La Reforma Podría Ser Fatal Para Kirchner

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La Reforma Podría Ser Fatal Para Kirchner http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1193271 Carlos Pagni | Ver perfil El escenario La reforma podría ser fatal para Kirchner Carlos Pagni LA NACION Noticias de Política: anterior | siguiente Lunes 2 de noviembre de 2009 | Publicado en edición impresa Los dirigentes de la oposición suponen que la reforma política ha sido pensada para potenciar la problemática candidatura presidencial de Néstor Kirchner. Casi nadie advierte, al menos por ahora, que el santacruceño se está poniendo con esta ley la soga al cuello. Sin embargo, la apertura de la interna peronista a todo el padrón electoral podría darle al Gobierno una sorpresa más desagradable que la ocurrida el 28 de junio pasado en la provincia de Buenos Aires. Es verdad que el proyecto aspira a neutralizar los factores que, en la interpretación del esposo de la Presidenta, condujeron a esa derrota. Uno de ellos fue la aparición de un millonario con veleidades políticas que, gracias a su costosa campaña publicitaria, consiguió torcer el rumbo de la historia. La nueva ley prohíbe la contratación privada de publicidad para el proselitismo. Eso sí, el Gobierno seguirá facultado a hacer propaganda durante la campaña hasta 15 días antes de las elecciones generales. Kirchner también atribuye su desgracia a la traición de los intendentes bonaerenses, habituados a apostar a las distintas variantes en que se desdobla el peronismo. La iniciativa pretende ser un antídoto para esa posibilidad, extendida ahora a los gobernadores del PJ. Su capítulo principal impide que candidatos carentes de estructura territorial, como Francisco de Narváez o Felipe Solá, se postulen en las elecciones generales por fuera de los grandes partidos. Para competir por la presidencia habrá que conseguir 27.000 adherentes, distribuidos en 5 distritos (art. 15) y, luego, participar en una interna abierta a todo el padrón, aun cuando se trate del único aspirante de su partido (art. 13). Los derrotados no podrán participar en la elección general. A la vez, para inscribir las candidaturas, el partido debe haber movilizado por lo menos al 3% del electorado en las primarias. A los peronistas disidentes se los condena, entonces, a irse del partido o a enfrentar a Kirchner en una interna. Existen, por supuesto, interpretaciones del 28 de junio distintas de la de Kirchner. La más habitual sostiene que su derrota fue el desenlace de un proceso complejo de declinación política, que se expresó en una corriente de rechazo cuyo caudal superó las estructuras del Estado -convertido en actor electoral- en beneficio de un candidato más o menos neutro. De ser así, el esposo de la Presidenta podría estar confeccionando su propia horca electoral. Hay que prestar atención a un detalle: de las internas obligatorias deben participar todos los ciudadanos habilitados en el padrón. Para cualquier líder oficialista con más del 60% de desprestigio, como Kirchner, esa cláusula es una invitación a participar en la interna del PJ a quienes sueñan con cortarle el camino. ¿Qué torneo puede ser más interesante, en ese hipotético domingo de primarias compulsivas? ¿Cobos contra Carrió? ¿La interna del macrismo? El 69,16% de los ciudadanos no está afiliado a partido alguno. Y votar en contra es una pasión argentina. Sobre todo, si más tarde, en los comicios generales, se puede apoyar al favorito. No sería la primera vez que un sistema electoral produjera resultados distintos de aquellos para los que había sido concebido. En El orden conservador , Natalio Botana demostró de manera magistral que con la ley de voto secreto, universal y obligatorio, Roque Sáenz Peña y su ministro Indalecio Gómez sólo querían abrir una hendija para que, al cabo de varias elecciones, la oposición al régimen se sentara como una minoría en el Congreso. No vislumbraron la avalancha que llevó a Hipólito Yrigoyen al poder en 1916. En 1972, Alejandro Lanusse y Arturo Mor Roig establecieron un ballottage del 50% para que una mayoría no peronista impidiera el regreso de Juan Perón al poder. Perón sacó el 23 de septiembre de 1973 el 63% de los votos. Hay desaciertos más cercanos en el tiempo. En 2003, Juan Carlos Romero propuso, para evitar un duelo con el duhaldismo gobernante, que se suprimieran las internas presidenciales en el PJ. No previó que Eduardo Duhalde -aconsejado por Juan José Alvarez- aceptaría la receta y la aplicaría para derrotar a la fórmula que el propio Romero integraba con Menem. Un caso final: Kirchner adelantó las elecciones de este año para que no se celebraran, como estaba previsto, hace dos domingos. ¿Estuvo en lo cierto? No se puede asegurar que la intervención del electorado independiente en la selección de la fórmula del PJ anulará las posibilidades de Kirchner. Entre otras cosas, porque eso depende de la capacidad de sus adversarios para sintetizar una oferta electoral. Pero no se puede descartar que el ex presidente esté construyendo el escenario que menos le conviene para esa contienda. El primero en advertir esta paradoja parece haber sido Eduardo Duhalde. Desde el Coloquio de IDEA, donde cien veces le susurraron: "Alguien tiene que frenarlo" (a Kirchner, claro), lanzó de nuevo su candidatura para la interna del PJ. Duhalde estudió la reforma, con informes de Alfredo Atanasof. Hasta ahora, creía imposible vencer al kirchnerismo sin antes arrebatarle el control de la maquinaria partidaria. Con esta ley, le ahorrarán un paso. Felipe Solá rechaza el proyecto. Pero acaso ya haya descubierto que podría aprovecharlo mejor que Duhalde, dada su mejor capacidad para atraer a los independientes. Son los únicos dos peronistas disidentes lanzados hoy hacia la presidencia. Carlos Reutemann "no sabe/no contesta". El texto comenzará a tratarse mañana. Iba a ingresar en el Congreso por el Senado, en reconocimiento del éxito de Miguel Pichetto con la ley de medios. Pero el plan fue corregido. Sencillo: es posible que la discusión se extienda más allá del 10 de diciembre. Y sólo antes de esa fecha el oficialismo podría conseguir en Diputados una reforma que requiere la aprobación de la mayoría absoluta. Así y todo, es difícil que Agustín Rossi obtenga el apoyo de sus habituales aliados de izquierda sin modificar cláusulas. Si se sanciona la ley, caducarían numerosas agrupaciones pequeñas. Hoy existen 659 partidos de distrito, de los cuales sólo 293 tienen alguna representación parlamentaria. Uno de los rasgos saludables del proyecto es que viene a acotar esa dispersión. En cambio, la ley hace poco por volver más transparente el proceso electoral. Sorprende, por ejemplo, que Florencio Randazzo no haya abogado por el voto electrónico. Como jefe de gabinete bonaerense, en 2003, se proponía importar de Brasil ese sistema. Hasta escribió un libro en su defensa. Ahora redescubrió las ventajas de la papeleta. Se entiende: Kirchner tiene prohibido hablar de otro método. Tampoco la calidad del financiamiento aparece más asegurada en el nuevo texto, como publicó LA NACION ayer. Las campañas de los Kirchner están manchadas por el aporte de droguerías salpicadas por el narcotráfico, sin que María Servini de Cubría aclare el caso. Sin embargo, aunque con pecados veniales, toda la clase política desdeña la rendición de cuentas. Un ejemplo: ningún partido de Santa Cruz presentó todavía en la Justicia los datos de la última elección. Con la nueva norma, ya estarían multados. Otro: Encuentro Popular para la Victoria, la opción porteña del kirchnerismo, consignó aportes de cámaras empresariales, prohibidos por la ley. Y tratándose de la candidatura de Carlos Heller, hay una curiosidad más inquietante: tres desembolsos por $ 3333 del Club Atlético River Plate. Pero esa es otra interna. .
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