Democratization and Political Succession in Suharto's Indonesia Author(S): Leo Suryadinata Source: Asian Survey, Vol
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Democratization and Political Succession in Suharto's Indonesia Author(s): Leo Suryadinata Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Mar., 1997), pp. 269-280 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645663 Accessed: 15-09-2016 05:52 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Asian Survey This content downloaded from 175.45.185.255 on Thu, 15 Sep 2016 05:52:49 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms DEMOCRATIZATION AND POLITICAL SUCCESSION IN SUHARTO'S INDONESIA Leo Suryadinata Indonesia has often been described as an authoritarian state. The military, represented by General Suharto, has ruled the country since the 1965 coup. However, some observers maintain that in recent years the authoritarian regime appears to have been softening, evidenced by the weakening role of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) in the political pro- cess. President Suharto appointed fewer military personnel to his 1993 cabi- net and selected a civilian to be the general chairman of Golkar, the ruling party; he also reduced the military composition of Golkar at the national level and the number of military representatives (unelected) in the forthcoming Parliament (DPR). The rise of Dr. B. J. Habibie and his Association of Indo- nesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI) have also been used to substantiate this point. Other examples of democratization are the higher frequency of protest movements by trade unionists and students in recent years, while opposition political parties have demonstrated more independence. The Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDI), for instance, was able to elect its own chairperson, Megawati Sukarnoputri (the daughter of the late President Sukarno), defeat- ing the candidate favored by the government, and Abdurrachman Wahid, who had been critical of the president, won re-election as chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) despite the government's preference for another can- didate. In recent years, numerous quasi-opposition organizations among the elite have been established, including Persatuan Cendekiawan Pembangunan Pancasila (PCPP), and Yayasan Kerukunan Persaudaraan Kebangsaan (YKPK). The most recent addition is the Independent Committee for Moni- toring General Elections (Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu or KIPP), Leo Suryadinata is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore. ? 1997 by The Regents of the University of California 269 This content downloaded from 175.45.185.255 on Thu, 15 Sep 2016 05:52:49 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 270 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1997 which is seen as a pro-opposition organization.' This paper will analyze the reasons for this "softening" and whether it means the start of a real democra- tization process. Reasons for Democratization There are many views regarding the reasons for the government's acceptance of democratization. One argument is that 30 years of development-oriented programs of the New Order government has given rise to a middle class that wants to participate in the political process and demands democratization or "liberalism."2 However, a contrary argument sees the middle class in Asia as illiberal in its political orientation.3 But apart from these contrasting views, the definition of the middle class is also problematic. Some use the term to refer to the small Muslim traders, civil servants, professionals, and military officers, while others insist that the middle class should consist of profession- als and entrepreneurs. Under the Western definition, the middle class in In- donesia is still weak. In 1990 Indonesians classified as "professional and technical" and "managers and administrators" only constituted 3.9% of the population.4 The concept of middle class is further complicated by the eth- nicity factor, as Indonesia's professional/entrepreneurial class has strong non- indigenous (i.e., ethnic Chinese) components. Because the ethnic Chinese minority is not a discrete element whose economic prosperity is very much subjected to the mercy of government officials, it is unlikely to demand rapid political change harmful to its economic interests. The indigenous Indone- sian middle class is smaller than that of the Chinese, and many of its mem- bers depend on government officials for favors-some are sons and daughters of government servants who have obtained facilities from the regime. 1. For a discussion on this group, see "Komite di Balik Bayang-Bayang Oposisi," Gatra (Jakarta), 6 April 1996, pp. 22-24. 2. Daniel Lev maintains that the middle class has grown significantly during the New Order and that this class is politically liberal, while Hans-Dieter Evers even argues that it demands constitutional democracy. See Lev, "Notes and the Middle Class and Change in Indonesia," in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young, eds., The Politics of Middle Class jin] Indonesia, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, no. 19, Monash University, 1990, pp. 44-48; Hans-Dieter Evers, "The Growth of an Industrial Labour Force and the Decline of Poverty in Indonesia," in Southeast Asian Affairs 1995, pp. 164-74. 3. Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and David Martin Jones, Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia (New York and London: St Martin's Press, 1995). 4. See Abdurrachman Wahid's "Indonesia's Muslim Middle Class: An Imperative or a Choice?" in Tanter and Young, Politics of Middle Class Indonesia, especially p. 22; Richard Robison, "The Middle Class and the Bourgeoisie in Indonesia," in Richard Robison and David S. G. Goodman, eds., The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonalds and Middle Class Revolution (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 84. This content downloaded from 175.45.185.255 on Thu, 15 Sep 2016 05:52:49 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms LEO SURYADINATA 271 Identifying the middle class in Indonesia is even more problematic when the concept is linked to democratization. William Liddle has commented, not surprisingly, that "we need to be wary of assigning professionals and entre- preneurs a role as 'middle class' (if they are middle, who are upper) based on the classic model of how societies function and change. Indonesian society and its New Order Government ... do not fit that model."5 The main opposi- tion in fact comes from Muslim groups, which do not necessarily belong to the middle class. These Muslims are urban dwellers who want to improve their economic position but lack the clout to change the political system. Nevertheless, their presence is beginning to be felt because of their outspo- kenness. Their aspirations, if not interests, are being articulated by nongov- ernmental organizations (NGOs), which have increased in number in the last 20 years to some 7,000 of which 2,800 are located in Jakarta.6 The better ones are able to articulate major issues in Indonesia and serve as pressure groups but they are not yet effective in introducing socio-political change.7 Nevertheless, they cannot be completely ignored, especially when the polit- ical elite in Indonesia is no longer united. Perhaps, Suharto recognizes the emergence of this potential political force and has begun to make some con- cessions to the moderate Muslim groups in order to co-opt the Islamic move- ment and eventually win its support. The government's accommodationist policy toward the moderate Muslim groups has alienated the mainstream of the military establishment, which sees it as a threat to the dual role of the military. Hence, there is a split between Suharto and some ABRI officers over the president's policy toward Islam. The most conspicuous example is the tussle between the Suharto-sponsored group and anti-Suharto group within Golkar. Golkar and Demilitarization Indonesian society underwent militarization after the liquidation of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, the Indonesian communist party) and the downfall of Sukarno in 1965, including a process of replacing civilians with military personnel. The military considered this the concrete manifestation of its "dual function" (dwi fungsi) doctrine. Not surprisingly, in the 1971 general election Golkar as the government party had the full support of the military and bureaucracy, winning 62.8% of the votes. Looking at Golkar's structure at that time, it was clear that the central leadership was in the hands of the military, who held key positions. The chief supervisor (pembina utama) of 5. William Liddle, "The Middle Class and New Order Legitimacy: A Response to Dan Lev," in Tanter and Young, ibid., pp. 49-52. 6. "Mereka yang ingin jadi agen perubahan," Gatra, 11 March 1996, p. 16. 7. Philip Eldridge, "Development, Democracy and Non-Government Organizations in Indo- nesia," Asian Journal of Political Science, 4:1 (June 1996), pp. 17-35. This content downloaded from 175.45.185.255 on Thu, 15 Sep 2016 05:52:49 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 272 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXVII, NO. 3, MARCH 1997 the party was General Suharto, who was supposed to play an advisory role but in reality was the decision maker. Although Golkar has three compo- nents-the military, civil servants, and civilians-it is obvious that the mili- tary has been the most powerful at both national and district levels. Even the party's district Advisory Boards were under its domain. One Indonesian political scientist bluntly commented that Golkar was the political arm of ABRI.8 Nevertheless, after the Golkar Congress in 1978, the role of the military appeared to have declined, as those who wanted to hold party positions were required to retire from the armed services.