I RETHINKING JUDICIAL INSTABILITY in DEVELOPING
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by D-Scholarship@Pitt RETHINKING JUDICIAL INSTABILITY IN DEVELOPING DEMOCRACIES: A NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURTS IN ARGENTINA by María Andrea Castagnola B.A. International Studies, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, 2001 M.A. Development Management and Public Policy, Georgetown University, 2004 M.A. Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, 2006 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science i University of Pittsburgh 2010 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by María Andrea Castagnola It was defended on April 15th, 2010 and approved by Daniel Brinks, Associate Professor, Political Science University of Notre Dame Steven Finkel, Daniel Wallace Professor, Political Science University of Pittsburgh Thesis Director: Chris Bonneau, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science University of Pittsburgh Thesis Director: Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science University of Pittsburgh ii Copyright © by María Andrea Castagnola 2010 iii RETHINKING JUDICIAL INSTABILITY IN DEVELOPING DEMOCRACIES: A NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURTS IN ARGENTINA María Andrea Castagnola, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2010 Why do justices remain in office such a short time despite having life tenure? The objective of this doctoral dissertation is to answer this question by systematically examining which factors influence judges’ stability in office at the levels of both the Argentine National Supreme Court of Justice and the Provincial Supreme Courts, from 1983 to 2009. The main argument is that, in developing democracies like Argentina, the larger the ideological distance between the appointing executive and the current executive, the higher the probability that a sitting justice appointed by an executive with different preferences will leave office. With Supreme Court tenure that averages 4.6 years and a recent re-democratization process that started in 1983, Argentina provides a good opportunity to analyze the factors that influence frequent turnover in nascent democratic countries. The main findings of the research reveal that executives do not trust justices appointed by other executives with different political preferences and in fact there is an overlapping between the electoral executive cycles and judicial turnover. The evidence in the previous chapters have systematically expose that executives (specially at the beginning of their terms) do not buy the strategic behavior model that claims that the justices in the court appointed by executives with other preferences would rule in favor of the incoming executive so as to survive in office. In the end, what this finding reveals is that in general argentine presidents and governors have been iv very averse to risky outcomes when it came to the Supreme Courts. Executive had been more conservative, or reluctant to risk, than what the literature had predicted. It is precisely because executives believe in a more attitudinal behavior of the justices that the political proximity between incoming executives and the justice matters to account for judicial stability in the bench. The results in Chapter 5 from the provincial level analysis had disclosed with great detail that loyalty between executives and justices are highly personalized and thus, strongly controlled. v TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................... VI LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... X LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................. XII ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................................................................... XIII 1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 1.1 DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY .................................................................... 8 2.0 EXPLAINING JUDICIAL TURNOVER: VACANCY CREATION THROUGH INDUCED RETIREMENTS ..................................................................................................... 14 2.1 ASSESSING PREVIOUS THEORIES ............................................................ 15 2.1.1 The strategic retirement theory ....................................................................... 15 2.1.1 Strategic decision making ............................................................................. 19 2.2 A THEORY OF VACANCY CREATION ...................................................... 24 2.2.1 Preferences and incentives of executives to craft a supportive court ....... 25 2.2.2 Strategies of vacancy creation: induced retirements .................................. 28 2.3 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................ 39 3.0 DISCLOSING THE LOGIC OF VACANCY CREATION IN THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT, 1916-2009 ....................................................................... 42 vi 3.1 THE TRADITIONAL WAY OF CREATING VACANCIES: NATURAL CAUSES, 1916-1946 ........................................................................................................... 44 3.1.1 The Radical administrations: 1916-1928 ..................................................... 44 3.1.2 The infamous decade: 1930-1943 ................................................................. 48 3.1.3 Revolution of ’43 and the military governments: 1943-1946 ..................... 50 3.2 A NEW WAY OF CREATING VACANCIES: INDUCED RETIREMENTS, 1947-2009 ............................................................................................................................. 54 3.2.1 The Peronist governments: 1946-1955 ......................................................... 54 3.2.2 The Liberating Revolution and the military governments: 1955-1958 .... 57 3.2.3 The radical governments: 1958-1966 ........................................................... 59 3.2.4 Argentine Revolution and the military governments: 1966-1973 ............. 63 3.2.5 The return of the Peronist government: 1973-1976 ................................... 65 3.2.6 National Reorganization Process: 1976-1983 .............................................. 68 3.2.7 The return of democracy: Alfonsín 1983-1989 ........................................... 71 3.2.8 The Menemist governments: 1989-1999 ...................................................... 74 3.2.9 The short stay of the radicals in the government and the convoluted succession: 1999-2001 ................................................................................................ 79 3.2.10 The Peronists again in government: Duhalde and the Kirchner couple . 82 3.3 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 92 4.0 UNVEILING JUDICIAL TURNOVER IN THE NATIONAL SUPREME COURT ………………………………………………………………………………………...96 4.1 DATA AND METHODOLOGY ...................................................................... 97 4.1.1 Alignment to the political party and the faction ....................................... 100 vii 4.1.2 Ideological distance: alignments to the executive mediated by the partisan power in Congress .................................................................................................... 103 4.1.3 Timing of the departure .............................................................................. 107 4.1.4 Political background of the justices ........................................................... 108 4.1.5 Executive partisan power ............................................................................ 109 4.1.6 Justice’s age and size of the court .............................................................. 110 4.2 UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL INSTABILITY IN THE NATIONAL SUPREME COURT, 1916-2009 ...................................................................................... 112 4.3 CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................. 125 5.0 INSTABILITY AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL: THE PERSISTENT POLITICAL MANIPULATION OF THE SUPREME COURTS ....................................... 127 5.1 A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE SUBNATIONAL DIFFERENCES ............ 128 5.2 THE LOGIC OF VACANCY CREATION IN THE PROVINCIAL SUPREME COURTS, 1983-2009 .................................................................................... 132 5.3 EXPLORING VARIATIONS IN THE PROVINCIAL JUDICIAL TURNOVER ..................................................................................................................... 147 5.4 UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL TURNOVER IN THE PROVINCIAL SUPREME COURTS, 1983-2009 .................................................................................... 154 5.5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 165 6.0 THE INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF JUDICIAL TURNOVER AT THE SUBNATIONAL LEVEL ............................................................................................... 168 6.1 EVOLUTION OF THE INSTITUTIONAL RULES OF THE SUPREME COURTS FROM 1983 TO 2009 ....................................................................................