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Exploring Solutions to Argentina's Political Crisis

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Exploring Solutions to Argentina's Political Crisis MJF-20 THE AMERICAS Martha Farmelo is the Institute’s Suzanne Ecke ICWA McColl Fellow studying gender issues in Argentina. LETTERS Exploring Solutions to Argentina’s Political Crisis: Transforming a Supreme Court Since 1925 the Institute of Current World Affairs (the Crane- That Blackmails the President Rogers Foundation) has provided By Martha Farmelo long-term fellowships to enable outstanding young professionals APRIL 20, 2003 to live outside the United States BUENOS AIRES, Argentina – In late January 2002, in the midst of a cacopho- and write about international nous, pot-banging protest at the Supreme Court, several white-kerchiefed Moth- areas and issues. An exempt ers of Plaza de Mayo sat in silence holding pictures of loved ones who had been operating foundation endowed by “disappeared” by security forces during the grisly, right-wing military dictator- the late Charles R. Crane, the ship of 1976 to 1983. Josefina “Pepa” Noia—one of the group of 14 mothers who Institute is also supported by marched for the very first time in the Plaza— held a hand-printed sign that read: contributions from like-minded individuals and foundations. “Primero se llevaron a nuestros hijos-hijas (Por algo será…). Ahora se llevan al país. Remoción de la Corte Suprema de In-justicia. Juicio Político!” TRUSTEES “First they took our sons-daughters (It must have been for something…[a Bryn Barnard blame-the-victim phrase common during the last dictatorship]. Now they are tak- Joseph Battat ing the country. Remove Mary Lynne Bird the Supreme Court of In- Steven Butler justice. Impeachment!” William F. Foote Kitty Hempstone By expressing their Pramila Jayapal disgust with the Su- Peter Bird Martin preme Court—whether Ann Mische silently or pounding a Dasa Obereigner metal saucepan—Pepa Paul A. Rahe and her fellow Argen- Chandler Rosenberger tines were addressing a Katherine Sreedhar crucial symptom of Edmund Sutton Argentina’s political cri- Dirk J. Vandewalle sis. As the last guarantor of citizens’ basic rights, HONORARY TRUSTEES a legitimate Supreme David Elliot Court is a crucial pil- David Hapgood lar of a stable democ- Pat M. Holt racy. In Argentina, this Josefina “Pepa” Noia (Front, right) on the steps of the Edwin S. Munger pillar is precariously Supreme Court in January, 2001. Richard H. Nolte weak. Among other ab- Albert Ravenholt errations, a majority of the justices have at times acted like the political servants Phillips Talbot of former President Carlos Menem and are accused of blackmailing Menem’s arch rival, President Eduardo Duhalde. Institute of Current World Affairs The Supreme Court emerged on the public agenda following the historic pot- The Crane-Rogers Foundation banging cacerolazo protests that led President Fernando de la Rúa to resign on Four West Wheelock Street December 20, 2001. Just ten days later, similar mobilizations contributed to the Hanover, New Hampshire 03755 U.S.A. downfall of his successor, Adolfo Rodríguez Saá. During the latter protests, the court was singled out for colorful accusations of rampant corruption. Popular anger at the judges peaked when a December 28, 2001 government threatens the court that it will spur the im- Supreme Court ruling upheld the government’s freez- peachment. So people react [in massive protest] to this ing of bank accounts, known as el corralito, widely con- spectacle, this barter of impunities.” sidered a violation of the constitutional right to private property. Duhalde loyalists finally overcame the opposition and terminated the impeachment proceedings in mid- Victor Abramovich is director of the Centro de Estudios October, 2002. Despite widespread clamor for the justices Legales y Sociales (CELS), one of Argentina’s premier hu- to resign, only Gustavo Bossert—widely considered the man rights organizations. He is a leading analyst of the least corrupt of the bunch—did so. He claimed his mo- Supreme Court and one of a handful of civil society lead- tive was “hartazgo emocional” or “emotional exhaustion” ers who have met with the Justice Minister and members resulting from the impeachment proceedings, i.e. emo- of Congress to lobby for change. In a recent interview, he dis- tionally, he’d had enough. cussed the court’s structural weaknesses, recommendations for correcting them and the prospects for change. Victor Abramovich is the Abramovich told me, “The members of the court have Executive Director of the severed their link to society and no longer have the le- Centro de Estudios Legales y gitimacy necessary to fulfill their role. People no longer Sociales. In 1979, CELS began trust the justice system because they believe that in large documenting the atrocities part it is manipulated by political power and responds committed by the military to individual interests. If you have a pending case, you juntas of 1976 to 1983, and don’t know if it will be resolved according to accepted provided legal and social aid to rules and principles, in an independent and impartial the detained-disappeared and manner,” he said. their family members. Photo courtesy of CELS. About a month after the Court upheld the validity of el corralito, at President Eduardo Duhalde’s behest and riding a wave of popular fury against the Court, Con- In December, the Supreme Court signaled in advance gress initiated impeachment proceedings against the nine that it was going to rule in favor of “re-dollarizing” de- justices. Soon thereafter, the judges made a 180-degree posits that the government had converted to pesos—an- turn from their previous decision and ruled that el corralito other profound threat to the Duhalde administration. was unconstitutional. This ruling came one day after the When pro-dollarization justice Carlos Fayt revealed that fifth furious, weekly cacerolazo on the steps of the Court, he had a frozen bank account (and should have recused convened by the association of labor lawyers and sup- himself from all rulings on el corralito), Duhalde then ported across the board by neighborhood assemblies. urged Congress to re-initiate Fayt’s impeachment. Given that timing, it seemed a pathetic attempt by the court to appease an angry, mobilized populace. The press covered these events with phrases like “sword of Damocles” to describe the threat that Duhalde On national radio, President Duhalde said, “[This held over the head of the Court, and vice versa. At times ruling] is due to the fact that the government did not ac- it appeared that rather than operate within a system of cede to the blackmail of the Executive and the Congress checks and balances, the Executive and Judicial branches by members of the maximum court, in which they de- were engaged in a high-stakes game of political “chicken” manded we not impeach them.” designed to bring down either the President or the justices. President Duhalde, however, has behaved as errati- cally as the judges. First, it appeared that he went along According to Abramovich, Duhalde’s initial zest for with the blackmail. According to Abramovich, in mid- impeachment hearings reflected his desire to purge the February he signaled the Congress to back off the im- so-called “automatic majority” of five Supreme Court jus- peachment proceedings and initiated negotiations with tices loyal to former President Carlos Menem, who in 1990 the justices to secure rulings that would uphold el expanded the number of judges from five to nine. “The corralito—and protect his term in office. Supreme Court is an instrument of power of Menemismo,” he said. “The constitution doesn’t say how many judges Diana Maffía is Assistant Ombudsman for the City should serve on the Supreme Court, so it only took a of Buenos Aires. She told me, “When the government so change in law to alter the number of judges. This law flagrantly violates the right to private property [freezing was voted on with the presence of a fake Congressman.” bank accounts], the Court makes not even a gesture, be- A congressional aide took a seat in his congressman’s cause of the impeachment proceedings in the Congress. place, was registered as present by an automatic counter And it begins a courting dance between the government and gave the Peronists quorum, he said. and the Court. The Court threatens the government that it’s going to declare the corralito unconstitutional. The Abramovich said Menem also stacked the federal 2 MJF-20 courts with judges beholden to him. These maneuvers public hearings, and the approval came one day to the transformed the most important judicial bodies into ser- next in a Congressional session that was practically se- vants of the executive branch. They also gave Menem cret,” he said. legal cover for a sweeping political and economic restruc- turing of the country that included privatization of all “Paradoxically,” he added, “the Senate just reformed public utilities and pardons for military dictators who its internal regulations to establish a public hearing [for had been jailed after historic trials for human-rights the designation of Supreme Court justices], something abuses. This majority was also responsible for setting that CELS had been asking for. But this won’t take effect Menem free from house arrest on arms-trafficking until March.” Reflecting on the selection of Supreme Court charges. “[Supreme Court Justice] Julio Nazareno failed justices in the U.S., he said, “Normally the designees have to recuse himself, even though he had been Menem’s law an appropriate legal background, so the discussions are partner in the province of La Rioja,” he said. about what they think about certain conflicts of val- ues they will have to resolve. We would have liked President Duhalde contributed directly to the Court’s to have known Maqueda’s opinion about things like pro- lack of credibility when he selected Senator Juan Carlos cedural guarantees, personal liberty, restrictions on free- Maqueda to fill the vacancy created by Bossert’s resigna- dom of expression, the use of roadblocks [as a form of tion.
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