Ohmae’s Economic Regionalism • Keith Faulks: A Return to the Nation-State Concept • Jonathan Kirshner and National Security Issue • Empirical Studies by Norrin Ripsman and T.V. Paul • Summary

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 25 1/13/14 9:26 PM Chapter II Discourse on Globalization in Military Studies

The military is a very interesting subject of study with its very own system and structure. Furthermore, for as long as history itself it has influenced the structure of societies in the world. Most sociologists who were born and raised in the Italian society regarded the military as a special entity. Gramsci, Vareto, and many more explained the significance of this special organization is the studies of societies and communities. This chapter will discuss the opinions of mainly sociologists in studying global military organizations. It will provide arguments on the importance of military sociology studies.

2.1. Views on Globalization by Anthony Giddens and Studies on Military Sociology

Academics have paid enormous attention to globalization for their interest in the concept in addition to their anxiety about it. Giddens is one of the scholars who saw the connection between globalization and manufactured risk (Ritzer, 2003). His view is very much related to his own study on the concept of modernization. On one side modernization brought development or positive sides while on the other it also generated risks. The last was modernization’s unexpected consequence. Modernization started, according to Giddens, with the emergence of capitalism, industrialism, the ability to observe the people’s activities and the power to control weapons of destruction, including the industrialization of war machines. It also produced the separation of space and time. Humans started to standardize time; and space was starting to move further from its place. The parting created bureaucracy and a nation state with all of its skills to connect local and global authorities. This separation is one of the main sources of dynamism of modernity. Nevertheless it also instigated a number of problems. The risk created by modernization escalated to a global-scaled liability, such as the threat of a nuclear war or terrorism. The modern world started to experience insecurity and uncertainty. Like an uncontrollable juggernaut, modernization presented the world with risks never before seen or even imagined, raising questions on the world’s survivability. How did it come to this? Giddens identified four factors:First, error in determining the elements

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 26 1/13/14 9:26 PM of the modern world. Second, mistakes made by the operator of modernization. Third, unexpected outcomes of the process. And fourth, reflectivity of social science; a new science that continues to bring fourth systems as the people move to a new direction. Giddens, therefore, viewed globalization as sharing risks from modernization; restructuring the way global society lives through profound ways. In order to stabilize the world, globalization requires countries in the world to cooperate. Giddens believes it is a two-way process between Western and non-Western countries. It gave birth to a new area in the world system: transnational. Globalization pushed the development of two very different concepts; cosmopolitanism and fundamentalism. The first refers more to the United States’ hegemony and the Western’s influence on the economy and culture. The second, on the other hand, promoted the emergence of condensed local cultures. Fundamentalism comes in many shapes, including ethnicity, religion, and nationalism, and it eventually created a new issue of security. This issue then became transnational due to the nature of globalization, terrorism as an example. Giddens built his theory on the understanding that globalization must be viewed as sharing risks among democratic states, especially those who could play the role of an agent like the United States in the West and China in Asia. Through this perspective Giddens positioned globalization in the contexts global social interaction. It does not mean Westernization alone because it allows the emergence of local values in the global arena (glocalization). Therefore proposals to build bilateral, multilateral and regional cooperation to tackle security issues have become one of the solutions to minimize future lost or difficulties. The recent natural disasters, the SAR pandemic, global climate change and armed conflict throughout the globe necessitate the global community to establish new norms to provide fair risk- sharing mechanisms. Giddens successfully made us realize that the world has left no place for any state to take refuge from the influences and implications of globalization. Each and every nation is, like it or not, either in full realization or in complete darkness, a part of the globalization Giddens calls the juggernaut. It could not be stopped, it could not be denied, and it has its consequences and risks. An important point of Giddens’ view on globalization is how this process has reduced the centrality of the West. The juggernaut, unstoppable it is, will not just ram through those who are the “consumers” of global values but also the states producing them. Globalization stretches the spread of global power to all corners of the world. The once-dominant West is experiencing

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 27 1/13/14 9:26 PM how globalization strengthens their influence and at the same it also reduces their power over the global community. His most fundamental discussion on sociological concepts is how far the agent and structure relations influence one another in a society’s social construction as well as its ability to let the agent regain its ability to actively participate in a single structuring process. This process, in connection to the discussion on globalization, national security and the existence of military institutions, would suggest globalization is a structure that pushes the stage of structure reorganization inside state institutions, particularly the military, as means to answer the challenges of global issues as well as a process to ensure participation in constructing global rules in the game on security issues. Although Giddens has clearly stated the nature of globalization – it breaks through national and regional borders – it is clear that he has his hopes on the existence of nation states. His proposals indicate how nation states are one of the essential factors of minimizing the risks of globalization.

Studies on Military Sociology World War II marked the emergence of military sociology as an important study in sociology. Two traditions emerged in this study (Eric, 2005). The first one focused its studies on civil-military relations, which was started by Samuel Huntington’s piece in The Soldier and the State in 1957. Huntington offered his analysis on the relations of military force with civilian authorities in both democratic countries and those where democracy is still a work in progress, such as South Africa. The second tradition focuses on military as a social institution. The study was initiated by Morris Janowitz in The Professional Soldier in 1960. This analysis, according to Janowitz, did not limit itself to the military institution (during peace and war) alone, but also on its relations to the civil society, cuts to the number of armed forces’ personnel or weaponry, peacekeeping, and conflict management as well as conflict reduction. In his study he pointed out how society remains dynamic and so the military should be highly adaptive. It would be fair to state that Janowitz’s study is more holistic compared to Huntington’s since his analysis was based on previous military sociology studies, including Huntington’s work. In this classic piece Janowitz found that western military organizations in the West continue to improve their professionalism in their attitude, skills and knowledge; requirements of a modern military force. There is a more interesting debate among sociologist: the debate on military sociology’s position within the realm of sociology. Caforio (2003) suggested that

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 28 1/13/14 9:26 PM military sociology is a part of sociology as the likes of education sociology, religion sociology, and gender sociology. Nevertheless Caforio failed to present concrete arguments to explain the phenomenon of women in the military, which was only explained through the approach of gender sociology, or that political sociology could explain civil-military relations. Given such realities sociologists, especially those studying the military, agreed to place military sociology as a general part of sociology (Eric, 2005); therefore they would have the flexibility to utilize sociological studies on the military. Further analysis of both Huntington’s and Janowitz’s traditions shows that both scholars use an approach rooted in the functionalist approach; a method that emphasizes heavily the rigidness of systems. The realities of functions and dysfunction of a military system’s components then inspired the rise of a different approach known as the Weberian approach or an interpretative approach. Its roots come from the ideas and thoughts of the philosopher Immanuel Kant. He saw universality comes from a priori truths, in which these truths derive from propositions based on proofs. The idea was then developed by Dilthey by utilizing Max Weber’s famous concept of interpretive understanding (Verstehen). In order for a sociologist to comprehend a social reality, understanding the social actors is key. Max Weber developed this idea to help him understand social groups and organizations in particular. This approach is better known as the interpretative approach because sociologists interpret in order to understand social realities, including the realities of the military domain. This approach allows us to understand how old and new ideas play a part in the process of change in military institutions. For example: to understand why someone would prefer to become a soldier or sailor or airman or marine and how human resources policy adapts itself to this motivation. Through the interpretative perspective we could then determine the ideal soldier/sailor/airman/marine and the required changes to achieve it. It is important to remember that military sociology’s main idea is that the military is an organization of violence. In other words, military sociology is sociology that focuses on an organization that deals with violence (Eric, 2005) and that is the object of military sociology studies. Violence is a social reality, both potential and manifested. Since there are many forms of violence as well as many ways to review it, Eric (2005) believed that the interpretative approach is the most appropriate way to clarify the relationship between civilians and the military. Nevertheless, both interpretative and functional approaches have yet succeeded in providing explanations on military issues. The first approach tends to ignore the role of

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 29 1/13/14 9:26 PM structure in influencing the actions of agents or actors. The second one, the functional approach, ignores the role of agents in influencing or redefining the system. Although there have been studies using the critical approach, these studies were not considered accurate enough to explain the dynamics of the military world (Eric, 2005). However, as said by Janowitz himself, the society is very dynamic and complex, and the same goes for the military organization. It provided a door to a new perspective of analysis, including how sociology tends to use the agent-structure analysis.

2.2. Kenichi Ohmae’s Economic Regionalism

Kenichi Ohmae’s study provided an outlook of the world’s economic development post-Cold War. He stated that globalization in the economic sector has blurred the territorial borders of states. Although Ohmae’s explanation of globalization tends to be“right-winged”, he is also like Marx and Engels who acknowledge the existence of real economic activities that are mondial by nature. 5It would imply that economy is the key factor determining the massive social changes within nations as a result of globalization. Since the nation state is the true barrier between the society and globalization, it should be understood that this process is all about the spread of economy in every possible direction. Hence it should be viewed as opportunities for economic development, and not a threat. In his book The End of the Nation State in 1995, Ohmae explained the “the four I’s”, namely investment, information, industry, and individuals, which he believes are the main driver of the global economy. Investment in stock markets grew rapidly after the Cold War. Technology development contributed to a quicker flow of global money and currencies, and in some cases it could even undermine the state’s control of the process of transactions. These investments were primarily driven by international corporations, where their capital was moving in a very rapid manner across developed and developing countries, including Asia Globalization, along with astounding technological advancement, has pushed more investment in human resources. 6This trend was set in motion when consumers

5 For further explanation on Ohmae as a right-wing globalization scholar or that he has a neo-liberal tendency, please look at one of David Korten’s books, When Corporation Rule the World, Kumarian Press, 1995. 6 See Keith Faulks’s explanation on Ohmae in Political Sociology: A Critical Introduction, (Edinburgh University Press, 1999) p. 56.

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 30 1/13/14 9:26 PM started to consume goods and services according to their needs. Corporations found it neccessary to establish new industries to meet these demands, which required not only labor and land, but also human resources with the ability and creativity to produce relatively low–priced goods. Cheap labor and land became a demand, and establishing industries in developing countries became a rational choice for the corporate world while continuing to maintain industries requiring less labor and land in developed countries. Ohmae introduced two significant ideas in the context of this study; the first is the role of nation states has become obsolete since their territorial boundaries have been much blurred as one of the consequences of globalization. Here Ohmae is telling us the only way to fully experience the benefits of globalization is by cutting the role of states in order to eliminate the unjust systems of the world. In terms of a state’s political economic policy, deregulation is key to how it should respond to globalization challenges. Protection policies would only degrade a state’s value in the arena of global competition. A government’s over-protection of its economy such as foreign investment restrictions and policies unfavorable to the market would, according to Ohmae, do harm to itself. In his point of view, an interdependent world with unlimited economy would not require domestic sovereignty or difficulties; it needs deregulation to decrease economic barriers. The global economy can help to provide various solutions to these issues.7 It will, however, require strong leadership to lead the people in this global fight. Such a leader should be able to realize that the state can no longer manage or administer many things directly. In other words, in this era of globalization a state will need a leader who is adaptive to this process as well as willing to prioritize consumers’ interests. They are entitled to determine which goods they want to buy and how much they will actually pay for them. Ohmae considers leaders who negate these needs as leaders with deaf ears.8 Ohmae’s second significant idea is the rise of region state. After the Cold War, provinces or areas with a certain economic autonomy within a nation state are more developed compared to those run by the centrality of a state. China’s economic- autonomous areas have much higher GDPs compared to itself; Hong Kong’s GDP reached $12,000 per capita, Shenzhen’s GNP $5,695 per capita, and Guangzhou’s

7 Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation-State: the Rise of Regional Economies, (New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1995), Ch. 6. 8 Faulks, op. cit., p. 57.

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 31 1/13/14 9:26 PM increased by more than $5,000 compared to only $317 per capita in China. Based on these facts Ohmae then proposed the establishment of economic zones based on the concept of region state. He stated “Where prosperity exists, it is region-based. And when a region prospers, its good fortune spills over into adjacent territories inside and outside the political federation of which it is a part”.9 Since he believes that the nation state should become only a facilitator, Ohmae proposed the concept of natural economic zones. A regional economy system would be able to guarantee equal and fair economic growth in one particular region. Ohmae depicted a region state as an area with good and thriving economic powers, both domestically and outside their state borders. Japan’s Shutoken region is a successful implementation of this economic strategy. It is open to foreign ownership and direct foreign investment. The central government would, as a logical consequence, need to have a more flexible federal coordination structure.10 Ohmae’s region state concept brought some implications to the military world. He believes that the military should no longer delve into territorial control. It has become increasingly irrelevant as political freedom and knowledge of natural resources are important for economic globalization.11 The reduced state authority and its apparatus on the people would no longer require a military with full control over territorial issues. Consumers require freedom to make rational choices without any limitations, including the state and its military.

2.3. Keith Faulks: A Return to the Nation-State Concept

Globalization could also be explained as, under the same philosophical fundamental, the ability to search new areas outside of a state’s territorial borders or identity areas for market expansion. Keith Faulks defined globalization as the ability of a political ideology to construct free-market values. As a result of social interactions between the state and groups of societies - the Multinational Corporation (MNC) - globalization in the field of economy is not only inevitable; it is dominated by neo liberal politicians

9 Ohmae, op. cit., Ch. 7. 10 Ibid. p. 100. 11 Faulks, op. cit. p. 58.

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 32 1/13/14 9:26 PM with the support of a group of politicians with great suspicions over the state’s will to intervene between the people.12 Citing Hirst and Thompson (1996) in Faulks (1999), globalization is in no way the same as the concept of economic internationalization. The last has happened globally over a long period of time, while globalization is how major global corporations were able to develop the ability to expand the market. The striking difference between these two processes is the position and role of the nation state. Economic internationalization considers the importance of the state to make important political economic decisions a given, while globalization systematically removes the state’s role and replaces it with market players.13 Massive economic activities in the globalization process have exceeded the state’s ability to control and regulate. The disparity between developed and developing countries is an unavoidable implication. Globalization and its market jargon has not only failed to resolve this fundamental issue, Faulks even suspected them of meaning to ensure the situation remains as it is, since the interests of developed countries are more dominant in any global agenda. In extreme, Faulks considered economic globalization as economic polarization (1995:64). Furthermore he criticized the use of many terms in the context of globalization, including the return of Multinational Corporation rather than Transnational Corporation (TNC), and believes that the term globalization is better replaced with internationalization. Faulks made three conclusions from the long and hard debate among globalization scholars. First, although globalization is said to give birth to a so-called global culture – heavily-socialized Western values through high-tech information technology became universally accepted – it could not abolish the values and practices of local identity. In certain areas in the world, these practices have gained many believers. In other words, globalization does not always mean that the global replaces the local. Second, it would be fit to use the term economic internationalization rather than economic globalization because the last implies its actors as free from state control. International economic fluctuations, caused by the behavior of economic actors in the financial markets, are closely related to the state’s stability. These economic players can determine state stability. Therefore allowing them to go beyond state control would imply the loss of control over state stability; evoking instability. Third, the magnitude of the state’s role in massive corporate companies who claim themselves to be transnational corporations (TNCs), when in fact they are multinational corporations (MNCs), suggests that the

12 Ibid. p. 71. 13 Ibid. p. 62.

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 33 1/13/14 9:26 PM state’s political agenda and national law and regulations are their basic references for business and management expansion plans. Through his three conclusions Faulks tries to remind us that globalization is an outcome of a long and complicated interaction between the state and multinational corporations. Thus both individuals and associations still require the state for its abilities, which they lack; that is, control over the military, communications and economy (1995:69). In short, to Faulks globalization is neo-liberalization. The state is a paradox to the neo liberals. On one hand they are critical toward the state and on the other hand they position it as the necessary evil (1999:71).14 Faulks did not explicitly highlight the role of the military in globalization; nevertheless one could conclude that he considered the military as a unique factor only the state could have to prevent possible replacement from external forces. The discussion on military issues is interdependent with the state. Identifying globalization in the military would require discussion of the implications of globalization to the state. This concept highly criticized the notion that cries the end of nation-state as a mere exaggerated rumor (1995:213). The state remains a powerful entity with the role to fulfill the people’s goals and interests.

2.4. Jonathan Kirshner and National Security Issue

Jonathan Kirshner in Globalization and National Security talked about the important question from the most current debate on globalization: what are the implications of globalization on national security? Kirshner perceived globalization as the change of the nature of the game. Whether the state retains the traditional state-centric concept or adopts the multistate-centric paradigm, or if its national objectives remains the same, globalization would certainly require the state to have new ways to manage and tackle external and internal challenges and threats. Failure to take into account the implications of globalization will result in a lack of proper understanding of changes in the balance of power, the prospects of war, and the strategic choices faced by the state.15

14 The terminology was used by Faulks to outline how the liberals positioned the state in two very contra- dictive ways. They believe the state’s intervention over civil society should be restricted in such a way, but at the same time they also want the state to guarantee the security of civil society from external threats. 15 Jonathan Kirshner in “Globalization and National Security”, (New York, Routledge, 2006), p.1.

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 34 1/13/14 9:26 PM Kirshner viewed globalization as a driving factor more or less independent against countries in the world. It has the ability to force all parties to adapt themselves with new norms from the interaction process of global community. The ability of states to absorb universal norms coming from global interaction dynamics is a very powerful tool to further interpret globalization in order to determine appropriate national action or strategy to achieve a state’s national goals. Sociologically, he saw globalization as a structure that forces the state - as the agent - to perform actions. The agent itself - the state – becomes a subordinate of these global power and norms. In his book, Kirshner explained the definition of national security. He argued that national security refers to an organized political violence, which is an expression of vital interests of at least one state. Thanks to globalization, national security no longer only ponders over the issues of war, chaos and rebellion. It now must deal with globalization’s implications on security: the changes in balance of power, both defense and offence postures as well as changes in other factors that might lead to security dilemmas, the possibility of war and changes in the state’s ability and readiness to defend its national interests.16 This explanation strives to connect globalization and the military through national security. At this point national interest is a strong argument for any state to develop its military strength. Nevertheless today’s situation has provided states with transformed patterns of national security threats as a result of the giant waves of social changes, including the Industrial Revolution and the dramatic expansion (Kirshner’s own terminology) of information and communication technology; hence new definitions of security emerged from the development of the national security concept. Kirshner explains this process systematically (Figure 1), in which globalization forced new fundamental changes on the three elements of national security: autonomy and state capacity, balance of power and axes of conflict.

16 Ibid. p.2.

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 35 1/13/14 9:26 PM Figure 1. How Globalization Affects National Security

Globalization

Autonomy and Balance of Power Axes of Conflict State Capacity

Source: Jonathan Kirshner, 2006

1. Autonomy and State Capacity. The most obvious consequence of globalization is the demise of the state’s power and sovereignty. While this issue is debatable because globalization could be an effective tool for a society’s transformational process, the fact that there has been a decline in the state’s ability to manageits macro economy has resulted in its difficulties to move resources for war through capital mobilization. The flood of new information and sophisticated information technology has taken society to a hypermedia environment where a state would find it challenging and difficult to control its people. Some would feel that technological advancement such as these could not totally weaken the state, but it does provide opportunities for the state to transform and strengthen its civil society. By quoting the words of Ronald Deibert, Kirshner (2006) stated that facts have resulted in changes of relative power of social forces. Those with interests that match the surrounding communication environment would experience more benefit compared to those incompatible with a more open situation. 2. Balance of Power. Rapid changes of communication and information technology did not just influence the relative power of social forces; the state also experienced the implications. Since information is now accessible to anyone, states can no longer maintain a rigid control over their people; they have been forced to open themselves due to these changes and have seen the emergence of liberal political forces. On the other hand, the state’s policies might start to compromise transparency. Soon afterwards globalization will influence the patterns of state and market relations (trade and production).

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 36 1/13/14 9:26 PM States unprepared to face economy liberalization would be pushed into the corner when compared to those prepared with strategies and solutions. Today’s cutting-edge information technology allows people to compare the economy of any state and make calculations of the state’s political influence or power over another. 3. Axes of Conflict. Globalization also hones the forms, styles and patterns of organized political violence because it has tendencies to create national or regional instability. Highly social dynamics play a role in pushing the forms of conflict to become more specific because global values propagated in turn must deal with local norms in the society. The inability to manage these conditions will ignite conflict among the people. In addition, implications of globalization have also resulted in transformation of how violence and war are expressed. The most recent example and most frequently mentioned is the resistance against the United States’ domination through terrorist movements by the use of a particular religious label. Globalization has also pushed the possibility of war wide open. Reasons that were not commonly used to start war, such as democratization and humanity, are used more often in recent times. In short, globalization tends to make weak states weaker and strong states stronger.

2.5. Empirical studies by Norrin Ripsman and T.V. Paul.

Ripsman and Paul created classifications of seven groups of scholars on globalization and its relationship with national security and the military: 1. Group of hardcore globalization scholars; represented by Kenichi Ohmae who explains how economic globalization has decreased a state’s focus on national security as threats of proliferations are no longer enough to be managed by one state’s military. The reason behind this notion is promoted by the existence of international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank and their structural adjustments of creditor countries, requiring cuts in their military budget. These institutions believe that the amount of money necessary for war is not balanced with the results obtained from it (2010:24). 2. Group of soft globalization scholars; represented by Jonathan Kirshner who has a similar notion to the previous group (hardcore), in which globalization

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 37 1/13/14 9:26 PM has become a powerful driving engine for social, economic, and political changes of a state. In addition, state boundaries have become frailer than ever. Therefore, the military’s role in maintaining national security tends to fade due to the pressure of global influence on society transformation (2010:25). 3. Group of liberal tradition commercial scholars; represented by Richard Rosecrance who states that trade is more vital than military power. Hence, in the future, states should reduce their desire of resolving conflicts or disputes by war, even if it involves territorial issues. (2010:26). 4. Group of democratic peace scholars who state that as a state adopts more democratic values in its political system it will eventually reduce the possibility of future wars. In democratic states a decision to make war must be approved by the public and parliament. This kind of process eventually modernizes the desire for war of a state by views from external actors (2010:27). 5. Group of normative school; represented by Mark Zacher. He argued that since states have absorbed many global norms and values, such as human rights, anti-genocide, humanitarian intervention, territorial integrity, sovereignty and the fight against war criminals, it has been more difficult to declare war since it is no longer easy to find reasons to do so. This in the end drastically reduces the military’s role in securing a region (2010:28). 6. Group of supporters of global cultural movement, which states that cultural globalization will reduce international conflicts. A global culture would allow the international community to enjoy the same culture everywhere in the world, such as music, movies, books, and information, in which they provide the energy to unify the people of the world rather than dividing them (2010:28). 7. The last group argued that globalization has made societies to feel more strongly about their local cultural and religious identities, although the global culture is widely spread around the globe. Such “reinforcement” tends to manifest in forms of violent acts like terrorism. It uses the advancement of information technology, which is the most influential driver of globalization, in a “smart” way (2010:28).

Ripsman and Paul’s empirical study has allowed them to identify initial propositions that were not proven in regards to the implications of globalization over national security. One of these propositions is that globalization does not necessarily alter current and ongoing patterns of global relations. The most striking implication of globalization

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 38 1/13/14 9:26 PM post-Cold War is how terrorist attacks have increased in their sophistication of attack patterns. The war on terrorism has also involved even more states. They skeptically argued that the only influence post-Cold War globalization had on national security was only on how states cooperate together in fighting against terrorism as the new public enemy. At a state level, the so-called waves of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) are not proven or in line with the values of the concept itself. There are still many states that are empowering themselves with weapons of mass destruction, like nuclear power, and are significantly increasing the number of their military personnel. Even though the RMA transformation has some requirements in regards to war efficiency, it is a well-known fact that the development of a state’s military infrastructure remains one of its biggest budget posts. States are required to have stronger military power in order for them to face internal and external threats. Both Ripsman and Paul have found a number of propositions worthy of testing , focusing on national security issues. These propositions are divided into two levels, namely those tested at the global level (PG) and those at the state level (PS). This classification is based on the understanding of some scholars that globalization has supported fundamental changes in the patterns of international relations; this is where the global level propositions are tested: (PG1) Interstate conflict should decline; (PG2) Worldwide defense spending and military manpower should be declining; (PG3) Multilateral regional and global institutions should be increasingly important in the provision of security; (PG4) The incidence of global terrorism should have increased dramatically. These four propositions were then tested to see how far changes have occurred at the global level, though they might have been an issue for a long time. Under the assumption that globalization also has significant implications upon states, these scholars also proposed general propositions to be tested at the state level: (PS1) A shift in the nature of wars from Clausewitzian interstate wars to “wars of the third kind”- civil ethnic wars and wars between small states – has taken place; (PS2) States have increasingly shifted their national security focus establishments to counter the challenge of post-industrial warfare and, in particular, terrorism; (PS3) National security increasingly includes non-defense areas of trade, ecology, migration, and health, because threats are increasingly economic, environmental and disease related; (PS4) National military doctrines are abandoning offense in favor of defense/ deterrence; (PS5) States increasingly prefer to counter powerful rivals with soft balancing and other less competitive strategies, rather than traditional hard balancing; (PS6) National conscription and the size of the military apparatus should decline; (PS7)

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 39 1/13/14 9:26 PM Defense spending should decline as traditional military apparatuses become of less utility; (PS8) Military establishments are shifting from war fighters to police forces; (PS9) States are privatizing security by including non-state actors in defense activities; (PS10) States increasingly pursue security through regional institutions. The study was conducted in many countries in the world, where both scholars classified them into four categories; the world’s major powers (the United States, Russia, and China), countries located in relatively stable regions (Europe, Southeast Asia and Latin America), countries located in hostile/high-tensioned regions (South Asia, Middle East and East Asia) and finally countries that are most likely to collapse or fail (Africa). From this research, both Ripsman and Paul offered their conclusions based on the propositions tested in the current political-economy reality. First, despite the decline of possible escalation of inter state war (PG1), the intensity of interstate conflict does not reflect the same tendency. On the other hand, conflicts between states have increased in numbers, although war might not be the means to end such disputes. In terms of world defense spending, there was a declining trend but it only lasted until 1998. As the world entered 1999, defense spending started to increase again, and from the 11 September 2001 tragedy up to the present, global defense spending has escalated. A paradox is made as the number of military personnel declines, nevertheless military spending, especially weapons procurement, continues to increase; therefore causing problems

Tabel 1. Analysis of Global and State Level Propositions

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 40 1/21/14 11:19 AM in (PG2). On the role of regional and global institutions in security issues (PG3), their study has allowed them to conclude that there has been an astonishing growth of these international and regional organizations as the global community embraced openness post Cold War. Nonetheless they have yet to have the same level of influence on national or international-level decision making as a state has; in short they have not replaced the vital role of the state. Hence there is contradiction in (PG3). As for the final proposition (PG4), they concluded that there has been an increased number of terrorist attacks post 9/11, in which terrorism is often labeled as part of the radical Islamic movements. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between current terrorism and the ones prior to 11 September 2001, which was dominated by opposition to the state, for instance the United Kingdom with the Irish Republican Army or IRA and the Basque group in Spain. Despite the fact that there has been a significant increase in terrorist attacks, both scholars believe that these movements will not topple a state; in other words they acknowledge the truth of the last global proposition. After testing the global level propositions, Ripsman and Paul then started to work on the state-level ones. The results of their analysis showed a distinct difference between the groups of states of their classification (major powers, stable region, turbulent region, and weak or failed states). The following table illustrates how they described the condition of the propositions:

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 41 1/13/14 9:26 PM Source: Globalization and National Security State (2010) Ripsman and Paul p.166.

At the end of their work, Ripsman and Paul made two small conclusions as empirical facts from the tested propositions. First, they emphasized that the idea of globalization undermining the role of the nation-state, especially in creating and ensuring security for citizens of the world is not true; they underlined that a state is a social-economic institution with the ability to adapt to global challenges. Second, based on the above explanation, even though current global challenges and threats derive from a state’s relations with the liberal market system as well as multilateral agreements that require much, including values that did not exist before, each state again has the ability to adapt its national interests as a nation-state. They argued that a state is not only adaptive but alto very flexible in order to negotiate current global challenges. In other words, the implications of global power are true for each state, globalization, however, does not diminish the role of the state in international relations, including in its efforts to ensure its citizen’s security and wellbeing.

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 42 1/13/14 9:26 PM Apart from these conclusions, Ripsman and Paul also provided theoretical contributions to the work of globalization scholars by claiming that there has been no thinker on globalization that has been successful in fully capturing current global phenomenon (2010:177). They believe that liberal thinkers have failed to understand a state’s inability to leave behind the traditional security approach, while the realists, even though they acknowledge that the state’s existence is still growing strong, could not see the reality that many states in stable regions are attaining more benefits from national security management compared to those located in volatile regions. This has encouraged states to establish a regional organization for them to share responsibilities among the members in facing challenges to their national security; this reality reflects the shift of the national security paradigm from a realist view. They also criticize the failure of the constructivists to realize that security practices (according to the constructivists are traditional by nature) are still undertaken mostly by

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 43 1/13/14 9:26 PM states, especially those in turbulent regions. This shows that global values like human rights and democracy are not always placed above all, and for some states national security is still their top priority. Therefore, they both suggested that scholars establish a new approach that is detached from the existing mainstream paradigm; one that is accepted by most scholars. They also added the need to incorporate a more eclectic approach and nuance in observing the phenomena of globalization and national security. Hence scholars may be able to read all the possibilities that might arise from this global influence.

2.6. Summary

The variety of thoughts on globalization and national security are the outcome of intense interaction between scholars and the issues of national security and international relations dynamics. Nonetheless, genealogically we can see how the birth of these thoughts cannot be separated from the position of scholars of social thought. Some have advocated a world order based on individual rights and freedom, also known as liberalism with its focus on the power of the market economy as the most efficient mechanism to create national prosperity by leaving the state with the least significant role in formulating economic regulations, as proposed by Kenichi Ohmae. The strong opponents for liberalism are those who believe that such a market mechanism is merely an illusion created by a group of multinational capitalism to further strengthen their position in the world, so that the real agenda of welfare will never be reached as it negates fairness, as explained by Keith Faulks. The rest can be categorized as those who are either trying to find middle ground or do not wish to be trapped in the middle of these two main traditions. Further study would show that the latter tend to fail in avoiding such trap. In the context of this book, examples are Giddens and Kirshner, while Ripsman and Paul focus on the eclectic dimension of globalization. From the military sociology point of view, it is clear that military sociology illustrates an area of sociological study of the military domain, or in other words, looking at the military through a sociological point of view. In this context, a sociological look at the military would depend on the kind of approach used or what is the most interesting study subject. For example, we could view the military from the perspective of gender theory, where the subject of study would be why the male is very dominant in the military and so the institution reflects the minds and ideas of men.

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 44 1/13/14 9:26 PM Another might be interested to study how far technological developments influence behavioral patterns of how officers and subordinates can or would take action. There are still many subjects that can be studied and elaborated on through the perspective of sociology. This book uses the perspective of political sociology upon globalization to see how globalization affects the military, especially in Indonesia, and vice versa, how far a military institution in Indonesia can contribute to the development of universal military values. What Eric has explained, in addition to examples of military sociology studies from Caforio’s notes on the development of this study, has showed that further study into military issues from a sociological perspective will come down to two main trends. The first is scholars who have the political sociology perspective believe that relations between the military and civilian institutions are the heart of the military institution dynamics. This thesis would suggest that further analysis and study on this relationship is an effective mechanism to push transformation in the military. It means that the military, as a social structure that has the tendency to dominate social practices, especially in developing countries, could only be reformed if its elements of power are taken away and returned to civilian institutions, including control of the military itself. This thesis comes from Plato’s question written 2500 years ago in Republic, where he asked “who guards the guardian?” In short, this perspective is currently the most dominant way of how sociology looks at the military. The second perspective comes from those wishing to escape from the first one by trying to delve deep into the military’s social practices. This perspective still includes the civil-military relationship study, but it looks upon the military as a social institution. Therefore, it is possible for us to dissect the military institution with the blades of analysis often used by sociologists to further study general social institutions. It is my personal opinion that this view has gone beyond the issues of civil military relations. It is an effort by scholars to find civilian traces in the military. It is crucial for Indonesia to view the diversity of perspectives of the meaning of globalization in the context of plurality, and these should be understood by the people and the state. At one point, nevertheless, we must determine which perspective we shall use and how we will interpret globalization. We could follow existing alternatives, or formulate our very own new tradition on globalization.

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 45 1/13/14 9:26 PM Tabel 2. Mapping Theoretical Thoughts on Globalization

From various sources

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 46 1/15/14 11:31 AM 47

bab1-2 M&G ING_M7.indd 47 1/20/14 3:32 PM 48

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 48 1/13/14 9:36 PM Chapter III

Globalization and Revolution in Military Affairs

• Globalization and National Security • Developments of Revolution in Military Affairs Concepts and Ideas • The World’s Military Technology Procurement • Globalization and Inter-State Conflicts • Transnational Organized Crime • Summary

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 49 1/13/14 9:36 PM Chapter III Globalization and Revolution in Military Affairs

Globalization, as a social phenomenon, has tremendous implications and influence on the international community, and the military institution is not in any way an exception. The emergence of Revolution in Military Affairs or RMA can be seen as means of world militaries to transform themselves in the face of rapid global changes. Since its beginnings are closely connected to the history of mankind, sociologically we can connect RMA with how global communities interpret and manage conflicts and differences involving military forces. Therefore, the main question posed in this section is the extent of the connection between globalization issues with revolution in military affairs.

3.1. Globalization and National Security

Based on the thoughts on globalization and national security in the previous chapter, we can conclude that globalization, especially post-Cold War, has caused major fluctuations and implications on both national and global scales. It is, indeed, a driving factor; however how far it could push fundamental changes in a state’s national security policy would be relative by nature. Although globalization might have helped states to recognize the rapid changes with actors – neighboring states, regional and global markets and civilians - in international politics, it does not eventually inspire them to reformulate their national security policies to adhere with universal values of international military power transformations. The fact is states, whether strong or weak, will not demonstrate the same responses to what they define as threats. This difference is the main reason why the formulation of national security policy remains a state’s prerogative authority. Global balance of power has shifted; nevertheless a state’s authority remains undefeated and strong even though the calculations for formulating such policy are very dynamic. Hence the state’s ability to determine its challenges and threats is paramount considering that it must maintain its authority and sovereignty in the face of mounting pressure and values of the global community. In general, it can be said (quoting Ripsman and Paul) in the

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 50 1/13/14 9:36 PM context of globalization that the state is an adaptive institution to global challenges and threats. This adaptive process in turn would reinforce the state’s position and role in international relations. There are two basic points from this explanation. First, the proposition that globalization is an independent factor is true, and second, the state has the ability and strength to respond to global challenges and threats. This ability challenges the first proposition, which claims that globalization is a driving force with immense power to influence how states behave and react. This point needs to be underlined because the state’s capacity to unilaterally respond to global influence is one of the determinants of how global dynamics develop and move from these different responses. In other words, for every globalization implication or every momentum that pushes a shift of power over global politics or new conflicts, the state will have the capability to determine the direction and development of international relations. A simple example is how the United States transformed its national security policy and strategy to combat terrorism after the 11 September 2001 attack upon the twin towers of the World Trade Center. That decision became a new chapter in international relations and on how the global community developed. This social fact became the trigger for the revolution of the military domain since it started new wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. A more contemporary example would be China’s success in blocking the United States’ weapons sale to Taiwan. It shows how as a state it could impose its national interest in the context of international relations. The question is what are the fundamental issues of today’s international relations? Sociologically globalization scholars defined globalization as bringing global flavors to local places as well as taking local tastes onto the global stage; a paradox of the development of modernization. In the context of national security, globalization, quoting Giddens (2000) and Ritzer (2003), although derived from the West and the United States, is really a two-way process. It becomes more decentered as states outside the West and the United States developed better abilities to play their role in international relations, which lately have become stronger. An important issue arises as to whether this globalized world would impose on our society to become more homogeneous with a setof universal values spreading to all corners of small villages in the world, or rather allowing it to be more heterogeneous where communities of all shapes and sizes live together side by side (Ritzer, 2003). Even so, I believe the most relevant question would be how do we set ourselves free

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 51 1/13/14 9:36 PM from that question or will they both eliminate one another, or will there be compromises and negotiations both at individual and community stages; to ensure homogeneity and heterogeneity do not become processes that contradicts one another, but rather go hand- in-hand within their respective patterns of relations. This perspective implies that both globalization and national security influence one another; thus neither one can be an independent power influencing the other. They are equal where globalization could employ pressure and new threats upon states while the latter could use their authority and power to bring about implications on how the world’s rule of the game should be played. A universal value that governs how states manage an issue might come from a state’s solution to manage and tackle domestic as well as external issues. Therefore the fundamental issue of globalization and national security is how a state understands globalization in order to formulate its national security strategies and maintain harmony in its international relations.

3.2. Developments of Revolution in Military Affairs Concepts and Ideas

The RMA concept was first used academically in 1955. The study came to be as a result of academic findings that during the 16th and 17th century innovations ora combination of a number of fields have resulted in transformation of the way in which military institutions organize warfare. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union focused much of its attention on military revolution, in particular the impacts of nuclear weapon technology. Western academics then developed the RMA concept further and made it widely known among the U.S. military from 1980. There are three schools of thought in studying the RMA concept, which all came to be due to the reason why RMA came to be in the first place. Andrew Krepinevich, James Adam, Colin Gray, and Williamson Murray represented the first school of thought. Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler pioneered the second school of thought and the third is where scholars synthesized the first two schools of thought. The first school of thought focused on the impact of technology on RMAand the idea that this revolution can influence and change the nature of a society and the state. Andrew Krepinevich (in Tim Benbow, 2004) identifies ten key points of this military revolution, which are: (1) revolution of infantry, (2) revolution of artillery, (3) revolution of sail and shot at sea in the 16th and 17th century, (4) revolution of

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 52 1/13/14 9:36 PM fortresses in the 16th century, (5) revolution of gunpowder, (6) Napoleon’s revolution, (7) the 19th century revolution in land wars, (8) the naval revolution in the 19th century, (9) the interwar revolution in mechanization, aviation, and information, and (10) the nuclear revolution. Technology might be considered to be the fundamental cause of the RMA, however it does not become the single dominant factor since military technological advancement is not necessarily followed by changes in military doctrines and organization. Krepinevich (in Tim Benbow, 2004) suggested that military revolution happens when the application of new technologies into a significant number of military systems is combined with innovative operational concepts and adaptation in a certain way that fundamentally changes the character and organization of war. Krepinevich’s proposed RMA definition explicitly explained the non-dominant nature of technology in the RMA concept and the close relations it has to the development and adaptation of other aspects. An example of this view is the RMA driven by social and political factors during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, where technology was not the dominant factor. These realities then gave way to the start another school of thought that views RMA as part of the transformation of politics, economy, and social. Its main scholars are Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler. They acknowledge that the use of firearms, submarines, and fighter aircraft brought changes in how the military execute wars; however they only added a new element to something that already existed. Weapon system advancement is not RMA; it is a sub part of the concept. The Tofflers stated that RMA is revolutionary change that changes “the game” itself, including the rules, equipment, measuring tools, organization, training, doctrine and tactics. A revolution happens when a new civilization challenges an old one and eventually transforms all aspects of the military domain. Alvin and Heidi Toffler suggested three waves of RMA. The first wave happened during pre-modern times, where settled agricultural societies replaced hunter-gather cultures. In this era, wars were focused on agricultural issues. Soldiers were paid by land lords and weapons technology was very much humble. A soldier’s physical strength was the main power. The second wave came along with the industrial revolution. Weapons were mass produced (in large numbers) and a large number of soldiers were deployed during wartime. The destructive nature of war escalated in this second wave, and soldiers no longer pledged their allegiance to land lords; their loyalty was bound to the state. Napoleon pioneered this type of soldier through conscription of young French men into military service. This transformation changed how military

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 53 1/13/14 9:36 PM organizations were constructed; they became more professional. Weapons technology experienced significant transformations during the Industrial Revolution, such as the invention of gunpowder, the main ingredient for firearms, and machines to mass- produce weapons, replacing humans as makers of weapons. The final wave came after the outbreak of the 1991 Gulf War. Information warfare became the signature of this wave where sophisticated technology provided high accuracy and calculated damages to war fighters. This wave brought about changes in the paradigm of the military world. The institution started to necessitate smarter soldiers with good skills and ability to use high-end weaponry. As a result, military organizations were then shaped into leaner and more flexible institutions. The third RMA school of thought was proposed by scholars who synthesized the two schools of thought discussed above. Their assumption is that technology alone is not enough to establish RMA. The existence of technology is not the dominant factor for this military revolution, unless it is followed by transformation in the aspects of doctrine and organization. These scholars then divided RMA into three aspects where there have been revolutionary changes in technology, doctrines, and organization (Elinor C. Sloan, 2002). Technological revolution led to transformation in strategy, organization, and military equipment. This revolution - consisting of precision force and precision guided munitions, force projection and stealth, and battle space awareness and control - improved accuracy, or in other words it eliminated the “fog of war”. Today’s technology emphasizes advancement and sophistication rather than size or the magnitude of damage it can inflict on enemies. Militaries need weapons technology that has a certain level of accuracy in order to minimize the number of civilians killed during combat. One example of precision force technology is missiles. The U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy use the Tomahawk cruise missile guided by Global Positioning System (GPS). With its relatively small size, this weapon could destroy a target located thousands of nautical miles away. Another example of weapons using precision force and precision guided munitions is the “smart bomb”. With speed, distance, and accuracy, these bombs could destroy targets in less time and are much more lethal compared with conventional bombs. The second technological revolution is force projection and stealth. This revolution caused the emergence of stealth weapons and vehicles that enemy radars could not detect, such as the Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter. The last technological revolution is battle space awareness and control as seen in satellite technology. Satellites can monitor the battlefield and the position of opponents from great distances so that

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 54 1/13/14 9:36 PM the presence of physical forces or commanders in combat areas can be minimized. The last revolution has implications for the military organization as it must adapt to the development of existing technology. Not only that, it also caused shifts in the concept of a winning strategy. Once a dominant concept, the Command and Control (C2) has become less proficient. Winning a war no longer depends solely on the internal relations between commanders and their men in operation; now it involves many aspects as we can see in today’s evolving concept of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, and Surveillance and Reconnaisance (C4ISR) along with Battle Management System as a unity to win the war. This type of development has brought us to the dawn of information warfare. Next is the second aspect of RMA; the revolution of military doctrines. The revolutions of technology and doctrine did not happen separately; the latter was influenced by the former. Such processes brought about a new style of military doctrine with its “jointness nature” as Navy, Air Force and Army are working together in the same theatre of war. These three services integrated with one another in order to achieve a common goal (to destroy the enemy’s strength). As for the Navy, RMA has influenced how sailors and aviators fight as today’s trend moves to the “shore”, or better known as littoral warfare. Navies all around the world no longer prepare solely for winning battles at sea but also on projecting forces for battles on land. The Tomahawk missile is now being transformed from a strategy-only missile into a weapon to strike targets ashore. The Navy is not the only service experiencing doctrine transformations; the Army and Air Force have joined the league. The Army’s current military operations focus more on smaller groups of soldiers in combat, which means forces for war are now more non-linear and spread out. That means war power is non-linear and dispersed, not unified. War strategies will prioritize offensive mobility. As for the Air Force, its doctrines have now adopted unmanned combat from its previous manned fighters. The unmanned combat doctrine allows pilots to control sophisticated fighter aircraft through satellites during wartime without even being in the air. The implementation of this doctrine is high in cost; however it does minimize the risk of losing the lives of fighter pilots in battles in the air. On the other hand, these revolutions have also brought space into theatre of war of the future. The use of satellites is crucial for information warfare and states will defend theirs in space, or attempt to destroy other satellites that are considered a threat to their military force and establishment. In short, world militaries will focus their strength more on the existence of satellites in space.

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 55 1/13/14 9:36 PM The third RMA aspect is the revolution of military organizations. Although organizations do not experience a huge revolution such as technology and doctrines, the transformation focuses more on better skills and capabilities as well as higher education levels of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. At the theoretical level, these three revolutions – technology, doctrine and organizations – happen simultaneously. A sophisticated technology will entail capable military personnel or even changes in the organization and relevant doctrine. In the end there will be a new military organization in a professional format with a balance between quality and quantity. It will also have an effect on the military’s bureaucratic system; from a centralized system to a decentralized one. The first system only provided battle information to high-ranking military officers while the second can also provide information to “boots” on ground; this change has the consequence of altering the “chain of command”. In the past subordinates were required to seek permission from their superior or commanding officer in order to shoot their weapons. Now an officer would only need to contact the operator of the weapon system. This organizational revolution also has implications for the military career system, where new career paths are available not just for combaters but also for those with required new skills. The table below illustrates the development of RMA.

Tabel 3. Development of RMA Concept

Developed from various sources

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 56 1/13/14 9:36 PM 3.3. The World’s Military Technology Procurement

The development of the world’s military technology is influenced by two things; the first is national security threats, and the second is the need of developed countries’ military industries to sell the productions to developing countries. In regards to RMA, the development of military technology can be seen from two different perspectives. The first perspective views RMA as the promoter of a state’s military transformation; hence the modernization of military weapon systems came to be. The second, on the other hand, sees the development of developed countries; weapons technology as the as the main reason why developing countries are developing their own RMA.17

Tabel 4. Ranks of World’s Military Strength in 2011 18

A recent publication by Global Fire Power (GFP) provided a mapping of the world’s military powers. Based on its analysis of, endurance, stamina, and survival, Indonesia is at number 18, leaving behind other countries in the ASEAN region. GFP’s survey results came from analyzing 45 factors from various sources; this organization

17 The main weapons producers of the developed countries are none other than the five UN Security Coun- cil members, namely China, the United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. (Source from Richard F. Grimmet, CRS Report for Congress). 18 http://www.globalfirepower.com/.

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 57 1/13/14 9:36 PM assessed the quantity of available weapon systems of a military, although they might not be readily available for deployment. GFP also considered the military capabilities on land, sea and air of each state and evaluated its logistics and finance aspects. Despite being relatively on “top” of the list, domestic and foreign military experts believe that Indonesia’s military power still calls forhigher competency of its officers. This analysis should push TNI to explore comprehensive and holistic creative efforts to compete with militaries of other countries and gain the respect it deserves.

Asian Countries with Highest Military Spending Based on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data, many countries have yet to reduce their military spending. In fact, defense budgets in African and South American countries have increased by 6 percent. Among the 10 countries with the highest military spending in the world in the past 10 years, four are Asian countries. Meanwhile there are five countries in the European region with the largest military budgets: Italy, Germany, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom19. Below are the four Asian countries with theirbillions of dollars of military spending during 2010:

China China’s military spending in 2010 is estimated at US$ 119 billion. China is second in the list of the world’s highest defense budgets throughout 2010. It has also experienced the most progressive development compared with other countries in the region and the world. From 2001 to 2010 China’s military budget grew by up to 189 percent; twice that of the other 10 countries in the list. As its economy experienced a slowdown in 2009, China’s spending only increased around 3.8 percent. However experts estimate that its 2011budget will rise up to 12.7 percent. Many analysts believe China’s actual defense spending is much higher than reported.

Japan Japan’s 2010 military spending was US$54.5 billion. Japan has maintained its defense budget at only 1 percent of its GDP since 1967. Therefore it has a stronger economic power as we can see today. While many East Asian countries have increased their capital spending to more than 55 percent over the past 10 years, Japan, on the other hand, has experienced a reduction of 1.7 percent; hence reducing its capital spending.

19 Data was downloaded from http://www.indowebster.web.id/archive/index.php/t-154497.html?s=bb0c8 d979e32cd7eab65756fb7557bba

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 58 1/13/14 9:36 PM Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia’s 2010 military spending was US$45.2 billion. Saudi Arabia’s high military spending is closely related to its great economic muscles. This defense budget is 10.4 percent of its total GDP and this percentage is the highest of all the countries in the list. Its increase of military spending is also the highest compared to the previous year; around 4 percent.

India India’s 2010 military spending was US$41.3 billion. India is fifth in Asia and ninth on the list of the world’s highest military spenders. Although this budget is relatively low compared to the previous year, this trend did not continue given that last February the Indian government increased its defense spending up to 11.6 percent in order to balance the military growth of China and Pakistan.

The Development of the World’s Military Technology

Stealth Fighter Aircraft Fighter aircraft are the Air Force’s formidable weapon systems. In modern warfare doctrine, the ability of fighter aircraft could be the determining factor in battles and wars. Squadrons of highly-advanced fighter aircraft have become an important element in any military operation (defense). Modern fighter aircraft necessitate a number of requirements that are very much different to any aircraft piloted by civilians, such as having stealth capability to avoid enemy radar detection, sophisticated avionic systems or maneuverability to avoid enemy pursuit. Stealth fighter aircraft is a hot discussion topic in the world of military aviation. A stealth fighter aircraft is an aircraft able to absorb and to deflect radar waves with its reduced indentation design that functions to minimize sharp corners that are easily detected by enemy radars, thus reducing its Radar Cross Section (RCS) and making it hard to detect. This kind of design has made its features dramatically different to other fighter aircraft. It is interesting to note that no stealth aircraft is undetectable. However its small RCS allow it to be seen as a flock of birds on enemy radars. Stealth technology was first developed by a Russian scientist, Dr. Pyotr Ufimtsev, in 1966. Today there are a number of countries developing their own highly-advanced and sophisticated stealth aircraft and competing with one another. The United States is in front of other countries in developing this stealth aircraft technology with its F-117

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 59 1/13/14 9:36 PM Nighthawk, F-22 Raptor, the F-35 JSF Universal Fighter, and Bomber B-2 Spirit. Russia, having developed this technology from the time of the Soviet Union, would not let itself be left behind by Washington. During the Soviet era, it had already prepared its MIG 1:44 and Su-47 Berkut. Nevertheless the program did not move forward. It was only under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin that the program resumed and then the Sukhoi T-50 stealth fighter jet was born through Russia-India cooperation. This fighter jet was designed to rival the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 JSF Universal Fighter. The aviation world was in shock when China, proving itself as the new superpower, was able to produce the J-20 Black Eagle stealth fighter, though many believe that China is using America’s technology, “stolen” from a US F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter aircraft shot down during the Kosovo War on 27 March 1999.20

Sophisticated Weapons from the United States 21 1. Personnel Halting and Simulation Response (PHASR) rifle. This rifle will not hurt anyone as it is a laser system designed to disorient and blind human targets. US soldiers and marines also used a similar weapon in the Iraqi War to paralyze enemies who refuse to stop at checkpoints. 2. Active Denial System. This weapon fires electromagnetic waves directly at the surface of one’s skin so that the person will feel weakness and pain, similar to having sunburn. The US military called it the ‘Goodbye Weapon’. 3. Railgun. This weapon uses magnetic fields to hurl projectiles at a fantastic speed up to seven times the speed of sound. Initially this weapon only existed in science fiction stories, but then the US military developed and tested it in 2008. It is planned that the weapon will be ready around 2020-2025. 4. MEMS Hybrid Insects. This weapon is more sophisticated than any other remote-controlled toy cars. Scientists replaced insect brains with computer chips to control their nerve systems; they are therefore able to control insects or butterflies and make them fly anywhere. By adding a video camera and a microphone, these insects are very powerful spy tools.

20 Downloaded from: http://www.suaramerdeka.com/v1/index.php/read/cetak/2011/10/24/163892/18KF- XIF-X-Jet-Siluman-Buatan-Indonesia-Korsel. 21 Data on the United States’ sophisticated weapons production was downloaded from: http://www.indo-defense.blogspot.com2011/09/new-york-idb-sebagai-negara-adidaya.html and http://www.teknologi. news.viva.co.id/news/read/246123-5-senjata-canggih-milik-as

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 60 1/13/14 9:36 PM 5. Laser Microphone. This technology already existed in the market, allowing anyone to tap a conversation from far away. When two people are talking in a room, solid objects in the room, such as the windows, will catch their sound wave vibrations. This invisible-to-the-eye laser can be directed the window and receive the laser reflection from that particular window. This weapon would then process the captured laser waves from the reflections and translate them into the conversation that occurred in the room

PT. Pindad’s Deadly Anti-Tank Weapons Thanks to PT. Pindad, Indonesia has three world-class anti-tank sniper rifle products or Senapan Penembak Runduk (SPR), able to penetrate 3-centimeter thick steel from a distance of 900 meters. The SPR has three variants: SPR 1, SPR 2, and SPR 3. SPR 1 was designed to use a 7.62 mm caliber ammunition with an effective range of 900 meters, while SPR 2 uses a bolt action system and a 12.7 mm caliber ammunition with an effective range of 500 meters and can penetrate many types of materials, it is even capable of ripping through 2-centimeter thick steel. SPR 3 has relatively similar capabilities to its predecessors but is more powerful and can rip through 3-inch thick steel.22 In regards to other countries, many have shown intention of developing their own advanced military technology. This endeavor is closely related to a state’s effort to maintain its national security. Below are several of the sophisticated weapons:23 • China developed a network of underground nuclear missile bases along 5,000 kilometers of its northern borders. These missile bases are undetected by enemies. It is estimated that China owns 150-400 missiles with nuclear warheads. However, some experts predict that China may have twice as many. • Iran will test its bio-capsules, capable of sustaining living beings in space. It will launch a satellite, the Kavoshgar 5 (Explorer). This test will provide Iran’s Space Agency with important data and information to further develop life-support systems in space. • Sweden is developing its magical cloak that can make a person ‘disappear’. Experts on military technology have designed a see-through camouflage cloak

22 Downloaded from http://www.indo-defense.blogspot.com/2011/08/senjata-anti-tank-produksi-pindad- yang.html 23 Downloaded from http://www.indo-defense.blogspot.com

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 61 1/13/14 9:36 PM that protects a tank from enemy’s heat detection radar. Not only that, this new technology could scan buildings or terrains, and then reproduce the heat and cold patterns of the panel located on the flank of a military vehicle. This camouflage device is being developed by the scientists of BAE Systems in Sweden. • The latest U.S. military spy device is more like a child’s toy; nevertheless it is the world’s most advanced device. The US Air Force is currently developing super miniature spy planes resembling birds and even insects, which could go unnoticed. Micro Air Vehicles (MAVs) were developed at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. The mission of the Air Force Research Laboratory is to develop MAVs that are able to find, track and target the enemy while operating in a complex urban environment.

Tabel 5. Patterns of Conflicts and World Power Polarization

From various sources

3.4. Globalization and Inter-State Conflicts

Globalization, a process that has shifted international political economic powers over a long period of time, has not only resulted in intensifying inter-state conflicts, but has

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 62 1/13/14 9:36 PM also promoted the resolutions of intrastate conflicts. The most dominant factor of interstate conflict escalation is the issue of dominance among winners of previous wars. Current conflict resolutions are reflecting the important role of mediating states often represented by figures from developed countries. As the Cold War ended, the United States became the only superpower as well as having great influence in national security issues. Robert G. Patnam explained that as the world went deeper into the globalization process post Cold War, it also experienced a growth of international connectivity in which state sovereignty was eroded from its autonomous nature, giving way to a new and unthinkable security environment. This process has also expanded the pattern of conflicts from defending the state into wider aspects.24 For example, Azizian (2005) argued that the collapse of the communism system in the Soviet Union and the birth of new nations from the rubles of the Soviet regime is one of the factorsof the widespread global influence, stimulating economic

24 Robert G. Patnam, “Globalization, The End of Cold War, and the Doctrine of National Security “, in (ed), Globalization and Conflict: National Security in a “New” Strategic Era, (NY, Routledge, 2005)

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 63 1/13/14 9:36 PM integration and furthering the development of civil societies. These movements have then pushed numerous conflicts in ex-Soviet countries, including insurgencies and rebellions based on ideology and identity.25 In line with Azizian, Leanne Piggot, in her study of globalization post-September 11 elaborated that the collapse of the Soviet Union has led globalization to an economic process associated with the widespread capitalist model of development. This has then resulted in anti-US sentiments through terrorist attacks that are breaking the borders of states.26 Based on the above explanation we can now see clearly that the shift of conflict at the global level was the determining factor driving the emergence of conflict, violence and resistance at lower levels, such as the state. As we look at the history of the development of world civilizations, we could classify conflicts into a number of periods: pre-World War, World War I, World War II, Cold War, post-Cold War and post-September 11. The writer believes that these six periods of war would allow us analyze the patters of conflicts. Why war? The assumption is that war is the peak of a conflict. War could never occur without being preceded by conflict. The cause of conflict may vary, but war without conflict is never possible. Therefore we could observe the consequences of each war period on the development of our international community. The table above, formulated by the author from various sources, provides a brief explanation on the relations of war, patterns of conflict and their consequences, especially political economy and international relations consequences. A brief look at these periods would suggest the absence of a relationship among them. Nevertheless, further study into various sources about world conflict would show the connection between each period and how these periods are merely working as linkages of continuing conflicts. The winners of each period, as one observes, will be those in conflict in the next period. Hence one may conclude that a world conflict that led to a major world war is an extension of previous existing conflicts. Most of them delve into the classic issue of state boundaries and control over natural resources. The table above illustrates how all conflicts leading to major world wars in the past have their own consequences. During the pre-World War era we lived in a multi-polar world, where world powers were spread among kingdoms and empires with formidable armies and war armadas and vast territorial control and expansion. Conflicts during this

25 Rouben Azizian, 2005, “Russian America and New Conflict in Central Asia”, in Patnam (ed), Globaliza- tion and Conflict: National Security in a “New” Strategic Era, (NY, Routledge, 2005) 26 Leanne Piggot, 2005, “Globalization, Power and Reform in The Middle East”, in Patnam (ed), Global- ization and Conflict: National Security in a “New” Strategic Era, (NY, Routledge, 2005)

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 64 1/13/14 9:36 PM era brought about implications such as the shift of empires’ borders and the emergence of colonies in various continents. Moving on to World War I with the rise of the Allies (Great Britain, the United States, Russia, Japan, Italy, France, Belgium) and its enemy the Axis (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire), in which the Allies won, became the basis of World War II and the Cold War. In World War I we could not see significant changes in the spread of world power since it is pretty much the same as the previous era where powers were spread quite evenly among a number of countries. The consequence of World War I was the rise of revolution in many countries and the collapse of absolute monarchies. As a continuation of World War I, World War II still focused on the rivalry between the Axis (Germany, Japan, Romania, Hungary, and Italy) and the strongholds of the Allies (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China) and the era lived in a multi-polar world. Once again the Allies was victorious and the end of World War II witnessed the emergence of new nation-states in parts of the continents of Africa and Asia, marking a new era of world political systems and the beginning of the Cold War turmoil. Next was the Cold War as two world superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union rivaled each other for global influence. Both were victors of World War II and each represented opposing political ideologies. The Soviet Union symbolized socialism and communism, and the United States signified liberal capitalism. Conflicts during this era did not accumulate into a grand war; nonetheless they had a very strong effect on the politics and economy of countries in the world. Thus the world was divided into the West and East blocs (bipolar). The United States won this war, marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union. It then gave way to the rise of new nation-states of ex-Soviet countries and the fall of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The end of the Cold War era was also marked by the reunification of West and East Germany into one single nation-state. During the post-Cold War era the United States automatically became the only superpower in the world. World politics was in the hands of Washington, which started to play its role as the “world police”. In this era, universal values were mostly those coming from the United States, such as democracy and human rights. In that unipolar world, it was easy for the United States to push its economic-political agenda onto other countries. Indonesia is one example of how complications post-Cold War became

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 65 1/13/14 9:36 PM the background of how it lost East Timor through foreign military operations disguised as humanitarian intervention efforts over conflict in the eastern part of Timor Island.27 The existence of a single superpower did not diminish the existence of conflicts. Marked by the attacks on the WTC in New York and the Pentagon, the world came to know the waves of terrorism in the name of Islam fighting against the hegemony of the Western world led by the United States. Post 9/11 the United States invaded Iraq and Afghanistan, believed to be the hiding places of terrorists. These invasions did not reduce the number of suicide bombings in various places around the world. Many saw Washington’s slogan to create democratic states in Iraq and Afghanistan as the West’s attempt to impose their political agenda in Islamic countries. On the other hand, the never-ending conflict of Israel-Palestine has always been a stumbling block for the United States and the West to establish a bridge of communications with Arab and Islamic countries. The issue of terrorism also brought its own consequences, especially in the shift of the world’s current economic powers. Today the United States is no longer the world’s single superpower as it faces challenges from the Global Financial Crisis. Countries of the European Union (EU) are also experiencing the same fate as they struggle to free themselves from the impacts of the severe economic crisis. On the other hand, China has risen to become the only economic power that continues to show positive economic growth. It turns out that China has become the backbone of the United States’ economy as well as most European countries as it emerges as one of the world’s economic giants. Its investments spread across countries in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the United States itself; making China the only state who could assist Washington in its economic crisis dilemma. The collapse of the economies of the United States and in Europe has lowered the once single superpower country in the world. As we analyze further our current era, we no longer live in a unipolar world as we return to a multipolar era where powers are spread among the United States, China, Russia and several European countries. There is, however, an interesting possibility that this era might lead to a bipolar era between the United States and China, signaled by micro-level implications from the United States-China rivalry. In the past years we have seen the rise of new countries in Africa, namely South Sudan, as well as the waves of the Arab Spring in the Middle East.

27 Anthony Howard, 2005, “Humanitarian Intervention in East Timor: Some ingredients for sustainable security?”, in Patnam (ed), Globalization and Conflict: National Security in a “New” Strategic Era, (NY, Routledge, 2005).

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 66 1/13/14 9:36 PM Then, would it be possible for us to experience another bipolar era in the foreseeable future, given that de facto it is only the United States and China who have the economy and politics to dominate the world? If so, then what are the prospects of such rivalry? Will it be similar to what happened during the Cold War, considering ideologically the conflict has its place as well as the possible consequences of such rivalry? It would be crucial for Indonesia to further study this situation in order to clearly manage our national interest in the midst of these global dynamics. In addition to discussions above, there is one important note to be made related to inter-state conflict which has yet to produce optimum conflict resolutions. The principal of a win-win solution in addressing inter-state conflicts - primarily on border conflicts –has become a mere slogan or theory. Examples include the Israel- Palestine conflict, the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute in the South China Sea and a number co-claimant states including the Thailand-Cambodia border dispute, and the Ambalat dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia; all of which are yet to enter resolution processes. These examples state clearly that issues of territory and state boundaries have dominated conflicts and disputes among states in the history of our modern civilization. Difficulties in resolving these conflicts come from the fact that each country’s national interest is different to one another. This difference has in turn brought the mediation process to a full stop; the negotiations could only then serve to avoid possibilities of increased escalation that might bring claimant states into war without really solving the existing disputes.

3.5. Transnational Organized Crimes

As the development of information and technology became very rapid, the world witnessed the rise of a new order with its influence on all dimensions of life. The transition has made it possible to connect with anyone from different parts of the world, along with consequences for the relationship between countries. Globalization, however, does not always bring benefits. It also allows access to numerous loopholes and opportunities that can be exploited to commit cross-border crimes through the convenience offered by the flow of information, technology, and transportation. Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) is regarded today as one of the main threats to global security. Not only has it grown rapidly, transnational crime also has complex characteristics. Some of the factors supporting the development of TOC are

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 67 1/13/14 9:36 PM globalization, migration or the movement of people, and the rapid development of information technology, communications, and transportation. Today’s unstable global economy and politics have also contributed in this already-complex situation. At a high level meeting held at the UN General Assembly on 17 June 2010, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon stated that while the threat of TOC continues to rise, each country’s ability and capacity to face this threat is still quite limited. Therefore it is very important for countries to enhance international cooperation to collectively combat the increasing threats of TOC. The UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), adopted in 2000, declared a number of crimes that fall under TOC, namely money laundering, corruption, human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and illicit production and trafficking of weapons. The Convention also recognizes the close relationship between TOC with crimes of terrorism, despite their very different characteristics. Although illicit drug trafficking was not mentioned in the Convention, the crime is categorized as TOC and has been regulated in three drug-related UN Conventions prior to UNTOC. The ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crimes (ASEAN-PACTC) in 2002 also mentioned eight types of transnational crimes in the scope of ASEAN cooperation: illicit drug trafficking, human trafficking, sea- piracy, arms smuggling, money laundering, terrorism, international economic crime, and cybercrime. Indonesia has been active in taking part in the efforts to combat these transnational crimes along with other countries. As part of the implementation of its active role, Indonesia has become a state party to five international instruments relating to crime prevention, as follows: 1. UN Single Convention on Narcotics 2. UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances 3. UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 4. UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and two protocols regarding Illicit Traffic and Human Trafficking; 5. UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).

The global community now faces a number of other transnational crimes that call for cooperation under multilateral frameworks, such as crimes of theft and smuggling of cultural objects, human organ trafficking, environmental crimes (illegal logging and illegal fishing), cybercrime and computer-related crimes. As part of its responsibility

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 68 1/13/14 9:36 PM and commitment as a state party to the five international instruments, the Indonesian government has formulated a number of laws and regulations relating to transnational crime prevention, in which all adopt or are in line with the standards and norms set out in these conventions. Aside for being an active participant in a number of regional forums such as the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering and the Egmont Group to discuss issues of prevention and eradication of money laundering, Indonesia also actively participates in numerous international forums related to transnational crime prevention: 1. Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) 2. Commission on Crime and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ), including UN Crime Congress held every 5 years; 3. Conference of Parties from UNTOC, including intergovernmental working groups held in the UNTOC framework; 4. Conference of State Parties from UNCAC, including inter-governmental working groups held in the UNCAC framework.

The Phenomenon of Transnational Crime Practices

Drug trafficking Drug trafficking cases tend to increase annually. Take Thailand as an example, with 112,119 cases in 1994 which increased to 167,039 cases in 1998. Cambodia only had 32 cases in 1994 but in four years it went up to 98 cases in 1998. Malaysia had 11,672 addicts in 1994, while in 1998 the number went up to 21,073. There were only 15 drug cases in 1988 in Brunei Darussalam, but it reached to 423 cases in 1998. Indonesia has experience a growth of 91.33 percent (from 958 cases in 1998 to 1,833 cases in 1999 and later 3,478 cases in 2000; an increase of 92 percent).28 Southeast Asia is known as the biggest producer of illicit drugs in the world, and together with the “Golden Crescent” (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran), and Colombia through the Golden Triangle along the borders of Thailand, Myanmar, and Lao. The Golden Triangle is the producer of 60 percent of the world’s opium and heroin. Southeast Asia, however, is not only a producer, but its large population is also a huge potential market. ASEAN has taken steps to reduce this crime in order to eradicate it

28 Data taken from Abdurrachman Mattalitti, et al. (2001), “Kerjasama ASEAN dalam Menanggulangi Kejahatan Lintas Batas”, downloaded from http:// fleepxfloopz.blog.com/2011/05/10/posisi-indonesia- menangani-kejahatan-transnasional-dalam-kerangka-kerjasama-ASEAN/

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 69 1/13/14 9:36 PM in the future. The Declaration of the ASEAN Concord on 24 February 1976 agreed on the need for increased cooperation with relevant international agencies to combat drug trafficking. During the Fifth ASEAN Summit in Bangkok, Thailand in December 1995, ASEAN leaders called for the strengthening of cooperation to create “a drug-free ASEAN”. Through the Second ASEAN Informal Summit in Kuala Lumpur, December 1997, ASEAN put forward more efforts to reduce the spread of this particular crime as ASEAN leaders adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020.

Piracy Data issued by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) showed that piracy and armed robbery against ships have occurred in various parts of the world, including the Straits of Malacca, the Indian Ocean, East Africa, South America, West Africa, the Mediterranean and the Black Seas, as well as the South China Sea; the last with the highest piracy rate in the world. The Kuala Lumpur-based International Maritime Bureau (IMB) indicated that there were 285 cases of hijacking and piracy in Asian waters in 1999, 113 of them occurred in Indonesia, while in 2000, there was an increase in the occurrence with 117 cases, the highest in the world. Due to this data, Indonesian water was considered to be the most dangerous water in the world. Nevertheless the coordinated sea patrols by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have successfully reduced the figures in 2011.

Women and Children Trafficking The UN has included illegal women and children trafficking as one of the transnational crimes listed in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted on 2 November 2000. Indonesia is one of the countries that has signed the Convention and its two protocols (Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air), and has the obligation to implement the convention in its national laws. Indonesia has also signed the Manila Declaration on Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime in Manila, 25 March 1998. Indonesia has already integrated UNTOC and its two protocols in its national law as well as government regulations. In terms of ASEAN, the regional forum continues to conduct information exchange, legal cooperation, institutional capacity building, as well as closer cooperation with ASEAN Dialogue Partners in order to implement its commitment to tackle various transnational crimes in Southeast Asia.

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 70 1/13/14 9:36 PM Arms Smuggling Addressing arms smuggling cases in Southeast Asia would imply the existence of intrastate conflicts and separatist movements in a number of countries, including Cambodia, the Philippines, Myanmar, Thailand, and Indonesia. Arms smuggling is alive and well in these countries because weapon producers from developed countries have employed strict control and regulations on arms trade licenses to their consumers in developing countries, including ASEAN member countries. In order to tackle this crime, ASEAN has sought to promote information exchange, cooperation on legal issues and law enforcement, training, institutional capacity building, and implemented existing cooperation, such as the ASEAN Senior Officials and the Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime.

Terorism The UN Security Council Resolution No. 1368 and No. 1373 clearly state that any effort to combat international terrorism will require the involvement of the UN. There are 12 international conventions on the prevention and prosecution of international terrorism. Indonesia has only ratified three conventions, namely the Convention of Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention-1963), Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (The Hague Convention-1970), and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention -1971). These were later adopted into Indonesia’s national law, namely Law no. 2 Year 1976. Indonesia has also signed the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999). It is paramount to immediately address transnational crimes due to their implications on a country’s national security and their potential to threaten a country’s stability, the wellbeing of the people. The development and spread of these crimes follows an alarming trend along with the technological developments of transnational organized crimes. Therefore ASEAN member countries took steps through the 10th Senior Official Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) in Makati, the Philippines, on 25- 29 October 2010. Eight major issues related to transnational crime were discussed in a series of meetings, including counterterrorism, human trafficking, money laundering, arms smuggling, sea piracy, international economic crimes, cybercrime, and illicit drugs trafficking. Indonesia is the lead shepherd for the issue of counter-terrorism. Also in the meeting, ASEAN countries committed to strengthen existing cooperation with Dialogue Partners: Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 71 1/13/14 9:36 PM Korea, and the United States in dealing with transnational crime issues as they become the region’s grave concern. Transnational crime threats have also contributed to the military transformation since national security is also within the military’s domain. Countries must immediately formulate changes in their military doctrines and organization to be able to conduct military operations on these crimes together with the police force. A military operation that is open for cooperation with non-military parties has also “forced” military officers to transform their culture and values. These changes include the adoption other countries’ military cultures and values into its own set of cultures and values; establishing social integration in the military with common interests in facing these crimes.

3.6. Summary

Revolution in Military Affairs or RMA, previously known in the Eastern Block as military technical revolution (MTR) during the Cold War, is a logical consequence of the United States and the Soviet Union’s military transformation. In general RMA is closely identified with issues of national security threats and not only with the rivalry of the West and East Blocks. It is necessary, however, to understand the source of these weapon system modernizations as it will prove that, aside for the sake of effectiveness and efficiency of modern warfare as it increasingly adopts non-war values (such as humanitarian issues during wartime), these superpowers were in the need of a wider market to avoid domestic over-production. It is the classic signature of capitalism in search of new prospective markets in order for them to continue their innovation and modernization. This is the true meaning of RMA. This chapter has illustrated a number of current national security issues, including interstate conflicts and TOC, in order to provide clear comprehension that the development of military technology goes hand-in-hand with the modernization and “sophistication” of these crimes and threats. Regardless of whichever came first – similar to the debate of which came first, the egg or the chicken – what is most important is the fact that both military technology and national security threats are experiencing significant developments. The existence of modern and advanced weapons generated by the RMA process have also been well utilized by terrorist groups all around the world, both by those with religious background and those with other interests. We could then, under these conditions, assign a strong relationship between the

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 72 1/13/14 9:36 PM producers of advanced weaponry in developed countries with the “sophistication” of crimes and threats. It is possible to say, naively, that sophistication of crimes is the unintended consequence of RMA, although empirically it is fair to say that it is due to the efforts of arms and weapons producers to expand their products’ market. Hence the notion that RMA came from the need to face national security challenges in the global era has become problematic since empirically, technological advancement will always requirea battlefield to test its sophistication and accuracy. In other words both are at an equal position and are influencing one another. Patterns of conflict seem to reflect a singular continuous cycle, a manifestation of repeating social changes. Nonetheless in each phase there are highly dynamic interactions reflecting the strategic context as the background of each change. As we have moved from multipolar, bipolar, unipolar and back to multipolar with the possibility another bipolarworld (the United States and China), each of these eras had its own consequences. Therefore it is important to recognize the extent to which these changes will have an impact upon the most empirical level of a country’s military institution. Observing the current global economy and political environment would allow anyone to foresee possible future trends. The national military transformation process should also have an analysis on the necessities in order to respond to the development of global security environment. One of the discussions in this chapter highlighted the ever-increasing complexity of today’s national security challenges and threats. Classical security issues still linger in the decision-making process of world leaders in calculating national security. Examples include the existence of interstate conflicts based on disputes regarding state boundaries, control over natural resources, especially energy and food security, and rivalry of international political influence. As a civilization, men could never be separated from their desire for more power and influence. On the other hand, humans could not bear the idea of having their land entered or disturbed by others without permission. These classical issues remain relevant and are included in the analysis of national security threats. It is clear that contemporary national security issues are complex by nature. Its complexity, however, has taken itself to the next level with increasingly sophisticated transnational crimes. Though these crimes are not new to the world, the perpetrators have effectively transformed their ways by using the available advanced weaponries, courtesy of RMA. Some consider the last as a new phenomenon. As terrorists and perpetrators of drug trafficking, women and children trafficking as well asarms

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 73 1/13/14 9:36 PM smugglers and pirates employ these new ways, many are facing difficulties in coping with these threats. This is the reason why some scholars believe that the state’s national security institutions are not prepared to anticipate such patterns of attacks and illegal operations. They might be in readiness to anticipate classical or traditional threats however, they are dealing with difficulties in anticipating these transformed transnational crimes. These transformed transnational crimes will require a different set of approaches, very different to the old ways of dealing with national security threats. TOC requires not only national authority but also cooperation and coordination among countries. Some believe that the multistate-centric approach is the only effective way to anticipate these threats. One may ask whether this multistate centric approach is vital in anticipating these new forms of crime. A multistate-centric approach requires well-organized cooperation and coordination with other countries. Coordinated patrols and securing the region together with neighboring countries can increase the effectiveness of anticipating TOC. These efforts would allow preventive efforts to tackle TOC. Nonetheless it has also about a question on the kind of level needed for this multilateral authority to make any kind of intervention in a region or into the territory of one country. The next question is to what extent the world will revise the definition and understanding of a country’s sovereignty. As an archipelagic state, Indonesia has yet to have the full capability to protect and ensure the sovereignty of its territory, especially on its waters, due to the lack of required weapons systems and supporting equipment. Consequently the question for Indonesia would be how far it can tolerate any intervention from regional countries in its territorial waters. On the other hand, how far can Indonesia pursue a criminal into the territory of its neighboring country? The most likely thing to happen is coordination rather than direct intervention. Intervening in any crime or with criminals could only be done by the law enforcers of a country. It would be very precarious to have another country’s law enforcement personnel or security establishment entering a sovereign country. This is the fundamental issue of the multistate-centric approach. The above explanation is the theoretical argument that critically analyzesthe multistate centric approach in resolving issues of transnational crimes. Indonesia’s experience in the release of hostages onboard MV Sinar Kudus from Somali pirates in 2011 through a military operation could be a lesson learned not only for Indonesia but also for countries who believe that joint military operation is the only way to overcome this kind of crime. Indonesia’s practice of problem-solvingin this case is the most

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 74 1/13/14 9:36 PM concrete critique on the theories of international relations through a multistate-centric approach. Despite the existing problems and questions, this approach does have its own value. Formulating regional cooperation with the spirit of cooperation and respect for each other’s sovereignty would allow a region to establish a regional military cooperation concept fitted to its needs. The main point of this explanation is that cooperation in combating transnational organized crime should be designed in a specific area of cooperation to ensure all parties understand their roles and positions, especially in relation to the sovereignty of nation-states.

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bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 76 1/13/14 9:36 PM Chapter IV

Military Transformation: Country Case Study

• The Changing Paradigm of Warfare • Military Transformation Practices in Europe • Military Transformation Experience in Asia • Military Transformation Cases of China and the . United States: A Comparison • Summary

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 77 1/13/14 9:36 PM Chapter IV Military Transformation: Country Case Study

Why is the discussion of military transformation important enough to be a part of this book? It should be well understood that military transformation is closely linked to all the implications of globalization. The previous chapter discussed how Revolution in Military Affairs and Military Technology Revolution from the West have “infected” countries in all corners of the globe. During the “infection” process, some countries followed all the requirements of transformation, while some took the liberty to innovate or adjust the transformation in accordance to their situation and needs. A country’s national interest is the foundation of the transformation process. Furthermore, discussing this particular transformation will allow us to further comprehend its aspects, involved parties, supporting systems and structures as well as the kind of strategic alliances involved in the process.

4.1. The Changing Paradigm of Warfare

Throughout the history of ancient and modern civilization war has become one of the most basic means for the survival of mankind. Classical thinkers such as Von Clausewitz stated that war is the continuation of a political process because humans are not only economic beings but also political. War is humanity’s last effort to ensure survival by the use of mass violence and involves a particular number of military forces. Thomas Lindemann (2010) in Cause of War: Struggle for Recognition explained that during wartime the military has a vital role in determining objectives, direction, strategy, operations, and tactics in order to ensure national security. In the end, all battles in the theater of war will come from a single objective; political acknowledgment for reasons of national security or self-preservation. A symbol is crucial in any war, either used by a single nation, bilaterally with another country, or with a number of allies to conquer or take control of another country by any possible means. Alliances are made due to reasons of economy, politics or power over natural resources. Therefore, as economic and political beings, men

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 78 1/13/14 9:36 PM would make a rational decision on whether to take part in a particular war or abandon it. A country with well-managed distribution of natural resources would rarely consider going to war because its needs are fulfilled. Nevertheless, some go to war for the sake of conquest or to expand hegemony. Another factor important for an alliance or cooperation on war is the existence of a collective symbol to provoke patriotism and bravery of soldiers as they defend this very symbol that represents nationalism and sacrifice for land and country. The alliance would also formulate a number of policies to provide benefits to countries joining the collective symbol. During the process where a country decides whether to join under the symbol or not, political acknowledgement from other countries is very significant since this particular country will allow another to explain its position at the time of war declaration. Thus, those who have yet to join the collective symbol should make their choice immediately. Since war is one of mankind’s means of survival and humans are dynamic and flexible creatures, wars also share these characteristics. As long as our history has recorded battles and wars, we can classify them into five generation types, which are: • First Generation Warfare. The wars of this generation were of a grand scale and involved massive numbers of soldiers, using simple weapons such as spears, swords and shields. Examples include the wars during the Ancient Greek time and the Crusade Wars. The victor usually had more soldiers and weapons. • Second Generation Warfare. Although retaining some similarities with its predecessor, this generation introduced weapons technology with cannons, rifles and pistols. Huge numbers of soldiers were still very important as can be seen during the American Civil war. This generation had yet to use tactics on the battlefield. • Third Generation Warfare. Massive numbers of men on the battlefield were no longer the trump card to victory in this generation. Less military personnel were needed because technology and tactics became vital to winning the war. World War I and II, the Cold War and post Cold War saw the use of strategy. 29 • Fourth Generation Warfare. The 11 September 2001 tragedy gave birth to

29 The nature of the first to the third generation of warfare was symmetrical because wars occurred between state actors.

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 79 1/13/14 9:36 PM this generation of war; asymmetric warfare where wars occur between state and non-state actors. Countries wage war against non-state groups. This includes the war between a country and a transnational crime organization as well as the fight against terrorism. • Fifth Generation Warfare. This generation is still characterized by asymmetrical warfare and terrorists are still in the picture; however, here they also conduct crimes in order to achieve their goals. The emergence of information and cyber warfare signaled the start of this generation.30

4.2. Military Transformation Practices in Europe

This section elaborates military transformation in a number of European countries, namely Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia as well as Canada in the northern part of the American continent. These countries were selected based on a number of characteristics, such as their relatively similar military capacity. Despite the fact that these countries have different experiences in military development, their military organizations are relatively well-developed. Here we will look at the main factors of military transformation from each military, both internal and external, and the level of relevance of these factors to the transformation itself. Canada’s military transformation, which commenced in 2003, went quite fast in terms of capacity and structure. It started as Canada saw its military in a different light, changing from a peacekeeping institution into a combat-ready organization (Dan Fitzsimmons, 2009). This happened after the Canadian government realized that conflicts in this modern era are very dynamic, as was the 11 September 2011 attack. The role of the Canadian military as the guardians of peace was introduced during the time of Prime Minister Jean Chretein (1993-2003). This policy immediately affected how the military was developed, both in capacity and organization. It became a passive military, where military patrols were not focused on combat. Its participation in peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and Kosovo reflected the guardian-of-peace policy. Military procurement was also reduced. In 1999 Canada procured 114 tanks,

30 In the past terrorists have received funding from supporters or sympathizers, or they were self-funded. Today, however, there are global initiatives to fight against terrorism by blocking all possible funding channels, including funding from other countries or donations on behalf of a certain religion. Terrorists have since opted to conduct criminal acts in order to collect the money they need for their cause.

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 80 1/13/14 9:36 PM falling to 66 in 2000. Prime Minister Paul Martin (2003-2006) took a very different policy for Canada’s military, that it should be an organization ready for any combat or war. In terms of military capacity and structure, as we analyze this change of perspective, we can see how different and radical it is to the previous policy. The military structure became more tangible through this policy as it was organized to participate in missions to wipe out terrorist networks in countries protecting or providing safe haven for them. The transformation included increase of personnel and weaponries for defense and offense. It was the start of a long process to establish a military with the capabilities to join the war on terrorism, positioning Canada in the forefront of the war. Changes in structure were made in order to acquire a more effective and efficient military by improving the capacity of personnel and high-mobility weaponries, including technologically advanced weapon systems with high accuracy for the Navy and the Air Force. These transformations required Canada to formulate policies they have never made before or that were not considered as in demand. In its previous military operations, the Canadian military would cooperate with the US military or others in the use of military facilities. Even though such policy had some risks, Jean Chretein considered it to be “normal” during the time Canada focused on peacekeeping missions. These transformations were structured to allow the military to perform special operations on enemy territory (abroad missions), including reconnaissance, unconventional war, and counter-terrorism missions. The objective is to conduct intervention in another country, including exercising “limited war”. Analyses on Canada’s military transformation showed that it was a series of democratization process. The most crucial factor that pushed the transformation was the radical change in the mindset of policy makers on the role of their military in the international community. Whether a country becomes a world leader, a neutral mediator, or a follower truly depends on the capacity of its political elites. Germany, on the other hand, started its military transformation in 1990 due to the dominance of external factors; usually called “pressure from the global community” (Dirk Steinhoff, 2011). If the world did not demand Germany joined forces to actively ensure world peace, it would be reluctant to transform its military from Bundeswehr to become a volunteer peacekeeping force. The role of NATO and the EU was very significant. Germany has much experiences in terms of improving its competency and role

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 81 1/13/14 9:36 PM among European countries after its unification. Previous wars have scared the German people, and so its military took a passive position in the development of global security. The people declared an adagio that it would never go to war again; a reflection of how traumatized the Germans are from all their wars in the past. Germany then experienced a crisis that also dramatically reduced its military budget. Thus it was difficult for any kind of military modernization. Nevertheless, Germany realized that it could not detach itself from international relations, especially since it has a strategic position in Europe and its military has an abundance of experiences to share with other world militaries in terms of maintaining world peace. It is the members of regional organizations such as NATO and EU who share their resources to maintain global security. It has contributed in the acceleration of German’s military modernization, including its weapons, personnel capacity development and communication technology advancement. The pressure from the international community is one crucial factor we should always consider as we study military transformation, including Russia’s. As one of the world’s most powerful countries, Russia underwent military transformation post Cold War, especially in its doctrines (Alexei G. Arbatov, 2000). After the Cold War ended, Russian military did not receive only external threats but also internal threats, with conflicts spreading in its land. The United States and its allies were pushing Russia to let go of its nuclear weapons program, as the West still considered Russia as a potential threat. On the other hand, these western countries were also trying to intervene in Russia’s domestic conflicts. Although the Kremlin was very “uncomfortable”, it could not bear the possibility of another conflict with the West due to possible economic and political embargos. Any kind of embargo would hamper Russia’s economic growth at that time and have dire consequences for its national security. These were the reasons why Russia took on military transformation, particularly its doctrines. Russia based its military doctrines on nuclear proliferation, the role of military in managing domestic conflicts, and stronger conventional defense. These doctrine changes led Russia to take part in maintaining global peace and therefore opened Russia’s economy and political relations with the world; though in reality its cooperation with western countries was still half-hearted. The effort and process of integrating Russia and the West’s militaries in maintaining world peace, including counter-terrorism still has a long way to go. We can see that military transformation in Germany and Russia was highly

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 82 1/13/14 9:36 PM influenced by external pressure for them to participate in guarding global peace and upholding values of democracy. What about the experience of the pioneer of peacekeepers, the United Kingdom? The objective of Britain’s military transformation was to establish a modern Royal Armed Forces (Adam N. Stulberg and Michael D. Salomone, 2007). It underwent improvement in military personnel capacity, highly- accurate weapon systems and management of Special Forces. The military undergoes a routine evaluation to ensure that its institution is designed to be as effective and efficient as required in order to respond to complex global threats, for example eradicating terrorist cells and networks as well as illegal nuclear technology development.

4.3. Military Transformation Experience in Asia

Japan The US-Japan alliance started after Japan’s loss in World War II, as the United States established a strong presence in Japan and prepared the platform and planning for its military’s readiness in Asia. Japan’s Constitution, which was drafted by the United States government and then adopted by Japan’s law in 1947, clearly stated in Article 9 that it could not establish its own Army, Navy, Air Force or any kind of war-potential organization. This condition, however, started to change after the West’s confrontation with the Soviet Union. Washington’s power over Japan then shifted to develop Japan as a strategic stronghold against the threat of communism.31 After the Korean War broke out in 1950, the US pursued the establishment of Japan’s national defense forces, and in 1954 the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) was formed. There has been a long debate on the existence of SDF, which developed into a well- equipped force, as it clearly violated Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution. Japan accepted its sovereignty from the United States in 1952 after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which formally ended the conflict, and Japan agreed to compensate its war crimes. During the Cold War, the United States became more and more a strategic partner for Japan in facing threats from USSR in the Pacific. A Mutual Security Assistance Pact of 1952 was replaced by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960, in which Japan allowed US military to have access to its territory, in return for the

31 Emma Chalett-Avery, Specialist in Asia Affairs, 18 January 2011, Congressional Research Service. Downloaded from http://crs.gov

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 83 1/13/14 9:36 PM United States ensuring Japan’s security. To put it simply, Japan let the United States handle its foreign policy and security issues while it focused on developing its domestic economy. Many disagree with Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution and some were even willing to revise or omit this article. One of them was Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke who negotiated the revision of the 1960 treaty by mobilizing the left wing political parties. Kishi brought the revision to the parliament and had hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in the streets of Tokyo; President Dwight Eisenhower cancelled his visit to Japan and Kishi finally resigned. US-Japan defense relations experienced a period of uncertainty when President Richard Nixon declared the 1969 Guam Doctrine (US allies must provide their own defense measures). Other factors that came into play included the normalization of US-China relations and US withdrawal from Vietnam. It did not go on for long after Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and Nixon signed a joint communiqué to return the Island of Okinawa to Japan 1972. The establishment of the Security Consultative Committee in 1976 was a realization that both countries are committed to increase and expand their defense relations, especially in facing possibilities of an attack over Japan. After the end of the Cold War, Japan was criticized for its failure to prepare military assistance for the coalition during the Gulf War in 1990 to 1991. At the time, Japan had contributed $13 billion for US military and humanitarian aid. Japan also participated in a number of UN Peacekeeping Missions, where Japan SDF were deployed to Cambodia, Mozambique, East Timor and the Golan Heights. In 1996 and 1997 President Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto revised their defense guidelines as the tensions in North Korea and the Taiwan Strait escalated. North Korea’s missile launch pushed Japan to conduct a joint research with the United States in developing ballistic missile defense system. During the Bush administration, it was clear that US policy on East Asia was pro-Japan. The US administration received many reports supporting the idea that Japan should become an equal partner in future cooperation. Japan responded positively to this idea and supported the United States in its war on terrorism. Under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi the Japanese legislatures issued the Anti-Terrorist Act and allowed Japan to send its tanker ship to the Indian Ocean to support military operations in Afghanistan. In February 2004 Japan sent more than 600 military personnel to Iraq to assist the

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 84 1/13/14 9:36 PM reconstruction efforts; for the first time since World War II, Japan finally deployed its SDF to another country without an international mandate. The ground force withdrew in 2006 and a division of the Japanese Air SDF was deployed to serve until 2008 when United Nations authority for international forces in Iraq ended. This policy had grave consequences for Japan’s politics as it took Koizumi and the LDP down after being in power for around 30-40 years. Since then, from 2008 to 2011 Japan had many Prime Ministers, as each administration only lasted for months. As Obama came to power in 2009, relations with Japan remained a priority, although some believed that a healthier Washington-Beijing relation might push Tokyo away. Under Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama from DPJ, US-Japan relations experienced a slowdown as the two countries had different point of views in regards to the relocation of Futenma military base; DPJ’s foreign policy was more Asian-centric. Analysts view this approach as sign that Tokyo has started to move away from Washington. After months of negotiations with the United States, Hatoyama finally agreed upon the relocation; however, the controversy surrounding Futenma caused his resignation in June 2010. His successor, Prime Minister Naoto Kan, was eager to improve relations with the United States and was willing to prepare funding to contribute and support US forces in Japan. Based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, around 53,000 US troops were stationed in Japan and the United States have exclusive rights to use 89 military facilities across Japan. In return, the United States will guarantee Japan’s security and this agreement has been in effect for more than 50 years. In December 2010 Japan announced that it has adopted a new defense guideline, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). NDPG 2010 was formulated based on the 2004 version issued by the Koizumi administration, and maintained a defense policy that oriented in Japan’s own capabilities but is more integrated with military and security strategy by employing multi-functional flexible defense forces to face changes in the security environment. This policy explicitly declared the importance of promoting cooperation with other countries, such as south Korea, Australia, India, and ASEAN countries. While the 2004 version saw Japan’s security and its region tied closely to international stability, the 2010 guidelines focused on the Asia-Pacific region. Even though the guidelines stated that the nature of security continues to change, it can also be considered as Japan’s resistance to return to a “normal” military state. The document did not reinterpret

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 85 1/13/14 9:36 PM Article 9, and currently any willingness to change the collective self-defense concept seems to be quite difficult as it faces a political deadlock.

Singapore Many military analysts consider Singapore’s armed forces to be the most advanced in Southeast Asia. Currently Singapore’s military are equipped with NATO standard weapon systems and its administration has very high standards for its military personnel, with non-commissioned officers required to have a Bachelor degree and officers to have a Masters degree. The development of Singapore’s national defense industries, Perlu tambahan kata di sini.. R & D including establishing its Research and Development, reflects the People’s Action department, R & D division, R & D Party’s determination to ensure the survival of the city-state in a region with conflict organization, R & D program.. potentials. Economy is Singapore’s key to success. Its population is relatively highly- R & D department, educated and the government has been working hard on strengthening and intensifying interactions among the armed forces and developed countries’ defense industries. This has allowed Singapore to take advantage of the opportunities given by RMA.32 Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has already applied sophisticated systems for its command, control, communications, and computer (C4) as well as its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). Its integrated logistics support (ILS) has also been well-developed. Geopolitics has forced Singapore to take defense very seriously ever since this city-state separated from Malaysia in 1965. Although Singapore is small in size and population, since the end of the 1990s its armed forces have become the best, most well-trained and most effective in Southeast Asia. The government allocates 25 to 30 percent of its total annual expenditure (approximately 5 percent of GDP) to the military. In 2003 and 2004 the value of Singapore’s defense budget was around S$8.25 billion (US$4.7 billion). Government leaders in Singapore emphasize technology as their strategy to develop the military as well as to compensate for the lack of professional military personnel. Thus the military has a technological edge in facing possible enemies around its territory. It has purchased advanced weapon systems from foreign weapon producers (such as the F-16C/D fighter/strike aircraft from the United States during the 1990s), and from its own national defense industries; the later to ensure the improvement of its Research

32 Tim Huxley, Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific at the International Institute for Strategic Studies,Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore. Downloaded from http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content. imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2004/v30n1/features/feature4.html

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 86 1/13/14 9:36 PM and Development program. In its Defending Singapore for the 21st Century (DS 21) concept, the Singapore government underlined that it will “exploit” the development of RMA in its military force development. This exploitation includes the integration of information technology in available weapon systems to achieve superiority in the battlefield. The Singapore Armed Forces Act 2000, a revision of the 1998 version, brought significant transformation to the military as well as its doctrines in itsforce development. The Singapore Army, for example, introduced the “24-hour battle” for military operations’ weapons and tactics. The Act also underlined the importance of cooperation. Its Ministry of Defense (MINDEF) is committed to exploiting new information and information technology to provide the military with a “strategic edge” in its C4 and ISR. MINDEF and SAF faced the challenge of ways to develop new doctrines and organizations to allow the exploitation of sophisticated technology relevant to the city-state’s strategic environment. The 1997-1998 economic crisis contributed to the deterioration of Southeast Asia’s security environment, nevertheless, Singapore saw signs that its strategic role would increase significantly in the future. During this time of uncertainty, Singapore leaders – while never referring to a specific threat – have repeatedly emphasized the vital role of the armed forces in guarding the country from conventional threats. Therefore Singapore integrated operational concepts of information and information technology for command and control. The development of social-politics (Sospol) in the 1990s, especially in Indonesia, became a serious concern for Singapore’s security. Separatism movements along Indonesian borders and the ongoing economic, social and political instability brought complex emergencies to Singapore’s front door. The city-state was faced with threats of crime, communal conflicts, piracy, hostage-taking, hunger, disease and disasters. New challenges came – both from state and non-state actors – from bombings, weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological), and misinformation, directed at civilians as well as national and military infrastructures. Even though Singapore has assigned the “Home Team”, a non-military agency under the Ministry of Home Affairs (principally police and civilian defense force), to manage asymmetrical threats, SAF also has the relevant capabilities for such a contingency (for example special operations for counter-terrorism missions). The 11 September 2001 attack had implications to Singapore’s defense and security.

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 87 1/13/14 9:36 PM In November 2001 the government announced the implementation of a “homeland security” strategy involving closer cooperation between MINDEF, Ministry of Home Affairs, SAF, and police. At the beginning of this decade, Singapore’s defense establishment started to consider broader issues in modernizing its armed forces by developing RMA-type capabilities as one of the components of military transformation. MINDEF senior officials and SAF high-ranking officers believed that there was an urgent needto transform. The military needed to develop operational flexibility in “an uncertain and complex security landscape”. MINDEF and SAF reallocated most of the defense budget and compensation for the demographic move; which in turn decreased the number of military personnel and fully exploited RMA. In his article in Pointer, Andrew Tan, former Director for Policies in MINDEF, Singapore, wrote about the implications of military transformation. He believes the transformation would engage a series of adaptation processes in the ever-changing security environment. As SAF maintains its capability to face conventional threats, it needs to withdraw itself from “numerical advantage” and move closer to the development of “a portfolio of capabilities”, where it could maintain its qualitative edge. The last would provide Singapore’s decision makers with many choices for facing various threats. In the near future, this radical idea for SAF’s structure, weapon systems, and training will merge with the strength of C4I new systems. SAF is developing itself substantially. These changes would require continuity in Singapore’s defense polices, such as conscript and reserve force. At the same time, we will see closer cooperation between MINDEF and SAF on one hand, and their cooperation with non-military bodies related to security on the other. The main point of Singapore’s military transformation is the ability of the defense and military establishments to adapt with RMA for the sake of national interest. The process of transformation should acclimatize with SAF capabilities and consider the possibilities of budget and demography constraints.

India US military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were dominated by the use of high- technology weapons and eventually influenced how global militaries conduct RMA. In the two wars, the US military has superiority on two battlefields that are very far from home and with a relatively small number of troops. Operation Iraqi Freedom gave the

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 88 1/13/14 9:36 PM world examples of how technology and “less boots on the ground” could defeat the enemy in a short period of time. Some, though, believe that these wars did not bring any peace to either of the countries, nor for the region. Whether this notion is right or wrong, these two wars have forced military leaders all around the world to review their doctrines, organizations, and force development in regards to the use of modern technology. Adopting the latest technology has become a necessity in warfare.33 In the case of India, the country’s conflicts, violence and instability have affected its military. India has long faced conventional conflicts, ethnic and sectarian-based violence, drugs, illegal immigrants, religious fundamentalists, and terrorists. It also faces serious domestic challenges with bad administration, management, insufficient law and rampant corruption. The military is needed to assist civilian authority to stabilize the situation. The Indian military faces immense challenges as it must study the concepts of transformation carefully. India’s military transformation entailed a number of elements. The first is the advancement of its old military industries into modern and productive producers of weapons systems and platforms. The second is providing the armed forces with required equipment and training to conduct conventional operations, counter-terrorism, cyber warfare, bio-chemical warfare, and media manipulation. Since the military must have the capabilities to face hybrid warfare, its organization should be flexible enough to adjust to various challenges. Some analysts call RMA a “strategic moment” for military and how it does its business. India is also eager to join the RMA bandwagon but the support of related agencies and institutions is paramount. Its Network Centric Warfare (NCW) instruments, for example, would need a joint organization equipped with new and modern technology and communication networks. Its civilian and military leaders would also need to change their mindsets to accommodate RMA, which in turn would substantially improve the capability of all related agencies. The military has formulated exclusive plans and adopted technological systems from Russia, France, the United States, Israel and the United Kingdom to establish its own synergized “independent” model. India’s current military technology is facing a completely new and advanced era of technology as the result of advancement and innovation in the technology of miniaturization, digitalization, science, biotechnology, sensors, stealth, communications,

33 V. K. Kapoor, RMA and India’s Military Transformation, Journal of Defence Studies Vol. 2 No. 2, 2008. Downloaded from http:// http://www.idsa.in/jds/2_2_2008_RMAandIndiaMilitaryTransformation_ VKKapoor

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 89 1/13/14 9:36 PM and information technology. The process of integrating all these new technologies into a new formulation of warfighting system would be India’s objective in its military transformation.

Below are steps taken by India in achieving its military transformation: 1. Preparation. This implies that RMA occur after a long period of reforms and requires long and extensive preparation. 2. Recognition of Challenge. RMA is needed because it is considered important. It is also a manifestation of radical political reorientation towards the Kargil conflict34 and Parakram Operation.35 3. Parentage. Political influence or political patronage is vital for the success of RMA. For example the United States’ RMA started in 1990 by Andrew Marshall, a father and an intellectual property rights agent with the support of US Secretary of Defense, William J Perry and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Admiral William A Owens. 4. Enabling Spark. This implies that RMA, such as for NCW, requires revolutionary efforts. 5. Strategic Moment. RMA holds strategic moments to promote new and challenging strategies. 6. Institutional Agency. RMA has a number of agencies and institutions to implement its processes, a military organization that suits its military culture, innovative doctrines and operations in which their concepts were adopted from the art of operations and through intensive training. 7. Instrument. It should be understood by the military and should be tailored to the needs of India. 8. Execution and Evolving Maturity. Clarifying the importance of strategy, tests and trials as well as the consequences of RMA. This step refers to the objective of RMA: achieving effective military and strategy. 9. Feedback and Adjustment. India must have the potential to push forward RMA renewal.

34 The Kargil conflict involved the armed forces of India and Pakistan in May and June of 1999 in the district of Kargil, Kashmir. Pakistani soldiers and Kashmir militants entered Indian territory at the Line of Control, which serves as de facto border between the two countries. 35 Operation Parakram was India’s military operation in responding to a terrorist attack on its parliament on 13 December 2001. It was India’s first full-scale mobilization of armed forces since the India-Pakistan War in 1971. It started on 15 December 2001 and ended on 16 October 2002.

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 90 1/13/14 9:36 PM These nines steps are tools to understand the RMA process. Changes and transformation within the Indian military can only happen if its officers and subordinates have the mentality to accept changes while at the same time educating political leaders on the ongoing process to allow this transformation to become a common need for all stakeholders. The nature of future warfare will push us to think bigger, maneuver and respond faster, and to be more efficient. Defense leaders should coordinate and push the transformation process to ensure it becomes a common need for the country.

4.4. Military Transformation Cases of China and the United States: A Comparison

Comparing the experiences of China and the United States in their military transformation process is essential for any military eager to undertake the same process. In today’s globalized world, these two countries are the main power players in economy and politics. Even though there is a sense the United States’ superpower status is weakening, it remains a strong player in pushing forward changes of global economy and politics outside its territory. China, on the other hand, is one of the world’s most populated countries with advanced information technology and military industry thanks to its remarkable economic growth; it is moving to become one of the world’s superpowers. Nonetheless we need to be aware of the potential conflicts that lie ahead, from the possibilities of conflict between China and the United States, between China and other countries to conflicts between the United States and other countries. As Giddens stated, the implications of conflict and tension are not limited to involved countries but they could spread far to other countries in different regions. Therefore we should see from the perspective of sociology the readiness of these two major powers in facing “possible” future conflicts and tensions. Studying their transformation experiences allow us to both understand the risks of conflict in the future and to further understand lessons learned from two different economic and political structures. We could look at the important decisions made by these two countries that could be of good examples when Indonesia decides to transform its military.

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 91 1/13/14 9:36 PM China The most interesting thing about China is observing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and its relationship with the China Communist Party (CCP). In his speech for PLA’s 80th anniversary, President Hu Jintao who is also the Secretary General of CCP firmly stated that PLA will be forever under the command of the party.36 Richard D. Fisher (2008) in one of his books, although very western-centric, explained the process of PLA’s modernization. He explained how China not only uses its military to tackle its defense and national security threats, but also integrates PLA into other sectors. In short, China’s military transformation is a part of a national process of transformation. For Beijing, PLA’s transformation became the foundation on which to develop military and information technology industries; both contributed highly to China’s economic development. Despite the fact that China’s military products still have weaknesses, it did not influence economic growth in a negative way. Defense, communications and information technology industries are some of China’s main contributors to its rapid economic growth. Meanwhile Elinor Sloan (2008) believes the main driver of China’s military transformation is its strategic security context. One of the changes made was related to its defense strategy, where, after the Cold War, China focused more on land-based strategies since the most potent threat came from land borders with 14 countries, especially ex-Soviet countries. As China’s relations with Russia and a number of countries in Central Asia entered a positive stage through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the government started to take on military transformation programs, especially the ones related to naval and maritime defense; moving its once land-based forces to the maritime domain. It seems that China has based its military transformation on current strategic reasoning, but classic ones remain in Beijing’s agenda, predominantly the Taiwan issue and control over the natural resources along the South China Sea, which involves other claimant states from Southeast Asia. Military transformation in China is part of its overall national transformation policy. It is most understandable for China since PLA is a sub-organization under the Communist Party and it ensures that the military would provide strong support to any government policy. Based on the Xinhuanet website page on China’s National Defense, the plans for PLA transformation are based on current threats to its national interests: the global economic crisis issue, international security stability issue, and Asia’s stronger role and position in the global economy and politics. It has become China’s need to

36 Richard D. Fisher, China’s Military Modernization, (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), p.15.

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 92 1/13/14 9:36 PM intensify its communications and relations with other countries in Asia. Still from the same webpage, it also described threats to China’s territorial and national integrity, including the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Tibet, and the South China Sea dispute.37 China defines the challenges and threats to its national security clearly, but it has also declared over and over again that its national security policies are based on the spirit of peace as written in the Five Principals of Peaceful Coexistence. These five principals are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non- aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.38 Nonetheless Fisher (2008), being a scholar on China’s military development, expressed his concerns over China’s slogan that it will not launch an attack if it was not attacked first, in particular with nuclear weapons. Fisher argued that their meaning of being attacked first is too loose. An attack could be interpreted by China as a form of external intervention to one of its policies, both domestic and foreign policies. Fisher deems this to be where China’s policy becomes biased and believes that it has the potential to invade or to launch a military attack upon traditional disputed areas like Taiwan, Korea Peninsula, Tibet, and South China Sea. This concern might be more of the West’s because China is moving rapidly to be the United States’ rival, but anything is possible when a country’s national security is threatened. In the 2006 Defense White Paper, PLA explicitly explained that in 2010 it will lay the solid foundation for the military transformation process as the first step, followed by continuing the process of the previous step and continuing to make major progress until 2020, then to finally enter the third step to reach a military with full capabilities on information warfare by mid-21st century.39 Fisher classified PLA’s modernization process into two fundamental phases. The first started during the time when Deng Xiaoping became Deputy Prime Minister and it was a “catch-up” period for China to prepare for large military contingencies, such as Korea and Taiwan. The second phase developed upon the achievements of the first while preparing the military to face global issues. The 1990s was China’s era for testing, and many important lessons were learned during this period. There are three transformation areas which then became the fundamentals of change in PLA: doctrine, military industry, and information revolution. China prepared two factors to push the

37 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/Cina/2011-03/31/c_13806851 38 Written in China’s National Defense blueprint issued in 2010. 39 Richard D. Fisher, op. cit. p.66.

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 93 1/13/14 9:36 PM success of its military transformation. The first is efficiency in its personnel policy in regards to doctrine change from manpower-intensive People’s War doctrines, and the second is rapid development of communication technology, communications, information, and internet industries as well as broadband infrastructure.42 In terms of military organization, Fisher identified the establishment of seven military regions as of the transformation process in PLA’s organization. China integrates the development of these military regions with local development programs. Local contractors supply the military regions with logistics, therefore improving local economic growth as well as improving the effectiveness of military logistics management. For personnel, as China understands the importance of well-educated military personnel to operate high-tech weapons and platforms, it created the Non Commissioned Officer Corps. PLA also placed great importance on professional military education by allowing its officers to have greater education opportunities. Military training has also received substantial improvement in empowering organization and human resources.43 From these explanations it is obvious that the military transformation is a small part of the national transformation program. As an organization, PLA is within the structure of CCP, but it has been able to take on its transformation program as planned. In China, politics is the “commander” of all decisions made by the state. By placing military transformation as a part of its national transformation, China successfully integrated military modernization with the development of related industries and the people’s economic growth. Despite the fact that it might be concluded that China has adopted western and the United States’ strategies of military reforms, personnel efficiency and China’s weapon system modernization programs have showed the world its own brand of RMA. Its RMA does not rely on the industries of developed countries, but they used it as an initiative to develop national industries.

United States The end of the Cold War brought about a realization among members of the US defense community that the military needed to go through a transformation process as the only country in the world with the capability to develop its military industries.

40 In the period of 1985 until 2005 PLA cut its personnel by 1,7 million, including 170,000 officers. 41 PLA does not recognize “doctrine” as a term. It uses operational theory and operational practice. 42 Richard D. Fisher, op.cit. p.67. 43 Ibid, p.73.

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 94 1/13/14 9:36 PM There was no competitor after the fall of the Soviet Union. Hence they urged the government to immediately invest in advanced military technology and formulate new and innovative war concepts to face future challenges although there were no clearly identified enemies at that time (Butler: 2010). Washington then issued Joint Vision 2010 in 1997 and was then revised in 2000 into Joint Vision 2020, which detailed the development of US military in order to face not only state actors but also groups or individuals that are a threat to the interests of the United States and its allies.44 As the victor of the Cold War the United States became the world’s only superpower. Some scholars believe that this victory was the start of US military transformation, which is also often associated with the idea of RMA (Blake, 2007); Sloan (2008); Adamsky (2010). Both RMA and military transformation underline the importance of change in US military institutions, but the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001, issued by the Department of Defense, explicitly explained that both concepts are not the same. RMA places emphasis on one desired objective from a process of change, while transformation focuses more on a continuous process of change in order to respond to global social, economy and political dynamics that continue to vary.45 In fact, there is not much difference between RMA and military transformation as explained by Sloan that military transformation can be seen as the next step of RMA. If we look at the strategic context of RMA during the United States’ involvement in the First Gulf War, its military transformation was its response to the changing security environment post 9/11. Prior to the terrorist attacks the United States concentrated on states that were threats of its national interest. After the attacks of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Washington shifted its focus to defense and deterrence against terrorist attacks. The category of “enemy” was expanded into groups, individuals and countries that are protecting or supporting global terrorist groups. Moreover, universal values that came from the moral principles of the United States became one of the reasons for the fundamental changes of US war fighting principles. Human rights and democracy issues turned into pretext to pressure countries not practicing the same values and principles. The principles of the state sovereignty does allow a country to choose whether to abide by these principles or not, but Washington’s position as the global police and single superpower allowed it to force them.

44 Look R. Butler, “The US Shift Beyond Capital Asset” in Scott Jasper (ed), Transforming Defense Capabilities: New Approaches for International Security (Vivabooks, 2020). 45 Elinor Sloan, Military Transformation and Modern Warfare: A Reference Handbook (Prageger Security International, 2008), p.8.

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 95 1/13/14 9:36 PM Much of the literature on US military transformation pointed out the role of Donald Rumsfeld as the man behind this process of transformation. As the youngest as well as the most senior US Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld’s ideas and thoughts are widely considered to have dominated US strategic thinking about its national security and the RMA model they used.46 Another name which often emerges in the discussion of military transformation is Admiral Arthur Cebrowski (Blake, 2007); (Butler, 2010). Elinor Sloan, a Professor of International Relations at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, former defense analyst in Canada’s Department of National Defense, has studied military transformations in many countries including the United States. This former Captain in the Canadian Air Force explained that the shift from RMA to military transformation did not entail adjustments to US military organization, doctrine, and military technology. She stated that although the shift happened, many scholars continued to identify military transformation as the next phase of RMA since the technology, organization and doctrines are the same; the aspects being upgraded are capacity and capabilities. Rumsfeld (Sloan, 2008) was of the understanding that US military transformation is the rapid development of personnel deployment, full integration of all services through “jointness”, and ability to impose major destruction rapidly by air and sea; all of which entail a new set of thinking and war fighting. Arthur Cebrowski, Director of the Office of Force Transformation, underlined the significance of moral values for military personnel since military technology development is part of humanity’s need to uphold moral values. Thus Cebrowski believes that military personnel must comprehend the relationship between the use of large-scaled military power and violence and the moral values they fight for.47 US military technology post September 11 still adopted, more or less, RMA process, for example Precision-Guide Munitions (PGMs), Intelligence, Surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), Capabilities, Control, Communications, Computing and Intelligence (C4I) processing. The latter was integrated with ISR and became C4ISR. Military doctrines were developed from the RMA version, such as Standoff Precision Force, Unmanned Combat Vehicle, Expeditionary and Highly Mobile Forces (including aircraft carriers able to be deployed at sea), Littoral Warfare (sea-basing involving various types of large naval vessels), and “Jointness” (combined operations of all US services). The transformation process also developed a special forces organization and

46 Donald Rumsfeld was appointed as US Secretary of Defense during the Ford administration in the mid- 1970s, and was later appointed once again for the same position during the Bush administration in 2000. 47 James R. Baler, ibid. p.2.

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 96 1/13/14 9:36 PM anti-insurgent operations as well as reconstruction and regional stability missions. Sloan identified two components of this military transformation: first, to find the right combination of military capacity to quickly respond to conventional and non- conventional war; second, to prepare soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines to have flexible skills and moral values to face two kinds of war. Training, therefore, has become a key element for the military to accomplish mission and objectives effectively. Based on these discussions, we could then conclude that US military transformation started from the understanding of the ever-changing security environment. US defense and military leaders are aware of how implications of globalization and dynamics of global politics have brought about uncertainty; thus there was a shift from RMA to military transformation. Transformation as a process is far more important than just a goal. The transformation process included major intervention into weapons and information technology industries as well as private security institutions. In the United States case, defense industries’ function was not only to support domestic military transformation processes, but also the processes of allied countries. Furthermore, these industries also supported military transformation of developing countries, including Indonesia.

bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 97 1/13/14 9:36 PM Tabel 6. Global Military Transformation Experiences

Developed from various sources

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bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 99 1/13/14 9:36 PM 4.5. Summary

The best thesis for a country’s military transformation is, undeniably, the challenges and threats of its national security. Indeed, each country has its own specific definition of national security as it depends on the formulation of its national interest. As a country’s national interests go far beyond time and space, its national security definition will be expanded and touches secondary-level issues of humanity, environment and economy. They become diverse footings for military transformation and enable the process to follow the definition of each country’s national security. This chapter has allowed us to see the relation patterns developed among countries in terms of military issues. We learned from the United States that building a reliable military needs the support of adequate military industries. This, however, was not enough for this superpower who has the desire to influence other countries to follow in its footsteps. As other countries adopted the concepts they established a dependence on military technology and war strategies. The allies came first, European countries in this case, followed by Japan and Singapore from Asia. This dependence promoted the development of US military industries and pushed forward research on weapons technology. We discussed how Russia lost its defense industries as well as having to face domestic conflicts. This weakness was the entry point for the United States and its allies to induce their new-found principles in military issues; Russia eventually followed the will of the United States rather than facing the possibility of an economy embargo that could further crush its domestic politics. This is where Russia was different to China. China’s centralistic political system ensures its dominance over domestic issues. Though other countries deem China as undemocratic, the system has become its main driver to develop a military force that is not only huge in personnel but also able to develop sophisticated weapon systems supported by strong and reliable national defense industries. Many have assessed the quality of China’s military equipment and weapons as below standard, and its current development has shocked the West. Learning from Washington’s experience, there is a strong belief that Beijing also has the desire to expand its economic and political influence by spreading its military equipment throughout the globe. Sociologically this proves the classic thesis that industry capitalism – either run by state or by private enterprises – will always search for ways to expand its market due to over-capacity. Weapons technology in Asia, including developing countries, is still below the level of countries with sophisticated and well-established defense industries. This

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bab3-4 M&G ING_M7.indd 100 1/13/14 9:36 PM discrepancy is the same with other commodities. China’s rapid weapons and military technology industry development could only provide an alternative for weapon source. It is, nevertheless, still too early to answer whether it would have implications on military transformation or the development of national defense industries. These countries’ experiences have showed that the role of political authority is key to military transformation, where the military is under civilian supremacy with different styles of government, except for China. How far will the military develops itself and becomes responsive to international development truly depends on the ability of government authorities to understand global economy and politics. Nonetheless, from a sociological point of view, defining military under civilian power could not be so black and white. In many cases of transformation, the separation of military and civilian shows how the military as an organization and its personnel as individuals make a significant contribution in pushing the formulation of military transformation policy. Rigid dichotomy between these two entities would become ineffective in the process of understanding a country’s strategic environment as well as challenges and threats to its national security. The most logical choice to accept and integrate ideas and understanding would be to have military individuals sit in the civilian government and to allow civilians to enter the military institution; allowing us to minimize possible conflict or inefficiency in the transformation process. On the sidelines, this effort might rival the widely-accepted military-civilian dichotomy that has been understood wrongly by many. We can learn from China how developing our national defense industry could allow us to reduce the military’s dependence on imported weapons from developed countries and at the same time become the driver for a wider national transformation, particularly in the fields of economy. Indonesia should place its military transformation in a wider discourse as it needs to reach other aspects outside the military institution; nothing close to the New Order understanding. This agenda should be viewed in a wider context since the military is not the only institution responsible for defense and security. If there comes a time when a war becomes our last resort, the responsibility to take action would come to everyone, even to those who despise war. Hence Indonesia’s military transformation should be supported by its national transformation that would allow our people to be smarter and no longer contained in the mindset of the New Order regime; that the military is a frightening and uncompromising institution. TNI needs to transform itself into a new military with new ways of thinking and acting.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 102 1/13/14 9:42 PM Chapter V

Indonesian Military and Policy Mapping

• Reorganizing and Rationalizing the Indonesian Military: A Brief History • Influences of Global Dynamics on Indonesia’s Military • TNI Development and Its Long-Term Implications • Summary

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 103 1/13/14 9:42 PM Chapter V Indonesian Military and Policy Mapping

The history of Indonesia’s military development is rich with changes initiated either by visionary military leaders or by the influences of dynamic strategic environments. Most people, nevertheless, believe that because the military has distinctive characteristics compared to other social institutions in Indonesia, it is resistant to alterations. In reality, as this book will explain further, the qualitative and quantitative changes in the military show the previous transformations happened in a very rapid manner. The most dominant factor in such rapid transformation is the military’s very own command system or chain of command, which negates any possibility of compromise in all of its hierarchy. However, the risks of rapid and radical changes within an institution with the authority to use force and violence such as the military are very high, particularly since these developments have always been connected closely to the dynamics of Indonesia’s economy, social climate and politics in the past seven decades. For that reason, in this chapter the author will provide a brief overview of these developments over time as well as the military’s ability to adapt to rising internal and external issues. In order for us to see and understand the extent of policies from the establishment of the military until the present time we will need to map out these policies along with documented periods of change. Since the scope of the discussion on Indonesia’s military policies is very broad, this chapter will only focus on the ones connected directly to the military’s reorganization process and the strategic context behind their formulation.

5.1. Reorganizing and Rationalizing the Indonesian Military: A Brief History

The Establishment of Badan Keamanan Rakyat (the People’s Security Agency or BKR) After Indonesia declared its independence on 17 August 1945, the people still struggled to defend its new-found independence and the state’s sovereignty from external forces - the Allies and the Netherlands – wanting to reclaim their control over Indonesia.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 104 1/13/14 9:42 PM In its first meeting on 18 August 1945, Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) or PPKI only elected the President and Vice President and ratified the 1945 Constitution. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia did not immediately establish its military. The leaders were concerned about how the establishment of a national military might provoke a combined attack from the Allies and Japan, who was assigned by the Allies to maintain status quo in its occupied areas, including Indonesia. As a new-born state Indonesia did not have enough national power to deal with possible external attacks. Nevertheless hostilities continued in many areas between the locals and the Allies and the establishment of a regular military became even more urgent. On 22 August 1945, PPKI established three bodies to garner the power and strength of the people in order to defend Indonesia. They are Komite Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Committee or KNI), Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesia National Party or PNI) and BKR. BKR is a part of Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang (War Victims Assistance Agency or BPKKP), originally called Badan Pembantu Prajurit (Soldiers Assistance Agency or BPP) and which became Badan Pembantu Pembelaan (BPP). These two organizations had existed since Japan’s occupation and their role was to maintain the welfare of Pembela Tanah Air (PETA) and Heiho soldiers. After they were disbanded by Japan on 18 August 1945, the former members were accommodated by BPKKP. The establishment of BKR was a change to the outcomes of PPKI’s meeting on 19 August 1945, which decided to create a national military. As there were adjustments to the field of struggle, some new names came about, including, among others BKR Laut (the embryo of the Indonesian Navy), BKR Kereta Api (securing the trains and railways), BKR Pos (securing postal communications), and BKR Udara (securing the air space). The President then announced BKR’s official establishment on 23 August 1945. In his speech, President Soekarno encouraged all former members of PETA, Heiho, Kaigun Heiho, and young people to join BKR and be prepared for possible conscription in the near future. Immediately this organization was spread throughout Indonesia. A number of former PETA members created the office of BKR Pusat (main office) in Jakarta, led by Kasman Singodimedjo and with Kaprawi as the secretary. These BKRs were the pioneers of armed revolution bodies who led many seizures of Japan’s civil and military powers in many parts of Indonesia. A number of areas then established their

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 105 1/13/14 9:42 PM own BKR after the President’s announcement. BKR in Jakarta was led by Moefreini, in Bogor by Muslihat, in Karisidenan Priangan by Aruji Kartawinata, and in Kediri led by R. Soerahmad.48 The announcement, however, did not reach all areas of Indonesia. Those who were not aware of BKR then created their own armed organization, including Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia (API) in Aceh and Penjaga Keamanan Rakyat (PKR) in Palembang. BKR leaders became members of the National Committee and contributed to resolving issues and problems in their own regions. BKR was not a regular military force; it was an armed corps of young people who led the fighting and struggles in many regions in the early years of post-Independence. BKR not only operated on land but also at sea and in the air. Former members of Kaigun Heiho and workers at vital sites such as ports and shipping companies formed BKR Penjaga Pantai (Coast Guard), while former members of Rikugun Koku Butai and Kaigun Koku Butai, Japan’s aviation units, created BKR Udara. Officially BKR was established to ensure the security of local areas butthe situation at that time forced the members to spearhead the seizure of weapons from the hands of Japanese soldiers. There was also Badan Perjuangan, organizations of young people to defend Indonesia’s independence. Most of these organizations have a special armed unit called laskar, and some were already established before the official military was formed. These paramilitary troops then developed further after the emergence of political parties as they usually have their own badan perjuangan.

Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (The People’s Armed Forces or TKR) Indonesia’s security post-Independence was out of control from time to time as in almost every city there were armed conflicts with Japan or the Allies/NICA troops. The sporadic resistances by the youth of the country were not effective; hence the need for a regular military was inevitable. With the participation of former KNIL officers – who swore to fight for Indonesia – the government formed Indonesia’s national military. On 5 October 1945 the government issued Maklumat Pemerintah (Government Edict) on the creation of a national military called Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR). The next day the government released an announcement on the formulation of this

48 Many BKR figures then fought as laskar (similar to paramilitary troops), mostly well-known figures in the society as well as young fighters during colonial times. Even Imam Syafe’I aka bang Pi’e, the most well-known bandit around Pasar Senen with his Oesaha Pemoeda Indonesia (OPI) organization was the State Minister of the People’s Security (Menteri Negara Keamanan Rakyat).

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 106 1/13/14 9:42 PM national military to enforce Indonesia’s national strength. On 9 October 1945 Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (the Central Indonesian National Committee or KNIP) called for the mobilization of TKR: “In order to maintain the security of the people, the President of the Republic of Indonesia has ordered the establishment of Tentara Keamanan Rakyat. It consists of citizens of Indonesia responsible for the security of the Indonesian people and maintaining the dignity of the Republic of Indonesia”. On 20 October 1945 the government elected the leaders of Kementerian Keamanan Rakyat (Ministry of the People’s Security) that included ad interim Minister of People’s Security Muhammad Soeljoadikusumo, Pemimpin Tertinggi TKR (the Supreme Commander) Soeprijadi, and Chief of Staff, a former KNIL Major, Oerip Soemahardjo. TKR did not have its supreme commander until November 1945 because Soeprijadi never took the position. A TKR conference was held in Yogyakarta on 12 November 1945, led by TKR Chief of Staff, Major Oerip Soemahardjo to elect TKR’s Pemimpin Tertinggi and the Minister of Security. The conference appointed Colonel Soedirman, the Commander of Division V as the Supreme Commander and Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX as Minister of Security. This result created new tension between factions of Amir Syarifuddin-Oerip Soemahardjo and Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX-Soedirman as they had different opinions on the status and role of laskar. The government officially inaugurated Colonel Soedirman as Panglima Besar or the Supreme Commander of TKR on 18 December 1945 with the rank of General and Major Oerip Soemahardjo was appointed as TKR Chief of Staff with the rank of Lieutenant General.49 TKR Supreme Headquarters (Markas Tertinggi or MT-TKR) was established in Yogyakarta, and Lieutenant General Oerip Soemahardjo then made the Markas Besar Umum (General Headquarters) under MT-TKR. Below is the organizational structure of MT-TKR and its commandments: 1. Supreme Headquarters of TKR. 2. General Headquarters of TKR consisting of Departments of Administration, Finance, Armament, Communications, Medical, Train and Railway Affairs, Education, Equipment, and Investigation.

49 Major Oerip Soemahardjo was influential in the establishment of the military organization during the early years of the revolution. Along with a group of young officers who were trained in the Corps Reserve Officieren (CORO), he absorbed the views of KNIL officers as well as conventional “western” understanding that a professional military organization would not be undertaken by civilians.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 107 1/13/14 9:42 PM 3. Commandment I West Java, consisting of Division I in Banten and Bogor, Division II in Jakarta and Cirebon, and Division III in Priangan. 4. Commandment II Central Java, consisting of Division IV in Pekalongan, Semarang, and Pati, Division V in Kedu and Banyumas, Special Division X in Surakarta, and Special Division IX in Yogyakarta. 5. Commandment III East Java consisting of Division VI in Madiun and Kediri; Division VII in Bojonegoro, Surabaya, and Madiun; and Division VIII in Malang and Besuki. 6. Commandment Sumatra consisting of Division I in the south and west part of South Sumatra, Division II in the north and east of South Sumatra, Division III in West Sumatra, Riau and its islands; Division IV in East Sumatra; Division V in Aceh, and Division VI in Tapanuli and Nias. After the establishment of these divisions (the term division or divisi was the embryo of Kodam or Military Area Command), TKR’s land service came from Java’s BKR and some from Sumatra. BKR Laut and BKR Udara were also merged with TKR. On 15 November 1945, BKR Laut officially became TKR Laut. BKR Udara automatically became TKR Udara, previously known as TKR Jawatan Penerbangan (Aviation), after the announcement on 5 October 1945. On 17 December 1945, The Commander of Yogyakarta Division handed over Maguwo Air Base along with its personnel and aircraft to Markas Besar Umum Penerbangan (Aviation Headquarters).

Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat (The People’s Salvation Armed Forces) An idea to change the name of Tentara Keamanan Rakyat to Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat, maintaining its abbreviation of TKR, emerged at the end of 1945 among officers at MT-TKR. The change of name was to deepen and expand the role of the armed forces. On 7 January 1946, Tentara Keamanan Rakyat officially changed to Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat and the Ministry of Security became Ministry of Defense. MT-TKR announced the change of name on 8 January 1946.

Tentara Republik Indonesia (The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia or TRI) The name Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat did not last for long as the government issued another announcement and changed TKR to Tentara Republik Indonesia or TRI on 26 January 1946 based on Surat Penetapan Pemerintah 1946 No. 4/SD (a government decree). This decree defined: 1) Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat, once named Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, is now officially called Tentara Republik Indonesia; 2) Tentara

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 108 1/13/14 9:42 PM Republik Indonesia is the only military organization in the Republic of Indonesia; 3) Tentara Republik Indonesia will be organized in accordance with international militaries; 4) Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat, now called Tentara Republik Indonesia, will be reorganized to establish a complete armed forces; 5) In order to execute Article 4, the government will create a committee. This Committee will include military experts and other experts on related issues. Based on this decree, TRI’s organizational structure was issued by Penetapan Presiden (Presidential Decree) on 23 February 1946 and was perfected by Panitia Besar Penyelenggara Organisasi Tentara, the committee created by the government to reorganize the military. The members of this committee were Lieutenant General Oerip Soemahardjo, Commodore Suryadarma, Major General Didi Kartasasmita, Major General Drg. Mustopo, Colonel Sutirto, Colonel Sunjoyo, Colonel Holand Iskandar, Major Simatupang, Prof. Supomo, and Prof. Roosseno. The outcomes of this committee were announced on 17 May 1946, including the establishment of Kementerian Pertahanan dan Ketentaraan (Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces), the strength and organization of the military, the transition from TKR to TRI, and the position of laskar and members of Badan Perjuangan. As a consequence of these outcomes, the number of TRI divisions was reduced, from ten to seven divisions in Java, three brigades in West Java and three divisions in Sumatra. Laskar and members of Badan Perjuangan not joining TRI were placed in a special bureau in the Ministry of Defense, Biro Perjuangan (Bureau of Struggle). The tension of rivalries between members of TRI and laskar became higher as both questioned the legitimacy of each other’s position.50 The military believed it was a waste of manpower and weapons to have laskar outside TRI, and at the same time prolonged the development of the military organization.

Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) At this point Indonesia officially had two types of armed forces; TRI as the regular and national armed forces, and Badan Perjuangan as a representative of the people’s strength. Conditions at this time were not conducive for the republic since both the Badan Perjuangan and laskar had their own political views based on which political

50 Most laskar came from local communities with strong ties to the region where they “suddenly” became a part of a revolutionary group. They see the military as a rigid organization based on the system and doctrines of the Dutch and Japan. On the other hand, the armed forces, most of whose personnel received professional military training and have legal status in the republic, saw laskar as unprofessional soldiers with no sense of discipline.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 109 1/13/14 9:42 PM party they came from. The government finally issued a Presidential Decree on 15 May 1947 to unite these two forces in a single national military organization. On 7 June 1947 another Presidential Decree was issued, stating that Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI was officially established on 3 June 1947. It was a combination of TRI and all the armed laksar, both staff of Biro Perjuangan and the ones who were not. This decree also stated that TNI was responsible for strategy and organization during the reorganization of its institution due to the merge. Those who joined TNI – all the services and laskar – were required to obey all orders and instructions from TNI leadership. On 2 January 1948 the President signed the Presidential Decree Number 1 Year 1948, which disbanded TNI’s leadership and Staf Gabungan Angkatan Perang (Joint Armed Forces Staff), replaced them with Staf Angkatan Perang or Armed Forces Staff in the Ministry of Defense and appointed General Soedirman as Panglima Besar Angkatan Perang Mobil (Supreme Commander of Mobile Armed Forces). On 6 March 1948, the government issued Law Number 3 Year 1948 on the Organization of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defense was authorized to manage all defense establishments and efforts in the republic. It then created the Army, Navy and Air Force under the Angkatan Perang (Armed Forces). The Minister of Defense was assisted by Staf Angkatan Perang (Armed Forces Staff) and Staf Tata Usaha (General Staff). The former was led by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, assisted by the Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force (the exact title is “Kepala Staf”), and the Secretary of the Armed Forces Staff. Presidential Decree Number 14 Year 1948 was issued on 4 May 1948, regulating the implementation of Law Number 3 Year 1948. It stated that starting 15 May 1948, the Ministry of Defense would have its organization of staff and departments based on that particular law. The mobile and territorial commands were included in the Komando Jawa and Komando Sumatera. The Ministry of Defense issued decree Number 126/MP/1949 on 10 December 1949 with the structure of the Army. Its organizational structure is as follows: the Kepala Staf (the Chief of Army), Directorate, Inspectorate and Troops, Army Staff “G”, “A”, and “Q”, Directorate of Education, Infantry Inspectorate and Army Weapons Support. The officers of the Army leadership were; 1) Chief of Army, Colonel A.H. Nasution; 2) “G” Chief of Staff, Colonel Bambang Sugeng; 3) “Q” Chief of Staff, Colonel Hidayat; and 4) “A” Chief of Staff, Colonel Suhud. Then on 15 January the Ministry of Defense issued another decree Number 12/ MP/50 on the teritorium or territory of military command: 1) North Sumatra Teritorium, consisting of Aceh, Sumatra Tapanuli and East Sumatra; 2) West Sumatra Teritorium; 3) Riau, Bangka and Belitung Teritorium; 4) South Sumatra Teritorium, consisting of Jambi, Bengkulu, Palembang and Lampung; 5) West Java Teritorium; 6) Jakarta

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 110 1/13/14 9:42 PM Teritorium; 7) Central Java Teritorium; 8) East Java Teritorium; 9) East Kalimantan Teritorium; 10) Maluku and Sulawesi Teritorium; and 11) the Lesser Sunda Islands Teritorium, consisting of Bali, Lombok, Sumba, Sumbawa, Flores and Timor. Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia (the Navy) or ALRI was regulated by the Minister of Defense Decree Number D/MP/313/51, issued on 28 July 1951. The decree identified ALRI as part of APRI, with the primary duty to defend the state and constabulary as its secondary duty. Its organization is as follows: 1. Staf Angkatan Laut (SAL) or Naval Staff: Operations Staff, Departmental Staff, Bureau of Weapons Support, and sections that were headed by the Assistants to KSAL (Chief of Navy). 2. Dinas Angkatan Laut or Naval Services, including education. 3. Kesatuan operasi or Naval Commands: Komando Teritorial Maritim (Maritime Territorial Command) and Komando Mobil (Mobile Command).

As for AURI (the Air Force), its reorganization was done in three phases as regulated by the Chief of Air Force on 27 April 1950: first phase consolidation, second phase reorganization, and third phase reconstruction of AURI. After Indonesia’s sovereignty was officially recognized by the Dutch on 27 December 1949, the military faced issues in developing, training and expanding the military, as well as completing its organization management. The responsibility to resolve these issues was handed over to the Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat (APRIS). Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, coordinator of security during the time of Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RIS), was in full authority of the military and police. Martial law was imposed on the republic, while regional security was the responsibility of military governors, who were also the security coordinator for their respective regions. Presidential Decree dated 28 December 1949 appointed: 1) Commander of APRIS, General Soedirman; 2) Chief of Staff, Col. TB Simatupang; 3) Chief of Army, Colonel AH Nasution, 4) Chief of Navy, Col. R. Subijakto; and, 5) Chief of Air Force, Commodore S. Suryadarma. These organizational changes were a part of a fight over TNI’s development concept. On one hand there was the KNIL group (T.B. Simatupang, A.H. Nasution, Subiyakto, Suryadarma) supported by Mohammad Hatta, and the other supported by Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX who aspired for a professional military. Another party was the former members of PETA and laskar and their opposition to changes in the military’s organizational structure. They were supported by Soekarno, Moh. Yamin, and the Murba Party. This group was also against the plan to reduce the number

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 111 1/13/14 9:42 PM of military personnel. Political parties fought with one another to gain more influence over the Armed Forces. Many officers were then persuaded by practical objectives of certain political parties. The 17 October 1952 incident was judged by many as the Army’s resistance against of the government. Until 1959 there was not much that could be hoped for from the government. It was unable to resolve many of the state’s main problems. It had not settled the constitution as there was discord among national leaders. The economy was in turmoil as corruption expanded throughout the country. At the same time there were a number of serious security issues as the government had yet to solve the West Irian issue, particularly with problems inside APRI and among political parties. Such havoc then forced APRI to try to find solutions to these problems by searching for the best government system for Indonesia and a military system that fits the Indonesian characteristics to face future challenges. The Collegial Meeting (Raco) on 25 February 1955 in Yogyakarta agreed upon a written agreement in the Piagam Keutuhan Angkatan Darat RI (Declaration of the Unity of the Army), which then became a pledge of allegiance in front of the burying ground of Panglima Besar General Soedirman (or the Great General Soedirman) with the President and Vice President leading the ceremony. The meeting discussed three main issues, namely the unity of the Army, settlement to the 17 October 1952 case, and the development of the Army. The 1957 Army Reorganization replaced the teritorium with Komando Daerah Militer (Military Area Command or Kodam) and the settlement of central-regional conflicts. The latter has had significant implications on the organization.

Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) One of the most significant developments of Indonesia’s military was the unification of its military services with the police under Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or ABRI. The process was based on Presidential Decree Number 225/Plt/1962 dated 21 June 1962. The unification happened because the military’s efforts to integrate its services into a single and powerful organization have always been hindered by political forces outside ABRI. Efforts to establish ABRI began when Ir. Juanda became the First Minister and a committee was established led by the Deputy Minister of National Security, Mr. Hidayat, with the Chiefs of Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Police as members. The goal of the committee was to formulate an organizational structure, which in this early

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 112 1/13/14 9:42 PM version was led by a Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata or a Commander-in-Chief with the Chiefs of the Services and the Police under him. This concept was then presented to President Soekarno, but he had his own idea on the future military organizational structure. President Soekarno reorganized the military by integrating the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the police by using the Samenbundeling Van Alle Krachten concept (or gotong-royong, the concept of a community working together hand-in-hand) into ABRI. He also formed Komando Operasi Tertinggi (Supreme Military Command or KOTI). The president arranged to have the military directly below him and the Chiefs of the services and the police became ministers. The most threatening and urgent issue at that time was freeing West Irian from Dutch’s colonization. President Soekarno clearly wanted to have the armed forces and the police under himself directly as the supreme Commander-in-Chief with a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to assist him in administration but without any commanding authority on operations. Some analysts at that time believed the new organizational structure would allow the President to have one of the services to be on his side if he needed support for his political interest. Presidential Decree Number 225/Plt/1962 officially appointed the President as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces or Panglima Tertinggi, assisted by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces with his three deputies on operations, development (or pembinaan51), and special issues. Each deputy supervised a number of directorates. The organization structure of the services and the police was standardized with the establishment of training and operational elements. The 1962 cabinet reshuffle changed the Chiefs of services into Commanders and they received ministerial positions in the cabinet, namely Minister/Commander of each particular service; so there was the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Commanders of each service. The Chief of Staff of Armed Forces became Coordinating Minister for Defense and Security or Menko Hankam/Kasab. After the death of the First Minister Ir. Djuanda, the cabinet structure was changed to a Presidium Cabinet with three deputy prime ministers. Deputy Minister became Coordinating Minister or Menko. The existence of Coordinating Minister automatically undermined the authority of the Armed Forces Staff (SAB) in the armed forces’ development.

51 The word “pembinaan” means the authority to develop, train, educate, and ensure the welfare of military personnel.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 113 1/13/14 9:42 PM The establishment of KOTI by President Soekarno with Decree Number 142 of 1963 dated 19 July 1963 was the President’s decision on operations. Its main role was to ensure the security of the implementation of all government programs and was led by President Soekarno himself. Therefore de jure and de facto ABRI was in the hands of the President. The 1962 reorganization brought about negative implications, including disintegration among the services because there were differences in their intelligence bodies, budgets, development of elite and command forces, and doctrines, just to name a few. The President also formed six more organizations with similar function to the services, namely KOTI, Kompartemen Hankam, Department of Army, Department of Navy, Department of Air Force, and Department of Police. These agencies were independent without clear coordination or integration. These policies compartmentalized ABRI and the services were in the verge of being trapped in a service-minded way of thinking. Rivalry among the services was also very strong, and political ideology of political parties went deep into the roots of the troops. In 1967 ABRI was reintegrated to make sure all services and the police were united in ABRI. Menteri Utama Hankam (Main Minister for Defense and Security), General Soeharto ordered Kepala Staf Hankam (Chief of Staff of Defense and Security) Major General M.M.R. Kartakusuma to formulate a new structure for ABRI to ensure the clarity of the role of each service and ABRI’s own organization structure. The government then issued President Decree Number 132 Year 1967 on Defense and Security Organization and Procedures. ABRI was divided into two different levels, department and services. The supreme commander of the military was still the President and he was assisted by the Menhankan/Pangab (Minister of Defense and Security/Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces). ABRI became an organic part of the Department of Defense and Security with the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Police. A year after the new organization was in force, many felt it had yet to help ABRI become a united organization because it was still very large, ineffective and inefficient. Another policy was issued on 4 October 1969, Presidential Decree Number 79 Year 1969 to improve ABRI’s organization. This reorganization was based on the nature of threats Indonesia was facing at that time, in which although the leadership of ABRI was concurrently held by the Minister of Defense and Security, the command and control were expanded within the Komando Wilayah Pertahanan organization (Regional Defense Command or Kowilhan).

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 114 1/13/14 9:42 PM The goal was to make certain that by the end of 1973 Indonesia would have a foundation and starting point to further develop the systems of Defense and Security or Hankam and ABRI. It was also to ensure that ABRI could have a modern Hankamnas (National Defense and Security) system, both personnel and doctrine, in the near future. The main principle of the 1969 reorganization was determining and dividing the functions based on the ability and core of each service. ABRI was therefore comprised of military forces and the police. The department level was led by Menhankam/Pangab and his deputy. The staff echelon included General Staff, Department Staff, Kekaryaan Staff, Planning Staff, Inspectorate, and Private Staff. Each of the service and the police were led by a Chief. The next reorganization happened in 1974 because it was believed that Indonesia had not achieved a full integration of its defense functions, both within the organization as well as working procedures. Presidential Decree Number 7 Year 1974 was issued on 18 February 1974, stating that Hankamnas functions would run under Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan (Department of Defense and Security or Dephankam). Its main tasks were to manage policies and the development of National Resilience of Hankamnas, formulate policies for ABRI as well as manage its development as the main core of Hankamnas and social strength, and to manage, lead and control all defense and security-related operations. The department was organized into two levels, the department level and the main command level. The department was led by a minister who was also the Commander- in-Chief of ABRI along with his deputy. They were assisted by Chief of Staff for Operations (Kasops), Chief of Staff for Administration (Kasmin), Chief of Staff for Kekaryaan52 (Kaskar), and the Inspectorate General (Irjen Hankam). The 1981 reorganization focused on the transition from the 1945 generation to the younger generation in order for ABRI to support the government’s National Development program. At the same time there was a significant reduction in the level of threats to the country’s defense and security. During these phases of reorganization, Indonesia’s defense and security were regulated in Law Number 29 Year 1954. Challenges and threats, both internal and external, pushed the government to formulate new legislations to keep up with the development of the country and ABRI. On 6 September 1982 the Parliament passed

52 Kekaryaan is a unique trait of the personnel of ABRI, allowing military personnel to have not only a career inside the military but also in the civilian world without having to leave his or her military career and rank.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 115 1/13/14 9:42 PM Law Number 20 Year 1982 on National Defense and Security. The law was followed by two Presidential Decrees, namely Number 46 Year 1983 on the organization of the Department of Defense and Security and Number 60 Year 1983 on the organization of ABRI. These regulations clearly separated Dephankam and ABRI Headquarters, and so the Commander-in-Chief or Pangab could concentrate in developing the capability of ABRI as well as the operational commands. The last decree explained ABRI’s organization, led by the Pangab. He was assisted by Kepala Staf Umum (Chief of Staff or Kasum), Kepala Staf Sosial Politik (Chief of Staff for Social Politics or Kassospol), and the Inspectorate General and Treasury. Each service – TNI AD (Army), TNI AL (Navy), TNI AU (Air Force), Polri (National Police) - was led by a Chief, and for the operational commands there were Komando Strategi Nasional (National Strategic Command or Kostranas), Komando Pertahanan Udara Nasional (National Air Defense Command or Kohanudnas), and Komando Wilayah Pertahanan (Regional Defense Command or Kowilhan). The 1984 Strategic Force Development Plan (Renstra Bangkuat)53 stated that in order to secure and support the second phase of Indonesia’s long term development until the year of 2000, Indonesia required ABRI with a posture that suited the development of the strategic environment. Its goal was to develop a resilient and cohesive ABRI in order to face the complex domestic and foreign strategic environment. The reorganization in 1984 liquidated Kowilhan and Kostranas and their role and function were assigned to Komando Daerah Militer (Military Area Command or Kodam) and Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Reserve Command or Kostrad), supported by Komando Armada TNI AL (Naval Fleet Command) and Komando Operasi TNI AU (Operations Command of the Air Force). It also reduced the number of Kodam based on the archipelagic defense strategy concept. Previously there were 17 Kodam in Indonesia. The new regulation in 1983 reduced the number to ten, including one Kodam in Jakarta, Komando Daerah AL (Naval Area Command or Kodaeral) and Komando Daerah Udara (Air Force Area Command or Kodau). The last two were previously Komando Utama TNI AL (Naval Main Command) and TNI AU (Air Force Main Command), which were replaced by a basing system. Their locations were determined by an area’s strategic and tactical values. Naval Main Command was divided into two Fleets, The Western and the Eastern Fleets.54 The Air

53 Perencanaan Strategis Pembangungan Kekuatan 54 Komando Armada RI Kawasan Barat (Western Fleet Command) and Komando Armada RI Kawasan Timur (Eastern Fleet Command).

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 116 1/13/14 9:42 PM Force Main Command was also divided in two, namely the Komando Operasi TNI AU I and Komando Operasi TNI AU II (Air Force Main Command I and II). There were still 17 Police Area Commands, but their name was changed to Polisi Daerah (Regional Police or Polda) because the police roles and responsibilities are closely related to the functions of regional-level governments. ABRI Headquarters, based on the Keputusan Pangab (Commander-in-Chief’s Decree) Number Kep/03/P/XII/1983, was organized in three echelons: the first assisted the Commander-in-Chief, the second was service-level, and the third was the executives. The second echelon was then regulated under Keputusan Pangab Number Kep/01/P/I/1984. Further national and international development encouraged the government to make further changes to the armed forces in order to increase its effectiveness and efficiency. On 5 October 1992 Keputusan Pangab Number Kep/08/X/1992 on the Army’s Organization and Procedures was issued along with Keputusan Pangab Number Kep/09/X/1992 on the Navy’s Organization and Procedures as well as Keputusan Pangab Number Kep/10/X/1992 on the Air Force’s Organization and Procedures; these three decrees improved the organization and procedures of the three services. Last was Keputusan Pangab Number Kep/11/X/1992 on the Police’s Organization and Procedures. Further changes to ABRI’s organization were undertaken in 1997 after the previous decrees were updated. The Navy’s reorganization was done under Keputusan Pangab Number Kep/08/VII/1997 issued on 9 July and for the Air Force as Keputusan Pangab Number Kep/08/VII/1997 dated 7 July. The 1998 reorganization was undertaken as a new civil society and paradigm were born in Indonesia. The military decided to put aside its political role in the country and society. During this era two regulations were made, Law Number 3 Year 2002 on Defense and Law Number 34 Year 2004 on TNI. During these changes and reorganization processes, the services and the police developed in accordance to their own interests; unhealthy rivalries among theme emerged.

A Return to TNI The 1998 Reformation era promoted the idea to separate the military, or TNI, and the National Police. Prior to this era, the idea was already in the minds of TNI and police officers since their roles are quite different to one another, especially the police’s non- combatant role and function. The separation was made in order to distinctively assert

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 117 1/13/14 9:42 PM the respective roles, responsibilities and authority of TNI and the Police, a part of the reformation on defense and security with the goal to improve the professionalism of these agencies of defense and security. The police were officially separated from ABRI on 1 April 1999. Through Keputusan Menhankam/Pangab Number Skep/259/P/ IV/1999 dated 12 April 1999, the name ABRI reverted to TNI. It was General Wiranto, then-Minister of Defense and Security/Commander-in- Chief of ABRI, who proposed the idea of the separation to the government. ABRI, at that time, was in the process of redefining and repositioning its roles through the implementation of internal reformation. In terms of law enforcement, it would be in the nation’s best interests to have the Police closer to other law enforcement agencies under the national law. An independent police force was also needed to strengthen the civilian government with the establishment of civil society in Indonesia. There was only one country like Indonesia in the world where the police and the military were under the same organization. Myanmar followed Indonesia’s way. This concept did not receive international consent. As a result, in the past, Indonesian police officers were rejected from participating in international police forums and meetings because the police force was under ABRI. On October 1998 General Wiranto issued the New Paradigm of ABRI. It was a realization of ABRI’s position on its internal reforms; it was an effort to manage and improve its systems, doctrines, and structures. The concept was based on Presidential Decree Number 355/M Year 1999 dated 26 October 1999 on the 1999-2004 Cabinet that separated the position of Minister of Defense and Security with the Commander- in-Chief of the Armed Forces. This decree was followed by a number of changes, aside from the separation previously explained, including changes in the organizational structure of General Staff of ABRI, Social Political Staff and the separation of the Police and ABRI organization. Based on Presidential Instruction Number 2 Year 1999 dated 1 April 1999 on the policy measures in separating Police and ABRI as well as Keputusan Menhankam/ Pangab Number Kep/05/P/III/1999 dated 31 March 1999 on the Delegation of Authority of the Development of the National Police, on 1 April 1999 the Police were officially separated from ABRI. A military ceremony was held for the official separation, where the Police Banners were handed over from TNI Chief of Staff to the Secretary General of the Department of Defense and Security, who then handed them to the National Police Chief.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 118 1/13/14 9:42 PM This new paradigm is a concrete realization of TNI’s internal reforms, and it was based on an analytical view of future prospects. A comprehensive approach has allowed the military to form four new paradigms in TNI’s social political role: 1) TNI does not always need to be in the forefront of social political issues; 2) a shift from the concept of occupying into influence; 3) changing the ways of influencing, from direct to indirect ways; and 4) the willingness to take on political and role sharing with other national components. TNI has, quantitatively, and continues to carry out internal reforms and in such a short period of time has achieved the following significant results: • Its attitudes and views of the new paradigm of 21st century ABRI. • Its attitudes and views of the new paradigm of ABRI’s social political role. • Police-ABRI separation as the decision of the military’s leadership since 1 April 1999 as the first step to transformation process. • The elimination of the Central Social Political Board (Wansospolpus) and Province- level Social Political Board (Wansospolda). • Social Political Staff was replaced by Territorial Staff • Liquidation of ABRI employees, Kamtibmas ABRI (social order), and Badan Pembina Kekaryaan ABRI (Personnel Development Agency or Babinkar). • Omitting social political division in Kodam (Sospoldam) and other military areas under it as well as Babinkar in Kodam (Babinkardam). • Eliminating kekaryaan in ABRI, either through retirement or by change of status. • Reducing the number of ABRI Factions in Parliament and Regional Parliament. • ABRI will never take part in day-to-day politics. • Termination of organizational relations with Golkar Party and keeping a distance from any political party in Indonesia. • Commitment to be consistently neutral during General Elections. • Paradigm changes on the relations of active military personnel with families and retired personnel. • Changes to and revision of military doctrine in line with reformation and the 21st century. • Change of name from ABRI to TNI. • Change of Social Political Staff to Social Communications Staff. • Liquidation of Badan Koordinasi dan Strategi Nasional (National Coordination and Strategy Body or Bakorstanas) and Badan Koordinasi dan Strategi Daerah (Regional Coordination and Strategy Body or Bakorstanasda).

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 119 1/13/14 9:42 PM 5.2. Influences of Global Dynamics on Indonesia’s Military

1945-1949 Era Under the 1945 Postdam Agreement the Allied countries promised to return colonized territories that were under Japan’s occupation at that time back to the colonizers if Japan pushed away. Near the end of World War II in 1945, most of Indonesia’s territory was under the Allied forces. Australia landed its troops in Makassar and Banjarmasin, and it had already occupied Balikpapan before Japan surrendered. Morotai island and West Irian were taken by Australian and US troops led by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the West Pacific Area Command (SWPAC). After the war ended, Australian troops were responsible for Kalimantan and the eastern parts of Indonesia. The United States was in control of the Philippines while the British, through South East Asia Command (SEAC), was responsible for India, Burma, Sri Lanka, Malaya, Sumatra, Java, and Indochina. Lord Mountbatten, Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Southeast Asia, was in charge of taking all Japan’s weapons and equipments and to be responsible for returning the Allied forces’ prisoners of war and civilian prisoners through Recovered Allied Prisoners of War and Internees (RAPWI). Based on the Civil Affairs Agreement, on 23 August 1945 the British and the Dutch troops landed in Sabang, Aceh. On 15 September 1945 British troops arrived in Jakarta accompanied by Dr. Charles van der Plas as the Dutch representatives of the Allied forces. The Allied troops were not alone when they arrived in Jakarta as the Netherland Indies Civil Administration or NICA, led by Dr. Hubertus J van Mook, also joined them. The British and the Dutch came not long after Indonesia proclaimed its independence, and was not long until the United Kingdom realized that Indonesia would do anything to defend its independence from Japan. Therefore the British troops withdrew from Indonesia after a defeat in the 10 November 1945 battle in Surabaya, Ambarawa battle on 15 December 1945,56 and finally the battle in Bandung also known as the Bandung Lautan Api on 23 March 1946.

55 The battle lasted until 28 November 1945 after the battle in Gunungsari. 56 The battle broke out on 20 November 1945 where 19 battalions from TKR and a couple of laskar battalions fought alternately. After the death of Lieut. Col. Isdiman, the battle was led by Colonel Soedirman until it ended in Banyubiru. The battle was very important as it was acknowledged by the British along with the battle of Surabaya, that Indonesia was undefeated although the British had deployed all of their forces.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 120 1/13/14 9:42 PM After the British left Indonesia, the Dutch launched its first Military Aggression in 1947 and its second in 1948. Indonesia retaliated with its first Serangan Umum (or general assault) on 1 March 1949 on Yogyakarta. The retaliation was planned by the highest military officials of Division III/GM III with the support of local government based on the instructions of General Soedirman. These military attacks were successful in breaking the morale of the Dutch troops and showed the world that the existence of TNI – also the Republic of Indonesia - remained strong, and contributed to strengthening Indonesia’s position during the negotiations in the United Nations Security Council. Mr. Alexander Andries Maramis, who was in New Delhi at that time, expressed his joy when he heard through radio captured from Burma about TNI’s huge military assault on the Dutch. The news became headlines in India’s newspapers. After consecutive defeats and faced with international pressure, finally the Dutch agreed to acknowledge Indonesia’s sovereignty through the Den Hague negotiations, better known as Konferensi Meja Bundar (Round Table Conference or KMB) on 23 August until 2 November 1949. The success of this negotiation was also supported by the Three State Commission established on 25 August 1947 as the United Nations’ reaction to the Netherlands’ first Military Aggression. The members of the commission were Australia (chosen by Indonesia), Belgium (chosen by the Dutch), and the United States as a neutral country. The establishment of the commission and the KMB would suggest that the Dutch were pressured by “the West” to immediately acknowledge Indonesia’s independence and sovereignty. In fact, both the United States and Britain had already recognized Indonesia’s independence, while Australia was one of Indonesia’s main supporters during the era when Indonesia defended its independence. They even participated in the New Delhi Conference on 20 to 25 January 1949. One of the outcomes of KMB which became a dispute in the future was the differences of interests between Indonesia and the Dutch. Indonesia wanted all of the East Indie’s occupied territories to officially become Indonesia’s territory, while the Dutch was eager to have West Irian separated from Indonesia due to ethnical differences. The conference was closed without a decision on this issue, and only stated in Article 2 of the agreement that West Irian was not a part of the territories which the Dutch would hand over to Indonesia, and that the issue would be resolved within a period of one year.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 121 1/13/14 9:42 PM 1949-1956 Era Indonesia had no desire to follow either the East or the West Blocks during the Cold War. Therefore in 1955 President Soekarno proposed the Non-Aligned Movement during the Asian-African Summit in Bandung. In the summit, participating countries declared their desire not to involve themselves in the West-East ideological confrontation. Other figures of this movement included President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru of India, and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. The movement lost credibility in the 1960s when some of its members followed one of the blocks, mostly the East Block. Nevertheless it survived until it finally diminished after the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

1956-1962 Era Indonesia’s good relations with the West deteriorated after Indonesia firmly expressed its position through its foreign policy on the Arab-Israel War in 1956. The war was a continuation of the 1948 war where Israel won over the Arabs, particularly Egypt. Peace negotiations Post war failed and the tensions along the borders between Israel and its neighboring countries made the problem worse and increased the hostility between Israel and the Arab countries. Gamal Abdul Nasser, inspired by the Asian-African Summit, nationalized the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956, and thus, the once international strait became the possession of the Egypt government. International reaction came strongly and the move was immediately protested by the British and France. The later was eager to “punish” Egypt not only for nationalizing the Suez Canal but also for its support of the Moroccan and Aljazeera rebels against French colonization. These two countries have deep interest in the Suez Canal and were plotting a joint attack upon Egypt by using the Arab-Israel hostility. Though the United States is an ally of both countries, it tried hard to prevent such attack. Egypt lost the war but it won politically. Diplomatic pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union forced the British, France and Israel to withdraw from the Gulf of Sinai Peninsula. Washington was afraid that the war might expand after the Soviet Union and countries of the Warsaw Pact threatened to launch rocket attacks on London, Paris, and Tel Aviv. The United States pushed the immediate termination of the invasion and sponsored the UN Security Council resolution for cessation. The first UN Peacekeeping Force under UNEF was established to watch over the demilitarization zone, and Indonesia’s

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 122 1/13/14 9:42 PM Garuda Contingent arrived on 8 January 1957.57 President Soekarno bravely and openly proclaimed Indonesia’s free and active foreign policy as its participation in resolving the Suez Canal crisis by deploying its troops as peacekeepers in Egypt. It was also a way for Indonesia to express its solidarity to a country who had just proclaimed its independence. This policy also started Indonesia’s relations with the East and marked the end with the West. Based on the negotiation result during KMB, the Dutch should have made some efforts to return West Irian to Indonesia in the late 1950s. It seems the Dutch still wanted to maintain their power over West Irian. Indonesia launched a number of actions to take West Irian back, both through diplomacy and military action. On 17 August 1960 Indonesia broke off its diplomatic relations with the Netherlands and started to procure weapon systems from the Soviet Union and other countries from the East Block to prepare for confrontation with the Dutch. On 19 December 1961 in Yogyakarta, President Soekarno launched Trikora. Two months afterwards Jaya Wijaya Operation commenced. This caused concerns in the international community and the United States pressured the Dutch to negotiate. Ellsworth Bunker, a mediator appointed by the United States, then proposed ways to settle the conflict peacefully. Based on these proposals, on 15 August 1962 through the New York Agreement, Indonesia and the Dutch agreed upon the issue of West Irian58. The Netherlands would leave West Irian.

57 Garuda Contingent I was led by Lieut. Col. Hartoyo, and was then replaced by Lieut. Col. Suadi Suromiharjo, with Maj Soediono Suryantoro as his number two. The Contingent was manned by 559 soldiers from the Infantry Regiment-17 Teritorium (TT) IV/Diponegoro and Infantry Regiment -18 TT V/ Brawijaya. They were brought by C- 124 Globe Master from the US Air Force to Beirut, Lebanon. From Beirut, the contingent was divided in two, one group went to Abu Suweir and the other was stationed in Al Sandhira. The later then went to Gaza along the borders of Egypt and Israel, while the Commando was stationed in Rafah. 58 During KMB, it was decided that the West Irian issue would be resolved within a year; nevertheless until 1961 the Dutch did nothing. President Soekarno launched Trikora and military operations to take Papua from the Dutch. The Jaya Wijaya Operation was Indonesia’s biggest military operation and employed the most sophisticated weapon systems in that era, mostly procured from the Soviet Union. After the battle of Aru Sea on 15 January 1962, the United States pressured the Netherlands to negotiate with Indonesia. It was concerned over the possibility of the Soviet Union’s involvement. The Indonesian delegation was led by Adam Malik and the Netherlands by Dr. Van Royen, while Ellsworth Bunker was the mediator from the United States. The New York Agreement detailed the handover of West Irian from the Dutch to Indonesia through the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). On 1 May 1963, the Red and White flag was hoisted in West Irian. After the Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat (Referendum or PEPERA) in 1969, it was clear to the international community that the West Irian people wanted to be a part of the Republic of Indonesia.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 123 1/13/14 9:42 PM 1962-1966 Era The Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation, better known as Dwikora, was a dispute over the future of Malaya, Brunei, Sabah, and Sarawak between the Federation of Malaya and Indonesia. The confrontation started as a result of the Federation’s desire to take Brunei, Sabah, and Sarawak. This desire was not in accordance with the Manila Agreement59 and was opposed by President Soekarno, who considered the Federation of Malaya, now known as Malaysia, only the “puppet” of the British, a new form of colonialism and imperialism. It is also considered to support disturbances of internal security as well as various insurgencies in Indonesia. When the United Nations accepted Malaysia as a full member, Indonesia protested by withdrawing from its UN membership on 20 January 1965 and established the Conference of New Emerging Forces (Conefo). The confrontation was “stopped” because of the attempted coup on 30 September 1965 by the Indonesian Communist Party. As part of the Commonwealth countries, Malaysia became a member of the Five Power Defense Agreement (FPDA) formed in 1971with the United Kingdom, Australia, Singapore, and New Zealand. The alliance was established to repress Indonesia’s influence and its possible aggression. One of the agreements of the members of FPDA was an attack on one of its members would also mean an attack on the others. During the FPDA’s 30th anniversary in 2001, the five countries agreed to long-term cooperation. This era also marked the end of Indonesia’s relations with Russia and China because of the communism threat. This opportunity was taken by “the West” to reinstate its good relations with Indonesia on defense.

1966-1999 Era Although still a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, the New Order regime preferred to have more relations with the United States and countries of the Western block. The United States interest to have stronger influence in Southeast Asia was immense, as it

59 The Manila Agreement was an initiative of the Philippines President Diosdado Macapagal to reduce the tension between Indonesia and the Federation of Malaya. Tensions increased after the referendum in Sabah, north of Kalimantan, Brunei, and Sarawak (Report of the Commission of the Inquiry North Borneo led by Lord Cabbold from the United Kingdom), which showed that not all of them were willing to join the federation. The agreement was signed on 31 July 1963 by heads of three governments, where they agreed that further investigation of the people’s aspiration must be taken by the United Nations before the establishment of the federation. Nevertheless Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rachman declared the formation of the Federation of Malaya before the UN mission submitted its report. Even UN Secretary General U Thant expressed his disappointment on the lack of British support for the UN mission. President Soekarno severed its diplomatic ties on 17 September 1963 and declared his support of the freedom fighters in the northern part of Kalimantan led by Azahari.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 124 1/13/14 9:42 PM was important to ensure it could prevent the expansion of communism‘s influence from Vietnam. Washington’s support was strong even when Indonesia decided to have East Timor as its 30th province. It revoked the military assistance postponement in 1967 and started to support the development of Indonesian military by providing training, exercise and procurement of light weaponries. Establishment of ASEAN in 1967 reflected Indonesia’s desire to increase ties and relations with neighboring countries and to reduce tensions and/or conflicts. The regional organization played a crucial role in maintaining regional security stability, allowing Indonesia to concentrate more on national development and economic growth. Previous internal security issues were resolved quickly, although separatism in Aceh and Papua did not receive enough attention, otherwise could not implement appropriate strategies. Massive arms procurement from western countries in the early 1980s had significant influence over the development of armed forces in the region. The next wave of arms procurement happened in the mid-1990s although these weapons were not 100 percent new. The 1997 Asian financial crisis resulted in a less favorable social political situation for Indonesia. Demonstrators went down to the streets demanding reforms in all fields of life. The relation with “the West” started to deteriorate due to human rights issues and the people’s political freedom. The tensions came to a critical point in May 1998. A referendum was held in East Timor in August 1999 encouraged by the countries who had supported integration; the United States and its allies. On October 1999 the United Nations formed the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) as the body responsible for the transition. A UN Resolution allowed International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), led by Australia, to forcefully enter and face the Indonesian military head-on. President Habibie’s decision finally closed the door to the possibility of an open war between Indonesia and Australia. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said that the 1999 East Timor Referendum was one of the results of Indonesia’s reformation process. Timor Leste’s independence was acknowledged by the Indonesian government in the same year.

1999-2011 Era In the face of difficult times, Indonesia was able to accomplish a number of its reform agendas. After the financial crisis subsided, Indonesia concentrated on managing its defense and security issues. Relations with the West started to improve after the

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 125 1/13/14 9:42 PM United States lifted its military embargo on 22 November 2005. The US-Indonesia military relations normalization included the continuation of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and sales of non-lethal military weapons after the announcement from US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. The normalization was also expressed by President George W. Bush to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the APEC meeting in Busan, South Korea. Indonesia also explored good relations with Russia and China. The East Timor issue was resolved permanently. The Indonesian and Timor Leste administrations established the Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) on 14 December 2004 to resolve issues of accountability in the East Timor incident in 1999. It is a bilateral mechanism, the first of its kind in the world, to find the truth and close all cases based on principles of reconciliation. The Freedom of Aceh Movement (GAM) issue was also resolved in this era through negotiations and public diplomacy. It was hailed as a diplomacy success of President Yudhoyono’s administration. The Indonesia-GAM negotiations went through five rounds facilitated by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), the Henry Dunant Center and former Finland President, Mr. Martii Ahtisaari as the mediator. The agreement between both sides was signed on 15 August 2005 to end the conflict in Aceh. Indonesia also faced the Ambalat dispute in this era. The decision of the International Court of Justice to favor Malaysia’s appeal on its sovereignty over the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands in 2002 was then followed with another dispute along the waters of Ambalat, East Kalimantan. On 16 February 2005 Malaysia provided mining concessions to Royal Dutch Shell and Petronas in the Ambalat Block, where Indonesia already allowed mining activities and explorations for ENI (Italy) and Unocal (the US) long before this new concession. Indonesia’s naval warships patrolled the area and a number of incidents around the waters have forced both governments to negotiate. Besides Ambalat, the South China Sea dispute is also one Indonesia must be aware of. Although it is not one of the claimant states, Indonesia does have a bilateral dispute with China on its continental shelf along the South China Sea. This issue has not come to the surface since China has assured Indonesia that neither country has a maritime dispute in the South China Sea. In its 1947 chart, China’s nine-dotted line covers Hainan Island to Kalimantan’s coastal lines, which includes Tonkin Gulf and the Paracel and Spratly Islands. In 1995 China claimed that in its chart the Natuna gas blocks were part of its territory, although they are positioned 1,000 nautical miles to the south of China. China has also claimed its sovereignty over a part of the Natuna Sea to the waters around Bangka Island and 20 nautical miles from West Kalimantan and around

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 126 1/13/14 9:42 PM Vietnam. Besides having a number of incidents with Vietnam’s naval ships, China has also had numerous military exercises in the South China Sea.

The Strategic Context of Indonesia’s Military Development The above explanation of Indonesia’s military development has exposed a number of issues underlying the development process. There are a number of different characteristics from each era, at the same time however, we can also identify general contexts of the development process. First is the political factor. Political parties, especially socialist/communist groups, were working hard to gain power over the armed forces. Hence TNI and PPAL was the result of a political compromise (1960s). Second is the leadership factor. BKR, TKR, TRI, TNI, and the Laskar are soldiers born in the time of the rise of the people to defend Indonesia’s independence. The ideas from the military’s most senior leadership became the foundation of changes and development in every period of leadership and era. Third is the diplomacy factor. The progress of diplomacy and reactions over the enemy’s force development has influenced the changes of TNI’s organization. Fourth is the strategy for struggle factor. It is evident that there are differences in the strategies used by political and military figures. Fifth is the reorganization and rationalization factor. After the 1948 reorganization and rationalization, the military organization was constructed on a single strategy, the Attrition Strategy, in which organization, dislocation, and categorization were structured based on the strategy to prepare long-term wars.

5.3. TNI Development and Its Long-Term Implications

Throughout its history, the Indonesian military or TNI has gone through many phases of change, influenced by the ever-changing strategic environment. These changes linger to this very day, and we can identify at least nine of them. First, BKR’s organization was a corps of armed fighters rather than a regular military force. Together with KNI it became the people’s organization that did not only assist, but also pushed and led Indonesia’s fight to defend its independence. In the early times post proclamation, many KNI and BKR figures took position and power, formulated the establishments of the state and moved the revolution forward. Second, on October 1945, the government called Oerip Soemohardjo to come to Jakarta to construct the military’s organization system. In the beginning TKR’s organization (1945) was constructed based on KNIL

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 127 1/13/14 9:42 PM and East Indies’ War Department (Departement Orlog/DVO) organization, minus the inspectorates for infantry, artillery, and cavalry. The first plan was to establish four divisions, three in Java and one in Sumatra. The plan had to be changed because the number of young people joining TKR in both islands exceeded the requirements. The establishment of these units was more spontaneous than planned in the midst of the revolution and struggle mess. Therefore the Chief of Staff had no choice but to form 10 divisions in Java and six in Sumatra. Third, during the First Syahrir Cabinet, the Supreme Headquarters was divided into Markas Besar Tentara (Armed Forces Headquarters or MBT) and the Direktorat Jenderal Militer (Directorate General of Military or Dirjen Militer). MBT was under General Soedirman while Dirjen Militer was led by Major General Soedibyo. Fourth, the change from Tentara Keamanan Rakyat to Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat and then to TRI on 24 January 1946 resulted in changes in the organization with the implementation of Headquarters and Ministry of Defense. Soedirman and Oerip still had their positions as Panglima Besar and Head of General Headquarters. Inside the Ministry of Defense were a number of offices such as Directorate Generals, Head of Personnel, and Head of Justice. Fifth, the choices of division commanders did not always receive warm welcomes from the locals. Some difficulties also emerged in the Ministry of Defense since there were two commando systems, from the Minister of Defense, Amir Syarifuddin, and from General Soedirman. In turn it caused losses for the struggle and operations. The ministry had its own Biro Perjuangan, the coordinator for laskar or Badan Perjuangan led by Djoko Suyono. Sixth, TNI was established on 3 June 1947 to merge TRI and the laskar under a collective leadership. TNI was led by General Soedirman along with three people from TRI (Oerip, M. Nasir, Suryadarma), and three from the laskar (Sumarsono, Sutomo, Ir. Sakirman). The merge did not result in an ideal military organization; it was expanded, instead. Seventh, one of the Indonesian Navy’s laskar was the Marine Keamanan Rakyat (People’s Security Marine) led Admiral Atmadji who had a number of Tentara Laut Republik Indonesia (TLRI) divisions with communist ideology. Supreme Naval Headquarters was established in Yogyakarta under the command of Admiral M. Pardi. This dualism in the navy’s organization was resolved on February 1946, when General Soedirman gave the navy its new official name, Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia (the Republic of Indonesia Navy or ALRI). On July 1947 a collective leadership was formed in ALRI called Pucuk Pimpinan Angkatan Laut (the Helm of Naval Leadership or PPAL) to resolve the leadership dualism. Eighth, the development of the Air Force relatively followed the whole process. BKR Udara immediately became

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 128 1/13/14 9:42 PM TKR Udara after 5 October 1945, better known as TKR Jawatan Penerbangan (TKR Aviation Service). TKR Headquarters initiated the establishment of air power. Ninth, the pioneers and supporters of TKR Jawatan Penerbangan were mostly former pilots of the Dutch and Japan aviation services; therefore professionalism was quite dominant. In a short time TKR Udara achieved many developments, in particular after Suryadarma became its leader. It experienced an increase in activity and a more settled organizational structure. The development of Air Force organization was in line with TNI’s organizational development, from BKR to TKR, TRI, TNI, ABRI, and finally returning to TNI. It was intentional that this book did not elaborate in great detail the changes experienced by TNI during the course of its history since the main focus of this book is analyzing the institutional changes in the military and how the wider strategic implications influenced the posture from 1945 until the present day.

5.4. Summary

It is undeniable that during the course of its development, TNI has experienced many changes. What has not been studied is how far these challenges have influenced TNI’s structural capacity and how far the influence of potential national challenges and threats effected these changes. On the other hand, we also have not analyzed TNI’s contribution to establishments of new global military relations norms. Nonetheless, the fact that changes have happened on a certain qualitative scale provide us with the fundamentals to formulate future transformation plans. The process of reorganization and restructuring endured by the military demonstrated that during its early establishments, TNI was preoccupied with domestic issues, either internal military issues or domestic political problems. Domestic political dynamics during President Soeharto’s regime until 1966, for example, were a major factor in forcing the military to adapt quickly since politics had strong relevance during this period. From a different perspective, during these years the military was in search of its ideal format of organization and structure. The fact that TNI was established from independent groups of fighters andlaskar from the people was a main issue that needed to be resolved in this particular period. On the other hand, should this position be seen from a single perspective, that TNI was an object of the country’s dynamic political process? By analyzing how agents inside the military organization played their role

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 129 1/13/14 9:42 PM in domestic political institutions, both as an institution as well as individuals, we can hope to understand this issue further. In some cases TNI has proven its effectiveness in creating generations of capable leaders thanks to its individuals’ capacities. This tradition continues to the present day, particularly after President Soeharto’s regime fell and was replaced by the New Order regime under General Soeharto. After this particular period, more leaders came from the military, making it one of the most effective institutions in producing leaders in the country. Since the early years of its independence, Indonesia’s development has always been connected to global issues; this trend continues to this very day. TNI’s own history is linked to the military education systems of Japan (PETA) and the Dutch (KNIL). Although laskar or paramilitaries also formed the military establishment in its early years, their position in the institution was “pushed away” since they had no professional military education, and the top military positions were dominated by these two groups of officers with military education backgrounds from Japan and the Netherlands. The tension between these two groups of officers during the development process of the military also contributed to the institution’s dynamics. Hence it is evident that TNI’s development is closely linked to the norms and values of Japanese and Dutch militaries. Theoretically, there is the possibility that TNI personnel could reproduce these values in the present time and the future in different contexts and with different qualities. During the Cold War, the conflict of interest between the two Blocks, West and East, was evident in the military’s strategic agendas, particularly weapon system development and improvement of personnel capacity. Adequate weapon systems were a central issue in this era as well as their origins; it reflected Indonesia’s position in the international community. In terms of foreign military education, Indonesia only had two choices, either to send its officers and personnel to the United States or to the Soviet Union, or to the countries of each block. The same applied also to weapons. As the world faced a dualism issue in regards to global leadership, Indonesia went forward with a different approach by establishing the Non-Aligned Movement. As one of the pioneers of this movement, Indonesia played a more active and strategic role by gathering newly-independent nations to stand on the sidelines of the world’s biggest dispute at that time by formulating a new foreign policy paradigm that was never thought of before; the free and active foreign policy. Although implementation of this principle would prove to be challenging in the future, this visionary breakthrough proved that Indonesia had the capacity to inject new values

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 130 1/13/14 9:42 PM against the general understanding of that era. During that time Indonesia was in a bad shape with its poor economy, domestic insurgencies, and only a few countries in the world acknowledging its independence, but it did not act only as an agent driven by a structure that dictated the policies of other countries in the world; it too, as a subject, was able to provide a breakthrough by establishing a new foundation for countries to interact with each other in the future. Even though this principle did not stop the Cold War and the Non-Aligned Movement ended after the Arab War, it did not diminish Indonesia’s role in international relations. These explanations could then prove one of Gidden’s theses that agents could contribute largely in a structuration process with structural constraints, which allows the structuring process of the designated structure. Indonesia, as a newly-independent nation in the world during the Cold War era, was under the influence and power of the two superpowers. Still, Indonesia could play a role in the international community and contributed implications to the world’s political and strategic environment. Sociologically speaking, what Indonesia did during that time was to act as an agent in a social interaction process to influence global power structures, where conflicts and tensions existed as well as negotiation activities between Indonesia and nations with immense powers.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 131 1/13/14 9:42 PM Table 7. TNI Internal Dynamics and Strategic Contexts

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 132 1/13/14 9:42 PM From various sources

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 134 1/13/14 9:42 PM Chapter VI

Initial Scenarios of Indonesian Military’s Transformation

• Why is Transformation a Necessity? • Global Level Scenario • National Level Scenario • Summary

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 135 1/13/14 9:42 PM Chapter VI Initial Scenarios of Indonesian Military’s Transformation

The ability of a community to recognize symptoms of change determines how far it can benefit from the process; a conclusion we could make from the previous chapters. We started in the beginning by discussing theoretical views and understanding in detail. In short, globalization and all of its implications are the final signs of the late modernity process. Globalization has the power to push how actors of complicated social relations take action, but it also allows them to exist and react as themselves and have the capabilities to decide the course of global norms. It also raises unexpected emergences, or can also be said to inherit uncertainties that might change the mindset and behavior of the international community. Therefore related actors in the regional and global stages should consider the risks of globalization.

6.1. Why is Transformation a Necessity?

This is not an easy question to answer. Nevertheless we have come to a basic understanding that the direction of a country’s military institution development is determined by how its policies define national security. By analyzing our national security’s challenges and threats we may anticipate the direction of the military transformation process. The rise of new forms of security, namely environmental security, human security and economy security, have pushed us to further analyze and study how we view security issues. It might seem the rise of these new forms of security has weakened the existence of state borders and states’ authority. Nonetheless, globalization has not diminished the role state actors play in maintaining security management and its quality. The emergence of private security companies or industries raised the idea that the private sector can replace the state’s role in the provision of security. In practice, their existence would have never noticeably developed without the involvement and support of government policies. It is the same with assumptions on how market mechanisms can be created without having states involved; these are false notions as markets can and will only exist if they are affixed to states. The most current case of this phenomenon

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 136 1/13/14 9:42 PM can be seen where capitalism was born, Europe and the United States. Governments of Europe and the United States must intervene in managing the negative impacts of the economic crisis, a true sign of how dilapidated the capitalism system is. In other words, when we talk about security issues, following the discourse that occurs at the international and regional level may be seen as only one of the arenas where we submit our national interests for the consideration of others, but never for the purpose of conceding them. International and regional agreements on security cooperation do not suggest involved countries are merging or mixing their national interests; this kind of cooperation permits states to have their national interests stand side-by-side for the common good. The main objective is the insertion of national interests into an international or regional agreement. Thus, although there are binding norms upon involved parties, this cannot be understood only from one particular side. Global norms may or may not influence a government’s national decision as it needs to consider the reciprocity of these norms domestically. In terms of military transformation, in a relatively short time (from third to fifth generation warfare) we have experienced rapid and massive fundamental changes of war and/or warfare. The existence of global binding norms on warfare and the modernization and industrialization of weapons technology in many countries pushed these changes. Often related to Revolution in Military Affairs as well as Military Technical Revolution, military transformation provides opportunities and also threats. Global values that emerged are like blades, some are blunt and some are sharp, but all have risks; which is the global risk itself. Massive development of defense and warfare technology has inspired countries to develop more efficient military forces. On the other hand, some fear it would have developing countries rely their weapon systems procurement solely from western countries as these technological advancement came from the West. China’s policy to promote development of its own national defense industry is a good example of how military transformation process can trigger national economic growth. Despite issues of quality, China has proven that anyone can achieve technological advancement, including developing countries. There are, however, possibilities China will or already has experienced overproduction. It will eventually require new countries as its weapons market. There is a sense that China speaks on behalf of developing countries in international meetings and forums; nonetheless its national interest remains in the forefront of its policies. Another threat of national dependency on weapons technology emerges.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 137 1/13/14 9:42 PM It is interesting that western weapons technology, claimed as part of their national interest, has and is reinforcing numerous resistances against western supremacy. Similar to capitalism that was born and is now “dying” in the West, the weapons they have produced are used by groups with conflicting ideology, like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Terrorist groups and pirates in Somali waters are also using western-produced weapons in their operations. Alas the paradox of the global society development. How can all these debates contribute to Indonesia and its military institution in understanding globalization, national security and military transformation? This chapter explores possible scenarios in Indonesia related to this question at global and national levels.

6.2. Global Level Scenario

Our global world is developing rapidly and is filled with uncertainty. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States was a single superpower; it has now changed dramatically. The once most powerful country in the world is fighting to survive the economic crisis spurred by its own abuse of capitalism. Protesters have overrun Wall Street, and although these protests have not hampered its national security, the United States government is experiencing concern as it works hard to avoid falling into a multidimensional crisis. The same can be seen in Europe. After crushing Greece, the crisis has now hit Italy and Spain. France might be next in line. On the other hand China and other developing countries are experiencing an economic boom that was once dominated by these western countries. These dramatic and rapid developments have brought about changes in the balance of global power and influence. China has risen as a new global player as its power not only relies on the economy, like India for instance, because it has invested much in its defense industry. In the future Beijing needs to increase its weapons and platforms’ quality in order to compete with the West, but it has successfully answered the issue of technology dependence on western-produced weapons technology. In its future defense planning, China is said to have prepared a space warfare concept to rival the might of the US military. Some assume our world could once again experience bipolarization of global power like the Cold War era. This assumption, however, is much too early for a number of reasons. First, China is a Communist state, but unlike Soviet Union, it is more moderate with its foreign investments. China is not in the process of establishing its

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 138 1/13/14 9:42 PM own empire of allies through a single ideology. It invests money into countries affected by the global financial crisis in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America; even the United States is invested in by China. This method is in great contrast to the Cold War’s political interactions. Second, these investments mean a healthier global economy is of China’s national interests. It has learned that no one could escape free trade and open markets thanks to globalization. The West’s once dominant markets and economy were crushed by globalization, and this can have implications for China’s own economy. If countries where China has invested fall, they might drag Beijing to its own economic crisis. Third, the Chinese people are everywhere in the world and in each country they have become a part of the community. Sociologically this would reduce the possibility for any direct confrontation between China and the United States. Fourth, the United States and Europe’ economy crisis has drawn China and other developing countries to assist in their recovery process. If the world did come to another episode of polarization of two superpowers, it would not happen just tomorrow or in the near future thanks to current development. This is where Indonesia can play its role in maintaining world peace, sharing the consequences of global risks, and developing a strong military for peaceful purposes.

Indonesia and World Peace The chapters of this book have explained how globalization can force countries to adapt in order to attain maximum benefit from its process, as well as to minimize its challenges and threats. At the same time there are opportunities to formulate new universal values. Today Indonesia is well-recognized by the global community. It would be most appropriate for Indonesia to start international-level initiatives for global peace and harmony. Conflicts and disputes in the world will continue in various degrees and with strong dynamics, but Indonesia has long emphasized harmonizing the world, since global peace is one of the purposes of the republic’s establishment. For that reason, pursuing global and regional initiatives through dialogues and cooperation are the most relevant options to reduce the risks for any parties involved. The establishment of a harmonious global order is not an effort to delegitimize military power of any nation; both are very different concepts and should not be merged, as it may generate ambiguous understanding of the process of peace and the efforts to create world harmony. World peace is a dynamic condition as it involves interaction among actors, each with their own interests. In regards to this perspective, world peace is a situation where all parties are sharing risks. Universal norms materializing as a

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 139 1/13/14 9:42 PM consequence of international relations may be viewed as the most optimal form of contestation among national interests of countries around the world. A condition of harmony is a social construction with agents or actors interacting closely with one another. Things can change easily when one party encounters injustice during the process or its national interest was compromised. If it develops further and threatens a country’s national security, this disharmony might lead to interstate armed conflicts. Peace and harmony must be maintained as a balance. At this point, the existence of military institutions is a necessity to ensure the continuity of such balance.

Indonesia Shares Global Risks No one is free from globalization, not even the West. Some of its consequences are intended and some are not. Facing this juggernaut has its risks; certain, uncertain, and even absurd. These unpredictable risks must be considered by all parties of this global interaction. In regards to security, our national interests are faced with more threats that transcend territorial boundaries of states. Today’s national interest no longer stays within the territory of a state because it can now reside in another country’s territory or even be in no man’s land. Foreign policy determines how we manage and minimize these risks through a fair and balanced risk sharing mechanism; one that respects the sovereignty of each country involved in the agreement. As one of the new emerging countries in this age of globalization, Indonesia has taken calculated steps to place its national security issues in a balanced portion with global economy and political development. Indonesia’s membership in the G-20 indicates its active participation in international relations in the new world order. Speaking on behalf of other developing countries, Indonesia has the opportunity to urge developed countries to critically understand the risks of globalization – none other than the West’s greed of capitalism – and share them fairly. Nevertheless Gidden’s concept of sharing risks might be a double-edged sword; it could become positive or it could be a trap for developing countries. The United States and European countries’ current instability has significant implications upon regional economies and politics. Awareness and vigilance are important since these developed countries might put the risk sharing concept on the table. Risk sharing in this context means sharing risks that belong to developed countries. We find ourselves faced by the very reason why we must balance today’s risk sharing concept with our national interests, especially for developing countries. None

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 140 1/13/14 9:42 PM of us desire counter-productive impacts on our national development or, even worse, degradation of developing countries’ national interests. The decision to maintain distance to the risks currently faced by the United States and Europe, nevertheless, would not be a very wise one because some of these risks are inevitable. At the moment, Indonesia relies its economic growth on domestic markets but in the long term it will not suffice to drive its national transformation. Since a number of economic sectors still rely heavily on foreign markets, slowly but surely, whether Indonesia maintains its distance or not, the western financial crisis will come to the shores of the archipelagic state. What we need to understand and be aware of is how fast the crisis is coming and how far we can prepare ourselves to face it when western countries are eager to bring risk sharing to our doorstep. These realities actually allow Indonesia to have a stronger role as the economy of western countries is weakening. Sociologically, Indonesia now has more power to include a national economy agenda and to introduce national values on a more universal level. Values of harmony in the midst of diversity and multicultural communities may become a new universal value, one that can be proven not only theoretically since it has become a daily practice in Indonesia under formal facilities from the government. By sharing these values we have contributed significantly to the future order of the international community. Our military will have quite a significant role to ensure the maintenance of global balance without sacrificing our national interests.

6.3. National Level Scenario

After identifying the state’s formulation on global challenges and threats, we can now discuss TNI and its highly dynamic strategic context. It is vital for the TNI institution to redefine current challenges and threats as the fundamentals of formulating strategic actions on what needs to be done, including what phases of transformation can be planned and executed in order to manage globalization and all of its paradoxes. Given the military transformation experiences of many countries, we can identify the basic issues of the transformation process, both the completed processes and those still ongoing: the relationship between the state and military institutions, the definition of national security, the instruments of transformation and the fundamental changes inside the military organization.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 141 1/13/14 9:42 PM How we define the relationship between TNI and the Indonesian government would not differ to other countries we have discussed in this book, except for China. There have not been any significant changes on the military’s position since its early establishment that it has always been under the President, although policies on war declaration or plans of transformation must involve related institutions such as the Parliament.60 Changes in post-reform political structures have encouraged TNI to make its own adjustments, including cutting its ties from day-to-day politics. This does not diminish TNI’s political functions related to guarding and maintaining national defense and security. Indonesia already has the right posture in its civil-military relations. TNI’s commitment to its reform is clearly stated in Law Number 3 Year 2002. Even though there are some debates on the revision of this regulation, TNI’s authority on national strategic decisions such as war declaration is fully in the hands of the President with approval from Parliament. Not only that, the position of the Commander-in-Chief of TNI must also receive Parliament’s endorsement. There has been some growing concern that this might bring TNI back into politics because there could be some compromise or negotiations along the process of approval. Being under civilian authority, TNI’s transformation should be designed by those in authority as well. It is interesting that the idea of military reforms prior to 1998 actually came from the military leadership with grave concerns over the future of the armed forces. Hence this issue should not dichotomize civilians and the military because its character is more political compared to its substance. Military authorities should be placed proportionally while making known the understanding that any threat to national security, either external or internal, is very much real. The process of strengthening civilian supremacy must be embodied in a comprehensive blueprint that promotes humanistic principles within the military while at the same time reinforces the basis and competence of military force. TNI can now develop itself based on the demands of the Indonesian people. The values of civilian institutions could also be implemented in military institutions; however the unique nature of the military should be taken into consideration. The demand for a country free from corruption, collusion, and nepotism, for example, can be included in the

60 Based on Law Number 34 Year 2004, Article 3, section 1, TNI is positioned directly under the President for deployment and the use of military force. The article then explains in verse 2 that TNI is under the coordination of the Ministry of Defense in terms of defense policies and strategies as well as administrative support.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 142 1/13/14 9:42 PM TNI’s reformation blueprint. It is crucial for this country to develop a professional military institution; its organization, technology, and its human resources. TNI should also come by its concept of transformation by engaging in intensive communications with academics and intellectuals who are deeply concerned with TNI’s future. The second issue in military transformation is defining national security as well as its challenges and threats. Current security issues must be understood in many ways due to their growing complexity and their close ties to national, regional and global strategic contexts. Problems of the latest generation of warfare have prompted terrorists to take on criminal activities in order to fulfill their needs of resources, especially in financing their attacks. The fact that these terrorists are also evolving in how they manage their networks and operations demands more serious attention and decisions about authorities, personnel capacity, and adequate organization and technology required in order to face this issue. Nonetheless, threats to our national sovereignty have not changed much. Today’s conflicts and disputes are still rooted in classic issues like border disputes, control over natural resources, and the security of energy distribution routes. Of course, we need to pay more attention to economic and environmental security, dubbed as the new perspectives of global security. In short, TNI should be introduced to these new terminologies of security to have better understanding and awareness. As we formulate the process of our military transformation, we need to know how to design a military force capable of executing conventional warfare with regular armed forces and large-scale weapon systems, while at the same time capable of handling new global security threats like terrorism, piracy, and other security issues. The answer to these questions is crucial as it will determine the shape of the organization, the weapon systems we need to procure, and the doctrines we need to formulate. If Indonesia wants to have strong and professional armed forces in the future, TNI’s transformation should be designed according to how it can have these two competencies. The third issue regards the instruments supporting the transformation process. The national transformation policy must be sustained by adequate defense and weapons industry forces. A strong and advanced defense industry is actually a choice because Indonesia could procure its weapons systems from developed countries that have a history of fine quality products, or, instead, Indonesia could develop its own national strategic industry to support national economic growth. As we reflect upon the experiences of the United States, European countries and China in military transformation, we can easily see the close relationship between the transformation process and national

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 143 1/13/14 9:42 PM defense industries, either managed by the state or by private sector. We have also learned that strong defense industries will not only strengthen the military’s weapons and platforms but also promote economic growth and export of national products. Judging by the current situation of Indonesia and the world, however, we should be very wise in making our decisions. It is possible to combine these two choices in order for Indonesia to attain the most optimal results. The development of strategic defense industries require strong financial support and much effort, so if we could not completely fulfill our domestic needs we could still procure weapon systems from other countries through import. Still, the need for having robust and advanced defense industries is paramount. We should continue our efforts to establish such industries by having concrete and well-planned strategies. The state should own some of these industries to minimize weapons production issues that might emerge in the future. The last issue is fundamental changes in doctrine, technology and organization. The three previous issues require the establishment of basic framework of military doctrine, an effective organization to face current and future threats, improved individual capacity of every soldier, sailor, marine, and airman particularly in warfare strategy and technology, and improving our research and development of relevant military technologies to face national security threats. Last but not least is advancing the welfare of military personnel, especially social security for the families to enable them to fulfill their daily needs and secure their future. As for RMA, Indonesia should implement it in accordance with our military culture. These four issues would be the initial foundation to construct the framework of TNI’s transformation; to become a strong and professional military force, capable of dealing with all forms of national security threats, both external and internal. Civilian authorities should involve military thinkers from TNI who are aware that military transformation is compulsory in order for TNI to respond to changing times.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 144 1/13/14 9:42 PM 6.4. Summary

National security issues are closely related to a country’s challenges and risks. These pluralistic risks oblige the state to carefully calculate the consequences and implications of any possible threat. The results of this calculation are the basis to devise a military transformation scenario. Failure to analyze current global trends will not only result in the military’s inability to face national security threats, but also delay the transformation process, and even foil the planned transformation. TNI, an irreplaceable institution within the Republic of Indonesia, is expected to be responsive in analyzing global trends and their dynamic changes and uncertainties. It is crucial for TNI to further examine and study all the possibilities from the dynamics of global economy and politics involving two global major powers, China and the United States. As Giddens explained the context of globalization, or if we borrow Norrin Ripsman and T. V. Paul’s term “eclectic” in facing globalization, Indonesia is an agent or actor in the global context that should always be involved in regional and global discussions on pushing forward universal values in this age of globalization. As a professional military institution, TNI, both personnel and the organization, should be able to contribute ideas and thoughts to the development of global norms and regulations. Indonesia can contribute its values from living in a diverse and multicultural society as a new universal norm, so the world may realize our people might have a better point of view on the future of mankind compared to the current mainstream view. It is a valuable lesson we have learned from our democratization process and it might become a reference for other countries unsure of how to implement democracy. Our ability to maintain diversity in the unitary state framework can be a lesson for those struggling in conflicts of identity. Another very important lesson is our military’s experience in overseeing the democratization and decentralization process of our country post-reform; a valuable lesson for countries under the power of military juntas. It is not a matter for other states to fully copy or implement our experience directly but more to inspire world leaders to create a future where people live in harmony. These experiences should empower our national confidence to reach the future we desire and hope for.

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bab5-6 M&G ING_M7.indd 145 1/13/14 9:42 PM Our military transformation will require debate and discussion, not to identify mistakes or politicize TNI issues but to push the process forward. This academic process ensures both personnel and the organization to be adaptive and to anticipate changes and uncertainties in the world. By forcing TNI to be more inclusive, particularly in ways of thinking and mindset, we are able to strengthen the capacity of the organization and its personnel. Nevertheless debates and discussions would not be enough for a military organization to fully transform. The full commitment from all elements within the republic to consistently allow TNI to strengthen itself is crucial to ensure it can and will defend the country and/or maintain national security. The final piece of the transformation process is empowering our defense industry as one of the bases of our national defense. This decision should be made by civilian authorities if we are not willing to continue our dependence on foreign military weapons and platforms. Thus it is vital to realize and understand that TNI’s transformation cannot proceed on its own. As an integral part of the Indonesian people, the transformation must be designed in the wider context of Indonesia’s national transformation. Only by this process will we truly have a more productive synergy between TNI and the people of Indonesia.

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 148 1/13/14 9:54 PM Chapter VII

Theoretical Contributions to Military Studies

• The Search for an Indonesian Globalization Paradigm • Military in the Perspective of Sociology • Contribution of Globalization Ideas to Military Sociology • The Fall of the Civilian-Military Wall: Critiques for Huntington • The Future of Military Sociology Studies • Summary

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 149 1/13/14 9:54 PM Chapter VII Theoretical Contributions to Military Studies

This book offers a practical proposal for Indonesia’s military transformation process. As the author has explained in the beginning of this book, transformation is necessary to strengthen the military’s construction for it to contribute to Indonesia’s unity and to the world. Outside the context of this practical need, this study contributes to theories on military studies. This chapter will elaborate on these contributions with the hope that it could provide sustainable enlightenment for the military system and for the Indonesian people.

7.1. The Search of an Indonesian Globalization Paradigm

In general there are two mainstreams in the discussion of globalization. First are the theorists who agree that globalization is a representation of economic and cultural “imperialism” of the West or the United States. In economy these theorists believe that no one could reject the entry and development of MNCs. There might be different terminologies for MNC, such as cosmopolitanism, economic internationalization, and TNCs, but the fundamental nature remains the same; the expansion of the economy and culture of the West or the United States. Second are the theorists who believe globalization is a two-way process because it allows not only Americanization or Westernization, but also the rise of local reaction to this process: fundamentalism. It could be in the name of ethnicity, nationalism or religion. In short, globalization brought out both cosmopolitanism and fundamentalism. Hence, in this context, Gidden’s theory on the risk of modernization will have global implications since there is a separation of space and time. For years we have seen how actions of fundamentalism, like terrorism, are connected globally; and today’s technological and weapons industry advancement has permitted their movements to become more sophisticated. One example is how the Bali bombings were connected to other terrorist attacks in other parts of the world. The globalization process should not be the only focus; identifying and understanding its implications is also crucial. Kirshner saw how globalization impacted a state’s

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 150 1/13/14 9:54 PM security; it has changed the rules of the game so far that states must devise adaptive strategies in order to face internal and external threats to their national security. When a state fails to identify the implications of globalization, it will not be able to predict the changes of global balance of power and prospects of war, nor will it have the capacity to make strategic choices. Another way in which globalization impacts a state is by forcing it to adjust its policies to the changes made. A number of empirical studies on military issues have found cases where countries adopted the concept of Revolution in Military Affairs or RMA because of the pressure from NATO countries like the United States and Canada (who are the representatives of global community) for the sake of the global democratization process or for world peace. Let us return to Giddens and Kirshner as both believe globalization was the reason for uncertainty in security. Today we might encounter threats of nuclear weapons of terrorist attacks in all corners of the earth at any given time. Risks created as part of a modernization process could quickly become global risks. One example is climate change caused by thinning ozone layer due to emissions from developed countries’ industries that are well over the permitted limit. Therefore globalization goes beyond borders of states or, borrowing Giddens’ term, is able to traverse through space and time. Giddens’ approach, understanding globalization as a series of risks of uncertain security as the unwanted consequences of modernization, will be a good basis for the overall formulation of military policies in Indonesia. These policies will entail international cooperation as countries work together to cope with the threats of security uncertainties. Nevertheless, the discussion of globalization in the context of Indonesia must always include the fundamentals of Indonesia’s national interests and security, andto push forward TNI to become agents of international security. How? By improving the capacity of TNI’s leadership, personnel and organization, including technology. Of course, the process will become more effective by having productive national defense industries. Based on the above theoretical explanation, developing countries such as Indonesia should perceive globalization not only as a process filled with uncertainties and risks, but also as able to facilitate the emergence of positive initiatives for the development of a civilization in any way possible. This ability to facilitate can become Indonesia’s modality to have a more optimistic view on international issues. In regards to dichotomy of scholars – left and right – trying to understand globalization further, quoting Ripsman and Paul’s findings, it will require more empirical studies to further comprehend globalization. This approach will allow us to avoid the traps of rigid definitions of globalization from other scholars.

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 151 1/13/14 9:54 PM 7.2. Military in the Perspective of Sociology

The most frequent question asked by a sociologist when discussing the military (military sociology) is: what differentiates this study from the ones by scholars of politics or economy? Its perspective or approach would be most obvious. There are two dominant approaches in military sociology. The first focuses on civil-military relations with Samuel Huntington as its pioneer, while the second elaborates on the institution as a social organization, led by Morris Janowitz. In his 1957 book The Soldier and The State, Huntington analyzed the relationship between the military and civilian authority, both in democratic states and those in the process of democratization such as countries in South Africa. Janowitz’s 1960 The Professional Soldier stated that institution analysis did not stop at military institutions alone (during peace and wartime) but also on civil-military relations, armed forces or weapons reduction, peacekeeping missions, and conflict management and reduction. He believes the military must have a high level of adaptability because society is very dynamic. He concluded that western militaries have developed their professionalism in terms of the required attitudes, skills, and knowledge to run a modern military. The discussion of which perspective is more dominant in military sociology eventually raised questions about the position of this discourse in sociology. According to Caforio (2003), military sociology is a sub-part of sociology, and shares the same position as sociology of education, religion, and gender. Caforio’s argument, however, was not strong enough to explain, for instance, how gender sociology can explain the phenomenon of women in the military, or how political sociology can explain civil- military relations. Sociologists who studied military sociology agreed that this field is a part of general sociology in the science of sociology (Eric, 2005), allowing them to be more flexible in utilizing sociological analysis on the military. By referring to these two sociological perspectives, related to the topic of this book, the next question is: where should we place the military transformation process and RMA? The discussion of military transformation will not cover how the military becomes adaptive nor can it answer dynamic issues of security. In its development this transformation is linked closely to a state’s political system and its relations with countries that are part of global power. From the elaboration of previous chapters, nevertheless, we can take one important lesson that may bridge the two perspectives we have discussed previously and the efforts to find a new military study from a sociological perspective, which places a military organization in the same perspective as any other: the internal dynamics of a military organization are inseparable from

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 152 1/13/14 9:54 PM external dynamics. In other words, it is no longer an institution that was once closed or immune to external intervention. This notion is no longer valid since it has been proven that the military is the most adaptive organization towards threats, both institutional and national. Any strategy or process that has undergone thorough war-gamings would then create policies to face these issues. The military is also the most responsive to technological needs since its weapons of war are becoming more advanced everyday. Failure to follow the development of weapons technology or military technology is sure to leave a military far behind and incapable of competing with other militaries. The use of sociological perspective in viewing the military has also given us a more critical mindset to understand that the lines and borders among the fields of social science is very much blurred; either they have been that way since the very beginning or were influenced by the development of this science. It might be the same with one of the impacts of globalization: blurring state borders; or how advanced communication and information technology can erase the lines between public and private spaces. In military studies, the discussion of political scholars and historians may not explicitly abstract the issues of their studies to represent the main concepts of sociology, but if a sociologist read them then they would appear as sociological issues.61 Thus, understanding the military from a sociological point of view ultimately led us to the most sensitive issue from the imaginary borders of social science.

7.3. Contribution of Globalization Ideas to Military Sociology

This section will discuss the main question of this book: how can ideas and understandings of globalization contribute to military sociology? We have discussed earlier that there are two dominant perspectives in military sociology; the first focuses on civil-military relations and the second sees the military as another form of social organization. We will use the second perspective since it is more holistic compared

61 We can also see how borders between disciplines of social science blur (sociology with other social science disciplines) in Muhadjir Efendy’s (2008) latest military study on the identity and profession of TNI. Although his approach was dominated by anthropology, he could not ignore the Weberian approach in his study. He found there is no single TNI professionalism understanding although TNI uses the system of chain of command. The differences of experience, family background, education and tours have strong influences over the understanding of military personnel on what professionalism is. See alsoWawan Purwanto’s TNI dan Tata Dunia Baru Sistem Pertahanan (2011), although he used the perspective of defense studies in his book, he elaborately explained leadership concepts alive in TNI. Another example is historian Ulf Sundhausen (1982) and his study on Indonesia’s military politics, which focused on his analysis of Indonesia’s military elites.

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 153 1/13/14 9:54 PM to the former. It allows us to expand our discussion, from the military institution to civil-military relations, armed forces or weapons reduction, peacekeeping missions, and conflict management and reduction. In other words, this book uses Janowitz’s approach. What are its relations to globalization? We have understood that globalization equals risk sharing, especially on security uncertainties from unexpected consequences of the modernization process; we are then pushed to cooperate with other countries to share these risks because, thanks to globalization, these risks can move through space and time; they move from one country to another. Globalization does not only bring cosmopolitanism but also fundamentalism, forcing the military to adapt through undertaking military transformation to respond to these global-scale risks. It needs to restructure itself in order to adapt. Or, on a broader level, globalization has the power to force states, particularly their military, to change their leadership and personnel capacity as well as their organization and technology, including doctrines. In other words, this global phenomenon demands changes in military organizations so it can restructure the world to minimize risks. The military goes through transformation to become the agent of this restructuring process. Therefore, in short, the biggest contribution of contemporary studies on globalization is their conclusion that the military is, sociologically, a more adaptive organization compared to other social organizations; a realization these scholars have as the result of global influences on international security. This adaptive trait of the military is true particularly in the context of specific issues like the ever-changing national security threats. The military, however, should also consider the issues of communication and information between the individuals within the institution and with those external, whether the state or other organizations. It is within the military’s interest to close any information access to those outside the institution in regards to the strategic context the military faces. Having said that, it is interesting that despite the military being a closed organization due to its nature, it also needs to be adaptive and at the forefront of new challenges in the society, whether domestic or global. This adaptive trait entails the need for accurate information analysis to ensure the military is capable of anticipating future trends. Developing a discourse to attain valid information and precise analyses will make certain of the military’s perceptiveness of rising issues. An ongoing dialectical process will provide the military – an institution that cannot be completely open - the ability to reorganize itself in accordance with new challenges and threats. This kind of organization, one that adapts itself to the changes of time, will have active internal dynamics. The individuals of this military organization are those who are continuously exposed to the latest national and global issues. Individuals who, sociologically, have

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 154 1/13/14 9:54 PM the ability to establish networks, access the latest information as well as define and analyze situations accurately and rapidly; active individuals, cooperative agents (using Margaret Archer’s term), or dominant actors (as said by Bourdieu). That is, the kind of individuals or agents needed by the military as driving agents of its transformation process.

7.4. The Fall of the Civilian-Military Wall: Critiques for Huntington

Classifying the military transformation scenario into two levels does not suggest that one is more important or urgent than the other. Its only reason is to develop a more focused strategic formulation. These two scenarios are, in fact, connected to each other because global, national, and even local issues have their own ways and styles of relating to each other and cannot be separated. This book does not specifically discuss civil-military relation issues, although in practice, as the principles laid in this book are executed the logical consequences of the process, will arrive at this most dominant issue of military sociology. One of the scholars on this issue, as mentioned earlier, is Samuel Huntington with his theory of two types of civil-military relations; subjective control and objective control of civilians over the military. In his point of view, civilians and the military create dualism of institution, haunting democracy issues of ex-authoritarian countries. He provided rational choices to ensure the smooth flow of the democratization process and that substantive civilian supremacy can take place.62 If this study was forced to enter the sphere of civil-military relations, then the approach of this book would lead to a situation where neither side is in the position to negate the other. In fact we have seen in the development of Indonesia post-reformation how civil authority has gained more and more power while the military took off its “cloak” of power to the civilians during the New Order. This separation, however, does not erase the military’s footprints in the government. As one of Indonesia’s social institutions, the military is acknowledged for bringing forth more effective leadership

62 Huntington believed that the subjective control and objective control of civilians are the choices that can be made by a state aspiring to civil supremacy in its political system. Each has requirements to be fulfilled either by politicians or military leaders. Subjectively, Huntington prefers the objective control concept as it can reduce or minimize possible conflict and tension that will arise. Nevertheless, this concept is not free of risk, since politicians tend to allow military leaders to get involved in power sharing in order to maintain the balance of their political power.

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 155 1/13/14 9:54 PM compared to political parties as representatives of civil power. This might be a period of transition in which military power cannot be eliminated completely from the world of politics, but this could also be the antithesis of Huntington’s rigid separation concept. Even if this period is considered as an ongoing transition process, in many cases we have witnessed how civilian leadership does not solve problems effectively, whereas military leadership is not always bad. In other words, the issue of civilian and military political traditions is not rigid or divided by a strict line. In this case the author would state that globalization has blurred the borders of “what is civilian” and “what is military”. How does globalization have such tremendous power to penetrate once rigid lines of differences and blur them, often making them absurd? The next section will provide an illustration on the works of globalization, how it nullifies ones that exist and creates those who did not. For Indonesia, the distinctive separation between military and civilians, including their social relations, was a new understanding that came about in the reformation process post 1998. This concept was more political than sociological. Politically, both existed in the state representation among the people. The military’s power to control was seen as an effective tool of the state to develop obedience. During the New Order, military individuals had excessive privileges in society. The New Order’s absolute power brought in many military leaders and personnel into the government structure, and this resulted in the people’s desire to establish civilian supremacy after 1998. Sociologically, the military no longer enjoys the privileges it once had, particularly in the cities. Although it is too early to assume globalization caused these changes, one cannot deny that even during the New Order military personnel often experienced the same social problems as most citizens do, particularly in relation to welfare. After reformation started the military lost most of the peoples’ respect, degrading it from any appreciation or recognition. Often we saw stories in the media about welfare issues of both active-duty military personnel and those who had retired, some even demanded justice from the state. If the main issue is the capitalization of symbols of power among the people, the military is not the only institution able to carry out such acts. Nowadays members of certain groups are used to capitalize their symbols as well as social status gained from their current position in institutions outside the state, political parties and mass organization as examples. The most concrete example of a military figure in civil society is President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, or often abbreviated to SBY, with his ability to promote a leadership tradition that institutionalizes non-military (civilian) values in Indonesia’s state leadership structure. The fact that there has been dissatisfaction in various groups of societies during both terms of his leadership proves that democracy values are alive

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 156 1/13/14 9:54 PM and growing in Indonesia. Not only has President Yudhoyono established a civilian- oriented government in Indonesia, he has also successfully institutionalized democratic values and promoted Indonesia’s democratic development to the world.63 Another example in a more specific social scope is Rahmad Darmawan, a Marine Captain of the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL), who successfully led Indonesia’s U-23 national football team (PSSI) to the finals of the 2011 SEA GAMES. Even though they lost to Malaysia in a penalty shootout, not a single Indonesian blamed RD, his nickname. On the contrary he was considered meritorious for his efforts to bring the national team to glory. Many expressed their sympathy when he resigned from his position as manager after the defeat and the internal problems within Indonesia’s national football association or PSSI. Indeed, we cannot generalize military leadership in civil society from these two examples alone, and say that every military man or woman has the leadership qualities to lead civilians. Some have failed, and some were involved in corruption or criminal cases. These examples would suggest that the civil-military dichotomy is no longer

63 Implementation of democratic values in Indonesia is in line with the success of direct elections that placed President Yudhoyono as the president with the most direct votes compared to other world leaders. According to Veja (Brazil’s biggest weekly magazine since 1969, similar to the United States’ Time and Indonesia’s Tempo) in its 26 October 2011 edition, “….Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is the ruler of world history with the most votes in absolute terms. His re-election - the second free elections in Indonesia - for a second term of 5 years, 8 July 2009, with 73.8 million votes, second place went to his own feat of five years before, and won 66, 3 million votes. The second is U.S. President Barack Obama, with 69.4 million votes cast in 2008. It follows in third place in the list of elected champions of votes, the very Susilo and 66.3 million votes in 2004. The fourth place is the former U.S. president George W. Bush in his reelection in 2004 with 60.6 million. Brazil is well on the list: the fifth is best placed Lula re-election in 2006, when it reached 58.2 million votes. In this ranking, it is up to sixth place and its President Rousseff 55,700,000 elections last October. The seventh was the late President Ronald Reagan, elected in 1984 with 54.4 million votes. The eighth position is also Lula in 2002, with 52.7 million votes. With two exceptions, the other champions of votes of all time is American, since, among countries of the larger population of the United States, or no presidentialism (India), or there is no democracy (China). And of course, the list order is relative, because the more recent the president-elect, he has been most benefited by population growth. The list is as follows: Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, with 52.5 million votes in 2008. George W. Bush, in his first election in 2000, with 50.4 million; Russian President Vladimir Putin on his re-election in 2004, with 49.5 million; George Bush in 1988, with 48.8 million; Bill Clinton, when reelected in 1996 with 47.4 million; Richard Nixon re-election in 1972, with 47.1 million; Ronald Reagan in his first election in 1980, with 43.9 million; Jimmy Carter almost enters the relationship, with 40.8 million achieved in 1976. Fernando Henrique Cardoso was the next reelection in 1998, with 35.9 million. The record could theoretically fall back in March of next year, when they make themselves the next presidential elections in Russia, if the likely candidate - Putin - has a large percentage of votes, although it is almost impossible to reach 73.8 million of Indonesian Susilo. The cop, insists it will come in November of next year, when Obama seek re-election in the United States, which has an electorate far more numerous than the Russian. It is possible that the record will fall, as the U.S. population - 312 million - far exceeds that of Indonesia, with its 243 million...... “

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 157 1/13/14 9:54 PM relevant in the case of capacity, dedication and integration to lead in this country. The institutions where someone studied or developed will unquestionably have strong influence over how that person thinks, feels and reacts. The community where the individual lives or work will also have a role in constructing his ideas and beliefs. TNI, like any other military in the world, eventually developed militaristic principles and values; yet in a wider context, Indonesia has changed and so has TNI since it has adjusted itself to a bigger framework. The West has had the same experience. Rukavishnikov and Pugh (2006:133) suggested that in the West there is no single solution to resolve the issue of democracy control over the military. They offered a reminder that the legal and political construction of civil-military relations is determined by the state’s characteristics, including its history and traditions, particularly its military history, the evolution of its internal political landscape, and of course the international security environment in regards to the state’s relationships with its allies. Lastly, a state’s political situation is decided by individuals within the military and the national leaders. In this context, an informal relationship between the two is paramount. The issues Rukavishnikov and Pugh raised have become somewhat of a sign to better understand the concept of civil-military relations. This imported concept should be contextualized with our diverse national characteristics. This process is not to obscure the concept or to deepen the friction between civilian and the military; the aim is to find a link that will place the two entities in a social structure that can be productive for Indonesia in the future as both the military and civilians are facing the challenges of globalization and all its risks. If the concept of civil-military separation is more political in nature, then where did globalization play its role in easing military and civilian psychological and sociological boundaries in the society’s daily life? Globalization and its implications, predominantly on information and communication technology, have gone beyond the classic tales of the military’s might and power in the dynamics of social interaction. The military was once the only institution with full authority in using or accessing advanced information and communication technology; this story, however, is in the past for Indonesia. In some cases, private and civil society groups have abilities that are no less inferior in terms of information access and the ability to communicate with anyone anywhere. The military and its tendency to restrict any incoming and outgoing information is now rivaled by many in the ability to use more sophisticated communication equipment. It no longer possesses privilege in accessing information as more competent groups and individuals emerge, beating the military in the information game. Today we live in the information age where those with access to information and have the capability to use it will have superiority over

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 158 1/13/14 9:54 PM others. It is plausible to say that globalization has leveled most of military’s once special abilities, making them available to civilians. Once again, this theory is only for Indonesia as a developing country. Hence, Huntington’s civil-military dichotomy might require further studies in the future, particularly in Indonesia’s case.

7.5. The Future of Military Sociology Studies

Few studies of military issues have used the sociological approach and perspective. As noted earlier, TNI requires the helping hands of sociologists to further analyze existing internal issues to push its transformation process towards a more professional, inclusive, and resilient military. Even so, we need to be able to answer the question of how far military sociology can contribute to this military transformation process in Indonesia. Most scholars have analyzed Indonesia’s military issues through the perspective of political science, history or security studies. These scholars include Sundhausen (1982), Notosusanto (1974), Crouch (1978), and Singh (1995, 1999). Very few have tried to further study the military as a social institution with its military-style social interaction. Ongoing debate about Indonesia’s military is dominated by its relationship with political powers and its interaction with the people. What happened in the New Order era seems to maintain some sort of influence on this issue, and this is no way a surprising fact because the military was at every level of people’s lives, from the President to the village chiefs. Today we live in a very different context where freedom has expanded far into small villages and the countryside. It will be very beneficial to move our attention to social processes inside TNI not only for the development of military sociology, but also to determine how we can assist in establishing the right military posture for this time of change. Academically, treating the military like any other social institution will allow us to elaborate upon issues that were once restricted or taboo in the military. In short, developing military sociology studies will bring assistance to the military as it undergoes the planned transformation process. Thus we have a set of working agendas on our hands. Why not call it the research agenda? The research we will develop in this case will derive from issues existing inside TNI and is intended for the desired transformation process. This working agenda constitutes research and practical agendas. The research agenda includes potential themes on military issues to be further studied through sociological perspectives, such as the author’s dissertation on the

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 159 1/13/14 9:54 PM dynamics of globalization in military affairs and the transformation of military education institutions. The dissertation elaborates on globalization as the background of national security dynamics, the demands on the military to adapt and anticipate globalization issues and benefits. Besides this research, there are many opportunities for sociologists to further explore issues within the military at the macro level. For example, the prevailing norms and values of TNI and their connection to the spirit and discipline of troops, issues of ideal leadership within the institution, gender themes, military leadership in civil society, and the fate of retired military personnel when they return to the community. Sociologists can also delve deeper into TNI’s institutional issues like the organization of military education, interaction between sailors and naval officers onboard a ship sailing for months, or social issues faced by soldiers stationed in border areas and remote places. The issues of welfare of low-rank non-commissioned officers and officers without strategic structural positions would also be interesting if analyzed further using sociological perspectives. Another working agenda is to encourage the emergence of military intellectuals in TNI so that they are able to express military issues using academic language. Aside from being a capacity building process for the military, it also encourages academic debates with “a different tone”. Lastly, there is no intention to further separate civilians and the military. The aim is to obtain a different perspective of military issues since having only groups outside of the military discussing these issues might have resulted in dominance from one side; therefore bringing us back to a more rigid civil-military dichotomy. On the other hand, establishing military intellectuals will bring about generations of thinkers with the skills to socialize their concepts and ideas to the international community, placing TNI as a military institution with personnel able to negotiate with other militaries when problems arise. The author believes that we are in the consensus of having a stronger and smarter military, capable of responding to future and complex national challenges and threats.

7.6. Summary

Indonesia, is a social construction that has functioned over quite a long period of time. It reflects a long history of civilization. In terms of national identity, our history is filled with crises and turbulent times. Indonesia has long interacted with the outside world as a civilization, and is not just an object of global civilization because the world acknowledges and accepts our concepts and ideas; Indonesia’s contribution to the world. In short, we are an important subject in the process of civilizing the world.

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 160 1/13/14 9:54 PM This has been possible because we have been able to correctly place our abilities in each and every external interaction we have had. Our role as the subject of world civilization is a historical fact. Globalization triggered debates over the role and position of the state, and often encourages binary opposition. Globalization is also a paradox. On one hand it provides benefits, and on the other it brings difficulties and problems. It is important for Indonesia to study globalization theories from prominent scholars and to take initiative to formulate a new understanding of globalization that is “genuinely” Indonesian. At a practical level we need to encourage thinkers and policy makers to make globalization more Indonesian. Pragmatically, Indonesia must be able to take as much as advantage it can from this globalization process and place its national interests over foreign or external interests. Globalization has encouraged the military institution to be more inclusive and to anticipate external issues. Sociology provides wider opportunities to study the military, and in this case, TNI. Strengthening the academic basis of military sociology is not the only benefit of using this approach because it will promote the military to become more adaptive to and anticipative of current and future issues. The approach is a representation of identifying civilian values inside the military. In the end it could help to erase psychological and political barriers of the civil-military dichotomy. This is the common thread of all the theoretical contributions in this chapter. Although this chapter is called “theoretical contribution”, the author has no intention to oppose already-established theories of globalization or military sociology. It is more appropriate to define this chapter as the author’s reflective effort to provide a small contribution to the theories of these two subjects. The author’s background as an active naval officer has influenced the construct of this book. It might be said that the author is in the arena where sociological studies and the author’s social background as a naval officer converges. In this arena, reflective substance emerged.

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 162 1/13/14 9:54 PM Chapter VIII

Closing

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 163 1/13/14 9:54 PM Chapter VIII Closing

Globalization is a contemporary reality we should all admit and accept. No one is free from the waves of globalization, whether those living behind mountains in the far corners of the earth or even primitive tribes and communities. With all its forms and characteristics, globalization is filled with contradictions and paradoxes able to negate or present something. It can raise the dead or something long-forgotten and it might also kill the living or abolish something that just came out yesterday. It is not merely Westernization as it has the effect of de-Westernization as many Eastern flavors have risen thanks to its processes. It does not only force a person, a group, or a state into taking action, but it also allows them to hold back, deflect, or hasten globalization itself. The development of our interconnected world has inspired variations of the national security concept. Since globalization blurred the borders and boundaries of our world, security issues have finally touched upon the essence of global civilization: humans and humanity. Nonetheless, in its most concrete form, security will always emerge as the link in the discussions of globalization and military, and at the same time it will be the state and its military institution that are the most active parties in this interaction process, whether during peace, conflict, or wartime. It is fair, then, to conclude that although the security discourse continues to expand its reach to other fields, national interest remains as the most instinctive motive for any kind of argument possible in the security realm. The state should respond well to both globalization and security issues. Military institutions are the most responsible for all issues of national security challenges and threats. As one globalization issue emerges as a threat to national security then the military is at the forefront to answer or adapt to the changes that occur. Without the effort to comply with the process of change, a military institution would most definitely have its capacity to respond to national security threats reduced. In regards to civil-military relations, even though this book does not discuss this issue specifically, there are theoretical consequences to explain it on a certain level. One input that the author believes is very valuable is, rather than to focus on the problematic part of this relationship, it would be more productive to approach the military from a sociological point of view by expanding sociology’s scope of study

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 164 1/13/14 9:54 PM on the military. Sociology, for example, can study the relation of power with identity (ethnicity, religion, and race), issues of social classes, gender and leadership issues, military education and transformation, and other sociological issues, which will have more benefits in finding similarities between the military and other social institutions. In short, the future of military sociology studies is as bright as Indonesia’s military transformation. It can only be possible if it becomes a joint agenda between sociologists, academics, researchers and military individuals with awareness of transformation. In the end we can conclude that the most significant contribution of globalization theories to studies on military sociology is the confirmation that the military is the most responsive or most adaptive institution of the state towards changes in its strategic environment. This understanding, therefore, could allow further analysis or study of the consequences of civil-military relations as well as possible organizational transformation based on fact and reality. It could also encourage efforts to search for possible approaches to find the most realistic explanation of an ideal civil-military relation, or at least one desired by the people in the future.

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ABRI ASEAN, 57, 68-71, 85, 125 Disintegration, 114 Informal Summit, 70 Dual-Function, 16 Asia, 21, 27, 30, 58, 59, 65, 66, 70, 77, General Election, 119 83, 85, 92, 93, 100, 125, 139 Hankamnas (National Defense and Central, 92 Security), 115, 133 East, 40, 58, 84 Headquarters, 116, 117, 128, 129, 133 Pacific, 69, 85 Neutral, 119 Southeast, 40, 69, 70, 71, 86, 87, 92, Organization, 114-118 120, 124 Reformation, 117-119 South, 40 Rivalry, 114 Asian-African Summit, 122 Socio-political, 16 Australia, 71, 85, 120, 121, 124, 125 Social-politics, 87 Austria, 65 Strategic Force Development, 116 Aydinli, Ersel, 19, 166, 168, 169 Adamsky, Dima, 95, 166 Ayoob, Mohammad, 18, 166 Afghanistan, 51, 66, 69, 84, 88, 122, 138 Azizian, Rouben, 63, 64, 166 Africa, 8, 10, 40, 58, 65, 66, 139 Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR), 104, East, 70 105, 106, 108, 127-129 South, 28, 152 Badan Pembantu Prajurit/Pembelaan Sub-Saharan, 41 (BPP), 105 West, 70 Bali, 9, 19, 111, 150 Agent-structure, 20, 30 Bangkok, 70 Ahtisaari, Martti, 126 Basque, 41 Air Force, 55, 59, 62, 81, 83, 96, 110- Belgium, 65, 121 114, 116, 117, 128, 129 Benbow, Tim, 52, 53, 169 Allied, 97, 120 Black Sea, 70 Alliance, 78, 79, 83, 124 Brazil, 157 Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia (API), 106 Brunei Darussalam, 69, 124 Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Bunker, Ellsworth, 123 (APRI), 111 Bureaucracy, 26 Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Burma, 120, 121 Serikat (APRIS), 111 Bush, George, W., 84, 96, 126, 157 Army, 55, 83, 87, 92, 110-114, 116, 117 Butler, R., 95, 96, 166

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 171 1/20/14 5:30 PM Caforio, Giuseppe, 28, 29, 45, 152, Decentralization, 145 166, 168 Decentralized, 56 Cambodia, 67, 69, 71, 84 Declaration of the ASEAN Concord, 70 Canada, 80, 81, 96, 151 Democracy, 7, 8, 17, 18, 28, 44, 65, 83, Capitalism, 8, 26, 44, 65, 72, 100, 137, 95, 145, 155, 157, 158 138, 140 Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan Castells, Manuel, 6 (Dephankam), 115, 116, 167, 169 Cebrowski, Arthur, 96, 166 Deregulation, 31 China, 8, 9, 21, 27, 31, 32, 40, 51, 57- Dilthey, 29 61, 65, 66, 67, 71, 73, 77, 84, 91-94, Djuanda, 113 100, 101, 124, 126, 127, 137, 138, Drugs, 68, 69, 71, 89 139, 143, 145, 157, 166 East Timor, 66, 84, 125, 126, 167 Communist Party (CCP), 92, 124 Economy National Defense, 92, 93, 137, 142 Global, 30, 31, 68, 73, 91, 92, 101, People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 139, 140, 145 10, 92 Internationalization, 33, 150 Chretein, Jean, 80, 81 Liberalization, 37 Civil Macro, 36 Authority, 155, 156 National, 6, 30, 31, 84, 104, 112, Society, 19, 28, 34, 36, 117, 118, 131, 141 157-160 Polarization, 33 Civil Military Relation, 16, 20, 28, 29, Political, 17, 19, 20, 21, 33, 40, 62, 45, 152-156, 158, 164, 165, 167, 168 64, 65 Clausewitz, Von, 78 Regional, 32 Clausewitzian, 39 Security, 136 Climate Change, 27, 151 Egypt, 122, 123 Clinton, Bill, 84, 157 Eisenhower, Dwight, 84 Communist, 124, 127, 128, 138 Elite, 6, 81, 114, 153 Conscription, 39, 53, 105 Europe, 6, 8, 9, 21, 40, 58, 66, 77, 80, Conflict 82, 100, 137-141, 143 Interstate, 9, 39, 40, 49, 63, 72, 73 Faulks, Keith, 25, 30-34, 44 Patterns, 62, 64, 73 Fisher, Richard, 92-94, 166 Contestation, 140 Fitzsimmons, Dan, 80 Counter-terrorism, 71, 81, 82, 87 France, 57, 58, 65, 89, 122, 138 Crouch, Harold, 159 G-20, 140 Darmawan, Rahmad (RD), 157 Geopolitics, 20, 86

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 172 1/20/14 5:30 PM Germany, 58, 65, 80, 81, 82, 83 Hatta, Moh., 111 Giddens, Anthony, 20, 25-28, 44, 51, Hegemony, 27, 66, 79, 167 91, 167 Heiho, 105 Globalization, 28, 145, 151, Kaigun, 105, 106 Manufactured Risk, 26 Hidayat, Colonel, 110 Nation State, 26, 28 Hidayat, Mr., 112 Reflectivity, 27 Human Rights, 17, 18, 38, 44, 65, 95, 125 Restructuring, 27 Hungary, 65 Risk, 27, 28 Huntington, Samuel, 28, 29, 149, 152, Space and time, 26 155, 156, 159, 167 Structuration, 131 India, 8, 9, 59, 60, 71, 85, 88-91, 120- Globalization 122, 138, 157, 170 Binary opposition, 161 Indian Ocean, 70, 84 Conflict, 9, 19, 37, 63-66, 139, 166-169 Indonesia, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 20, Consequences, 31 21, 45, 57, 58, 60, 61, 65, 67-71, 74, Cosmopolitanism, 27, 150, 154 87, 91, 97, 101, 103-131, 138-146, Economy, 9, 150 150, 151, 153, 155-159, 161, 165- Fundamentalism, 27, 150, 154 167, 169, 170 Military, 9, 17, 18, 32, 34, 35, 37, Indonesian National Committee (KNI), 50, 138, 145, 151, 164 105, 127 Modernity, 26, 136 Indonesia National Party (PNI), 105 National security, 21, 22, 28, 34-39, Internationalization, 33, 150 44, 49, 50, 52, 63, 64, 66, 138, 160, Iran, 8, 61, 69 164, 166-168 Iraq, 8, 51, 60, 66, 85, 88, 138 Paradox, 141, 161, 164 Iskandar, Holand, 109 Scholar, 21, 30, 33, 37, 39, 43-45, Islam, 8, 9, 41, 66 51, 151 Israel, 66, 67, 89, 122, 123, 166 Terrorism, 27 Italy, 58, 65, 126, 138 Westernization, 27, 164 Janowitz, Morris, 28, 29, 30, 152, 154 Glocalization, 27 Japan, 32, 58, 65, 71, 83-85, 100, 105, Golan Heights, 84 106, 109, 120, 129, 130 Guam Doctrine, 84 Juggernaut, 26, 27, 140 Hamengku Buwono IX, Sri Sultan, Kan, Naoto, 85 107, 111 Kant, Immanuel, 29 Hashimoto, Ryutaro, 84 Kargil, 90 Hatoyama, Yukio, 85 Kartakusuma, M.M.R., 114

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 173 1/20/14 5:30 PM Kartasasmita, Didi, 109 50, 52, 73, 95, 101, 136, 138, 140- Kartawinata, Aruji, 106 143, 145, 152, 154, 160, 164 Krepinevich, Andrew, 52 Leadership, 142, 156, 158, 160 Ki-Moon, Ban, 68 Operations, 7, 10, 55, 59, 66, 72, 74, Kirshner, Jonathan, 25, 34, 35-37, 44, 81, 84, 87, 88, 90, 123 150, 151, 166-168 Organization, 10, 26, 28, 30, 54-56, KNIL, 106, 107, 111, 127, 130 80, 90, 94, 96, 107, 109, 110, 113, 127, Kuala Lumpur, 70 128, 141, 146, 152-154, 168, 169 Lao, 69 Social class, 165 Local Cultures, 9, 27 Social structure, 20, 45, 158 London, 19, 122 Technology, 21, 49, 57, 59, 61, 72, Madrid, 19 78, 89, 95, 96, 100, 101, 153 Maguwo, 108 Technical Revolution (MTR), 72, 137 Malaysia, 10, 67, 69, 70, 86, 124, 126, 158 Transformation, 21, 57, 72, 73, 77, Ambalat, 67, 126 78, 80-83, 88-98, 100, 101, 136-138, Confrontation, 124 141, 143-146, 150, 152, 154, 155, Sipadan-Ligitan, 126 159, 164-167, 169, 170 Manila, 70, 124 Moefreini, 106 Marshall, Andrew, 90 Mozambique, 84 Martin, Paul, 81 Multistate-centric, 19, 34, 74, 75 Mediterranean Sea, 70 Mustopo, 109 Middle East, 8, 9, 40, 64, 66, 168 MV Sinar Kudus, 74 Military Myanmar, 69, 71, 118 Adapt, 28, 53, 55, 88, 104, 129, 146, Napoleon, 53 152-154, 160, 161, 164, 165 Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 122 Area, 108, 112, 116, 119 Nasution, A. H., 11, 16, 110, 111, 167 Budget, 37, 39, 58, 59, 82, 88, 114 National development, 115, 125, 141 Capacity, 80, 81, 97 National Police, 12, 116-118 Doctrine, 39, 53, 55, 72, 82, 96, 119, 144 NATO, 81, 82, 86, 151 Education, 94, 126, 130, 160, 165 Natural economic zone, 32 Gender, 44, 160, 165 Naval Area Command (Kodaeral), 116 Humanistic, 142 Navy, 7, 11, 54, 55, 81, 83, 105, 110- Industries, 21, 57, 89, 91, 93, 94, 100 114, 116, 117, 128 Infrastructure, 39, 87 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 122 Inclusive, 146, 159, 161 Network societies, 6 Institution, 16-18, 21, 22, 28, 29, 45, New Order, 16, 101, 124, 130, 155,

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 174 1/20/14 5:30 PM 156, 159, Independence (PPKI), 105 New Zealand, 71, 124 Protection, 31 NICA 106, 120, Pugh, Michael, 158, 168 Nixon, Richard, 84, 157 Putin, Vladimir, 60, 157 Nkrumah, Kwame, 122 Region state, 31, 32 Nobusuke, Kishi, 84 Restructuring, 129, 154 Non-Aligned Movement, 122, 124, Revolution 130, 131 Agricultural, 8 North Korea, 84 Military Doctrine, 55 Obama, Barack, 85, 157 Industrial, 8, 35, 53, 54 Ohio, 62 Interwar, 53 Ohmae, Kenichi, 25, 30-32, 37, 44, 168 Technology, 55, 56, 78 Ouellet, Eric, 168 Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), Owens, William A, 90 21, 39, 49, 50, 52-57, 72, 73, 78, 86- Pakistan, 51, 59, 69, 90, 138 91, 93, 94, 96, 97, 137, 144, 151, 152, Palestine, 8, 66, 67 166, 170 Paracel Islands, 126 Rice, Condoleezza, 126 Parakram Operation, 90 Rikugun Koku Butai, 106 Pardi, M., 128 Ripsman, Norrin, 5, 25, 37-44, 50, 145, Paris, 122 151, 168 Patnam, Robert, 63, 64, 66, 166-169 Ritzer, George, 26, 51, 168 Paul, T.V., 18, 19, 25, 37-44, 50, 145, Romania, 65 151, 168 Roosseno, 109 Pembela Tanah Air (PETA), 105, 111, 130 Rosecrance, Richard, 38 Peninsula Round Table Conference (KMB), 121, 123 Korean, 93 Rukavishnikov, Vladimir O., 158, 168 Sinai, 122 Rumsfeld, Donald, 96 Penjaga Keamanan Rakyat (PKR), 106 Russia, 40, 57-60, 64-66, 71, 80, 82, 83, Pentagon, 19, 66, 95 89, 92, 100, 124, 126, 157, 166 People’s Action Party, 86 Salomone, Michael D., 83 Perry, William J., 90 San Francisco Peace Treaty, 83 Philippines, 71, 120, 124 Sato, Eisaku, 84 Pindad P.T., 61, 170 Saudi Arabia, 59 Plato, 45 Security Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Concept, 35, 164

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 175 1/20/14 5:30 PM Global, 13, 17, 18, 20, 67, 73, 82, 143 South/Latin America, 40, 58, 70, 139 International, 92, 95, 151, 154, 158, Soviet Union, 8, 9, 52, 60, 63-65, 72, 83, 166, 167, 169 95, 122, 123, 130, 138 National, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 28, 34- Spratly Islands, 67, 126 39, 42, 43, 44, 49, 50-52, 57, 61, 63, Steinhoff, Dirk, 81 64, 66, 71-74, 78, 82, 92, 93, 96, Strait 100, 101, 112, 136, 138, 140-146, Malacca, 70 151, 154, 160, 164, 166-169 Taiwan, 84 Private, 97, 136 Structural Adjustment, 37 Regional, 111, 125 Stulberg, Adam N., 83, 169 Studies, 17, 159 Sundhausen, Ulf, 153, 159, 169 Threats, 17, 19, 35, 57, 72-74, 92, Sunjoyo, Colonel, 109 143-145, 154, 164 Supomo, Prof., 109 Self Defense Forces (SDF), 83 Supreme Military Command (KOTI), Shutoken, 32 113, 114 Singapore, 70, 86, 87, 88, 100, 124, 170 Suryadarma, 109, 111, 128, 129 Sloan, Elinor, 54, 92, 95-97, 169 Sutirto, Colonel, 109 Social organization, 17, 19, 152, 154 Sweden, 61, 62 Soedirman, 107, 110-112, 120, 121, 128 Taiwan, 51, 92, 93 Soeharto, 114, 129, 130 Tan, Andrew, 88 Soekarno, 105, 111, 113, 114, 122-124 Tel Aviv, 122 Soeljoadikusumo, Muhammad, 107 Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR), Soemahardjo, Oerip, 107, 109 106-108, 127-129, 132 Soeprijadi, 107 Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat, 108, 109, 128 Soerahmad, R., 106 Tentara Laut Republik Indonesia Somali, 74, 138 (TLRI), 128 Sociology Terrorism, 7, 18, 19, 26, 27, 38, 39, 41, Education, 29, 152 51, 66, 68, 71, 80, 81, 84, 143, 150 Gender, 29, 152 Thailand, 67, 69, 70, 71 Military, 7, 12, 15, 17, 19, 20-22, The Freedom of Aceh Movement 25, 26, 28, 29, 44, 45, 149, 152, 153, (GAM), 126 155, 159, 160, 161, 165, 168 Tito, Josip Broz, 122 Religion, 29, 152 TNI South China Sea, 67, 70, 92, 93, 126, 127 History, 103, 104, 127, 129, 130 South Korea, 85, 126 Development concept, 111 South Sudan, 66 Organization, 16, 127, 143-146, 151

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bab7-8 M&G ING_M7.indd 176 1/20/14 5:30 PM Day-to-day politics, 16, 119, 142 Arab, 131 Social political role, 119 Civil, 79 Rationalization, 127 Cold, 9, 16, 18, 19, 21, 30, 31, 39, Reformation, 16, 118, 119, 143 41, 50, 52, 63-65, 67, 72, 79, 82-84, Reorganization, 104, 110, 116, 117, 92, 94, 95, 122, 130, 131, 138, 139, 127, 129 168 Toffler, Alvin, 52, 53, 169 Crusade, 79 Toffler, Heidi, 52, 53, 169 Escalation, 40, 67 Traditional state-centric, 19, 34 Greek, 79 Trafficking 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 167 Gulf, 54, 84, 95 Transnational Crimes, 67-74, 80 Kosovo, 60 Turkey, 8 World I, 9, 64, 65, 79 Ufimtsev, Pyotr, 59 World II, 9, 28, 64, 65, 79, 83, 85, 120 The United Kingdom (UK), 41, 57, 58, Weapon systems, 53, 56-59, 72, 81, 83, 80, 83, 89, 120, 124 86-88, 94, 100, 123, 130, 137, 143, United Nations (UN), 7, 10, 70, 85, 144 121, 123-125 Wiranto, 118 The United States, 6, 8, 9, 18, 21, 27, Working agenda, 160 37, 40, 51, 57, 59, 60, 63, 65-67, 72, Xiaoping, Deng, 93 73, 77, 82, 83-86, 89-91, 93-97, 100, Yamin, Moh, 111 111, 120-126, 130, 137-141, 143, Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (SBY), 145, 150, 151, 157 16, 125, 126, 157, 170 Department of Defense, 95 Yugoslavia, 65, 122 Joint Vision, 95 Zacher, Mark, 38 QDR, 95 Vietnam, 84, 125, 127 Wall Street, 138 Warfare Generation, 79, 80, 137, 143 Weber, Max, 29 World Trade Center (WTC), 18, 19, 51, 66, 95 September 11, 18, 40, 41, 51, 64, 80, 87, 96, 168 War

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