The Indonesian Military Response to Reform in Democratic Transition: A

The Indonesian Military Response to Reform in Democratic Transition:

A Comparative Analysis of Three Civilian Regimes 1998-2004

Inaugural - Dissertation

zur

Erlangung der Doktorwürde

der Philosophischen Fakultät der Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg im Breisgau

im Seminar für Wissenschaftlicher Politik

vorgelegt von

Poltak Partogi Nainggolan

Aus Jakarta, Indonesien

Wintersemester 2010/2011 Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Jürgen Rüland

Zweigutachter: Prof. Dr. Heribert Weiland

Vorsitzender des Promotionsausschusses der Gemeinsamen Kommission der Philologischen, Philosophischen und Wirtschafts- und Verhaltenswissenschaftlichen Fakultaet: Prof. Dr. Hans-Helmut Gander

Tag der Fachprüfung im Promotionsfach Politische Wissenschaft: 10 Februar 2011 This dissertation is dedicated to those who struggle for a better Indonesia and become the victims of reform Acknowledgements

Having worked in an institution such as the Indonesian parliament (DPR) -- an important actor in the democratic transition in Indonesia -- and witnessed many important events during this period, I am encouraged to share with the public my knowledge and insights into what really happened. The unclear prospect of post-Soeharto reform and the chaotic situation caused by various conflicts throughout Indonesia have also motivated me to examine the response of the Indonesian military, which since the formation of the country has been viewed as the loyal guardian of the state.

The idea for this dissertation came up in mid-2001, after the sudden fall of the first democratically elected civilian regime of Abdurrahman Wahid. However, the project could only begin in 2004 after I had received a positive response from the representative of the Hanns Seidel-Stiftung in Jakarta, Mr. Christian Hegemer, about my PhD scholarship for the study at Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg (University of Freiburg). I, therefore, would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the Hanns Seidel-Stiftung. In particular, I would like to thank Mr. Christian Hegemer, Dr. Michael Czepalla and Mrs. Monika Gerhard for their efforts in providing the scholarship and extending it.

Despite the difficulties to find a supervisor (Doktorvater), who is an expert on civil-military relations and Indonesia’s democratic transition, I eventually found Prof. Jürgen Rüland, a well-known scholar on Southeast Asia. However, the next difficulties came: I had to persuade both Prof. Rüland and my employer, the Research Centre of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR), of the feasibility of my project, a process that took several months before I eventually got Prof. Rüland’s final consent. During this period, I received much encouragement from Dr. Andreas Ufen from the Institut für Asienstudien at the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Hamburg, Dr. Andreas Ufen, who persuaded my to wait and carry on. Despite his tight schedule, and busy activities at the Department of Political Science (Seminar für Wissenschaftlicher Politik), Prof. Rüland has done much to supervise this dissertation amid many frustrations, including the constraints of the scholarship. He assisted me in applying for the extension of the scholarship and, more significantly, provided his advice that helped me accomplish this dissertation six years afterward. For this reason, my sincere appreciation goes to Prof. Jürgen Rüland, who has also dedicated his time and tireless support to help me improve the final version of this dissertation.

For the preparation of the proposal and the evaluation of this dissertation, I am extremely grateful to Prof. Heribert Weiland, the Director of Arnold-Bergstraesser Institut (ABI) Freiburg. I deeply appreciate the time he devoted to me and the access he

i provided me to ABI’s facilities, especially for office space and the institute’s excellent library. I thus also extend my sincere gratitude to the staff and librarians of ABI for their friendly assistance and good service.

During the processes of researching and writing my dissertation, I learnt much from many colleagues and friends at the Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg and the Arnold-Bergstraesser Institut. I am grateful to those who spent their time and efforts to share with me their views and suggestions during seminars, colloquiums, and meetings of the Southeast Asian Studies group. Others from whom I have greatly benefitted in discussions on issues of democratic transition in Indonesia are Dr. Marcel Baumann, Stefan Rother, Dr. Patrick Ziegenhain, Maria-Gabriela Manea and Dr. Paruedee Nguitragool. I am very grateful for their interest in my academic work and progress, the mentoring they provided to me (especially for meeting the formalities at the university) and their assistance in finding new accommodation. This gratitude includes my Indonesian friends from the University of Indonesia, particularly Panji Anugrah Permana, who have just started their own doctoral project.

I also greatly appreciate all the secretarial assistance I received from Mrs. Böhme and Mrs. Tranh since my arrival in Freiburg as a foreign student. I am grateful for their helping hands in handling my communications with the university, particularly the Department of Political Science (Seminar für Wissenschaftlicher Politik), and settling administrative and personal problems. For further technical assistance, I would like to thank Yulia Indahri (Iin), a colleague in my office at the DPR, for her time and tireless efforts.

My special thanks also go to the many persons who allocated so much of their time for references, information and interviews with me. Of course, it is not only the time and effort they took for which I am grateful; it is above all, their willingness to share their knowledge and views. Perhaps, the most memorable discussions were with my father who, unfortunately, passed away three years before I finally submitted this dissertation. For this reason, I also dedicate this book to the memory of my father, Sahat M. Nainggolan, SH.

Last, but by no means least, my heart goes to my family in Jakarta, Indonesia, particularly to my wife, Riris Katharina, who has for many months looked after our lovely daughter, Reynnalda Alesha, and took care of family concerns while I was conducting fieldwork in Indonesia and wrote my dissertation in Germany. She has given me the support, encouragement and love, without which this PhD dissertation could not have been accomplished.

Due to acostics neuroma illness, I nearly collapsed during the writing of this acknowledgement in my apartement in Freiburg. Thank God, I could return home and

ii meet my family before being sent to the hospital for an immediate medical check-up. I saw another miracle in my life, after a 14 hours complicated surgery, I have survived to finish these acknowledgements.

Needless to say, endlich, none of the persons mentioned above is to be blamed for the shortcomings of this dissertation, for which I am alone responsible.

Jakarta, April 2011 Poltak Partogi Nainggolan

iii Table of Contents

Acknowledgments...... i Table of Contents...... iv List of Abbreviations ...... ix List of Diagram and Tables...... xviii Chapter One Introduction...... 1 I. Background...... 1 II. The Essence of the Problem ...... 2 III. Literature Review ...... 4 IV. The Objective and Significance of this Research ...... 8 Chapter Two Theory and Methodology ...... 11 I. Theory...... 11 A. Theoretical Framework ...... 11 1. Democratic Transition ...... 11 2. Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Transition and Consolidation...... 13 3. Civilian Regime Performance and Military Response...... 15 4. Historical and Cultural Factors: Civilian Regimes and Military Response ...... 19 B. Theoretical Approaches...... 29 1. Actor Theories ...... 29 2. Cultural Theories ...... 37 3. Structural Theories...... 45 II. Methodology...... 51 A. Assumptions and Hypotheses...... 51 B. Description of Variables, Concepts, and Indicators. 52 C. Research Instruments and Analysis...... 56 Chapter Three The Habibie Regime (1998-1999)...... 58 I. Coping with Military Reform ...... 58 A. What Had Influenced Habibie to Introduce Reform?...... 58 B. Habibie and His Reform Policies ...... 59 C. Military’s Earlier Reactions ...... 63 D. Military’s Strong Contestation of Further Reform Demands...... 66 E. Habibie’s Compromise with the Military...... 70 F. Military Success In Preserving Its Interests ...... 72 II. Coping with Soeharto’s Alleged KKN Cases ...... 76 A. Habibie’s Serious Attempts to Investigate Soeharto’s Alleged KKN Cases ...... 76 B. Explanations for Military Resistance ...... 78 C. The Military and the Emergence of Terror in Jakarta ...... 80

iv D. The Military and the Emergence of Terror in Various Regions ...... 87 E. Threats, Intelligence Operations, and Common Interests ...... 89 III. Coping with Human Rights Violations...... 93 A. Habibie’s Soft Approach to End Violence, and Military Reaction...... 93 B. Military’s New Repressive Approach in Trouble Spots...... 96 C. Referendum, East Timor Inferno, and the Threat of A Coup ...... 99 D. Military Brutality and the Role of Militias...... 102 E. Habibie’s New Approach and the TNI as Veto Player...... 109 IV. Coping with Separatism...... 112 A. Habibie and Wiranto’s Response to Secessionism... 112 B. Military Response to Separatist Movement in Aceh 116 C. Military Response to Separatist Movement in Irian Jaya...... 118 D. Military Response to Referendum on Independence in East Timor...... 119 V. Coping with Radical Muslims ...... 127 A. Habibie, Islam, Radical Muslims, and the Green Generals...... 127 B. The Green Generals and Radical Muslims...... 131 C. Habibie’s Pro-Islam Politics and Its Impacts ...... 134 D. The Military, Radical Muslim Organisations, and Militias ...... 136 E. Military Leaders and Their Pragmatic Interests ...... 140 VI. Conclusion ...... 142 Chapter Four The Abdurrahman Wahid Regime (1999- 2001)...... 145 I. Coping with Military Reform ...... 145 A. What Had Influenced Wahid to Introduce Reform?. 145 B. Military Position to Wahid’s Election...... 147 C. Wahid and His Reform Policies ...... 148 D. Wahid and Security Sector Reform...... 149 E. Military Response to Wahid’s Reform Policies ...... 155 F. Ethnic Conflict in Kalimantan: Military Contestation against the Police ...... 165 G. Religious Conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi: Militias and Military’s Intelligence Operations ...... 169 H. The Progress of Security Sector Reform ...... 172 I. The Military as Veto Player: End of Reform ...... 176 II. Coping with Soeharto’s Alleged KKN Cases ...... 179 A. Wahid’s Attempts to Investigate the Soeharto Cases ...... 179

v B. Understanding Military Perception of Soeharto...... 181 C. Military Response to Wahid Regarding Soeharto’s Alleged KKN Cases ...... 183 D. Military Resistance In Maluku ...... 188 III. Coping with Human Rights Violations...... 193 A. Wahid’s Policy Regarding Human Rights Violations...... 193 B. The Military and Culture of Violence ...... 195 C. Military Response to Wahid’s Concern on Human Rights ...... 198 IV. Coping with Separatism...... 204 A. What Had Influenced Wahid’s Response to Secessionism ...... 204 B. What Had Influenced Military Response to Secessionism ...... 206 C. Military Views on Decentralization ...... 210 D. Wahid’s Policy Regarding Separatist Conflict in East Timor...... 212 E. Military Response to Wahid Regarding Separatist Conflict in East Timor...... 214 F. Wahid’s Policy Regarding Separatist Conflict in Aceh ...... 216 G. Military Response to Wahid Regarding Separatist Conflict in Aceh ...... 220 H. Wahid’s Policy Regarding Separatist Conflict in Irian Jaya ...... 223 I. Military Response to Wahid Regarding Separatist Conflict in Irian Jaya ...... 226 J. Understanding Wahid’s Compromise with the Military...... 228 V. Coping with Islam and Radical Muslims...... 231 A. Wahid and Islam...... 231 B. Wahid and Radical Muslims ...... 233 C. Wahid, Radical Muslims, and the Green General .... 235 D. Wahid, Radical Muslims, and the Red-White and the Green Generals...... 240 E. Common Interests of Radical Muslims and the Green Generals...... 245 VI. Conclusion ...... 247 Chapter Five The Megawati Government (2001-2004)...... 249 I. Coping with Military Reform ...... 249 A. What Had Influenced Megawati to Introduce Reform?...... 249 B. Military Position to the Rise of Megawati ...... 252 C. Megawati and Reform Policies ...... 253

vi D. Megawati’s Policies Regarding Security Sector Reform...... 255 E. The Military and Javanese Political Culture ...... 262 F. Military Response to Megawati Regarding Security Sector Reform ...... 267 G. Military Response to Decentralization ...... 271 II. Coping with Soeharto’s Alleged KKN Cases ...... 275 A. Megawati’s Views on Her Mandate...... 275 B. Megawati’s Policy Regarding Soeharto’s alleged KKN Cases...... 277 C. Military Response to Megawati Regarding Soeharto’s Alleged KKN cases ...... 281 III. Coping with Gross Human Rights Violation Cases ...... 282 A. Megawati and the Culture of Violence...... 282 B. Megawati’s Response to Gross Human Rights Violation Cases ...... 285 C. The Military and the Culture of Violence ...... 289 D. Military Response to Gross Human Rights Violation Cases ...... 294 IV. Coping with Separatism...... 296 A. Megawati and the Unitary State ...... 296 B. The Military and the Unitary State...... 301 C. Civilian and Military Leaders’ Cooperation to End Separatism in Aceh...... 304 D. Burying the East Timor Trauma...... 310 E. Separatism, Violence, and Conflicting Interest in Irian Jaya ...... 312 V. Coping with Radical Muslims ...... 318 A. Megawati’s Thoughts on Islam ...... 318 B. Megawati and Radical Muslim Groups...... 319 C. Megawati and the Red-White Generals...... 322 D. The Military and Radical Muslim Groups ...... 324 E. Megawati, the Military, and Radical Muslim Groups ...... 327 F. The End of Religious Conflict and the Return of Stability in Maluku...... 328 G. Religious Conflict in Poso and Pressure for Formation of TNI’s New Regional Command...... 330 VI. Conclusion ...... 334 Chapter Six Conclusion ...... 337 Zusammenfassung...... 344 Bibliography...... 350 Appendix...... 395

vii List of Abbreviations

AAK Aliansi Anti-Komunis (Anti-Communist Alliance)

ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)

Akmil Akademi Militer (Military Academy)

A MIN Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (The Indonesian Mujahidin Force)

AMPI Angkatan Muda Pembaruan Indonesia (Pro-Golkar youth organization for Indonesia’s reform)

APBN Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (National Revenue and Expenditure Budget)

Aster Asisten Teritorial (Territorial Assistant)

Babinsa Bintara Pembina Desa (lowest military post at village level)

BAIS Badan Intelijen Strategis (Military Strategic Intelligence Board)

Bakorstanas Badan Kordinasi Pemeliharaan Stabilitas Nasional (Coordinating Agency for the Maintenance of National Stability)

Bakin Badan Kordinasi Intelijen Negara (National Intelligence Coordinating Board)

Banpres Bantuan Presiden (presidential aid funds)

Banser Barisan Serbaguna (The Versatile Guard)

BIN Badan Intelijen Nasional (National Intelligence Board)

BLBI Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia (liquidity credits from the Bank Indonesia)

BMP Besi Merah Putih (Red-White Iron militia group)

BPPC Badan Pengelolaan dan Pemasaran Cengkeh (Clove Marketing and Buffer Agency)

Brig. Gen. Brigadier General

ix Brimob Brigade Mobile (heavily armed special police unit)

Bulog Badan Urusan Logistik (State Logistics Agency)

CAVR Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor Leste (The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor)

COHA Cessation of Hostilities Agreement

CIDES Center for Information and Development Studies

CPM Corps Polisi Militer (Military Police Corps)

CSIS Centre Strategic for International Studies

CTF Commission for Truth and Friendship

DDII Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Teaching Council)

Dephan Departmen Pertahanan (Department of Defence)

Dephankam Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan (Department of Defense and Security)

DI/TII Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (Islamic Soldier/Indonesian Islamic Soldier)

DKM Dewan Kehormatan Militer (Military Honorary Council)

DOM Daerah Operasi Militer (military operations zone)

DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives)

DPRD-I Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah I (House of Representatives at provincial level)

DPRD-II Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah II (House of Representatives at municipality/regency level)

DPRP Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua (The Provincial House of Representative of the Papuan People)

Falintil Forças Armadas para a Liberação Nacional do Timor Leste (the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor)

x Foreri Jaya Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian Jaya (Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya

FPDU Fraksi Partai Daulatul Ummah (Sovereignty of the Islamic Community Parties Faction)

FPI Front Pembela Islam (Front for Islam Defenders)

Fretilin Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor)

FSPUI Forum Silaturahmi dan Perjuangan Umat Islam (Muslim Forum for

Communication and Struggle)

FUI Forum Ummat Islam (Forum for Muslims)

FURKON Forum untuk Perjuangan Keadilan dan Konstitusi (Forum for the Promotion of Justice and Constitution

GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Movement for An Independent Aceh)

GDP Gross Domestic Product

Gen. General

GNP Gross National Product

Golkar Golongan Karya (Functional Group)

GPK Gerakan Pemuda Kabah (Kabah Youth Movement)

GPK Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan (Security Disturbance Movement)

G-30-S/PKI Gerakan 30 September Partai Komunis Indonesia (The September 30, 1965 Rebellion Movement of the Indonesian Communist Party)

HAMMAS Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim Antar Kampus (Inter-University Muslim Students Association)

Hankamrata Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta (total defense based on the people power)

HDC Henry Dunant Center

ICG International Crisis Group

xi ICMI Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Association of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals)

ICW Indonesian Corruption Watch

Inpres Instruksi Presiden (Presidential Instruction)

IPTN Industri Pesawat Terbang Nasional (national aircraft industry)

ITB Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology)

JI Jamaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community

KAMMI Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Student Actions Association)

Kapolri Kepala Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (Chief of the National Police)

Kasgab Kepala Staf Gabungan (Chief of the Joint Staffs)

Kasospol Kepala Staf Sosial Politik (Chief of Social-Politics Affairs)

Kaster Kepala Staf Teritorial (TNI Chief of Territorial Affairs)

Kasum Kepala Staf Umum (TNI Chief for General Affairs)

Keppres Keputusan Presiden (Presidential Decree)

KISDI Komite Solidaritas untuk Dunia Islam (Solidarity Committee for Islamic World)

KKN Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme (Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism)

KKR Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi (Committee for Truth and Reconciliation)

Kodam Komando Daerah Militer (Military Regional Command)

Kodim Komando Distrik Militer (Military District Command)

Komnas HAM Komisi Nasional untuk Hak Asasi Manusia (National Commission for Human Rights)

Kontras Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (The Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence)

xii Kopassus Komando Pasukan Khusus (Army’s Special Forces)

Kopkamtib Komando Operasional untuk Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (The Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order)

Koramil Komando Rayon Militer (Military Sub-District Command)

Kostrad Komando Cadangan Strategis (Army’s Strategic Reserve Command)

KPP HAM Komisi Penyelidik Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia (Indonesian Timtim Commission of Investigation into Human Rights Violations in East Timor)

KPU Komisi Pemilihan Umum (National Elections Commission)

KSAD Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat (Army Chief)

Laksus Pelaksana Khusus (Special Agency)

Lemhannas Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional (National Resilience Council)

LBH Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Foundation)

LIPI Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of Sciences)

L J Laskar Jihad (Jihad Warriors)

Lt. Gen. Lieutenant General

Mahidi Mati Hidup untuk Indonesia (alive or dead for the sake of Indonesia)

Malari Malapetaka 15 Januari 1974 (The January 15, 1974 Incident)

Maj. Gen. Major General

MBB Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm

Mendagri Menteri Dalam Negeri (Minister of Domestic Affairs)

Menhan Menteri Pertahanan (Minister of Defense)

Menhankam Menteri Pertahanan Keamanan (Minister of Defense and Security)

xiii Menkopolkam Menteri Kordinator Politik dan Keamanan (Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security)

Menpen Menteri Penerangan (Minister of Information)

MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MNLF Moro National Liberation Front

MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly)

MRP Majelis Rakyat Papua (The Papuan People’s Assembly)

MUI Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Council of Islamic Clerics)

NGO Non-Government Organization

NKRI Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia)

NII Negara Islam Indonesia (The Indonesian Islamic State)

NU Nadhlatul Ulama (the resurrected Islamic cleric group)

OPM Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Organization for an Independent Papua)

Opsus Operasi Khusus (Special Operation)

OTK Orang Tak Dikenal (unknown perpetrators)

Pam Swakarsa Pasukan Pengaman Swakarsa (voluntary civilian security forces)

Pangdam Panglima Komando Daerah Militer (Military Regional Commander)

Pangkostrad Panglima Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army’s Strategic Reserve Commander)

Pansus Panitia Khusus (Special Committee)

Paspampres Pasukan Pengamanan Presiden (military elite presidential security guards)

PBB Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party)

xiv PBHI Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (The Indonesian Association for Legal Assistances)

PDI Indonesian Democratic Party

PDIP Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle)

PDKB Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (Love the Nation Democratic Party)

PDP Presidium Dewan Papua (Presidium of the Papuan Assembly)

Pepera Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat (the UN Act of Free Choice)

Perda Peraturan Daerah (Regional Government Regulation)

Permesta Piagam Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta (Charter for People’s Struggle)

Perpu Government Regulation in lieu of a Law

Petrus Penembak Misterius (Mysterious Shooter)

Pilkada Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (direct elections of governors, mayors, or head of districts)

PK Partai Keadilan (Justice Party)

PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)

PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)

P okja Kelompok Kerja (Working Committee)

Polres Polisi Resort (Resort Police)

PP Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth)

PPMI Perhimpunan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia (The Association of Indonesian Muslim Workers)

PPI Pasukan Pejuang Integrasi (all East Timorese pro-integration militias)

PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)

PPRC Pasukan Pengendali Reaksi Cepat (new rapid strike forces)

xv PPRM Pasukan Pencegah Rusuh Massa (operational troops for preventing mass revolt)

PRRI Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia

RMS Republik Maluku Selatan (The Republic of South Maluku)

R UU Rancangan Undang-undang (Bill)

RUU KKN Rancangan Undang-undang Keselamatan dan Keamanan Negara (Bill on State Safety and Security)

Satgas P3TT Satuan Tugas Panitia Penentuan Pendapat di Timor Timur (task force for popular consultation on the East Timor referendum)

SBSI Serikat Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (Indonesian Workers Union)

S BY Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (The Sixth Indonesian President)

Sesko Sekolah Komando (Military Command School)

SGI Satuan Gugus Tugas Intelijen (Military Intelligence Task Force)

SIRA Sentra Informasi untuk Reformasi Aceh (Centre for Information on Aceh Referendum)

SIUPP Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Press (press enterprise permit letter)

Sishankamrata Sistem Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta (total people’s defense and security system)

SP 3 Surat Penghentian Penyelidikan dan Penuntutan (Letter for Cancellation of the Investigation and Prosecution)

SPKP HAM Solidaritas Persaudaraan Korban Pelanggaran HAM (Brotherhood Solidarity for the Victims of Human Rights Violations)

TAP MPR Ketetapan MPR (MPR decree)

TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Military)

TPF Tim Pencari Fakta (Fact Finding Team)

UI Universitas Indonesia (University of Indonesia)

UNHCR United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees

xvi UU Undang-undang (Law/Act)

UNTAET UN Transitional Administration in East Timor

UNTEA United Nations for Temporary Administration

Wakasad Wakil Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat (Army Deputy Chief)

xvii List of Diagram and Tables

Diagram 1: Model of Analysis...... 52

T a b l e 1: Matrix of Analysis ...... 56

T a b l e 2: Ethnical-Regional Distribution of the Central Army Elite ...... 155

T a b l e 3: Ethnical Background of Army Officers 1990-2000...... 156

T a b l e 4: Ethnical Background of Army Officers Promoted to Brigadier General 1990-2000...... 157

T a b l e 5: List of Major Incidents of Violence During Wahid...... 199

T a b l e 6: Interviewees, Their Backgrounds, and Date of Interview (Appendix) 395

xviii Chapter One

Introduction

I. Background

Indonesia, a geographically vast country comprised of more than 17,000 islands and with high levels of diversity in terms of ethnicity, language, and religion, has a strategic position in Southeast Asia. The country, which was occupied by the Netherlands for more than 350 years and by Japan for about three years, proclaimed its independence in 1945, and gained full sovereignty in 1949. Indonesia had its first experience with the democratic process by holding fair, democratic, and direct legislative elections in 1955 for the first time ever.1

Unfortunately, just four years later, the country entered a period of authoritarian rule under its first Javanese civilian President, Sukarno. This situation ended a phase characterized by democratic transition, which started in 1945, and, moreover, prevented the country from becoming an established democracy in the Third World. Following the regime change from Sukarno to Maj. Gen. Soeharto, who is also a Javanese native, Indonesia entered a new and prolonged period of authoritarianism under military rule. From 1971 until May 1998, Soeharto repressively ruled the country and rejected demands for reform, which buried any hope of democratic transition flourishing in the immediate aftermath of the Sukarno era.2

Apart from its important role in defending the country from the returning Dutch colonizers, the Japanese, and the allied forces in the 1945-1949 period, the Indonesian military had also been actively and dominantly involved in Indonesian politics.3 In 1946, for example, Maj. Gen. Soedarsono kidnapped Prime Minister Sjahrir, and in 1948, soldiers and officers engaged in a communist rebellion in Madiun.4 Military factions were also involved in separatist movements in the Sumatra and Sulawesi provinces and fought each other during the PRRI (Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia -- Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) and Permesta (Piagam

1 For an overview of the 1950-1957 democratic period, see Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, New York, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962. 2 For an overview of Soeharto’s New Order period, see Michael R J Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Soeharto: Order, Development and Power for Change, London: Routledge, 1993; Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994; Michael R J Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order. London: Routledge, 1998. 3 Ibid. 4 Benedict R. O’G Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972; Abdul Haris Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia (On Indo- nesia’s Independence War), Jakarta: PT Gunung Agung, 1989.

1 Perjuangan Rakyat Semesta --Charter for People’s Struggle) campaigns in 1958.5 Moreover, internal conflict among army generals and their units led to the 1965 power struggle and the fall of Sukarno.6 After the power struggle, which continued after the 1966 coup d’etat, for more than three decades, the military has continuously supported the existence of Soeharto’s repressive regime.

In 1974, army generals exacerbated anti-Japanese riots which culminated in the Malari riot because of a conflict of interest between Gen. Sumitro and Maj. Gen. Ali Murtopo.7 Later, in 1984, the military supported Soeharto in suppressing his opponents in the Pokja Petisi 50, a political group that consisted of fifty former prominent military and civilian leaders who often criticized Soeharto’s authoritarian policies.8 In a different move, from 1991-1998 they supported the establishment of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia --Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association), which caused friction between Islamist and nationalist generals.9 In summary, there was not a single major political problem in the period from the country’s independence up until the end of the Soeharto era, in which the military was not involved, whether as individuals, groups, or the institution as a whole.

II. The Essence of the Problem

The collapse of Soeharto’s military regime in May 1998 and the subsequent rise of a civilian regime under Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie have been embraced as the beginning of a new era of reform (era reformasi) in Indonesia. It was hoped at the time that Habibie would reform the country’s political system and initiate military reform, subjects which Soeharto had ignored for many decades. For this reason, radical students demanded that the new civilian regime consistently implement the demanded reforms, which included investigation and prosecution of Soeharto for his corruption, collusion, and nepotism, as

5 Abdul Haris Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas (Fulfilling the Call of Duty), Jakarta: PT Gunung Agung, 1995; Audrey R. Kahin (ed), Regional dynamics of the Indonesian revolution: unity from diversity, Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press, 1985. 6 See, for example, Col. A. Latief, Pledoi Kol. A. Latief (The Plea of Col. A. Latief), Jakarta: ISAI, 1999; John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30 th Movement & Suharto’s Coup D’Etat in Indonesia, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007. 7 Heru Cahyono, Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro dan Peristiwa 15 Januari 1974 (General Soemitro, Army Chief for Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, and the January 15, 1974 Riot), Jakarta: PT Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1998; Ken Conboy, Intel, Menguak Tabir Dunia Inteljen Indonesia (Intelligence, Uncovering the Curtain of Indonesia’s Intelligence), Jakarta: Pustaka Primatama, 2007. 8 John Bresnan, Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy, New York, Colombia University, 1993: 207; Theodore Friend, Indonesian Destinies, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003: 179-180. 9 Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance, London and New York: Routledge, 1995.

2 well as the investigation and prosecution of the military on charges of human rights violations. They also called for peaceful solutions to be sought for separatist conflicts throughout the country.

The withdrawal of military support from Habibie during the 1999 Presidential election and the transfer of its support to Abdurrahman Wahid through a decisive voting in the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat --People’s Consultative Assembly) revealed, however, that the military was still an important actor influencing the country’s political system. Furthermore, the military’s inconsistent support of Wahid resulted in his impeachment as President through a controversial Special Session of the Assembly. Thus, the role of the military in blocking Wahid’s efforts to defend his position by imposing a state emergency through a Presidential Decree at that time was very influential. The military’s stance opened the way for Megawati Sukarnoputri to replace Wahid.

The rise of Megawati as the next Indonesian President with the full support of the military could not banish concerns that the military might at some point withdraw its support of the civilian regime. Nonetheless, Megawati was able to stay in power until October 2004 and finish the remainder of her presidential term. This marked the end of the period of post-Soeharto civilian regimes before the former military general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, rose to power in October 2004.

The fall of Soeharto, the emergence of the three civilian regimes within six years, and the unclear prospects of democratic consolidation in Indonesia afterwards, indicated that the military was still a vital actor to guaranteeing national stability and the survival of post-Soeharto civilian regimes. The reality that a military regime or a government led by a former military president was more stable compared to the civilian one begs the question as to how the military actually cooperated with civilian regimes in the country’s new era of democratic transition.

As a matter of fact, since the era of independence, the military has had a huge impact on the country’s democratic development or lack thereof. From 1955 to 1965, due to its involvement in separatist conflicts, the military influenced Sukarno’s decision to introduce a centralistic and repressive political system under the so-called “guided democracy.”10 This marked the failure of Indonesia’s first democratic transition following the success of the first free election in 1955. From 1966 to 1971, the military played a role in deliberately crushing the expectations of student movements for increased levels of democratization, because the transition period ended with unfair elections and new

10 See, Adnan Buyung Nasution, Aspirasi Pemerintahan Konstitusional di Indonesia: Studi Sosio-Legal atas Konstituante 1956-1959 (The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio-Legal Study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956-1959), Jakarta: PT Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1995.

3 authoritarian practices.11 Likewise, the resignation of Soeharto in 1998 and the subsequent rise and fall of civilian regimes could not be separated from the military’s manoeuvrings.

All in all, Indonesia’s transition from a long-established authoritarian political system towards democratic consolidation is still at a fragile stage. Since the end of the Soeharto regime in 1998, the country has embarked on a tentative experiment with democracy. Although profound changes are currently in progress, there is no guarantee that the world’s fourth largest country, measured in terms of population, will succeed in democratization.12

Needless to say, Indonesia’s unclear prospects for democratic consolidation will have implications for political stability and security in the region. If the democratic experiment in Indonesia falters or, in a worst-case scenario, fails, the country is in danger of becoming a failed state, which would attract extremist groups or once again fall under the rule of an authoritarian regime or military supremacy.13

On the other hand, if Indonesia succeeds in this transition, it could consolidate into a pluralistic democracy --the third largest in the world, and the largest in the Muslim world. This would provide a chance for exhibiting a model of peaceful co-existence between democracy and Islam, and serve to counter the theocratic ideologies and intolerant and anti-Western Islamic state concepts that are apparent in other parts of the Muslim world.

III. Literature Review

Until the end of the 1990s, literature on civil-military relations and democratic transition and consolidation dealt mainly with cases in Latin America and Southern and Eastern Europe. Important works include Transitions from Authoritarian Rule by Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead,14 Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and-Post

11 See, for example, Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. 12 Angel M. Rabasa, “Stop Snubbing Indonesia’s Military,” The International Herald Tribune, August 2, 2002: 4. 13 Ibid. 14 Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Baltimore and London: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

4 Communist Europe from Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan,15 and Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America from Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark.16

In later years, literature dealing with military behaviour during transition, particularly in the case of Indonesia, was focused mainly on internal conflicts, while discussions on the role of the military in the country’s transition only made up a small part of these studies. These include, among others, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power by Angel Rabasa and John Haseman;17 Herrschafts-figuration und Demokratisierung in Indonesien 1965-2000 (English: Power Figuration and Democratization in Indonesia 1965-2000) by Andreas Ufen,18 “Indonesia: Transforming the Leviathan,” by Anthony L. Smith,19 and Der indonesische Demokratisierungs-prozess: Politischer Neubeginn und historischer Kontinuität (English: The Indonesian Democratization Process: A Political New Start and Historical Continuity) by Christoph Schuck.20 Rather than focusing on the military response to democratization, their works delve into complex topics such as current international terrorism, political parties, conflict of interest among the civilian elite, and so forth.

Meanwhile, in their writings on the military and transition, including for example, Demokratie in Asien: Ein Kontinent zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie [English: Democracy in Asia: A Continent between Dictatorship and Democracy], and Defekte Demokratie, Band 1: Theorie [English: Defective Democracy, Volume 1: Theory] Wolfgang Merkel et al presented theoretical discussions and studied regime change and democratic transition in various countries. Nevertheless, a limited amount of attention was devoted to Indonesia.21 More significantly, they acknowledged that they have not yet

15 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Eu- rope, South America, and-Post Communist Europe, Baltimore and London: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 16 Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark (eds.), Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America, University of Miami: North-South Centre Press, 1998. 17 Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power, Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 2002. 18Andreas Ufen, Herrschaftsfiguration and Demokratisierung in Indonesien 1965-2000 (Power Figuration and Democratization in Indonesia 1965-2000), Hamburg: IFA, 2000: 92-93, 188-218, and 551-557. 19 Anthony L. Smith, “Indonesia: Transforming the Leviathan,” in John Funston (ed.), Government and Politics in Southeast Asia, Singapore: ISEAS, 2001: 92-95. 20 Christoph Schuck, Der indonesische Demokratisierungsprozess: Politischer Neubeginn und historischer Kontinuität (The Indonesian Democratization Process: A Political New Start and Historical Continuity), Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesselschaft, 2003: 163-176. 21 See, Wolfgang Merkel, Demokratie in Asien: Ein Kontinent zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Demo- cracy in Asia: A Continent between Dictatorship and Democracy), Bonn: Dietz, 2003; Wolfgang Merkel et al, Defekte Demokratie, Band 1: Theorie (Defective Democracy, Volume 1: Theory), Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2003: 113-116.

5 arrived at a clear explanation of the future course of democratic transition in the country following the fall of Abdurrachman Wahid’s civilian regime.22

In Indonesia itself, there have been studies on the military during democratic transition, for example, in the writings of Sukardi Rinakit, namely The Indonesian Military after the New Order23 and “Decentralization and the Military”.24 There are also writings by Arief Yulianto, namely, Hubungan Sipil Militer di Indonesia Pasca Orba di Tengah Pusaran Demokrasi [English: “Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia after the New Order in the Middle of Democratization Sphere”],25 and Kusnanto Anggoro, for instance, “Militer dan Transisi Menuju Demokrasi” [English: “The Military and Transition towards Democratization”],26 and “Politik Militer dan Konsolidasi Demokrasi di Indonesia” [English: “Military Politics and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia”].27 In these works, however, the authors did not concentrate on military resistance and did not apply a comprehensive comparative approach to the three civilian regimes of Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati. When observing the interplay between the Indonesian military and civilian regime, Anggoro stressed the importance of using cultural theory by emphasizing the importance of Javanese traditional values on tahta (reign), harta (wealth), and kuasa (power).28

Jacques Bertrand in his sociological study on Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia29still doubted the military’s role in elite and communal conflicts after the fall of Soeharto. Meanwhile, Kevin O’Rourke in Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post- Soeharto Indonesia30 has attempted to connect the military reaction to Soeharto’s fall and reform demand with the spread of communal conflicts in various regions as well as the military role to retain its position in politics. Throughout his work, enriched by empirical

22 Ibid: 113. 23 Sukardi Rinakit, The Indonesian Military after the New Order, Singapore: ISEAS, 2005. 24 Sukardi Rinakit,”Decentralization and the Military,” in Maribeth Erb, Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, and Carole Faucher (eds.), Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia, London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005. 25 Arief Yulianto, Hubungan Sipil Militer di Indonesia Pasca Orba di Tengah Pusaran Demokrasi (Civil- Military Relations In Indonesia After the New Order In the Middle of Democratization Sphere), Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 2002. 26 Kusnanto Anggoro, “Militer dan Transisi Menuju Demokrasi (“The Military and Transition towards Democratization”) in Maruto MD and Anwari WMK (Eds.), Reformasi Politik dan Kekuatan Ma- syarakat: Kendala dan Peluang Menuju Demokrasi (Political Reform and Society Forces: Constraints and Opportunities towards Democracy), Jakara: PT Pustaka LP3ES Indonesia, 2002. 27 Kusnanto Anggoro, “Politik Militer dan Konsolidasi Demokrasi di Indonesia” (“Military Politics and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia”) in Analisis CSIS, No. 3, Tahun XXXII/2003, Jakarta: CSIS: 333- 336. 28 Ibid. 29 Bertrand, Jacques. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 30 Kevin O’Rourke, Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia. NSW: Allen & Un- winn, Crows Nest, 2002.

6 data, O’Rourke argued that the military must have been a significant actor behind instability in the country by disclosing covert intelligence operations allegedly organized by the military at the beginning of reform era. He has attempted to relate the emergence of the conflicts with traditional belief of majority people (the Javanese) in Indonesia. Nonetheless, aside from these improvements, his work has not yet profoundly discussed and explained the cultural perspective of the behavior of the military, civilian leaders, and the Indonesian people largely influenced by Javanese culture. He has not tried to verify his conclusion through interviews with relevant military and civilian figures. To have done precisely this is one of the major contributions to this study, together with the systematic analysis of a plethora of new source material from websites, newspaper reports and documents. O’Rourke also did not cover in his analysis the military behavior and civil-military relations during the full period of the Megawati presidency.

More specific discussions of the Indonesian military and aspirations of reform can be found in the works of Jun Honna, Leonard C. Sebastian, and Marcus Mietzner. Honna, in his work entitled Military Politics and Democratization, described the military’s response to the Indonesian people’s pursuit of democratization in the time following the 1966 and 1998 transitions. He did not, however, cover the full period of all civilian regimes, including most notably, the Megawati regime.31 In addition, in his book, Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of Military Force, Sebastian presents ground- breaking research on the Indonesian military by linking the realpolitik of the Indonesian military to its social roots. He asserts that the realpolitik has strong socio-cultural undertones, which in turn shape the development of military doctrines. He argued that only after the country’s policymakers gain a better understanding of the military’s doctrines, which reinforced its significant presence in the country’s affairs and its subsequent restructuring, will they be able to introduce meaningful reforms of the military.32 Therefore, Sebastian used a non-structural perspective, which may have prevented him from performing a deeper analysis of the military’s vested interests as well conflicts of interest among actors within the institution. Mietzner takes a different approach in The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance, and presents more up-to-date information on how the Indonesian military has responded to reform.33 However, in order to gain a better understanding of post-Suharto military reform and its constraints, further research is

31 Jun Honna, Military Politics and Democratization, Indonesia: London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 32 Leonard C. Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of Military Force, Singapore, ISEAS, 2006. 33 Marcus Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationa- lism, and Institutional Resistance, Washington, East-West Center, 2006.

7 needed on the first three civilian regimes during this crucial period of democratic transition.34

This research will focus on the relations between the civilian regime’s performance and how the Indonesian military has responded to reform. It will also deal specifically with historical and cultural factors and the civilian regime’s achievements in encouraging the military’s compliance with reform, or other responses the military has had to these reforms. The research will provide details on how the military supported civilian regimes or resisted them during the early stages of post-Suharto democratic transition. More specifically, it will clarify whether, in response to reform, there are differences or similarities in the achievements of the different civilian regimes and what type of support or resistance the Indonesian military provided to these regimes.

I will use a combination of actor-oriented, cultural, and structural approaches to help explain civilian regimes and the Indonesian military’s response to reform. First, I will discuss theoretical approaches to civil-military relations and democratic transition and consolidation, as well as historical and cultural factors that can influence the military’s response. This will be followed by an in-depth discussion of the civilian regimes of Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati. I will analyse their respective responses to the Indonesian people’s goals regarding military reform, the investigation and prosecution of Soeharto for his corruption, collusion, and nepotism, as well as prosecution of the military in relation to charges of human rights violations. Furthermore, a discussion will be presented of their solutions to separatist conflicts and the emerging demand for syariah law to be adopted. The military response to these ambitions must also be discussed for all the different civilian regime periods.

IV. Objectives and Significance of this Research

As was the case during the administration of the first civilian president Sukarno, the increase in conflicts and separatist movements that endangered Indonesia’s integrity in the post-Soeharto era has been connected to military resistance against civilian leaders in Jakarta. The unclear prospects for transition since 1998 also reveal that civil-military relations in Indonesia are absolutely crucial, and additional research on civilian regimes and military behaviour in the country is needed. A study should be conducted regarding the dynamics of changing levels of military support and resistance towards the three different civilian regimes over six years (1998-2004) of democratic transition in order to

34 For an insightful study of the transition from Soeharto to Habiie, see Marcus Mietzner, From Soeharto to Habibie: The Indonesian Armed Forces and Political Islam during the Transition, in Geoff Forrester (ed.), Post-Suharto Indonesia, Renewal or Chaos?, Singapore and Leiden: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and KITLV Press, 1999: 65-102.

8 accurately portray the nature of post-Soeharto civil-military relations. This research underlines the limitations of the “third wave of democratization” in the country, which until recently have delayed its democratic consolidation.35

In acknowledgment that military resistance to civilian leaders is a pivotal issue in Indonesia’s political reform process, a comparative analysis of the three civilian regimes of Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati during the years 1998-2004 needs to be conducted. This analysis will demonstrate the degree to which reform demands have been fulfilled by each regime and the military as a state apparatus.

Individual, cultural and structural factors have influenced the survival of the civilian regimes and the military response to their respective policies. The focus of the research on interactions between the military --as individuals, collective actors, and as an institution-- and the civilian regimes reveals why, in response to reform, the Indonesian military has had varying levels of support or resistance for these civilian regimes.

A deeper understanding can be gained regarding the origins of Indonesia’s difficulties in democratic transition during the first three civilian regimes, by examining historical and cultural factors that influenced each of these civilian regimes and pushed the military to comply with, or otherwise respond to, these reform demands. At the same time, using information from consistent observation throughout the entirety of each civilian regime provides for a more comprehensive description of the Indonesian military response to reform, particularly its developments from year to year. A combination of individual, cultural, and structural theories provides a better explanation of the background that has influenced the interplay between the military and these three civilian regimes, as well as the military’s resistance to Indonesia’s democratic consolidation. Analysis across the micro and macro levels provides for a more accurate portrayal of the prospects of transition in Indonesia.

The results of this research help to clarify factors, which have caused military insubordination to Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati. It shows why the reform process has stalled in post-Soeharto Indonesia and why it was more difficult for Habibie and Wahid to maintain political stability in comparison with Megawati. Furthermore, this new research recognizes the type of civilian supremacy that each regime sought to adopt, and their respective policies regarding the repositioning of the military. The results of this dissertation extend beyond the boundaries of purely academic interest, and provide

35 On the “Third Wave of Democratization” see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman and London: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. See also, Muthiah Alagappa (ed), Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives. Hono- lulu, Hawaii: East-West Center, 2001 and Muthiah Alagappa (ed), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Militsry in Asia. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001.

9 valuable information for post-Megawati civilian regimes in their quest to continue the reform process and achieve democratic consolidation.

10 Chapter Two

Theory and Methodology

I. Theory

I.A. Theoretical Framework

I.A.I. Democratic Transition

O’Donnell and Schmitter define democratic transition as the transformation and change of a political regime from a non-democratic to a democratic regime, or the interval between one political regime and another in the period of democratization.36 Importantly, democratic transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the initiation of a process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime, and, on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative.37 Meanwhile, democratic consolidation is linked to a period after democratic transition, during which “the military becomes firmly subordinated to civilian control and solidly committed to the democratic constitutional order.”38

Samuel P. Huntington and Juan Linz distinguish among three forms of democratic transition, namely, transformation, replacement, and transplacement.39 In transformation, the process occurs when the elites in power take the lead in bringing about democracy. In replacement, democratic transition occurs when the opposition groups take the lead in bringing about democracy and the authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown. In transplacement, the process occurs when democratization is initiated though joint action by the government and opposition groups. Huntington has added intervention as another type of transition, during which the processes of political liberalization and further democratization are forcefully introduced by foreign democratic countries.40

In the case of replacement, it is also said that there are strong opposition groups who can freely organize themselves vis-à-vis a dominant conservative group which

36 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whiteheads (eds.), 1986, loc. cit: 6. 37 Ibid. 38 Larry Diamond, “Introduction: In Search of Consolidation,” Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, 1997: xxviii. For a broad explanation, see also Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Defining and Crafting Democratic Transition, Constitutions, and Consolidation,” Crafting Indonesian Democracy, R. William Liddle (ed.), Bandung: Mizan, 2001: 17-28. 39 Huntington, 1991: 113-114 in Gregorius Sahdan (trans.), Jalan Transisi Demokrasi Pasca Soeharto (Democratic Transition Path Post-Soeharto), Bantul: Pondok Edukasi, 2004: 34-35. 40 Huntington, 1991: 113, in Sahdan (trans.), 2004: 59, ibid.

11 strongly opposes reform demands.41 In addition, unlike in a country with a one party system or military regime, replacement is more common in countries with a personal rule authoritarian regime. Following the breakdown or collapse of old authoritarian regimes caused by intensive mass demonstrations or people power, which is subsequently superseded by an absence of legitimate, democratic government, opposition groups take over control of the government through free and fair elections. However, the replacement of the old authoritarian regime, itself, is not necessarily comprehensive or perfect. Groups in the new democratically-elected government can, therefore, be trapped in conflicts of interest and may fail in delivering the type of regime they originally promised.42

Huntington argues that to successfully move towards consolidation, democratic transition must also be supported by a high overall level of economic wealth and relatively equal distribution of income and/or wealth.43 According to Huntington, in addition to the emergence of a conducive political culture, strong bourgeoisie, middle class, and civil society, economic development and high economic growth are the main factors necessary for driving democratic transition.44 This condition can stem the spread of military adventurism into politics, which can cause political crises during transitional periods.45 Huntington also emphasized that after democratic transition has been achieved, consent must be reached between the new regime and the loyalists of the old authoritarian regime (the status-quo groups) in order to eliminate undemocratic political structures and culture. Referring to the role of the military, Huntington links democratic transition with the “praetorian issue,” that is, the efforts to reduce the involvement of the military in politics, and to establish a professional pattern of civil-military relations.46 Similarly, Giuseppe Di Palma argues that the third wave of democratization has generally resulted in economic prosperity and equality; a modern and diversified social structure centred around an independent middle class; and national culture that, by tolerating diversity and preferring accommodation, is already implicitly democratic.47

Luciano Martins argues that every form, type, or model of transition has its own distinctive character, and thus, transition could happen either discontinuously or continuously. He also points out that in the case of discontinuous transition, there are two

41 Huntington, 1991: 113-114, in Sahdan (trans.), 2004, ibid: 53-54. 42 Ibid: 53-55, 344. 43 Samuel Huntington, Tertib Politik dalam Masyarakat yang Sedang Berubah (Political Order in Chang- ing Society), Jakarta: Rajawali, 1983: 37-38. 44 See also Sahdan (trans.), 2004, op. cit: 64-65. 45 Salvador Giner, in Sahdan (trans.), 2004, ibid: 74. 46 Huntington, 1983, op. cit, in Sahdan (trans.), 2004, ibid: 76. 47 Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transition, Berkeley, 1990: 3, in Sahdan (trans.), 2004, ibid: 38.

12 possibilities of regime development, namely:48 (1) the existing regime tries to manage crisis through various compromises, or using higher levels of coercion, in case the regime is able to consolidate itself. However, both strategies fail in maintaining the transition process due to various internal problems and the increased level of threat coming from external sources; (2) the existing regime cannot consolidate itself due to its failure to manage crisis through various forms of compromises or higher levels of coercion, in which case the regime collapses. At this point, there would be two possible outcomes for these attempts at compromise, namely: (i) the attempts will succeed and the existing regime will be ready to introduce changes, (ii) the attempts will fail because either the existing government or the opposition continues to hold to its own stance or position, leading to anarchy and political instability causing the transition to falter. In the case of continuous transition, however, the existing regime sometimes has a limited political coalition.

I.A.2. Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Transition and Consolidation

Felipe Aguero emphasizes that the critical issues in civil-military relations for democratic transition are those that are related to power.49 Consequently, civilian supremacy, must be approached from the perspective of changes in the relative empowerment of civilian reformers and the military. Thus, if civilian democratizing elites want to pursue control over the military and the military resists these ambitions, civilian supremacy only occurs as a result of overpowering military resistance. Aguero acknowledges that civilian supremacy arises exclusively, or even necessarily, due to an imposition. For this reason, institutional changes often lead all participating actors, including the military, to find positive grounds to support democratic civilian control. In democratic transition, such institutional changes come about as the result of bargaining backed by powerful resources that affect actors’ range of options for pursuing or resisting change.50

Aguero points out that the process of gaining the military’s loyalty may require a considerable amount of time. In many cases, military loyalty cannot be taken for granted directly following the establishment of democracy, and thus coup attempts could occur. Establishing military compliance is a complex task since democratization involves not

48 Luciano Martins, “Liberalisasi Kekuasaan Otoriter di Brazil (“Liberalization of Authoritarian Power in Brazil),” Transisi Menuju Demokrasi, Kasus Amerika Latin (II) (Transition towards Democracy, Latin America Case –II), Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Eds.), Jakarta: LP3ES, 1993: 107-140, in Sahdan (trans.), 2004, ibid: 48-49. 49 Felipe Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective, Baltimore: the John Hopkins University Press, 1995: 11. See also, Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, New York: Vintage Book, 1957: 84.

13 only removing the military from political arenas and eliminating military contestation, but also the assertion of the prerogatives of civilian officials in military and defence affairs.51

The burdens and costs of political reform actions are also variable for the civilian government and the military. Aguero mentions that the burdens and costs are higher for those who seek to change pre-agreed rules in order to better accommodate their interests and demands than for those who are satisfied with the recently established rules.52 The constitutional and popular legitimacy of the new regime make it very costly for the military to attempt to reverse recent changes in order to limit democratization. In addition, if the civilian regime seeks civilian supremacy, the civilians, in turn, have to advance beyond the rules accorded by the transition.

Civil-military relations in democratic transition and the relative power of both parties will also be affected by the level of cohesion within the military or ruling civilian coalition, and the amount of public support each party can exhibit. In this context, a unified civilian coalition with persistent and substantial electoral backing will find it easier to promote reform that weakens military resistance to civilian control. On the other hand, a cohesive military facing a divided government with limited public support may stand better chances of deterring civilian initiatives or even strengthening military prerogatives altogether.53 Thus, the process of asserting or resisting civilian supremacy involves efforts by the military to gain civilian allies in support of its interests as well as attempts by civilian democratic leaders to promote and assign critical military posts to those military leaders most welcoming of their policies.54

In assessing civil-military relations in democratic transition and consolidation, Stepan draws a specific connection between military contestation or resistance with the existence of their prerogative in politics.55 He argues that the military will demonstrate no contestation if military and civilian leaders can accept the diminution of military prerogatives as an integral part of a comprehensive reformed government model and civil- military relations. However, there can be a situation in which there is a low level of conflict, while at the same time the military enjoys a high level of prerogative. The military can maintain this high level of prerogative if it remains unchallenged by the top political leaders of the democratic regime. Still, Stepan mentions that civilian government

50 Aguero, 1995, op. cit. 51 Ibid: 12. 52 Ibid. This approach is likely in line with the new institutionalism as formulated, for instance, by Paul Cammack in “The New Institutionalism: Predatory Rule, Institutional Persistence, and Macro-Social Change,” in Economy and Society, Volume 21, No. 4, November 1992: 405. 53 Aguero, 1995, op. cit: 13; Alagappa, 2001, loc.cit: 35. 54 Aguero, 1995, op. cit: 23. 55 Alfred Stepan, Militer dan Demokratisasi: Pengalaman Brazil dan Beberapa Negara Lain (Military and Democratization: Brazil and Other Countries), translated by Bambang Cipto from Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, Jakarta: Grafiti, 1996: 131-132.

14 efforts to democratically reduce military prerogatives can result in a high level of contestation or resistance from the military, resulting in a crisis benefitting the military.56

Meanwhile, military resistance to the civilian regime and its reform demands, which according to Samuel E. Finer, result in political interventions, can follow a number of different models, namely:57

1. Formal constitutional means; 2. Collusion or competition with civilian authority; 3. Intimidation of civilian authority; 4. Threatening of civilian authority with violence or non-cooperation; 5. The use of violence against the civilian authority.

I.A.3. Civilian Regime Performance and Military Response

There are two potential outcomes of democratic transition that must be taken into account by civilians and the military. On the one hand, the transition has made procedural democracy viable, and on the other hand, it has also allowed the military to act with a high degree of autonomy. Finer reminds us that the civilian government’s reform agenda aims at diminishing this autonomy and will cause tension within the military. This resulting conflict is costly for the civilian government or regime, but less costly than risking an erosion of popular support or the institutionalised setting of excessive military prerogatives.58 For this reason, Yahya A. Muhaimin argues that civilian government policies which can harm the interests of the military, examined from the perspectives of its institution, groups and individuals, will push it to assume a more active role in politics.59

In democratic transition, Aguero argues, civilians in the government will resist both covert and overt military pressure on policies related to civilian issues and will attempt to impose greater control on military domains.60 This situation will result in heightened tensions in the relations with the military, and will deteriorate further if the

56 Ibid: 136. 57 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, New York: Preager, 1962: 140-163. These models have been discussed in Ikrar Nusa Bhakti et al, Tentara Mendamba Mitra: Hasil Penelitian LIPI tentang Pasang Surut Keterlibatan ABRI dalam Kehidupan Kepartaian di Indone-sia (Soldier and Its Ally: LIPI Research on ABRI Involvement in Indonesian Political Parties), Jakarta: Mizan, 1999: 37. 58 Finer, 1962, op .cit; Bhakti, op. cit: 12. 59 Yahya A. Muhaimin, Perkembangan Militer dalam Politik di Indonesia 1925-1966 (Military Develop- ment in Indonesian Politics 1925-1966), Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1982: 4 & 6. 60 Agüero, 1995, op.cit; Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark (eds.), Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transi- tion Latin America. University of Miami: North-South Centre Press, 1998; Muhaimin, 1982, op.cit: 24.

15 civilian regime cannot control social mobilisation, the spread of violence and armed groups, or autonomous movements in civil society, which seek accountability for past abuses by military officers, particularly in terms of human rights. The military, in response, will take pre-emptive or reactive measures to maximize its autonomy and resist civilian impediments. Aguero identifies:

“The most extreme reaction is the attempt to block political change altogether, in the hope of an authoritarian re-equilibration. More often, however, the military tries to steer the course of change towards positions closer to its own preferences or attempts obstructive measures, such as maintenance of a veto power or strong oversight capacity over government policies; threats of use of force to stop specific policies, such as an expansion of political pluralism or the transfer of human rights violators to court; control over intelligence agencies; and rejection of governmental or congressional “interference” with matters deemed internal.”61

The previously mentioned military manoeuvres are invariably aimed at procuring guarantees and reassurances, while also decreasing the level of uncertainty about the institutional features of the armed forces. Currently, these include securing its autonomy and protecting it from external control or a civilian regime. More precisely, institutional guarantees given by the civilian regime to the military are those that prevent outcomes in the political process, which may be deemed as threatening to the military institution and its view of national security. In several cases, guarantees have been granted including military immunity from prosecution for past human rights violations and the preservation of the military’s autonomy. In other cases, guarantees from the civilian regime have taken the form of constitutional provisions allowing for direct representation of military interests, the continued existence of institutions from the authoritarian past, and power being granted to formerly authoritarian elites who manage to mobilize enough popular support to play an important role within competitive institutions. Still, the civilian regime can also withdraw its guarantees to the military, and these guarantees may simply evaporate. However, this would cause a substantial level of frustration inside the military that could lead to resistance or attempts to forcefully reinstate these guarantees. Growing frustration within the military could cause goals to be redefined to focus more on greater

61 Agüero, 1995, op.cit; Agüero and Stark (eds.), 1998, loc.cit. Specifically, Juan J. Linz, in Crisis, Break- down, and Re-equilibration, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, and Adam Przeworski, in ”Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts,” in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (eds.), Constitutio- nalism and Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 discussed the issue of re-equilibration.

16 levels of contestation, and a reawakening of its temporarily dormant dominant and commanding stance.62

Drawing lessons from Southern Europe and South America’s experiences, the success of democratization efforts can be measured by the ability of civilian officials to exercise the powers assigned to the offices to which they were elected, including powers over the military.63 The unity of the civilian regime and its ability to gain popular support, including from political parties, factions in parliament, and other organizations, to coalesce around formal agreements regarding institutions and basic rules of governance are factors impacting civilian strength in repositioning the military. 64 In other words, the unity of the civilian regime on fundamental issues will limit the range of resistance strategies available to the military. Furthermore, the ability of the civilian regime to maintain citizen support for its policies acts as a deterrent to forceful action by the military against reform, as it signals the increased costs of intervention and reduces the military’s bargaining power. Popular support for successor governments in democratic transition is particularly important when their ideological make-up clashes with military views or when they enact reforms that are strongly disliked by the military. Therefore, the civilian regime must have the ability to exercise its power over the military in a timely fashion. This is especially important in setting the goals of asserting civilian supremacy and gaining popular support for this as well as other reforms during democratic transition for the sake of democratic consolidation.

Efforts by the civilian regime to fulfil people’s calls for the investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses will meet with military resistance. In this regard, O’Donnell and Schmitter state that the more brutal, inhumane, and extensive the repressive actions have been, the more often their actual perpetrators --whether they are in the military institutions themselves or collaborated with them-- will feel threatened and attempt to form a bloc opposing any transition.65 If the perpetrators or the military institutions cannot prevent the transition, they will strive to procure iron-clad guarantees that under no circumstances will “the past be unearthed.” Failure to provide such a guarantee will cause military institutions to remain a serious threat to the nascent democracy. The extreme sensitivity of the military on this issue can threaten the transition process as well as recently consolidated democracies.66 According to O’Donnell and

62 Muhaimin, 1982, op.cit: 24-26. 63 Ibid: 17. 64 Ibid: 32-33. 65 See Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, Volume 4, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986: 29. 66 See also Bilveer Singh, Dwifungsi ABRI: Asal-usul, Aktualisasi, dan Implikasinya bagi Stabilitas dan Pembangunan (ABRI Dual Function: Its Origin, Actualization, and Implication to Stability and Develop-

17 Schmitter, a civilian regime policy of granting clemency and appeasement in dealing with the post-authoritarian period is the most viable and least dangerous option for the democratization process if the repression was initially less brutal and widespread, or if this violence occurred a long time ago.

Likewise, actions taken by the civilian regime to accede to international pressure to investigate and prosecute past human rights abuses and introduce democratic conflict resolution for international armed conflicts during democratic transition can play a role in triggering military resistance. Aguero explains that external factors, which triggered or encouraged the transition and supported the processes of democratic consolidation in Greece and Argentina, will not be valid for all states. Thus this contradicts Whitehead, who speaks of “democratization through convergence.”67 If a civilian regime complies with international pressure by taking peaceful and democratic approaches to handling international armed conflicts, separatist movements, or regional conflicts following the collapse of authoritarian regimes, this can also invite resistance from the military. Thus, if the civilian regime’s transition is aggressively introduced along with harsh rhetoric and stems from international pressure, particularly if it addresses the military’s past human rights violations, negative reactions from the military elite can be expected.

The ways in which successor governments overcome economic problems in democratic transition and the effects this has on public support may influence the bargaining position from which the governments face the military.68 Aguero argues that in most cases, public support for democratic advancement has prevailed over frustration about economic difficulties. Therefore, it can generally be expected that more favourable conditions for democratization will exist when successor governments are economically prepared to cope with the difficult legacies of authoritarianism and with the possible rising demands of a resurrected civil society.69 Economic prosperity will also provide flexibility in the government’s dealings with the military and help to satisfy some of the military’s economic and budgetary demands. In addition, Finer adds that the civilian government may depend on the military in crisis situations, which will re-open the chance

ment), Jakarta: PT Gramedia, 1996: 20, translated edition of Bilveer Singh, Dwifungsi ABRI: The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Singapore, Institute of International Affairs, 1995. 67 Laurence Whitehead, “Democracy by Convergence and Southern Europe: A Comparative Politics Pers- pective,” in Geoffrey Pridham (ed.), Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe, New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1991; Aguero, 1995, op. cit: 33-34; Agüero and Stark (eds.), 1998, loc.cit. 68 Aguero, 1995, op.cit: 35. 69 See also Guillermo O’Donnell, “Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes,” in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rules: Comparative Pers- pectives, Volume 5, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

18 for the military to intervene in politics.70 The same situation might happen if the popularity of the civilian government suddenly drops.

I.A.4. Historical and Cultural Factors: Civilian Regimes and Military Response

Scholars have argued that the past institutions of the country and its military will influence the country’s civil-military relationship. Amos Perlmutter argues that the transition for revolutionary soldiers, who were once freedom fighters, is particularly difficult for those officers who become romantic and nostalgic remembering their invigorating revolutionary days.71 In addition, Harold Maynard says that it is on the basis of the revolutionary experience that the military justifies its civil function.72

Furthermore, the historical background of the country and its military will influence the level of military participation, intervention or involvement in a country’s politics, the scope of issues with which the military is concerned and the means it employs in addressing them, and models or patterns of civil-military relations.73 Huntington links the condition of civilian supremacy and the models of civilian control, whether there was subjective or objective control, in a country to both its historical and cultural backgrounds.74 Therefore, new democracies will differ from long-established democracies in how they address issues such as military professionalism and levels of autonomy, contestation, and prerogatives for the military. The acceptance of civilian government decisions in formulating and implementing national defence policy, although common in long-established democracies, is rather sensitive in a new democracy because it entails a new delineation of prerogatives.

The military’s previous cooperation in establishing and maintaining the recently ousted authoritarian regime will strongly define the military’s interest in democratic transition.75 As a result, in some cases, they may initially seek to maintain some of the features of the old regime or assist in shaping the new one. In most cases, the military strives to seize internal control of its activities and attempts to protect itself from external

70 Samuel E. Finer, 1962, as quoted by Singh, 1996, op. cit: 14. 71 Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennett (eds.), The Political Influence of the Military, London: Yale University Press, 1980: 23. 72 See Harold Maynard, “Indonesian Military Elite Role Perceptions”, ibid: 428. 73 See Timothy J. Colton’s studies in, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authorities: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979: 233 in Samuel E. Finer, 1962, op. cit: 18. 74 See Huntington, 1957: 83-84, ibid: 17-18. 75 See Aguero, ibid: 23.

19 political control, fearing, and eventually resisting political change if it impinges on the rules of control.76

The path taken by the new emerging democracy’s transition will also affect the nature of the country’s elite, as well as determining which elite --the military or civilian-- will control the transition, while also influence the extent of its control over the transition process.77 To put it another way, the militarised or civilian nature of the outgoing authoritarian regime is the critical factor for determining who will be in control of the transition. Perlmutter recognizes that specific historical experiences, as well as professional practices, international connections, and generational or “promotion” cliques, all affect military unity during democratic transition. Of particular importance is the way the military views its own past performance in the government roles and the performance of the successor civilian governments.78 At this point, there are two conditions that can strengthen the military’s unity. Firstly, military unity is enhanced if its past performance in government is seen as generally positive. Secondly, military unity is enhanced if a generalized perception arises that core institutional interests of the military are being harmed by the action of successor elites.

Nico T. Budi Harjanto states that a transition process between civilian and military forces based on either a pact or negotiation model to establish a platform for democratic rule requires that historical and strategic considerations for the future be taken into account.79 By referring to Wendy Hunter’s “historical institutionalism,” Harjanto explains that established institutional patterns tend to shape political life.80 In this context, political development is viewed as a path-dependent process, following a pattern which links it to the next phase, and then back to the same repeating pattern, leading to alternative systems eventually disappearing. By using existing institutional patterns, a political force, including the military, which has already been a long time participant in the political sphere, can maintain its existence. Harjanto continues by stating that if the military and other conservative elites can manage their institutional prerogatives in the transitional period from authoritarian rule, they can probably preserve their power and determine the limits of popular sovereignty in a new democratic rule. Historical institutionalism suggests that a number of institutional reforms are relatively immune to

76 Amos Perlmutter, “Military and Politics in Modern Times,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 9, No. 1, March 1986: 2, ibid. 77 Ibid: 29-30 and 58. 78 Ibid: 31. 79 Harjanto, “Masa Depan Peran TNI dalam Tatanan Demokrasi di Indonesia: Harapan Kalangan Militer,” („The Future of TNI Role in Indonesian Democracy: The Hope of the Military”) in Rizal Sukma and J. Kristiadi (eds.), Hubungan Sipil-Militer dan Transisi Demokrasi di Indonesia: Persepsi Sipil dan Militer (Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Transition in Indonesia: Civil and Military Perception), Jakarta: CSIS and the Asia Foundation, 1999: 86.

20 change demands, except in certain critical situations. Thus, this approach highlights the difference between the process of repositioning (penataan) and change.

Still, in conjunction with historical factors, O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead argue that a higher degree of militarization of the authoritarian regime in the past will expose the military more transparently to emerging civilian policy and increase the difficulty of the transition.81 In other words, the degree of militarization or civilianization of the past authoritarian regime influences the level of power the military and civilians hold in the bargaining process during the democratic transition period. This significantly affects the military’s ability to set the transition agenda and to impose protective preconditions for itself meant to outlast the authoritarian regime.82 Therefore, the military has a stronger position if the transition is from a militarized rather than from a civilianized authoritarian regime.

There is a strong connection between the formation of a country’s national army and its political history.83 For example, the origins of the Indonesian military lie with the armed groups and the pro-independence militia that fought the Japanese occupation forces and the Dutch colonial government from the end of the Second World War until 1949.84 The Indonesian military has been a key player since the very beginning of the Indonesian state.85 It was instrumental in winning the country’s war of independence against the Dutch colonial power and has played an important political role ever since. Because of these origins, the army prides itself on its history as a revolutionary people’s army and as the prime mover of Indonesia’s independence.86 For the same reason, the military has come to view itself as the guardian of national unity and cohesion, and as a co-equal, if not superior, to the civilian political leadership. This background served as justification

80 Harjanto, ibid, referred to Wendy Hunter’s work on “Politicians Against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Post-Authoritarian Brazil,” Comparative Politics, 27, No. 4, July 1995: 426. 81 See Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transitions from Autho- ritarian Rules: Latin America, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986: 34-36, especially on “Degree of Militarisation of the Authoritarian Regime,” as quoted in ibid: 44 et. seq. 82 See O’Donnell, “Introduction to the Latin America Cases,” loc. cit: 10 et seq, as also quoted in ibid. 83 Democratization in Indonesia: An Assessment, Forum for Democratic Reform, Sweden: International IDEA, 2000: 87. 84 Dozens of BKR/TKR (Badan Keamanan Rakyat/Tentara Keamanan Rakyat or People’s De-fence Council/People’s Defence Army), ex-members of PETA (Pembela Tanah Air --The Fatherland Defenders) and cadets of the Indonesian first military academy of Tangerang killed in the war against Ja-panese soldiers in Lengkong on January 25, 1946. See, Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro and Nugroho No- tosusanto, Sejarah Nasional Indonesia VI: Zaman Jepang dan Zaman Republik Indonesia (Indonesia’s National History VI: The Japanese Occupation and the Republic Era), Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1992: 175- 176. See also “Cerita dari Kakek dan Paman, Keluarga Margono Djojohadikusumo” (“On the Margono Djojohadikusumo family”), March 30, 2009, MegaPrabowo 2009, http://perubahanuntukrakyat.com/ 2009/03/30/cerita-dari-kakek-dan-paman/, was accessed on February 23, 2010. 85 Poesponegoro and Notosusanto, 1992, op. cit. 86 Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power, RAND Corporation, 2002: 9-10.

21 for the Indonesian military’s intervention in politics based on the concept of the “middle road,” or later renamed as the dwifungsi (dual-role or function). According to this concept, the Indonesian military had a socio-political as well as a defence function, which gave it an institutionalized role in politics.87

Harold Crouch claims that the military’s self-perception of its role as a political power comes from a blurring of its military and political functions during the national liberation wars.88 He insists that the lack of an apolitical tradition among soldiers has facilitated military leaders playing these roles in the revolution.89 Since its naissance, the Indonesian military has therefore shown itself both as a military and political power, and has played an important political role throughout most of its history. It has behaved as a saviour or guardian of the nation, and further justified its right to play a permanent role in politics for several years following Indonesian independence.90

From a historical perspective, Jusuf Wanandi clearly explains the emergence of the Indonesian military as praetorian guards:

“The role of the TNI in politics dates back to the 1945 revolution against the Dutch. The TNI started life as the People’s Army and the Revolutionary Army, and acted as a body of freedom fighters against the Dutch. That has been the basis for its legitimacy to have a role in Indonesian civil life, including politics, ever since. It has also been used in the interpretation of the 1945 Constitution, to affirm that professional or functional groups, including the TNI, can be represented in Indonesia’s highest constitutional body, namely the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR).

However, in reality, this dual role (that is, external and internal defence) derives more from the TNI’s historical/political role rather than from the Constitution…. After 1978 Soeharto was in full control of the TNI, which gradually became his praetorian guard.”91

87 Ibid. 88 Harold Crouch, Militer dan Politik di Indonesia (Military and Politics in Indonesia), Jakarta: PT Sinar Harapan, 1986: 22. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid: 24. 91 Jusuf Wanandi, “Challenge of the TNI and Its Role in Indonesia’s Future,” in Hadi Soesastro, Anthony L. Smith, and Han Mui Ling (eds.), Governance in Indonesia: Challenges Facing the Megawati Presi- dency, Singapore, ISEAS, 2003: 92-93.

22 Meanwhile, based on empirical studies, Yorgos A. Kourvetaris provides both historical and cultural perspectives of military intervention and deeper involvement in politics:

“The politics of intervention and praetorianism are a rationale for military authoritarianism and intolerance toward democratic and pluralistic politics. The military are incapable of understanding the forces of social change. By their very nature, military institutions are very conservative and hierarchical and cannot tolerate disorder and social unrest. They bring stability for the short run but stifle human freedom and democracy in the long run. In case after case, the authors show the military’s unwillingness to relinquish power and work in a constructive and co-operative way to solve societal problems. In almost all countries surveyed, there is a long tradition of military praetorianism, lack of high political culture, and little differentiation between political and military institution.”92

Similarly, Brian Loveman points out that the military has a tradition of practicing the politics of anti-politics --opposition to excessive freedom-- which puts emphasis on national security and integrity, state sovereignty, and existing threats from internal and external political subversions, such as communism, anarchism, and foreign intervention.93 These issues can be manipulated by the military to repress universities, labour organizations, the media, and even the legislature by claiming to protect “national values” and the country’s “permanent interests,” and “saving the nation” from the “contamination” of foreign influence and interests.94 Regarding the politics of anti- politics, Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr. add that the military is characterized by a rejection of “politics” since it incited conflict among personalist factions and, later, political parties over ideology; they argue that the spoils of rule result in bloody civil strife.95

The military sees “politics” as creating poor economic conditions, horizontal conflicts, and instability, which then “forces” sectors of the military to intervene to restore order and cleanse the system of political corruption. The implementation of the military’s politics of anti-politics has some general characteristics, such as the centralisation of authority, a “flexible” constitution, which offers little effective constraint on the exercise of governmental authority, and official recognition of governance through a state of siege.

92 Yorgos A. Kourvetaris in “Civil-Military Relations and Military Disengagement,” in Constantine P. Danopoulos (ed.), Military Disengagement from Politics, London: Routledge, 1988: 271, 273. 93 Brian Loveman, For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999: 254-255. 94 Loveman, 1999, ibid, see also pp. 186 & 213. 95 Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., (eds.). The Politics of Anti-Politics: The Military in Latin America,Lincoln and London: The University of Nebraska, 1978: 5.

23 These are combined with a systematic persecution of opposition elements, including the press, the pragmatic repression of the regime’s opponents expressing overt resistance to official policies or programs, and the non-recognition of the legitimacy of active opposition or political bargaining, negotiation, or compromise.96 In particular, the military’s politics of anti-politics is anti-liberal and anti-Marxist, assuming repression of opposition, silencing or censuring the media, and subordinating the labour movement to the regime’s objectives. Worker strikes are also not tolerated. The military further emphasizes order and progress, and places a high priority on economic growth. Additionally, clearer linkages between the state and coercion are evident, there is a more insistent demand for order and respect for hierarchy, a less tolerant attitude toward opposition, and an outright rejection of “politics,” which is perceived as being the source of underdevelopment, corruption, and evil.97

Naturally, civilians and the military have differences not only in terms of their organizations, procedures for handling problems and decision-making, as well as personal performances, but also in regards to their values, perceptions, and interests. In general, the military views civilians as being weaker, especially in terms of discipline. They are also seen as selfish, lacking accountability and effectiveness, corrupt, and slower than the military in making decisions, because they must first assess various opinions and interests before making decisions.98 Military men claim that they have better technical and managerial skills compared to their civilian counterparts.99 Moreover, military officers tend to perceive political parties as agents of conflict, not as instruments for producing consensus. For Kenneth Fidel, military intervention in politics is also considered as the result of a perceived failure of civilian politics and civilian leadership. New military insurgents also tend to view civilian institutions and leadership as inherently incapable of coping with issues of development and public order.100

Muhaimin summarizes these phenomena into the so-called “politico-military symptom” and superiority complex, namely the subjective reasons or psychological factors which drive the military to enter political arena.101 Currently, the military has the general perception that the civilian government and democracy are incompatible with attempts at creating political stability and state integration in a country burdened with poverty, pluralism, primordial conflicts, and nation building. In other words, it sees civilian government and democracy in new emerging states as being unable to respond to the threats of chaos and disintegration.

96 Ibid. 97 Ibid: 12. 98 Muhaimin, 1982, op. cit: 12. 99 See also Samuel P. Huntington, Tertib Politik di dalam Masyarakat yang Sedang Berubah (Political Order in Changing Society, 2nd Book), Jakarta, Rajawali, 1983: 314. 100 Kenneth Fidel (ed.), Militarism in Developing Countries, New Jersey, Transaction Books, 1986: 4-5.

24 According to Aguero, the military always feels uneasy in new democratic phases because such situations are far more pluralistic than most officers anticipate and open the way for the development of national-regional autonomy, federalism and even separatism.102 In this context, the military’s traditional value system, which places emphasis on the importance of unity, is in accordance with the views of conservative civilians who want to defend the existence of a unified state. This explains why Rizal Sukma says that there is military resistance to the notion of federalism in Indonesia and radical demand for reform.103

Sukma argues that once democratic transition is started, civilian political groups will all share an interest in democratization. Furthermore, even if some of these groups are less than enthusiastic about democratization, no major political groups will actively and openly seek military intervention to advance their interests. Civilians within the government will also resist military pressure on policies in the civilian sphere and will try to achieve greater control in military domains. At the same time, the military will make pre-emptive or reactive moves to maximise its autonomy and resist these so-called “civilian ‘encroachments’” or intrusions.104

Civil and military response to democratization in Indonesia can also be seen from the perspective of the country’s political culture. Ulf Sundhaussen sees the importance of identifying the existence of political cultures and their influence on the country’s acceptance of military involvement in politics for analysing the continuation of military involvement in politics, particularly in the Third World.105 Furthermore, he stresses that if there is no deep-rooted rejection among the people towards military power, generals, who were in the position of making top decisions, could enjoy widespread recognition and support from the people.106

Muhaimin similarly argues that the intensity of military intervention in politics will depend on a country’s level of political culture.107 The higher a country’s political culture or the longer its tradition of democracy, the greater the country’s power will be in preventing or limiting the military’s intervention into politics. Conversely, the lower the country’s political culture or shorter its tradition of democracy, the weaker the country’s

101 Muhaimin, 1982, op. cit: 6-7, 12. 102 Aguero, 1995, ibid: 12. 103 Rizal Sukma, “Conflict management in post-authoritarian Indonesia: Federalism, autonomy and the dilemma of democratization,” Damien Kingsbury and Harry Aveling (eds.), Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia, London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003: 67. 104 Ibid: 24. 105 Ulf Sundhaussen, “The Durability of Military Regimes in Southeast Asia,” in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (eds.), Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985: 270, 186, in Singh, 1996, op. cit: 17-18. 106 Ibid: 21. 107 Muhaimin, 1982, op. cit: 8.

25 position will be in preventing or limiting the military’s political role. For this reason, the coup d’etat, as the military’s highest possible form of political participation occurs mainly in countries with low political cultures. In this case, political culture refers to the circumstances, which will determine the character and attitude of soldiers and the military as an institution in a state.

In the case of Indonesia, the religious cultures of both Islam and Hinduism have existed in the country since long before the Portuguese and Dutch Colonialists arrived. Huntington and Merkel offered a critical assessment of their compatibility with democracy, as they have strongly influenced the country’s political culture until recently.108 Aside from the continuing debates on Islam and democracy, Huntington’s empirical studies showed that most Muslim countries, stretching from Morocco to Indonesia, have non-democratic regimes, though some of them started to introduce political liberalization in the 1990s.109

Huntington has recognized religious cultures as one of three factors (the others being political and economic factors) that limit democratization in these countries. At this point, the rise of fundamentalism in Islam and its political movements has been pointed to as a constraint on democratization because of its coherence with the emergence of military intervention there, either in the form of its support of authoritarian regimes or involvement in the toppling of civilian democratic regimes.110 Esposito, whose analyses often shows empathy with Islam, also presented a negative assessment, “Across the political; and ideological spectrum, the Muslim experience has been one of kings, military rulers, and ex-military rulers possessing tenuous legitimacy and propped-up by military and security forces.”111

108 Wolfgang Merkel, Systemtransformation: Eine Einfuehrung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transfor- mationsforschung (System Transformation: An Introduction to the Theory and Empiry of Research on Transformation), Olpaden: Leske + Budrich, 1999: 95-100. Huntington, 1991, op. cit, or Huntington, Gelombang Demokratisasi Ketiga translated edition from the Third Wave by Asril Marjohan, Jakarta: Grafiti, 1997: 381-399, 404. 109 Huntington, 1991, ibid: 381. 110 Ibid: 395-398. On the cases of other countries, for example, Pakistan, see Oleg V. Pleshov, Islamism and Travails of Democracy in Pakistan, Delhi: Greenwich Millennium Press, 2004: 158-173, where he revealed army as the initiator and instrument of Islamization. See also, John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996: 109-114. The same book also discussed similar case of Sudan, see particularly p. 89, and different cases in other countries, such as Iran, Algeria, and Egypt, where the military could demonstrate either their pro- or anti-Islam political movements through their intervention in politics. In Islam and Democracy: State-Society Relations in Developing Countries 1980-1994, New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 2000: 194, referring to what occurred in the Philippines, where Muslims are merely minority, Ali Reza Abootalebi argues, “Clashes between the army and Communist insurgents, along with the Muslim insurgency, continued to give credence to possible future military intervention in politics.” 111 Joshua Cohen and Deborah Chasman (Eds.), Islam and the Challenge of Democracy, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004: 93.

26 Meanwhile, the connection between the religious culture of Hinduism and democratization in Indonesia can be seen by analysing the impact of Javanese political culture, which dominated by Hinduism, on the civilian regime’s performance in pushing political reform and the military response to it. Bilveer Singh, for example, acknowledges that this dimension of Indonesian political culture is a factor in explaining the development of the Indonesian military’s dual function.112 He states that the cultural perspective of the Javanese, which make up the majority of the population, predominantly influences politics and the military in the country.113 Furthermore, G. Moedjanto reminds us that the concept of power in Javanese political culture does not arise suddenly, but rather as a result of the historical process of the development of the king’s power.114 The concept is based on historical experiences and after it was adapted and perfected, it was then reinstated and practiced in real life. The ruling king or queen employed many different methods to establish, develop and strengthen their power. This included, for example, exhibiting their superiority over others, not only his/her superiority in terms of origin, techniques of governing, or military prowess, but also their superiority as the family chosen by God to wield power.

The similarity between the Javanese kingship model and Soeharto’s increasingly paternalistic rule reflected the Javanese cultural underpinnings of the New Order. Making up more than 41 percent of the total population, the Javanese, the largest single ethnic group in Indonesia, still took a disproportionately large number of the most important positions in the government and the military.115 The officer corps was particularly Javanized, not only as a consequence of Java’s central role in the development of modern Indonesia, but also because the Indonesian military appeared to regard the great predominance of Javanese in the officer ranks as a matter of policy. Therefore, the Javanese cultural predispositions influenced the way the government appealed to the population and interactions within the New Order elite, and the emerging elite after Soeharto.

According to Muhaimin, since the pre-independence period, Indonesia has had a strong, but sophisticated, patron-client relationship in terms of society, as well as material and non-material aspects, which has been due to the dominant influence of Javanese political culture.116 In this relationship, the patron provides for all of the material and non- material needs of the clients, and the clients, in turn, offer their loyalty. Thus, the source of the patron’s legitimacy comes from their capability to fulfil the needs of the clients,

112 Singh, 1996, op. cit: 55. 113 Ibid. 114 G. Moedjanto, The Concept of Power in Javanese Culture, Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1993: 104-108. 115 “Political Culture,” http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/85.htm, May4, 2005: 1 (1-4). 116 Muhaimin, 1982, op. cit: 9-10.

27 and from the resulting loyalty of the clients.117 Meanwhile, acting as one important sub- culture, the Indonesian military has influenced the Soeharto government’s attitude in terms of both the ethos and direct participation of military officers at all levels. Although increasingly professional in a technical sense, the Indonesian military never lost its perception of itself as the embodiment of the national spirit. Also, even though factions always exist, the Indonesian military maintains the dwifungsi (dual functions) concept, which justifies a special relationship between the soldier and state.118

As a political concept, the Indonesian military’s dual function is described as “the spirit of service of the armed forces to take up together with the other social forces, the duties and responsibilities of the struggle of the Indonesian nation both in the field of defence and security and also in the field of development of the nation’s welfare in an effort to achieve national goals.”119 In simple terms, the Indonesian military has roles in both the national defence and domestic policy, with these two functions combining to form a responsibility for managing and maintaining internal security and stability.

In post-Soeharto Indonesia, the Javanese political culture still has a strong influence on Indonesian politics, including the military, due to the existence of conservative military leaders who came to power during the Soeharto era. Regarding the military’s involvement in politics and its resistance to reform, C.S. Kuppuswamy says that the concept of the dual function (dwifungsi) of the military draws on the country’s experiences in struggling for independence, its political culture, and the Pancasila (the five principle of state ideology).120 Kuppuswamy further emphasizes that the work culture of the Indonesian armed forces that arose during the struggle for independence sees them as the guardians of the nation and that their loyalty is to the nation and not to civil leadership.121 For this reason, he believes that the work culture inherited from the past can be attributed to the continued dominance of the armed forces in Indonesian politics despite recent efforts to reduce their influence.

Salim Said argues that in Indonesia the political culture of integration, which rejects the separation of the military and civilians, has justified the existence of the dual function concept for a long time, and resisted a transition to civilian supremacy. Thus, the lack of a new political culture favouring democracy has caused the failure of democratic

117 Lucian W. Pye, “Participation and Authority,” in Sidney Verba and Lucian W. Pye (eds.), The Citizen and Politics: A Comparative Perspective, Stamford: Greylook, 1978: 95-98, as quoted by Muhaimin, 1982, op. cit: 9. 118 “Political Culture,” loc. cit: 3. 119 C.S. Kuppuswamy, “Indonesia: Armed Forces and Their Diminishing Political Role,” Paper No. 528, October 7, 2002, http://www.saag.org/papers6/paper528.html: 2 (1-4), was accessed on May 4, 2005. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid: 4.

28 consolidation in post-Soeharto Indonesia.122 Louis Horowitz mentions that militarism in Third Word countries is not a function of dependency or developmentalist models, but rather a response to the inner history and military dynamics of the Western hemisphere and its specific national condition.123

Sukma clarifies the relevance of historical and cultural factors with the recent military resistance to reform in Indonesia as follows:

“In a highly centralized system of the New Order, the military played an important role in ensuring the centre’s control over the regions on the one hand and in forcing the regions’ obedience on the other….This system still persists until today… Given the fact that the military still plays an important role in politics at regional level, it is likely that the centre might be tempted to use the military channel to intervene in regional political affairs. And there are indications that military officers, even though they may already have resigned from the service, will continue to occupy or seek top civilian positions such as governor or bupati (heads of district).”124

I.B. Theoretical Approaches

I.B.1. Actor Theories

In this research, actor theories are helpful for micro level analysis and explaining internal factors which influence both the performance and policy of the civilian regime, the response of the military, and the interplay between the two parties. Since democratic transition towards consolidation is marked by interplay amongst actors, the adoption of actor theories as one of the types of transformation theory in this research reveals the interplay between the military and civilian regime.125 In this context, similar to mass and elite,126 the military and civilian regimes are both seen as important actors in democratic

122 “Indonesia Belum Miliki Budaya Politik Seperti Korea Selatan” (“Indonesia does not have yet Political Culture as in South Korea”) , Media Indonesia, 9 Mei 2005: 7. 123 See David Irving and Louis Horowitz, “The Military Elite,” in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.), Elites in Latin America, New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, in Loveman and Davies, Jr, (eds.), 1978, op. cit: 272-273. 124 Sukma, in Kingsbury and Aveling, 2003, loc .cit: 72. 125 See Ellen Bos, “Die Rolle von Eliten und kollektiven Akteuren in Transitionsprozessen“ („The Role of Elites and Collective Actors in Transition Process“), in Wolfgang Merkel (ed.), Systemwechsel 1: Theorien, Ansätze und Konzeptionen (Regime Change I: Theories, Methods, and Concepts), Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1994: 81-102. See also, Wolfgang Merkel, 1999, op.cit: 102-107 and 162-169. 126 See Wolfgang Merkel and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, Von der Diktatur zur Demokratie: Transformationen, Erfolgsbedingungen, Entwicklungspfade (From Dictatorship to Democracy: Transformations, Success Conditions, Development Paths), Opladen/Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999: 53-57.

29 transition.127 They are analysed as individual and collective actors or groups, and as institutions or organizations that are involved in the transition process. They have their own goals, interests, preferences, perceptions, decisions, strategies, reactions, and behaviours, and have demonstrated their position either as proponents or opponents of democratization.128 They are also viewed as actors characterised by their orientations (perceptions and preferences) and capabilities in their performances and interplay.129

Fritz W. Scharpf argues that actors respond differently to external threats, constraints, and opportunities not only because they may differ in their intrinsic perceptions and preferences, but also because their perceptions and preferences are very much shaped by the specific institutional setting within which they interact.130 As an institution, the interplay between the military and the civilian regime is seen in the framework of the systems of rules that structure the courses of actions that a set of actors may choose. This framework of analysis includes not only formal legal rules that are sanctioned by the court system and the machinery of the state, but also social norms that actors generally respect and whose violation is penalized with loss of reputation, social disapproval, withdrawal of co-operation and the granting of rewards, or even ostracism. In rational-choice theory, actors’ behaviour is evaluated based on the choices they made in light of an assessment of costs and benefits.131 Through this approach, the interplay between the military and the civilian regime is seen from sanctioned rules that effectively change the costs and benefits that an actor can expect when following a certain course of action, and also social norms and culturally stabilised systems of meaning and social entities that are capable of purposive actions.132

Furthermore, rational choice focuses on actors and their preferences, and explains their political behaviour based rationally on interest calculations. It starts from the assumption that political life is based on strategic interactions among individuals to maximize their own interests.133 For this reason, political institutions are the result of such strategic interactions. In other words, political institutions are made by political actors according to their preferences in instrumental ways. They become the instruments to attain political interests so that once an institution is established, it will determine parameters for other individual actors, including their interest calculations, although these institutions can always be modified when needed. Rational choice is relevant because the main forces for change among the military are their individual leaders, who, if they

127 On the government as collective actors see also Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Cen- tred Institutionalism in Policy Research, Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1997: 39. 128 See Bos, in Merkel (ed.), 1994, loc. cit: 87. 129 Scharpf, 1997, op.cit: 51. 130 Ibid: 36-39. 131 See Bos, in Merkel (ed.), 1994, loc. cit: 87-88. 132 Scharpf, 1997, op.cit. 133 Harjanto, in Rizal Sukma and J. Kristiadi (eds.), 1999, loc.cit: 87.

30 contend with civilian leaders, will become political actors who also have bargaining power.134

Scharpf describes institutions as consisting of complex actors, which create and constrain options, and shape perceptions and preferences. In addition, actors are characterised by specific capabilities, perceptions, and preferences. Actors who are willing to risk paying the price of possible sanctions may violate binding rules. Importantly, since social backgrounds and socialization histories of individuals have become increasingly diverse, the influence of institutions on perceptions and preferences, and hence on intentions, can never be completely understood. He stresses that in cases where institutional change threatens to be costly, institutions will be hard to reform or abolish.135

According to Adam Przerworski, conflicts of interests among the elite are always influenced by the structure of interests in democratic transition. It should be noted that the military has vested-interests in preserving their corporate autonomy; the bourgeoisie are interested in protecting and controlling their production means; and the state apparatus -- mainly, the bureaucrats, police, and technocrats-- want to maintain their safety and basic economic interests.136 Conflicts of interests, which cause friction among the elites, can be observed among strategic actors who hold power by differentiating hard-liners and soft- liners, and moderates and maximalists in opposition groups. These groups likely include principalists or moralists, who are ready to take risks. In this regard, the hardliners, maximalists, and moralists are categorized as an insensitive risk group, whereas moderates and soft-liners are seen as sensitive actors who do not want to incur risk.

Przerworski continues by mentioning that an authoritarian regime begins to fracture when several members of the regime start trying to secure the support of opposition groups.137 If the regime remains cohesive and tightly controls the situation, a compromise will not be reached. On the other hand, if several powerful groups attempt to seek political support among groups who have been previously forced to leave the political arena by the authoritarian regime, the waves of mass mobilizations will appear to contain the regime. The most vulnerable situation during democratic transition is caused if a group of elites within the existing authoritarian regime seek external support for their power.

134 Ibid. 135 Scharpf, 1997, op.cit: 41-43. 136 Adam Przerworski, “Sejumlah Masalah dalam Studi Transisi Menuju Demokrasi” (“Problems in Study of Transition towards Democracy”), Transisi Menuju Demokrasi (III): Kasus Amerika Latin (Transition towards Democracy, III, Latin America Case), Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Eds.), Jakarta: LP3ES, 1994: 85-86, in Sahdan (trans.), op. cit: 300. 137 Przerworski, 1994, ibid: 87-88, in Sahdan (trans.), 2004, ibid: 301.

31 Przerworski also adds that struggles for democratic transition in many countries generally begin within the elite class, namely, between the soft-liners who overtly demonstrate their pro-democracy stance and the hardliners who support the status quo or the authoritarian regime.138 The soft-liners usually align themselves with opposition groups to fight against the hardliners, which results in the fall of the authoritarian regime, or transactions occurring between the conflicting parties.

In order to explain reasons for military involvement in politics by certain actors, Harold Crouch points to internal and external factors.139 When speaking of internal factors, Crouch refers to the internal characteristics or situation, while external factors refer to the environment or structural factors. The first factor consists of values and attitudes of military officers, which affect their political orientation and their conceptions of power in society. The second factor consists of material interests of military officers, as corps, social classes, or individual members. For Huntington, these military interests refer to a goal of building an apolitical society and consensus based on order. In this context, the military prevents society from reaching the community structure it aspired to, by criticising and reducing the role of politics.140

Crouch also argues that the values and orientations of military officers are mostly a product of their historical experiences.141 This means that their upbringing and early roles will establish traditions and values within them, which will be a model for early military generations and afterwards. Singh states that the material interests of the military, such as the allocation of an adequate budget for its facilities and salaries, will play a wider role in affecting its decisions regarding political intervention.142 The failure of civilian political leaders to fulfil this need will create an opportunity for the military to engage and intervene in politics. In addition, the ambition of senior military officers to gain additional facilities encourages them to be active in the political sphere. Finer identifies six motivations for the involvement of military leaders in politics.143 These motivations include national interests, regional interests, class interests, organizational or military corps interests; real condition of soldiers in general, and individual interests inside the military. In a similar view, Sundhaussen states that military interventions in politics are motivated by their class interests in defending the values and aspirations of the middle

138 Ibid. 139 Harold Crouch, “The Military and Politics in Southeast Asia,” in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (eds.), Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985: 288; Singh, 1996, op.cit: 7. 140 Huntington, op. cit, 1983: 383. 141 Crouch, in Ahmad and Crouch (eds.), 1985, loc.cit, in Singh, 1996, op.cit: 8. 142 Ibid: 9-13. 143 Samuel E. Finer, 1962: 32-60; Singh, 1996, op.cit: 14.

32 class they belong to.144 He adds further interests for such interventions, ranging from institutional to individual interests that do not favour constitutional rules because of officers’ ambitions of authority and power.145

However, Huntington’s thesis which says “it is false to attempt to explain military intervention in politics in terms of internal structure of the military organization or the social background of the officers in a country” can be critically questioned.146 In the Indonesian case, attempt of coup such as in 1965 was organized by officers who occupied strategic positions within the military organization. Political interventions were also conducted by the military because of the prevalence of historical and traditional values or political culture in the military. Huntington is not, however, wrong when he mentions that “some military men in politics have been apparently motivated by high ideals of public service, and others by private profit.”147

Referring to actors, Edwin Lieuwen pointed out that a surplus of ambitious or opportunistic military men has made politics in nearly every country little more than an endless process of dissension, intrigue, and revolutionary turmoil.148 He agrees with many authors who have detected a tendency on the part of military men to side with conservative parties, and a tendency for civilian politicians to side with the liberals. Both parties accepted the existing social order, in which virtually all civilian politicians and army officers are members of the small, vague, middle class. More importantly, aside from their political parties, their overriding interest is power.

Lieuwen describes various motives for military officers to intervene in politics. He distinguishes among three different groups, namely devoted professionals, latent militarists, and idealistic officers.149 The devoted professionals might intervene in the name of their legitimate duty to retain internal order. The latent militarists might be motivated purely by political ambitions. The idealistic officers, who considered it their duty to provide social justice, might contend with the other two. Importantly, he argues that the political immaturity of the new groups aspiring to power and the lack of any strong and well-integrated group apart from the military may encourage the military to

144 Ulf Sundhaussen, Politik Militer Indonesia 1945-1967 Menuju Dwifungsi ABRI (Military Politics in Indonesia 1945-1967: Towards ABRI Dual Function), Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986: 440-473, quoted by Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, et al, 1999: 40. 145 Ibid. 146 See Samuel P. Huntington, Special Adaptation from Political Order in Changing Societies, Bombay, G.U. Mehta, 1975: 109. 147 Ibid. 148 Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, Revised Edition, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1965: 20 and 27. 149 Ibid: 123.

33 intervene and create additional militarism. Quoting Stanislaw Andrzejewski,150 Lieuwen mentions that if there is no conformity on the right to command or the duty to obey, either because of ethnic pluralism or as an outcome of an internal rupture, brute force must remain the last resort, and the distribution of military will then be the major determinant of the social structure.

Lieuwen also describes that in their intervention, the military can serve as political arbiters, as they control the means of violence, the sine qua non for political change in most countries.151 Advanced weapons technologies and improved capabilities increase the military’s confidence in its overwhelmingly superior power over unruly civilian elements. They are, therefore, less hesitant to put that power to use.

In specifically examining the actors within the military, Lieuwen sees that young officers become the sponsors of fundamental change and reform.152 They might undermine traditional institutions and be proponents of public-welfare measures, whereby democratic political institutions are of less concern to them. Senior officers, on the other hand, might value stability, and thus disfavour social and political experimentation. These senior officers might be more partial to democratic institutions than their younger rivals, but this is likely to be a narrowly-defined “democracy,” which is tolerated insofar as it functions within the traditional order, because they are at the top of their profession. The senior officers are influenced by the conservatism that comes with rank, age, status, and the attainment of comfortable material circumstances. Also, struggles among them are complicated by ideological cross-currents and fierce personal and professional competition.

Lieuwen reminds us that due to the special position of the military as overseeing the monopoly of physical power, the main force towards professionalism has to come from within the military.153 He also finds that in almost every country he researched, the military organization is strained by struggles brought on by the country’s social crises and competition between the (military) professionalists. Among the military professionalists, there is competition between the group of officers who consider that the military has to confine themselves to military duties, and the militarists who opt to take an active role in politics.

The military’s strategic position in democratic transition as an informal political actor with a potential veto-power, whose political actions influence the success or failure of democratic consolidation, especially at the time of economic, social, and political

150 See, Stanislaw Andrzejewski, Military Organization and Society, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954: 128. 151 Lieuwen, 1965, op.cit: 124. 152 Ibid: 126-127; 130-131. 153 Ibid: 152.

34 crisis, is acknowledged by O’Donnell and Schmitter, as well as Merkel.154 Merkel identifies the military as a state organ and a potential internal veto-player that can demonstrate its significant power and influence as a veto player by making interventions that can be dangerous to democracy.155 He stresses that the emergence of threats to national security and integrity will encourage the military to be an active veto-player that becomes an enemy to democracy.156

According to O’Donnell and Schmitter, democratic transitions are typically initiated and negotiated by political elites in both the regime and the opposition, where civil society has played a crucial role in building pressure for democratic transition and pushing it through to completion.157 Actors struggle not only to satisfy their immediate interests or the interests of those whom they purport to represent, but also to define rules and procedures whose configuration will determine likely winners and losers in the future. As a matter of fact, these emergent rules will largely define what resources can legitimately be expended in the political arena and which actors will be permitted to enter it.158 Therefore, O’Donnell and Schmitter have identified conflicts and struggles amongst actors in democratic transition.

Regarding the interplay between the military and civilian regime, O’Donnell and Schmitter write:

“The degree of military penetration of the polity and society varies across authoritarian regimes, as well as across the democratic ones that may follow them.

(…) When the armed forces neither have nor feel a responsibility for the policies of the regime, it is easier for them to take a hands off attitude to the transition, by declaring themselves concerned only with

154 See Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusion about Uncertain Democracies,” in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whiteheads (eds.), Transition form Authoritarian Rule, Prospect for Democracy, Vol. 4, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986: 34 et seq. See also Merkel, 1999, op.cit: 162-164, where Merkel introduced the terminology of Veto-Mächte (n). Meanwhile, Jürgen Rüland used the terminology of veto-player, and Christoph Schuck with Veto-Akteur. See, Jürgen Rüland, “Demokratisierung in Südostasien: die Asienkrise als Motor politischen Wandels?“ („Democratization in Southeast Asia: The Asian Crisis as Root of Political Change?“) Zeitschrift für Politik, Jahrgang 48, Heft 1, 2001, München: Zymanns: 16, and Schuck, 2003, op. cit: 163-192. 155 Wolfgang Merkel, Demokratie in Asien: Ein Kontinent zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Democracy in Asia: A Continent Between Dictatorship and Democracy), Bonn: Dietz, 2003: 177-179. 156 Ibid: 164. 157 “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusion About Uncertain Democracies”, 1986: 48- 56 in Larry Diamond, “Introduction: In Search of Consolidation,” Diamond, Plattner, Yun, and Hung (eds.), 1997, loc.cit: xxx. 158 Guillermo A. O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusion about Uncertain Democracies,” in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whiteheads (eds.), 1986, loc.cit: 6.

35 protecting their own institutional values of stability and autonomy, as well as public order and national security. In such cases the armed forces can remain relatively indifferent to the emerging rules of the political game, the identity of partisan actors, and the content of policy demands. When the transition is initiated from regimes with extensive military participation, and especially where military officers remain as chief executives during the transition itself, the impact is more direct and immediate: the institutional interests of the military --not to mention the personal interests of the officers involved-- cannot but be affected by emerging civilian authorities who may not be sympathetic to such considerations.”159

Regarding the position of the civilian regime and military in democratic transition, there is a theoretical discussion on pacts as an option that seems relevant in guiding this research, of which Linz and Stepan say:

“Much of transition literature on pacts contains references to ‘hardliners’ and ‘moderates.’ Transition is frequently seen as involving a pact between the regime moderates and the opposition moderates who are both able to ‘use’ and ‘contain’ their respective hard-liners. This is, in essence, a four-player game theory model. However, two conditions must be satisfied for it to be a true four-player game. The moderate players in the regime must have sufficient autonomy so that they can, over time, conduct strategic as well as tactical negotiations with the players from the moderate opposition. Conversely, the moderates in the opposition need a degree of continued organizational presence, power, and followers in the polity to play their parts in the negotiation pacts.”160

In a more progressive analysis, Henry Bienen no longer sees the military as a sterile and neutral state element continuing to justify its legitimacy and interest as being solely for the sake of the nation.161 This view is based on the empirical observation that the military has its own interests and shows its resistance to efforts to end authoritarianism and transfer power to civilian institutions. Meanwhile, there are several underlying factors to the military’s resistance to transfer of power to civilian institutions, namely:162 (1) There is the danger of a military opponent becoming ruler; (2) all decisions

159 Ibid: 34. 160 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Eu- rope, South America, and-Post Communist Europe, the Johns Hopkins University: Baltimore, 1996: 61. 161 Henry Bienen, “Civil-Military Relations in the Third Worlds,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1981: 368. 162 Ivan A. Hadar, “Militer dan Pemerintahan Otoriter” (“Military and Authoritaruan Govenrment”), Wacana, Edisi 17, Tahun III, 2004, Yogyakarta, Insist Press: 17-48.

36 that the military regime has made will be declared invalid; (3) all privileges that the military currently enjoys will be withdrawn; (4) there will be political chaos once the reform is introduced; (5) the military’s self-image as an agent of modernization will be tarnished as the transfer of power begins; (6) there will be political pressure on the military by parties that have enjoyed the benefits of its regime; (7) the military is always obsessed by greed for power; and (8) in many cases, the military fears that it would face prosecution due to the gross human rights violations of the past.

I.B.2. Cultural Theories

This research utilizes cultural theories to help explain the perceptions and preferences, which influence military and civilian actors in their decision-making and interactions.163 The performance or policies of civilian regimes and the military’s response are discussed by analyzing their respective dominant political cultures as individual or collective actors or groups and also as an institution.164 By definition, political culture refers to the inherited set of dominant ideas, beliefs, attitudes, and opinions people share about who should govern, to what end they should govern, and by what means. This is based on values and beliefs since these are shared ideas about what is good and what is true, and such beliefs often provide a foundation for values.165 Political culture is a patterned way of thinking and beliefs about how the government and the country ought to operate, and influences the political behavior of the actors. Huntington classified this as being part of historic cultural traditions, the existence of which varies significantly in the extent to which their attitudes, values, beliefs, and related behavior patterns are conducive to the development of democracy.166

In the context of cultural theory, discussions on transformation can be approached for religious-cultural types of civilization. Merkel167 has pointed to Lipset’s thesis on the relevance between cultural and historical factors and change. Lipset (1993: 137) argues that unlike political institutions, including electoral systems and constitutional arrangements which are more easily changed, cultural factors that stem from different

163 The application of cultural theories to explain transformation, see again, Merkel and Juergen Puehle, 1999, op. cit: 36-44. See also Merkel, op .cit, 1999: 95-101. 164 Merkel und Puhle, 1999, op.cit.: 36-44. See also Jürgen Rüland, „Theoretische, methodische und thematische Schwerpunkte des Systemwechselforschung zu Asien“ („Theoretical, Methodological and Thematical Focuses of Research on Regime Change in Asia“), in Merkel (ed.), 1994, loc. cit: 279-284. See also Merkel, 2003, loc. cit: 69-70. 165 “Political Culture in America,” http://www.socialstudieshelp/APGOV_Political1%20Culture.htm., May 6, 2005: 1-5. See also S.M. Rahman, “Building Political Culture a New,” http://www.friends.org.pk /rahman/building%20political.htm: 1-2. 166 Huntington, 2001, op. cit: 298. 167 Merkel (ed.), 1994, loc. cit: 95-96.

37 histories are extremely difficult to manipulate. Furthermore, in explaining the religious- cultural types of civilization and transformation, Merkel has also quoted the thesis of Kennan (Huntington, 1991: 298), which links democratization and Western culture as a supporting basis, and sees the incompatibility between liberal democracy and non- Western culture or society. By referring to Huntington, Merkel agrees that there are religious cultures, which are friendly or positive to democracy, and others, which are skeptical, or even seen as “enemies” of democracy (Huntington, 1991: 300). Specifically, this point of view sees fundamentalist Islam as diametrically opposed to the ideals and practices of democracy, because it would clash with values like gender parity, human rights, rule of law, and the separation of religion and state, or secularism, which are all requisites of a democracy.168 The more the counter-productive values of the religious culture to democracy are maintained, the more apparent the constraints to democracy would become.

Huntington clarifies the existence of various religious cultures and their degrees of compatibility to democracy as follows:169 (1) Western culture with its liberalism and Protestantism; (2) Latin American culture with its Catholicism; (3) Japanese culture; (4) Orthodox-Slav; (5) Hinduism culture; (6) African culture; (7) Confucianism culture; and (8) Islamism culture. Of the eight religious cultures, he claims that the first three religious cultures are compatible with Western democracy, although they have gradual differences. The next three religious cultures are unclear in their positions as to whether they support or reject democracy; and the last two religious cultures, Confucianism and Islamism, are often seen as incompatible with liberal democracy.170 In a more critical analysis, he doubts the prospect of liberalization in Muslim countries and whether their social and political movements will maintain their commitments to democracy. He questions whether the new governments will continue to leave their doors open to Islamic social and political movements, e.g. fundamentalist or radical groups, without provoking interventions from the military, which in most Muslim countries is generally known to be very secular.171

Although Huntington admits that there are certain Islamic values, which are generally congruent with the requirements of democracy, he also emphasizes that Islam rejects any distinction between the religious and the political community. Using the expression that “there is no equipoise between Caesar and God,” he says that political participation is linked to religious affiliation. Moreover, since the political rulers should be practising Muslims, syariah should be the basic law, and the ulama should have a

168 Ibid: 96, 99-100. 169 Ibid: 96-97. 170 See also Huntington, 1991, op. cit. and Huntington, Gelombang Demokratisasi Ketiga (The Third Wave), 1997, op.cit: 387, and 398-404. 171 Ibid: 397-398.

38 decisive vote in articulating, or at least reviewing and ratifying all governmental policy. These concepts are incompatible with democracy. From an Islamic viewpoint, governmental legitimacy and policy are derived from religious doctrine and religious expertise, so they differ from and contradict with the premises of democratic politics.172 Even now, several years after the publication The Third Wave, he still voiced the same questions regarding the success of democratization in countries where Muslims make up a majority, due to the strength of their conservative values, or the anti-democratic secularism and anti-Western democracy.173

Douglas E. Ramage found that exclusivism and extremism practiced by Islamic political movements during the Soeharto era have caused military resistance to these movements participating in Indonesia’s politics.174 Exclusivism and extremism proved incompatible with the principles of “togetherness,” “family-like” and “integralistic state,” which became the basic values of the country’s ideology and have been protected by the Indonesian military since independence. For this reason, Ramage has asserted that Islam was never acceptable to the Indonesian military as the basis of the state.175 Meanwhile, Uhlin has recognized that there is a deep-rooted antagonism between the Indonesian military and political Islam.176 He has described armed conflicts between Muslims and the military, which have occurred in many parts of the country, although he agreed with Zifirdaus (1990: 448) that none of the major Muslims organizations have ever clashed with the military.

Meanwhile, Hinduism culture and its constraints to Indonesian democratic consolidation can be seen in the influence of Javanese political culture on civilian regime performance in pushing for reform, and the military response to it. In this context, we should highlight Ramage’s statements on the strong existence of the notion of an integralistic state amongst Indonesian civilian and military leaders.177 An integralistic state was initially conceived by one of Indonesian founding fathers, Soepomo, who perceived the state and society as a single organic unit and stressed the importance of social obligations rather than individual rights. In proposing his notion of an integralistic state in the constitutional and independence preparatory debates of 1945, Soepomo argued that Indonesian political culture, particularly Javanese village governance, was based on family principles. Because all individuals in the state are inseparable from one another and the state is like a family in which all components play crucial roles, Soepomo insisted

172 Huntington, 2001, op. cit: 307. 173 See Samuel P. Huntington, “After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave,” Journal of Democra- cy, October 1997, Volume 8, Number 4, Washington DC: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997: 6-10. 174 Ramage, 1995, op.cit: 122-155. 175 Ibid: 140. 176 Anders Uhlin, Indonesia and the “Third Wave of Democratization”: The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World, Curzon Press, 1997: 65. 177 Ramage, 1995, op.cit: 125.

39 that such principles were not suited to Western concepts of parliamentary democracy with checks and balances and guarantees of individual human rights. Ramage argued that these ideas have remained part of Indonesian political thinking and have been revived in official discourse since the late 1980s, particularly in military thinking.178 Thus, the concept of an integralistic state has been the ideological foundation of the Indonesian state’s Pancasila ideology and military interventions into the country’s social and political affairs. Ramage points out that military interest in integralism has not been discussed in previous studies on the military and politics in the country.

Peter Britton has pointed to “local traditions” and “the Javanese military legacy” in describing the source of legitimacy for the Indonesian military in politics.179 He argued that evidence of the Javanese military legacy could be seen in the integration of state and military power, with which the Grand Kings of Java were usually perceived as the Grand Commanders. In other words, the Kings, who were also military leaders, claimed that they themselves were Knights. Considering that most officers in the Indonesian military have Javanese cultural background and the cultural values have been preserved through literature and traditional ceremonies, Britton’s work helps to explain why the Indonesian military still wants to be involved or interfere in the country’s politics.

Britton has stated that the rejection of civilian supremacy by the military is rooted in the Javanese military legacy. He viewed the response of Grand Commander Sudirman to disobey the civilian leaders or the Sukarno-Sjahrir administration in the period of the national liberation war against the Dutch as less affected by the practice Sudirman learned from the Japanese colonial government, and more inspired by his growing understanding on the Javanese traditions from the pre-colonial period, whereby the separation of civil- military power was not known, and military power was political power.180 Britton has connected the blurred distinction between civilian and military role which has been occurring since 1957 with the consistency of the military in keeping their Javanese military practice, which has been widely understood among officers. As a result of the creation of the military’s new symbols, which correlated with the symbols of Javanese power, the Indonesian military was able maintain its traditional identity and values despite the influence of military professionalism the officers obtained from training and education in America. Britton later argues that the influence of military training and

178 Ibid: 126. 179 Peter Britton, Profesionalisme dan Ideologi Militer Indonesia (Professionalism and Indonesian Milita- ry Ideology), Jakarta, LP3ES, 1996: 1, 11, quoted by Salim Said in Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini, dan Kelak (The Indonesian Military and Politics: Past, Today, and Future) Jakarta: PT Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2001: 180. 180 Britton, op. cit: 54, 56, 65; Said, op. cit: 181.

40 education in America on Indonesian military officers’ ideology is not significant due to the dominance of Javanese military concepts and traditions.181

In Javanese political culture, power and control cannot be separated from one another, and they have been established by a patrimonial bureaucratic state, in which proximity to the ruler was the key to command and rewards.182 This power is described in terms of a patron-client relationship, in which the patron is the Bapak (father or elder), and the client is the anak (children or people in general). The terms of respect and compliance to the ruler are expressed by the Javanese Gusti-kawula (lord-subject) formulation, which expresses the relationship of mankind to God, as well as the relationship of the subject to his ruler. Here, the reciprocal trait for compliance is benevolence, meaning that benefits flow from the center to the obedient subjects. By extension, the government’s developmental activities are advantages and blessings to the faithful. Bureaucratically, Javanese political culture is filled with an attitude of compliance, such as respect for seniors, conformity to hierarchical authority, and avoidance of confrontation. These are all characteristics stemming from the pre- independence of the priyayi class, whose roots go back to the traditional Javanese courts. This Javanese political culture is similar to the Indonesian military values, which emphasize obedience to command, respect for seniors, conformity to hierarchical authority, uniformity of attitude, and intolerance for differences of opinion.183

Benedict R.O’G. Anderson claims that the Javanese perception of power differs radically from Western concepts of power that have evolved since the Middle Ages. This difference leads to contrasting views regarding the workings of politics and history.184 The first and foremost premise of Javanese political thought is that power is concrete. Power is also homogenous, meaning that all power is of the same type and has the same source. Thus, power in the hands of one individual or one group is identical to power in the hands of any other individual or group. Also, the quantity of power in the universe is finite and does not change, which means that concentration of power in one place or in one person requires a proportional diminution elsewhere. Last but not least, since all power derives from a single homogenous source, power rises above questions of good and evil; it is not subject to questions of legitimacy. Anderson summarized that, from the Javanese political culture perspective, power is something concrete, homogenous, constant in total quantity, and has no inherent moral implications.185 Also, all power is of

181 Britton, ibid: 119-120; Said, ibid: 182. 182 “Political Culture,” http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/85.htm, May4, 2005: 1 (1-4). 183 Ibid. 184 Benedict R.O’G. Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990: 19-20. 185 Ibid: 22-23. See also “The Essence of Power,” in Franz Magnis-Suseno, Javanese Ethics and World- View: The Javanese Idea of the Good Life, Jakarta: PT Gramedia, 1997: 101-102, translated by Jon Scott and Michael Saunders, from Franz Magnis-Suseno, Javanische Weisheit und Ethik: Studien zu einer

41 the same type and has the same source, so the Javanese are not concerned with its proper uses.186 They have no sense of noblesse oblige, and they do not perceive anti-social behaviour as diminishing power. Power is amoral; the centre is only obliged to itself, therefore, the edicts of the Javanese rulers had no ethical content.187

Anderson sees a correlation between the perception of concentration and the idea of purity, while the idea of impurity is intimately related to diffusion and disintegration.188 Furthermore, power has to be absorbed from various sources, then accumulated, and finally concentrated, so the loss of concentration is synonymous with the loss of power. In this context, the Sapta Marga (seven principles or milestones), the code of the Indonesian military formulated in the early 1950s, is an example of power orientation, concentration, and display, which becomes a typical aspect of modern Indonesian public political behavior.189 Unity is, in itself, a fundamental symbol of power, in which oneness is power, and multiplicity is diffusion and weakness. According to Anderson, the Javanese idea of power also has impacts for perceptions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and foreign relations.190

The adoption of Javanese political culture into Indonesian military values was outlined by Lt. Gen (ret) Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, a prominent military and national figure from the first generation of post-independence military academy graduates. In addition, he was the former Governor of the National Resilience Council (Lemhannas -- Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional), a state institution, which trains Indonesia’s future leaders.191 He points out that among the eleven basic values of the Indonesian military leadership, ten have roots in Javanese political culture. These values, among others, are Ing Ngarsa Sun Tulada (the Indonesian military leaders should serve as examples to their soldiers), Waspada Prabu Wisesa (the Indonesian military leaders should be prepared to act under all circumstances), and Ambag Paramarta (the Indonesian military leaders should have the capability to set priorities in responding to problems).192

Importantly, Javanese political culture puts emphasis on the importance of harmony, order, stability, and continuity.193 For this reason, consensus, not voting, is

östlichen Moral (Javanese Wisdom and Ethics: Studies on Eastern Moral), Muenchen/Wien: R. Olden- bourg Verlag, 1981. 186 See, Ann Kumar, “The state and status of the nation: A historical viewpoint,” in Damien Kingsbury and Harry Aveling (eds.), 2003, loc. cit: 53. 187 Ibid. 188 Anderson, 1990, op.cit: 24. 189 Ibid: 26. 190 Ibid: 36, 41. 191 See Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, Kepemimpinan ABRI dalam Sejarah dan Perjuangannya (ABRI Lea- dership in Its History and Struggle), Jakarta: Intermasa, 1996: 4-5. 192 Ibid. 193 “Political Culture,” 2005, loc. cit: 3 (1-4).

42 pivotal to decision-making processes, while conflict and anarchy are to be avoided. As was the case during the Javanese kingdom and Soeharto eras, the major components of the nation’s political culture were derived from two central goals, namely, stability and development. This means that if authority during Soeharto’s rule was based on the military’s coercive support, the government’s legitimacy rested on its success in achieving socio-political stability and economic development.194

Kumar noted that traditional Indonesian culture, which is predominantly reflected by Javanese political culture, is viewed by Western scholars of Indonesia as inimical to democracy and modernization, and, generally, as an obstacle to desirable developments.195 Javanese political culture’s unfavourable fit with democracy has also been observed by Magnis-Suseno and further discussed by Kumar, who quotes Magnis- Suseno’s explanations as follows:

“The Javanese ideal of rukun essentially implies the continuous effort of all individuals to interact peacefully with each other … (and to) repress signs of social or personal tension … The Javanese sense of hierarchy requires everyone, in speech and behaviour, to show proper respect to those with whom one comes into social contact. People in higher positions should be respected … It is easy to show how these ideas must stifle democratic aspirations.”196

Magnis-Suseno goes on to say that the word rukun conveys a type of behaviour, and to act according to rukun means to endeavour, at all times, to repress signs of social or personal tension and to preserve the impression of harmonized social relationships as much as possible.197 It implies continuous efforts by all individuals to interact peacefully with one another as well as to remove potentially divisive and dissonant elements. More fundamentally, rukun demands a comprehensive principle of social order, where everyone must work to prevent anything, which can harm the rukun condition in society -a condition of apparent harmony.198

Referring to the eras of the Javanese kingdoms, Moedjanto stated that the power of a king or a ruler might be illustrated by the size of his army.199 It could also be reflected by the various troops and ceremonial equipment the king possessed. The extent of the king’s power could be seen in the faithfulness of his regents and other officials in carrying

194 Ibid. 195 Kumar, in Kingsbury and Aveling (eds.), 2003, loc. cit: 52. 196 Ibid. 197 Magnis-Suseno, 1997, op .cit: 43. 198 Ibid. 199 Moedjanto, 1993, op. cit: 104.

43 out his orders.200 The greatness of the king’s power was also characterized by other elements, namely:201

1. the vastness of his kingdom’s territory; 2. the number of conquered territories and the nature of the tributes offered by conquered kings; 3. his wealth, the number of honorary titles, and fame.

According to Moedjanto, there was no mention of any division of power, meaning that authority was not divided, but rather remained a totality. An expression of “ngendi ana surya kembar” (only one sun in the world) in Javanese political culture refers to the meaning that there was no one who competed for the king’s power.202 The existence of such terminologies as kawula (servant) for the subject people and gusti (lord) for the king is a further expression of the absolute power of a ruler. According to Magnis-Suseno, this reflected the principle of an integral state or the so-called “manunggaling kawula Gusti” as introduced by founding father Supomo in the formation of the 1945 State Constitution with the goal of guaranteeing unity and harmony among elements of the state.203 People in Java believed that if the king obeyed this concept to its full extent, the country and the people would benefit; however, if the king only obeyed part of the concept, the country would deteriorate and the people would suffer.204

Moedjanto also mentioned that in a materialistic context, the king attempted to control all aspects of life and social economic activities within the community as well as the government of the country. Attempts were made to collect revenues from all possible sources of wealth by, for instance, levying taxes to cover all manner of expenditure, including the upkeep of soldiers, their provisions, military operations, and all sorts of royal celebrations.205 In addition, wealth was also needed to elevate the prestige of the king and the kingdom.

The king centralized all forms of power into his hands. It was also necessary for the king or ruler to gather all available sources of power and strength. These resources may have been of a human nature, e.g. soldiers and regents, but they could also have been of a non-human nature, e.g. indications of God’s predestination or will through divine

200 Ki Reditanaja, Alap-alapan Drusilawati (The Wedding of Drusilawati),Batavia, 1932: 3-4, ibid. 201 Moedjanto, 1993, ibid: 104. 202 Ibid. 203 Franz Magnis-Suseno, Mencari Sosok Demokrasi: Sebuah Telaah Filosofis (Finding Democracy: A Philoshopical Study), Jakarta: PT Gramedia, 1995: 14, 89-91. 204 Moedjanto, 1993, op. cit: 107-108. 205 Ibid: 109.

44 revelation or other signs. In these terms, wealth and a strong army were the first conditions, which needed to be fulfilled.206

Javanese political culture emphasizes the centralization and accumulation of power, control, stability, and state integrity, and also has a fundamental impact on Indonesia’s political system. Anderson uses it as a framework to discuss the country’s slow progress towards democratization and civilian regimes’ reluctance to introduce reform.207 With this background and the lack of a high political culture, which provides chances for negotiations and bargaining, the adoption of cultural theory is helpful to determine military resistance to reform and civilian regimes, in terms of insubordination and coup attempts.208 At this point, resistance and conflicts in society, as well as unconstitutional or undemocratic regime changes often occurred due to power struggles, which are difficult to address if the ruler, as the patron, fails to fulfil his clients’ needs.209

The dominant political culture emphasizes the values of loyalty, collectivism, and unity, and is sensitive to the notions of criticism, freedom, resistance, disobedience, secessionism, and radical change. Furthermore, it preserved the patron-client relationship of traditional society, which refers to low political culture. This stands in contrast to high political culture, which bars the military from interventions, but requires it to respect civilian regimes or uphold civilian supremacy, and introduces negotiations and diplomacy to overcoming problems.210 The relevance of this can also be seen in forms of sensitive response of civilian regimes and military leaders to the notions of the federal state and the elimination of the military’s territorial functions.

I.B.3. Structural Theories

To gain a clearer understanding of the interplay between the military and civilian regime, particularly the military’s response to reform demands in Indonesia’s democratic transition, this research also needs to use structural theories for its macro analysis by examining linkages with the condition of the state in general at the time when the interplay occurred.211 Structuralism contributes to a deeper analysis of the military response to the civilian regime’s performance. At this point, factors external to the military, such as the weak condition of the civilian government and civil society, political decay, corruption, worsening economic conditions, and a high degree of social inequality

206 Ibid: 110. 207 See BORG Anderson, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture,” in Claire Holt (ed.), Culture and Poli- tics in Indonesia, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972: 1-69. 208 See Finer, 1967, op.cit; also, Kourvetaris in Danopoulos (ed.), 1998, loc. cit: 271, 273. 209 See Anggoro, 2003, loc. cit. 210 See again Kouvertaris, in Danopoulos, 1988, loc. cit. 211 Ibid: 270-272.

45 can be examined to see whether the military made any use of its politics of anti-politics, and also to explain military resistance to reform or its counterproductive behaviour in democratic transition.212

Structural theories expose a disruption in the political process and a vacuum of power, which could draw in the military and become politicised if there is a civilian political failure.213 Such political failure can be corruption, factionalism, political decay, illegitimacy and inefficiency of civilian political leadership. All of these defects may endanger national security and justify the military stepping in and interfering to preserve stability, law, and order.214 As a consequence, the stability of the state is seen as one of the most important factors inhibiting military interventions. Weak governments rather than strong armies, account for the occurrence of military coups.215

In regard to structural factors, Muhaimin lists reasons, which motivate the military to enter the political arena and take on a political role sharing a strong relation with the condition of the country’s political life and political system. He argues that instability in the country’s political system opens wide the opportunities for the military to use force to improve the situation and bring back stability.216 Often, such structural factors harm the reputation of a civilian government. Thus, in a situation where the civilian political leadership is corrupt, weak, or cannot handle the fundamental tasks of a government, there is heightened motivation for political intervention by the military.217

From a similar perspective, Singh views military intervention in politics as an implication of political, economic, and social crisis resulting from state changes.218 Quoting Amos Perlmutter, Singh supports this argument by saying that military regimes exist in changing societies, which lack political order and legitimacy.219 They grow in unstable administrations that are not politically developed or structurally integrated. In most cases, the administration has never functioned or has already started to malfunction. Military regimes are established to replace weak civilian regimes, and weak executives and governments.

212 Brian Loveman linked threat to state integrity with military’s politics of anti-politics, see Loveman, 1999: 186, 213, 254-255; and also Loveman and Davies, Jr., (eds.), 1978: 5 & 12. 213 See Kouvertaris, in Danoupoulos, 1988, loc. cit. 214 Ibid. 215 Dankwart Rostow, quoted in Lee Sigelman, “Research Note: Military Size and Political Intervention,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Volume 3, Spring, 1975: 95-100. 216 Muhaimin, 1982, op. cit: 3. 217 Ibid: 4. 218 Singh, 1996, op. cit: 7. 219 See Amos Perlmutter, “The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations, Aspirations, and Achievements,” World Politics, Vol. 33, No. 1, October 1980: 97.

46 In Crouch’s terminology, the structural factors listed above are identified as external factors resulting from socio-economic conditions, political situations, and international influence, which can influence the military to intervene in politics.220 The existence of international factors is mentioned by Crouch in extending important conditions for a broader military intervention in politics.221 The impact of political situations becomes significant due to the unstable domestic situation produced by the civilian authority’s ineffectiveness in managing its own administration. As stated by Crouch, the failure of civilian government to preserve stability and achieve a satisfactory level of economic growth leads to a loss of legitimacy of the military, which makes the military resistant to radical reform.222 Such a failure provides not only a reason but also the perfect chance for the military to intervene. Conversely, a strong and effective civilian government, which has successfully maintained its legitimacy, can evidently avoid the possibility of a military coup. Therefore, the existence of a political system with a selfish and corrupt civilian government and politicians, which has lost people’s credibility, offers a justifiable reason for the military to become more involved in politics.223 This situation occurred in most of the Third World countries where the military eventually overthrew the civilian regime, which, according to Huntington, caused praetorianism, through which the guardian takes on the position of the master they once guarded.224

Claude E. Welch recognizes eight factors, which encourage the military to continue to intervene in politics and resist reform demands. These factors include:225

1. The decreasing prestige and role of main political parties; 2. Frictions among prominent politicians; 3. Increasing efforts to prevent foreign threats and intervention; 4. The negative impacts of coup d’etat in neighbouring countries; 5. Internal conflicts, in particular, social and ethnic conflicts; 6. Economic malaise; 7. Corruption and inefficiency of the civilian government; 8. Increasing consciousness among the military elite of their power and capability to influence and replace civilian political leaders.

220 See Crouch in Ahmad and Crouch (eds.), 1985, loc. cit: 288. 221 Ibid; Singh, 1996, op.cit: 12. 222 Crouch, in Ahmad and Crouch (eds.), 1985, loc. cit: 294. 223 Singh, 1996, op. cit: 11. 224 David E. Albright, “A Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” World Politics, Vol. 33, No. 4, July 1984: 553-576, quoted by Taufik Abdullah in “Civil-Military Relations in the Third World: An Introductory Taxonomy,” Prisma, No. 20, March 1981: 4-5; see also Singh, 1996, ibid. 225 Claude E. Welch (ed.), Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change, Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1970: 17-35, ibid.

47 Sundhaussen argues that the withdrawal of the military from politics depends on structural factors, such as the emergence of civilian counter-elites, the middle class, labour organizations, and vocal opposition. These are all positive impacts of economic and political developments.226 Furthermore, international allies’ support of the military, or their withdrawal of this support provokes the military to resist going back to the barracks.227 However, Singh says that the dynamics of internal rather than external politics influence the military.228 It is also noted by Singh that the emergence of an organized and moderate political party and civilian leaders, which are able to run a stable government and ready to protect national interest and secure the interest of the military, will cause the military to leave the political arena.229 Political symbioses built by the new civilian political elite and middle class determine whether military intervention in politics will end or not.230 In other words, in the long run, the existence of new and effective civilian authorities, which can attend to the state’s interests and will not lead it into political chaos and instability, will determine whether the military returns to the barracks or rises to block reform demands.

Apart from the disagreement with Huntington, who says that military interventions in politics cannot be explained with military reasons, his theory is justifiable and points to the causes of interventions being in the political and institutional structure of society.231 Military interventions in developing societies are only one specific aspect in a condition where politics tends to lack autonomy, complexity, consistency, and adaptability.232 Therefore, when many different types of social forces and special groups, such as universities, the clergy, labour unions, and so forth, become “politicized,” or they become directly active in general politics and issues that influence not only their own group, but society as a whole, the military will respond in a similar fashion. This means that military men are concerned not only with the particular intentions of promoting increased pay and power for the military, but also with the distribution of power and prestige throughout the political system.

Huntington argues more clearly that the absence or weakness of effective political institutions will cause military officers to play a political role. Such institutions normally allow for social forces to participate in politics, or in the condition which is recognized as a praetorian society.233 In this situation, power is fragmented, causing authority and office

226 Sundhaussen, in Ahmad and Crouch (eds.), 1985, loc. cit: 272 et seqq. 227 Crouch says that international support for the military is effective in situations when civilian regime has lost most its power. See Crouch, in Ahmad and Crouch (eds.), 1985, ibid: 299. 228 Singh, 1996, op. cit: 20. 229 Ibid. 230 Ibid: 21-22. 231 Huntington, 1975, op. cit. 232 See also, Perlmutter, 1980, loc. cit: 203-204. 233 Huntington, 1975, op. cit: 110.

48 to be easily gained and lost. In search of power, politicians simply shift their loyalties from one social group to another. The degree to which military institutions and representatives are involved in politics correlates directly with the weakness of the function of civilian political organizations and the incapability of civilian political figures to cope with various crucial problems facing the country.234 A veto coup, an extreme sort of intervention, occurs if the existing government begins to carry out multiple radical policies, or seeks the support of various groups in eliminating the military from the political arena.235

Fidel describes that, in the past, military intervention in politics was most often rooted in political issues and, in particular, questions of political legitimacy. In contrast, modern-day interventions are likely to be motivated by more pragmatic questions, such as the failure of civilian leadership or government to set up and implement acceptable development programs or the inability of the civilian government to maintain domestic order.236 At this point, the military’s concern with developmental questions is also a function of the fact that social change or stagnation fundamentally disturb both the personal and corporate status of the military.237 Developmental stagnation, which causes genuine concern for people’s living conditions, becomes a strong source of motivation. Fidel explains that in the absence of progress under the existing social and political order, military men may begin to consider their personal and collective role in society in terms of a historic mission. Also, military interest in development possibly has its roots in the desire to control the nature of change so as not to radically alter the present condition of the officer corps and the role of the military institution. In sharp contrast with these inflexible officers, others perceive change as inevitable and they concentrate their efforts on becoming involved in change processes and preventing others from exercising a veto power over programs that potentially press the military from their advantageous position in society.238

Lieuwen has pointed to both the structural condition and encouraging environment as causes of praetorianism, or military intervention in politics.239 Drawing on cases in Latin America, he claimed that the re-emergence of the military on the region’s political scene was a by-product of the area’s developing economic and social crisis, which political institutions were not strong enough to restrain. In the resulting political chaos, the military was called on or forced to intervene again and again.240 Lieuwen also found that whenever the military took on political power, whatever the actual reason, it claimed

234 Huntington, 1968, op. cit: 346. 235 Ibid: 349. 236 Fidel (ed.), 1986, loc. cit: 4. 237 Ibid: 7. 238 Ibid: 8. 239 Lieuwen, 1965, op. cit: 24.

49 it was doing so only because the civilian government has failed. According to the military, it was supposedly solely motivated by the purest of patriotic goals and, serious national circumstances necessitated its intervention. Lieuwen mentioned that since independence, the military has developed the determined principle that its responsibility is to step forward in times of internal crisis to rescue the nation from itself.241

Perlmutter adds that the collapse of executive power is a major precondition for praetorianism, namely, “a situation where the military class of a given society exercises independent power by virtue of an actual or threatened use of force.”242 He argues that in modern praetorian states, the military challenges civilian legitimacy while offering a new type of political authority. The decline of authority, weak and ineffective political parties, and the absence of social cohesion in the state help to explain why the military tends to intervene.243 Disregarding both the institutional and individual interests of the military, he emphasizes that military intervention into civilian affairs is usually not triggered by military groups, but by civilians. He found in most cases that when civilian political structures and institutions failed, when factionalism developed, and when constitutional means for carrying out political actions were lacking, civilians turned to the military for political support.244 Thus, whatever type of intervention the military undertakes --acting as an arbitrator, ruler, or moderator-- there must be, in essence, a reciprocal situation or problem. Relevant examples include problems with the political system and structure, such as highly politicized civilian and military institutions, weak political institutions and social cohesion, or divisions among civilians.245

Huntington and Finer have similar views on the connection between these problems with the state’s political structure and institutions and the specific types of military intervention. At this point, both argue that a state with a mature or advanced political structure and institutions maintains political autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability, but at the same time does not have a political army, political bureaucracy, government business, or political religious corps. Conversely, a state with low or poor political structure and institutions retains no political autonomy, complexity, coherence, or adaptability. However, this state will have a political army, political bureaucracy, government business, and political religious corps.246 Finer insists that in a state with a mature or advanced political system, the level of military intervention is low,

240 Ibid: 123. 241 Ibid: 124. 242 Perlmutter and Bennett (eds.), 1980, loc. cit: 8-9, 199; See also Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977: 89. 243 Ibid: 15-16, 205. 244 Amos Perlmutter, “The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army,” Comparative Politics, April 1969: 390-391, quoted by Perlmutter and Bennet (eds.), 1980, loc. cit: 205. 245 Ibid: 205-208, 254-264. 246 Sundhaussen, 1986, op. cit: 440-447; Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, et al, 1999, op. cit: 43.

50 while in a state with a low or poor political system, the level of military intervention is high.247

The relevance of political structure and military intervention is also mentioned by Sundhaussen.248 The failure of the civilian regime to develop a political system, which guarantees political order and stability, contributes to its weakness. In the meantime, the incapability of a civilian regime to deal with the national disintegration caused by this failure further encourages the military to interfere in politics.

Nonetheless, for Crouch there is no single factor that is sufficient to explain why the military intervenes in politics or when such an intervention would occur.249 Likewise, Fidel emphasizes that employing a single approach, hypothesis, or theory to explain military intervention or resistance fails to clearly describe cases, which take place in certain countries. He agrees with Fidel that military intervention or resistance may very well occur in conjunction with a combination of various conditions.250 Huntington acknowledges that an explanation will succeed not by its austerity, but rather its comprehensiveness.251

Therefore, by using a combination of micro and macro level analysis and simultaneously adopting actor, cultural, and structural theories, this research aims to comprehensively describe and explain actor constellations, their rational calculations, compromises, alliances, co-operations, supports or resistances, as well as conflicts inside the military and civilian regime, and between parties. In addition, the modes of interaction of the two parties in the form of unilateral action, negotiated agreement, majority vote, and hierarchical direction will be more clearly portrayed.252 Therefore, actor theories are used to examine the internal side of the military, while cultural and structural theories are used to examine the external side of the military in relation with its response to reform introduced by civilian regimes during democratic transition.

II. Methodology

II.A. Assumptions and Hypotheses

The basic assumptions in this research are as follows:

247 Sundhaussen, op.cit: 442; Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, et al, 1999, op.cit: 42. 248 Sundhaussen, op.cit: 440-473; Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, et al, 1999, op,cit: 40. 249 Crouch, in Ahmad and Crouch (eds.), 1985, loc. cit: 299. 250 Fidel (ed.), 1986, loc. cit: 3. 251 Huntington, 1991, op. cit: xiii. 252 Scharpf, 1997, op.cit: 44-47.

51 (1) Given the fact that since independence the Indonesian military has been actively involved in politics, and that there has been no major political crisis in the country’s history without their involvement on an individual, group, or institutional basis, the Indonesian military has been sensitive to civilian regimes’ moves to introduce reform, particularly radical reform;253 (2) It was not easy to implement the concept of civilian supremacy in the early years of post-Soeharto transition as there was an absence of common perceptions among military and civilian leaders.

The hypotheses of the research examine different relations as follows:

(1) On the one hand, the lack of compromises, incentives, or compensation offered by civilian regimes to the Indonesian military, and on the other hand, the potential loss of many vested interests faced by the Indonesian military, encouraged them to resist reform and the civilian regimes that introduced it; (2) The less threatened the vested interests of the Indonesian military were by the reform policies of the civilian regimes, the more likely it was to offer favourable responses or support of such policies and the respective regimes; (3) The combination of historical and cultural factors and the civilian regimes’ poor performance increased the Indonesian military’s resistance to reform.

The historical and cultural factors constitute a contextual factor that influences the interaction between the civilian regime performances, the independent variable, and the military response, the dependent variable in this case. Their influences are structural and persistent, reflecting a path-dependency of the Indonesian politics. An analytical model of this study is presented below.

Diagram 1

Model of Analysis

Independent Variables Dependent Variables

Historical and Cultural Factors

Civilian Regime’s Military Performance Response

253 For an insightful study of the transition from Soeharto to Habibie, see Marcus Mietzner, “From Soeharto to Habibie: the Indonesian Armed Forces and Political Islam during the Transition,” in Geoff Forrester (ed.), Post-Suharto Indonesia: Renewal of Chaos?, Singapore and Leiden: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and KITLV Press, 1999: 65-102.

52 II.B. Description of Variables, Concepts, and Indicators

Civilian Regime’s Performance refers to a civilian regime’s reform policies, particularly in regards to military and security sector reform, and how these reforms are implemented. This will be studied by examining the capability of three post-Soeharto civilian governments to introduce and implement security sector reforms and whether or not they needed to make compromises and give incentives or compensation to the military. Regime performance is measured by examining the regimes’ capability in investigating and prosecuting Soeharto for his corruption, collusion, and nepotism as well as the military for its human rights violations. Also examined will be the governments’ approach to the separatist conflicts mounted in the early years of democratic transition. Correlations with the military response to their reform policies are also studied in order to determine whether they were influenced by historical and cultural factors and resulted in the military’s support or resistance.

Historical and Cultural Factors refer to the ideas and views espoused by civilian regimes and military leaders regarding reforms that should be implemented, which can be influenced by the historical background of the formation of the Indonesian state and military, and the cultural norms and views of civilian regimes and military leaders. This influence is investigated by examining their family, educational, ethnic and religious backgrounds, linkages (including to conservative Muslim groups), standpoints, thoughts, statements, and opinions of each civilian regime and key military officials on reform. The influence of historical and cultural factors will be identified by looking at the ideas and views of civilian regimes and military leaders on Soeharto, state integrity, the unitary state, centralization or accumulation of power, culture of violence, devolution, federalism, Islam, syariah law, and the formation of an Islamic state. The study evaluates whether the civilian regimes and military leaders encouraged and supported reform, or whether they were reluctant and resisted to it because of their strong willingness to defend the old principles of the state ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 State Constitution. These principles emphasized the centralization and accumulation of power and control, harmony, stability, and state integrity. They also rejected the adoption of syariah law, due to the dominant influence of Javanese culture and their resistance to the rising pressure of militant Islam in the country.

More specifically, Historical and Cultural Factors refer to the conservative views of the civilian regimes and military leaders in maintaining Pancasila and the NKRI

53 (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia --the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia), and in glorifying the important role of the Indonesian military since independence. Historical and Cultural Factors support the military’s role in politics as well as their resistance to federalism. They also help explain the military’s obsession with state stability and integrity, and their reluctance and resistance to further democratization due to the prevalence of a low political culture. This concept of a “low political culture” refers to the civilian regimes’ and military leaders’ failure to employ democratic means, such as negotiations and diplomacy, to handle problems during democratic transition, particularly dissatisfaction and open conflicts, which led to insubordination and coup attempts. On the other hand, “high political culture” is characterized by military subordination to the civilian regimes and its obedience to the principles of civilian supremacy.

Military Response refers to any form of support or resistance by the armed forces to reforms introduced by the civilian regimes in four main areas, namely, (1) military and security sector reform; (2) investigation and prosecution of Soeharto’s alleged cases of corruption, collusion, and nepotism; (3) investigation and prosecution of the military’s alleged cases of human rights violations; and (4) the handling of separatist conflicts and proponents of syariah law. Military support demonstrates the military’s acceptance of reform demands and civilian regimes’ reform policies. Resistance, on the other hand, refers to the military’s negative reactions and continued rejection of reform.

Military support is analyzed for cases such as the abolition of the military chief for political and social affairs post, regional commands, and the military faction in parliament. I will also examine the separation of military and police organizations, the appointment of a civilian minister of defence, and the withdrawal of military officials from state institutions. This helps to further explain the military’s institutional and behavioural changes. At the same time, military resistance will be studied by examining the military’s interest in maintaining territorial commands, prerogatives, off-budget or illegal business activities, involvement in ethnic, religious, and separatist conflicts, as well as human rights violations and resistance to the prosecution of these violations. Its roles in making politics of anti-politics, in being a veto-player, and in showing insubordination to the civilian presidents and minister of defence will also be examined.

In general, the military response will be explored by examining the involvement of the military in the country’s day-to-day politics, and by analyzing whether or not its politics of anti-politics and activities as a veto player were still being executed, for example, during amendment processes for the 1945 State Constitution and the drafting of new laws redefining and repositioning the post-Soeharto military. Specific cases will also be analyzed, including the military’s reaction to the announcing of states of emergency and the subordination of the chief commander to the minister of defence, as well as the repositioning and reorganization of the ministry of defence. The level of resistance,

54 whether low or high, is measured according to how many cases of military resistance were recorded in response to the reform policies of each civilian regime.

The period from 1998-2004 has been chosen for analysis because it fully encompasses the three civilian regimes of Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati, as well as the first democratic legislative election following the fall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime. Civilian regimes in this research refer to all post-Soeharto civilian presidents with no military careers or background in their lives. It cannot, however, be ignored that during this period of democratic transition, there were also ex-military and active generals in their respective cabinets, including the coordinating minister for politics and security and military chief commander. In other words, the members of the civilian administrations were not complete newcomers and free of all influences of the previous authoritarian regime. However, their presidencies can still be identified as civilian regimes. Lower numbers of retired military officers and active generals, and a more dominant presence and influence of civilians in decision-making processes in their cabinets justify the assessment of the Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati administrations as civilian regimes.

In this dissertation, democratic transition refers to the transformation and change of a political regime from a non-democratic to a democratic regime, or the interval between one political regime and another during the democratization process.254 It covers the period following the dissolution of an authoritarian regime and the installation of new regimes in the process of democratic consolidation.255

This study focuses on the period of struggle for democratization following the fall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime. This period must be dissociated from “democratic consolidation” which refer to the post-transition period in which “the military becomes firmly subordinated to civilian control and solidly committed to the democratic constitutional order.”256 Democratization itself refers to:

“The processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship were either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (e.g. coercive control, social tradition, expert judgement, or administrative practice) expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations (e.g. non-taxpayers, illiterates, women, youth, ethnic minorities, foreign residents), or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to public participation (e.g.

254 O’Donnell and Schmitter in O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (eds.), 1986, loc. cit: 6. 255 Ibid. 256 Diamond in Diamond, Plattner, Yun, and Hung, 1997, loc. cit: xxviii; see also Linz and Stepan in Liddle (ed.), 2001, loc. cit: 17-28.

55 state agencies, military establishments, partisan organizations, interest associations, productive enterprises, educational institutions, etc.).”257 To highlight linkages between the variables and indicators, a matrix analysis is presented below.

Table 1 Matrix of Analysis

Variables Civilian Regimes (Habibie, Wahid, Megawati)  Policies for military reform  Actions targeting Soeharto’s alleged cases of corruption, collusion, and nepotism Regime Performance  Coping with human rights abuses allegedly involving the military, and prosecuting the guilty parties  Coping with separatist movements; coping with radical Muslims  Personal, family, ethnic, religious background  Political linkages and alliances; relations with radical Muslims Historical/Cultural  Views on constitutional and law reform Factors  Views on separatist movements  Views and commitment to the unitary state  Views on an Islamic state or syariah law  Support Military Response  Compromise  Resistance

257 Diamond, in Diamond, Plattner, Yun, and Hung, 1997, loc.cit.

56 II. C. Research Instruments and Analysis

To ensure that balanced information was collected, all indicators of the Civilian Regime’s Performance and the Military Response variables were examined using recent books, mass-media reports, survey results, official speeches, investigation reports of government and non-government organizations, observational notes, and documentary studies as well as structured and in-depth interviews with relevant civilians and military figures, activists, and analysts.

Literature, biographies and autobiographies, documents, mass-media opinions and interviews were used to analyze the Historical and Cultural Factors in order to understand how the civilian regimes and military leaders share their beliefs in their own political culture. Key figures with strategic positions and influence both in the civilian administrations as well as in the military are primary sources of information. Alternative sources are prominent figures who were for or against radical reform and those who have been generally recognized as pro- or anti-democracy, conservatives, progressive, soft- liners or hard-liners in both civilian regimes and military institutions. Most of them witnessed the transitional change in Indonesia. Former and current national and international human rights leaders and activists were also interviewed to make this research more comprehensive.

Overall, forty-three military and civilian figures were interviewed during 2005- 2008. Interviews were conducted in Jakarta, Bogor, Maluku, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, East Nusa Tenggara, West Timor and Irian Jaya provinces, where main incidents, rebellions and military operations have occurred. The names and the backgrounds of the interviewees are presented in the appendix. In-depth and structured interviews were conducted for 1-2 hours, during which tape recorder was not used to give chance to the informants to freely express their opinions. Nonetheless, notes were made during interviews, followed by summaries after every interview has been concluded. Also, every informant has been asked whether their names and information may be cited or not. In fact, most informants have no objections their names and information can be cited.

In addition to the literature reviews and interviews, the researcher’s personal notes recorded in Indonesia from 1998-2004 were also used as source material. These notes were compiled from various sources, including journalists, non-government organizations, and fact-finding teams. The use of the personal notes is complemented by an examination of official documents such as the constitution, laws, and parliamentary minutes and records, as well as presidential decrees and instructions.

Library studies were conducted in Indonesia and Germany, and fieldwork was carried out in different regions of Indonesia. Questionnaires were prepared as guidance for structured and in-depth interviews. Standard questions and other filtering, controlling,

57 or verification questions were used to obtain more reliable and objective information. A cross-check analysis using different sources of information was carried out to gain better insights into what occurred inside the civilian regimes and the military, and their interplay during the 1998-2004 democratic transition.

This dissertation on the Indonesian military response to reform in democratic transition under three civilian regimes from 1998-2004 is therefore an applied qualitative research which employs a descriptive-interpretative analytical method. A systematic analysis is presented on a regime-by-regime, case-by-case, and year-by-year basis. In addition, all of the research findings are presented in the form of a qualitative research report.

58 Chapter Three

The Habibie Regime (1998-1999)

I. Coping with Military Reform

I.A. What Had Influenced Habibie to Introduce Reform?

This section opens with a discussion of President Habibie’s background. Indonesia’s third president was born in South Sulawesi to Javanese and Sulawesi parents. His mother and his wife are both descendants of Javanese nobles, and three of his brothers in law are two star generals of the army.1 The young Habibie was a serious student, and was described as highly energetic, mercurial in his temperament, excitable and dismissive of criticism. He pursued higher education in Java at the prestigious Bandung Institute of Technology (Institut Teknologi Bandung --ITB), and went to Germany after obtaining his diploma. There he studied at the RWTH Aachen Institute of Technology from 1955 until 1965. After receiving his doctorate, he pursued a career as an aeronautical engineer by working at the Hamburger Flugzeugbau, later known as the Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) company, until 1973.

Habibie returned to Indonesia in 1974 upon the request of President Soeharto, through his special envoy, Lt. Gen. Ibnu Soetowo, who was director general of Pertamina, the state oil company, to lead the country in drafting strategies to achieve its technological goals.2 Soon afterward, he presided over several large and high cost state owned-enterprises, for instance, the national ship (Perusahaan Perkapalan --PAL) and aircraft industries (Industri Pesawat Terbang Nasional --IPTN), and then became the state minister for research and technology in 1978.

His political career began in 1982 when he became a member of the MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly), a representative of the ruling Golkar (Golongan Karya --Functional Group) Party. His membership in the group reached its peak with his 1990 election as the chairperson of the ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia -- Association of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). His significant role in the ICMI led him to be appointed as Soeharto’s deputy (vice-president) in March 1998 before he eventually replaced the former strong man of the Orde Baru (New Order) two months later.

1 A. Makmur Makka (ed.), 60 Tahun Habibie (60 Years Habibie), Jakarta: Pustaka Cidesindo, 1996; George Junus Aditjondro, Korupsi Kepresidenan, Reproduksi Oligarki Berkaki Tiga: Istana, Tangsi, dan Partai Penguasa (Presidential Graft, Reproduction of Three Feet Oligarchy of Palace, Military and Ruler’s Party), Yogyakarta, LKiS, 2006: 376-377. 2 James Castles et al (eds.), Who’s Who in Indonesia’s Political Arena, The Players, The Parties: A Com- prehensive Guide, Jakarta: Castle, 1999.

58 Interestingly Franz Magnis-Suseno mentions that Habibie’s background does not make him a typical Javanese, but rather more of an urbane leader with a broad international vision. He was able to accept modernity and generally did not want to act in the manner of a member of the Javanese political elite.3 He didn’t beat around the bush when talking with other people, and expressed his opinions and wishes transparently without using too much basa-basi (introductions). He urged people to immediately support his ideas, which is highly contradictory with behaviors commonly demonstrated by Javanese people. The long time he spent studying and working in Germany influenced his ways of making decisions, often ignoring the urun-rembug (deliberation) practiced in Javanese tradition.4 Unlike Javanese kings and leaders in general, he made decisions based on logic and scientific considerations, avoiding mystical calculations.

Unlike Sukarno and Soeharto, whose backgrounds were totally Javanese, and both of which never studied abroad, Habibie’s experiences were much different, and, hence, so were his style and outlook. Perhaps it was his time spent in Europe that made him different. He was educated in the West and spent many years of his adult life there. In many ways, he had adopted a Western lifestyle and outlook, and was very adept in dealing with the Western world, unlike his predecessors. In many ways, he also approached problems from a Western perspective due to his scientific outlook and training. Accepting or adopting Western democracy and all the attendant values that arose from it was not difficult for him.5

I.B. Habibie and His Reform Policies

Habibie introduced political liberalization shortly after he was installed as the new President on May 28, 1998. He offered amnesty to political prisoners and erased the sentences of those who had been labeled as leftist or rightist extremists in the past and had become the military targets due to their alleged subversive activities, for instance, Pramoedya Ananta Toer and Hussain Al-Habsyi. He opened up freedom of expression and ordered the minister of information (Menteri Penerangan --Menpen), Lt. Gen. (ret) Junus Josfiah, to annul the press enterprise permit letter (Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Press --SIUPP). By September 1999, he had enacted Law No. 40/1999 to guarantee freedom of the press in the country. During May 1998-August 1999, about 1,600 new press licences were issued by his government, which was more than six times as many compared to the 32 years of Soeharto’s rule during which only 241 press licences were

3 Makka (ed.), 1996, loc. cit: 449. 4 Franz Magnis-Suseno was interviewed on November 14, 2007 in Jakarta. 5 Bilveer Singh, Succession Politics in Indonesia: The 1998 Presidential Election and the Fall of Soeharto, London: Macmillan Press, 2000: 266-267.

59 permitted.6 The new situation made the press become more liberal, although the ministry of information was maintained. In February 1999, he signed a new law on political parties, under which new political parties could be freely founded and were not required to have Pancasila as their sole ideology. In total, between June 1998 and September 1999, sixty-seven new laws were passed by the Habibie government and the newly energized parliament, which was to emerge beyond its rubber stamp status.7 These achievements were very much appreciated by observers and critics, such as, Franz Magnis-Suseno and Marzuki Darusman.8

Not surprisingly, once Habibie’s initial efforts to embrace reforms had been conducted, this caused negative impacts for military officers. The release of political prisoners and the flourishing freedom of expression encouraged radical students and reform activists to question the role of military officers in past political interventions that had resulted in gross human rights abuses, for instance, the July 27, 1996 attacks of Megawati’s PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia --Indonesian Democratic Party) headquarters and the May 13-15, 1998 riots. In response, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid, Minister of Home Affairs (Menteri Dalam Negeri --Mendagri), sued Detak tabloid and Merdeka daily due to their reports on his alleged involvement in the July 27, 1996 case.9 At the same time, Jakarta regional (Kodam Jayakarta) commander, Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, had prosecuted Tajuk magazine for its reports on his alleged involvements in the May 13-15, 1998 riots.10

Nevertheless, Habibie supported the amendments to the 1945 state constitution and laws that would affect --directly, or indirectly-- the military’s future role. The amendments had changed, for example, the composition of parliament, which reduced the number of military members at all levels. On a national level, their seats in the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat --People’s Consultative Assembly) and DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat --House of Representatives) had been reduced by about 50 percent, from 75 to 38 percent. This cutback was also encouraged for provincial and municipality parliaments (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tingkat I dan II --DPRD I and II). As a

6 Lukas Luwarso,”Pers Indonesia, Pergulatan untuk Kebebasan” (“Indonesian Pers, Struggle for Freedom”), [email protected], http:// www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2000/08/31/0006.html: 11. 7 Dephumham, http://www.legalitas.org, was accessed on June 11, 2009. 8 Franz Magnis Suseno was interviewed on November 14, 2007 in Jakarta; Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on December 17, 2007 in Jakarta. 9 In interview on January 27, 2008 in Jakarta, Lt. Gen. Syarwan described that he was largely discredited by the reports. 10 Ahmad Syafei, “Pers Masih Jadi Kambing Hitam” (“Pers Is Still a Scape Goat”), Suara Merdeka, Febru- ary 9, 2002, http://www.suara-merdeka.com/harianb/0202/09/analisis1.htm: 1; Luwarso, 2000, loc. cit: 12.

60 result, the number of military officers appointed as members of parliament at both the national and regional levels was cut in half, and affected 2,800 officers.11

Habibie also urged military leaders to stop practicing fungsi kekaryaan, or appointing active duty soldiers to non-military functions or civilian assignments, and to withdraw active officers from bureaucratic and elective posts in the government. Thus, the officers had to resign from their military careers if they wanted to occupy positions in political parties and compete in elections to serve as members of parliament, governors, or majors. During the elections, they had to distance themselves from political parties and restrain from influencing their old ally, the Golkar Party.

Catering to the demands of radical students and activists for security sector reform, Habibie encouraged the military to assume a new name, causing it to make a significant adjustment from its previous name, which had amassed such notoriety, the ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia --the Indonesian armed forces, including the national police). The new name was to be TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia --the Indonesian military, not including the national police) starting from April 1, 1999. The return to its name of the early post-independence period was an attempt to improve the military’s image in the reform era, although in reality it could not dissociate itself from the New Order. 12 The national police force was separated from the military, and thus, primary responsibility for internal security was transferred to the police. They assumed a security function, while the military focused solely on defense matters. Consequently, the Department of Defense and Security (Dephankam) was renamed the Department of Defense (Dephan) in accordance with the military’s new role.

Moreover, Habibie endorsed calls for the replacement of the Kasospol (Kepala Staf Sosial Politik --military chief of staff for social and political affairs), whose tasks dealt mainly with political matters in order to control political parties, parliament, bureaucracy, and civil society. This position was replaced with the Kaster (Kepala Staf Teritorial --military chief of staff for territorial functions), whose tasks would no longer have any relation with political matters. This change led to the abolition of the TNI’s socio-political council and its staff throughout various regions of the country. In addition, Habibie endorsed the liquidation of the military’s extra-judicial agency, Bakorstanas (Badan Kordinasi Pemeliharaan Stabilitas Nasional --coordinating agency for the maintenance of national stability), which had been misused to control civilian political activities.

11 Harold Crouch, “Wiranto and Habibie: military-civilian relations since May 1998,” in Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury (eds.), Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, Australia: Mo- nash Asia Institute, 1999: 140. 12 Patrick Ziegenhain,The Indonesian Parliament and Democratization, Singapore, ISEAS, 2008: 88.

61 It is also important to note that Soeharto’s successor pushed the military to introduce these reforms despite offering incentives. For example, in 1999 he only allocated 5.31 percent of the national revenue and expenditure budget or the Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (APBN), 13 or about 0.94 percent from Indonesia’s GDP, 14 to the institution. It was a major drop compared to Soeharto’s authoritarian regime. In 1988, for example, this figure reached 2 percent.15 Even as the country fell into the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Soeharto still continued to allocate a higher budget to his military, namely 1.3 percent of GDP.16 With the severe burden inherited from the 1997 crisis, Indonesia’s GDP in 1998 shrunk by 13.1 percent, a sharp drop from the 7.8 percent growth posted in 1997.17 Unemployment figures rose from 4,275,000 in 1997 to 5,063,000 in 1998, or from 4.7 percent to 5.5 percent,18 while GNP per capita fell to Rp. 1.1 million in 1998 from 2.2 million in 1997. 19 These factors certainly produced unfavorable conditions for President Habibie to push military reform.

Nonetheless, aside from the unfavorable economic conditions described above, President Habibie still recommended that the military discontinue its dual function and withdraw its involvement in day-to-day politics. The military, of course, became inconvenienced by his political liberalization and moves to appease radical students and reform activists, since the ban on public criticism of TNI members had been lifted. Thus, they were also condemned for their role as the protector of the past regime, which had caused their image to fall dramatically from a position of supremacy to the lowest level possible.

With the support of the reform movement amid the euphoria of democratization following the resignation of Soeharto, at the beginning of his administration, President Habibie capitalized on the civilian supremacy over the military by introducing political liberalization, which implicated the military and placed it under public scrutiny.20 The wave of condemnation had forced Gen. Wiranto, the chief commander, to offer an explicit apology for wrongdoings. This was utterly unprecedented since the formation of TNI.21 This situation would surely call the TNI’s historical role into question, which

13 J. Danang Widoyoko, “Dilema Anggaran Pertahanan” (“Defense Budget Dilemma”), paper, workshop on defence forces reform organized by Imparsial, Jakarta, April 25-29: 1-15. 14 “Indonesian Military,” http://www.nationmaster.com/country/id-indonesia/mil-military: 1, was accessed on March 21, 2009. 15 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in Widoyoko, loc.cit. 16 Ibid. 17 Laporan Tahunan Bank Indonesia 2002 (Bank Indonesia Report 2002), Jakarta: Bank Indonesia, 2003: 28. 18 Key Indicators 2002 of Developing Asian Pacific Countries, ADB, 2003: 172-173. 19 Laporan Tahunan Bank Indonesia 2002 (Bank Indonesia Report 2002), Jakarta: Bank Indonesia, 2003, op. cit: 45. 20 See Honna, 2003, op.cit: 200. 21 Harold Crouch, ”Establishing Civilian Supremacy in Southeast Asia,” in Uwe Johannen and James Go- mez (eds.), Democratic Transition in Asia, Singapore: Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 2001: 177.

62 could lead to the loss of additional vested-interests it had enjoyed since independence as well as its roots in the nation’s political culture.

I.C. Military’s Earlier Reactions

Due to its essential role since the formation of the state, as identified, for example, by Huntington, the military became the first group to anticipate the trend that would end up affecting its very existence. The military’s fear of losing its long-established prerogative, as mentioned by Aguero and Stepan,22 motivated it to actively address the reforms raised during transition. They were aware that the new political constellations and configuration of elites would determine the new rules and procedures that would govern them.

On January 28, 1999, three election laws, which would provide for open, free, and fair polling, were completely rewritten by a group of academic experts known as the Panitia Tujuh (Team of Seven) and passed by the parliament. All major parties and political leaders, including those from opposition groups, appeared willing to participate in the new legislative elections, which would be held by June 7, 1999 under these new ground rules. The three laws covered the requirements for forming political parties, the election system, and the composition of the national and local representative bodies. More specifically, the new election system law provided that the KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum --National Elections Commission) would be responsible for overseeing the June 7, 1999 elections. Among its tasks was the appointment of the Indonesian Election Commission (PPI) members, the next lower level of the election bureaucracy. It was also charged with creating procedures for use in polling, coordinating election monitors, allocating the number of seats assigned to each province, counting votes and announcing the final results, and determining which “social functional groups” were eligible to nominate people to fill the sixty-five appointed seats in the MPR. Given the broad powers of the KPU and the voting system within the commission, its membership was of critical importance to controlling and shaping the results of the coming elections and the new composition of legislative bodies, which would influence the future of the country’s reforms.23

The election system law also stipulated that the KPU would be composed of one representative from each party competing in the elections and five members appointed by the government. The two groups of party representatives and government members had

22 See Aguero, 1995, op. cit: 13; Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, translated by Bambang Cipto, Militer dan Demokratisasi: Pengalaman Brazil dan Beberapa Negara Lain, Jakarta: PT Grafiti, 1996: 131-132. 23 Edward Masters, “Indonesia's 1999 Elections: A Second Chance for Democracy”, Asia Society, May 1999.

63 equal voting rights; that is, the forty-eight party members would have 50 percent of the vote, and the five government appointees would have an equal percentage. Importantly, the superior authority of the KPU members had control over the implementation of the often unclearly worded election system law. Accordingly, the TNI has tried to influence the KPU’s makeup, since the very beginning, by sending their men to fill five, or almost half of the eleven who were proposed by the government, who would represent government interests.24

Lt. Gen Syarwan Hamid, Minister of Home Affairs (Mendagri), who was also ex- Kasospol (Kepala Sosial Politik --the Indonesian armed forces’ chief for social and political affairs) was the facilitator of the formation and composition of the KPU membership. TNI was therefore able to easily propose Maj. Gen (ret) Feisal Tamin and Maj. Gen (ret) Dunija, who were senior home ministry officials and had long campaigned alongside the Golkar Party and the military in the past, to control grassroots opinion in remote areas as KPU members. Also, they could embrace Brig. Gen. Sudi Silalahi, an active general, ex-chief of staff of Jakarta regional command (Kodam Jayakarta) to be recommended as one of the five crucial nominees. It was anticipated that Silalahi would be serving as the surrogate of the military, in particular for the new, but nevertheless powerful, Kaster (Kepala Staf Teritorial --TNI’s chief for territorial affairs), which played the old function of Kasospol. Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The attempts to place military men on the KPU provided reasons to doubt Gen. Wiranto’s sincerity in withdrawing his military from day-to-day politics and to allow new and free parliamentary elections to take place unimpeded.25 On the other hand, there were also probably those within the Habibie regime who still wanted to use old practices to ensure a favorable election outcome for the interests of their own camps.

In mid-February 1999, as the home ministry’s nominees for the five government representatives were leaked to the press, a high degree of agitation arose, causing the ministry to miss three deadlines for announcing the nominees. It was reported that the delay was caused by the military’s determination that one of its members be included.26 The military was apprehensive about not having a seat on the KPU, a situation, which had never arisen in more than seven past legislative elections due to the fact that the military’s role was so crucial to guaranteeing the security of the country during the campaign period and elections themselves.27

However, due to strong criticism from radical students and reform activists, President Habibie was prevented from authorizing the proposal of candidates encouraged by the military. Intense pressure over several days from radical students and reform

24 Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 217. 25 Ibid. 26 Masters, 1999, loc.cit. 27 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 218.

64 activists, including large demonstrations in Jakarta, pushed Minister Syarwan Hamid to replace military candidates such as Tamin, Dunija, and Silalahi with high standing and independent civilian figures, such as, Adnan Buyung Nasution, Andi Mallarangeng, and Adi Widjojo. The replacement of the generals and the promotion of the liberal and pro- democracy figures and ardent reformers was likely directed by Minister Syarwan to build support from civil society for the forthcoming legislative elections, which would improve the Habibie government’s image.28 Therefore, it seemed that President Habibie and his home minister buckled under popular pressure.

A compromise might have been reached, as the full KPU elected Nasution to serve as the KPU’s chair, but Adnan Buyung Nasution declined and handed over the top position to his runner-up, Gen. (ret) Rudini. In exchange for appointing reformers to the KPU, the government apparently insisted that the retired general be the commission’s chairperson. 29 Rudini was a former army chief under Soeharto, who sat on the commission as a representative of the MKGR (Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong --the Mutual Self-Help and Familial Deliberation Party), a Golkar splinter group. In the 1960s, MKGR was one of the military’s political vehicles for initating its dual function. Rudini was known as a critical officer, but he still agreed with the existence of the military’s dual function (dwifungsi), which should be maintained in order to cope with new social developments. 30 Thus, despite the failure of the TNI to acquire seats among the five government representatives, the most important position, namely that of chairperson, ended up in the hands of an ex-army chief.

The military’s efforts to influence reforms were also apparent in the parliament. The Team of Seven opened up the option of blocking the appointment of military members to the DPR and, in return, providing for a small member of appointments to the MPR. In response, the TNI organized a lobbying effort and pressured all the members of the KPU, by warning them about the consequences of radical change or speedy reform.31 Feeling the reality of the military’s pressure, the KPU eventually agreed to let fifty-five active military members be appointed as DPR members, out of total 550 (10 percent).

In addition, growing pressure from radical students and reform activists to abolish the TNI’s dual function and seat on the DPR, led military representatives in the MPR Working Committee to propose that the forthcoming 1999 MPR special session (Sidang Istimewa) adopt a decree recognizing the military’s role in both the DPR and MPR. Massive opposition from radical students and reform activists, as well as new political

28 Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid also described the background and reason in interview on January 27, 2008 in Jakarta. 29 Masters, 1999, loc.cit. 30 See Rudini, “Legitimasi Sosial Peran Sospol ABRI,” paper presented at Sesko ABRI Seminar, Bandung, November 4-5, 1996, in Honna, 2003, op.cit: 40. 31 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit.

65 parties, outside the parliament building resulted in a moderate version of the decree (MPR Decree No. 14 on General Elections). This version defended the military presence, but also made reference to a gradual diminution of their representation, although TNI was silent on whether or not the number would eventually fall to zero. A statement was issued by the military faction’s chairperson in the MPR, Lt. Gen. Yudhoyono, who was also the current TNI’s chief for territorial affairs (Kaster). According to the statement, the TNI’s social and political role would be systematically reduced, indicating that the military in due course could maintain its political interests.32 Hence, as noted by Stepan, there could be a situation with a low level of conflict, while at the same time the military could still enjoy its high level of prerogative. 33 More importantly, its prerogatives could be protected, as the top political leaders in the democratic regime would not challenge it.

I.D. Military’s Strong Contestation of Further Reform Demands

In fact, Habibie wanted to continue pushing reform in order to draw support away from his opponents inside and outside the parliament. He could be serious with his reform agenda given the fact that in 1996 he was the only civilian leader --as the chairperson of ICMI-- who had asked the military, which was still using its old name at the time, to introduce reforms. Understandably, his tough efforts to democratically reduce the military’s prerogatives would be met with a high degree of resistance from the TNI. As Stepan argues though, the military would prevail in this crisis.34

Of course the military did not want to come out the loser in negotiations with the civilian elite. After its interventions in the KPU and parliament, it increased the intensity of competition. In connection with this, Finer had emphasized that military resistance to civilian regime and reform demands could be attained in various ways, for example,35 through constitutional means, collusion and competition, and intimidation. In addition to these methods, it could invoke the threat of non-cooperation and violence.

Knowing that the military’s soft resistance had failed in achieving its principal objective, Lt. Gen. Suyono, Secretary General of the Department of Defense, charged that Habibie’s reform policies ran the risk of causing the military to grow increasingly impatient with the constant challenges to its authority, which could eventually cause the situation to explode.36 Meanwhile, the Indonesian society’s fragility during the reform era

32 Majalah Tempo, November 23, 1998: 23. 33 Stepan, translated by Cipto, 1996, op. cit: 131-132. 34 Ibid: 136. 35 S.E. Finer, 1962: op. cit. 36 See “ABRI Ulang Tahun di Tengah Hujatan” (“ABRI’s Anniversary amid Charges”), October 6-12, 1998, quoted by David Bourchier, “Skeletons, vigilantes and the Armed Forces’ fall from grace”, in Budi- man, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 155.

66 left it vulnerable to manipulation by military leaders to delay or stop further reforms. In Jakarta and other regions, military elements started to provoke incidents, and exacerbate communal conflicts to create chaos on a national scale in order to increase their bargaining position vis-a-vis Habibie.

Conflicts in regions where military governors and garrison commanders no longer existed were supposedly created by the military in order to show local people and civilians in the country that without the military’s presence, the political situation would become uncontrollable. Rinakit was apparently quite right in saying that the stronger the civilian government’s efforts to implement decentralization, the stronger the military’s corresponding resistance.37 As the military’s interests were disrupted, social violence spread to the whole country. Conflicts that broke out in districts that were led by the military may have been contrived by the military itself so as to avoid public accusations that the military was behind this violence. The shadow conflicts were used as evidence to argue that it was absurd to say that they had created problems, since similar conflicts also occurred in regions where they held the reigns of control. Reportedly, unrest and bloody incidents were deliberately created in certain regions, and rogue military elements disguised as civilians were charged with carrying out these dirty jobs. Provocations and the use of militias, paramilitary, or counter-dissident vigilante groups38 became a daily occurrence in the military’s involvement in troubled spots.

Various threats to TNI’s institutional interests, including decentralization policies, apparently motivated it to protect its territorial functions by creating conflicts and instability in these regions. In fact, social violence increased drastically following the start of the reform era, with medium and high-scale conflicts raging in regions led by civilian governors, i.e. Maluku, Aceh, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, and Irian Jaya. On the other hand, regions still run by military governors, i.e. Bali, North Sumatera, and West Java, conflicts were less common and those that occurred were less violent.39

The involvement of some military elements in communal conflicts across the country likely correlated to their objective of influencing the results of the November 1998 MPR special session. This would prevent the reform movement from using the session to urge the military to introduce radical reforms. Around the time that the conflicts commenced, the TNI position was at stake due to increasing demand for their role in social and political affairs to be reduced. Throughout May 1998, the protests of radical students had been uncontrollable. In the following months in mid-1998, all indications suggested that if nationalist opposition groups such as, Barisan Nasional (National Front founded by anti-Soeharto generals), NU (Nadhlatul Ulama --the

37 Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher (eds.), 2005, loc. cit: 84. 38 Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 17, 19-20; David Kowalewski (1991),”Counterinsurgent Vigilantism and Public Response: A Philippine Case Study,” Sociological Perspectives, 34 (2): 127-144. 39 Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher (eds.), 2005, loc. cit: 80.

67 resurrected Islamic cleric group), and PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan -- Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle), joined the radical students, and if popular opposition figures such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri created a united front, the impact of these coalitions could jeopardize the outcome of the future MPR special session and threaten the fate of Gen. Wiranto’s career as chief commander of TNI.40

President Habibie therefore had to address some very delicate issues, including the communal and “mysterious” cultural conflicts, namely, the slaughter of so-called black magic healers or practitioners, locally refered to as dukun santet or dukung tenung.41 Interestingly, starting in early July 1998, the unexplained murders began to occur more frequently. Affected parties included the dukun tenung, kyai (traditional Muslim clerics), teachers of pesantren (traditional Islamic boarding schools), and common citizens, who were known as the followers of Wahid’s NU and Megawati’s PDIP. The slaughters occurred in Banyuwangi and other neighboring districts, such as Jember, Lumajang, Pasuruan, Sumenep, and Bangkalan. It was believed that only the military had the skills to conduct killings, which were supposedly coordinated by active or retired TNI personnel for their own institutional purposes.42 An independent fact- finding team made up of credible NU senior clerics found evidence that military elements were involved in the killings.43 Not surprisingly, during a rare interview, the ex-instructor of the School for Intelligence Techniques of Bais (Badan Inteljen Strategis --Military Strategic Intelligence Board), Lt. Col. Rudolf Barimbing, indicated the role of his former agency by stressing that “only fools would believe that these killings were purely criminal acts.”44 Other retired military officers also claimed that the mysterious killings of suspected black magic healers were professionally orchestrated and matched the military profiles of previous Bais covert intelligence and psychological operations.45

The occurrences, that Lt. Col Barimbing and other retired military officers disclosed, have helped explain the role of his institution, Bais, as behind the military covert operations in Banyuwangi. To control state security, Habibie had appointed his trustee, his brother in law, Lt. Gen. Z.A. Maulani, as the new chief of Bakin (Badan Kordinasi Inteljen Negara --National Intelligence Coordinating Board). Nonetheless, the first civilian president disregarded Bais, an important and a solid military intelligence institution during the Soeharto era, which was still under military control 46 As a

40 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 171. 41 Waluyo, 2007, loc. cit. 42 Hermawan Sulistyo, “Greens in the Rainbow: Ethnoreligious Issues and the Indonesian Armed Forces”, in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singa- pore, and Indonesia, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001: 303. 43 Majalah Tajuk, February 1998, cited in O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 169. 44 Majalah Gatra and Majalah D&R, ibid: 170. 45 Anuj Ralhan, “Psychological Operations in Indonesia’s Recent History,” Washington DC, 2002: 16. 46 Waluyo, 2007, loc. cit.

68 consequence, the institution could not be placed completely under his coordination, and its operations could not be wholly controlled.

Different sources of information disclosed the involvement of Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus --army’s special forces) deserters, who had been caught by “Banyuwangi citizens” while acting as Ninjas, or fighters who dressed like Japanese knights (Samurai) who were armed with swords or machets.47 It was further reported that Kopassus were operating in and around Banyuwangi at that time, which also involved “drops outs” from the Akabri (the Armed Forces Academy --the previous name of Akmil or today’s Military Academy) allegedly organized by certain military figures. 48 The military therefore became more vulnerable and seemed to be back at work in conducting psychological operations with the goal of influencing the prospects of reform by introducing terror, hysteria, and fear into the public.49 A reasonable explanation for the Banyuwangi killings was that they might be an attempt to provoke a national upheaval, which could excuse the suspension or even the annulment of the November 1998 MPR special session.50 Deputy chief commander Adm. Widodo pointed to the impossibility of holding the incoming MPR session due to to the weakening national stability and security.

Alternatively, the mysterious killings might have been focused on upsetting the political opposition. A fundamental common interest of the military was that if either of the country’s opposition leaders, namely, Wahid or Megawati, threw their support behind the demonstrators demanding the removal of the current commander in chief, the MPR would have no choice but to remove him/her. The radical student and reform activist movements had already shown their huge potency in stymieing the military’s interests. Backed by Wahid and Megawati, they would be unstoppable. It was therefore feared that radical reform would pave the way for a sudden ouster of old system elements, thus severely curbing the influence of the military and Gen. Wiranto’s position. Meanwhile, with the mysterious killings and instability in the regions of East Java, the military could create antagonism between Wahid’s NU and Megawati’s new mass-based party, PDIP, in their traditional bases.51

There was therefore a possibility that the military was planning to create chaos throughout East Java, disrupting the formation of Wahid’s National Awakening Party (PKB) and at the same time disrupting a major congress of Megawati's PDIP planned for

47 ”Awas, Pasukan Ninja Menuju Jakarta,” SiaR News Service, November 4, 1998, [email protected] http://apchr.murdoch.edu.au/minihub/xp, Xpos, No. 43/I/24, Oktober 30, 1998; “Awas, Aksi Kelompok ‘Eks-Tidar’", Siar-XPOS, March 11, 1999. 48 Nicholas Herriman,”Sorcerer Killings in 1998 in East Java: An Analysis of Press and Academic Reports”, paper presented to the 17th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Melbourne July 1-3, 2008, the Monash Asia Institute. 49 Ralhan, 2002, loc.cit. 50 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit; see also Sulistyo, in Hefner (ed.), 2001, loc. cit: 302-303. 51 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit.

69 Bali, just half an hour by ferry from Banyuwangi. 52 Such motivation has also been described by a human rights worker who has investigated the May 13-15, 1998 riots who questioned the role of Maj. Gen. Sudi Silalahi, the East Java regional (Kodam V Brawijaya) commander responsible for all the troubled spots.53 For both popular leaders, it was obviously not the first time they had been targeted by such covert military operations. Prior to the 1997 general elections, Wahid’s NU and Megawati’s PDI had been severely disturbed by Operasi Naga Hijau (Operation Green Dragon) and Operasi Naga Merah (Operation Red Dragon), respectively.54

I.E. Habibie’s Compromise with the Military

Since the Banyuwangi killings failed to achieve their intended objective of delaying or annulling the November 1998 MPR special session, the military prepared militias and paramilitary groups to become involved in different covert intelligence and psychological operations to influence the results of the session. President Habibie also felt threatened by the session, and rather than blocking Gen. Wiranto’s efforts to organize the groups, he supported the general financially. These funds were taken from off-budget sources, for example, the reforestation fund and Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik --State Logistics Agency) emergency cash,55 and used to cover the operational costs of securing the session from the pressure of radical students and reform activists. In the time leading up to the session, it became clear that the opposition movements led by Wahid and Megawati had also urged President Habibie to resign, and, moreover, did not want him to run again in the upcoming presidential election. Thus, a type of symbiotic relationship emerged based on the common interest of the military and Habibie to safeguard their positions in the special session.

The most direct way of preventing the MPR from working against their interests was of course to simply stop it from convening in the place where demonstrators had forced Soeharto to resign, namely, in the parliament building.56 For this reason, Habibie supported the TNI in sending approximately 30,000 troops and 125,000 civilian vigilantes to barricade the parliament. Most of these people had been recruited from radical Muslim groups and trained by TNI under the auspices of the Pam Swakarsa

52 Jason Brown, “The Banyuwangi Murders: Why Did Over a Hundred Black Magic Practitioners Die in East Java Late in 1998?” Inside Indonesia, No. 62 April-June 2000, http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2000/08/16/0015.html. 53 Author’s interview with the human rights worker in Jakarta. 54 Majalah Forum Keadilan, February 10, 1997 in Honna, 2003, op.cit: 43. 55 Public debates between Gen. Wiranto and Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zen in 2004 unintentionallydisclosed the use of the off-budget sources. See also, S. Yunanto et al, Militant Islamic Movements in Indonesia and South- East Asia, Jakarta: FES and the Ridep Institute, 2003: 125, 178-179. 56 O,Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 294-295.

70 (Pasukan Pengaman Swakarsa --voluntary civilian security forces) project.57 They aimed to put a halt to rallies of advocates of total reform and end opposition of President Habibie.58 Their repressive methods of dealing with the demonstrators resulted in the Jumat Kelabu (Black Friday), also known as the First Semanggi Tragedy, which occurred on November 12-13, 1998, caused dozen students and civilians died and hundreds injured.59

Wiwid Partiwo, a student of Trisakti University gave testimony about the Black Friday before the Komnas HAM. Students from this university had been killed during the May 12, 1998 Trisakti shootings, which had triggered the fall of Soeharto. Partiwo disclosed the existence of covert and psychological military operations, in which Paspampres (Pasukan Pengamanan Presiden --military presidential guards), consisting of TNI members of elite units with a high degree of operational autonomy, were involved in the tragedy.60 As mentioned by Bourchier, President Habibie had stitched up a deal with the military; they collaborated to put in place an amended version of the New Order regime to protect their common interests.61 In effect, the First Semanggi Tragedy had been successful in protecting Habibie from being forced out of power, as well as protecting the TNI from having to completely withdraw from political life.

Before the Banyuwangi killings and the First Semanggi Tragedy began, Indria Samego, Habibie’s political aide, had reminded the president that due to the military’s high level of resistance to radical reforms, it could easily provoke simultaneous incidents throughout the country to produce nationwide instability by employing its potential for conducting intelligence operations. 62 Samego also reminded the president about the military’s disinclination to change its fundamental principle of “kemanunggalan tentara dengan rakyat” (unity between the military and the people). This principle had distinguished it from militaries in advanced democracies that would impede attempts to remove this dual function. That is why post-Soeharto military leaders continued to see democracy as being at its best when guided by stability and order, and civil liberties and individual rights were circumscribed by measures to secure national security.63

Nonetheless, Habibie’s preoccupation with staying in power until the next presidential election had forced him to follow an ambiguous reform agenda with military leaders. This so-called “new paradigm,” which replaced the concept of “occupying” with

57 Bourchier, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 156. 58 Sulistyo, in Hefner (ed.), 2001, loc. cit: 305. 59 Muhadjir Darwin, “Freedom from Fear: Social Disruption and System of Violence in Indonesia”, in Aris Ananta (ed.), The Indonesian Crisis: A Human Development Perspective, Singapore: ISEAS, 2003, Appen- dix 2, No. 23. See a detailed explanation in Part III (on human rights violations) of this chapter. 60 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit. 61 Bourchier, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 156. 62 Indria Samego was interviewed on June 14, 2006 in Jakarta. 63 See Sebastian, 2006: 47.

71 “influencing,” implied that there was no significant difference between the two terms, because both express the military’s readiness to engage in political role-sharing with other national institutions, based on the old assumption that the military had a rightful role to play in domestic politics.64 Thus, he was able to agree with the military leaders’ statement, which insisted that the military reform process had to be gradual, and the elimination of its social and political role would depend on the maturity of the society, which continued to remain sentimentally attached to its New Order era mission.65

Habibie’s compromise with the unclear TNI reform agenda could be seen in his new decision. In it, he agreed to reduce the dual function but only on the proviso that this process be undertaken over a span of years, which, according to the observers, was an absurdly long period of time in the current political climate.66 Likewise, military leaders, such as Lt. Gen. Yudhoyono, blamed radical students and reform activists for the unstable situation produced by their quickly increasing pressure of reforms, in order to justify the TNI’s new integralist intervention. Such an intervention was similar to moves by military leaders in the late 1950s to counter President Sukarno and other civilian leaders with their experiment in liberal democracy. Stressing that a Western-style multi- party democracy remained inappropriate for Indonesia, and the post-Soeharto political situation could bring the country back to the 1950s and 1960s, Yudhoyono began to support this parallel measure. As recognized by Lindsey, it was not hard to see that if Indonesia experienced political turmoil, security disturbances, and instability, then the current debate regarding the shape of the reform might be reinvented by the military and the government as a debate about whether reform should take place at all.67

I.F. Military Success in Preserving Its Interests

The new intervention was conducted by the TNI by retaining a formidable political presence through its territorial organizations. The insignificant change in the territorial structure gave it a considerable capacity to intervene in local politics under the guise of maintaining stability. Regional civilian administration, particularly in remote areas lacking civil society control, was still vulnerable to its pressure. It was no coincidence that in May 1999, Gen. Wiranto announced that there would be a phased return to the pre-1980s system of having seventeen military regional commands (Kodam), in

64 Crouch, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 138-139; Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 307. 65 Crouch, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit. 66 See, Timothy Lindsey, “Indonesia’s Negara Hukum: Walking the Tightrope to the Rule of Law”, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 370. 67 Ibid: 373.

72 line with the “new paradigm” designed to ensure that the Kodam were closer to the populace.68

To this end, the first such move was taken with the creation of Maluku regional command (Kodam XVI Pattimura) in Maluku on May 15, 1999. In Central Sulawesi, after violence began in Poso in December 1998, a new regional command (Kodam Merdeka) was considered.69 In addition, by September 1999 there were reports that a regency level military command, namely, Korem 161 Wirasakti in Kupang, would be upgraded to the status of Kodam, and six additional Kodam would be established, but no time table was set.70 As a substitute for the Korem 164/Wira Darma of Dili, East Timor, which had been dissolved, a new Korem was created in Flores to transfer soldiers who had lost their posts following the referendum.71 The creation of a Kodam in Kupang had been cancelled due to the vociferous local outcry to such plans in Flores, a region in eastern Indonesia, which had a population dominated by non-Javanese and Christians. Thus, the rationale behind the formation of the new territorial structures was to preserve the TNI’s political hegemony with all its interests.72

Communal conflicts and religious and ethnic violence throughout the country had provided a crucial opportunity for the military to maintain its role in society, and more specifically, to preserve its most important historical, cultural, and political property, namely, its territorial structure. The connection between various conflicts and the military could, to some extent, be seen as co-relational, as they are both directly and indirectly involved in the conflicts as individuals, groups, and institutions. As concluded by Azca, without necessarily blaming the military for instigating or masterminding anything, violence had certainly served to justify the preservation and expansion of the military’s territorial structure, which indicated a setback for the reform processes.73

TNI officials being appointed to important positions continued. Active military officers were still “elected” from a government-approved list of three candidates by the parliament based on the 1997 election. This election had been heavily dominated by the Golkar Party, and these candidates replaced retiring military officers as governors in several provinces, particularly in major provinces like Central and East Java. The same thing happened at lower levels, where active military officers often replaced retiring

68 The Editors, “Changes in Civil-Military Relations since the Fall of Soeharto”, Indonesia, 70, October 2000, New York: Cornell University, SEAP: 132. 69 George Junus Aditjondro, Pemekaran Kodam Sulawesi (The Enlargement of Sulawesi Kodam), 2002: 1, in Muhammad Najib Azca, “In Between Military and Militia: The Dynamics of the Security Forces in the Communal Conflict in Ambon”, AJSS, 34, 3, Leiden: KBNV, 2006: 451. 70 The Editors, Indonesia, October 2002, loc. cit: 132-133. 71 “Mabes TNI-AD Bersikeras Mendirikan Korem di Flores”, TNI Watch!, [email protected], Decem- ber 15, 1999. 72 Aditjondro, 2002, in Azca, 2006, loc. cit. 73 Ibid: 432, 451.

73 military heads of regencies, or mayors. Provincial governments also continued to recruit military officers to important positions. In Jakarta, for instance, 150 active military officers, or 458 including retired officers, were employed by the Jakarta administration.74 Even in the new Department of Defense, the military still controlled civilian and bureaucratic posts. What had been proclaimed as a “new paradigm” did not necessarily reduce the number of positions held by people with military backgrounds. It also did not end the practice of putting pressure on civilian agencies to request the appointment of military officers to civilian posts.75 Thus, these internal reforms made by the TNI were rather half hearted since they were only a response to criticism. They were also aimed at persuading critics of the TNI to accept its reform agenda, which was conceived by TNI itself to maintain its dwifungsi as a means of legitimizing its role as a proponent of modernization.76

The TNI in fact still wanted to engage in political role-sharing with civilians. It refused to stay out of politics, remain disconnected from societal groups, or maintain an equal distance from all political forces. Using the existing territorial structure, they still had a chance to exert pressure both on the regional and local governments and population. This explained why, by early 1999, the speed of military reforms had been very slow and had not progressed very far. As Crouch stated, whatever the theoretical arguments the TNI used in favor of reforms, the interests of many military officers were tied to the old system.77

O’Donnell and Schmitter had previously emphasized that during transition, actors struggled not only to satisfy their immediate interests and/or the interests of those whom they claimed to represent, but also to define rules and procedures, which would determine likely winners and losers in the future. Certainly these emerging rules would largely define which resources could legitimately be expended in the political arena, and which actors would be permitted to enter it.78 Not surprisingly, the TNI still wanted to defend its position in the forefront and its parliamentary seats until 2004 by proposing the RUU KKN (Rancangan Undang-undang Keselamatan dan Keamanan Negara --Bill on State Safety and Security) to the DPR in September 1999 despite strong opposition from radical students and reform activists. The new repressive state emergency bill would

74 Media Indonesia, November 20, 1998. 75 Media Indonesia, November 10, 1998. 76 Ikrar Nusa Bhakti et al, Tentara yang Gelisah: Hasil Penelitian Yipika tentang Posisi ABRI dalam Gera- kan Reformasi (Anxious Soldiers: Research Report of Yipika on ABRI Position in Reform Movement), Bandung: TAF, PPW-LIPI & Mizan, 1999: 285-287, in Muhammad Najib Azca, “Security Sector Reform, Democratic Transition, and Social Violence: the Case of Ambon, Indonesia”, Berghof: 4-5. In interview on May 15, 2006 in Jakarta, Bhakti gave the same opinions on the current progress of the TNI reform; see also Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 307. 77 Crouch, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 139-140. 78 O’Donnell and Schmitter, in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whiteheads (eds.), 1986, loc. cit: 6.

74 enable the TNI to legally conduct searches and seizures, place people under immediate detention, impose curfews, and order media shutdowns.

From the beginning, President Habibie gave no objection to the bill being submitted to the parliament, because he wanted Gen. Wiranto to be his deputy, or vice- president, in the next presidential election. Consequently, the TNI’s heavy handed response to protesters struggling for a new political atmosphere and questioning the military’s post-Soeharto position and past wrongdoings led in the end to the Second Semanggi Tragedy on September 23, 1999, during which four people died and scores were wounded.79 The next day as demonstrations continued, and due to Habibie’s interest in running in the presidential election that would be held in less than two months, and was then threatened by the tragedy, he immediately changed his mind. He stepped in and declared that he would suspend signing the bill into law.

As found by Aguero, in some cases, the military initially sought to maintain some of the features of the old regime or to assist in shaping the new one. In most cases, it also struggled for internal control of the military and for protection from external political control. It worried about and finally resisted political change when it imposed rules of control.80 Likewise, as highlighted by Harjanto, the transition process took on the shape of a pact or negotiation model between the civilian and military forces. Its search for preferences and platforms of democratic rule was a process defined by historical and strategic considerations for the future. 81 It also showed how established institutional patterns had tended to shape political life.82

Political development in Indonesia had taken on the characteristics of a path- dependent process. It followed a pattern, which connected to the next phase, and then backed to the same pattern again, so that in the end it barred other choices. By also using existing institutional patterns, a political force like the military, which had been involved in politics for a long time, could maintain its existence. More significantly, the TNI and conservative elites were able to exercise their institutional prerogatives stemming from authoritarian rule during the transition period. They were able to preserve their power and determine the limits of popular sovereignty in a new democratic rule under the civilian regime of Habibie.

79 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 295. 80 Amos Perlmutter, “Military and Politics in Modern Times,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 9, No. 1, March 1986: 2, in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whiteheads (eds.), 1986, loc. cit. 81 Nico T. Budi Harjanto, “Masa Depan Peran TNI dalam Tatanan Demokrasi di Indonesia: Harapan Kala- ngan Militer” (“The Prospect of TNI Role in Indonsia’s Democracy: Military Hope”), in Rizal Sukma and J. Kristiadi (eds.), Hubungan Sipil-Militer dan Transisi Demokrasi di Indonesia: Persepsi Sipil dan Militer (Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Transition in Indonesia), Jakarta: CSIS and the Asia Foundation, 1999: 86. 82 Harjanto, ibid, referred to Wendy Hunter’s work on “Politicians against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Post-Authoritarian Brazil,” Comparative Politics, 27, No. 4, July 1995: 426.

75 II. Coping with Soeharto’s Alleged KKN Cases

II.A. Habibie’s Serious Attempts to Investigate Soeharto’s Alleged KKN Cases

On November 12, 1998, the MPR special session issued MPR Decree No. 11/1998 on the creation of clean government based on KKN practices (Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme --corruption, collusion and nepotism). It was only after student protests once again led to student deaths at the hands of the military that the MPR special session finally agreed to a resolution to investigate the New Order regime’s corruption. The investigation actually named Soeharto, explicitly mentioning him, his family and cronies as bad examples for the KKN. 83 Therefore, the decree gave President Habibie the mandate to seriously investigate the Soeharto family and their cronies’ KKN in seven charity foundations. These foundations included Supersemar, Dakab, and Amal Bakti, which had caused state losses exceeding US$ 600 million.84 An estimate of the Soeharto family’s total wealth, which was not free from the practices of KKN, started at US$ 15 billion and ran as high as US$ 73.4 billion. 85 Meanwhile, the UN’s Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative released an official report that ranked Soeharto as the highest earning political leader, who had been accused of corruption and stealing from the people during the period 1967-1998, with US$ 15-35 billion wealth.86

Under strong pressure from political parties, radical students, and reform activists, Habibie then had to show that legal conditions had changed and supremacy of law now prevailed. By late November 1998, he took the initiative to follow-up the MPR’s explicit order to probe Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases. To investigate the sources of Soeharto’s wealth, he ordered his first attorney general, Sujono Chanafiah Atmonegero, to conduct enquiries.87 Furthermore, to build support from the reformist camps ahead of the new legislative elections of June 1999, he tried to break the stalemate on Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases. Thus, on June 1, 1998, Atmonegoro announced the launching of an investigation into the assets of state officials, including Soeharto and his family, by establishing a team of thirty-five members.88 Displaying the seriousness of his effort, President Habibie asked a famous independent lawyer, Adnan Buyung Nasution, to help him in the investigation. Seeing Habibie’s apparent sincerety and seriousness in pursuing the Soeharto family’s ill-gotten wealth, Buyung Nasution responded by setting up an independent commission.

83 Ziegenhain, 2008, op.cit: 101. 84 “Soeharto’s (Un) Pardon,” Asian Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2006: 11. 85 Time, Volume 153, No. 20, May 24, 1999. 86 M. Fadjroel Rachman, “Rekor Koruptor ‘Top Markotop’” (“’Top Markotop’ of Corruptor Record”), Ha- rian Kompas, September 20, 2007: 6. 87 Crouch, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 134. 88 Nadirsyah Hosen,”Habibie, Soeharto, and Yudhoyono: A Better World for All,” May 21, 2006.

76 Two weeks later, on the morning of June 15, 1998, Atmonegoro met Habibie to report his preliminary findings on the corruption cases. Reportedly, during this meeting, he told the President that he had found evidence of illegal practices perpetrated by Soeharto's “charitable” foundations or yayasan. In the attorney general’s legal opinion, the proof was enough to allow the former New Order strong man to be interviewed as a suspect. Detention was possible and there were indications of corruption having also been committed by several of Habibie’s top ministers and some of Habibie’s relatives. Unexpectedly, Attorney General Atmonegro also publicly claimed to have told Habibie that he had legal evidence that even the President himself could become a suspect in the allegations of the corruption cases.89 Because of this, Habibie then asked Atmonegoro to visit his office again just five hours later. That same afternoon, Habibie informed the attorney general that he had been replaced by Maj. Gen. Andi Muhammad Ghalib.

Habibie’s concern regarding Atmonegoro’s public statements and uncontrolled moves, and Soeharto’s reaction of issuing a harsh threat caused the President to cancel the plan to form an independent commission under Buyung Nasution, and he instead appointed a new attorney general.90 Habibie took some actions that seemed to be favors to his predecessor, Soeharto. Among these was his decision to discharge Atmonegoro after the attorney general announced that he was organizing an investigation of the unexplained wealth of previous government officials, including Soeharto and himself.91

Under pressure from the MPR, Habibie later issued a presidential order to Attorney General Ghalib to initiate an investigation. Nevertheless, Ghalib limited his investigations of the Soeharto family’s wealth to land and cash-holdings in local banks. According to his critics, he acted like a well-rehearsed striptease dancer in uncovering the extent of the Soeharto wealth bit-by-bit at a dreadfully slow pace. President Habibie’s efforts had suggested that the case had been focused only on Soeharto’s foundations which seemed to contrast with reports of Soeharto’s wealth published in the mass- media.92

In the beginning, however, Ghalib was seemingly serious in following the President’s order. On December 2, 1998, in response to a mass demonstration, President Habibie instructed the attorney general to investigate Soeharto’s wealth. Ghalib then began with an easier case by moving for a trial in regard to the Goro-Bulog scandal. This scandal had involved Soeharto’s youngest son, Hutomo Mandala Putera (Tommy), through his Goro company which had caused state losses of about Rp. 3 trillion.93 The

89 Ibid. 90 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 190-191. 91 Philip Shenon,” Suharto Rebuilds His Political Base to Shield Fortune,” The New York Times, July 2, 1998. 92 Hosen, 2006, loc.cit. 93 “Gubernur BI: Rp. 546 Milyar Dikembalikan” (“BI Governor: Rp. 546 Billion Returned”), Suara Pem- baruan, August 18, 1999.

77 evidence that Tommy had caused these losses was quite obvious,94 and therefore the state prosecutors specified Tommy as a suspect on December 10, 1998.

II.B. Explanations for Military Resistance

The military resisted the investigation and prosecution of Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases. Since the transfer of power from Soeharto and the inauguration of Habibie in the Merdeka palace on May 22, 1998, Gen. Wiranto had told Habibie and other Soeharto successors that the military would do anything to protect Soeharto and his family from any attempts that could disturb their future life after the resignation. Wiranto’s initiative to come forward and convey a few remarks immediately after the inauguration obviously explained the military’s position and their top leader’s message to those who wanted to disturb the ex-New Order ruler and his family. A question that obviously arises is: why did Wiranto and other senior military officers agree to protect Soeharto and his family? A clear explanation will therefore be needed in order to understand the TNI’s response to the full investigation of Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases by the Habibie regime.

Interestingly, chief commander Gen. Wiranto and army chief Gen. Subagyo had a background as Soeharto’s adjutants. They owed their careers entirely to Soeharto, and felt personally indebted to him, as he had promoted them to the highest posts in the military. They were beneficiaries of the material rewards which Soeharto customarily bestowed on his loyal supporters for their assistance.95 These men as well as military units involved in joint ventures with members of the Soeharto family, received privileges from his government. Understandably, the ex-New Order’s authoritarian ruler and his family were encircled by trusted ex-adjutants and military bodyguards, the so-called “Cendana graduates,” who gained fast-track promotions, held key positions, and had direct access to Soeharto and privileged access to funds.96 They held Soeharto in high esteem and respected his achievements for the nation. This was a general patron-client relationship in Javanese society as earlier mentioned by Muhaimin.97

Similar to Soeharto, Wiranto came from an ordinary family with a traditional Javanese background. Not surprisingly, he frankly acknowledged that he had cultural relations with Soeharto; even after Soeharto was no longer a president, he maintained these. He continued to regularly visit him after the resignation, and continued to conduct what in Javanese society popularly known as ngilmu and ngelmu. This means he learned about a lot of rational and irrational things from him, although he refused to perceive this

94 Andi Ghalib informed this also in interview on January 8, 2008 in Jakarta. 95 O’Rourke, 2002, op .cit. 96 Bourchier, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kinsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 150. 97 Muhaimin, 1982, op cit: 9-10.

78 as receiving orders to be carried out in response to current situations. 98 After his resignation, Soeharto’s close ties to the military, which had remained a powerful national institution, were in evidence in June 1998, when he accompanied several powerful army generals to Islamic prayers held in military mosques in Jakarta. It is reported that the former president still regularly visited Paspampres officers and their commander, Maj. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, in their Jakarta headquarters. They would meet for lunch, and even practiced shooting exercises together, all of which drew criticism from President Habibie’s military adviser, Sintong Panjaitan.99 At a news conference, Gen. Wiranto acknowledged that he and other senior military officers remained “close” to Soeharto.100 It seems that this could explain why Wiranto wanted to promote Sutarto as his operational assistant, although Panjaitan had asked Habibie to replace the Paspampres commander.101

Furthermore, Wiranto possessed many of qualities that Soeharto sought. As a fellow native of Central Java, he shared many of Soeharto’s notions of hierarchy, bravery, loyalty, and fealty. The 1968 military academy graduate put a leather puppet of Bima in his office. Bima was an important figure from among five Pandawa knights, who in the Javanese shadow puppet and Mahabarata epic had fought for Rama in his sacred war against Dasamuka, the leader of the evil forces with his troops (the Kurawa). Wiranto said that he was highly impressed by Bima’s character, which was preoccupied with the values of power, force, and more importantly, keenness in confronting the risks of defending his decisions.102 He was known as very loyal --the most important of Javanese values-- to the Soeharto family, and kept the family’s problems unpublicized. For example, although Soeharto’s children fought viciously among themselves, he was unique in his ability to negotiate the poisonous atmosphere and maintain friendly relations with all six children at once.103

More so than other military leaders, Wiranto was loyal and firmly followed Soeharto’s orders. He was successful in securing the re-election of Soeharto to his seventh five-year term as a 76 year old, amid people’s growing anxiety regarding the deepening economic crisis as well as resistance to his presidency. The appointment of Gen. Wiranto as chairperson of the second working committee of the March 1998 MPR general session (Sidang Umum) was politically significant. It signalled Soeharto’s attempt to contain Gen. Hartono’s rising powers as chairperson of the first working

98 Idi Subandy Ibrahim (ed.), Dari Catatan Wiranto: Bersaksi di Tengah Badai (From Wiranto Notes: Testimonials Under Storm Attack), Jakarta, IDe, Indonesia, 2003, xvi,xxv, 7, 8. 99 Hendro Subroto, Sintong Panjaitan: Perjalanan Seorang Prajurit Para Komando, Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2009: 435-436. 100 Shenon, 1998, loc.cit. 101 Subroto, 2009, op.cit: 436. 102 See “Wiranto: Indonesia Butuh Pemimpin Seperti Bima” (“Wiranto: Indonesia Need A Leader Like Bi- ma”), Kompas, June 20, 2009: 1. 103 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit.

79 committee supported by Soeharto’s daughter, Siti Hardijanti (Tutut). Not only did it show that Soeharto did not fully trust Hartono, who had been catapulted to the key position as a result of Tutut’s lobbying, but more importantly, Soeharto wanted the leadership of the second working committee in the hands of someone who was more trustworthy and reliable. Wiranto’s committee was to evaluate the list of candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency. With this appointment, Soeharto likely signaled that Wiranto was far more important, reliable, and trustworthy than Hartono.104 No less important, Wiranto was not only personally very close to Soeharto and his family, but also well-respected within the military.105

II.C. The Military and the Emergence of Terror in Jakarta

In September 1998, Habibie ordered that Soeharto be questioned concerning the acquisition of his wealth, and he charged Attorney General Ghalib with leading the investigation. One month later, his investigating team under Ghalib reported that there was not enough evidence to warrant any trials. The angry public, however, pushed Habibie to once again reopen the investigation into Soeharto’s wealth in November 1998.106 Thus, in December 1998, Soeharto was questioned by the attorney general about corruption during his 32 years in power.

It was no co-incidence, therefore, that only one day after the state prosecutors announced Tommy as a suspect on December 10, 1998, an explosion rocked the Plaza Atrium in Central Jakarta. Then in the dawn of January 1, 1999, a second blast rocked the Ramayana department store, closer to Habibie’s office, which nearly damaged the Sabang road (Jalan Sabang), a strategic business area near the Merdeka palace. Several bombs would have decimated the location if they had not failed to explode at once. Since the bombs were not planted in Jakarta’s most-populated areas, it was argued that they were likely designed to create terror targeted at President Habibie, who could hear the explosion from his palace. One of the suspects was a member of a gang whose boss was involved with a notorious youth organization in Jakarta. He received Rp 40 million to blow up the store two days after the blast from its leader, who remains at large and is only identified as Amir.107 According to the main suspect, he had previouly asked two military personnel to help him blow up the department store, but they had turned down his request.108 Unfortunately, no further investigation was conducted of the case.

104 Singh, 2000, op. cit: 52. 105 Crouch, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 128. 106 “Indonesia: Corruption Timeline”, Global Integrity Report 2004, http://www.globalintegrity.com, Was- hington DC. 107 “Suspect in Ramayana Blast Testify in Court”, The Jakarta Post, June 16, 1999. 108 Ibid.

80 Within less than 72 hours, another bomb exploded as Tommy’s older brother, Bambang Trihatmodjo, was forced to appear at the attorney general’s office to be interrogated regarding his role as the treasurer of a charitable foundation run by his father, Soeharto, that was being investigated for indication of misuse.109 As in Tommy’s case, Attorney General Ghalib explained that the evidence in the Bambang case was also quite clear.110

Following the two bomb blasts, which were likely aimed at terrorizing President Habibie, hosts of downtown office buildings, malls, and hotels in Jakarta and its surrounding areas received similar bomb threats. The targets of terrors had become the Jakartans in order to spread fear, which was expected to increase insecurity and political instability. On January 8, 1999, riots broke out in Karawang, 60 km from East Jakarta, during which twenty-six people were wounded and two died. Interestingly, the mass media reported that the attention of local police had been mysteriously diverted by a false report of chaos elsewhere. However, they asserted that military personnel had been involved in provoking the riots.111

On January 27, 1999, Ghalib officially summoned Tommy to his office and formally indicted him with corruption in the Goro-Bulog case also known as the Bulog land scam deal, which cost the state an additional Rp 95.4 billion.112 Tommy, Soeharto’s youngest son, was former commissioner of PT Goro Batara Sakti (PT GBS), a large company which occupied land previously belonging to the country’s logistics body (Bulog). Less than two weeks later, on February 9, 1999, there was a bomb explosion in the Kelapa Gading mall. This was the strategic location that had motivated Ricardo Gelael to start the Goro-Bulog project in the first place. Gelael was a good friend of Tommy’s from automobile sports, and a former executive of PT GBS and business crony of the former President Soeharto.

Habibie wanted to increase the scope of the investigations. On March 8, 1999, he agreed when Ghalib reported to him that the attorney office had found that there was enough evidence to prosecute Soeharto. However, when Gen. Wiranto came for a meeting on the same day, Habibie changed his mind, and asked the attorney general to delay prosecution until the results of the June 1999 general elections were known113. On April 12, 1999, Tommy was compelled to appear in court, but did not come. Three days later, on April 15, 1999, a bomb exploded in a public telephone office (warung telekomunikasi or wartel) in front of the Hayam Wuruk plaza, about 300 meters from the

109 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 233. 110 In interview on January 8, 2008 in Jakarta, Andi Ghalib has also described this. 111 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 193. 112 Eriko Uchida, “Latest Graft Cases 'Not a Deterrent' to Corruption in Indonesia,” Basel Institute of Go- vernance, March 25, 2002. 113 Hosen, 2006, loc.cit.

81 state palace. A series of bomb blasts had followed the interrogations of Soeharto’s children.

On April 19, 1999, Ghalib again forced Tommy to come to his office for the second court appearance of Soeharto’s youngest son. At the same time, in an effort to save their client, Tommy’s lawyers asked for an exemption to halt the proceedings, but the judge rejected the request. Following this rejection, later that afternoon, at 03:20 p.m, a bomb exploded in the basement of the Al-Istiqlal mosque, a well-known mosque admired by Muslims in the country, located next to the Merdeka palace compound where Habibie worked and lived with his family. The blast destroyed at least fifteen office rooms, some pillars were cracked, and dozens of windows smashed, causing injuries to four people.114 A security guard at the mosque reported that two men had been seen fleeing on a motorcycle shortly before the explosion. In interview, Ghalib explained that he had not made a special investigation of the connection between the recent bomb explosions in Jakarta and his attempts to investigate the Soeharto KKN cases, but he assumed that those who did not want the cases to be seriously prosecuted were behind the serial explosions. Speaking frankly, he added that due to his continuing investigations, he and his family had been receiving threats, which were supposedly being sent by parties who felt threatened by his moves.115

Therefore, the deeper the dissatisfaction Soeharto and his family and cronies felt, the greater the risk confronted by the Habibie government. More interestingly, five attempts to punish either Tommy or Bambang for their respective corruption cases were followed shortly thereafter by bomb explosions, and the intervals between four of the bomb explosions were three days or less. Besides, the day after the Al-Istiqlal mosque blast, just as suspicions were finally starting to focus on the Soeharto family, Jakarta’s police officials announced that the perpetrators were members of the Indonesian Mujahidin force, referring to Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (AMIN). For Indonesians, Amin was a confusing group of Muslim radicals, because their political goals were unclear.116 At that time, the only known information was that the group’s training camp was near Bogor, about 80 km Southwest of Jakarta.

Certainly the authorities’ quick accusation of the AMIN was accompanied by a growing amount of public cynicism, particularly among the country’s reform activists. It was questioned how the authorities, who had failed to produce any explanation for the violence and terrorism affecting the country over the past year, needed just hours to determine the guilty parties in the case of the Al-Istiqlal mosque blast. This is why the

114 ”Blast Rocks Jakarta Mosque”, BBC News, April 19, 1999. 115 Andi Ghalib was interviewed on January 8, 2008 in Jakarta. 116 Sapto Waluyo,”Indonesia’s Predicament to Counter-terrorism Policy in the Era of Democratic Transi- tion”, UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 15, October 2007, Jakarta: Centre for Indonesian Reform (CIR), 2007: 123.

82 Legal Aid Foundation (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum --LBH) and a group of Indonesian NGOs accused the police of engineering this announcement. Denunciations were also issued from Islamic camps, whose leaders complained about the deceitful methods often practiced by the military’s intelligence officers, including Lt. Gen. Ali Murtopo and Gen. Benny Murdani, during the Soeharto era. It seemed that the police’s announcement about the existence of the AMIN was untrustworthy, because journalists who issued investigatory reports on the organization and actually visited the training camp that the police had claimed was in Bogor found nothing of the sort. There was also the big question of explaining why the alleged Muslim terrorists would target the nation’s largest and most beloved mosque. As in the explanation for the case of the Ramayana department store bombing, the Amin case appeared to be a simple, but vulgar deception or fabrication produced to distract public attention from the true perpetrators.117 The existence of AMIN was successfully explained at a later point. It was a splinter group of Darul Islam, the Islamic troops which fought against both the Soekarno and Soeharto governments to create an Islamic state, which was formed right after the Ambon violence broke out. It was found that in their activities across Indonesia (in Maluku, Poso and so forth), their members still obtained access to military facilities, such as Pindad, which produced standard TNI equipment and weapons, through rogue elements inside the military.118 Needless to say, in the past Lt. Gen. Ali Murtopo, Soeharto’s intelligence adviser and head of Special Operations (Operasi Khusus --Opsus), had espoused his idea of working with radical Muslim leaders.119

Other police sources explained that they had been ordered by their superiors to call off their investigation into the Al-Istiqlal mosque bombing, but had described what actually happened on the ground.120 It was furthermore important that the new authorities had focused their investigation on former and serving members of covert intelligence and psychological operations units of Kopassus, the Group IV. Meanwhile, different sources of information in Jakarta pointed out that the Soeharto family had financed the bombing through a Rp. 200 million payment to the perpetrators. The payment had been made with the involvement of a former minister and a little known Muslim activist employed by Tommy’s holding company, the Humpuss group.121 The minister was supposed to be Muhammad “Bob” Hasan, one of former President Soeharto’s close cronies, who had been accussed of involvement in the embezzlement of US$244 million of forestry funds, 122 while the Muslim activist was presumed to be Toto Tasmara, who had an unusual background. As was the case in many covert military intelligence and

117 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 233-234. 118 “Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing,”ICG Asia Report No. 92, Singapote/Brussels, 2005: 1, 15-17, 24, 25-31. 119 Ibid, also p. 6. 120 ”Bombings Leave Southeast Asia Puzzled,” Far Easter Economic Review, January 24, 2001. 121 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit. 122 Uchida, 2002, loc.cit.

83 psychological operations recently run in the country, riots and bombings indicated the involvement of thugs, religious extremists, and military elements. Once imprisoned in the 1980s as a Muslim militant, Tasmara was not only later freed, but also employed as a vice-president of Bank Duta. The bank was controlled by Bob Hasan and Soeharto, whose shares, on behalf on his three foundations, reached 87 percent.123 Later, Tasmara became a corporate secretary for Tommy’s Humpuss group, which included Tommy’s failed national car project, and defaulted on its loans to Indonesian state banks after the 1997-1998 financial crisis, which caused around Rp. 4 trillion (US$ 439 million) in damages to the state.124

Bob Hasan, Soeharto’s business partner since the 1950s, became one of Soeharto’s closest friends. He was a leading timber tycoon who helped manage the former president’s fortune. He was also the adopted son of Soeharto’s superior, the late Maj. Gen. Gatot Subroto, ex-Central Java regional (Kodam Diponegoro) commander,125 who shared the Nusamba group with Soeharto. The group had holdings in forestry, pulp, paper, banking, automobile manufacturing, and, moreover, the scandalous Bank Umum Nasional. This bank had received the fourth largest amount of liquidity credits from the Bank Indonesia (Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia --BLBI), from the total of over US$13 billion. The funds were collected since the economic crisis in 1997 and were used for corrupt personal financial gain.126 Due to his closeness with Soeharto and his family, Hasan had been appointed as Minister of Industry and Trade in Soeharto’s seventh cabinet, and was also a member of the prestigious legislature, MPR.

Apart from this, analysts said that it would not be the last time that Islamists connected to the Soeharto family would be suspected of involvement in events of unexplained violence in Indonesia. Not all the bombings were the work of Muslim organizations though. In fact, several major bomb explosions took place immediately before various members of the Soeharto family faced legal proceedings, and were apparently intended by their supporters to intimidate prosecutors and judges.127 More importantly, the blasts took place during the first few months of 1999, and supposedly had some similarities, namely: (1) they were connected to dates on which Tommy or Bambang were summoned by the attorney general’s office or the court; (2) they were of similar magnitude; (3) nobody claimed responsibility; (4) the authorities could not present reasonable explanations; (5) the Al-Istiqlal mosque bombing case was temporarily obscured by atrocities in the Maluku archipelago (Ambon, Ternate, Tidore,

123 “Suharto Inc.: All in the Family,” Time Asia, May 24, 1999. 124 “Indonesia sues Suharto son Tommy over carmaker sale,” Suharto, Indosnesos, May 5, 2008. 125 John T. Sidel, “Macet Total: Logics of Circulation and Accumulation in the Demise of Indonesia’s New Order,” Indonesia, 66, October 1998, New York: Cornell University, SEAP: 166. 126 “Indonesia: Corruption Timeline”, Global Integrity Report 2004, loc. cit. 127 “Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims,” ICG Indonesia Briefing Paper, 10 October 2001, Jakarta/ Belgia: ICG, 2001: 3.

84 and so forth128), which could not have broken out without the existence of provocateurs, or third parties, who systematically created anarchy in different regions of Indonesia, simultaneously;129 (6) if the Kopassus had indeed been involved, this would suggest that the TNI’s most notorious unit was conducting a terror operation in favor of the Soeharto family. 130 Of course, throwing or planting bombs to further political goals was not unprecedented, but since the fall of Soeharto in May 21, 1998, bomb explosions had became more common. Between May and the end of 1998, for example, at least six bombings were recorded, followed by nine more in 1999.131

Heavy pressure from political parties, radical students, and reform activists on President Habibie to prosecute Soeharto was disrupted by the flaring up of past conflicts in Ketapang (Jakarta), Karawang, Ciamis (West Java), Central Java, Kupang (East Nusa Tenggara), Ambon (Maluku),132 Lombok, Mataram (West Nusa Tenggara),133 Makassar (South Sulawesi), Poso, Palu (Central Sulawesi), Sumatera, Kalimantan,134 and Irian Jaya. In Jakarta, destabilization was marked by the breakout of an incident in Ketapang on November 22, 1998. The TNI was found to have facilitated and protected the rioters,135 which indicated that the incident not purely or even primarily motivated by religious concerns. 136 More significantly, the police arrested 187 people, mostly Ambonese Christian gang members or thugs who had guarded an illegal gambling hall, and three of them were ex-Kopassus troops.137 For a long time, TNI soldiers had been known for their involvement in providing protection for gambling, prostitution, and other businesses.138 After this incident, a series of bomb blasts and terror began in January 1, 1999, threatening the Central Jakarta area, not far from the Presidential palace as well as many downtown office buildings, malls, and hotels in the surrounding areas.

128 For more details, see Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit: Appendix 2 No. 38. 129 Regarding the Ambon riots, in separate interviews on June 25 and 26, 2006, in the city of Ambon, local soldiers of Kodam XVI Pattimura, i.e. Col. Iro Suparmo, Maj. Ahmad Basar, Capt. Hendrikus JR, informed the role of the provocateurs, among others, the Laskar Jihad and the RMS separatist organization, but they did not uncover the involvement of TNI units. Author’s interview with a resource person in Jakarta cited the important role of Maj. Gen. Sudi Silalahi, the East Java regional (Kodam V Brawijaya) commander, in allowing the transshipment of the Laskar Jihad troops from different places in Java to Ambon. 130 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit. 131 The Jakarta Post, January 19, 2001, cited in ICG, 2001, loc.cit. 132 In this region, virtual “wars” has taken place between relatively evenly balanced Muslim and Christian communities. The initial conflict that broke out in January 1999 involved Christian Ambonese and Muslims from nearby Sulawesi who had migrated to Maluku in large numbers during the previous three decades, ibid: 10. 133 To compare Lombok and Mataram, see Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit: Appendix 2 No. 22. 134 In Central Kalimantan, many of the Dayaks leading the campaign to force Muslim Madurese to flee from the province were themselves Muslims. See, “Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kali- mantan,” ICG Report No. 19, June 27, 2001, Jakarta/Belgia: ICG, 2001. 135 See, for example, “Lagi Massa Tersulut” (“Again, People Incited”), Panji Masyarakat, December 2, 1998: 75. 136 ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 6-7. 137 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 187. 138 Juwono Sudarsono was interviewed on July 17, 2009.

85 In the Ketapang riots, the involvement of the Soeharto family and the military was indicated by various sources. The thugs, both Christians and Muslims, 139 who had triggered the riots were employed by the Soeharto family’s chief henchmen and military backed-Muslim militant organizations. One such organization, the FPI (Front Pembela Islam --Front for Islam Defenders) and his antagonistic chairperson, Habib Rizieq Shihab, reportedly received political and financial support from senior military officers such as Gen. Wiranto (TNI chief commander), Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zen (ex-chief of staff of Kostrad --Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat or army’s strategic reserves command), and Maj. Gen. Djaja Suparman (current chief of staff of Kostrad). 140 The chairperson had admitted that two days before the violence erupted, the Ambonese Muslim thug’s leader, Ongen Sangaji, who was linked to Soeharto’s son, Bambang, had spoken to FPI at a meeting. The meeting was organized by the Muslim cleric, Habib Ali bin Alwi al Ba’agil, who personally taught Soeharto’s other son, Tommy, about Islam.141

Additional findings explained a connection between those who had instigated the Ketapang riots and the Soeharto family and military.142 The gang war between young Christian Ambonese thugs and Ketapang’s Muslim residents was orchestrated by these outside forces so that it escalated into an inter-religious conflict with the burning of twenty-seven churches and schools in the surrounding area.143 More visibly, the gangs, in particular, PP (Pemuda Pancasila --Pancasila Youth)144 maintained connections with different members of the Soeharto family and military leaders. The security forces “captured” most of the gang members and put them on ships bound for Ambon, where they played a central role in mass communal fighting in early 1999.145 It was also found that they had been transported with naval landing craft on the orders of Jakarta Governor, Lt. Gen. Sutiyoso.146 Several years earlier, in 1994, the governor had worked with FPI patron, then Brig. Gen. Djaja Suparman, on Wiranto’s efforts to organize civilian militias and paramilitary groups, while Wiranto was commander of Kodam Jayakarta. It appears

139 The Christians were not pillars of the local church but petty criminals who happened to have been born into the Christian community of Maluku, similar to the gangs of Muslim Ambonese also operated in Jakarta, see ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 7. 140 Yunanto et al, 2003, op. cit: 50-51, 178-179; Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 84. 141 Ibid, and p. 60. See, further, Suara Hidayatullah, edition 04/XII, August 1999. 142 See “Provokator Menjahili Negeri” (“Provocateur Disturbed the Country”), Majalah Forum Keadilan, February 8, 1999: 25. 143 ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 6-7. 144 Loren Ryter, “Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free Men of Soeharto’s Order?” in Benedict R.O’G Anderson (ed.), Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia, New York: Cornell University, 2001, loc. cit: 46, 154. 145 Colombijn and Lindblad, “Introduction”, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 4. 146 John McBeth and Dini Djalal, “Tragic Island: Ambon Violence May Have Had Its Origins in Jakarta,” Far Eastern Economic Review, March 25, 1999.

86 that when he transported these PP thugs to provoke similar strife in Maluku, Sutiyoso was doing so at Wiranto’s command.147

II.D. The Military and the Emergence of Terror in Various Regions

In Kupang, a riot broke out on November 29, 1998, the day that Habibie decided to form an independent commission that would be led by Nasution to investigate Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases. It was also one day before Soeharto’s lawyers raised the threat of blackmail. Reportedly, masses of people tore through the city of Kupang, damaging mosques. Information from the Department of Defense linked to the TNI headquarters stated that the raids there were supposedly a reprisal for the targeting of churches in the Ketapang riot in the preceding weeks.148 On the other hand, reports from the priests and provincial government officials who saw the raids revealed that the masses were not comprised of local Kupang inhabitants, but rather uniformed youths sent in from remote places as far away as Dili in East Timor.149 Therefore, the Department of Defense’s claim that the incident occurred spontaneously was further called into question.150 Quite amazingly, in Kupang, where there was a large contingent of security forces, and, moreover, a base for the TNI’s operations in East Timor, anti-Muslim masses were allowed to run amok through the city for two full days. Not only did the security forces grant the masses free reign, but in some instances, they safeguarded them from local inhabitants who tried to retaliate. 151 The city was brought under control on December 2, 1998, the day when Habibie announced his plan to abandon the independent commission due to Minister Muladi’s statement that there was a lack of evidence.

In Maluku, the role of militias or paramilitary groups and rogue elements in the military linked to the Soeharto family was even more apparent, while the direct involvement of the military as an institution was less evident. A civilian intelligence officer interviewed in Jakarta highlighted the role of several military officers from the Presidential Guard Foundation (Yayasan Paspampres) in organizing the return of the native Ambonese thugs from Jakarta to Ambon.152 In addition, the existence of thugs linked to Bambang Soeharto was confirmed by a former leading figure of Bakin (the

147 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 188. 148 “Berita Penerangan Peristiwa Kupang” (“Release on Kupang Incident”), http://www.dephan.go.id. 149 “Siapa Pengembus Badai SARA” (“Who Provoked Primordial Sentiments”), Majalah Forum Keadilan, December 28, 1998: 15. The commander of Korem 161Wirasakti, Kupang, Col. Arief Rachman, in interview in Kupang, on August 15, 2007, described the provocateurs as being from outside the province, but declined to explain who they actually were. 150 See, Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit: Appendix 2 No. 31. 151 “Siapa Pengembus Badai SARA” (“Who Provoked Primordial Sentiments”), Majalah Forum Keadilan, December 28, 1998, loc. cit. 152 Muhammad Najib Azca, “In Between Military and Militia: The Dynamics of the Security Forces in the Communal Conflict in Ambon”, AJSS, 34: 3, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2006: 441.

87 national intelligence coordinating board).153 In the riots prior to January 19, 1999, some individuals from the army and police, either active members, deserters, or retired members, played roles in instigating and participating in the clashes, especially in Dobo village.154

In Irian Jaya, Soeharto’s loyalist, Gen. Wiranto, supposedly refused to interrupt the activities of other Soeharto loyalists although they encouraged the Papuan rebels to oppose the central government. This is why the Soeharto family and the military elites who resisted Habibie’s decisions to seriously prosecute their alleged practices of corruption, collusion, and nepotism were able to freely conduct their activities in support of the rebels there. Among others, Theys Eluay, one of the representatives of the UN Act of Free Choice (Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat --Pepera) who had internationally legalized the integration of Irian Jaya into Indonesia, and previously was a member of the central executive board of the pro-Soeharto Golkar Party and DPR representing the province, played a significant role in reviving post-Soeharto Papuan nationalism. Also, Yorris, who until that time was involved in various military intelligence operations, for instance, in mobilizing thugs and paramilitaries to seize Megawati’s PDI headquarters on July 27, 1996, was often cited by people who had seen him aiding separatist demonstrations in the province.155

Bomb threats and explosions that occurred elsewhere, including in big cities, targeting business centers, and disturbing economic activities, reportedly also involved security forces, military elements, paramilitaries, or religious radicals and thugs. The Kupang riot, in particular, was followed by more demonstrations against Soeharto, and, consequently, by more riots throughout the country. As high-level officials of the Habibie government admitted in a confidential communication, the eruptions of violence across the country were no coincidence. Soeharto’s loyalists were purposely inciting these conflicts.156 Several press reports cited anonymous government sources that arrived at the same conclusions.157 The sources stated that the perpetrators of this violence intentionally focused on communities with grave ethnic or religious fractures, which could be exploited and agitated.

In essence, the eruption of unrest and its widespread use of as a deceitful instruments for political ends could have served several goals: (1) to distract public attention from demands for trials of Soeharto and his family; (2) to threaten the Habibie government’s officials; (3) to destroy the public’s general confidence in, or even

153 Ibid. 154 Ibid: 442. 155 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit. 156 Azca, 2006, loc. cit: 196. 157 “Setelah Ambon Mana Lagi” (“After Ambon, What Else”), Panji Masyarakat, February 3, 1999: 75.

88 destabilize the Habibie government.158 Therefore, the increasing pressure in Jakarta for trials of Soeharto and his family, and, in particular, the attacks on the Soeharto family residence compound by student demonstrators corresponded with the escalating regional violence. It was known that pro-reform students engaged in persistent demonstrations throughout December 1998 and January 1999, through which they strongly demanded the prosecution of Soeharto and his family. Moreover, they became increasingly aggressive by repeatedly attacking troops, who maintained a heavy defensive barricade in a 100 meter radius around the Soeharto family residence compound at Jalan Cendana in Central Jakarta. A clash on January 9, 1999, brought about 160 casualties, and reflected how seriously the TNI and its leaders, in particular, were in protecting Soeharto and his family.159

II.E. Threats, Intelligence Operations, and Common Interests

Habibie feared that the Soehartos’ aggressive reaction would damage his government, because it could implicate him and many of his cabinet members who had drafted and helped implement the presidential decrees (Keputusan Presiden --Keppres), which had enabled the Soehartos’ alleged KKN during the New Order era.160 In addition to the military’s growing attempts to cultivate destabilizing elements across the country, the issuance of the MPR decree (Ketetapan MPR --TAP MPR) gave a constitutional order to Habibie to move forward with the investigation by early December 1998. The old strong man was holding all the trumps though in the form of his lawyers, and was ready to launch a reprisal by disclosing the personal wealth of Habibie’s officials and other secrets, including their extra-marital affairs.161 Like Wiranto and other senior military officers who were beneficiaries of gifts, which Soeharto routinely bestowed on his assistants, Habibie and his family appeared to have received benefits from Soeharto beyond their ventures with the Soeharto family. The current instability and the growing demands of reform activists that Soeharto be brought to trial had probably strengthened the mutual dependence of Habibie and Gen. Wiranto.162

The counter-attack and further threats by the Soeharto family and its loyalists caused Habibie to fail in enforcing the MPR Decree No. 11/1998 and secure his reformist

158 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit. 159 “Tiada Kata Jera dalam Demo” (“No End for Demonstration”), Majalah Forum Keadilan, January 11, 1999: 23. 160 The Indonesian Transparency Society has labeled as illegal 79 of the 528 such presidential decrees issued between 1993 and May 21, 1998. See, “Suharto Inc.: All in the Family,” Time Asia, May 24, 1999, loc.cit. 161 “Komisi Dibentuk, Soeharto Melempar Truf” (“Commission Formed, Soeharto Plays his Last Card”), Majalah Tempo, December 7, 1998; “Yohannes Yakob: Kami Sudah Pegang Kartu Truf” (“Yohannes Ya- kob: We Had the Last Card”), Majalah D&R, December 12, 1998: 20. 162 Crouch, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 134 et seq.

89 credentials. His minister of justice, Muladi, had directly reminded him that if they were not careful with regard to the juridical aspects of the Soeharto case, the political impacts could be serious. The mass media exposed that Muladi was concerned with threats of revenge from the Soeharto family as well as the military.163 In interview, he described such threats as a major constraint to fulfilling reform demands.164 Under such threats, of course, Ghalib could not conduct a serious investigation. The attorney general revealed that such threats affected not only himself but also his family.165 Thus, the absence of consent between the new regime and the loyalists of the old authoritarian regime to eliminate the undemocratic political structures and culture that had been observed by Huntington in his studies166 impeded Habibie’s reform policies.

A tape scandal that explained Habibie and Ghalib’s orchestrated scenario to investigate Soeharto exposed the existence of covert intelligence and psychological operations connecting the military and Gen. Wiranto.167 Habibie’s native Sulawesi ally and advisor on the Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung --DPA), Baramuli, stated that the scandal was obviously an intelligence game and psychological operations planned by the military. 168 Baramuli’s counter-attack was the first case in which a top administration official had launched a public allegation against Wiranto’s military. More importantly, Baramuli implied that Maj. Gen. Syamsu Djalaluddin, Attorney General Ghalib’s aide for intelligence (Jaksa Agung Muda Bidang Inteljen) was responsible for the leak of the conversations in the telephone between Habibie and Ghalib, and that the active two-star general had been working on behalf of the military intelligence, Bais. 169 For this reason, after the tape scandal, Habibie immediately discharged Syamsu although he had been appointed to the position just a few months earlier.

Syamsu’s track record seemingly indicated that he was a Soeharto loyalist and a close ally of Wiranto. Documents showed that until September 1998, he served as the head of the military police corps (Corps Polisi Militer --CPM), the investigative unit of the army that had found no guilty parties within the military during a series of military human rights violations, i.e. the July 27, 1996 PDI headquarters attack, the 1997-1998

163 “BB Buka ‘Extra Account’ untuk Tampung Pengembalian Utang” (“BB Opens ‘Extra Account’ for Debt Return”), Suara Pembaruan, August 16, 1999. 164 Muladi was interviewed on March 28, 2008 in Jakarta. 165 Interview with Andi Ghalib on January 8, 2008 in Jakarta. 166 Huntington, 1983, op. cit, in Sahdan (trans.), 2004, op. cit.: 76. 167 In interview on January 8, 2008 in Jakarta, Andi Ghalib told that his conversations by phone with Presi- dent Habibie was secretly recorded by their opponents. He also described the progress of the investigations of the Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases, which had been conducted in line with the president’s expectation and direction. Because of this their opponents, particularly, radical students and reform activists, blamed them for organizing false efforts. 168 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 230, 222. 169 The appointment of an active military official to occupy the civilian post also explained the extent to which military reform had been implemented.

90 student and activist kidnappings, the Trisakti shootings, and the May 1998 anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta. Logically, after being assigned to the attorney general’s office, it was inconceivable that he was actually working against Wiranto on behalf of others, namely, Ghalib and Habibie.170 Furthermore, Syamsu was replaced with Lt. Gen. (ret) Yusuf Kertanegara, another of Wiranto’s close allies, former Irjen Dephankam (General Inspector of the Ministry of Defense and Security) and member of the military honorary council (Dewan Kehormatan Militer --DKM). He had sacked Lt. Gen. Prabowo from the position of Kostrad commander six months earlier, demonstrating Habibie’s incapability of continuing reforms. He seemingly miscalculated that Kertanegara as well as Tyasno Sudarto, the Bais chief, were former commanders of the Central Java regional command, where Soeharto had served as commander in the 1950s. He likely ignored that the future commander continued to select Soeharto loyalists, such as Subagyo, Wismoyo Arismunandar, and so forth. Thus, Wiranto’s choice to appoint Kertanegara based on his military background to replace Syamsu was apparently aimed at inserting him into the Habibie camp so that Wiranto could ensure that the attorney general’s office would protect, rather than attack, Soeharto, his family and cronies, and other related military interests.171

Due to the various military threats and heavy criticism of the reform movement, after the tape scandal, Ghalib was replaced by his deputy, Ismoedjoko (Wakil Jaksa Agung). Leading up to the presidential election on September 25, 1999, the caretaker of the attorney general’s office initiated prosecution on the Soehartos’ alleged KKN cases. Nonetheless, the drama surrounding Habibie continued. The President ordered that the prosecutions be halted and in a letter (Surat Penghentian Penyelidikan dan Penuntutan -- SP3) he urged Ismoedjoko to cancel the investigation and prosecution by October 11, 1999. Thus, the attorney general's office, in a decision signed by the Acting Attorney General, Ismoedjoko, formally cancelled the investigation of the Soeharto case on the grounds that there was not enough evidence.172 It could hardly have been a coincidence that Ismoedjoko’s SP3 accomplished something that Gen. Wiranto had vowed to do the moment Habibie assumed his presidency, namely, protect Soeharto. Habibie’s decision to close the case and to also nominate Gen. Wiranto as his running mate in the next presidential election obviously indicated his pragmatic approach to winning the military’s favor.173

170 In interviews, Andi Ghalib (on January 8, 2008 in Jakarta), as well as Indria Samego (on May 15, 2006 in Jakarta) and Dewi Fortuna Anwar (on December 18, 2006 in Jakarta), who were Habibie’s advisers, did not disclose Habibie’s difference with Wiranto. 171 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 224. 172 Hosen, 2006, loc.cit; Andi Abdussalam, “News Focus: Soeharto's Health and Legal Case,” Antara, May 20, 2006, Selected Postings from East Timor, Prominent Indonesians Call For Soeharto's Trial. 173 “Bila Kingmaker Ingin Menjadi King” (“If the Kingmaker Wants to be a King”), Majalah Tajuk, Octo- ber 21, 1999.

91 Prior to the October 1999 MPR special session (Sidang Istimewa), Habibie explained his decisions by reminding everyone of Ismoedjoko’s claim that the Soeharto investigation was halted due to insufficient proof. The president knew that his ministers’ missions in Europe had found no evidence of bank transfers in the Soeharto family name, despite what had been reported by the foreign media. He avoided mentioning that his government had never formally requested assistance from the Swiss government. As a result, pro-reform students and radical reformists lost trust in Habibie.

As Ghalib admitted in his biography published 2 years later, chief commander Gen. Wiranto and President Habibie had prevented him from declaring Soeharto as a suspect of KKN.174 In interview, Ghalib also mentioned the same limitation in regards to the insufficient evidence.175 According to Ghalib, Gen. Wiranto was genuinely worried by the prospect of continuing investigations, which could carry serious implications for Soeharto. Other reports supporting Ghalib’s statements explained the additional constraints he faced in moving forward with the investigation of Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases. The scandal exposed by Majalah Panji Masyarakat regarding the circulation of the Ghalib-Habibie tape had clearly informed Habibie’s orchestrated scenario and false efforts to cope with these cases, which worsened the president’s image in public and among opposition leaders.176

Habibie’s inconsistency in dealing with Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases and his support of Ismoedjoko’s SP3 in finally ending the prosecution were seemingly connected with his long-relationship with Soeharto spanning a time period from 1950 until the 1997 legislative and presidential elections. Looking at his background, he had actually known Soeharto for more than 40 years. Posted in Sulawesi as a mid-rank army officer, Soeharto met the Habibie family while Habibie was still a young child. Then, after Habibie’s father passed away, Soeharto had taken a personal interest in Habibie. Soeharto replaced Sukarno through a controversial mandate during the crucial transition period from civilian to military authoritarian system. He convinced Habibie to dedicate his skills to the country by offering him more important positions in Indonesia, because in Germany his highest position had been as vice-president of MBB.

After returning to Indonesia, Habibie headed several large, high-cost ventures involving strategic state-run enterprises supported by Soeharto, including the national aircraft industry (IPTN). President Soeharto gave his protégé his own government department and unlimited funds, including money from reforestation projects. In effect, he sacrificed agricultural and small and medium-scale economic sectors, to build Southeast Asia’s first aircraft industry in Indonesia. Critics accused Habibie of building

174 Usamah Hisyam (ed.), HA Muhammad Ghalib: Menepis Badai Menegakkan Supremasi Hukum (HA Muhammad Ghalib: Challenging Storm to Uphold Law Supremacy), Jakarta: Dharmapena, 2000: 342, 352. 175 Andi Ghalib was interviewed on January 8, 2008 in Jakarta. 176 Hisyam (ed.), 2000, ibid: 379-382.

92 aircraft nobody wanted, and of not understanding economics. The military also felt insecure in buying his IPTN products and disliked having to receive ex-East German ships bought by him because of their dissatisfaction with the conditions of the ships and the issue of underlying corruption in these dealings. However, with Soeharto’s full support, Habibie was untouchable.177

Starting in 1978, Habibie served as State Minister of Research and Technology until President Soeharto chose him as his deputy (vice-president) in March 1998. His close friendship with Soeharto had been absolutely critical to his rise to power. Habibie himself openly acknowledged Soeharto as his long-time mentor and patron, and referred to him grandly as Mr. SGS or “Super-Genius Soeharto.”178 In his autobiography, he said that he had learned a lot from Pak Harto (Mr. Soeharto) about the Indonesian culture of leadership, particularly the culture and philosophy of Javanese leadership. He believed it would be difficult to lead Indonesians if he could not understand the culture of Javanese leadership. He admitted that the past experience and additional knowledge he received from Pak Harto over 40 years regarding the (Javanese) culture of leadership had influenced his way of making policy.179 This entailed paying respect to elder people or his predecessors, and Soeharto in particular. Thus, he could not allow further investigation, prosecution, or the trial of the former New Order ruler.

Therefore, Habibie’s long relationship with Soeharto kept him from being consistent and serious in dealing with the Soehartos’ alleged KKN cases. His personal interests could also be potentially harmed by the relevations in such a case. As Aguero recognized in similar cases,180 the military’s previous partnership in the formation and protection of the authoritarian regime, which was now initiating withdrawal, had a strong defining effect on military interests during the democratic transition under Habibie. The military --in this context, the TNI-- initially sought to preserve some of the features of the old regime.

III. Coping with Human Rights Violations

III.A. Habibie’s Soft Approach to End Violence, and Military Reaction

According to Habibie, Indonesia paid a high human price for its post-Soeharto democratization. He regretted that during his presidency, when anarchy emerged, he was

177 Jonathan Head,”Profile: President BJ Habibie”, BBC Special Report, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ events/indonesia/profiles/98092.stm: 1-2. 178 Rizal Sukma, Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 179 Bacharuddin Jusif Habibie, Detik-detik yang Menentukan: Jalan Panjang Indonesia Menuju Demokrasi (Decisive Seconds: A Long Road toward Democracy), Jakarta: THC Mandiri, 2006: 53-54. 180 Perlmutter, 1986, loc. cit, in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whiteheads (eds.), 1986, loc. cit: 23.

93 unable to effectively end the violence and bring back stability.181 In the war-torn province of Aceh, for instance, he had tried to introduce peaceful settlement by lifting its DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer --military operations zone) status, ending the war, and opening dialogues with GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka --Movement for An Independent Aceh) rebels. However, his inability to uphold civilian supremacy caused him to be inconsistent in lifting the DOM and pulling out the troops, which gave the military the opportunity to continue its repressive measures there. In addition, his dependency on Gen. Wiranto led to an unwillingness to conduct a formal investigation or prosecution of human rights violations of the military in Aceh, despite mounting evidence and testimony pointing to killing, torture, and disappearances. The evidence had been gathered by the parliament and Komnas HAM’s fact-finding teams.182 Hence, aside from the apology extended by Wiranto to the Acehnese due to the grave violations of human rights perpetrated by the military, and Habibie’s earlier support of the formation of commissions to inquire into human rights abuses in Aceh, Habibie showed no signs of being ready to follow-up on inquiries and engage in prosecution. No additional actions were taken on allegations that military personnel and high-ranking officers, in particular, might have been involved. As Marzuki Darusman stated, the President did not want to take any risk of strong resistance by military leaders.183

As Usman Hasan, head of presidential advisory team for Aceh, describes, Habibie did not want prosecution of military atrocities in Aceh during the DOM years, particularly, the First and Second Operasi Jaring Merah (red-web operations). Once legal proceedings were taken against some soldiers, later prosecution could reach the highest echelons of the military and his cabinet ministers.184 Thus, Gen. Wiranto, Gen. Feisal Tandjung, and Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid,185 who were ministers or occupied ministerial level positions in the Habibie cabinet, as well as many others, could be affected. Habibie was reasonable and did not take the advice of his special advisers, who had concluded that the main issue of the vertical (separatist) conflict in Aceh was military atrocities during the DOM years. His inability to make his own decisions triggered a new war between the GAM and the military. In Lhokseumawe, the war caused 781 civilians deaths, while 163 others went missing, 100 were raped, and hundreds of soldiers died. Across all of Aceh’s regions, the war caused about 3,000 fatalities.186

181 “Transisi Demokrasi, Habibie Ingatkan Indonesia Membayar Mahal untuk Demokrasi” (”Democratic Transition, Habibe Reminds Indonesia’s High Pay for Democracy”), Harian Kompas, June 7, 2006: 5. 182 Majalah Gatra 4, No. 38, August 8, 1998; Gatra 4, No. 41, August 29, 1998, cited in Bertrand, 2004: 175. 183 Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on December 17, 2007 in Jakarta. 184 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 177. 185 In interview on January 27, 2008 in Jakarta, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid argued that at that time in the war- torn Aceh, he only conducted his duty as a member of the Indonesian armed forces (ABRI) just like other Indonesian soldiers in other provinces. Therefore, he argued that the use of violence was often unavoidable. 186 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit: Appendix 2 No. 35.

94 In Irian Jaya, Habibie had also attempted to initiate a new approach to addressing separatist conflicts and started to relax his political control over the biggest island in the most eastern part of Indonesia. By October 5, 1998, following Gen. Wiranto’s announcement, 187 the new President lifted the province’s DOM status after it had experienced the repressive policies of Soeharto for almost 30 years. He signaled a possible reduction in the TNI’s participation in the conflict. He pursued dialogues with Foreri (Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian Jaya --Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya People), a coalition of local churches, universities, tribes, women, and student groups, which had denounced the province’s integration into Indonesia and had demanded a referendum for Papuans to choose their own future. Ignoring his advisers, and considering that it was his duty to listen directly to the concerns of his people, in February 1999, he opened a dialogue with 100 noted Papuans,188 or the so-called “Team of 100,” representing a wide social, religious, and geographic spectrum of Papuan society,189 in the state palace. Unfortunately, during the unprecedented meeting, Foreri affirmed their standpoints and formally demanded independence, effectively shocking Habibie and Gen. Wiranto. 190 Thus, the meeting halted any plans for the national dialogue that had previously been highly anticipated by the new president.

Habibie’s decision to lift DOM in Aceh and Irian Jaya, which had often been seen by the military as a soft policy,191 which could cause disintegration192 of the state, voiced their negative reactions and anger. Habibie’s reluctance to prosecute the perpetrators of human rights violation in the provinces with vertical conflicts encouraged the military to preserve their culture of violence there. In fact, the withdrawal of combat troops did not mean that TNI had completely ended its presence in Aceh, since its regular units assigned for aims of national defense remained there. But nothing resulted from this constructive development following the renewed use of violent measures against the Acehnese. Still, TNI troops were unable to control their emotions and overreacted in their response to the new situation. A number of new incidents that heralded a return to violence started as the celebrations by local populations enthusiastic to observe the troops’ departure turned into large-scale violent events. The departure of the Kopassus from Lhokseumawe in early September 1998 was witnessed by thousands of people, and resulted in a riot that quickly spread to other towns in the area, causing extensive destruction to government and foreign investors’ properties, such as banks and office buildings. 193 According to

187 Amiruddin al Rahab, Heboh Papua: Perang Rahasia, Trauma, dan Separatisme (Papua Question: Se- cret Operations, Trauma and Separatism), Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2010: 45, 75. 188 Al Rahab, 2010, op.cit: 29. 189 Eva-Lotta E. Hedman,“Papua: the Last Frontier for democratization, demilitarization and decentralization in Indonesia,” in Eva-Lotta E. Hedman (ed.), Dynamics of Conflict and Displacement in Papua, Indo- nesia, Refugee Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 42, University of Oxford, September 2007: 8. 190 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 175-177. 191 Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on December 17, 2007 in Jakarta. 192 Dewi Fortuna Anwar was interviewed on December 18, 2006 in Jakarta. 193 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 175.

95 Acehnese intellectuals and NGOs, the riots were engineered by the military to create a pretext for returning to Aceh to continue their presence there.194 In fact, Gen. Wiranto had sent new combat troops from Medan, the neighboring city, to secure the town. He also provided vital revenue to the central government in Lhokseumawe, including the oil, gas, and fertilizer plants.

III.B. Military’s New Repressive Approach in Trouble Spots

Under Habibie, there was no significant change in the perception of the TNI’s generals and their jobs and responsibilities. Fundamentally, whether they were retired or not, the generals saw their job as a sacred mission bestowed upon those ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the nation. Such a view, a key legacy of a politicized military nurtured during the New Order, which had still been very prevalent up until that time, was likely being used to protect them from any charges of abuse by claiming that their mission was to maintain the integrity of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia --NKRI).195

In other words, the TNI soldiers could not be blamed, because in conducting their jobs, they were carrying out the state’s mission of defending the integrity of the NKRI. This pretext had often been used as an axiom for justifying or excusing violent incidents involving civilians. This meant that such missions needed to be carried out at all costs. More specifically, as the nature of the mission became sacrosanct, it also became politically acceptable and practically convenient for TNI soldiers to stop taking into account the basic rights of local people and other civilians caught in conflict situations.196

In trouble spots such as Aceh and East Timor, clashes resulting in TNI casualties were usually followed by heavy-handed retaliation as collective punishment of villages allegedly supporting rebels. Day by day, this became a common tactic of TNI soldiers in conducting their anti-guerilla warfare. Furthermore, they also were able to arbitrarily attack communities of militants or poorly armed believers in any region of the country.197

Examples of this continuing reality were the sweeping operations hunting for GAM rebels and their sympathizers, during which TNI units raided villages, harming non-combatants. Ali Zamzami from Solidaritas Persaudaraan Korban Pelanggaran HAM (SPKP HAM --Brotherhood Solidarity for the Victims of Human Rights Violations)

194 Philip J. Eldridge, The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia, London and New York, Routledge, 2002, op. cit: 142. 195 Aboeprijadi Santoso,”Generals and the ‘Invention of Tradition’”, The Jakarta Post, May 6, 2008: 7. 196 Ibid. 197 Ibid.

96 reprimanded TNI soldiers for operations, which had been improperly conducted. 198 Around eleven people were killed in early January 1999 when troops opened fire on a crowd that was protesting the persistant military presence in Aceh. A few days later, about 1,000 TNI soldiers attacked Kandang in the hunt for a GAM leader, an action which marked the start of a new escalation of violence. 199 The more the Acehnese demonstrated against military presence and in favor independence, the more frequently the TNI soldiers opened fire on crowds. In the May 1999 incident in Krueng Geukeueh, while searching for GAM members participating in a large meeting or rally, the soldiers opened fire on a crowd of mostly women and children, causing fourty fatalities.200 The incident was pointed to by Zulfikar Muhammad from Koalisi NGO HAM (NGOs coalition for human rights), and Zamzami, as another brutal new case of alleged violence by TNI soldiers.201

The TNI began to launch sweeping operations more commonly in different locations, and raided villages believed to be hiding rebels. They increased their troop levels to close to 6,000 as part of the newly installed operational troops for preventing mass revolt (Pasukan Pencegah Rusuh Massa --PPRM). Since they played the same function as troops assigned during the DOM years, with this policy the military leaders in Jakarta had actually annulled their previous decision to remove non-organic troops from Aceh.202 More significantly, with the return of combat forces and the start of a new and bloody anti-insurgency campaign, Aceh’s status as a military operations zone was, in effect, restored. Habibie’s soft approach of making visits, asking forgiveness, and promoting reconciliation with the Acehnese in late March 1999 had been met with large demonstrations demanding a referendum on independence. This gave the military reason to udertake even more repressive measures. 203 Thus, as pointed to by both Marzuki Darusman, a Komnas HAM’s investigator, and Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Habibie’s adviser and spokeswoman, the new repressive measures reflected the military’s disappointment in the president’s weakness in seeking a peaceful approach to coping with separatist conflict in Aceh.204

The Linud 100 (airborne) unit of TNI soldiers was reported to be involved205 in an unfinished operation from July 1999 that led to the killing of a well-known Islamic cleric,

198 Ali Zamzami was interviewed on August 25, 2007, in Banda Aceh. 199 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 176. 200 Ibid: 177. 201 Zulfikar Muhammad and Zamzami were interviewed on August 25, 2007 in Banda Aceh. 202 Majalah Forum Keadilan 8, No. 16, July 25, 1999. 203 David Bourchier, “Habibie’s Interregnum: Reformasi, Elections, Regionalism, and the Struggle for Po- wer”, in Chris Manning and Peter van Diermen (eds.), Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis, Singapore: ISEAS, 2000, loc. cit: 25. 204 Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on December 17, 2007 in Jakarta; Dewi Fortuna Anwar was interviewed on December 18, 2006 in Jakarta. 205 John Roosa, “Brawling, Bombing, and Backing: The Security Forces As a Source of Insecurity”, Inside Indonesia, January-March, 2003.

97 Teungku Bantaqiah, and more than fifty of his followers. 206 In other words, in Bantaqiyah’s village, the soldiers had massacred fifty-one unarmed civilians.207 Those unfamiliar with the nature of the TNI’s covert intelligence and psychological operations would simply say that the killings were conducted by OTK (Orang Tak Dikenal -- unknown perpetrators), official terminology commonly used by the local authority to support the operations of the security forces through their plausible deniability, and contain the GAM rebels. 208 Nonetheless, the Acehnese voiced their rejection of the PPRM’s existence. Following the withdrawal of PPRM troops due to mass strikes and pressure by local NGOs on August 3 and 4, 1999, however, more troops were substituted in their place. Chief Commander Gen. Wiranto and Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Gen. Feisal Tandjung were in charge of the First and Second Red- Web operations during the DOM years. These operations had resulted in atrocities and met with sustained resistance amid the Acehnese’s rising demand for the prosecution of the perpetrators. Not including the GAM’s armed rebels, nearly 2,000 Acehnese civilians had become the victims of the TNI’s new military operations.209

Meanwhile, in Irian Jaya, as President Habibie offered political liberalization to the Papuans, the military worked to repress activities it deemed to be separatist. As a result, one student --another version said three students210-- was killed in Abepura during a demonstration after the military opened fire on Cendrawasih University to prevent students from aggressively raising the Bintang Kejora (Morning Star) flag frequently used by the separatist Papuans, or those labeled by the military as Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan (GPK --Security Disturbance Movement). The security forces and military units in particular, had fired rubber bullets at demonstrators who refused to lower the flag after it was raised on July 2, 1998.211 Gen. Wiranto justified such repressive measures by saying that whenever a flag other than the Bendera Merah-Putih (the Red and White flag) of Indonesia was displayed during a demonstration, then this was a separatist act that shattered national unity and integrity.212 This situation suggests that post-Soeharto TNI leaders were still preoccupied with the notion of unitary state, which had become sacrosanct. Therefore they denied any further right to national self-determination.213

It was reported that the military used the “fence of calves” tactic in fighting the Papuan rebels, in which ordinary villagers were put in a line and forced to walk in front

206 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 178. 207 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 293. 208 Interviews with Burhanuddin Umar, an Acehnese and a pro-Masyumi or modernist Muslim activist, and with Muchlis, an employee who lived in Banda Aceh , on August 23, 2007, in Banda Aceh. 209 John McBeth, “Worse to Come,” Far Eastern Economic Review,” July 29, 1999: 16-18. 210 Daeng Baranggau, local resident of Abepura, was interviewed on June 4, 2008 in Abepura. 211 Harian Kompas, July 7, 1998; Majalah Forum Keadilan 7, No. 8, July27, 1998, cited in Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 154. 212 Media Indonesia, July 8, 1998, ibid. 213 Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 47.

98 of troops to flush the rebels out of hiding, causing the bloody Biak incident of July 6, 1998.214 It was also said that unidentified military units opened fire on a demonstration in Biak and threw the dead into the sea.215 Later, as some bodies washed up on the shore, the military claimed that they were not victims of the massacre, but of the devastating tsunami that hit the coast of Papua New Guinea on July 17, 1998, several days afterward.

In Maluku, the new political situation was marked by the euphoria of reform under Habibie and produced big riots. By the second week of November 1998, for example, students at a rally were demanding an apology from Maluku regional (Kodam XVI Pattimura) commander, Maj. Gen. Hikayat, who had claimed himself to be a representative of the province’s people. This claim came after he attended the MPR special session on 10-13 November 1998 in Jakarta, and triggered a major clash with the military. The students who protested that Hikayat did not represent the people’s voice clashed with military officers. Reportedly, ninety-four people died and 100 were badly wounded, while 2,000 houses, 300 stores, and other public buildings were burned down.216

III.C. Referendum, East Timor Inferno and the Threat of A Coup

In June 1998, Habibie offered a special economic package to East Timor, which was faced with a severe economic crisis and international pressure for democratic transition in Indonesia as well as growing demonstrations demanding independence for the province. Furthermore, in his address to the nation on the occasion of Indonesia’s national celebration on August 15, 1998, he asked forgiveness for the human rights abuses conducted by the military in the past in the province. This initiative apparently annoyed the TNI as a state institution.217

Unfortunately, the East Timorese leadership showed little enthusiasm for wide- ranging autonomy, and the president failed to stop demonstrations demanding a referendum on independence in the province. The initiative remained ineffective as violence and covert intelligence and psychological operations conducted by paramilitaries linked to the TNI continued. Knowing that his proposal was inadequate for dispelling the uncertainty there, by January 27, 1999 he stated that he would give East Timor independence if the offer of wide-ranging autonomy were denied.

Habibie’s approval of a referendum reflected his support of a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict in East Timor, which had been raging since Soeharto integrated it as

214 Colombijn and Lindblad, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 7. 215 The Editors, Indonesia, October 2000, loc. cit: 131. 216 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit: Appendix 2 No. 26. 217 Bourchier, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 155.

99 Indonesia’s twenty-seventh province in 1976. To show that he was serious about this new option, he also ordered the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights Affairs to release Xanana Gusmao, the resistance leader. Using this solution, the new president wanted to portray Indonesia as a country, which had left its authoritarian system and was becoming a new democracy.

The referendum in East Timor was freely held on August 30, 1999 under UN supervision, but Habibie’s negligence in anticipating the TNI’s reaction was not in line with the progressive solution. In fact, his order to the TNI to control the activities of its paramilitaries led to anarchy after the clear result that 78.5 percent refused the wide- ranging autonomy. He did not anticipate that violence would break out and escalate within hours of the results being announced because of the mounting dissatisfaction and anger among pro-Indonesia paramilitaries.

Frustrations over the result of the referendum caused the TNI linked-pro- Indonesia paramilitaries to engage in vast destruction, burning, and looting, and displacing of the local population. Hundreds of people were killed, mostly civilians who favored independence, and around 200,000 fled to the mountains or the nearest province of West Timor due to the systematic destruction of cities and hundreds of villages in East Timor.218 Given the fact that the Indonesian security forces did not react by stopping the anarchy, the UN decided to send a peacekeeping force.

President Habibie proved unable to control the TNI and its militia forces during their systematic scorched-earth campaign,219 which had damaged about 70 to 80 percent of East Timor's infrastructure as they withdrew from the territory.220 This resulted in an abrupt confrontation between him and his chief commander, Gen. Wiranto. The president had embarked on his East Timor policy to improve Indonesia’s international image, but the military had, in effect, sabotaged that policy. 221 Due to their interest in giving Indonesia a better image, Habibie and his cabinet had rejected Wiranto’s statement of martial law in East Timor the previous day on September 6, 1999. This reaction infuriated Wiranto and led the TNI to put more pressure on Habibie. It was reported that within several hours of the cabinet decision, Wiranto with a group of generals in tow visited the president.222 Amazingly, reports indicate that Habibie acted upon the things Wiranto said in the meeting, bowing to the pressure. In other words, the president was

218 Associated Press, September 3, 1999, cited in Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 143-144. 219 Philip J. Eldridge, The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia, London and New York, Routledge, 2002: 138-139. 220 “East Timor: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2000”, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, February 23, 2001. 221 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 273. 222 Derwin Pereira, “Wiranto is the Man to Watch,” and “Inside Story: The ‘Silent Coup,’” The Straits Times, September 12, 1999.

100 pushed into going along with his chief commander’s plan.223 The result of the TNI’s pressure became clear early the following day, as Habibie reversed his cabinet decision and announced martial law in East Timor.

By September 10, 1999, responding to heavy international pressure,224 and trying to improve the image of Indonesia due to its urgent interest in regaining foreign aid, Habibie was ready to accept the long-awaited invitation of international peacekeepers. This meant accepting the presence of foreign troops on “Indonesian soil,” without Wiranto’s consent. According to Habibie’s aides, just before he made the announcement, on September 8, 1999, Wiranto confronted him on the issue and threatened to step down.225 The President also received a written ultimatum from the chief commander, who warned him that if he admitted foreign troops into East Timor, the military would hand power to a ministerial triumvirate consisting of Gen. (ret) Feisal Tandjung, Lt. Gen (ret) Syarwan Hamid226 and Gen. Wiranto himself.227 As Habibie refused to resign, Wiranto reportedly agreed to allow him to keep his position on the condition that from then on, the chief commander, not the president, would make all strategic decisions regarding the former Indonesian province.228

Rather than a calculated threat, the general’s move was likely soft resistance responding to an external factor, using Crouch’s terminology. 229 This resulted in deception aimed at forcing President Habibie to delay his decision, in order to give the TNI and its militias the chance to finish their scorched-earth campaign in East Timor before they entirely removed all of their forces from the former territory. Domestic and international media widely referred to these alleged events, in particular, Wiranto’s ultimatum, as a “silent-coup,” which achieved its goal of bluffing the new civilian president. In Aguero’s study, it was found that threats of force to stop specific policies would be the military’s most extreme reaction during the early stages of democratic transition.230

In effect, Wiranto’s ultimatum had prevented Habibie from summoning international or UN peacekeepers, but his aides spread word that a coup d’etat had been attempted. This triggered a counter-move from the Bais, through which Maj. Gen. Tyasno Sudarto, the new chief, replacing Maj. Gen. Zacky Makarim, 231 and his

223 Bowling, 1999, in Bourchier, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc. cit: 29. 224 Crouch, in Johannen and Gomez (eds.), 2001, loc. cit: 182. 225 Harian Kompas, September 9, 1999: 1, 11; Harian Kompas, September 13, 1999: 1, 11. 226 In interview on January 27, 2008 in Jakarta, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid gave no comment about this. 227 Pereira, The Straits Times, September 12, 1999, loc.cit 228 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit. 229 See Crouch in Ahmad and Crouch (eds.), 1985, loc. cit: 288. 230 Aguero, 1995, op. cit.: 23. 231 The Editors, “Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite January 1, 1998-January 31, 1999,” Indone- sia, 67, April 1999, New York: Cornell University, SEA: 140.

101 intelligence officers spread word that the president was on the brink of resigning. It was reportedly no coincidence that late that night Habibie’s residence suffered a rare power outage, which according to some of his aides, was meant to intimidate the president.232 This calls to mind one of Finer’s models of military resistance, namely, the use of intimidation. 233 Wiranto’s final announcement that Indonesia would accept the UN sponsored-military forces was not instantaneous. Thus, on the evening of September 12, 1999, the TNI endorsed the presence of an international peacekeeping force within days of the “silent coup.” Of course its main forces had been withdrawn and the scorched- earth campaign was complete, so the damage had been already done by the time the UN arrived.

III.D. Military Brutality and the Role of Militias

Eventually, Habibie announced his policy on TV by saying that he had made a decision to approve an international peacekeeping force working together with the TNI to reestablish stability in East Timor after the referendum. While delivering his speech on Indonesian television and arguing that the government could not wait any longer, because too many people had lost their lives, Wiranto stood at his side, symbolizing his support of the decision. This was even though Wiranto had made sure that the international peacekeeping force would effectively begin their tasks no sooner than 15 days later, the minimum length of time needed by the Indonesian military to complete its scorched-earth campaign in East Timor234 and withdraw the pro-integration militias from the territory.235

Reports from the Komnas HAM, for example, indicated that armed pro-integration militias were being supplied with weapons by their supporters in the TNI. This was evidently being accomplished through covert intelligence and psychological operations with, the involvement --as usual-- of the black-clad Ninjas, mysterious warriors who wore masks during their operations in an imitation of the practices in Japanese histories, which had never occurred in East Java or Banyuwangi in particular.236 Reports about the connection between the militias and the TNI, as well as the TNI’s involvement in the violence, were issued by the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor and the Indonesian Commission of Investigation into Human Rights Violations in East Timor (KPP HAM Timtim). 237 As Liem said, thugs acting on the orders of their Kopassus masters were responsible for the killings and devastation that grew in intensity during

232 Pereira, The Straits Times, September 12, 1999, loc. cit; O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 274. 233 S.E. Finer, 1962: op. cit: 140-163. 234 Eldridge, 2002, op. cit: 138-139. 235 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 275. 236 Douglas Kammen, ‘The Trouble with Normal: The Indonesian Military, Paramilitaries, and the Final Solution in East Timor,” in Anderson (ed.), 2001, loc.cit: 172. 237 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 240.

102 1999 and came to a terrifying climax in September 1999.238 It was also significant that the Komnas HAM had specified the possible involvement of high level TNI officers in the post-referendum violence.

In addition, there was abundant evidence that gangsters and street hoodlums who had joined militia groups had razed much of East Timor and followed orders from the army leadership. 239 On April 4, 1999, the Besi Merah Putih (Red and White Iron) paramilitary group, for example, opened fire with automatic weapons on unarmed civilians seeking safe haven in Liquica. They slaughtered those, who tried to escape.240 On April 17, 1999, while fighting back East Timorese activists demanding independence and causing disturbances, the TNI killed twelve people and wounded ten more.241 TNI headquarters officials immediately denied that security forces had been involved in the Liquica killing. A report issued by a journalist who interviewed witnesses and survivors, however, noted that the TNI was not justified in claiming that there was no blood on their hands. Witnesses and survivors of the incident said that they recognized the local military troops who were not wearing uniforms, but carried semi-automatic weapons and actively participated in the shooting. 242 There were further contradictions with the TNI’s explanation of the event. They said that there had only been five deaths in the Liquica killing, but local people saw army troops removing several truckloads of bodies, which were later found dumped in a nearby pond.243 Other sources said that the death toll was estimated at fourty-five.244

Yayasan HAK, East Timors most prominent and respected human rights group, pointed to the role played by Indonesia’s most capable and also most feared army unit, the Kopassus. José Oliveira, a spokeperson from the Yayasan HAK, said that in April 1999, he had witnessed Kopassus soldiers directing pro-Jakarta militias in a massacre in the Liquica’s Catholic church, which left fifty-two unarmed civilians dead and dozens more injured.245 Aside from this case, Kopassus soldiers had been involved directly or indirectly in activities across the whole of East Timor; they gathered intelligence, supervised beatings and torture, and supported the militia with training. In Liquica,

238 Liem Soei Liong,”It’s the Military, Stupid!” in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 203. 239 Colombijn and Lindblad, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, ibid: 21. 240 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 261. Another source said that it occurred on April 6, 1999, see Eldridge, 2002, op. cit: 156. 241 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit: Appendix 2 No. 42. 242 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit. 243 Ibid. 244 Robert Lowry, “East Timor: An Overview of Political Development,” in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc .cit: 94. 245 Mark Dodd, “Kopassus in E Timor --Licensed to Kill,” The Australian, December 19, 2005, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,17604498%5E28737,00.html.

103 humanitarian aid workers saw Kopassus soldiers directing the Besi Merah Putih militias.246

On the same day, Deputy Chief Commander Eurico Guterres, a protégé and long- time associate of the Indonesian military, who had then become a central leader247 of the pro-integration East Timorese movement, made a speech during a meeting in the Dili parliament building on August 9, 1999. The meeting was attended by TNI soldiers and it dealt with directing the militias to conduct a systematic cleansing of the ranks for traitors to the cause of integration.248 A confession by Aitarak member Eusebio Soarez, who was captured in Dili, revealed that the meeting, which was also attended by Basilio Araujo, the political leader of the Pro-Integration Movement, instructed all pro-integration defenders to kill pro-independence people after the August 30th referendum.249 In fact, TNI soldiers who were responsible for guaranteeing security there before and after the referendum did not take the appropriate actions. Leaked Indonesian army documents showed that Aitarak, which was led by Guterres, was a regular part of the Indonesian armed forces.250 Moreover, Guterres has boasted to journalists that he took his orders directly from Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri, then the Kodam IX Udayana regional commander, and told others that he communicated with Maj. Gen. Zacky Makarim, 251 the TNI representative for the task force on the East Timor consultation for referendum (P3TT).

The TNI also did nothing, although the foreign press reported the killing of refugees, who were taking shelter in the house of a pro-independence figure, Manuel Carrascalao. The killings were carried out by militias, and resulted in between fourteen and twenty-five deaths.252 When appearing before a fact-finding team of the Indonesian parliament (DPR) visiting East Timor to see Indonesia’s readiness for the referendum, Guterres confessed that he had directly led the attacks on the refugees. Unaware that his actions could be prosecuted in the future as gross violations of human rights, he specifically told the team about how he had brutally killed Carrascalao’s son. Guterres reported that he and his militia groups had to consume pills distributed by Indonesian soldiers before they began their actions.253 Importantly, he disclosed that he had just been

246 Ibid. 247 Calvin Sims, “Jakarta Won't Pardon Suharto Son; Orders Militia Chief's Arrest,” New York Times.com, October 5, 2000. 248 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 262. 249 Conor O’Clery, “Killer Held in Mountains Tells of Murder Plans,” Irish Times, September 22, 1999. 250 “East Timor under the Indonesian Jackboot: An Analysis of Indonesian Army Documents”, Tapol, 15 November 1998. 251 Joanna Jolly, “Militias Vow to Rise from the Ashes,” South China Morning Post, 19 November 1999. 252 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit. 253 Humphrey Wangke, the secretary of DPR fact finding team, was interviewed on August 15, 2007, in Kupang, West Timor.

104 following the orders of TNI officers when he and the pro-integration militias took action together with TNI soldiers.254

Furthermore, the Bobonaro-Maliana military district (Kodim 1636) commander, Lt. Col. Burhanuddin Siagian, reportedly was caught carrying out executions on September 4, 1999.255 This resulted in his indictment for a particularly vicious atrocity in the Maliana region. 256 Previously, he had made public speeches threatening to kill supporters of independence for Timor-Leste, and was responsible for the death of seven people in April 1999. The Kodim 1636 commander was charged with individual responsibility and command responsibility for the following crimes against humanity: torture, murder, persecution, and deportation or forcible transfer of a civilian population. He was held responsible for the creation of the Bobonaro militia system, which had become one of the most repressive in the whole of East Timor. 257 The Kodim 1636 commander was also alleged to have participated in looting and arson during an attack on a church complex in Suai. It was also accused for causing the destruction of some 80 percent of the buildings in the town and was estimated to have killed over fifty people. They were alleged to have removed twenty-six bodies and secretly buried them in a region nearby.258

The killings in Suai began on September 6, 1999, as the Laksaur Merah Putih and Mahidi militias and members of the TNI and POLRI attacked refugees staying in the Suai Church complex. The attack was reportedly led directly by the Regent of Covalima, Col. Herman Sediono and the Suai sub-district military (Koramil) commander, First Lieutenant Sugito. At the time of the attack, the police, the Loro Sae Mobile Brigade Contingent, and members of the TNI were outside the fence shooting refugees who tried to flee the church complex. At least fifty people were murdered in this incident, and the burying of the corpses was directed by the Koramil commander along with three members of the TNI and a contingent of the Laksaur militia.259

One day earlier, on September 5, 1999, Detachment 81 (D-81), a unit from Group V of Kopassus, was reported to have silently slipped into the territory, giving evidence of

254 Eurico Guterres was interviewed on October 10, 2007, in Jakarta. 255 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 269; Eldridge, 2002, loc. cit: 156-157. 256 Reported by James Dunn, who served as UN expert on crimes against humanity in East Timor, in 2001- 2002, see “West Papua: Indonesian Military Colonel Siagian, Indicted for Crimes Against Humanity, Rallies Mmilitias in West Papua,” The Institute for Papuan Advocacy & Human Rights (IPAHR), 2007, http://jsmp.minihub.org/indictmentspdf/Cailacoindnannexeng07feb03;http://jsmp;minihub.org/indictments pdf/MalianaBurhanuddin22_7_03.pdf. 257 The Cailaco Indictments issued on February 3, 2003 and The Maliana Indictments issued on July 10, 2003 by the Special Panel for Serious Crimes of Dili District Court. 258 Eldridge, 2002, ibid. 259 “Background on September 6, 1999 Suai Massacre,” Executive Summary Report on the Investigation of Human Rights Violations in East Timor, KPP HAM Timtim, and Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the Secretary-General, January 31, 2000.

105 the formal deployment of the covert warfare group after the result of the referendum.260 There was no evidence of any human rights abuses being committed by the group in East Timor, but it was believed that the group was deployed to Dili (Baucau) on September 5, 1999. On this same day, there was an attack on the Catholic diocese office, where several hundred Timorese had sought protection. Reportedly, at least, twelve people died in the diocese incident.261 In the night of the following day, the attackers razed Bishop Carlos Belo’s house, and hundreds of refugees were forced into trucks and taken away.262

Reports from Dili’s notoriously violent Becora neighborhood said that uniformed soldiers had searched houses using machine guns, firing their weapons, and throwing grenades.263 Houses in the suburban area of the capital of East Timor were burned down and pro-independence residents who did not escape and hid in the hills were immediately forced by the militias onto trucks bound for Atambua on Indonesia’s border with West Timor. The atrocites were reportedly organized by TNI soldiers in cooperation with pro- Jakarta militias in Becora and had caused around fifty fatalities among the local people. 264 On September 8, 1999 in a separate case in Maliana, thirty-three non- combatants were reportedly murdered by a joint force of TNI soldiers and militias.265

An independent international human rights group called the Commission for Seeking of Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) had been recommended by a UN affiliated- human rights commission to conduct investigations since 2002. In a report, it pointed to the activities of pro-integration militias and the TNI having been responsible for the deaths of 1,400 pro-independence East Timorese.266 Many perished in September 1999 from vicious attacks, which put into perspective the significance of the crimes allegedly committed there by the TNI.267 In terms of numbers of lives lost, the terrors allegedly perpetrated by the TNI were extremely widespread and deep-seated so as to be a very significant crime. The violence was further described as being more than just the sum of a series of massacres and murders on a remote half-island involving perhaps 2,000 victims.268 By September 1999, it had resulted in the forced expulsion and exodus of

260 John McBeth, Dan Murphy, Rodney Tasker, and Michael Vatikiotis,”Indonesia: No Way Out,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 23, 1999. 261 Dodd, 2005, loc.cit. 262 O’Rourke, 200 2, op. cit: 272. 263 “Update from Becora,” East Timor International Support Centre, September 5, 1999. 264 O’Clery, 1999, loc. cit. 265 Laporan Singkat KPP HAM Timtim (Executive Summary Report of KPP HAM on the Investigation of Human Rights Violations in East Timor), Jakarta: Komnas HAM, January 31, 2000. 266 Chega!, CAVR, 2006; also interview with Pat Walsh, vice-chairperson of CAVR, in Phnom Penh, Cam- bodia, March 11, 2009; and “Xanana Akan Bawa Laporan Soal Kekejaman Indonesia ke PBB,” Media In- donesia Online, January 18, 2006, http://www.mediaindo.co.id: 1. 267 Joseph Nevins, A Not-So-Distant Horror: Mass Violence in East Timor, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006: 5, 18. 268 Richard Tanter, Desmond Ball, and Gerry van Klinken (eds.), Masters of Terror: Indonesia’s Military and Violence in East Timor, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006: 118; Jim Della-Giacoma, “The

106 three-quarters of East Timor’s 800,000 people, and the organized destruction of the territory’s infrastructure and housing. It also involved an attack on the territory’s religious institutions and a frontal attack on the fundamentals of democracy and freedom.

Unfortunately, it was difficult for Habibie to force the TNI to assume official responsibility for what happened in post-referendum East Timor. The TNI had shown resistance to Habibie’s efforts to address the conflict peacefully. Although he was able to continue with the referendum process, and survived both the “intimidation” and a “silent coup,” he was unable to stop the TNI from implementing what people had suspected as a planned and systematic scorched-earth campaign. Piecing together field observations, certain patterns emerged, which clearly show that the violence was not spontaneous, but was to some degree actually organized by and carried out with the compliance of the TNI.269 Interestingly, while they denied any involvement and proclaimed their innocence, the TNI was ableo to plan a well-orchestrated campaign of violence and create hellish conditions in East Timor. 270 As argued before by Aguero, the civilian regime’s compliance with international pressure to peacefully and democratically handle armed conflicts after the fall of authoritarian regime had invited resistance from the military. In this case, Habibie’s further moves towards democratization, which were introduced with strong rhetoric and an aggressive approach, also stemmed from international pressure, and met with negative reactions from military elites.271

Caetanno de Soussa Guterres, an ex-member of Falintil’s resistance, the TNI’s brutality was stirred up by their deep frustration and humiliation in losing a territory that had been occupied for more than two decades.272 Likewise, Eurico Guterres, a prominent militia leader, said that the systemic violence was conducted by the TNI to defend East Timor as an Indonesian province and part of the unitary state (NKRI). He explained that as a leader of pro-integration militias, he had to support the TNI’s decisions before and after the referendum. He also stated that what he had done there was merely carrying out the TNI’s order to defend East Timor at all costs. Therefore, all the actions of the pro- integration militias he had led, which had resulted in grave human rights violation, were consequences of a national policy of the Indonesian security forces, in particular, the TNI.273

The latest report by the Indonesia-Timor Leste Joint Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) also found that gross rights violations had occurred in East Timor in 1999 in the form of crimes against humanity such as murder, rape and other forms of

Violent Archipelago: Rethinking Its Place in History,” Indonesia, 82, October 2006, New York: Cornell University, SEAP, 2006. 269 Robinson, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 254-255. 270 Colombijn and Lindblad, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, ibid: 21. 271 Aguero, 1995, op. cit: 33-34. 272 Caetanno de Soussa Guterres was interviewed on August 15, 2007, in Kupang, West Timor. 273 Eurico Guterres was interviewed on October 10, 2007, in Jakarta.

107 sexual violence, torture, and illegal detention and forcible transfer and deportation carried out against civilian populations. It was concluded that the pro-autonomy militias were the “primary direct perpetrators” of the gross human rights abuses, while TNI’s personnel, police, and civilian authorities had consistently and systematically cooperated with and supported the militias in a number of significant ways, thus contributing to the perpetration of the crimes.274 It was further stated that when viewed as a whole, the gross human rights violations committed against pro-independence supporters in East Timor in 1999 constituted an organized campaign of violence. A recent report by CAVR was presented by its vice-chairperson, Pat Walsh, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on March 11, 2009. It demanded the prosecution of TNI commanders deemed responsible for the atrocities, and highlighted the existence of this organized campaign of violence.275

Looking back, there was nothing new about the behavior of the Indonesian military at that time. It was known that the country’s long history was filled with actions of violence and chaos organized by this state institution, which had been given the privilege of holding weapons and using armed violence to perform its duties. TNI’s leaders and soldiers, including Gen. Wiranto’s 1968 class and the following generations, had been indoctrinated with the culture of violence, which designated them as hulubalang raja, or the loyal guardians of the ruler --rather than the state-- making them similar to Tentara Mataram or Wisanggeni (the Mataram or Wisanggeni army). That is why Kusnanto Anggoro, an expert on military and Javanese history and political culture from CSIS Jakarta, still referred to the post-1998 Indonesian military as Tentara Jawa (the Javanese army), which continued to firmly uphold the principles of seeking senjata (weapons), tahta (reign), kuasa (power), dan harta (wealth) as part of their daily lives.276

In addition to this, T. Hari Prihatono, chairperson of Propatria, an NGO focused on Indonesia’s security sector reform, explained that the TNI’s culture of violence, which had resulted in many cases of gross human rights violations in the country, was not always guided by business interests.277 The background of the current chief commander, Gen. Wiranto, supports this view, as be was born in Yogyakarta and grew up in Solo, where the Javanese culture originated. Like his senior and patron, Soeharto, Wiranto had rarely had occasion to leave Indonesia, particularly, for pursuing education and

274 Yemris Fointuna and Abdul Khalik,”Former Timor Militias Reject CTF Report,” The Jakarta Post, July 15, 2008: 2. Significantly, Indonesia accepted the truth commission’s report, findings, and conclusions, and recognized the truth that gross violations of human rights happened prior to and shortly after the popular consultation, that blamed the country’s government, military, and the police for gross human rights violations in East Timor in 1999. Furthermore, the government extended deep regrets for what had happened in the past that had claimed many lives. That acceptance ended years of denial. See, Tony Hotland, “RI, T. Leste Both Involved in ‘Gross Rights Violations:’” CTF, The Jakarta Post, July 12, 2008: 3; “RI Accepts Blame in E. Timor Mayhem,” The Jakarta Post, July 16, 2008: 1. 275 After the presentation in the IPU Seminar on Peace and Security, Pat Walsh, was interviewed on the same day, March, 11 2009, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 276 Kusnanto Anggoro was interviewed on October 31, 2007, in Jakarta. 277 T. Hari Prihatono was interviewed on October 31, 2007, in Jakarta.

108 participating in exchange program abroad. This could supposedly affect the development of the military leaders’ views regarding democracy, the military’s role, and human rights in the future.

III.E. Habibie’s New Approach and the TNI as Veto Player

The new president, Habibie, had attempted to overcome various engineered communal conflicts with a new approach.278 In Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya, for example, he initially did not adopt the Javanese approach, which is absolutely intolerant of disloyalty. Unlike Soeharto, he introduced peaceful conflict resolution by lifting the status of the respective provinces as military operation zones. He ended the wars and opened dialogue with different rebel groups, and, moreover, offered an alternative option of a referendum for independence in East Timor. His failure to preserve East Timor and his dependency on Gen. Wiranto, however, provided the TNI with greater opportunities to continue their culture of violence across Indonesia. As a result, it became more difficult for Habibie to end the repressive measures of the Indonesian military, and, unfortunately, he was later accused of endangering the existence of the NKRI.279

Similarly, President Habibie failed to bar the TNI’s role as a veto player in the MPR, which had been used to prevent the investigation and prosecution of its alleged past human rights abuses. Using its representatives in the MPR, the military organized lobbies with civilian members of parliament to protect their vested interests by demanding support for the creation of Article 28I (1) in the 1945 amendment to the state constitution, which forbids the prosecution of past human rights abuses under retrospective law. Constitutionally, the TNI was successful in protecting its personnel from possible accusations of having committed gross human rights abuses. This success would certainly constrain the operations of future human rights tribunals,280 but evidently showed the strategic position of the military during the transition, and which had been acknowledged by O’Donnell and Schmitter as a potential veto-player.281

On September 23, 1999, civil society opposition to the drafting of a new repressive law for a state of emergency proposed by the TNI resulted in the Second Semanggi Tragedy. During the incident, students and fanatical supporters of Megawati were killed, while others were severely injured. The TNI also arrested student demonstrators and NGO leaders. During these incidents, the TNI presented a stern response to protesters struggling for new spheres of activity by questioning the military’s

278 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Habibie’s political adviser and spokeswoman, was interviewed on December 18, 2006 in Jakarta. 279 Ibid. 280 Edridge, 2002, op. cit: 145. 281 O’Donnell and Schmitter, in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whiteheads (eds.), 1986, loc. cit: 34 et seq.

109 position post-Soeharto and its past wrongdoings. Regrettably, President Habibie was unable to restrain TNI soldiers from opening fire on demonstrators with live bullets, which resulted in the deaths of four people --three of them teenagers-- and scores of wounded.282 In the previous year, on November 12-13, 1998, the First Semanggi Tragedy had erupted after the students, in a forceful attempt to come to the parliament building to stop the MPR special session, clashed with the military in the Semanggi area. This resulted in the deaths of fourteen students and civilians, 195 people being seriously wounded, and 239 more slightly injured.283 An alternate source counted seventeen dead and over 400 wounded.284 Some had been found shot dead with live bullets, while others were killed, or suffered serious wounds from rubber bullets fired at close range. 285 Instead of answering students’ demand of justice for the perpetrators of these gross human rights abuses, the military introduced a new wave of violence. Even worse, the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Gen. (ret) Feisal Tandjung, commented that the occurrence was a consequence of the democracy student demonstrators fought for.286

Ironically, the perpetrators --163 soldiers including twelve field officers-- ended up serving imprisonment periods of just 14-21 days for indisciplinary conduct, meaning that only low ranking officers had been punished in the absence of investigations of possible gross human rights violations. 287 The only case in which the Habibie government prosecuted high-ranking officers was the case of the 1997-1998 kidnapping of students and reform activists which implicated Gen. Wiranto’s rivals, namely, Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto and his elite group. With the full support of Gen. Wiranto, due to the chief commander’s interest in rooting out Prabowo’s influence, and to punish the insubstantial accusation of indisciplinary conduct, Habibie had no difficulty in bringing them before the military court. Prabowo was shown to be an ambitious military leader who had been a captain in the Kopassus until he became a three star general in the Kostrad and had been charged with his role in a counter-coup d’etat and coup d’etat.288 His group’s maneuvers to challenge Wiranto and Habibie following the transfer of power from Soeharto were suspected of being an “unfinished coup attempt”.289

282 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 295; Darwin in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit, Appendix 2, No. 23 and 24. 283 Ibid, Appendix 2, No. 23. 284 Bourchier, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 157. 285 Crouch, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, ibid: 137. 286 O’ Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 183. 287 Ibid: 184. 288 Subroto, 2009, op.cit: 450-463 and 22-25. 289 In a recent public statement, Lt. Gen. Prabowo regretted his half-hearted maneuvers, which had been suspected as a coup attempt. See, “Prabowo Menyesal Tidak Kudeta” (“Prabowo’s Regret for Cancelling the Coup”), Kompas-online, March 31, 2009 http://nasional.kompas.com/read/xml/2009/03/21360125/prabowo.menyesal.tak.kudeta, was accessed on March 31, 2009: 1.

110 In due course, the TNI’s honorary council (Dewan Kehormatan Perwira --DKP) discharged Lt. Gen. Prabowo from his strategic position as Kostrad commander, Maj. Gen. Muchdi from the Kopassus, Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin from the Kodam Jayakarta, and Maj. Gen. Zacky Makarim from the Bais. It did not, however, extend any sentence for their alleged activities in masterminding the kidnapping or for their role in cases of alleged gross human rights violations during the May 12, 1998 Trisakti shootings and the subsequent May 13-15, 1998 riots.290 Although it is believed that he worked with Prabowo during the last days of Soeharto, Zacky was not immediately replaced.291 For the kidnapping as well, low and middle ranking officers received just one to two year sentences.292 The same held true for the Trisakti shootings, where several lieutenants and police officers were sanctioned with light punishments ranging from two to ten months sentences.293

The prosecution of the military elites for their involvement would logically become a dilemma for the president in certain cases. In the First Semanggi Tragedy, for example, he had supported the TNI’s use of paramilitary groups, whose members were mostly his sympathizers, to tackle radical student demonstrators and the reform movement. Likewise, for the Banyuwangi killings, he let grave human rights violations remain unanswered for. The chief of the Bakin, Lt. Gen. Maulani, presumably was aware of the covert military intelligence and psychological operations purportedly organized by the Bais. He was also, however, Habibie’s brother in law, which of course gave him an advantage since the case took place in both PKB’s and PDIP’s traditional bases. The case also implicated his rivals, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri, in their preparations for the forthcoming legislative and presidential elections. Therefore, President Habibie did not endorse any inquiries into accusations that military elites might have provoked both communal and separatist conflicts in various parts of Indonesia.294 Such accusations could have been harmful to his political interests and the stability of his administration due to the possible involvement of some of the generals in his cabinet.

Habibie’s interest in remaining in power had further damaged his image. Therefore, his government’s rhetoric of reform was soon weakened by this exercising of violence reminiscent of previous years. As had happened under Soeharto, the opposition was accused of being an enemy of the state and the president. Emulating the New Order’s tradition, President Habibie claimed that student demonstrators and reform activists were

290 Laporan Pelapor Khusus Komnas Perempuan tentang Kerusuhan Seksual Mei 1998 dan Dampaknya (Report of Special Rapporteur of Women National Commission on Sexual Assaults on May 1998 and its Impacts), “Data Korban Kekerasan Seksual 1998 Diserahkan” (“Data of the 1998 Sexual Assaults Vic- tims”), Harian Kompas, May 24, 2008: 24. 291 Honna, 203, op.cit: 163. 292 Fadli Zon, Politik Huru-Hara Mei 1998 (The Politics of May 1998 Riots), Jakarta: IPS, 2004: 30-31, 146. 293 “Kerusuhan Mei 1998: Kejahatan Negara Tanpa Pertanggungjawaban” (”The May 2008 Riots: State Crime Without Accountability”), Harian Kompas, May16, 2006: 4. 294 Crouch, in Johannen and Gomez (eds.), 2001, loc. cit: 182.

111 manipulated by anarchists. Security forces harassed public figures and prominent critics, such as Ali Sadikin and Sri Bintang Pamungkas. The military in particular, threatened them with arrest, and the regime’s Chief of National Intelligence Coordinator, Lt. Gen. Maulani, was said to play a significant role in this respect.295 Maulani was also apparently behind the sidelining of leftists, such as the PRD and ex-PKI members, from political activities and kept them from joining new political parties in the new era of reform. Furthermore, President Habibie had asked the military to respond harshly to student demonstrations, which tended to become more radical on a day-by-day basis.296

IV. Coping with Separatism

IV.A. Habibie and Wiranto’s Response to Secessionism

Is there any relation between the TNI’s continued culture of violence and the emergence of separatist activities in the region? In this context, Habibie’s political aide Samego said that military’s long distrust of civilian leaders’ loyalty to the state due to the persistent danger of disintegration or separatism had justified them in maintaining their dual function to protect the existence of the unitary state (NKRI). 297 Military leaders, including Chief Commander Gen. Wiranto, often used the rhetoric of satu untuk semua, semua untuk satu (one for all, all for one). On numerous occasions, they promoted the important principles of unity and loyalty, which are deeply emphasised in Javanese culture. 298 From this cultural perspective, repressive measures were fundamental for guaranteeing loyalty and obedience from all parts of the nations. Thus, separatist movements could not be tolerated and had to be eradicated. 299 At the same time, compromising with separatist elements would weaken the sovereignty of the state, meaning that loyalty to the state was of vital importance to maintaining national integration. Provinces such as Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East Timor, where separatist movements exist, were seemingly perceived as Indonesia’s outer islands, which should show their compliance to Java, the centre of the NKRI’s power and authority.

In reality, for the moment at least, the Javanese were the natives of Indonesia’s main island of Java. With approximately 85 million people, or more than 40 percent of the country’s total population, the Javanese made up the largest ethnic group.300 They were traditionally concentrated in the provinces of East Java, Central Java, and

295 Timothy Lindsey, “Indonesia’s Negara Hukum: Walking the Tightrope to the Rule of Law,” in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 371. 296 Max Lane, “Bebaskan Semua Tapol” (”Free All Political Prisoners”), http://www.xs4all.nl/-prdeuro/LI- BERATE/Nomor8/mimbar-i.htm: 4, 12. 297 Indria Samego was interviewed on May 15, 2006, in Jakarta. 298 See Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 47. 299 Ibid. 300 “Javanese,” http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery;jsessionid=agrmk82835k6s?tname=javanese&s..: 1.

112 Yogyakarta. Due to the migration policy implemented in Indonesia over several decades of Soeharto’s New Order era --part of the national transmigration program-- large populations of Javanese became established in almost all of Indonesia’s provinces. Javanese could be found in all professions, and in particular, in the government and the military.301 Compared to their related ethnic groups, namely the Sundanese (30.9 million), Madurese (6.8 million), and Balinese (3.0 million), their numbers were much higher than any other ethnic group in Indonesia.302 In addition, since most important events in the country’s history happened or were decided by the central government in Java, the Javanese culture had a great influence on the country’s future.

More importantly, the traditional over-representation of the Javanese in the central army elite continued until 1999. At least 55 percent of military leaders, or thirty- three out of every sixty officers, at the central level were from this ethnic group. The Javanese were trailed by the Sundanese in second place with 6.5 percent, or four out of sixty officers. The Batak, Balinese, and Madurese, who were also categorized as Javanese, as well as the Minangkabau, came next.303

The background of the state formation and composition of the population had an effect on Indonesia’s political culture. The strategic position of Java in the country’s history, as well as its majority population, had exercised a fundamental influence on the country’s political culture as well as the TNI. Considering that their doctrines had long since been internalized, especially in educational and training centers, and cemented over several generations, it was not easy to change the military’s behavior to make it more adaptable with reform demands.

The new chief commander, Gen. Wiranto, like his Javanese predecessors, 304 continued to put emphasis on the importance of defending the unitary state, which could be endangered by uncontrolled reform in the post-Soeharto era. 305 Due to the recent emergence of regional disobedience, which endangered the unitary state, the general did not support civilian leaders’ proposals, including those from MPR speaker Amien Rais, to adopt federalism in the country. 306 Likewise, he often reminded the nation of the dangerous threat of foreign intervention, as in East Timor, which could damage national integration. Wiranto was concerned that the spirit of unity and nationhood had been weakened since the outbreak of reform demands in 1998. He said that civilians, political elites in particular, should be blamed for the situation. His reasoning was that instead of

301 Ibid. 302 Ibid. 303 The Editors, Indonesia, April 1999, loc. cit. 304 Soeharto and other military leaders had feared that civil society would some day have the potential to challenge existing power structures and norms in their own society. See Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 49. 305 “Situasi Kebangsaan: Bangsa Terpuruk, Kaum Nasionalis Kumpul” (“The Nation Worsened, Nationa- lists Gathered”), Harian Kompas, March 20, 2006: 2; see also Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 47-48. 306 Harold Crouch was interviewed on April 22, 2006, in Jakarta.

113 paying greater attention to the agenda of common concerns, they had become more deeply involved in their own individual or group interests.307

Not surprisingly, the military officers’ mindset was centralistic. It fell in line with Javanese political culture, which considered anything contrary to its precepts as a threat. Quoting Britton (1996), Rinakit noted that the Javanese values influenced the inner workings of the military. By quoting Anderson (1990), he also emphasized the idea of Javanese political culture as symbolized by a lamp. The more centralistic the power, the brighter the lamp. In other words, decentralization stood in contradiction to the ideas of power in the Javanese political culture, because it dimmed the lamp.308

Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999 had extended autonomy to provinces to rule their own regions. Although these laws were an attempt by the central government to appease regional governments, Habibie’s decentralization policies could become a danger to national integration, since the authority of the regional governments would become too extensive. The military worried that the process of national integration, which had taken place post-1958 after Gen. Nasution introduced the Jalan Tengah (Middle Way) concept, would be threatened by the rising demands of decentralization. The Middle Way established the basic principle of the military’s dual function rooted, particularly, in territorial structures.309

In the meantime, the parallelism of the military’s organizational structure with the civilian bureaucracy guaranteed national integration, because it was capable of identifying early activities that would be dangerous to the political stability of the country. The military maintained its perceptions that there was no other group in society as committed to the unity or integrity of the nation as itself. In addition, it stood alone in its capability to eradicate rebellions and separatist movements, such as the 1948 PKI Madiun, PRRI/Permesta, DI/TII, and the 1965 G-30-S/PKI putsch. 310 Decentralization was therefore simply a process that threatened national integration, and thus, contradicted with the military’s role as an institution concerned with national building and integration (Maynard, 1976). The military was generally of the opinion that decentralization would not bring a better life for Indonesians, since it pushed them to be inward-looking and encouraged them to adopt a narrow spirit of localism.311

Due to its unchanged historical and cultural views during the Habibie era, the military, had also never supported civilian leaders’ attempts to establish a federal state in Indonesia. As Habibie’s political aide Samego describes it, the military worried that such

307 “Wiranto Risau Terpuruk Solidaritas Kebangsaan” (“Wiranto Worried the Deteriorating Solidarity of the Nation”), Rakyat Merdeka, June 1, 2006: 9. 308 Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher (eds.), 2005, loc. cit: 75-76. 309 Ibid: 75-76. 310 See also, Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 30-42. 311 Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher (eds.), 2005, loc. cit: 76-77.

114 an attempt would endanger the existence of the unitary state, which at that time was being threatened by a rising pride in regards to religion, ethnicity, and civilian leaders’ group identifications.312 The military saw civilian leaders as more interested in maintaining their parochial, rather than national, interests. Consequently, these leaders could not be entrusted with the responsibility of protecting the unitary state in the future. Besides, military leaders still were not sure about the prospects of Habibie’s presidency, and they considered his performance as poor in the current transition.

Even worse, it was thought that federalism and separatism would diminish the power and authority of Java as the centre of power. Therefore, federalism could not be tolerated, and separatism had to be immediately eliminated, because it was synonymous with rebellion directed at weakening the power of Java. For this reason, any separatist movements in the country would meet with a repressive response from the military. Crouch underlined that the values of Javanese political culture, which stress the accumulation of power and lay emphasis on unity and loyalty, influenced the TNI’s response to reform, formation of a federal state, and separatism. Therefore, the TNI’s culture of violence, which was refelected in its coercive and repressive measures, fervently grew as the country confronted increasing threats of separatism in its post-1998 democratic transition.313 More so than in the past, repressive methods were transparently applied by the military to address separatist movements throughout the country.

Of equal importance is Crouch’s view that the Javanese political culture, which accentuates a centralistic government structure, is actually in accordance with the military’s efforts to protect its political and economic interests. However, civilians were not the sole perpetrators of disloyalty to the country. In certain cases, the military was also guilty of this, as some of its leaders were involved in provoking separatist movements due to the existence of their political and economic interests. Importantly, Rinakit revealed that more repressive measures had been imposed on Aceh and Irian Jaya, provinces rich in natural resources. 314 This is why security sector reform and the elimination of the TNI’s territorial function, for example, as proposed by civilian leaders, was difficult to realize.

Unlike the military, President Habibie was able to tolerate proposals for the establishment of a federal state, and even a referendum on independence. 315 He was familiar with the concept of a federal state from his experience in Germany. He understood that, similar to a unitary state, it was only an instrument for establishing a just

312 Indria Samego was interviewed on June 14, 2006, in Jakarta. 313 Harold Crouch was interviewed on April 22, 2006, in Jakarta; Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 47-48. 314 Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher (eds.), loc. cit, 2005: 84. 315 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Habibie’s adviser and spokesperson, was interviewed on December 18, 2006 in Jakarta.

115 and prosperous society. Therefore, such notions could be openly discussed in society.316 Quoting Magnis-Suseno, a typical urban leader with a broad international vision, Habibie was able to transparently articulate his new proposals and opinions, and asked other people to back his ideas.317 Likewise, A. Makmur Makka, Habibie’s secretary for almost two decades, reminds us that Habibie’s experiences studying and working in Germany had contributed to his way of thinking and making decisions, which was very uncommon for Javanese people and Indonesia’s political elites.318 He was known as a person who made his decisions based on logic.

President Habibie’s style and outlook resulted in a concern among TNI leaders about losing vulnerable regions, for example, Aceh and Irian Jaya, after the secession of East Timor through the August 30, 1999 referendum. This motivated the military to again declare military operations zones (DOM) in these two regions. This was after they had been briefly lifted by the president after he took power, and almost 30 years after they had been implemented via the repressive policies of the Soeharto regime.319 With the exception of Aceh, Indonesia’s westernmost province, which had contributed significantly to the country’s independence war, Gen. Wiranto did not publicly apologize for his past military actions in Irian Jaya and East Timor.320 Reportedly, it was just local commanders who had issued open apologies for atrocities carried out by individual soldiers, and which had never been conducted by whole units or institutions.

IV.B. Military Response to Separatist Movement in Aceh

Meanwhile, in Aceh, criticism of the TNI’s handling of the new separatist conflicts was voiced by intellectuals and NGOs such as Musliadi from Koalisi Aksi Gerakan Mahasiswa Aceh Barat (West Aceh student movement action coalition), Dja’far Siddik from IFA, as well as Suprin Sulaiman, Kurdinar, and Zulfikar Muhammad from Koalisi NGO HAM, and Ali Zamzami from SPKP HAM. 321 Their support for a stronger role of the police in the province, rather than returning it to the military, was ignored.322 The TNI feared that the GAM might be continuing their struggle and guerilla activities, due to President Habibie’s soft approach.323 Further incidents occurred in November and December 1998 mainly in North and East Aceh, as well as Pidie, where hundreds of youths, many armed with weapons, searched for military members. They kidnapped and

316 Indria Samego, Habibie’s political aide, was interviewed on June 14, 2006, in Jakarta. 317 Magnis-Suseno was interviewed on November 14, 2007, in Jakarta. 318 Makka (ed.), 1996, loc. cit: 449. 319 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit: 125. 320 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 174; Eldridge, 2002, op. cit: 142. 321 The first three activists were kidnapped in 2002; the rest were successfully interviewed on August 25, 2007 in Banda Aceh. 322 Interview with Ali Zamzami on August 25, 2007, in Banda Aceh. 323 See again, interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar on December 18, 2006 in Jakarta.

116 killed seven soldiers.324 As a consequence, the troop presence was increased after major clashes. On the other hand, the Acehnese organized large demonstrations demanding a referendum on independence within days of the East Timor offer.325 In addition, support for a referendum demanding independence had spread dramatically like wildfire across the province.

Habibie’s promise of establishing a free port in Sabang, enlarging the Banda Aceh airport, providing funding to build eighty-five madrasah (Muslim schools), and train transportation were meaningless, since the Acehnese had lost hope and trust in the government. 326 A new political development later emerged in Aceh as students and intellectuals from all over the province formed a large congress on February 4-6, 1999 to establish the Centre for Information on Aceh Referendum (Sentra Informasi untuk Reformasi Aceh --SIRA). The centre was to start a new phase of struggle for demanding a referendum on independence. The formation of SIRA and the cry for referendum it produced therefore became new difficulties for Habibie.

President Habibie continued to respond sluggishly. He received Governor Mahmud’s proposal for special statute for Aceh and passed it into law on September 23, 1999, just a few days before his transitional presidency ended. Still, there was nothing new about Aceh’s special status in the new law, because it had been acquired several decades earlier, but remained an empty title lacking follow-up. The new law protected the Acehenese in practicing syariah (Islamic law) for religious, educational, and economic affairs, as well as in the local culture. The law, however, was seen as insufficient by many had been demanding justice and freedom for a long time. Habibie’s reluctance to settle core issues, namely the prosecution of military perpetrators of atrocities, led to his failure in appeasing the Acehnese. The new law was unable to eliminate Acehnese aspirations for a referendum, as security forces resumed their repressive measures.

The experience dealing with East Timor had hardened military resistance to separatist demands.327 In sweeping operations following the secession of East Timor, TNI units raided villages, hunting for GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka --Movement for An Independent Aceh) rebels under a new campaign called Operasi Wibawa 99 (Operation Authority 99). The operations resulted in human rights violations, in particular when around 1,000 TNI soldiers assaulted the Kandang region in search of GAM leaders.328 Sporadic clashes between TNI soldiers and the GAM resulted in additional negative effects over the subsequent months.

324 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit. 325 Bourchier, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc. cit: 25. 326 Majalah Tempo 27, No. 15, January 12-18, 1999; Majalah Gatra 5, No. 20, April 3, 1999, cited in Bertrand, 2004, op. cit. 327 Eldridge, 2002, op. cit. 328 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 176.

117 IV.C. Military Response to Separatist Movement in Irian Jaya

In Irian Jaya, as President Habibie began to relax political control, a group of Papuans mobilized in favor of independence. Nonetheless, in June 1998 he was still pursuing dialogues with the Foreri (forum for the reconciliation of Irian Jaya people). This move was a progressive breakthrough, because Foreri denounced Irian Jaya’s integration into Indonesia, and demanded a referendum for Papuans to choose their future. The dialogue with Foreri culminated on February 26, 1999 in an unprecedented meeting of 100 delegates from Irian Jaya with Habibie, during which they were guaranteed freedom of speech without fear of prosecution, including the issue of independence.

At this point, it should be stated that Habibie was the only president who directly and bravely received a delegation of 100 people, who claimed themselves as representing all Papuan aspirations and interests, in the Merdeka palace. Ignoring his advisers, and considering it his duty to listen directly to his people, he conducted this dialogue with them in the state palace. As anticipated, during the dialogue the delegation voiced its goal of forming an independent state and asked Jakarta to recognize the Papuan declaration of independence, which had been declared on December 1, 1961. In front of President Habibie, Tom Beanal, the chief of the Amugme tribe, read a political declaration and stated that the Papuans were not making a new declaration of independence, but just demanded the government to recognize the previous one. Mr. Beanal insisted that they were ready for the consequences of this goal being realized.329

The strong declaration in favor of independence certainly surprised Habibie. Though shocked by the declaration, the President tried to listen carefully to the demands. Afterwards though, he re-emphasised that independence was impossible. He said that the Papuan demand was a matter of principle for Indonesia, and not a simple wish to be fulfilled. He pointed to similar demands of secession from other provinces, such as, East Timor and Aceh. Trying to defend his arguments, he said that he was not a robot able to instantly cope with every request, but was subject to the same constraints as any other human being. 330 In a failed effort to convince the delegation otherwise, Habibie was unable to persuade the delegation to reconsider its objective of independence. Unfortunately, the delegates maintained their standpoints and read a declaration denouncing the history of their region’s integration into Indonesia, and formally demanding independence. Thus, the meeting in the presidential palace put an end to a plan for a national dialogue that Habibie had once expected.331

329 J. Osdar, “Sentuhan Para Presiden kepada Papua” (“Presidents’ Policies to Papua”), December 1, 2005, Kompas-online, http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0512/01/Politikhuku/2254535.htm: 1-3. 330 Ibid. 331 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 153-154.

118 After the deadlock in the dialogue between the president and the Foreri, which had denounced Irian Jaya’s integration into Indonesia and demanded a referendum for Papuans to choose their future, President Habibie unilaterally decided to divide Irian Jaya into three provinces. He did not heed the TNI’s advice and made his decision without deliberating on the security consequences for the new provinces following the lifting of their military operations zone status. Law No. 45/1999 on the formation of the West, Central, and East Irian Jaya provinces produced conflicts among different tribes, and exacerbated the ongoing conflict between the regional and central governments. Communal conflicts were also caused by Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 327/M/1999 on the appointment of Bram Oktovianus Aturury as the caretaker of the governor of West Irian Jaya. Consequently, the Papuans organized protests and accused Habibie of attempting to divide them in order to avert further separatist tendencies.332

On February 27, 1999, Gen. Wiranto was also astonished to learn that independence was the single most important issue that had been voiced by the 100 Papuan representatives who President Habibie had encouraged to freely speak their minds.333 The threat of separation, therefore, resulted in more severe military measures in Irian Jaya. It is likely that Wiranto anticipated the impact of a stronger cry for independence, which could generate similar movements in other parts of Indonesia. As a result, the military stopped following compromise approaches.

IV.D. Military Response to Referendum on Independence in East Timor

Anticipating that his proposal on wide ranging-autonomy could be rejected, President Habibie offered another option of a referendum on independence to East Timor, an offer that was not offered to Aceh or Irian Jaya.334 He felt that his pragmatic approach to handling the province was still in Indonesia’s interests, and was mandated by the political realities of the post-Soeharto era.335 He merely wanted to be realistic in assessing Indonesia’s interest in a province, which represented less than 1 percent of the country’s total population and territories, but which had been using a disproportionately large amount of the national budget since Indonesia’s invasion in 1974 and East Timor’s integration into the country in 1976.

Based on these considerations as well as the reality that the majority of the people of the tiny territory are Catholics, in his worst-case scenario, Habibie seemingly calculated that Indonesia had little to lose in practical terms. To persuade skeptics that

332 “Pusat Diminta Hormati Otsus Papua” (“Central Government Demanded to Respect Papua’s Special Autonomy”), http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2005/11/26/Utama/ ut- 01.htm: 1-2. 333 Philpott, 1999: 66, in Bourchier, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc. cit: 25. 334 Bourchier, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 155. 335 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 212.

119 East Timor was not worth keeping, he drew attention to the tiny size of the territory and the small proportion of the total population that its people contributed to the country. In February 1999, he also pointed out that aside from rocks, the East Timorese had given the country nothing. They had no natural or human resources, in addition to having no appreciable gold deposits or technology.336 He concluded that the benefits of maintaining the province were neglibible for Indonesia with its majority Muslim population. Nevertheless, his new and radical initiative displeased the military, and in particular, its conservative leaders.

In fact, President Habibie’s lack of preparation for winning the referendum has been blamed for the loss of a large amount of support from the East Timorese for the proposal of integration with Indonesia under the new structure of wide-ranging autonomy. Furthermore, he did not anticipate that violence would erupt and escalate in East Timor within hours of the results being announced, because of the mounting dissatisfaction and anger from pro-integration militias and their main sponsor: the military. They thought that he wanted to use the referendum on independence to distance himself from Soeharto, to appear reform-minded, and to increase his reputation internationally. The referendum proposal surprised the TNI, which had expressed little public opposition, but later accused him of failing to consult them.337 This contradicted with the past reality that since the formation of Indonesia, the military had been a powerful and effective means for the regimes to encourage political integration in the country and protect national unity.338 In other words, it played a vital role in coping with separatist movements across the country.

Habibie’s civilian advisers in the ICMI, for instance, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, influenced the decision on the reasonable proposal of independence.339 The involvement of the TNI headquarters was ignored, causing a negative reaction from Gen. Wiranto and other members of the military elite to Habibie’s presidency. Several weeks before the president announced his new proposal, TNI commanders were already alarmed to discover that he was even examining such a plan. The new proposal had been perceived by the TNI as a critical decision that would cause a great setback to the military’s determined effort to keep the territory within Indonesia.

Taking into account President Habibie’s lack of preparation for winning back East Timorese support for the option of wide-ranging autonomy, TNI leaders were reported to have launched Operasi Sapu Jagad (Operation Global Clean Sweep) to undertake covert

336 Ibid. 337 Ibid: 257. 338 Manuel Schmitz, Ethnische Konflikte in Indonesien und die Integrationspolitik Suhartos (Ethnic Con- flict in Indonesia and the Politics of Integration of Soeharto), Mitteilungen des Instituts fuer Asienkunde Hamburg, Nummer 362, Hamburg, IFA, 2003: 88-103. 339 Dewi Fortuna Anwar was interviewed on December 18, 2006 in Jakarta.

120 intelligence and psychological campaigns threatening pro-independence East Timorese and preparing reprisals if they chose independence in the August 30, 1999 referendum.340 Prior to this operation, the press reported that Dili, the capital of East Timor, was seized by rumors of the activities of the black-clad Ninjas.341 The TNI’s move to reduce troop levels in East Timor in August 1998, following Habibie’s offer of special autonomy, had also been replaced with a new policy of using and arming militias from Jakarta as part of alleged covert operations. By September 1998, just one month after the highly publicized withdrawal, the TNI secretly sent around 3,500 fresh troops there.342

Habibie’s controversial decision upset the TNI and reunited factions in the institution, most notably the East Timor veterans, due to their interest in saving the territory from secession. Immediately, Gen. Wiranto asked his formal rival Prabowo’s associates to prepare a contingency plan. These associates included Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, who was then an expert in TNI headquarters, especially for counter- insurgencies, and Maj. Gen. Zacky Makarim, Bais chief. Zacky was reported to have told East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana, that as a military man, intelligence officer, and veteran, he could not accept losing East Timor.343 Therefore, just a few days after the reshuffling of military elites on January 4, 1999, Wiranto gave Zacky the more crucial task of representing the military and its interests in the taskforce on the East Timor consultation (P3TT). Wiranto’s appointments of Sjafrie and Zacky, who formerly belonged to the Prabowo clan, suggested that Wiranto now had confidence in them. As before, during the crucial times before Soeharto’s fall, Wiranto, Sjafrie, and Zacky, minus Prabowo, had now become important TNI leaders controlling the development of military operations occurring close to referendum. The chief commander was both aware and in full control of all the TNI actions in East Timor.344

Although the taskforce’s name sounded unobjectionable, it would actually have vital control over all of the TNI’s operations in the threatened territory. More importantly, Zacky was a senior Kopassus intelligence operative with many years of experience in East Timor, as well as Aceh and Irian Jaya in running counter-insurgency campaigns against the anti-NKRI (separatist) rebels. Together with Mahidin Simbolon, Zacky had gained a reputation as a foremost expert in covert warfare, and along with Sjafrie, the two were among those most intimately involved in East Timor. In addition, Sjafrie was the former chief of the clandestine “Elang” (“Eagle”) military unit that carried out kidnappings and murders in Aceh following his replacement as Jakarta military (Kodam Jayakarta) in 1998. Now Zacky, aided by Sjafrie, was apparently given the responsibility of conducting a crash program in raising, training, and arming pro-integration militias in

340 Tapol Bulletin, June 7, 1999, cited in Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 143. 341 Kammen, in Anderson (ed.), 2001, loc. cit. 342 Ibid: 175. 343 Bourchier, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc. cit: 29. 344 Honna, 2003, op.cit: 175.

121 East Timor.345 Both men were also seemingly responsible for training the militias to initiate intimidation and violence targeted at pro-independence groups to secure victory in the coming referendum.346 Using these militias, TNI leaders could expect to protect their institution in their covert operations from future accusations of human rights abuses.

Parallel to the TNI, the militias were also present in the districts, sub-districts, and most villages. They established battalions in each of East Timor’s thirteen districts, companies, and platoons at the sub-district and village levels. At each level, their members cooperated with, and doubled as, resident military personnel. 347 Their ranks were evidently filled with East Timorese civilians, who fanatically backed integration with the Indonesian government. These included high numbers of TNI troops in civilian uniforms, as well as some West-Timorese hoodlums.348

At that time, the regional commander of Bali and West and East Nusa Tenggara (Kodam IX Udayana) who was responsible for East Timor’s security was Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri. He had previously served as an aide to Maj. Gen Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin in Jakarta regional command (Kodam Jayakarta), prior to Brig. Gen. Sudi Silalahi, the chief of staff, who was promoted to East Java regional (Kodam V Brawijaya) commander. Silalahi’s responsibility bordered on Damiri’s regional command, and he had previously been connected with the Banyuwangi killings.349 In addition, Damiri’s assistant in Kodam IX Udayana was Brig. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon, well known as Zacky’s alternative in covert operations. He was also an ex-Korem 164 commander based in Dili, the capital of East Timor. Importantly, during a meeting in Bali in February 1999, Damiri and Simbolon were reported to have ordered the militias to eliminate all East Timorese leaders and sympathizers.350

According to Liem, creating militia forces in East Timor was a logical consequence of the Kopassus operation of conducting a counter-insurgency to get East Timorese to fight against other East Timorese.351 It was shown that many of the 11,000 militias were trained in West and East Timor by the Kopassus Groups IV and V. Non- Timorese from across Indonesia, often thugs from Indonesia’s Eastern regions, and even criminals released from prisons, were also recruited as members of the militias. However, Gen. Wiranto has denied any TNI involvement with the militias whatsoever. He went on to clarify that the armed thugs had emerged and developed their ranks spontaneously. In

345 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 258. 346 Kammen, in Anderson (ed.) 2001, loc. cit: 184. 347 Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000: 71; O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 259. 348 Liem Soei Liong, in Colombijn and Lindbad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 203. 349 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 169-171. Author’s interview with a noted human rights observer in Jakarta also cited this. 350 Kammen, in Anderson (ed.), 2001, loc. cit: 183-184. 351 Liem Soei Liong, in Colombijn and Lindbad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 203.

122 the meantime, a number of militia members and pro-integration leaders voluntarily confessed to having received arms and funding from the TNI. Likewise, a local officer admitted that he had distributed rifles to newly recruited militia members. 352 Similar confessions were made by representatives of pro-integration groups who testified that they were trained by TNI members.353

It was therefore, clear that the chief commander’s explanation and clarification contradicted with the testimony of Lt. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri, the TNI’s East Timor post- referendum martial law chief. Appearing before a public hearing held by the Joint Indonesia-Timor Leste Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) on October 24, 2007 in Jakarta, he argued that the existence of the militias was legally justified. They had been formed as civilian defense groups or Wanra, part of the Indonesian defense system, which existed everywhere in Indonesia, including East Timor, at that time. They were trained in discipline and were bound to certain rules. These rules, of course, had been made or dictated by the Indonesian military. Moreover, they were, supplied with weapons to “safeguard their neighborhoods.”354

Linkage and patronage activities of the TNI with militias became more transparent just days after President Habibie made his formal offer of a ballot on January 27, 1999, as militia violence erupted in several western districts of East Timor. In mid- February 1999, a Kopassus intelligence officer reportedly addressed militia leaders from twelve districts in regards to a plan to launch an all-out attack on suspicious sympathizers of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) and the Falintil, Xanana’s military organization. The officer’s address was similar to the instructions given earlier by top generals of the Kodam IX Udayana regional command during the Bali meeting.355 In fact, the TNI itself was directly involved in many cases of violence throughout East Timor. On April 17, 1999, for example, while fighting back East Timorese activists demanding independence and organizing resistance, the TNI caused the deaths of twelve people and wounded ten more.356 Meanwhile, the Liquica killing, which resulted in approximately fourty-five deaths, 357 was another clear indication of the TNI’s unwillingness to secure a peaceful solution for East Timor.358

Documents of the Operation Global Clean Sweep proved the TNI’s central plan of disrupting the referendum by using militia violence and intimidation. As noted by

352 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 258-259. 353 The testimony made before a public hearing held by the Joint Indonesia-Timor Leste Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) on October 24, 2007, in Jakarta. See, Desy Nurhayati, “TNI ‘Armed’ East Timor Civilians,” The Jakarta Post, October 25, 2007: 1. 354 Syahnakri’s testimony, ibid. 355 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit; Kammen, in Anderson (ed.), 2001, loc. cit. 356 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit: Appendix 2 No. 42. 357 Lowry, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc. cit: 94. 358 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 261; Eldridge, 2002, op. cit: 156.

123 Robinson, militia groups were seeking broader coordination with the TNI. The rhetoric of terror reflected in the document, a hallmark of the TNI’s repressive methods, had become a standard feature of the militia’s style. Thus, Operation Global Clean Sweep could begin flexibly and its impact depended on developments on the ground.359

The Garnadi document dated July 3, 1999, was signed by Maj. Gen. Garnadi, the special assistant to the powerful Coordinating Minister Gen. (ret) Feisal, who was serving as the vice-chair of Zacky’s P3TT taskforce. This document outlined the TNI’s post- referendum contingency plan to evacuate pro-integration militia members and TNI units, and recommended securing their withdrawal routes and destroying vital facilities and objects.360 The recommendation clearly showed that high-ranking TNI officials expected, and were possibly also planning, apocalyptic consequences to the referendum. The document had been widely distributed among civil servants in Dili, following a visit by Jakarta’s officials. The document seems authentic, and Garnadi, himself, admitted that the signature on it was his own.361

The Tavares document preceded the Garnadi document and revealed that the pre- and post-referendum violence was planned at high levels. It’s instructions dated July 7, 1999 were purportedly signed by Joao da Silva Tavares, supreme commander of all pro- integration East Timorese militias (Pasukan Pejuang Integrasi --PPI)362 and ordered a continuation continue of the campaign of terror and intimidation against those who were influencing the East Timorese to reject special autonomy. The document was copied to various officers, including TNI chief commander, Gen. Wiranto, and Kodam IX Udayana regional commander, Maj. Gen. Damiri, although these officials were not actually named. The instructions promised in detail that the TNI would provide militias with substantial material support, in particular, weapons. 363 It was clearly mentioned that if the pro- autonomy forces were defeated, then Operasi Pembersihan (Operation Clean-Up) would be simultaneously launched to its fullest extent against the pro-independence forces. The operation’s name was a bit different from the Operation of Global Clean Sweep, but it followed similar aims.

Among the documents found amid the escalation of the conflict leading up to the referendum, the Garnadi document was most likely authentic and may be considered the “smoking gun,” proving that there was both a close official relationship between the TNI and the militia, and that the post-referendum violence was planned at the highest levels in

359 Geoffrey Robinson,”The Fruitless Search for a Smoking Gun: Tracing the Origins of Violence in East Timor”, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 247. 360 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 265; Kammen, in Anderson (ed.), 2001, loc. cit: 185. 361 Harian Kompas, May 4, 2000, cited in O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit. 362 See,”Mantan Panglima PPI Dimakamkan di TMP Seroja” (“Ex-PPI Supreme Commander Buried in Seroja National Cemetery”), Republika-online, June 11, 2009, was accessed on June 11, 2009. 363 Robinson, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 248.

124 Jakarta.364 A key passage in the document states that “evacuation routes must be planned and secured, possibly by destroying facilities and other key assets,” and lends credence to claims that the document spelled out a systematic “scorched-earth” plan due to the fact that East Timor was almost entirely destroyed following the referendum.365 Additionally, two other documents found before the ballot, the Telegram Brigade Penyelamat Integrasi Timor-Timur (The East Timor integration savior brigade telegram) and the Operasi Cabut (The Operation Pull-Out), outlined the TNI and militias’ readiness and plans for a repressive response and evacuation after the ballot. These documents emphasize the roles played by Jakarta’s military elites, for example, Lt. Gen. Johnny Lumintang, army deputy chief, and regional commanders down to the lowest levels, regional government officials, and intelligence officers.366

TNI leaders were uneased by the result of the registration for the referendum, which accounted for 98 percent of East Timor’s eligible voters.367 For this reason, during a cabinet meeting on July 28, 1999, Wiranto strongly recommended to President Habibie that the referendum be cancelled.368 Habibie’s civilian ministers, however, rejected the idea, and argued that international repercussions would be harmful. The opposition of the TNI leaders to the civilian opinion was so heated that the the cabinet meeting lasted all day. In the end, the civilians prevailed and the referendum process continued.

In response to international criticism on the TNI’s involvement, on August 13, 1999, Gen. Wiranto made the pointless change of removing Korem 164 commander, Col. Tono Suratman, but retaining Maj. Gen. Zacky, the key officer in charge of all TNI operations in East Timor through his P3TT taskforce. Surprisingly, instead of being dishonored, shortly therafter Suratman gained both a promotion in rank and a different post as deputy TNI spokesman. Soon afterward, it became known that his substitute was a fellow Kopassus officer, Col. Noer Muis, who continued to give the militias free rein.

Phone calls from international leaders, including UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, demanded that the TNI restore law and order. A few days before the referendum, Wiranto was pressured into withdrawing Zacky to Jakarta, and provisionally substituting him with Maj. Gen. Tyasno, who was also an ex-Bais chief.369 Again, Wiranto had taken an artificial measure that was merely aimed at easing international pressure. It should be borne in mind that Tyasno was Wiranto’s ally and Zacky’s successor in the Bais, and they had worked together closely for years. Attention was drawn to the fact that Wiranto had substituted TNI commanders in East Timor with those who had a similar background,

364 Ibid: 249. 365 See also, Eldridge, 2002, op. cit: 138-139. 366 Robinson, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 251-254. 367 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 266. 368 Lowry, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc. cit: 98. 369 Their similar background was more deeply discussed in the Editors, Indonesia, April 1999, loc. cit: 140.

125 effectively replacing like with like. With such a mechanism, Zacky could supposedly retain control of TNI operations from afar.370

The result of the referendum, which caused East Timor’s secession, obviously seemed like an insult to the TNI as a sign that it was unable to defend the territory within Indonesia. President Habibie’s decision to release Xanana and return him triumphantly to East Timor caused a rise in domestic criticism of TNI leaders and soldiers for actively arming the militias, which deeply harmed the TNI.371 Intense international pressure to accelerate the transition of post-referendum East Timor to independence added to the TNI’s dissatisfaction with Habibie. Habibie’s aides in the state palace reported that the president had received a written ultimatum from Wiranto, threatening him with the “silent coup” of a ministerial triumvirate.372 Therefore, it is important to refer back to Loveman’s earlier study, which pointed out that the military’s intense resistance to the referendum on independence and the threat of a coup were actually the sorts of politics conducted to preserve national integrity and state sovereignty from foreign intervention.373

After the Maliana case, in which thirty-three non-combatants were killed by a joint force of militia and TNI soldiers on September 8, 1999,374 Wiranto arrived in Dili airport with a delegation of Habibie’s ministers and immediately declared martial law. He said that anyone on the streets after midnight would be shot on sight. This decision actually reflected the military’s victory over civilian leaders in Jakarta. Not suprisingly, several perpetrators of the various violent post-referendum incidents as well as prominent militia leaders were present at the Dili airport meeting where Wiranto declared martial law.375 Envoys of the UN Security Council who visited East Timor after the referendum also noted that the TNI was able to “switch the violence on and off” at will. Nonetheless, there was nothing new about such findings, because journalists had been reporting on the situation for 7 months. Thus, within half an hour of the UN envoys’ departure, shootings began again on Dili’s streets.376

At the same time, in the countryside the TNI and its militia forces continued its planned and systematic scorched earth campaign before withdraw all their forces. The US President’s warning of severe economic sanctions if the violence did not end in East Timor eventually compelled the TNI to begin an organized withdrawal by September 15, 1999. This amounted to precisely 10 days, the minimal length of time needed to complete

370 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 269. 371 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 144. 372 Derwin Pereira, “Wiranto is the Man to Watch,” and “Inside Story: The ‘Silent Coup,’” The Straits Times, September 12, 1999, loc.cit; O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 273, 457. 373 Loveman, 1999, op. cit: 186, 213, 254 et seq. 374 Laporan Singkat KPP HAM Timtim (Executive Summary of KPP HAM on the Investigation of Human Rights Violations in East Timor) Jakarta: Komnas HAM, January 31, 2000, loc. cit. 375 Lowry, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc. cit: 101. 376 The Financial Times, September 13, 1999, cited in O’ Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 275.

126 the missions described in the Garnadi document following the start of the scorched earth campaign. 377 Following the referendum on independence, East Timor was literally demolished by the TNI in September 1999, and, in particular, by the mobilized militias,378 who had been armed and trained by members of the TNI.379 It should be noted that the TNI’s response was aimed at preventing a new nation or state from emerging.380

For all intents and purposes, Gen. Wiranto and other TNI leaders may have been trying to send a message to secessionist movements elsewhere in Indonesia. Repressive measures in responding to secessionist movements had been adopted by Javanese kings or rulers, and even civilians, since the Sukarno era. Furthermore, none of the military’s senior officers ever expressed public reservations about the TNI’s actions in East Timor, not even Yudhoyono, Kaster, who was celebrated as an intellectual reformer.381 Rather than voicing differences of opinion, other prominent members of the military’s high command remained conspicuously silent. The exception here was Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, one of the few reformist generals. In an unexpected move, he sharply criticized his colleague, Maj. Gen Djaja Suparman, Kostrad commander, for his statement, which seemingly supported the TNI generals accused of responsibility for the East Timor atrocities following the referendum.382

V. Coping with Radical Muslims

V.A. Habibie, Islam, Radical Muslims, and the Green Generals

The following section discusses relations among radical Muslims, President Habibie and the military. Tracing Habibie’s background, it is notable that he was born in South Sulawesi, where people generally have conservative views regarding religion. His father was a Muslim cleric, while his grandfather was a Muslim leader and member of the Islamic Court of Law. He was raised in an orthodox family, and from a young age was

377 See again, Eldridge, 2002, op. cit: 138-139. 378 Nordholt, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 49. 379 Kiki Syahnakri’s testimony conveyed before the public hearing of the CTF on October 24, 2007 in Ja- karta. However, due to his background as TNI general, until recently he denied the accusations which mentioned TNI’s involvement in the so-called gross crimes against humanity in East Timor. See again, Nurha- yati, 2007, loc. cit: 1. 380 Tanter, Ball, and van Klinken (eds.), 2006, loc. cit: 11. 381 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit. 382 Victoria S, “Mayjen TNI Raden Agus Wirahadikusumah, MPA: Jenderal Kritis di Kursi Pangkostrad” (“Maj. Gen. Raden Agus Wirahadikusumah, MPA: Critical General in Charge of Kostrad”), Indonesia Media Online, Berta 04-2000.htm, April 2000, http://www.indonesiamedia.com/rubrik/berta/berta00april- agus.htm

127 known as both a serious and strongly religious student.383 His brother, Junus Effendy, ex- naval officer, was sentenced to prison at the beginning of the Soeharto era for his alleged involvement with radical Muslim activists. In addition, his younger sister was the wife of Lt. Gen. Z.A Maulani, a pro-Islamist group general.

Habibie’s political career culminated with his 1990 election as chairperson of the ICMI, the most important Muslim intellectual organization. With the backing of the ICMI, as well as Soeharto, he was untouchable, despite closing down three vocal magazines, Tempo, Detik, and Editor, which had criticised him for the controversial buying of ex- German ships. The ICMI successfully backed him in his bid for the vice-presidency in the March 1998 presidential election without any challenge from the military, unlike in 1993 when it openly opposed Soeharto’s nomination of Sudharmono as his vice- presidential candidate. The military had proposed ex-armed forces (ABRI) commander, Gen. (ret) Try Sutrisno as an alternative. More significantly, the ICMI showed its influence in placing its members in the Soeharto-Habibie cabinet and parliament.

Upon his appointment as vice-president, Habibie drew on many of his close aides from within the ICMI and its think-tank, CIDES (Center for Information and Development Studies). He backed the ICMI in founding a sectarian newspaper, Republika, and PPMI (Perhimpunan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia --The Association of Indonesian Muslim Workers), and in further developing the organization’s pro-Muslim agenda including the syariah banking system. Together with the ICMI, he sponsored the formation of Badan Kordinasi Umat Islam (Coordinating Board for Muslims) on May 1998 to coordinate the activities of all major Muslim mass-organizations. These organizations could be used for political purposes in a show of force in the near future if needed.384

Because of its controversial anti-Chinese and sectarian campaigns, the ICMI allegedly contributed to the flaring up of the May 13-14, 1998 riots,385 which caused 288 deaths and 101 more people to be wounded. In addition, ninety-two women became the victims of sexual harrasment, all of which gave clear evidence of gross human rights violations386 and paving the way for Habibie’s rise to power. The ICMI's strong influence continued after Lt. Gen. Prabowo fell from his position as Kostrad commander. Lt. Gen. Maulani, the new chief of Bakin, and President Habibie urged Chief Commander Gen.

383 “Habibie B.J,” http://www.bookrags.com/history/worldhistory/habibie-b-jema-02/: 1-2; James Castle et al (eds.), Who’s Who in Indonesia’s Political Arena: The Players, the Parties: A Comprehensive Guide, Ja- karta: Castle, 1999. 384 Singh, 2000, op. cit: 122. 385 Ibid. 386 Laporan Pelapor Khusus Komnas Perempuan tentang Kerusuhan Seksual Mei 1998 dan Dampaknya (Report of Special Rapporteur of Women National Commission on Sexual Assaults on May 1998 and its Impacts), “Data Korban Kekerasan Seksual 1998 Diserahkan” (“Data of the 1998 Sexual Assaults Victims”), Harian Kompas, May 24, 2008: 24.

128 Wiranto to replace Prabowo's successor, Maj. Gen. Lumintang, with Maj. Gen. Djamari Chaniago, regional commander of Kodam III Siliwangi. The replacement of Lumintang, who had been installed just 6-7 hours earlier, was linked to his Christian background, and ignored the fact that he was one of most distinguished graduates from the 1970 Military Academy and also an excellent professional.387 In a similar case, the ICMI played an important role in preventing Maj. Gen. Luhut Pandjaitan from becoming the Kopassus commander. He would have replaced Maj. Gen. Muchdi, who, like his protégé Prabowo, had been discharged due to his alleged involvement in student kidnappings and the May 13-14, 1998 anti-Chinese riots. Pandjaitan had a special forces career and other qualifications, including past posts as ex-commander of the Pussenif (Pusat Senjata Infantri --Infantry Weapons Center) and the special anti-terror unit of the Kopassus. Muhdi was succeeded by Maj. Gen. Sjahrir, who was not a special forces career officer.

Soon after the downfall of Soeharto, the ICMI launched a process of de-Soeharto- ization in the cabinet and parliament. It replaced old members with its own, especially radical Muslims, a process which had been impossible because of Soeharto’s veto. President Habibie awarded key cabinet positions to ICMI-affiliated figures, e.g. Adi Sasono, Soleh Solahuddin, and A.M. Saefuddin. Since the early 1990s, many people affiliated with the ICMI had been more involved in the Golkar Party so that as Habibie became president, many of them, for example, Fadel Muhammad and Marwah Daud Ibrahim, were appointed to the executive board of the party.388 Therefore, Habibie had made the ICMI his most important political vehicle during the Soeharto era during his long struggle to become vice-president, and also in the following era in an effort to preserve his presidency.389

Since Habibie’s main basis of support came from Islamic groups, the impression quickly emerged that under his presidency, Indonesia would undergo a process of Islamization.390 Moreover, Bilveer Singh, a Singaporean scholar of Indonesia, saw the political paradigm shifting in favor of “political Islam,” and referred to an almost permanent struggle for the formation of an Islamic state, or the implementation of the syariah law. In other words, Indonesia would become more Islamized, partly due to the fact that 87 percent of its population follows the Islamic faith, but more essentially, due to the rise of a political elite that believed in “Islamizing” the country’s politics, economy, and social order.391 President Habibie had declared on June 25, 1998 that he would never adopt a single official religion because he regarded all religions as equal, and that Indonesia would not declare itself as an “Islamic state.” 392 Even so, the political,

387 Singh, 2000, op. cit. 388 Sukma, 2003, op. cit: 84. 389 O’ Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 19. 390 Sukma, 2003, op. cit. 391 Singh, 2000, op. cit: 227. 392 “Country Will Not Become Islamic State,” The Straits Times, October 9, 1998.

129 economic and social trends at that time tended to indicate that “political Islam” was on the rise, particularly due to the emerging phenomenon of “ICMI-ization” of the country across all its structural levels.

The commitment of Habibie’s supporters in the ICMI to their agenda of “Islamization” is reflected in the statement of one of the ICMI’s founding members, Imaduddin Abdulrahim. He argued that only Islam could serve as an integrative basis for Indonesia. According to him, nationalism could not be the unifying basis for Indonesia, but rather Islam, the set of beliefs followed by 90 percent of the people, was fit to serve as the moral basis for the state.393 On the other hand, due to his lack of legitimacy, President Habibie expected Islam to serve as an important source for support. Therefore, he needed to inject a sense of Islam into his policies.394 For this reason, too, he developed a close relationship with radical Muslim groups so that he could gain strong support in dealing with moderate Muslim and national-secular groups, who threw their support behind Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati, his main rivals in the forthcoming elections.395

President Habibie’s relationship with radical Muslim groups could be seen in his support for the formation of Partai Keadilan (Justice party) and Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent and Star Party), and the re-establishment of Masyumi, which was banned during the eras of Sukarno and Soeharto. At the same time, his government continued to watch over the political activities of the leftists, in particular seeing to it that ex-PKI members did not join new political parties.396 His close connections with radical Muslims had saved him from being removed from power along with Soeharto. As pointed out by Sukma, Habibie ruled the country by presenting a more reconciliatory approach towards Islam in domestic politics. This was due to his dependence on the support of some segments of Islamic movements and the need to cultivate an image as an Islamic leader as the basis of his legitimacy.397

Habibie’s strongest support turned out to be none other than the ICMI he headed as general chairperson from its inauguration in December 1990 to March 1998, right before he was installed as vice-president. He himself had alluded to his reliance on the ICMI, by appealing to the ICMI not to leave him alone in his golden cage after becoming vice-president.398 For its part, the ICMI made no bones about its support for Habibie.

The political situation surrounding Soeharto’s collapse had prompted many other Islamic groups to throw their support behind Habibie. Aside from the ICMI, one such

393 Ramage, 1995, op. cit: 53, 168. 394 Sukma, 2003, op. cit: 84-85. 395 Dewi Fortuna Anwar was interviewed on December 18, 2008 in Jakarta. 396 Lane, “Bebaskan Semua Tapol” (“Free All Political Prisoners”), loc. cit: 4. 397 Sukma, 2003, op. cit: 79, 81-83. 398 Singh, 2000, op. cit: 224, 226.

130 group was the KISDI (Komite Solidaritas untuk Dunia Islam --Solidarity Committee for Islamic World), an organization affiliated with the DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia --Indonesian Islamic Teaching Council). The KISDI, which had previously backed Habibie to become vice-president, also promoted him as Soeharto’s successor. Its support was clearly demonstrated on May 22, 1998 when KISDI members staged a rally at the parliament building, carrying a banner reading: “Opposition to Habibie = Opposition to Islam”.399 As acknowledged by its chairperson, Ahmad Soemargono, the KISDI had openly defended Habibie several times in face to face talks with groups that were trying to undermine the legal government.400

V.B. The Green Generals and Radical Muslims

Importantly, the KISDI was founded with the support of Soemargono’s close friend, Prabowo Subianto, when he was a Lieutnant Colonel, as well as other sectarian military leaders. This was part of an endeavour to mobilize support from modernist Islam for Soeharto’s New Order regime in the 1990s 401 to counter Soeharto’s opponents in Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.402 Following Prabowo’s fall from his position as Kostrad commander a few days after Soeharto’s resignation, the radical Muslim organization continued to maintain relations with sectarian generals inside the military. The organizations members were not only involved in organizing demonstrations against Habibie’s opponents, but also in serving as militias in various covert military intelligence and psychological operations. Five thousand KISDI members assisted Pam Swakarsa in protecting Habibie from the threat of impeachment proposed by radical reformists during the MPR special session in November 1998.403 To this end, KISDI leaders cooperated with military elements to mobilize tens of thousands of rural youths armed with bamboo spears to confront anti-Habibie and anti-military demonstrators at the MPR session in November 1998.404

Another radical Muslim group, which supported President Habibie like the KISDI, was the FPI. It was established in August 17, 1998 and had branches in at least sixteen provinces with ten million members. 405 Until recently, it was chaired by Habib Muhammad Rizky Shihab, a religious teacher educated in Saudi Arabia. Because of its militant campaigns defending Islam and Habibie, the FPI, which established with the

399 Sukma, 2003, op. cit: 84. 400 Ahmad Soemargono, Saya Seorang Fundamentalis (I am a Fundamentalist), Jakarta: Global Cita Press, 1999: 111. 401 Adam Schwarz, 1999, in O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 180; ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 12. 402 Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 78-79, 83. 403 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit. 404 ICG, 2001, loc.cit. 405 Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 84.

131 support of Kodam Jayakarta regional commander Maj. Gen. Djaja Suparman, was later said to be the city’s most hostile militia group. It has been reported that other army generals such as Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zen, Maj. Gen. Zacky Makarim, Lt. Gen. Suaidi Marasabessy, Gen. Fachrul Razy, and Gen. Wiranto had regular contact with the FPI. Conversely, FPI leaders maintained regular contact with Indonesia’s military elite through its Habib community based at its centre in Central Jakarta’s Kwitang area. According to Habib Shihab, since the days that Wiranto had only one star, he had always attended the FPI’s important events, e.g. the commemoration of the Prophet Mohammad’s birth.406 It should be emphasized that no suggestion is being made here that Wiranto or the other military officers who attended the commemoration share the goals of the FPI, but only that they had found it useful to maintain contacts with Islamic organizations that had the capacity to mobilize supporters in the streets.

In addition to this, another important FPI figure, Habib Ali bin Awi al Ba’agil, claimed to be a close friend of Gen. Wiranto and his ally, Maj. Gen. Djaja Suparman.407 Ba’agil was known as the religious teacher of Soeharto’s children, in particular Tommy and Bambang. His name had previously been mentioned in connection with Soeharto and his family’s corruption cases as well as the bombing incidents and the FPI meeting with the Ambonese Muslim leader, Ongen Sangaji, close to the flaring up of sectarian conflicts in Maluku.408 Lt. Gen. Prabowo was also reported to have actively supported this militia organization.409 During the MPR special session on November 10-13, 1998, the FPI joined forces with state-sponsored civilian militias (the Pam Swarkarsa). It worked with the KISDI to prevent pro-democracy student activists from marching on parliament to demand the resignation of President Habibie and the military’s total removal from politics.410

Another important group was the Laskar Jihad (holy warriors). This was a paramilitary division of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama’ah (Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunnah and the Community of the Prophet), which was formed when religious conflicts escalated in Maluku, and was chaired by Ja’far Umar Thalib, an Afghani veteran. The members of this organization received military training under the supervision of Brig. Gen. (ret) Rustam Kastor. It was reported that plans had been made to send 10,000 jihad troops to Ambon, Maluku, to do what they said was a “compulsory duty without exception for all Muslims.”411

406 “Kita Tetap Tegas, Tolak Presiden Perempuan,” Koran Tempo, June 23, 2001. 407 Majalah Tempo, October 1, 2000: 26, cited in ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 12-13. 408 See, “Tommy and Habib Ali Baaqil,” Indonesian Observer, September 18, 2000, loc.cit; “Baagil di Ba- lik Bom?” (“Baagil Behind the Bombing?”), Majalah Tempo, October 1, 2000: 26. 409 “Sipil Berwajah Militer” (“Civilian with Military Face”), Majalah Forum Keadilan, No. 07, June 11, 2006: 18-19. 410 Yunanto et al, 2003, loc. cit: 51-52; Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 84. 411 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit: 122.

132 Aside from the KISDI, FPI, and Laskar Jihad, there were other Islamist groups, which explicitly backed Habibie. Few of these, for example, the PPMI and GPK (Kabah Youth Movement) were actually mass-based organizations created by the ICMI, PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan --United Development Party), or Golkar. In addition, Habibie’s supporters soon founded the FURKON (Forum for the Promotion of Justice and Constitution) to challenge radical students and reformists who demanded his resignation through an MPR extraordinary or special session (Sidang Istimewa). Together, the KISDI, FPI, and FURKON morphed into militias, which worked with the military to secure Habibie’s and Wiranto’s positions from the threat of a transitional presidium prepared by the Ciganjur Group. This presidium would have consisted of Wahid, Megawati, Rais, and Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, and was promoted by radical students and reformists. To maximize support for the Habibie presidency, the activities of these radical Muslim organizations were coordinated by Adi Sasono and his ICMI brothers in arms under an umbrella organization called the Forum Ummat Islam (FUI -- Forum for Muslims).412 Hence, President Habibie was backed by important segments of the Muslim community, particularly its radical elements.

Habibie’s political survival up until the next presidential election would depend on the support of Islamic political parties. One of these political parties was the PPP, which had strongly backed him to replace Soeharto amid the mounting political and economic crisis facing Indonesia in the second quarter of 1998. The PPP shared similar views with Habibie on Muslim interests, particularly the supporting of national legislations prompted by syariah law. To ensure another term of presidency for Habibie, PPP chairperson, Hamzah Haz, reportedly received “tactical funds” from him. The PBB chairperson, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, and Gen. Wiranto, TNI chief commander also reportedly gathered a similarly large amount and used it to secure the East Timor referendum.413

Like the PPP, the PBB’s support of Habibie correlated with its interest in adopting syariah law in the country. The PBB's founders, Hartono Marjono, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, and Achmad Sumargono, acknowledged that they had continued to strive for the same objectives of Mohammad Natsir and Syarifuddin Prawiranegara, who had fought since the independence era for the formation of an Islamic state with their Masyumi party For the time being, Marjono maintained his political attitude as a radical Muslim opposition figure promoting the interests of the old Masyumi, although he remained under tight supervision by the Soeharto regime under the policy of cekal (cegah dan tangkal --

412 Singh, 2000, op.cit. 413 Habibie’s “generosity” was criticised as a practice of money politics. In the PPP, this caused a schism between Hamzah and his rivals from the Muslim Indonesia faction; in PBB between Yusril and Hartono Marjono/Fadli Zon; and in the military between Gen. Wiranto and Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zen.

133 blocking and refusing) and was not permitted to go abroad by Soeharto.414 It is also important to note that Prawiranegara’s son, Farid, was a close friend of Lt. Gen. Prabowo, who had protected the ICMI against the Soeharto and Wiranto factions.

Long before the PBB was founded, Yusril was one of many prospective leaders of the HMI (Association of Muslim Students) and the ICMI. He was called a “young Natsir” and had been groomed by the senior Masyumi leaders to replace Natsir with the mission of continuing to promote the Masyumi’s interests in the future. For this reason, Yusril had also been sent to Malaysia to study and develop the Masyumi’s and Natsir’s goal of forming an Islamic state in a plural society, as in Malaysia and Indonesia. Marjono and Yusril became two Muslim intellectuals who continually represented an oppositional stance to the country’s secular national ideology, Pancasila. Led by Yusril and some militant Islamic leaders, the PBB received strong support from the DDII, which claimed to have about 8 million members. Later, the PBB explicitly adopted Islam as its ideological foundation. Expecting to draw support from former members of the Masyumi, the PBB attracted followers and sympathizers from several regions of Java and South and West Sumatera.

V.C. Habibie’s Pro-Islam Politics and its Impacts

Habibie also had close ties with Fuad Bawazier, a crafty power broker who maintained ties with the ICMI and other radical Muslim groups. Bawazier was Habibie’s supporter in Poros Tengah (the Central Axis), a coalition formed by radical Muslim parties to prevent Megawati from winning the forthcoming presidency. Bawazier reputedly helped Gen. Wiranto recruit and finance Muslim militias, for instance, the Laskar Jihad.415 Its 10,000 young militant members protected the November 1998 MPR special session and became the most active organization in sending thousands of volunteers to troubled spots in the Maluku islands to back Muslims against Christians.416 Aside from this, Habibie’s support came from small factions in the MPR, e.g. Daulatul Ummah faction (FPDU). This faction was comprised of five radical Muslim parties, which backed Gen. Wiranto’s candidacy for vice-president in the October 1999 elections.

President Habibie’s sectarian politics were reflected in his Aceh policy. Rather than attempting to answer the Acehnese’s cry for freedom and justice or prosecute past grave human rights abuses,417 he endorsed the law outlining Aceh’s special status. The

414 Masykuri Abdillah, Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy (1966- 1993), Hamburg: Abera Verlag Meyer & K.O.K.G, 1997: 243. 415 Yunanto et al, 2003, op. cit: 125, 178-179. 416 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 292; ICG, 2001: 13. 417 See again, interview with Marzuki Darusman, a member of Komnas HAM’s investigation team, on De- cember 17, 2007 in Jakarta, on Habibie’s unwillingness to follow up on his team’s inquiries.

134 law allowed the Acehnese to apply syariah law to religious, educational, and economic affairs, as well as local culture. His dealings with the ICMI to strengthen his position in national politics had been, furthermore, pointed to as responsible for triggering religious conflict in Maluku. More than elsewhere, in Maluku, President Habibie and the ICMI’s open public policies promoting Islam at the expense of other religions caused a heightening of tensions in the dividing society.418 His sectarian policies to obtain more support for the coming elections by sponsoring militant Muslim organizations and their paramilitary groups provoked the religious conflict in Maluku.

President Habibie’s pro-ICMI policies were also implicated in the situation in Poso, Central Sulawesi, where the Christian and Muslim populations were in balance. His move to pass a new law on the enlargement of the Central Sulawesi province and decentralize Poso in December 1998 caused fierce competition among candidates for Bupati (district head). The Christians, who wanted the position, but failed to secure it, organized demonstrations. They accused the Muslims of corruption and manipulating the selection process, which led to clashes. This also started a new cycle of reprisals in Maluku. The decentralization policy placed more power and resources in Poso and resulted in acute conflicts as societal groups mobilized along religious lines. This was due in part to existing social structures, in which religion had been a strong identifier for group differences. The increase in sectarian politics in Jakarta influenced Poso, where the sectarian conflict in the district of Central Sulawesi turned into vicious fighting,419 and national and local elites’ interests and their capacities to mobilize client groups played a significant role. The level of tension was maintained by political and military elites from the past Soeharto regime, who had conflicts of interest with President Habibie.420

In Jakarta, President Habibie allowed the FURKON, KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia --Indonesian Muslim Student Actions Association), FPI, KISDI, and the youth wing of the PBB to organize a large rally to call for volunteers to defend Islam in Maluku and prepare for jihad (holy war).421 Immediately, registration for jihad was opened in conservative Muslim neighborhoods in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Semarang, and Makassar. The formation of jihad forces and the tendency towards civil militarism422 also occurred in Poso, Central Sulawesi, and other regions facing religious conflicts. As a result, the Laskar Jihad (Jihad Warriors) was formed and

418 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 118. 419 ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 10. 420 Majalah Tempo 28, No. 8, April 24-30, 2000; Majalah Tempo 29, No. 15, June 12-18, 2000, cited in Bertrand, 2004, op.cit: 132. 421 Harian Republika, March, 6, 1999; Harian Kompas, March 4, 6, 1999, Majalah Forum Keadilan, No. 25, March 1999, ibid. 422 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit: 110.

135 would develop into another radical Islamic group that had gained prominence since the fall of Soeharto.423

In fact, Habibie’s policy of creating a new province in North Maluku in August 1999 ignited a new religious conflict in the Maluku archipelago. The conflict was centered around the fierce competition over control of political and economic resources between Muslims and Christians affected by the growing sectarian politics he endorsed in Jakarta following the formation of the ICMI.424 He was led to take the wrong decision based on his ignorance of the historical background inherited from the Dutch colonial rule, during which the region had been divided into North and South Halmahera. Accordingly, the impacts of the subsequent religious conflict were much more severe, and reached across Maluku and elsewhere. In the meantime, President Habibie had made biased decision in dealing with East Timor. He linked it with a large amount of development compensation, which had been provided by the majority Muslim population in Indonesia since the integration of the territory as the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia in 1976, and offered a new proposal of a referendum on independence.

Unlike Habibie, military leaders at that time were of the opinion that the ICMI's ideology and long-term objectives endangered national interest Its exclusiveness was said to be the main challenge to the nation’s secular ideology of Pancasila, which emphasised the principle of negara integralistik (an integralistic state or integralism) and kebersamaan (togetherness or family-like-ness). They suspected that the ICMI had a hidden agenda to eliminate the military’s dual function, which had long standing historical and cultural roots with the formation of the Indonesian state. Accordingly, most generals were not at ease with the rise of the ICMI.425

V.D. The Military, Radical Muslim Organizations, and Militias

President Habibie’s concessions to the ICMI’s sectarian objectives alarmed the military and caused it to be more vigilant of further calls for democratisation. The choice of a democratization strategy had long been a cause for much anxiety and tension between the military and the ICMI.426 In other words, the use of the ICMI in the struggle for democratization had aroused all the ideological issues that most easily provoked and challenged the military’s political thinking and ideology. The nationalist wing inside the TNI feared that President Habibie would be used by the ICMI as a godfather for its sectarian policies in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Therefore, Habibie’s sectarian policies

423 ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 13. 424 Research reported by Thamrin Amal Tomagola, cited in Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 129-130. 425 See Sulistiyo, in Hefner (ed.), 2001, loc. cit: 298. 426 Ramage, 1995, op. cit: 112.

136 would not only be harmful to an integralistic state, but also to secular Muslim officers’ interests.

At this point, it is important to note that the military’s commitment to the preservation of Indonesia as a unified state was intimately linked to Pancasila and their own dwifungsi. 427 Also, the perception persisted that there was an ideological threat from Islam. Based on this, the military might once again seek to raise the specter of an “Islamic threat” in order to continue to justify a military role as the defender of Pancasila and the state from the threat of the extreme right. As previously predicted, actions by the TNI leaders to approach radical Muslim groups in the post-Soeharto period were unable to eliminate such suspicions.

This situation was recognized by President Habibie’s political aide, Samego, who pointed out that in general the Indonesian military would not go along with the formation of a religious state, or the adoption of religion as a state ideology.428 Its reluctance to help the government address communal conflicts throughout the country was caused by a high level of uncertainty produced by President Habibie in response to reform demands. Therefore what was commonly observed was the use of religious issues and radical Muslim groups by the military for its leaders and institutional interests. Gen. Wiranto’s fear of accusations that the TNI was violating human rights justified his interest in using radical Muslim groups and their paramilitary organizations as militias, for example, in handling pro-reform students, radical reformists, and anti-Habibie demonstrators during the MPR special session in November 1998.429

Thus, the general had reason to use the militias by recruiting Habibie’s radical Muslim supporters in the FURKON as private volunteers to assist the TNI in providing security during the special session. The mobilization of the militias in Pam Swakarsa, consisted of 40,000 civilians.430 This resulted in new violence and awakened a sense of tension surrounding divisions between Muslims and secular nationalists, which carried consequences for relations with non-Muslims. 431 Thus, TNI leaders had used policies aimed at shifting the nature of the confrontation from a vertical (students versus the Habibie government and the military) to horizontal one (students versus radical Muslims).432

One of the elements of the Pam Swakarsa, the FPI, had already been organizing activities that seemed to be typically designed to support the military in opposing reform demands rather than protesting relevant issues that had offended large parts of the

427 Ibid: 155. 428 Indria Samego was interviewed on June 14, 2006, in Jakarta. 429 Sulistiyo, in Hefner (ed.), 2001, loc. cit: 305. 430 Crouch, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 147. 431 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 103-104. 432 Sulistiyo, in Hefner (ed.), 2001, loc. cit.

137 Muslim community, such as abuses of Acehnese women and the religion ministry’s extortion of hajj pilgrims.433 Ironically, immediately after the FPI was founded in mid- 1998, the leadership instructed its followers in their own peculiar version of Islamic doctrine. They were also trained in martial arts and had a structure similar to a military unit. They were accorded ranks and given command responsibility for specific neighborhoods, particularly, in North Jakarta, where many militant Muslims live.

The involvement of military elements in the formation of radical Muslim groups could also be seen in the case of the Laskar Jihad, for which Brig. Gen. (ret) Kastor played a role in supervising military training and preparing for their involvement in the Maluku conflict. Furthermore, Lt. Gen. Maulani, the Bakin chief, followed the agenda of the ICMI in pushing de-Christianization by replacing the newly appointed Kostrad commander, Lt. Gen. Lumintang with Lt. Gen. Chaniago. The military also followed the agenda of the ICMI by preventing Maj. Gen. Luhut from becoming Kopassus commander and replacing Maj. Gen Muchdi. Previously, military leaders, such as Gen. Feisal and Gen. Hartono, had been transparent in their endorsement of the establishment of the ICMI, as was the case with Lt. Gen. Prabowo, Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zen, and Maj. Gen. Muchdi, with their Islamist backgrounds.434

In a more blatant manner, the military had used members of the FPI, Laskar Jihad, and KISDI to engineer horizontal conflicts throughout Indonesia in an attempt to increase their bargaining position across from President Habibie and the reform movement. The FPI was involved in the orchestrated Ketapang incidents, which triggered similar incidents in other parts of the country.435 Meanwhile, the Laskar Jihad waged war against Christians in Maluku. The two radical Muslim groups, along with the KISDI, and followers of the PPP, PBB, and so forth, were elements of Pam Swakarsa. They had been recruited from radical Muslim bases in Banten, Bekasi, Karawang, Bogor, Cianjur, Bandung, Lampung, Makassar, and marginal areas of Jakarta, and organized by Gen. Wiranto and Maj. Gen. Kivlan for safeguarding the November 1998 MPR special session, just two weeks later.436

Gen. Feisal, the coordinating minister for security and political affairs, was said to have also played a role in persuading President Habibie to instruct Wiranto to use Muslim volunteers along with military militia groups.437 Kivlan, together with several Muslim officers, admitted to having been involved in organizing the Muslim volunteers under

433 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 187; Togi Simandjuntak (Ed.), Premanisme Politik. Jakarta: ISAI, 2000: 113- 115, 117. 434 Sulistiyo, in Hefner (ed.), 2001, loc. cit: 298. 435 See „Lagi, Massa Tersulut“ („Again, People Incited“), Majalah Panji Masyarakat, December 2, 1998, loc.cit; Yunanto et al, 2003, op. cit; Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 84. 436 Kivlan Zen, Konflik dan Integasi TNI-AD (Conflict and Integration in Army), Jakarta: IPS, 2004: 92-95. 437 Crouch, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, loc. cit: 133; Bourchier, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, ibid: 159.

138 orders from Wiranto.438 Aside from Wiranto and Kivlan, Gen. Hartono was apparently the most important advocate of the Pam Swakarsa. In addition, Habibie’s presidential guards were said to have been active in recruiting vigilantes from several parts of Java.439 Meanwhile, key Muslim figures, such as leaders of the FURKON, Komaruddin Rachmat, Faisal Biki, and Heri Ashari, as well as the chairperson of Council of Islamic Clerics (Majelis Ulama Indonesia --MUI), K.H. Ali Yafie, and editors of pro-Habibie sectarian newspaper, Republika, were publicly sympathetic with the Pam Swakarsa.440

The existence of the FUI, established by Habibie’s allies to gain wider support across Indonesia, was very helpful in mobilizing the volunteers. The FUI was an alliance of some twenty Islamist groups explicitly backed by President Habibie. Few of these were real mass-based organizations created by the ICMI, PPP, Golkar, or the military itself. Importantly, the leaders of at least three militia groups linked to the FUI acknowledged that their members had received training from military personnel before the beginning of the November 1998 MPR special session.441

To strengthen the Pam Swakarsa, the military recruited 300,000 members of the Islamic Youth Movement; 120,000 members of the Hizbullah Brigade; 120,000 members of the FURKON; 1,000 members of the Bandung Moslem League; 700 members of the Bandung Islamic Students, and 450 members of the Al-Furqon youth.442 The military- backed Islamic militias were armed with bamboo spears and were deployed in clashes with student demonstrators. Through Pam Swakarsa, the military not only used the militias or paramilitary groups to secure Habibie’s presidency, put a halt to the pro- reform student rallies, and end opposition to Habibie. They were also used to protect the military’s position and interests, especially during the special session, from the violent pressures of the reform movement, which demanded that the president immediately resign and the military retreat completely to the barracks.443

Under Soeharto, the use of militias and paramilitaries, consisting of thugs and radical Muslims, had become common practice in covert military intelligence and psychological operations. The Malari (Malapetaka 15 Januari 1974 --the January 15, 1974 incidents), for instance, had revealed the machinations of Lt. Gen. Ali Murtopo and his Opsus (Operasi Khusus --Special Operation) in organizing the radical Muslims, as outlined in the Rachmadi document, to counter student demonstrators criticizing the country’s growing corruption and dependence on Japanese investment in early 1974. Such operations would always require a major role to be played by military intelligence

438 Kivlan, 2004, op. cit. 439 “Mahasiswa Mengaku Informan Minta Perlindungan Komnas HAM” (“Students Claimed Informant Asked Protection from National Commission for Human Rights”), Media Minggu, November 22, 1998. 440 Bourchier, in Budiman, Hatley, and Kingsbury (eds.), 1999, ibid: 159. 441 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 180. 442 Rinakit, 2005, op.cit: 122. 443 Sulistiyo, in Hefner (ed.), 2001, loc. cit: 305.

139 (Bais), the agency most adept at training and employing civilian militias, and the special forces (Kopassus) units in organizing them.

Apart from being paid, the “volunteers” were enjoined to move against the pro- reform students or the anti-Habibie and anti-military demonstrators in defense of “Islam”. 444 Under the guidance of Gen. Wiranto, the military mobilized the Pam Swakarsa, by which they hoped to avoid blame for using coercive measures against the pro-reform movement. Therefore, Colombijn and Lindblad referred to the use of the Pam Swakarsa as “little more than old wine in new bottles.” It was the same as the use of bands of thugs, street hoodlums, or gangsters when civilian politicians needed them and the military wanted to fish in troubled waters. 445 The two analysts had, moreover, discerned that most of these were militant Muslim groups, and the best known was probably the FPI, which put pressure on the opponents of President Habibie and the military.

V.E. Military Leaders and Their Pragmatic Interests

After successfully safeguarding the special session and controlling the radical Muslims, on January 5, 1999, Gen. Wiranto began a reshuffling process and announced significant changes in the military line-up. The changes affected 100 officers from across the entirety of the TNI institutions, causing analysts to conclude that what Wiranto did was to weed out the ICMI elements from the military.446 Specifically, there was a clear demotion and loss of power for Gen. Fachrul Razy as TNI Chief for General Affairs (Kepala Staf Umum --Kasum), and Maj. Gen. Zacky as Bais chief. Lt. Gen. Sugiyono, ex- Soeharto ADC, replaced Fachrul, who had been previously promoted to a higher ranking by the ICMI, while Maj. Gen. Tyasno Sudarto replaced Zacky.447 Both Sugiyono and Tyasno were closer to Soeharto in terms of loyalty than the people whom they succeeded. At the same time, a Christian, Lt. Gen. Lumintang, ex-commandant of the Military Staff and Command College --a marginal post-- was appointed Army Deputy Chief (Wakil Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat --Wakasad). This represented a de-ICMI-ization and de- greening process in the military, clearly confirming that political and military appointments had become heavily politicized, and were increasingly viewed through ethnic and religious lenses.448

444 Ibid: 305-306. 445 Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 21. 446 The Straits Times, January 6, 1999, cited in Singh, 2000, op. cit: 228. 447 The Editors, Indonesia, April 1999, loc .cit: 140. 448 See Reports and editorial of pro-Islam newspaper, Harian Republika, January 5-6, 1999, in Singh, 2000, op. cit: 228-229.

140 The military’s support of radical Muslim groups was actually temporary in nature. This led Crouch to doubt whether military leaders such as Feisal, Prabowo, Djaja, and Wiranto were devoted Muslims in the same way as the radical Muslims they backed. Likewise, the Australian expert of Indonesian affairs doubted that these military leaders wholly encouraged the formation of an Islamic state and the implementation of syariah law to replace the 1945 state constitution and Pancasila ideology.449

Agreeing with Crouch, Ikrar commented that military leaders’ support of radical Muslims and their interests were so pragmatic due to the rising pressures of the reform movement on military institutions at that time. Ikrar argues that it was actually impossible for the TNI to justify the establishment of an Islamic state as long as the Sapta Marga (seven pledges) doctrine was maintained, because it demanded loyalty to the 1945 state constitution and Pancasila ideology. He draws attention to the fact that in the past military support for radical Muslim groups was part of its covert intelligence operations, i.e. the Malari, Woyla, and Tanjung Priok cases. It was aimed at producing people’s dependency on the military to preserve state stability. The existence of the groups was needed by the military in order to justify its repressive approach in the country.450

Radical Muslim groups also played a role in helping Gen. Wiranto meet the MPR’s minimum requirements of support for securing a formal nomination of an MPR faction to run in the November 1999 presidential election. He might refrain from using his TNI faction from fear that his candidacy would produce early resistance from reformist blocs in the MPR. He failed to win the Golkar Party nomination, which had the second largest members after the PDIP. Its leaders had decided to nominate other candidates and the chief commander had also previously refused to be nominated as the running mate of either Habibie or Akbar Tandjung. 451 Therefore, Wiranto sought the support of his military allies, the radical Muslim factions. He successfully gained the solid support of the FPDU (Fraksi Partai Daulatul Ummah --Sovereignty of the Islamic Community Parties Faction). Not surprisingly, since Soeharto’s final years in office, military leaders have been cultivating good relations with key figures in the FPDU such as Hartono Marjono, Ahmad Sumargono, and Jusuf Hasyim. Their common interest in defying the increasing pressure of democratic forces resulted in a honeymoon between the military and radical Muslim factions at that time. Unlike the situation under Murdani, because of this shared interest the military had been tolerating political activities of radical Muslims in following their interest in establishing Islamic law.

Although the FPDU was in the MPR, it was the second smallest faction with a mere ten seats. It had garnered attention for being passionately committed to the

449 Harold Crouch was interviewed on April 22, 2006, in Jakarta. 450 Ikrar Nusa Bhakti was interviewed on May 15, 2006, in Jakarta. 451 See also “The 1999 Presidential Election and Post-Election Developments in Indonesia: A Post-Elec- tion Assessment Report,” No. 28, 1999, Jakarta/Washington DC, 1999: 7.

141 promotion of Islamic law. Unlike the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), which had resorted to violent means to achieve its objectives, the five tiny parties within the FPDU, for instance, the PBB (the Crescent and Star Party), were far from being revolutionaries. They legitimized general elections and used the parliament to struggle to realize their objectives. They maintained long-standing ties to the military during the final years of the Soeharto regime. In addition, they had all been strong supporters of Habibie due to his profound sympathy towards Islamic groups. In the meantime, the military backed radical Muslim groups in their defence of President Habibie from the pressure of radical students and reform activists. Gen. Wiranto, moreover, played a determined role in mobilizing Muslim militias to secure the November 1998 MPR special session. It was not difficult for him to gain the support of radical Muslims in the MPR for the formal nomination that his vice-presidential campaign required. As a result, in a formal request organized by a member of the military faction, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid,452 seventy-four MPR members sponsored Wiranto’s nomination paving his way to the vice-presidential elections.453

VI. Conclusion

Obviously, after more than there decades of enjoying its priviledges protected by its historical and cultural legitimacy, the military was sensitive from the very beginning to reform demands. Thus, due to his positive response to reform demands, Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie, Indonesia’s first civilian president in the post-Soeharto democratic transition, was confronted with fierce resistance from the military, which felt threatened by the reform. He attempted to uphold civilian supremacy over the military with his decision to offer a referendum on independence in East Timor without prior consultation with its leaders. He also initiated political liberalization, which challenged the military and placed it under greater scrutiny and criticism.454

At the beginning of his presidency, Habibie attempted to follow demands for reform. Unfortunately, his long involvement during Soeharto’s New Order regime constrained his movement in introducing reform to the military, which had been fulfilling a dual role for more than three decades under an authoritarian political system. The increase in military pressure, as well as Habibie’s interest in retaining power during his transitional term and also to run again for the next term, caused him to change his position from encouraging the military to fulfil reform demands to tolerating their inconsistent response. Therefore, it can be stated at this point that he was unable to retain

452 In interview on January 27, 2008 in Jakarta, Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid, revealed how enthusiastic the Muslim conservative groups, including ICMI, Marwah Daud Ibrahim, and other Habibie’s supporters, had been in extending their support. 453 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 320; “The 1999 Presidential Election and Post-Election Developments in In- donesia: A Post-Election Assessment Report,” No. 28, 1999, Jakarta/Washington DC, 1999: 7, loc.cit. 454 See Honna, 2003, op. cit: 200.

142 his liberal views and new approaches to push further reform, which would largely implicate the military and the country’s basic principles, including those dealing with secessionism.

Just a few days after Habibie took power, competition between military leaders, namely Gen. Prabowo and Gen. Wiranto, reached its zenith with the replacement of Gen. Prabowo. Meanwhile, friction between the green and the red-white generals continued, particularly between those who had long been suspected of being ICMI and Murdani sympathizers. More importantly, the military was not eager to adopt reforms because of its existing historical and cultural legitimacy, which had protected its individuals, groups, and institutional interests for a long time. The dominant influence of the Javanese political culture, due to former Soeharto generals and the New Order’s military officers, proved counter-productive to democratization. This was due to a continuation of subjective campaigns to integrate civilian and military tasks, as well as prioritize unity and harmony, and the use of repressive measures. The increase in acitivities of radical Muslims demanding syariah law also produced unfavorable situations for pushing the military to continue reform.

Calls for serious reform and an investigation of gross human rights violations had been specifically blocked by the military. This had been achieved through a sophisticated engineering of new conflicts and the instigation of new violence in society to increase the military’s bargaining position vis-a-vis the Habibie regime and the reform movement. The military often manipulated the importance of defending the unitary state (NKRI) and Pancasila ideology to justify its policies of repression, a culture of violence and vested interests. The military actually frequently disturbed national security, for instance, in ending the investigation and prosecution of Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases, through various suspected covert intelligence and psychological operations by employing militias and radical Muslims. In addition, the military sometimes employed constitutional means, by becoming a veto player in the parliament (both the DPR and MPR) to protect their interests. Their push to nominate chief commander Gen. Wiranto for vice-president in the 1999 elections is another specfic example.

With its atrocius actions in East Timor, the TNI was surprisingly effective in deflecting popular frustration and reminding Indonesia's leaders that they could not afford to alienate their army. The TNI’s mounting disappointments following the referendum in East Timor led to its growing resistance to President Habibie. This situation not only resulted in the spread of conflicts throughout the country, but also in the failure of Habibie to gain support for his new term, since his accountability speech was rejected, particularly by the TNI faction in the parliament (MPR).455

455 See Ziegenhain, 2008, op .cit: 94-95.

143 Accordingly, there was no significant change in the military’s behavior resulting from the security sector reforms under Indonesia’s first post-Soeharto civilian regime. The military was successful in influencing and changing the path of reform through constitutional and unconstitutional means in its attempts to resist the new president and to push him to defend the military’s interests. Taking into account Martins’ models of democratic transition,456 the Habibie regime was unable to consolidate itself because of its failure to manage crisis through the use of various forms of compromise or higher levels of coercion by cooperating with the military.

456 Martins, in O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (Eds.), 1993, loc. cit: 107-140; also, in Sahdan (trans.), 2004, op. cit: 48-49.

144 Chapter Four

The Abdurrahman Wahid Regime (1999-2001)

I. Coping with Military Reform

I.A. What Had Influenced Wahid to Introduce Reform?

Abdurrahman Wahid was born in Jombang, East Java, the main base of the largest Islamic traditional organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU --the resurrected Islamic cleric group). He was the son of Wahid Hasyim, a respected national figure during the independence war, and the grandson of Hasyim Ashari, the only “great leader” (Rais Akbar) of NU. His parents were both Javanese and devoted Muslim scholars, and he laid claim to ancient Chinese ancestry, a Chinese Muslim named Tan Kim Han.1

After finishing his education in a Javanese Islamic traditional boarding school (pesantren), Abdurrahman Wahid continued with higher education at the University of Al-Azhar Cairo (Egypt), University of Baghdad (Iraq), Europe, and Canada, but he obtained no formal degrees. He spent most of his time reading about Western philosophy, spy fiction novels, and biographies of many prominent figures at the library of the American University in Cairo. He also got involved in discussions around campuses and watched foreign movies.2

In 1984, he became chairman of NU and his progressive thinking helped convert NU into a more politically independent mass-organization. He merged Islamic boarding school tradition with Islamic liberalism and secularism, Western liberalism, and Javanese syncretism.3 It has been said that Wahid was a culturalistic Muslim with the instincts of a Javanese king.4

During the authoritarian Soeharto years, Wahid maintained a wide sphere of compliance and criticism. He endorsed Soeharto’s policy in forcing all political parties and social organizations to adopt the secular state ideology, Pancasila, in the mid-1980s. On the other hand, Wahid opposed the efforts of Soeharto to control Islam for his regime’s advantage. This was evident in his resignation from the government-backed Islamic scholars’ association, ICMI, and his move to alternatively establish the Forum

1 Mark Tran, “Abdurrahman Wahid,” Guardian Unlimited Special Reports, http://www.guardian.co.uk/indonesia/Story/0,2763,200655,00.html: 1-3. 2 Greg Barton, Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid, Equinox Publishing (Asia) Pte. Ltd., 2005, http://www.antarakita.net/reviews/r24.html: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005. 3 Harry Bhaskara, Questioning Gus Dur, Jakarta: the Jakarta Post, 2000: 43-44. 4 Barton, op. cit.

145 Demokrasi (Forum for Democracy) with prominent nationalists in March 1992 as a response to the rising primordial tendencies in Indonesian politics at that time.

In 1998, after Soeharto’s resignation, Wahid founded the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB --National Awakening Party) with an inclusive platform despite its Islamic credentials. Known as a moderate Muslim eager to collaborate with other religious groups, he had become one of Indonesia’s most powerful voices for ethnic and religious tolerance. He called on Islamic leaders to understand that minorities had their own thoughts about the law and state, so his colleagues should be wise and ready to compromise. Instead of a religious state, he endorsed the practice of secularism without specifically saying that it was secularism.

While campaigning in the 1999 presidential elections, Wahid supported the separation of state and religion as well as rights for women and minorities.5 In an interview, he said, for example,”if the new parties want Islam to be a moral or educational force in politics that is okay. But, if they want to perform it with the laws of this country, then we must resist that.”6 He maintained his belief in secular government, which made him a champion against the (radical or conservative) Islamist camp and garnered him the support of many Indonesians.7

Wahid’s behavior, wise to some, disrespectful to others, and his mercurial style of leadership constantly confounded critics and sometimes caused him to be misunderstood.8 He was a very frank speaker, and well-known for his sharp and sometimes cynical commentary on the country’s politics. He was also noted for his unpredictability and indecisiveness. Nevertheless, the central aspect of his personality was the fact that he is a populist leader who has always expressed strong and relentless concerns regarding issues of nationalism, democracy, and the relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia.9

Despite his official position as a leader of NU, an organization with about 40 million members, Wahid was seen as a leading proponent of secular democracy in the country. His views were often more nationalist than they were explicitly Islamic.10 He strongly envisioned the establishment of a civil democratic society in Indonesia where all citizens could enjoy equal rights regardless of their religious views, race, or other

5“Abdurrahman Wahid: Southeast Asia History, Biographies,” http://reference.allrefer.com/encyclopedia/ W/WahidA.html: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005. 6 “Profile Abdurrahman Wahid,” ibid. 7 “Indonesian Election Triggers Violence,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4 80232. stm: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005. 8 Barton, op. cit. 9 Sukma, 2003, op.cit: 118. 10 Ramage, 1995, op.cit: 49, ibid.

146 origins.11 Directly after his election as president, he guaranteed that the nature of Indonesia as a Pancasila state, as the basis for the development of democratic pluralism and religious tolerance, would remain unchanged. In his idealism, he was trying to look for a political future of greater democratization with less military influence and no Islamic fundamentalism.

With one foot in the traditional world of Javanese mysticism and the other in the modern world of globalization, Wahid governed the country. A dukun (a Javanese soothsayer) who habitually accompanied Wahid was able to see the ”big man,” the spirit of Soeharto, standing in the doorway at the top of the steps. This dukun conducted a prayer ritual before Indonesia’s fourth President entered the palace where he would now work and live. He and his family waited for the soothsayer to finish his prayer ritual to banish the black power of Soeharto, who was trying to hurt them, before they began their time in this important and historical place.12

I.B. Military Position to Wahid’s Election

While Wahid had medical problems which left him with physical handicaps, he was still an extremely popular figure when he was elected in the 1999 MPR special session by opponents of Megawati. He was initially hailed as an alternative reformer, who could heal deep national wounds from decades of Soeharto’s oppression and corruption. It is of no lesser importance that his victory resulted from the transfer of Gen. Wiranto’s support from Habibie to himself during the presidential election, causing the TNI/Police faction, the new name for the military or the armed forces (ABRI) faction, in MPR to vote for him.13

Just a few minutes before the election, it is likely that the military sent an important message to supporters of Megawati not to push for the election of Megawati. At that moment, thousands of pro-Megawati demonstrators had converged on Jakarta’s main traffic junction, in front of Hotel Indonesia. This was also outside the 1999 MPR assembly, where members were waiting to vote for their presidential candidates. The message became clear soon after voting commenced --an explosion tore through the crowd injuring several PDIP supporters.14 For the Wahid camp, the bomb explosion would also be understandable as a crucial message not to stop thinking about the military’s role in this election. This also meant that the new president had to take into

11 Abdurrahman Wahid, Islam, Negara, dan Demokrasi (Islam, State, and Democracy), Jakarta: Erlang-ga, 1999: 101; Sukma, 2003, op.cit. 12 Terry McCarthy, “Democrat...or Boss?” Time, Search Time.com, July 09, 2000. 13 Mietzner, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc.cit: 53. 14 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 317.

147 account that the military was the main guarantor of the country’s stability and the future of his administration.15

Therefore, it seems that Wiranto’s entire TNI/Police faction backed Wahid in the presidential elections. Being aware of the military’s deep involvement in the long history of Indonesia, Wahid was of the opinion that a proposal for military reforms would be unpopular.16 More importantly, it would be difficult to implement such reforms because the country had to break free from its centuries-old legacy of civil-military relations infuenced by the political culture of the dominant ethnic group, namely the Javanese, who preserved the ruler’s law and culture of violence.17

I.C. Wahid and His Reform Policies

Over a period of 1 year and 9 months (from October 1999 until June 2001), the Wahid government produced fifty-one laws together with the DPR, making it more productive than the previous regime of Habibie.18 Most of the laws were about the formation of new provinces, municipalities, or cities, connected with the regime’s interest in responding to the public’s push for greater autonomy. Of fifty-one laws, there were three important laws concerning political reform and human rights protection, namely the amending Law No. 7/1999 on elections, the Law on Labour Unions, and the Law on the Human Rights Court. Anticipating that the 1999 Human Rights Act (Law No. 39/1999) would frustrate the international community’s demand for the trials of those responsible for East Timor violations, the Wahid government passed a new bill on human rights courts. This became Law No. 26/2000 and it specified a wider range of offences and provided for retroactive prosecutions. The law, adopted in November 2000, extended the coverage of internationally recognised human rights abuses.

Wahid’s commitment to reform (or reformasi) could also be seen in his support for MPR decrees (Ketetapan MPR --TAP MPR) and laws (Undang-undang --UU). The first important step, initiated already before Wahid came to power, was the drafting of MPR Decree No. 11/1998 on the creation of clean governance free from the practices of KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme --corruption, collusion and nepotism). This decree clearly mandated the investigation of accusations of KKN cases involving Soeharto, his family, and cronies in seven state charity foundations (Supersemar, Dharmais, Dakab, Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila, Dana Mandiri, Dana Gotong Royong Kemanusiaan, and

15 Joe Havely, “Analysis: New hope for Indonesia?”, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/481548.stm: 1-4, was accessed on 29 October 2005. 16 Abdurrahman Wahid was interviewed on October 14, 2006, in Jakarta. 17 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 403. 18 Dephumham, http://www.legalitas.org, was accessed on June 11, 2009.

148 Trikora). These crimes caused state losses of Rp. 1.4 trillion. The second step was MPR Decree No. 6/2000 on the separation of TNI and the police, and MPR Decree No. 7/2000, which stipulated the role of TNI and the police. This was part of the reposition policy of the military institution, because after more than three decades it had become so powerful and enjoyed many priveledges given by the state. Likewise, Wahid wanted the withdrawal of the Special MPR Decree No. 25/1966, which banned the spread of communism, but his effort was blocked by conservative factions including the military and Islamist parties in MPR.

Furthermore, Wahid followed up on MPR Decree No 11/1998 by supporting the making of Law No. 28/1999 on clean governance free from the practices of the KKN. He also initiated the creation of Law No. 21/2001 on special autonomy for the Irian Jaya province, which was to help settle the gap between the regional and central governments. The law gave Irian Jaya special status in regards to its law, economy, and politics under the unitary state of Indonesia (NKRI) to prevent it from further separatist acts.19 Last but not least, he encouraged the creation of Presidential Instruction (Instruksi Presiden or Inpres) No. 9/2000 on mainstreaming gender for the acceleration of equality and justice for women. During his first days, he made important decisions such as to empty Indonesia’s jails of political prisoners, namely the leftist radicals such as PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokratik --People's Democratic Party) activists and PKI sympathisants who still detained under Habibie, and to promise more decentralization of governmental authority.

I.D. Wahid and Security Sector Reform

During the 1999-2000 period, 1 year after Wahid took office, Indonesia achieved a modest economic recovery during which economic growth reportedly took hold. GDP expanded by 4.9 percent in 2000 from 0.8 percent in 1999, which improved expenditure and industrial origin or sectors and surpassed the government’s projection of 3-4 percent GDP for 2000. Unlike in 1999, when exports weakened and imports collapsed, in 2000, there was strong growth in either exports or imports. In addition, the open unemployment rate decreased slightly from 6.4 to 6.1 percent and GNP per capita during 1999-2000 rose from 1.3 to 1.5 percent.20 Nevertheless, Indonesia’s economic recovery was still very much under the tutelage of the IMF and World Bank.

19 “Pusat Diminta Hormati Otsus Papua” (”Central Government Was Demanded to Respect Papua’s Special Autonomy”), http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2005/11/26/Utama/ut01. htm: 1-2. 20 Laporan Perekonomian Indonesia 2002 (Report on Indonesia’s Economy 2002), Bank Indonesia, 2003: 28, 37.

149 Shortly after his election, President Wahid introduced a series of measures to establish civilian control over the military, and to curb the military. He made clear that he supported TNI reform, which resulted in important repercussions within the officer corps. His moves certainly posed a direct threat to the institutional interests of the TNI and the personal interests of senior officers, as he simultaneously allocated only 2.96 percent of the state budget (APBN) to the defence sector in 2000, or around 1.1 percent of Indonesia’s GDP. This was a sharp decrease compared to 1999, when it reached 5.31 percent and to the budget he gave to the educational sector, which equalled 4.26 percent. Likewise, in 2001, he provided 3.79 percent of the state budget for the defence sector, a slight increase compared to 2000, and still much lower than the budget he allocated for the educational sector - 4.69 percent.21

Importantly, for the first time since the 1950s, a civilian, Juwono Sudarsono, was appointed as Minister of Defence. Also, in the past military officers never spoke about civilian supremacy, but now it had become part of the vocabulary of senior officers.22 Not surprisingly, Wahid first forced Gen. Wiranto to resign from military command, and later from the TNI, after being named in connection with gross human rights abuses in East Timor. Following this, a major reshuffling of top military appointments occured, favouring officers considered loyal to the president and supportive of democratic reform.23 Wahid, for instance, promoted Agus Wirahadikusumah, a progressive figure, who became Kostrad (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat --Army's Strategic Reserves Command) commander to replace Djaja Suparman, an anti-reform general.

Later, Wahid supported devolution of power by implementing Law No. 22/1999 on regional government and Law No. 25/1999 on the balanced financial regulation of the central-regional governments passed under Habibie which markedly increased regional autonomy and challenged the military’s territorial function. Accordingly, the local parliament received the power to terminate business agreements that only benefited the companies supported by the military, which mostly operated in important sectors such as the fishery, forestry, and mining sectors. The decentralization scheme obviously caused a significant loss of power for the TNI, which would have been even higher, had active officers holding civilian positions in the regional governments been forced to resign from the military prior to expiry of their term. In the past, TNI officers were usually governors of the richest provinces with budgets exceeding Rp. 250 billions (US$ 25 million) annually.24 In line with this, Wahid demanded that the TNI diminish its territorial function by pushing it to dissolve regional commands in Aceh and Maluku in order to decrease tensions, violence, and incidents, which often led to human rights abuses.

21 Zulfahmi, 2006, loc.cit: 15; Widoyoko, 2005, loc. cit. 22 Crouch, in Johannen and Gomez (eds.), 2001, loc.cit: 178. 23 Eldridge, 2002, op. cit: 138. 24 Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher (eds.), 2005, loc.cit: 79.

150 In a surprise move on March 8, 2000, he signed two new Presidential decrees. One eliminated Bakorstanas (Badan Kordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional -- Coordinating Board for National Stability Strengthening Assistance, an extra- constitutional body to control state stability), and another stopping Litsus (Penelitian Khusus --special background check). The removal of Bakorstanas caused a loss of jobs for 271 colonels and three generals. The annulment of Litsus would no longer allow the TNI to reject the appointment of civilians deemed to have “unclean” backgrounds, and, hence, to justify the continued appointments of military personnel in the civil service.25

In another surprise move in March 2000, Wahid reportedly mentioned that the notorious Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus --Army’s Special Forces) would be sharply reduced. Honna said that this was part of radical reform initiatives26 and that the numbers would go from about 6,000 troops to a little over 5,000. This was a decrease from the preliminary proposal to radically reduce the troops by 700 hundred personnel within 1 year in order to avoid resistance from inside the unit.27 Nonetheless, Kopassus commander Maj. Gen. Sjahrir clarified that he has not yet received orders to carry out the reduction, and there has been no further reporting on the issue, and the result was still unclear.28

Simultaneously, Wahid announced plans to implement the enlargement of combat forces in all three-service branches, namely, the navy, air force, and the army, and especially Kostrad. This was, in part, an attempt to relieve TNI over the changing status of civil-military relations, as well as an issue of providing jobs for surplus officers. Previously, in December 1999, Wahid had announced and promised a 62 percent rise in the military budget from Rp. 11.6 trillion to Rp. 18.9 trillion per year, with Rp. 9.12 trillion reserved for equipment and Rp. 5.45 trillion for soldier salaries.29 However, overall, the vast majority of the above announced changes in the TNI organization and strength had not been implemented.

By May 2000, Wahid’s civilian minister of defense, Juwono Sudarsono, announced plans to eliminate the position of chief commander (Panglima TNI) and changed it with a chief of the joint staffs (Kepala Staf Gabungan --Kasgab TNI). According to the proposal, the new position would no longer carry ministerial rank, but be placed under the minister of defense. It had been also proposed that the position of

25 See “Kelompok Cilangkap Dominan” (“Cilangkap Group Still Dominant”), Media Indonesia, June 11, 2000. 26 See Honna, 2003, op.cit: 180-182. 27 “Personel Kopassus Akan Dirampingkan (“Kopassus Personnel Will be Trimmed”), Suara Merdeka, March 21, 2000. 28 The Editors, Indonesia, 2000, op.cit: 134. 29 “Anggaran Militer Naik 62%” (“Military Budget Increases 62%”), TNI Watch!, December 15, 1999, ibid: 135.

151 Kasgab TNI be revolved among the three service branches at regular 3-year periods, but the plans showed no progress. On the other hand, on July 1, 2000, the national police was separated from the TNI and placed directly under the president’s control, which meant a loss of budget for the military.

Since the reform movement began, the quantity of officers who held the gubernatorial and mayoral positions had been gradually reducing. Based on the data from 2001, out of thirty-one provinces and 337 municipalities, the number of military governors and majors is seventeen (54.83 percent) and 123 (36.49 percent), respectively. These were slightly lower proportionately compared to the data of 1999 when out of twenty-six provinces and 316 municipalities, fifteen (57.69 percent) and 116 (36.70 percent) of the similar positions were occupied by military officers.30

Compared to Habibie, Wahid more progressively pushed the reposition of the TNI in order to rapidly increase military professionalism and establish civilian supremacy. As argued by T. Hari Prihatono, chairperson of Propatria, an NGO focused on security sector reforms, Wahid tried to establish civilian supremacy and encourage the military to obey civilian leaders.31 His commitment to military reform was also acknowledged by Effendy Choirie, a close aide of his in PKB. Specifically explained during an interview, President Wahid wanted the military only as a defense force because his NU had always been a victim of TNI’s dual function.32 His moves to promote pro-reform officers to strategic positions, i.e. Wirahadikusumah as Pangkostrad (Panglima Kostrad --Kostrad Commander), Saurip Kadi as Aster (Asisten Teritorial --Territorial Assistant), and Simbolon as Kasdam Jaya (Kepala Staf Kodam Jaya --Chief of Staff of Jakarta Regional Commander), were applauded by the reform movement.33 Simbolon had even been promoted as Kopassus commander, though not successfully, due to the resistance of Wahid’s opponents inside the army.

Likewise, his new civilian minister of defense, Mahfud MD, who replaced Juwono due to his illness, noted that Wahid had broken the long tradition established since the military was founded in 1945 by accepting for the first time a navy officer (an admiral) to become chief commander. This is the person who, on April 20, 2000 in a TNI leaders meeting (Rapat Pimpinan or Rapim), had promised to bring the military out of their old social-political functions, focused only on their defense duties.34 Mahfud himself explained that he had replaced military officers with civilians, comprising seven of eleven first echelon positions, in his ministry. He also appointed a civilian to chair Lemhannas

30 Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher (eds.), 2005, loc.cit: 79. 31 T. Hari Prihatono was interviewed on July 13, 2006 in Jakarta. 32 Effendy Choirie was interviewed on July 11, 2006 in Jakarta. 33 See also, Honna, 2006, op.cit: 180. 34 Rusdi Marpaung (eds.), Dinamika Reformasi Sektor Keamanan (The Dynamics of Security Sector Re- form), Jakarta: Imparsial, 2005: 149.

152 (Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional --National Resilience Institute), an important institute preparing future leaders of the country, which, until the Habibie era, was still controlled by the military and directed at least by a three-star general.

In the meantime, Wahid promoted progressive officers who opposed Gen. Wiranto and his group with their ambiguous reform. The progressive officers, represented by Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah --the then newly appointed Kodam VII Wirabuana regional commander in Sulawesi-- Brig. Gen. Saurip Kadi, Brig. Gen. AA Simbolon, and Col. RR Simbolon, wanted to create a professional military focused only on external defense so that TNI would no longer be engaged in day-to-day politics whatsoever. Referring to Lieuwen,35 in this regard, Wirahadikusumah and his friends could be classified as young officers who were the underminers of traditional institutions, and who were against senior officers whose ideal was stability, and who, as its defenders, disfavoured political experimentation.

On December 13, 1999, Wirahadikusumah presented his reform agenda in a paper entitled “Redefining, Repositioning, and Reactualising the Military in the Life of the Nation” before the DPR Committee 1 (Komisi 1), Sub-Committee on Defense, without previously consulting his seniors in TNI headquarters. In his surprising proposal, he suggested a reduction of Kodam numbers throughout the country, which was against the proposal of the main leaders of the army who wanted to add garrison commands at the provincial levels in the near future. For this reason, TNI spokesperson, Maj. Gen. Sudrajat, commented on Wirahadikusumah’s agenda as a violation of the code of ethics of officers.36

His view on the territorial structure was the most important of all changes he suggested because this would implicate many aspects. Since 1945, through the territorial command, TNI conducted their political role on a daily basis, similar to the Dutch colonial military structure. Here, military posts or personnel were placed at every rank of civilian bureaucracy, from the provincial capital (Kodam or Komando Daerah Militer -- military regional command) down to the village (Babinsa or Bintara Pembina Desa -- lowest post at village level in order to control civilian political activities at the grassroots) level. For a long-time, both officers and ordinary soldiers considered territorial command posts as the most enviable job in the military, largely since it offered abundant chances to generate individual affluence. In contrast, Wirahadikusumah was of the view that the territorial command was exactly what was impeding democratization due to their

35 Lieuwen, 1965, op. cit: 126-127. 36 “Ekspresi Kemarahan Angkatan 1973”, TNI Watch! [email protected], December 21, 1999.

153 existence as a means of domination, control, and political manipulation; thus, it should be curbed if the country chose to campaign for a new and more democratic future.37

Since his appointment as Pangkostrad, Wirahadikusumah suggested that the two lowest layers of the territorial command at the village and sub-district level be removed. Through his associate, Saurip, then assistant for territorial affairs at army headquarters, he ran a project aimed at the withdrawal of 33,000 military personnel from the lowest (village or community) level, namely, Babinsa. They were planned to be concentrated at the district levels or Kodim (Komando Distrik Militer --Military District Command) where they would have received training as members of regional defense units.38

Therefore, by April 2000, there was an experimental removal of military personnel posted at the village level (Bintara Pembina Desa or Babinsa) and subdistrict level (Koramil or Komando Rayon Militer --Military Subdistrict Command) in the Kodam Jayakarta and Kodam V Brawijaya regional commands. However, there had not been any reporting on their actual liquidation. Instead, it appeared that the Babinsa and Koramil had simply been repositioned as part of the local Kodim.

At this point, he was ready to eliminate numerous businesses run by TNI’s various “charitable foundations” and by individual units and officers, which had been used as a financial conduit of the territorial commands, but the benefits of which have been flowing more to the individual officers running the businesses rather than the military as an institution. He could not also excuse the practice of backing or racketeering in the discotheques, brothels, and narcotics businesses. As pointed out by Choirie, Wahid’s main political adviser, what Wirahadikusumah actually wanted to do was to root out the practice of dual function to help the military focus on defense matters, changing them into professional soldiers.39 Through the promotion of Wirahadikusumah and his allies, conservative generals anticipated that Wahid would immediately launch comprehensive40 and progressive military reforms41 which would have severely affected the TNI and their careers.

Therefore, conflict of interests emerged between hardliners and softliners, or maximalists and moderates, or between those who were ready to take risks and those who did not want to confront risks. Different social backgrounds and socialization histories of the pro-reform officers --Wirahadikusumah, for instance, pursued higher education in the US after completing his military academy, and was concerned about the civil-military relationship-- led to their different perceptions and preferences on the military’s role in

37 ”I’m Just Anticipating Change Earlier than the Others”, Van Zorge Report, January 7, 2000. 38 Mietzner, 2006, op. cit: 73. 39 Effendy Choirie was interviewed on July 11, 2006 in Jakarta. 40 Ikrar Nusa Bhakti was interviewed on May 15, 2006 in LIPI, Jakarta. 41 Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono, was interviewed on July 17, 2009 in Jakarta.

154 Indonesia. They were aware of the consequences of violating TNI’s old values and were willing to pay the price of sanctions being applied in the institution.

I.E. Military Response to Wahid’s Reform Policies

In the history of pre-modern Indonesia (the Javanese kingdom era), soldiers played important roles that could not be separated from the activities of kings, their families, and palaces (keraton). Likewise, in traditional Javanese society, soldiers had a good image and became a class that was deserving prestigious positions. At the beginning of Soeharto’s New Order in the mid-1960s, the proportion of Javanese in the military was 66 percent. Within 10 years (1977), it increased to 74 percent, and eventually reached 80 percent in the next 5 years (1982).42 This means that, with a proportion of only 41 percent of the entire Indonesian population,43 the Javanese contributed two-thirds to the troop’s manpower in the late 1990s.

The following figures reveal more specifically the ethnic composition of the TNI. The data cover officers who were posted in the central army elite, or were considered to possess key posts in the army, naval, or air force:

Table 2 Ethnical-Regional Distribution of the Central Army Elite

Ethnic Groups Number of Officers Javanese 33 Sundanese 4 Toba Batak 3 Minangkabau 2 Balinese 2 Madurese 2 Ambonese 1 Menadonese 1 West Timorese 1

42 David Brown,”The State of Ethnicity and the Ethnicity of the State: Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia,” in Ethnic and Racial Studies, No. 1, 1989: 69. 43 BPS, http://www.bps.go.id, November 21, 2000.

155 Banjarese 1 Karo Batak 1 Bugis-Makasarese 1 Morotai 1 Unknown 7 TOTAL 60 Source: The Editors, Indonesia, April 1999: 134

Therefore, the above figures disclosed that Javanese held 50 percent of positions in the central army elite.

Within the army, the composition of army officers based on their ethnical background during the last one-decade was as follows:

Table 3 Ethnical Background of Army Officers 1990-2000

Ethnic Groups Number of Officers Javanese 6,311 Sundanese 1,505 Batak 802 Bali 286 Padang 243 Palembang 170 Aceh 140 Bugis 124 Minahasa 115 Makassar 110 Ambon 70 Betawi 53 Melayu 45

156 Madurese 29 Irian 26 Timor 26 Banjar 23 Dayak 11 Source: Zen, 2004: 131-132 (modified)

The above data illustrate that in the 1990-2000 period about 63 percent of the high- ranking army officers were Javanese by ethnic background. Since the army was the main branch which mostly exercised the military’s dual function role, it can be said here that dwifungsi was basically a Javanese phenomenon.

In more detail, the figure below presents the ethnic background of the army officers that had been endorsed to become brigadier generals in the decade between 1990 and 2000:

Table 4 Ethnic Background of Army Officers Promoted to Brig. Gen. 1990-2000

Ethnic Groups Number of Officers Javanese 378 Sundanese 93 Batak 48* Minang 42 Minahasa 21** Aceh 16 Palembang 16 Bugis 15 Bali 14 Banjar 9 Madurese 8 Melayu 8

157 Ambon 6 Makassar 6 Toraja 4 Timor 3 Notes: * + 2 from Tapanuli and 1 from North Sumatera. **+ 3 from Sangir Talaud and 1 from North Sulawesi. Source: Zen, 2004: 133-134 (modified)

Again, the data above showed that around 55 percent Javanese of total ethnic background had been promoted from senior middle rank-officers to much higher positons, namely, brigadier generals. Since the position of generals was much more important than other lower ranks, it can be concluded here that the Javanese generals dominated the policy or decision-making process in the army, especially, on matters of the military’s dual function. This means that, until Wahid assumed the presidency, the majority of generals in the army were Javanese. In other words, the Javanese generals held more important positions, particularly in the decision-making process than any other ethnic group in the army, as well as the military as a whole, for the reason that the army soldiers were always the overwhelming majority in the Indonesian military.

The proportions of the contribution that indicated the Javanese domination in the composition and main structure of TNI institutions were certainly an interesting fact for those who probably never saw similar facts in other countries. It was, therefore, reasonable for Wessel to comment that “No serious observer of Indonesia can overlook the fact that Javanese domination of government offices and army leadership exceeds its proportional share in relation to the population of Indonesia.”44

Importantly, Javanese dominance in the armed forces had been reinforced by the domination of the Javanese ethnic group in government and politics in general. As stated by Brown, the above data indicated that the promotion process in the military was ethnically selective. This means that Javanese leaders, either for security reasons or “primordial affiliation” had tended to favour their fellow Javanese in recruitment and promotion.45 Likewise, decisions for implementing military reform would be strongly influenced by those military leaders who held key positions.

44 Ingrid Wessel, “State Nationalism in Present Indonesia,” in Wessel (eds.), Nationalism and Ethnicity in Southeast Asia, Berliner-Asien-Afrika-Studien, 4/2, Muenster/Hamburg, 1994, 40-41. 45 Brown, 1989, loc.cit.

158 That is why Kusnanto Anggoro, a security and political analyst from Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and a lecturer of the Indonesian military command school (Sekolah Komando --Sesko), said that constraints for military reform laid in the norms and values which TNI soldiers inherited from generation to generation which essentially have not yet changed until recently.46 Effendy Choirie, Wahid’s main political adviser who was also a member of the Subcommittee of Defense of Committe I (Komisi I) of the parliament, stated that conservative officers were reluctant to reform, and always justified their claims on the important role of the military in the country’s history.47

In fact, military leaders under Wahid, such as chief commander Gen. Wiranto and army chief Gen. Tyasno, expressed their worries on the amendments of the 1945 State Constitution which implicated the position of the military in the newly emerging democracy. They were of the opinion that the amendments would give a chance for the emergence of old conflicts as happened in the 1950s during the liberal democracy era. That time period had damaged national unity and the military’s dual function, which had existed since 1945, and which led the country to disintegration.48 Therefore, military leaders still took the view that the 1945 State Constitution is sacrosanct and is not necessary to be amended for the sake of preserving NKRI.49

Similarly, Lt. Gen. Ryamizard, the new Kostrad commander, a hardliner or anti- reform figure who replaced Wirahadikusumah, stated that to understand TNI, one needed to learn the country’s history because it was born in a particular period of history that made it unique and highly relevant in national politics.50 Moreover, TNI’s conservative leaders still cited that the TNI army was originated from the people, and that it was established to undertake a national liberation struggle. They always justified this by stating that this was what has placed it apart from many other armies elsewhere. Moreover, they said that TNI was not even founded by the political leadership but self- established by the nationalist youths to defend the dignity of the nation. In view of these origins, TNI perceived itself as being equal to civilians.51 Thus, referring to Perlmutter’s analysis,52 the founding of the country and the formation of the military in the past still influenced the new civil-military relationship that was being built by Wahid, a civilian president. Thus, for nostalgic soldiers still celebrating the revolutionary days the

46 Kusnanto Anggoro was interviewed on October 11, 2006 in Jakarta. 47 Effendy Chorie was interviewed on July 11, 2006 in Jakarta. 48 “Amandemen Jangan Digagas Politisi” (“Amendments May Not be Proposed by Politician”), Harian Kompas, Maret 22, 2007: 1;”Tyasno: Amandemen UUD’45 Tidak Sah” (“Tyasno: The Amendments of the 1945 Constitution Not Legitimate”), Suara Pembaruan, September 21, 2006: 2. 49 See also, Sebastan, 2006, op.cit: 47. 50 Lt. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu was interviewed on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta. 51 Bilveer Singh, Ryamizard --in the Footsteps of Gajah Mada, Sydney: Book House, 2005: 43. 52 See Perlmutter and Bennet (eds.), 1980.

159 transition became difficult. In other words, TNI still wanted to justify its civil function on the basis of the revolutionary experience, a point also stressed by Maynard.53

In reality, Wahid’s announcement of military reorganization and the sidelining of several allies of Wiranto had implications for his support in parliament and in the party. Matori Abdul Djalil, PKB chairperson and MPR deputy speaker, had become a target of an assassination attempt on March 5, 2000, after being stabbed by two assailants suspected of acting under orders of military elements.54 The attack happened days after the announcement of a military reshuffle. The putative reason behind the attack was that Matori had advised Wahid on whom to promote, and enthusiastically suggested a total change of military leadership in order to promote true reformers.55 The PKB chairperson was a key go-between with army generals to secure their support before the President's successful purge of former TNI chief commander General Wiranto and his followers. He had secretly met Lt. Gen.Tyasno Sudarto and Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah at the Borobudur Hotel the year before and the two agreed to support the President. Immediately afterwards, in early December 1999, Tyasno, previously a Wiranto supporter, was promoted to the army's top post of chief-of-staff from his position as deputy chief. Meanwhile, Wirahadikusumah, who had a well-established reputation as an army reformer, then began an unprecedented public sniping campaign against Gen. Wiranto and criticized the army's role in politics and its endemic corruption. He was rewarded with a promotion to the army’s top combat command, the chief of the Kostrad. Matori was also influential in choosing Adm. Widodo Adisucipto to take command of TNI. President Wahid accepted his advice to choose Widodo over Wiranto’s preferred candidate, who became the deputy.56

Police, describing the Matori attack as a random act of violence and not likely an assassination or intimidation attempt, failed again to convince the public. Mass media had reported that there were two men on a motorcycle who attacked him in front of his home, in an exclusive house compound equipped with internal security in South Jakarta, as Matori was returning from jogging.57 A further police statement claimed that the attacker was a member of Angkatan Mujahiddin Islam Nusantara group (AMIN), the obscure radical Muslim organization that had been previously declared by the police as the

53 See Maynard, in Perlmutter and Bennet (eds.), 1980, ibid. 54 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 367. 55 ”Siapa Bohir Proyek Pembunuhan Matori,” (”Who Was Behind the Killing Attempt of Matori”), Koran Kontan, March 13, 2000. 56 Effendy Chorie, Wahid’s close associate in the parliament, interviewed by Jakarta's Forum news magazine, see Tim Dodd, “Stabbing Triggers Alarm for Wahid's Rule,” Australian Financial Review, March 7, 2000. 57 “Leader of Gus Dur's Party Stabbed.” The Straits Times, http://straitstimes.asial.com.sg/asia/sea1_03- 06.html, March 6, 2000.

160 perpetrator of the 1999 Al-Istiqlal mosque bombing.58 Although the statement said that several members of AMIN attacked Matori with a machete,59 few believed that AMIN existed. Moreover, the attacker’s identity was later found as a thug of a small market in East Jakarta, and without evidence of a religious fundamentalism. More importantly, although the police authorities had sufficient evidence, they never arrested the alleged perpetrators.60 An independent and critical information source, Siar, cited the connection of the military with the attack, and, in particular, suspected the role of the ex-Kostrad commander who was supposedly humiliated by his sudden replacement with Wirahadikusumah.61

Other events that could be obviously linked to the military’s reaction to Wahid’s plans for military reorganization and further security sector reforms were the emergence of serial bombings and new unrest simultaneously throughout the country, namely, Jakarta, Central and East Java, Aceh, West and Central Kalimantan, Poso, Lombok, West Timor, Maluku, and Irian Jaya. Military elements were further suspected in inciting political elites in provinces such as Bengkulu and Makassar to resist the Wahid government. For this reason, Wahid later warned that military elements were organizing parallel campaigns on a larger scale. Commenting on the new riots in Lombok, the president further said that there was great frustration of TNI officers, whose power was vehemently being questioned.62 It was clear at the time that his relationship with TNI rapidly worsened due to his tendency to interfere in the internal affairs of the institution.63 Wahid’s indisposition to protect military domestic interests led to TNI’s defiance of his presidency, which harmed his efforts to build civilian supremacy.

Military resistance to Wahid further crystallized in their maneuvers against the promotion of reform-minded generals. Prior to this, Wiranto had made a comprehensive reshuffle of personnel and recommended a conservative civilian minister of defense, Juwono Sudarsono. Wiranto had, moreover, successfully used his TNI/Police faction in MPR to exert his influence on the amendments of the 1945 Constitution, especially Chapter XII, Article 30 (2), the Second Amendment to the 1945 State Constitution. These interventions preserved TNI’s strong position in the country’s traditional concept of sistem pertahanan dan keamanan rakyat semesta (total defense and security system). At the same time, the military could maintain its strategic position which subordinated it to the president and not the minister of defense. Due to this arrangement, Mahfud M.D,

58 See again, Waluyo, 2007, loc.cit: 123. 59 “Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing,” ICG Asia Re- port No. 92, Singapote/Brussels, 2005: 26. 60 Ibid. 61 ”Penganiayaan Matori: Kelompok Radikal dan Djaja Terlibat,” (“Matori Assault: Radical Group and Djaja Suspected Involved”), SiaR-Xpos, SiaR News Service, [email protected], March 11, 2000. 62 Richard Lloyd Parry,”Dark Forces Strikes Lombok,” The Independent, January 23, 2000. 63 Sukma, 2003, op. cit: 124.

161 Juwono’s successor and Wahid’s pro-reform aide, failed in his plans to place the new chief commander, Adm. Widodo, under his authority. The amending clause of the constitution had supposedly been manipulated by Widodo to derail Mahfud’s agenda of implementing civilian supremacy.64

Saurip,65 a reformist general and Wirahadikusumah’s associate, admitted that President Wahid could not push for further military reforms because TNI was still under Wiranto’s and his allies’ control. As a result, Wahid and the reformist generals failed in developing stable civilian supremacy and sending the military back to the barracks. As far as the reformist generals were concerned, the campaign for a comprehensive security sector reform cost them their current posts in TNI.66 Saurip, for instance, was transferred to a less important post as a staff in the TNI headquarters until he retired. Moreover, President Wahid could no longer retain Wirahadikusumah as Kostrad commander because the reformist general’s policy of auditing the Kostrad budget had brought him at loggerheads with powerful TNI figures, particularly Wiranto and Sutarto, and all territorial commanders.67

Wirahadikusumah had discharged two of his staff in Kostrad due to their involvement in financial misconduct, invited public accountants to investigate the case and disclosed the internal corruption to the mass-media. The accusation of abusing about USD 20 million from Kostrad enterprises during the time of Djaja, his predecessor, had drawn angry reactions from Wiranto, Widodo, and Djaja.68 To reduce tension, and in an attempt to initiate compromise with the current military leadership, President Wahid abandoned his agenda of reforming TNI’s territorial command structure, and his more conciliatory stance towards separatist activities, and subsequently allowed security crackdowns both in Aceh and Papua.69

The military demonstrated even stronger resistance in May 2001, when its leaders, primarily army chief, Gen. Sutarto, declined to support Wahid’s plan to issue a presidential decree on state emergency, which was needed to retain control over the deteriorating political and security situation. Because of this insubordination,70 Wahid tried to substitute Gen. Sutarto with Lt. Gen. Wirahadikusumah, and promote a Christian

64 Mahfud MD was interviewed on January 9, 2007 in Jakarta. 65 Maj Gen. Saurip Kadi was interviewed on November 8, 2006 in Jakarta. 66 Ibid; see also, Honna, 2003, op.cit: 183. 67 Abdurrahman Wahid was interviewed on October 14, 2006 in Jakarta. 68 Koran Jawa Pos, July 15, 2000, cited in Honna, 2003, op.cit: 183. 69 Marcus Mietzner, “The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationa- lism, and Institutional Resistance,” Washington DC, East-West Center, 2006: 34. 70 In a talkshow (“Kick Andy”) with Andi Noya in Metro TV on March 7, 2008, again, Wahid mentioned Gen. Sutarto’s behavior at that time as insubordination.

162 general, Lt. Gen. Lumintang, to become TNI deputy commander.71 He also wanted to promote Gen. Sudarto to replace Adm. Widodo as chief commander. However, he failed to carry out these plans, even to promote Lumintang, due to the resistance of military elites.72 One of these was Gen. Agum Gumelar, the new coordinating minister for political and security affairs, who was just appointed to replace Gen. Yudhoyono after the latter’s earlier insubordination to Wahid’s plan to declare a state emergency.

Wahid’s maneuvers to replace the conservative with reformist generals that affected many officers73 produced abundant resistance from his opponents inside the military. For this reason, in the middle of May 1999, TNI’s main commanders organized a meeting in Bandung, and issued a statement to reject the president’s plans to promote reformist generals, read by Kodam IX Udayana regional commander, Maj. Gen. Willem da Costa, a Wiranto partisan. They, the eleven regional commanders, declared that TNI would not obey to what they called Wahid’s “political generals,” referring to the reformist camp in the military, which at that time was still in power. Essentially, the statement meant that if Wahid appointed reformist generals such as Wirahadikusumah and Saurip Kadi to key posts, the entire military command would openly rebel.74 Lt. Gen. Sutarto had stated that if President Wahid persisted in promoting Wirahadikusumah, there would be a very strong resistance from the ranks. He even threatened that he would leave TNI should Lt. Gen. Wirahadikusumah became his new boss.75

Apparently, conservative generals feared that with the presidential decree (Maklumat) on state emergency, Wahid would introduce radical reforms and execute a comprehensive reshuffle of TNI institution that would affect them. For this reason, Sutarto called a gathering of 200 high-ranking officers to back his statement of refusal to Wahid’s Maklumat and endorse support from all Kodam regional commanders for his army leadership.76 He was successful in obtaining support from 124 retired generals from the army, including senior generals, such as, Wiranto, Try, Hartono, and Wismoyo.

Later, under the order of the new Kostrad commander, Lt. Gen Ryamizard, the military held apel kesiagaan (an alert gathering) at the Monas square, in front of Wahid’s office, the Merdeka palace on July 22, 2001. This was open blackmail as the gathering involved two thousand soldiers, including special troops from Kopassus, the Marines and

71 Usamah Hisyam et al (eds), SBY: Sang Demokrat (SBY: The Democrat), Jakarta, Dharmapena, 2004: 529-531. 72 Yenny Zanuba, Wahid’s daughter, personal secretary and spokesperson, was interviewed on October 14, 2006 in Jakarta. 73 Abdurrahman Wahid was interviewed on October 14, 2006, in Jakarta. 74 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 399. 75 Majalah Tempo, October 15, 2000, in Honna, 2003, op, cit: 186. 76 Honna, 2003, ibid: 190.

163 Air Forces,77 and several military tanks with their cannons all directed at the presidential palace. With the gathering, the military wanted to convey that it was ready to take any measure to block President Wahid’s decision to declare a state of emergency.78 This was a parallel to the October 17, 1952 show of force which occurred at the same location and also with the guns directed on the palace.79

The October 1952 incident was followed by the discharge of Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution from his position as chief of staff of the armed forces (Kepala Staf Angkatan Bersenjata --Kasab), and it encouraged Soekarno to leave the post vacant afterwards. However, Wahid did not react in the same way, even though the show of force was continued by a military parade on several strategic roads in the capital city. With the work culture inherited from the days of the freedom struggle, the TNI apparently wanted to style themselves as the guardians of the nation and show that their loyalty was to the country and not to civilian leadership.80

Maj. Gen. Ryamizard’s statement, that the show of force was aimed at safeguarding Wahid, could hardly be more away from reality.81 It was much more likely that the move was an attempt to help the politicians in the parliament to unseat Wahid more quickly. As noted by Singh, through the show of force, Ryamizard actually would have liked to prevent Wahid’s supporters from coming from the East Java region to Jakarta to put pressure on the president’s opponents in the military and parliament. In fact, the military’s maneuvering sent strong emphatic warnings to Wahid that reform measures should proceed no further. Of course, as argued by Effendy Choirie, the roll call could not have been performed without the consent from Widodo, the chief commander.82 Some even predicted that TNI sought to trigger a nationwide unrest to justify a military takeover.83

Aside from this, TNI had reshuffled its top leadership four times. This, on the one hand, had helped the armed forces to defend themselves against Wahid’s progressive reforms. On the other hand, it had constrained him from consolidating his power and meeting his objectives in developing civilian supremacy.84 Predictably, thus, military headquarters did not back his decision to declare martial law as well as to remove the police chief, Gen. Surojo Bimantoro in June 2001. Such behavior by the military, argued

77 “Cerita di Balik Apel TNI di Monas”, (“Stories behind TNI Gathering in Monas”), Detik.com, July 23, 2001. 78 Zen, 2004, op.cit: 100. 79 See also, Honna, 2003, op.cit: 192. 80 Kuppuswamy, 2005, loc. cit. 81 Singh, 2005: 63. 82 Effendy Choirie was interviewed on July 11, 2006 in Jakarta. 83 Singh, 2005, op.cit: 63. 84 Rinakit, 2005, op.cit: 197.

164 T. Hari Prihatono, chairperson of Propatria, a NGO campaigning for Indonesia’s security sector reform, was an act of insubordination to civilian leaders, particularly, the president.85 More interestingly, the military backlash that led to Wahid’s impeachment was often seen in connection with Ryamizard’s subtle support for Wahid’s pro-military deputy, Megawati Soekarnoputeri, in her new struggle for the presidency.86 Therefore, it was noticeable that in its intervention and controlling the means of violence, TNI could perform what Lieuwen87 calls the arbiters of politics.

I.F. Ethnic Conflict in Kalimantan: Military Contestation against the Police

In 1997 and 1998, extremely violent ethnic clashes occureed in West-Kalimantan between indigenous Dayaks and migrants, from Madura, East Java. In 1999, the war between Dayaks and Madurese in the towns of Sambas and Sampit in Central Kalimantan killed hundreds of people, mostly Madurese, while thousands fled to Java when the Dayak people took revenge on the migrant group.88 Again, in early 2001, when Wahid paid a state visit to Nigeria and Sudan, such clashes suddenly erupted in the neighbouring towns of Central Kalimantan.89

A brawl, which began with a quarrel between Dayaks and Madurese in a karaoke bar near Kereng Pangi in December 15, 2000, fuelled the tensions. Within 2 months, it escalated into a violence that spread to Sampit and the capital city of Central Kalimantan, Palangka Raya,90 220 km away from the site of the original incident. In this incident, thousands of Dayaks took part in a raid against Madurese. The violence killed 469 people, among whom 456 were Madurese, according to the early March 2001 statistics,91 and destroyed thousands of homes.92 Additionally, about 108,000 Madurese fled Central Kalimantan, followed a few weeks afterwards by the entire Madurese community in the province due to fast rising violence and killings across parts of the province.93

85 T. Hari Prihatono was interviewed on July 13, 2006 in Jakarta. 86 Singh, 2005: 63. 87 Lieuwen, 1965, op. cit: 124. 88 Abdul Khalik, “Ethnic-Based Conflict Continues to Haunt West Kalimantan,” The Jakarta Post, February 28, 2008. 89 See also Sulistiyo, in Hefner (ed.), 2001, loc.cit: 304-305. 90 “Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan,” ICG Asia Report No. 18, June 27, 2001: 3-6, 19. 91 Majalah Tempo, March 11, 2001: 21, ibid. 92 Ester Indahyani Jusuf, “Item 15: Indigenous Issues,” Asian Legal Resource Centre, UNHCR, April 12, 2001. 93 Majalah Tempo 30, No. 2, March 12-18, 2001; Majalah Tempo 30, No. 7, April 16-22, 2001; “The Sampit Violence”, http://www.thejakartapost.com/editorial.asp, The Jakarta Post, February 23, 2001; Le- wa Pardomuan, “Indonesian Islanders Take Borneo Riots Lightly,” March 28, 1999, Reuters.

165 Nevertheless, Wahid, who had an NU base in Madura, offered no emotional reaction in response to the new wave of violence in Kalimantan. He had asked Madurese to restrain and behave more wisely as migrants in order to avoid new incidents and more strife. His great influence among NU’s followers in Java and Kalimantan was very helpful in easing and preventing the Madurese from taking revenge. Also, he suggested that reporters should not exaggerate the level of violence in Central Kalimantan, even though the clashes had drawn worldwide attention as international mass-media captured horrible images of mutilated corpses and decapitated bodies. Similar to Habibie, Wahid had a heavy task to settle horizontal conflicts in Kalimantan.

In fact, Wahid’s neutral stance and peaceful approach to the conflict in Kalimantan significantly reduced the tensions, which contributed to the improvement of security conditions there. The involvement of third parties, e.g. radical Muslims and the security forces had been contained due to the tireless efforts of the new Kodam VII Wirabuana reformist regional commander, Maj. Gen. Wirahadikusumah, in controlling the region. The absence of interventions from military elements at that time had not only prevented the recurrence of the riots, but also contributed to further stability in most parts of Kalimantan.

However, the fall of Wirahadikusumah and Wahid’s weaker position in the following months changed the situation. On July 5, 2000, military’s covert and psychological operations started again, and this time, Central Kalimantan became the target of the new riot. Some people dressed like Ninja, or Japanese warriors with masks and dark costumes, suddenly attacked some Muslim zones, as happened in East Java in mid-1998 and East Timor in the 1990s.94 The police could not prevent and control the clash that consequently broke out. This led to a riot and caused at least four deaths, twenty slightly wounded, and two houses burnt.95

Horizontal conflicts between the Christian Dayaks and the Muslim Madurese continued, which led refugees to flee from a large number of hot spots. Those who chose to embark on evacuation ships were compelled to pay bribes to the security forces. The rivalry between the soldiers and the police started competing to control the lucrative sale of passenger accommodation. This new chaotic situation deteriorated because of the fights between two components of the security forces in Kalimantan: the military and the police.

Not long after the separation of the police from the Indonesian military as a consequence of the reform agenda supported by Wahid and reformist generals, on February 27, 2001, a brawl caused by a quarrel over control of an evacuation ship

94 See again, for example, Ralhan, 2002, loc.cit. 95 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: Appendix 2 No. 51.

166 escalated into a fatal battle between TNI soldiers and the police.96 In this incident, a group of soldiers made intense attacks and injured two middle-ranking police officers. In an attempt of revenge, a heavily armed special police unit (Brimob --Brigade Mobile) commenced a fierce gun battle,which raged through the streets of Sampit, involving more than eighty soldiers and police troops.97 The battle killed a passer-by and a soldier, injured three more soldiers, three police personnel, and two other persons.98 The clash also destroyed dozens of buildings and vehicles in the area, including the evacuation ship provided for the displaced Madurese.

Defense minister, Mahfud M.D. was of the opinion that the military should take over control of the situation in the field from the police. However, the organizational separation of the two branches mandated by the 2000 MPR annual session (Sidang Tahunan) unexpectedly produced trouble.99 Threatened by a lessening of authority as a result of Wahid’s security sector reform, the military responded slowly to civilian moves of reinstating security in Kalimantan.

Army chief, Gen. Sutarto, complained about the separation of the police from the military after a long, secretive, and unusual meeting with all fifty-five active generals on March 1, 2001.100 Critics, nevertheless, said that the military’s concern stemmed not from the security needs of the Kalimantan inhabitants, but rather from the institutional interests of the military. Reportedly, the military had gained profits from its role in providing security services, protecting the logging, mining and plantatation companies101 since the New Order era.102 Through various foundations, it also got involved in other businesses throughout the country, particularly in resource rich regions like Kalimantan.103 Since its separation from the police, however, it no longer held a clear monopoly on coercive force, while the police, even though weaker, was beginning to perform as an adversary.

96 “Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan,” International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 18, June 27, 2001, loc.cit: 10. 97 “Salah Paham, Aparat Bentrok” (“Misunderstanding, Security Apparatus Clashed”), Banjarmasin Post, February 28, 2001. 98 ”Di Tengah Evakuasi Pengungsi Sampit, TNI dan Brimob Baku Tembak” (“Sampit Refugees Evacua- ted: TNI and Brimob Cross Fire”), Harian Kompas, February 28, 2001. 99 ”TNI Shoud be Given More Authority to Maintain Security,” The Jakarta Post, March 2, 2001. 100 Ibid. 101 “Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan,” International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 18, June 27, 2001, loc.cit: 19. 102 Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo was interviewed on June 19, 2006 in Jakarta; Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi was interviewed on November 8, 2006 in Jakarta; .Maj. Gen. Sidarto Danusubroto was interviewed on November 28, 2006 in Jakarta. 103 See, for example, Moch. Nurhasim (ed.), Praktek-praktek Bisnis Militer: Pengalaman Indonesia, Bur- ma, Filipina, dan Korut (Military Business in Practices: Lessons from Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines, and North Korea), Jakarta: The Ridep Institute, 2003; Lex Rieffei et al, Menggusur Bisnis Militer: Pem- biayaan TNI Melalui APBN (Eradicating Military Business: Financing TNI with APBN), Bandung: Mizan, 2007.

167 In reality, the deployment of troops to the new trouble spots in Central Kalimantan frightened the looting Dayaks, who were equipped only with hatchets and sickles. Because of the new wave of riots, chief commander Adm. Widodo recommended to Gen. Sutarto to strengthen the military by inceasing the number of local soldiers and sustain the army’s presence. He also suggested that military seize strategic towns such as Sampit and Palangka Raya to safeguard Madurese refugees. Meanwhile, Gen. Sutarto mentioned that if the army took action, the only available choice of action would be to shoot on sight. Nevertheless, he argued, this was unworkable because the military lacked legal authority. Therefore, he used the new strife in Central Kalimantan as a pretext to endorse “a legal umbrella,” namely, expanded military powers, so that the military could become pro- active in preserving security.104

Military passivity to stop the new horizontal conflicts drew sharp criticism. NGO activists such as Hendardi from PBHI (Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum Indonesia --The Indonesian Association for Legal Assistances) and Mufti from Kontras (Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan --The Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence) wondered how the mobs could run amok in full view of the military.105 It seemed that the prologue of the new riots in Central Kalimantan was paralleled by what had previously happened in East Timor and Maluku. Not surprisingly, in one incident, the absence of the military following the withdrawal of the police led to the slaughter of 118 Madurese and tens of thousands were forced to flee by rampaging Dayaks mobs.106 The statement of army and police officers whic said that they were

The new fighting between the indigenous Dayaks and settlers from the island of Madura broke out on March 22, 2001, near the town of Kuala Kapuas in Central Kalimantan. At least ten people were killed. Nevertheless, for almost three weeks, throughout the riots, soldiers showed their unwillingness to lend a hand. Their leaders were allegedly exploiting the ethnic and religious clashes to engage in their own objective, augmenting their political bargaining power. The role of the third parties in horizontal conflicts in Kalimantan could not be disregarded.107 Ihsan Fadlil, an ulama (religious scholar) from the largest Muslim boarding school in Bangkalan, Madura, said that he and Madurese in Bangkalan heard reports that the military was taking sides by only confiscating the weapons from the Madurese.108 In the meantime, one of the common Dayak grievances was that the police, for whatever reason, favoured Madurese and that they had not acted vigorously enough to arrest the Madurese responsible for the

104 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 396. 105 Hendardi was interviewed on January 16, 2007 in Jakarta; Mufti was interviewed on July 24, 2006 in Jakarta. 106 ”Descend Into Darkest Borneo,” The Economist, March 1, 2001; O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit. 107 Sulistiyo in Hefner (ed.), 2001, loc.cit: 303; Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003: Appendix 2 No. 43. 108 Pardomuan, 1999, loc.cit.

168 death of a Dayak at Kereng Pangi in December 15, 2000 which had incited all the conflicts in Central Kalimantan. As reported by International Crisis Group, this view of police partiality seemed confirmed when Dayaks were murdered during the 2 days of Madurese control of Sampit on February 19-20, 2001.109

I.G. Religious Conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi: Militias and Military Intelligence Operations

Riots caused by the deteriorating state of inter-religious relations reoccurred in Poso during April and May, 2000.110 The first in a series of violent incidents occurred between April 16-19, 2000. Again and quite simply, as happened during the Habibie era and in other primordial conflicts in Indonesia, a fight between drunken teenagers turned into a large-scale riot. Six people died and churches, schools, and hundreds of houses were burnt down.

After a few weeks of a lull, the conflict reignited and continued for several more weeks. The second incident broke out on May 23, 2000, spread fears and paralyzed the whole city.111 Like in previous riots, the violence was triggered by a brawl between two drunken young men of different religions. Also, similar to other places in Indonesia, such as Ketapang, Kupang, and Maluku, the growing inequality and tensions between Muslims and Christians in Poso had been exploited by third parties to create a new incident that worsened the situation. Unfortunately, it was still not clear who began the brawl that had turned it into a several-day riot.112

In addition, there was an attack by an unknown group on the Christian people who were guarding and patrolling their villages, where three persons were killed. Approximately 2,000 people fled to Poso military district (Kodim Poso), and around 500 people to Poso police resort (Polisi Resort or Polres Poso).113 Also, four people were wounded, and 267 houses and a number of public buildings and cars were burned down.114 The riots continued in Sayo from May 24-26, 2000, and rapidly spread to Tojo district (Kecamatan Tojo), where two people were killed, and at least eleven people seriously injured.

109 “Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan,” International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 18, June 27, 2001, loc.cit: 23. 110 “Rekomendasi ‘Mandul’ Pansus Poso” (“’Vain’ Recommendations of Special Committee on Poso”), Harian Kompas, July 14, 2005. 111 Ibid. 112 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: Appendix 2 No. 47. 113 “Rekomendasi ‘Mandul’ Pansus Poso” (“’Vain’ Recommendations of Special Committee on Poso”), Harian Kompas, July 14, 2005, loc.cit. 114 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: Appendix 2 No. 47.

169 After a number of small conflicts during which several churches went up in flames, Christian retaliation targeted the Muslims in Poso. It was reported that people dressing like ninjas suddenly attacked several Muslim territories.115 The so-called Barisan Kelelawar (Batmen) led by a West Timorese, Fabianus Tibo, purportedly supported by the military, was alleged of killing hundreds of people, while 30,000 refugees took refuge in neighbouring areas.116 The appearance of ninjas, comprising of paramilitary groups from other regions who had previously participated in the East Timor conflict and the Banyuwangi killings, in instigating conflict in Poso seemed to suggest that the military intended to demonstrate its resistance to the Wahid government through covert operations. According to Panji Masyarakat and The Jakarta Post, at least sixteen people, including former military officers, were allegedly involved in instigating the conflict.117 Tibo’s friend, Dominggus da Silva, and former Jamur Jaya village chief, Yulius Sebi, disclosed that they had been abducted by three military officers who wore civilian dress while investigating the previous incidents, and admitted that they were from the Pasukan Cinta Damai (Love Peace Troops). One of them was Capt. (Inf.) Agus Firman Yusmono, who promised to send back Tibo and his friends to their own home after a three-day interrogation, but they did not come home although the investigation had taken place. During the abduction, the military officers forced Tibo and his friends to take part in the Christians retaliation attacks.118

Likewise, Kodam VII Wirabuana regional commander, Maj. Gen. Slamet Kirbianto, revealed that Paulus Tungkanan, another friend of Tibo and the successor of Advent Lateka, the leader of the Pasukan Merah (Red Troop --the Christian warriors), was an ex-army soldier with first lieutenant rank. Tibo himself was only a naïve follower of the troop due to his lack of education. Unexpectedly, in October 2000, a document entitled “Military Response towards Social Conflict in Poso,” published by Yayasan Bina Warga of Central Sulawesi, accused Tibo as the mastermind of the May 2000 incidents in Poso.119 After igniting communal and separatist conflicts in other regions in Indonesia, and due to conflicts of interest with the Wahid government and the reform movement, the military apparently needed to create a plausible pretext for producing insecurity and instability in Poso. It used militias and paramilitary groups to counter pressure from the reform movement, which became more and more critical of the TNI’s involvement in conflicts.120

115 Ibid, Appendix 2 No. 48. 116 Panji Masyarakat, July 5, 2000, The Jakarta Post, July 31, 2000 and September 11, 2000. 117 Ibid; Nordholt, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), loc. cit: 50. 118 Maria Hasugian et al, “Mencari Keadilan dari Prahara Poso” (“Finding Justice from Poso Turmoil”), Majalah Tempo, April 16, 2006: 76-78. 119 Ibid: 78. 120 The political motive of the military involvement in Poso was explained in interview with Rusdi Marpa- ung and Al-Araf, human rights activists from Imparsial, on April 9, 2008, in Jakarta.

170 Civil society organizations accused the military of orchestrating the incident in Poso and criticized the unfair trial of Tibo who received the death sentence in the absence of any investigation. Similar to the Habibie era, under Wahid, the Poso conflict was sustained due to the role of security forces in producing new incidents. Since mid-April until early June 2000, at least 120 people were killed, 189 wounded,121 and about 1,000 houses damaged.122 Both Christians and Muslims therefore came to the conclusion that the military, the militias, and the jihad troops who later came mainly from Java, as well as local and Jakarta elites, were the trouble-makers.123 They wondered why there was an overwhelming presence of TNI troops, especially Kopassus, and military standard weapons in Poso.124 The Jakarta and Poso governments had never decided to send combat battalions to Poso, nonetheless, troops and army special force units were operating there. Many military standard weapons had been distributed to civilians, while the jihad troops, from the Laskar Jihad and Mujahiddin, could freely enter and leave Poso and create new incidents.

Lack of enthusiasm of TNI in preventing the actions of the militias gave rise to public suspicion that the military was organizing covert intelligence and psychological operations in order to strengthen its bargaining position vis-à-vis the civilian government.125 As noted by Umar Abduh from the Poso Centre for Democracy and Social Studies, the involvement of the military in maintaining the sectarian conflict in Poso was evidenced by an escalation of its intelligence activity in the area. Furthermore, the presence of paramilitary troops and radical Muslims was an indicator of the military’s intelligence work in an attempt to instigate religious strife.126 This may explain why bombs exploded, people were mysteriously shot dead, and many others living in remote areas intimidated.

Also Aditjondro states that elements of both the military and religious radicals often become involved in the outbreak of vertical and horizontal conflicts in post-Soe- harto Indonesia. The military’s special interests in Poso could, however, change from time to time, either in the political or in the economic domains. They were connected with

121 “Warga Maumere Berdoa Tolak Eksekusi Tibo Cs” (“Maumere Prayed against the Executions of Tibo cs”), Suara Pembaruan, April 3, 2006: 3. 122 Majalah Tempo 28, No. 8, April 24-30, 2000; Majalah Tempo 29, No. 15, June 12-18, 2000; “Terpi- dana Kasus Poso Diperiksa” (“Poso Convicts Prosecuted”), Media Indonesia, April 4, 2006: 6. 123 “Tokoh Agama Poso Protes Polisi (“Poso Religious Leaders Protested Police”), http://www.Kompas. com/utama/news/ 0511/25/682541-htm: 1-2, was accessed on November 25, 2005; See also, ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 10. 124 Ridwan M. Sijabat, “Political elites ‘prolonging’ Poso sectarian conflict,” The Jakarta Post, April 29, 2006: 4. 125 “Komnas HAM: Segera Adili Pelanggar HAM” (“Komnas HAM: Brings to Justice Human Rights Vio- lators”), Harian Kompas, April 27, 2006: 2; Interview with Rusdi Marpaung and Al-Araf, human rights activists from Imparsial, on April 9, 2008, in Jakarta. 126 Ibid.

171 the elections of mayors or district heads (bupati), and the provision of humanitarian aid.127 Yet, as underlined by Sydney Jones from the International Crisis Group, military interests in selling weapons and providing security services128 were merely derivative businesses of their wider interests. These were to control religious conflict in the wealthy region of Central Sulawesi in order to create a better bargaining position in their power struggle with political elites in Jakarta over security sector reform. The latter was at variance with the military’s idea to establish a new regional command in Central Sulawesi.

Incidents in Poso exacerbated the sectarian violence into lasting until December 2001.129 Wahid belatedly responded to the conflict in Poso. Only in 2001, his government began the Sintuwu Maroso Operation to bring back security and order to the region. The result was, however, ambiguous as violence and conflict easily recurred in Poso when conflicts of interest among elites in Jakarta, especially between civilian and military leaders, intensified.130 A combination of political, economic, and religious grievances exploited by the security forces, namely the military and the police, caused appalling atrocities in Poso.

I.H. The Progress of Security Sector Reform

By the time Wahid came to office in 1999, the TNI still maintained their predominantly Javanese-influenced doctrines, such as Hankamrata (Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta --total defense based on the people power), Tri Ubaya Cakti (three sacred tasks which are reflected in the Doctrine of Kekaryaan or civic action, the Doctrine of Development, the Doctrine of National Security), and Cadek (Tjatur Dharma Eka Karma --four services led by one desire). As in the past, the existence of the Hankamrata TNI combines civilian and military tasks, which contributes to blurred civil- military relations. This also applies to Tri Ubaya Cakti since it still defended the Kekaryaan Doctrine and the Doctrine of Development. Together these doctrines provided the armed forces the justification for continuously involving themselves in civilian affairs and occupying non-military posts. In accordance with this, the existence of the Cadek doctrine still reflected TNI’s unwillingness to dissociate defense and security functions,

127 Sydney Jones was interviewed on April 19, 2006, in Jakarta. 128 See also, Arianto Sangaji,”Kekerasan Poso dan Ekspansi Modal” (“Poso Violance and Capital Expan- sion”), Harian Kompas, September 12, 2006: 6. 129 “Warga Maumere Berdoa Tolak Eksekusi Tibo Cs” (“Maumere Prayed Against the Executions of Tibo cs”), Suara Pembaruan, April 3, 2006, loc.cit. 130 “Konflik Poso: Pemerintah Seharusnya Evaluasi Operasi Sintuwu Maroso” (“Poso Conflict: The Go- vernment Should Evaluate Sintuwu Maroso Operation”), Harian Kompas, March 13, 2006: 4; “Tokoh Agama Poso Protes Polisi” (“Poso Religious Leaders Protested Police”), http://www.Kompas.com/utama/ news/0511/25/ 682541-.htm: 1-2, was accessed on November 25, 2005.

172 the latter of which should actually be carried out by the police.131 No less important, both Cadek and Tri Ubaya Cakti were directly adopted from the old Javanese language which, as argued by Sebastian, “invokes in the mind of its Javanese beholder traditional notions of power.”132

Rinakit correctly noted that, compared to other internal (organizational) reforms of the military, the revision of military doctrines was still left behind. Arguably, TNI did not revise its doctrines because once it did, its role in socio-political affairs (dwifungsi) would inevitably come to an end. Due to its fear that it would no longer have any legal basis to legitimize its socio-political role, TNI retained these old doctrines.133 Referring to the important Javanese notion of satria (knight), which gave the satria roles in guarding both the palace and society, TNI officers wanted to retain their traditional roles as military commanders and political leaders. In other words, the military still wished to identify itself not only as the instrument of the state but also its protector.

Obviously, it was not easy for the military institution to change such a self- perception deeply rooted in their traditional worldview. During the era of Javanese kingdoms, besides being commanders, military officers also held such political positions as temenggung (head of the county) and adipati (mayor).134 The TNI thus strongly resisted plans to dismantle the regional commands (Kodam), regarding them as crucial for regaining their political control over society. It justified the retention of the territorial commands by persistently raising the threat of disintegration and by reminding others of their responsibility to prevent it. By issuing TNI Commander Decree No. 151/P/V/1998 on May 18, 1998, Gen. Wiranto authorized the re-establishment of seven regional commands which had been liquidated by Gen. Murdani in 1984, namely, in Aceh, Maluku, East and West Kalimantan, West Sumatera, North Sulawesi, and Nusa Tenggara.

More importantly, as explained by Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, during the long period of Soeharto’s rule (1966-1998) soldiers had been intensively indoctrinated by feudal values that strongly influenced Indonesian society. This was hadly surprising given Soeharto’s preoccupation with the Javanese style of leadership in ruling the country. This constrained TNI in redefining and repositioning itself after 1998. Therefore, Widjojo argued that TNI could not be modernized and soldiers could not be professionalized as long as the armed forces’ system of recruitment, promotion, and education was not changed. This situation, which differed markedly from the military in Western countries,

131 See Honna, 2003, op.cit: 56. 132 See Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 42. 133 Rinakit, 2005: 164-165. 134 Ibid: 145-146.

173 hampered the TNI to respect civilian supremacy and, particularly obey objective civilian control over the military.135

With this cultural disposition, the TNI recalcitrantly resisted President Wahid’s attempts to replace conservative military leaders with reformers. This becomes evident on a closer scrutiny of Gen. Wiranto’s promotion policy, the deals he was able to strike with the President when the latter sacked him and the deliberate discreditation of the reform faction in the TNI. Although Gen. Wiranto eventually obeyed when replaced by Wahid as coordinating minister of politics and security in February 2000, he did so only on the condition that Adm. Widodo, his supporter from the navy, be promoted as his successor. He also agreed to resign as coordinating minister for political and security affairs, but the concession the President had to make was the appointment of Wiranto’s loyal ally, Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, as the new minister. Several months before, he had successfully recommended a civilian with conservative views on civil-military relationships, Juwono Sudarsono, to become the minister of defense.

In November 1999 Wiranto reshuffled over 100 senior military officers136 in an apparent attempt to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the reformist forces within and outside the armed forces. Later, in February 2000, a second military reshuffle repositioned seventy-four senior officers, this time promoting reform-minded officers and replacing many Wiranto’s supporters. With Wahid’s position increasingly becoming tenuous in a deepening conflict with the legislature, he began to backpedal in his promotion of military reformers. The two other major reshuffles under his aegis --in June 2000, affecting 122 officers, and in August 2000-- increasingly shifted the balance back to the conservatives in the TNI.

Wiranto’s forced resignation and the rise of Agus Wirahadikusumah in the TNI ranks stirred increasing restiveness in the armed forces. After the Agus-Djaja dispute, rumors spread again about a planned military coup d’etat, which led to a domestic confusion.137 The rumour was an obvious warning that military elites were discontented with the presidential intervention in the military’s promotion process, an act they viewed as interference in their internal affairs, Whereas Wahid, ignoring surging military hostility, continuously made public statements about the existence of a coterie of unfaithful officers, especially among the regional (Kodam) commanders.138. The military

135 Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo was interviewed on June 19, 2006 in Jakarta. 136 The Editors, Indonesia, 2002, loc.cit: 126. 137 Ibid: 136. 138 He claimed that there were a couple of Pangdam who were gathering power to challenge his government. Later, he revealed that those military generals had, in fact, organized a meeting in a hotel to discuss plans to destabilize his government. According to various sources these statements were directed at Maj. Gen. Sudi Silalahi (Kodam V Brawijaya or East Java regional commander), Maj. Gen. Slamet Supriyadi (Kodam III Siliwangi or West Java regional commander), and Maj. Gen. Bibit Waluyo (Kodam IV Dipo-

174 conservatives hit back. In the so-called Bulakrantai document, reform-minded generals were accused of a conspirative meeting at the residence of the Kostrad commander on April 16, 2000 for devising a strategy to hasten the rise of Lt. Gen. Wirahadikusumah to the position of army chief and replacing the current Gen. Tyasno Sudarto. The four page counterfeit document, allegedly made and spread by forces loyal to Wiranto and ex- Kostrad commander Djaja, had served its goal.139

Samego, a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Science (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia or LIPI), stated that there were indications of covert intelligence operations organized by conservative military elite who were behind the distribution of the false document to stop the manoeuvres of the pro-reform generals who were behind the distribution of the false document.140 He pointed out that the the military conservativehad successfully politicized a common social event at the residence of Wirahadikusumah into a political gathering in order to bring down reformist generals who held important posts at the time, and particularly, to discredit their leader. In an interview, Maj. Gen. Saurip insisted that the gathering was no more than a traditional thanksgiving ceremony many Indonesians usually hold, which was attended by members of their families. There were no discus-sions of political issues or on planning political manoeuvres to remove TNI leaders.141

Commenting on the Bulakrantai document, Saurip further stated that there was a power struggle between conservative generals, represented by Wiranto, Sutarto, Djaja, and all eleven regional commanders, and his own group behind the spread of the false document aimed at discrediting their reform notions. Saurip stressed that the Bulakrantai document142 was actually the sort of intelligence operation repeatedly conducted in the past by TNI conservative generals as revealed by the Rachmadi and Gilchist documents143 The spread of the document, he explained, occurred soon after meetings of senior generals in Wiranto’s residence, when eleven regional commanders in Bandung agreed on the objective of preventing further military reform, in particular with a view to civilian

negoro or Central Java regional commander). See “Sejumlah Pangdam Ingin Goyang Saya” (“Several Regional Commanders Want to Challenge Me”), Banjarmasin Post, March 15, 2000; “Pangdam Jelek, Out Saja” (“Bad Regional Commanders Should Go”), Banjarmasin Post, March 18, 2000; The Editors, Indonesia, 2002, loc.cit. 139 The Editors, Indonesia, 2002, ibid: 137. 140 Indria Samego was interviewed on June 14, 2006 in Jakarta. 141 Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi was interviewed on November 8, 2006 in Jakarta. 142 Bulakrantai is the name of the street where the gathering took place. 143 The Rachmadi document was used by the military for its intelligence operation under Lt. Gen. Ali Moer-topo for the 1974 Malari affair to blame a radical Muslim group and their leader, Rachmadi. The Gilchrist document was used by the military for its intelligence operation under Lt. Gen. Soeharto for the 1965 G-30-September PKI affair to crush PKI. The document was claimed found in the residence of British Ambas-sador to Indonesia, Gilchrist, in Jakarta.

175 supremacy and the removal of TNI territorial commands throughout the country.144 Samego supported Saurip’s opinion on the conservatives’ moves to overthrow the reform faction by spreading the so-called Bulakrantai document.145

The politically engineered Bulakrantai document eventually caused the fall of Agus Wirahadikusumah and his allies, as Wahid could not defend himself and his camp due to the fast growing pressure of his opponents in TNI against him. Agus was relieved of his Kostrad command and also other reformers, like Saurip, lost their command.146 Worse, Wahid had to support Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, who was promoted to become the new Kostrad commander, and Lt. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, who was promoted as the new army chief replacing Gen. Tyasno Sudarto. The rise of military conservatives in top position of the TNI had a strong obstructive effect on the president’s options in pushing further military reform. In fact, President Wahid’s efforts to democratically reduce the military’s prerogative in the field of promotion produced strong opposition from conservative military leaders. This corresponds with Finer’s analysis who refers to several means of the military to stall reform such as formal constitutional means, intimidation, and non-cooperation threats.147 The latter two had been already been experienced earlier by Habibie. If Habibie was intimidated in his palace and residence, Wahid faced the same in front of his palace, in the form of TNI’s show of force led by Kostrad commander (Pangkostrad) Gen. Ryamizard. More significantly with regards to the military resistance, Stepan believed that the military would succeed in that crisis.148

I.I. The Military as Veto Player: End of Reform

Wahid’s effort to produce an internationally recognized law on human rights tribunals and, in particular, his interest to enact retroactive trials, was opposed by the TNI/Police faction which received support from radical Muslims and other conservative representatives from the past regime in the parliament. After a long debate, a compromise was reached which provided for special ad hoc human rights tribunals to try severe human rights abuses occurring before the new law came into force. Nevertheless, under this solution, the tribunals had to be set up in each case by the president with the approval of the DPR. This however opened the procedure to politicization. In its annual session of August 1-18, 2000, the MPR weakened the authority of human rights courts even more. In the session military and conservative factions succeeded inserting a clause in the new Article 28 (I) of the amended 1945 State Constitution, which prohibits trying citizens

144 Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi was interviewed on November 8, 2006 in Jakarta. 145 Indria Samego was interviewed on June 14, 2006 in Jakarta. 146 The Editor, Indonesia, 2000, loc.cit: 126. 147 Finer, 1962, op.cit: 140-164; Ikrar et al, 1999, loc.cit: 37. 148 Stepan, 1996, op. cit: 136.

176 under retroactive laws.149 The constitutional clause challenged Wahid’s ability of prosecuting severe human rights abuses and protected military officers from the punishment for gross human rights violations that occurred before 1999. It effectively ruled out that Wahid could instrumentalize human rights issues to harass his opponents in the military. This also weakened Wahid in his defence against ongoing military-supported moves in the MPR to impeach him.

In the following months, the military extracted still more concessions from Wahid. Lt. Gen. Yudhoyono obtained the important portfolio of coordinating minister for political and security affairs, as well as his promotion to a four-star general, on October 26, 2000. Conversely, Wahid’s supporter for reform, Lt. Gen. Wirahadikusumah, was ousted from his key post as Kostrad commander and replaced by the conservative Lt. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu. The military also succeeded to remain represented in the DPR until 2004 and in the MPR until 2009, thereby consecutively strengthening its veto player role in the process of democratization and military reform.

The military’s veto player role became also evident towards the end of the year 2000, when Wahid had to contend with a series of bombings in Jakarta, Bekasi, Medan, Pematang Siantar, Pekan Baru, Batam, Sukabumi and Mataram on December 24, 2000, and new unrests throughout the country. According to Wahid, the perpetrators were political actors who were seeking to undermine his administration and expel him from power, a thinly veiled hint that he suspected the military to be behind these incidents.150 Since the violence did not abate, by late January 2001, Wahid had lost patience and tried to discharge army chief Gen. Sutarto, but failed due to the TNI’s veto player role in DPR. The army chief refused to resign, and Wahid received support for the measure neither from the military nor from the leaders of the political parties in the DPR. Working against Wahid was MPR decree (Ketetapan MPR --TAP MPR) No. 7/2000 of August 18, 2000, which provided that the appointment and dismissal of the police chief commander (Kepala Polisi --Kapolri) needed legislative endorsement. A particular obstacle for further reforms were was the TNI/Police faction in the DPR and the MPR which in collusion with conservative and opportunistic civilian politicians could slow down, dilute and prevent the progress of military and security sector reform in large.151

It was thus hardly surprising that the TNI/Police faction in the DPR did not support the President when he was facing charges of embezzling money from the Yanatera Bulog foundation and a grant from the Sultan of Brunei. In August 28, 2000, the DPR formed with the consent of the TNI/Police faction a Special Commitee (Pansus) on

149 Eldridge, 2002, op.cit: 148. 150 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 398. 151 As argued by AS Hikam, a legislator and member of Commission I overseeing defence, foreign affaits and information. He was interviewed on April 10, 2008 in Jakarta.

177 Buloggate and Bruneigate with the ultimate objective of impeaching the president. Also in the two memorandums which according to then existing impeachment rules had to be passed by the legislature before the MPR could vote on the dismissal of the president, the DPR TNI/Police faction did not support the president. In the vote on the first memorandum, the TNI/Police faction voted against the president, meaning the armed forces censured their supreme commander.152 In the second voting, the TNI/Police faction abstained, knowing that the vote would be won by the anti-Wahid camp. Wahid’s refusal to respond to the Buloggate and Bruneigate charges, his decision at the height of the crisis to replace the police chief and Wiranto ally, Gen. Bimantoro, without seeking the DPR’s approval and to declare a state emergency, finally resulted in his impeachment in a special MPR session on July 23, 2001.153 No less important is the fact that with the election of Megawati Soekarnoputri, the country’s fifth president is a politician close to conservative circles in the armed forces and hence the TNI’s most favored candidate.

With a view to the events, one can thus hardly disagree with DPR Vice Chairperson Muhaimin Iskandar, a member of Wahid’s PKB, that the TNI/Police faction was an important force in the parliament. If it had not supported the ouster of Wahid, the other factions would have not dared to do so.154 In this connection it is also important to note that only days before the impeachment vote, the military headquarters reshuffled the membership of its DPR faction Officers who had hesitated overthrowing Wahid, such as Maj. Gen. Ferry Tinggogoy, were replaced by conservatives, such as Maj. Gen. Max Tamaela, the former commander of Maluku’s Kodam XVI Pattimura regional command. Also, in their official comment on the second memorandum, all TNI/Police faction members had made obvious that they would agree with the convening of a special MPR session.155 In interview, Wahid stated that it was clear from the outset that TNI did not support his presidential decree on state emergency (the Maklumat), which was eventually issued on July 23, 2001.156 Together with the national police, the military explicitly declined to support President Wahid’s order to dissolve the DPR and to prevent the opening of the MPR special session which pursued only one agenda: the impeachment of the president.157 The Wahid area thus shows that the military was still politically highly influential. Supporting the inthronization and the impeachment of Wahid it acted as kingmaker and by derailing Wahid’s military reform as a veto player in Indonesia’s democratization.

152 Patrick Ziegenhain, The Indonesian Parliament and Democratization. Singapore, ISEAS, 2008: 130. 153 Ibid: 143. 154 Ibid: 131. 155 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit. 156 Abdurrahman Wahid was interviewed on October 14, 2006 in Jakarta. 157 Ziegenhain, 2008, op.cit: 144.

178 II. Coping with Soeharto’s Alleged KKN Cases

II.A. Wahid’s Attempts to Investigate the Soeharto Cases

To implement MPR Decree No. 11/1998 which mandated the creation of clean governance, and laid down the legal foundation for prosecuting corrupt practices of former President Soeharto, his family and cronies, Wahid ordered the investigation of Hendra Rahardja, the owner of the now defunct Bank Harapan Sentosa (BHS),158 and Bob Hasan, former minister of forestry under Soeharto, one of his most famous business cronies of Chinese descent.159 President Wahid appeared serious in prosecuting Hasan, who was accused of embezzling US$244 million of forestry funds. Hasan was the former director of PT Mapindo Parama, the sole contractor in a large-scale forestry mapping project. The Central Jakarta District Court had sentenced Hasan to 2 years in jail for a previous corruption case amounting to US$ 75 billion in 2001. The High Court disregarded his appeal and increased the term to 6 years.160 For misappropriating of Rp. 1.95 trillion (US$ 216.7 million) of BLBI (Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia -- Liquidity Support of Bank of Indonesia) funds disbursed to the BHS bank during the 1997-1998 economic crisis, Rahardja obtained a life sentence, and his two accomplices, namely Eko Edi Putranto -- the former bank commissioner--161 and Shemy Konjongian -- the former director of the bank-- were each sentenced to 20 years in jail.162 Such moves, which pleased reform activists, heightened pressure on Soeharto and his family as well as his cronies and loyalists.

In an attempt to distinguish his policy from Soeharto, Wahid was quoted by the (British) Guardian as saying that Soeharto just tried to please his cronies or friends, but that he, Wahid, would build an economy for the majority of the people.163 He charged that Soeharto robbed the country by allowing the conglomerates and his cronies to control the economy, while the majority of Indonesians lived at the subsistence level. For this reason, he vowed to give subsidies to the people, not to the conglomerates as Soeharto did. To stop new cronies and KKN practices, he sought to uphold of the rule of law principle.164

158 See,”Jejak Intel Swadaya,” (“Track Record of Private Intelligence”) Tempo Interaktif, April 19, 2010, http://www.tem-pointeraktif.com/khusus/selusur/markus2/page04.php, was accessed on May 1, 2010. 159 Uchida, 2002, loc. cit 160 Ibid. 161 Abdul Khalik, “RI poised to recover US$ 800 million in stolen assets,” the Jakarta Post, http:// www. the jakartapost.com/news/2007/09/05/ri-poised-recover-800m, was accessed on May 1, 2010. 162 “Koruptor yang Lolos dari Pengawasan Imigrasi,” (“Corruptors Disregarded Immigration List”), Me- dia Indonesia, May3, 2020: 19. 163 Mark Tran, “Abdurrahman Wahid,” Guardian Unlimited Special Reports, http:///www.guardian.co.uk/ indonesia/Story/0,2763,200655,00.html, loc.cit. 164 Ibid.

179 In a report published by Tranparency International, Soeharto was listed on the first place of the ten most corrupt political leaders in the world. By contrast, when Soeharto was still in power, Forbes had named Soeharto in July 1997 as the fourth richest man in the world. Moreover, Time had revealed that Soeharto’s children and grandchildren owned between 312 and 350 companies in Indonesia and abroad.165 On December 6, 1999, due to growing public pressure to prosecute alleged KKN in Soeharto’s former inner circle, Wahid ordered Attorney General Marzuki Darusman to reopen the investigation files of Soeharto. This overturned the controversial SP3 (Surat Perintah Pemberhentian Penyidikan --a letter which ordered the prosecutors to close the cases), which had just been issued by the Darusman’s predecessor, the Acting Attorney General Ismoedjoko, 2 months earlier, on the eve of the October 1999 MPR special session.

Therefore, on February 10, 2000, Darusman sent out a letter to summon Soeharto to the Attorney General’s office. Expectely, Soeharto ignored the summons three times on the ground of his deteriorating health. Thereafter, Wahid sent envoys, consisting of military and civilian figures, namely, Lt. Gen.Yudhoyono and Saefullah Yusuf, and also his personal secretary (who happened to be his daughter), Yenny Zanuba, to approach Soeharto at his residence. They tried to persuade him to be cooperative so that he would be pardoned from sentencing as long as he agreed to return his wealth to the state. As Soeharto continued to resist, on March 31, 2000, he was named a suspect for collecting and misusing more than US$600 million through seven charitable foundations controlled by his family.166

Although the investigation continued, and on April 5, 2000 Soeharto was summoned once more, the investigation was eventually terminated due to his deteriorating health. The government’s prosecutors imposed the status of city arrest on him and, a week later, prohibited him leaving the country. In the following months, the Attorney General’s office tightened its control over him. Soeharto was placed under house arrest, and in August 2000, he was formally charged with corruption.

On August 31, 2000, the trial of Soeharto for allegedly siphoning off Rp. 5.1 trillion (US$ 570 million) from various charities that he and his family had operated,167 began in the South Jakarta District Court, the first level court. Yet, Soeharto did not attend the trial, with his doctors citing health reasons such as mental disorder and permanent brain damage. For the reason that there was no use to continue the trial, on September 28, 2000, a five-judge panel of the South Jakarta District Court dismissed

165 M. Fadjroel Rachman,“Jejak Langkah (daripada) Partai Golkar“ (”The Footstep of the Golkar Party”), Kompas-online, December 5, 2005, http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0512/05/opini/2265007.htm: 1-2. 166 Majalah Tempo, May 21, 2006: 30. 167 “Indonesia: Corruption Timeline”, Global Integrity Report 2004, loc.cit.

180 corruption charges against Soeharto, and closed the case. This automatically ended the status of his city arrest. Surprisingly, however, although Soeharto was eventually declared permanently unfit to stand trial by his doctors, he was still able to criticize all charges directed against him and demand that political leaders revoke MPR Decree No. 11/1998 as the legal basis enabling the trials.168 The court’s decision was therefore criticized by NGOs such as YLBHI (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia --Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation) and ICW (Indonesia Corruption Watch) because Soeharto could actually be prosecuted, including with in absentia trial.169

As the first level court did not see fit to prosecute Soeharto, the case was returned to the Office of the Attorney General who made an appeal to the Jakarta High Court. The court accepted the appeal, and on November 8, 2000 overruled the controversial previous decision by ordering the lower court to re-open the case. However, on February 2, 2001, the Supreme Court accepted Soeharto’s appeal, released him from city arrest, and stated that the trial could be continued if he recovered from his illness.170

Importantly, in December 2001, the new Attorney General, MA Rachman, submitted two reports to the DPR on Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases. In the first report, Soeharto was charged to have violated Article 1 Section 1, and Article 28 and 34 of Law No.3/1971 on anti-corruption and abuse of power by issuing Keppres (Keputusan Presiden --Presidential Decree) No. 20/1992 and Inpres (Instruksi Presiden -- Presidential Instruction) No. 1/1992 which benefited his family and cronies.171 Both Keppres and Inpres allowed his son, Tommy, to monopolize cloves business across the country through BPPC (Badan Pengelolaan dan Pemasaran Cengkeh --Clove Marketing and Buffer Agency), which had caused Rp. 1.7 trillion (US$ 187 million) in losses to the state.172 In the second report, Soeharto had allegedly misused a large amount of funds from the seven state foundations.

II.B. Understanding Military Perception of Soeharto

In Javanese tradition, keselarasan (harmony) and keheningan (tranquility) served to legitimize an emperor’s rule. Upheaval, amok, and chaos would therefore do the opposite.173 It seemed clear that the Trisakti shootings were designed to serve as a triggering mechanism, while the deliberately instigated riots of May 14, 1998 were meant to delegitimize Soeharto. Similarly, post-Soeharto unrest was provoked to produce huru-

168 Ibid. 169 “NGOs Suggest Soeharto be Tried in Absentia,” Antara News, 05/10/2006, http://www.antara.co.id/en/ print/?i=1147268057, was accessed on May 1, 2010. 170 “Indonesia: Corruption Timeline”, Global Integrity Report 2004, loc.cit. 171 “LSM: Soeharto Harus Diproses Hukum, (NGO: Soeharto Must Be Prosecuted”), Suara Pembaruan, May 9, 2006.

181 hara (upheaval), which in the Javanese concept of power meant a message to the civilian leaders that they should pay more attention to their satria (knights, soldiers) and kawula (people).174 From this point of view, if Wahid faced riots and unrest, it signified that there was something wrong with his policies, especially with his military reform.

In the Javanese concept of power, a state is similar to keluarga besar (a big family). Thus, if the father does not adequately care for his children, the children will demonstrate their annoyance by demonstrating mutung, or temporarily stop obeying him, and ngamuk (run amok). Likewise, in case the king did not care any longer for his satria’s and kawula’s needs, both would perform their mutung and ngamuk attitudes as resistance until the king knew his ignorance.175 In reverse, if the king or father felt he had properly taken care of his satria and kawula or the children, he would demand kesatyaan penuh (whole loyalty) from them. Otherwise, he would use all his power and at all cost, particularly, exercising kekerasan (violence), to defend his wahyu (mandate), taking into account his position as a representative of God, to punish the disloyal people.176

Similar to the old political elites, military officers still paid their respect to Soeharto although the old man had resigned. In line with the Javanese principle of mikul duwur mendem jero in the Javanese political culture, the former leader should always be respected. He should not be harassed, rather he should be released from any charge of the past wrongdoings, and be forgiven. The failure to observe this principle was identical with disregarding the principle of lengser ke prabon (the peaceful retirement) of the former leader.177 This insult would be compensated by vengeance of the old leader’s followers and loyalists, particularly his guards or the military that still respected that patron.

II.C. Military Response to Wahid Regarding Soeharto’s Alleged KKN Cases

As often occurred during the Habibie period when the Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases were being investigated, two bombs exploded simultaneously in Jakarta at the same time when the annual MPR meeting was being held. The first bomb incident took place at

172 ”AGO Reopens Graft Case Against Tommy”, The Jakarta Post, July 20, 2007. 173 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit. 174 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc. cit. 175 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit. 176 Interview with Vonny Kusumastuti, an expert of Javanese political culture, on October 11, 2006 in Ja- karta. 177 G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan K.H, Soeharto: Pikiran, Ucapan dan Tindakan Saya (Soeharto: My Thoughts, Words, and Deeds), PT Citra Lamtoro. Gung Persada, 1989.

182 the first floor of the Attorney General’s Office (Kejaksaan Agung) building on July 4, 2000. This came right after Tommy Soeharto had left the building just one hour before. Soeharto’s youngest son had been queried for his aeroplane chartering business which was accused of misusing eight helicopters belonging to the forestry ministry. No one was injured in the blast, but it caused serious damage to the building. One day later, a second, more powerful device, was found at the building and defused by the police. That much larger bomb was planned to explode on the third floor and would have demolished at least half of the building, mainly the records library and its files on the Soeharto family’s current corruption investigations, but the shake from the previous explosion stopped the timing device of the larger bomb.178 Although, there were no fatalities, the explosion was considered as sending a message to Wahid not to follow-up the investigation of the Soeharto cases.

Police investigators identified the unexploded device as military material issued to an arsenal in the East Java regional command (Kodam V Brawijaya) in the years before. They also discovered that all nine guards escorting Soeharto’s son were ex-military personnel. Six of them arrived at the building together, using a white Toyota Land Cruiser. At least four eyewitnesses saw that several of them brought a kit bag from the building to their car.179 The investigators had discovered the car in West Java, and found out that it belonged to Boli Diaz, a former sergeant-major in Paspampres (Pasukan Pengaman Presiden --the military’s elite presidential security guards), who was the younger brother of Agus Diaz, the head of Tommy’s personal guards. Later, it was reported by the police that the drawing made from the porter’s explanation and those who had seen someone planting the unexploded device in the third floor of the Attorney General’s office, corresponded with the face of Boli.180

The police had actually possessed adequate evidences, namely, the suspects who were under arrest, positive identifications from eyewitnesses, and fingerprints from the bomb. Unfortunately, on July 18, 2000, as the investigations were finally on the brink of uncovering an important case of political violence, and police officials stated that they were merely waiting for the conclusions of the fingerprints test from the forensic laboratory, the case suddenly died because the conclusions themselves had never been announced.181 More astonishingly, the police investigators gave no more statements on the case, and the Kodam V Brawijaya regional commander, Maj. Gen. Sudi, also disregarded his assurance to investigate how the bomb went missing from the arsenal in

178 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 369. 179 ”Pelaku ‘Bom Kejaksaan’ Eks Paspampres, Sebuah ‘Hard Top’ Putih Diamankan” (“Attorney General Office Bomber Is Ex-Presidential Guard, White ‘Hard Top’ Car Seized”), Media Indonesia., July 13, 2000. 180 ”Bom di Kejagung: Dua Pria dalam Hardtop Diperiksa” (“Attorney General Office Bomb Case: Two Men in Hardtop Investigated”), Suara Pembaruan, July 14, 2000: 1, 4. 181 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 370.

183 his region. Previously, the investigators said that the serial number of the explosives was traced back to the East Java army command.182 TNI leaders never revealed how the explosives went missing or who was responsible. That is why rumours circulated the bomb was planted by parties working for Tommy, who was being questioned by the Attorney General Darusman around that time.183

Furthermore, Boli Diaz and Tommy’s other bodyguards were released from custody, while the local police official who had been handling the case, Edward Aritonang, was replaced weeks later. This situation forced Attorney General Darusman to temporarily abandon his investigation of the helicopter scandal of Tommy.184 Since earlier, Darusman had predicted powerful forces would prevent further legal moves against the Soeharto family. He was of the opinion that there were forces of resistance within the bureaucracy, such as, the armed forces, who thought things should not go any further.185 The reason became clear after Wahid later confirmed that the case had to be closed because certain elements inside the military, especially the army, opposed the investigations.186 This paralleled an earlier KKN investigation against Soeharto. In April 1999, the police had been ordered to shut down their investigation into the Al-Istiqlal mosque bombing perpetrated hours after Tommy’s appearance in court in the Goro-Bulog corruption case,187 also known as the Bulog land scam deal, which cost the state an additional Rp 95.4 billion.

On August 1, 2000, another explosion occurred in front of the Philippine embassy, causing two deaths and seriously injuring the Ambassador and twenty others. The bombing has been linked to Attorney General Darusman’s decision of sending Soeharto and his family to court on allegations of corruption.188 Testimonies in the Jakarta court disclosed that the bomb was planted by members of the Abu Sayyaf,189 a Philippine terrorist group aligned with the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah ands operating in the Sulu archipelago, which was believed to retaliate against a government military offensive against Muslim insurgents in the Philippine south. Some of the alleged perpetrators such

182 Roosa, 2003, loc.cit. 183 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit; Media Indonesia., July 13, 2000, loc.cit; Suara Pembaruan, July 14, 2000, loc.cit. 184 Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on December 17, 2007. 185 Chris Brummitt,“Indonesia Marks Eighth Anniversary of Downfall of Ex-Dictator Suharto”, Associated Press, May 21, 2006. 186 “Tommy and Habib Ali Baaqil,” Indonesian Observer, September 18, 2000, loc.cit; Majalah Tempo, October 1, 2000: 26, cited in ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 12-13; Abdurrahman Wahid was interviewed on October 14, 2006 in Jakarta. 187 ”Bombings Leave Southeast Asia Puzzled,” Far Easter Economic Review, January 24, 2001. 188 Darwin, in Aris Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: 106-107. 189 Since its establishment in the early 1990s in the southern Philippines, the militant group had con -ducted violences in what they describe as their fight for an independent Islamic province. For further information, see “Abu Sayyaf,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Sayyaf, was accessed on May 4, 2010.

184 as Amrozi, Fatur Rachman Al-Ghozi, Dulmatin and Hambali were also Pondok Pesantren (Islamic boarding school) Ngruki graduates or senior figures in the Jemaah Islamiyah.190 Amrozi told the judge panel of the Jakarta court that the bombing was carried out by Faturrahman Al Ghozi who previously ordered him to prepare explosive materials. He admitted that he had bought the materials from Tidar Kimia chemical shop in Surabaya.and provided vehicle to transport the explosives to Jakarta.191

But how could the group get access to the explosives and easily prepare and conduct its operations without being detected by Indonesia’s national intelligence institutions? Again, there was speculation that the blast was related to military resistance to the Wahid presidency. Such a kind of blast was almost impossible during the pre- reform era. While it is possible that the terrorist group could rely on allies among Islamist extremists in Indonesia, the attack could also be facilitated by the unwillingness of Indonesian intelligence to prevent it.192

A more dreadful incident, with adverse repercussions on the exchange rate of the Rupiah, was the bombing of the Jakarta Stock Exchange building on September 13, 2000. At that time, Tommy Soeharto was being questioned by the Attorney General’s Office for his alleged corruption cases, and the following day the above-mentioned trial of former President Soeharto on more serious alleged corruption cases was also scheduled.193 The C-4 explosion killed fifteen persons and wounded dozens others. It raised serious questions about the end of the bombing incidents and had an adverse effect on foreign investors’ confidence to do business in Indonesia.194 Quite obviously the bombing was a caluculated move by Soeharto loyalists inside the military to undermine the country’s slow and painful recovery from the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998 and to blackmail Wahid into abandoning the prosecution of Soeharto’s KKN ccases.195

As during the Habibie government, terror attacks during the Wahid government were apparently carried out in response to the political measures the President took at that time. Every time a member of the Soeharto family got into trouble with the authorities, trouble breaks out in some regions in Indonesia. In a rare public statement Wahid’s Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono made clear the alleged involvement of high

190 “Bali Suspects Linked to 2000 Blast.” BBC NEWS/ASIA-PACIFIC, March 11, 2003, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/low/asia-pacific/2839501.stm, was accessed on May 4, 2010. 191 “Bali Bombing Suspect Admits Role in Philippine Embassy Bombing,” Xinhua News Agency, Xinhua- net, 2003-06-19, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-06/19/content_927980.htm, was accessed on May 4, 2010. 192 ICG, 2001, loc.cit; ICG, 2002, loc.cit; ICG, 2004, loc.cit. 193 Waluyo, 2007, loc.cit: 124-125. 194 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.) , 2003, loc.cit: 107. 195 Waluyo, 2007, loc.cit.

185 ranking (military) officials in transition violence and their objectives, as well as about the reason why he failed to prevent and address the conflicts:

”Whenever there is a court case involving Soeharto, his family, or a high official from the past regime, a riot always follows… Those who are behind the riots are individuals defending Soeharto. I profoundly believe that these are ex-officials from his last government, who were appointed again in Habibie’s government, namely, my ex-cabinet colleagues… By defending Soeharto, these persons are actually attempting to defend themselves…They included ex-high officials, either military or civilians, those who are aware of Habibie’s and Wahid’s intricacies in addressing the four or five cases of ongoing unrests in areas, i.e. Aceh and Maluku. Therefore, I can make sure that there is an intentional and organized attempt to overwork the security forces, in order to create the sense that Wahid is vain and powerless to control the situation…The military and the intelligence agencies are still evenly split between the old and new force. The problem is that those financing the unrests have more money....”196

Thus, surprisingly, a minister, considered as a conservative inherited from the ancient regime, for the first time pointed out that Soeharto’s cronies may have been behind the bloody riots in order to derail investigations in past mismanagement and corruption.197 More importantly, he supposedly knew who was funding the operations of both the blasts and regional conflicts. Nevertheless, he refrained from mentioning the names for ethical reasons, respecting his relation with his colleague ministers in the cabinet, although mass media had identified the two most likely architects as Gen. Feisal and Gen.Wiranto.198 Juwono, however, said military officers’ alleged involvement was “uncontrollable factors” in the country’s violence and that he was powerless to force their sacking.199

Asked about Tommy by the mass media, Juwono further mentioned that he was convinced that Tommy’s personal guards had perpetrated the bombing of the attorney general office.200 Juwono’s allegations were supported by Maj. Gen Saurip Kadi, who also believed that New Order elements might have had a hand in orchestrating riots across the country due to their interests in creating a strong bargaining position against Wahid

196 ”Juwono Sudarsono: Kroni Soeharto Mendanai Kerusuhan” (“Juwono Sudarsono: Soeharto’s Cronies Finance the Riots”), Majalah Tempo, July 19, 2000; Van Zorge Report, January 22 and February 2, 2001; O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 369. 197 McCarthy, 2000, loc.cit. 198 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit. 199 Richard Galpin, “Army Accused over Moluccas Conflict”, BBC News, July 17, 2000. 200 Majalah Tempo, July 19, 2000, loc.cit; McCarthy, 2000, loc.cit.

186 and his reform agenda.201 A similar opinion came from Lt. Gen (ret) Agus Widjoyo, who stated that bomb explosions in August and September 2000 apparently followed attempts to bring members of the Soeharto family to court202 and also Attorney General Marzuki Darusman told the mass media that the bombings showed the characteristics of the works of rogue or anti-reform military elements and Soeharto loyalists.203 Later investigations revealed that two of the suspects in the Jakarta Stock Exchange bombing were active military personnel from Kostrad and Kopassus, 204 while a different source mentioned both were Kopassus members.205

Due to the potential involvement of the Soeharto loyalists, Juwono’s successor as defence minister, Mahfud M.D., recommended that the government simply drop the case against the former president. Otherwise, the country would be threatened by more terror, and the government would be further undermined.206 Unfazed, President Wahid rejected his aides’ proposition and went on with his efforts to hold the Soeharto family accountable for the mismanagement and embezzlement of state resources during the New Order period.

Despite the ongoing maneuvers to destabilize his government, President Wahid rejected pardoning the convicted son of Soeharto. Tommy Soeharto, sentenced by a court to 18 months in prison for his role in a multi-million dollar land scam, was arrested on Wahid’s order. With this move, Wahid tried to send the message that violence and corruption will no longer be tolerated in the country. Tommy Soeharto pleaded guilty on October 3, 2000 and at the same time asked for a presidential pardon to avoid jail which Wahid refused.207 This decision resulted in further unrest.

201 Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi was interviewed on November 8, 2006 in Jakarta. 202 Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo was interviewed on June 19, 2006 in Jakarta. 203 ”Drop Soeharto Trial to Avoid More Violence--Minister,” Reuters, September 15, 2000. 204 ”Political Brief,” Van Zorge Report, February 2, 2001; “Sipil Aceh: Teroris Atau Kambing Hitam,” (“Civilian Acehnese: Terrorist or Scapegoat”), Majalah Tempo, October 1, 2000; “Siapa Dalang Bom: GAM, Militer, Atau...” (“Who Behind the Bomb: GAM, the Military, or ...”), Majalah Tajuk, No. 16, September 28 October 11, 2000; Kingsbury, 2004, loc.cit. 205 Fawthrop, 2002, loc.cit. 206 Mahfud MD was interviewed on January 9, 2007 in Jakarta. 207 Calvin Sims, “Jakarta Won't Pardon Suharto Son; Orders Militia Chief's Arrest”, New York Times.com, October 5, 2000.

187 II.D. Military Resistance in Maluku

Wahid faced a chaotic situation in Maluku, where from Central and Southeast Maluku, the religious conflict reached North Maluku. Within a short period, the escalation produced new and worse violence of unprecedented levels. For this reason, in a gathering with Maluku people in Jakarta on January 15, 2000, he stated that the conflicts were created by “dirty hands” or “intellectual actors.” These were, namely, the status quo group or Soeharto’s loyalists, particularly, inside the military, which were opposing the reform movement and the Wahid regime. The anti-reform movement in Jakarta obviously attempted to switch the existing vertical conflicts between the Pattimura University’s students, who demanded the termination of the military’s dual function practices in Maluku, and the TNI, into horizontal conflicts by instrumentalizing religious issues.208

Thamrin Amal Tomagola, a researcher from the University of Indonesia who was a native of Maluku, supported Wahid’s suspicions by helping to disclose that the “dirty hands” were Soeharto loyalists inside and outside the military, who supposedly pursued two hidden agendas. These were to prevent the prosecution of Soeharto and his generals (for alleged human rights violations and other abuses), as well as to create a new regional command in the region, namely, Kodam XVI Pattimura, thus making it to seventeen throughout Indonesia as earlier planned by the military. Munir, a noted human rights activist who was later murdered by an intelligence operative, expressed a similar opinion as Wahid on the alleged involvement of military officers in provoking conflicts in Maluku. The new TNI commander, Adm. Widodo, also admitted this involvement, though he could not tell when exactly this began.209

Obviously, the investigations of the Soeharto family spurred military behavior, which soon led to a markedly deteriorating security situation in Maluku. One example was the extraordinary troop build-up in the province. The TNI deployed at least fifteen different external battalions consisting of 8,000 army troops and 400 from the mobile brigade, which reportedly often not only provoked but also escalated the conflict.210 There are many reports which suggest that the military had failed to remain neutral in handling local incidents. The troops which were sent there to back up the police were slow in stopping the fighting between two Muslims and Christians. As mentioned by some witnesses, including senior military officers who were questioned about the situation in the field, soldiers involved in this fight not only took sides in conflict, but also shot at rioting crowds.211 The local population, whose families took part in the fighting, shared

208 Tri Ratnawati, Maluku dalam Catatan Seorang Peneliti (Maluku in Notes of A Researcher), Yogyakar- ta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2006: 57, 87. 209 Ibid: 57-58, 61. 210 The Editors, Indonesia, 2000, loc.cit: 132. 211 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: Appendix 2 No. 52.

188 similar information.212 Military interference thus markedly increased the number of casualties in the conflict.

Towards the public, the new TNI chief commander, Adm. Widodo, excused his soldiers’ involvement for the reason that they had to intervene in order to protect their families. This justification drew questions of why TNI leaders sent troops who had a conflict of interest and could not act firmly to reduce conflict? In fact, the overwhelmingly Muslim Kostrad troops were siding with the Maluku Muslims, while the Brimob security forces, who were 75 percent Christians, were siding with the Christians.213

The conflict in Maluku was further exacerbated through the arrival of more than 4,000 Laskar Jihad fighters in Ambon and other islands in the province.214 As already briefly mentioned in Chapter 3,215 the Laskar Jihad is a paramilitary division of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama’ah (Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunnah and the Community of the Prophet), which was chaired by Ja’far Umar Thalib, a veteran of the Afganistan war in the 1980s. It was formed to assist Muslims when religious conflicts escalated in Maluku. Its members had received military training under the supervision of Brig. Gen. (ret) Rustam Kastor. By using passenger ships such as Pelni and Rinjani since April 2000, their fighters had been arriving in the war-torn archipelago from Tanjung Priok (Jakarta) and Tanjung Perak (Surabaya) harbors.

Contemporary media reports and academic studies of the conflict were quite unanimous in their judgment that the massive influx of jihad fighters in the province could not have occurred without substantial logistical support. In view of the close relations some military leaders entertained with radical Muslim organizations such as the PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang --Crescent and Star Party), DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia --Indonesian Islamic Teaching Council), Kisdi (Komite Solidaritas untuk Dunia Islam --Solidarity Committee for Islamic World)), FPI (Front Pembela Islam -- Front for Islam Defenders), Furkon (Forum Penegak Keadilan dan Konstitusi --Forum for the Promotion of Justice and Constitution), and Laskar Jihad, suspicions not coincidentically concentrated on the armed forces. This belief was corroborated by information that retired military officers and soldiers led by retired Brig. Gen. Kastor -- former Chief of Staff of the eighth army command, Trikora, in Jayapura West Papua who

212 Family John Gomez and their neighbours were interviewed in Ambon, on June 25, 2006. 213 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit.: 131. 214 Majalah Tempo 29, No. 12, May 22-28, 2000; Noorhaidi, Laskar Jihad, Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post New Order Indonesia, Utrecht: Unversiteit Utrecht, 2005, https://open-access-leiden- univ.nl/bitstream/1887/13369/1/Dissertation+Noorhaidi.pdf, was accessed on May 5, 2010. 215 See Chapter 3: 90-91.

189 had also been stationed at the TNI headquarters in Jakarta-- organized military training for the Laskar Jihad at a camp near Bogor, not far from Jakarta.216

With this background, the Laskar Jihad fighters were apparently allowed to enter Maluku by the security forces. The TNI could actually have prevented the jihad troops’ departure if it wanted to seriously halt them because they knew much about the troop leaders, sponsors, plans, the jihadis appearances (such as specific uniforms and outfits) and the departure points. Also, the access of the Laskar Jihad to weapons and explosives they used in training and in the war zone in Maluku could have been blocked if there was no tacit or open support of the TNI for the Laskar Jihad fighters. Giving more credence to such reports, a member of the Laskar Jihad described, how upon arrival at the harbor of Ambon, their troops were passionately welcomed by some military men, who greeted them with “welcome to the jihad battlefield!” Moreover, shortly after arrival they were provided with standard military weapons, including AK-47s and SS-14s217 and on several occasions were backed in combat by military personnel and units.218

In order to avoid a further influx of jihadis to Maluku, and to de-escalate the conflict, President Wahid belatedly ordered the training camp near Bogor closed219 and Adm. Widodo to ensure that all visitors entering Maluku would be examined. The security forces, however, failed to implement the president’s order. Although he was no longer TNI chief commander, Gen. Wiranto’s explained this fact by saying that the TNI could not prevent the jihad fighters getting on board of ships in Java because just like other passengers they paid for the tickets and had no weapons. This explanation, of course, drew indignant criticism in light of the TNI’s persistent claim to bear the main responsibility for the country’s security.220 Mufti Makarim, for instance, a human rights activist of Kontras, wondered why the security apparatus allowed the Laskar Jihad to come to Ambon, and assist them assaulting their Christian enemies.221 Again, it seems that the military’s role in the Maluku conflict must be linked to its displeasure with the

216 George Junus Aditjondro, “Notes on the Jihad forces in Maluku,” July 2000, http://www.angelfire.com/ rock/hotburrito/laskar/aditjondro500.html, was accessed on May 5, 2010; Noorhaidi, 2005, op.cit: 201, 216; Istiqomatul Hayati “Polisi Akan Periksa Brigjen (Purn.) Rustam Kastor,” Tempo Interaktif, May 8, 2001, http://www.tempointeraktif. com/ hg/nasional/2001/05/08/brk,20010508-14,id.html. 217 ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 13; “Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku”, ICG Asia Report, No. 10, December 19, 2000. 218 Manning and van Diermen (eds.), ISEAS, 2000, loc.cit; Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), loc. cit. Further evidence for a collusion between TNI elements and Laskar Jihad troops was provided by the mass media. In early July 2000, for example, a BBC cameraman covered an intense gun battle in the streets of Ambon, the capital city, where Christian fighters were trading fire with Muslim militias who were fighting together with regular army troops. 219 ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 13. 220 Philips Jusario Vermonte,“The Relationship between the Army and Islamic Groups in Indonesia: Com-paring the Period of the Transition to Authoritarian Rule in the 1950s and the Transition to Democracy in the 1990s”, working paper, Jakarta: Interseksi Foundation, 2007. 221 Mufti Makarim was interviewed on January 30, 2007 in Jakarta.

190 ongoing investigations of military personnel’s involvement in the human rights violations after the East Timor referendum in August 1999.

The arrival of the well-armed Laskar Jihad and the fast increasing presence of jihad volunteers222 in Ambon resulted in renewed fighting and were responsible for the deterioration of the Maluku conflict with a sharp increase in casualties, particularly among Christians. For instance, in Awaai village, sub-district of Salahatu, Ambon, the Muslims (kelompok putih or the white group) assailed the Christians (kelompok merah or the red group).223 Between December 26, 1999 and January 7, 2000, 907 people were killed, but a less conservative account estimated more than 2,000 people died.224 A week before the incident in Awaai village, the Christian territory in Leihitu had been totally ravaged, with seven people killed.225 Due to the intensifying conflict in the province, Wahid finally imposed darurat sipil, or a state of civil emergency beginning June 27, 2000. Nevertheless, the measure did not show any significant results, and the archipelago was still on fire.

Influenced by professional provocateurs, the religious conflict in Maluku entered a second phase in May 2000, as the new waves of jihad forces arrived. In the process, as confirmed by military and police officers interviewed, Laskar Jihad forces, supported by military units from Java and Makassar (who were in their majority Muslims) launched attacks on predominantly Christian police forces, including Brimob, and their headquarters.226 Colombijn and Lindblad claim that the violence was stimulated and maintained by the military that had ulterior political and economic interests.227 After all, TNI could extend their functions beyond mere defence into national security matters, and thereby revitalize their dual-function or socio-political role, by restoring their territorial command system.

Also Kodam XVI Pattimura regional commander, Brig. Gen. Max Tamaela, confirmed emotionalized troops took sides in the conflict.228 Unfortunately, the regional commander did not mention that at least five of the nineteen military battalions sent to Maluku were from East Java (Kodam V Brawijaya) and commanded by Maj. Gen. Sudi, an officer associated with Gen. Wiranto and Lt. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, both of whom were linked to either to the human rights violations in East Timor and during the

222 Majalah Tempo 29, No. 12, May22-28, 2000. 223 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: Appendix 2 No. 52. 224 Majalah Gatra 5, No. 53, November 20, 1999; Majalah Gatra 6, No. 10, January 22, 2000; Majalah Gatra 10, No. 12, February 5, 2000. 225 Darwin in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: Appendix 2 No. 52. 226 Author’s interview with Major Toga Panjaitan on June 20, 2001 in Jakarta; Author’s interview with Mj. Ahmad Basar on June 25, 2006 in Ambon.. 227 Colombijn and Lindblad, in Colombijn and Lindblad, 2002, loc. cit: 4. 228 O’ Rourke, 2002, op. cit.

191 handover of power from Soeharto to Habibie. It took the TNI leadership until June 14, 2000 to eventually replace biased troops.229 Brig. Gen. Tamaela, a Wiranto’s ally and sympathizer of the Muslim’s cause, was replaced by Brig. Gen. I Putu Yasa, as the new commander. I Putu Yasa was a Hindu from Bali and could therefore be expected to stay neutral,230

A report of Komnas HAM, based on an 11-month study of the Maluku conflict, further supported evidence for the involvement of TNI troops. Komnas HAM’s investigators concluded that human rights abuses were perpetrated by “both individuals and state apparatus, and both the military and the police.”231 As reasons for the conflict the report named social resentment, agitation and provocations by third parties and outside agents, the non-neutral stance of the security forces, religious animosities, reprisals, and the political rivalry of elites. The November 1998 Ketapang riot232 was also cited as a factor that had stimulated the conflict. The gang war between Christian Ambonese thugs and Ketapang’s Muslim residents in Central Jakarta orchestrated by outside forces had escalated into an inter-religious conflict.233 Reportedly, the security forces had “captured” most of the gang members --who connected with the Soeharto family and military leaders-- and put them on ships bound for Ambon, where they played a central role at the beginning of sectarian conflicts here in early 1999.234 Therefore, it became obvious that the increasing violence was not only caused by mounting local frustration and anger, but also provocation from outside by third parties.235 It was indeed inexplicable, why, despite having 11,000 personnel deployed throughout the Maluku region, the military was constantly powerless to control the conflict.

In reality, military behavior in Maluku showed a number of similarities with their behavior in East Timor. In addition to the existence of militias, Wiranto, while still on his post as TNI chief, established in Maluku a task force called Satgas Pemulihan Perdamaian (Task Force on Restoration of Peace), for which Maj. Gen. Suadi Marasabessy had responsibility. This was similar to the innocuous-sounding post of head of security advisor to the Indonesian government’s Satgas P3TT (Satuan Tugas Panitia Penentuan Pendapat di Timor Timur --Task Force for Popular Consultation on the East Timor Referendum) occupied by Maj. Gen. Zacky, whose responsibility was to monitor security preparations in advance of the ballot. While Zacky was supposedly preparing a smooth referendum in East Timor, Marasabessy was presumably attempting to bring back peace in Maluku. O’Rourke however mentions that both seemed to possess major

229 Harian Kompas, July 28, 2000. 230 Waluyo, 2007, loc.cit. 231 ”Human Rights Commission Releases Report on Maluku Conflict,” Detikworld, February 6, 2001. 232 See Chapter 3: 34-36, 97. 233 ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 6-7. 234 Colombijn and Lindblad, “Introduction”, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc. cit: 4.

192 authority over military operations in their respective regions, and to pursue different objectives as indicated by the title of their tasks forces. Like in East Timor, Wiranto also claimed that TNI were doing their utmost to return order in Maluku, even though the violence constantly worsened.236 Marasabessy’s promotion to the higher post of chief of general staff (Kepala Staf umum or Kasum) in March 1, 2001 gave him strategic authority over troop deployment and military operations across Indonesia. This could explain why TNI activities in Maluku expanded significantly afterward.

Investigations by human rights organizations and independent researchers such as University of Indonesia researcher Tomagola provided an even more complex picture of TNI involvement in Maluku. Kontras activist Mufti, for instance, found out that apart from the involvement of the military’s special intelligence task force (SGI) in supporting the Laskar Jihad on the ground, Kopassus soldiers protected Christian militia leaders such as Berty “Coker” Loupatty and Alex Manuputty.237 Berty was known as a gang leader who turned out to be an informer for Kopassus. Other members of the Coker gang admitted they had been trained and funded by Kopassus.238 Tomagola, for his part, cited Wiranto and three active generals, e.g. Djaja, Suadi, and Sudi, as the main agents of provocation who were responsible for triggering and prolonging the religious strife.239 Wiranto filed a defamation suit against Tomagola, but court proceedings were cancelled as Tomagola threatened to use the trial as a platform for presenting the complete details of the TNI leaders’ involvement in all episodes of the Ambon religious conflict.240

III. Coping with Human Rights Violations

III.A. Wahid’s Policy Regarding Human Rights Violations

Different from Habibie, Wahid took more serious measures to prosecute human rights abuses perpetrated by military personnel. He supported the investigation of Gen. Wiranto due to his alleged involvement in East Timor’s post-referendum gross human rights abuses. That is why the general was abruptly discharged from the highest position in the military as chief commander after being implicated by the KPP HAM Timtim (National Human Rights Commission on East Timor) in connection with gross human rights abuses in East Timor. However, Wahid not only targeted Wiranto, but also other alleged perpetrators of abuses.

235 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 347. 236 Ibid: 348. 237 Mufti Makarim was interviewed on January 30, 2007 in Jakarta. 238 Tom Fawthrop, “Indonesian Military's Links to Terror,” Asia Times, November 7, 2002. 239 ”Wiranto Sues UI Sociologist,” The Jakarta Post, May1, 2001. 240 ”Peristiwa” (“News and Events”), Majalah Tempo, May 13, 2001: 38; O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 400.

193 He had supported the investigation and prosecution of the May 12 Trisakti shootings as well as the November 12, 1998 First Semanggi Tragedy and the September 1999 Second Semanggi Tragedy, for which the military was believed to be responsible. Also, he encouraged enquiries into allegations that military personnel had provoked ethnic and religious unrest in various parts of the country, i.e. in Ambon, Poso, and Papua. Further, he had encouraged the national police to investigate the July 27, 1996 incident at the PDI headquarters, including the involvement of pro-Soeharto PDI leader, Soerjadi. The investigation had actually revealed the involvement of the Jakarta regional (Kodam Jayakarta) commander, Maj. Gen. Sutiyoso, and his paramilitary troops.241 Lastly, Wahid instructed the Komnas HAM (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia -- National Human Rights Commission), particularly its KPP HAM Timtim, to investigate military involvement in East Timor atrocities both prior to and after the August 30, 1999 referendum.242

Aside from this, President Wahid was praised by NGOs for his struggle demanding the withdrawal of MPR Decree No. 25/1966, which banned the spread of communism. Moreover, he apologized on behalf of his traditional supporters, the NU, to former PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia --Indonesian Communist Party) members and their families for the violence and atrocities committed by NU and its affiliated organizations after the 1965 Coup, which had forced President Soekarno to step down.

In the first day of his presidency, Wahid had made an important gesture to empty Indonesia’s jails of political prisoners.243 In January 2000, he revoked Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 41/1967 that had been endorsed by the Soeharto regime in its anti-Chinese and communist campaign due to the alleged involvement of the People’s Republic of China in the October 1965 putsch. The decree had restricted for a long-time the public celebration of Chinese religious practises and traditions. Soon thereafter, by March 8, 2000, he dissolved the Bakorstanas (Badan Kordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional --Agency for Coordination of the Assistance for the Consolidation of National Security), an extra-constitutional military intelligence body, which had replaced similar organizations such as Kopkamtib (Komando Operasional untuk Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban --the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) and Laksus (Pelaksana Khusus --Special Agency) These were created to politically repress anyone who threatened the regime’s stability during the Soeharto era. Having dissolved Bakorstanas was obviously an outstanding attainment of Wahid in protecting civil liberty.

241 Otobiografi Politik RO Tambunan: Membela Demokrasi (Political Biography of RO Tambunan: Defending Democracy), Jakarta: TPDI, 2008: 374. 242 The Editors, Indonesia, 2000, loc.cit: 126. 243 ”Seluruh Tapol dan Napol Dibebaskan” (“All Political Prisoners Will be Released”), Harian Republika, Desember 24, 1999.

194 On November 23, 2000, Wahid in cooperation with the DPR endorsed Law No. 26/2000 on human rights tribunals. To support the implementation of this law, he issued Presidential Decision (Keppres) No. 31/2001 to establish human rights tribunals in regional courts in Jakarta Pusat, Surabaya, Medan, and Makassar on March 12, 2001. In addition, on April 6, 2001, he issued Keppres No. 48/2001 to set up the office of Sekretariat Jenderal Komnas HAM (The Secretariat General of the National Commission of Human Rights).

When he took office, Wahid had to deal with the powerful TNI, which was humiliated by its withdrawing in disgrace from East Timor to pave the way for the intervention of the UN peacekeeping troop Interfet led by Australia. Such humiliation caused TNI to resist international, specifically United Nations, calls for an independent investigation of crimes against humanity in East Timor, where commanders, as reported by the (British) Guardian, turned a blind eye to or even orchestrated the campaign of terror targeted at civilians by anti-independence militias.244 Wahid faced a dilemma: Should he side with the TNI or comply with the international community, which would apply pressure through the international lending institutions, e.g. the IMF and World Bank? Worse, what had been identified by Crouch as the external factor,245 eventually reunited different factions in TNI to challenge the Wahid presidency.

The rising reform demands, especially from the families of the victims of the Trisakti shootings and the May 1998 anti-Chinese riots, helped President Wahid support the establishment of a human rights investigation team (KPP HAM) on the cases. Further, he ordered Attorney General Marzuki Darusman to follow-up KPP HAM’s findings. The latter had revealed that the cases were gross human rights violations. He was convinced that, if pursued further, senior level military officers, former commanders and even some of the top military leaders could be held accountable.

III.B. The Military and Culture of Violence

As observed by analysts, cultivating new values in the Indonesia military was not an easy task because from generation to generation, soldiers grew up and were educated in an institution predominantly influenced by Javanese political culture. Kusnanto Anggoro, an expert on military affairs and himself a native of Java, explained that most TNI soldiers, particularly their leaders, were like Kumbakarna, a Ramayana knight figure, who preferred to seek power rather than show loyalty to the truth. He acknowledged that there were few soldiers who performed like the character Wibisana in Ramayana, which

244 Tran, loc.cit. 245 Ahmad and Crouch (Eds.), 1985, loc. cit: 288, 298, in Singh, 1996, op. cit: 12.

195 together with Mahabharata was a Sanskrit epic of Hindu mythology, which had a strong impact on Javanese thinking since 5 AD. Wibisana was a wise knight and model figure who loved truth and did not put force as his first choice to counter critics and his opponents.246

In the Ramayana, Kumbakarna was caught in the dilemma between defending his homeland and siding with the truth. Although Kumbakarna knew that the ruler in the palace, Alengka or Ngalengkadiraja, was breaking the law, he was a patriot who fought to defend his ruler to his last drop of blood. In Mahabharata, the Pandawa knights struggled for defending their rights for the throne of the Hastinapura kingdom against the Kurawa, who wanted to take control of the the kingdom. As elaborated by Slamet Susanto and Tarko Sudiarno, the story above had been taught for a long time in society, particularly in the military, and taken as an example how Indonesians should love and uphold the country’s honor.

The persona of the wayang (Javanese shadow puppet) characters in the Ramayana and Mahabharata epics were enriched with the story of Babad Mataram, which recounted conflicts, hunger for power, and coup d’etats that occurred among the rulers, princes, knights, and soldiers from generation to generation in the old Mataram kingdom.247 More specifically, the Babad Mataram treated the changes of power holders such as that of Ken Arok, who was the founder the Rajasa dynasty around 1227 and the first ruler of the Singhasari-Majapahit, an ancient Hindu-Buddhist kingdom in Java. He became the king after killing Tunggul Ametung, a powerful regional leader or ruler of the Tumapel area.. According to the Babad Mataram, the bloody coup d’etat is an important element of Javanese political culture, reflecting the idea of brutal power struggle in the past that countinues to the present.

It seemed that military resistance to civilian rulers, such as Wahid, brought to mind the soldier’s position as a hero. Here, the military might be symbolized as Kumbakarna who did his utmost to defend Buriswara, his elder brother, who had kidnapped Sinta, Rama’s wife, and taken her hostage. Kumbakarna might be compared with his other brother, Wibisana, who sided with Rama for the sake of truth. In a simple sentence, Kumbakarna’s philosophy was ”right or wrong is my country,” while, Wibisana emphasised “right or wrong is right or wrong.”248 In this context, the character of the wayang portrayed human attributes that incorporated some valuable insights, rarely found in the textbooks, about love for the fatherland and concern for fellow human beings. To

246 Kusnanto Anggoro was interviewed on October 11, 2006 in Jakarta. 247 Slamet Susanto and Tarko Sudiarno,”Schools Bring ‘Wayang Kulit’ to Classroom”, The Jakarta Post, http://www,the jakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20050319.P01, March 19, 2005: 1-2. 248 Veven Sp Wardhana,”Mass Media ‘a Hero’ in the Coverage of East Timor”, The Jakarta Post, http:// www.sidsnet.org/mir/pacific/usp/journ/nius/docs/nov99/2458.html, November 19, 1999: 3.

196 find the model character of a soldier or military leader similar to Wibisana was apparently difficult. During the Wahid era, military figures such as Agus Wirahadkusumah and his close allies might have the character Wibisana, while Wiranto and the supporters of his policy on East Timor might reflect the character Kumbakarna.

Likewise, Vonny Kusumastuti, a Javanese native and expert on ancient Indonesian political systems, explained the repressive character of the Indonesian military by linking it to the culture of violence that grew in different Mataram dynasties. During these times, struggles for power and succession were followed with conflicts, chaos, coup d’état, civil war, and bloodshed. According to Vonny, various mayhems and human rights abuses orchestrated by the military during the Wahid presidency, and the political disorder that led to his impeachment were comparable to similar episodes that happened in the Babad Mataram. In this context, a culture of violence such as amok, scorched-earth policy, and targeting large number of kawula (ordinary people) took place both in old and modern Indonesian political systems.249

In an interview with the author, Wahid added that there was a similarity between the current behavior of military officers and the past keraton (the palace of the Javanese king) guards, particularly regarding their policy of prioritizing security approaches. He therefore criticized military leaders who still threatened to stage a coup against civilian leaders whose policies were against their wishes.250 Maj. Gen. Wirahadikusumah, one of the few officers following the character of Wibisana criticized that human rights abuses such as in East Timor are just part of a larger culture of impunity within the Indonesian military. This was actually a clear but rare acknowledgment by a TNI officer who for a long time had known that military brutality had occurred and was perceived as normal practice.251 As from the point of view of Wirahadikusumah and other intellectual officers human rights abuses such as in East Timor were very embarrassing, they wanted to end that sort of culture, and so vehemently pushed internal reform. Nonetheless, the pro- establishment group in the TNI leadership saw the critics as a serious challenge to the chain of command and a threat to their authority. This caused Kostrad commander, Lt. Gen. Djaja Suparman, to angrily respond to the criticism by declaring that attacks on the officer corps would anger the military as a whole, including the troops.252

Commenting on the Kostrad commander’s reaction, Wirahadikusumah’s ally, Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi, replied that efforts to transform TNI into warlord troops, not professional soldiers, continued. According to Saurip it was precisely such efforts that had led TNI to become deeply involved in numerous violent incidents across the country.

249 Vonny Kusumastuti was interviewed on October 11, 2006 in Jakarta. 250 Abdurrahman Wahid was interviewed on October 14, 2006 in Jakarta. 251 Harian Kompas, February 2, 2000: 1 cited in O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 357. 252 The Editors, Indonesia, 2000, loc.cit: 135.

197 They were also involved in the unconstitutional attempts of challenging the authorities of legitimate civilian regimes, such as Sukarno and Habibie. This bad old culture of TNI must be eradicated, if the country wanted to see the military functioning only as an instrument of the state and no longer one of ambitious individual figures.253

Human rights violations occurred persistently due to the strong existence of a culture of violence that the soldiers inherited from the past. In this context, TNI soldiers sticked to their old principle of countering violence with violence.254 TNI, therefore, should start to reform their educational, recruitment, and training systems. As also reminded by Wahid’s cabinet member, A.S. Hikam, the corporate culture of the military did not change because the curricula were still the same as during the Soeharto era.255

Mufti Makarim, the human rights activist from human rights advocacy group Kontras, deplored the long standing culture of violence that had been internalized in the TNI institution. Even though many officers or soldiers have been investigated as gross human right violators and some of them had been jailed, violence orchestrated by the military during the Wahid period continued unabated.256 Kusnanto thus stated that without a comprehensive change of the TNI’s old doctrines and values, he was pessimis- tic that the armed forces would behave as expected and become professional soldiers who adapt to reform demands. Even with such comprehensive change, he added, the country would still need 20-30 years, or one generation, to definitely see its military be able to uphold civilian supremacy. This means that current TNI soldiers were still imbued with their old culture that always encouraged them to seek tahta (reign), kuasa (power), and harta (wealth) by exercising their social, economic, and political functions, outside their core function of defense.257

III.C. Military Response to Wahid’s Concern on Human Rights

Wahid’s support of KPP HAM Timtim to investigate the alleged East Timor gross human rights abuses resulted in the most comprehensive inquiry that the military had ever faced, with potentially wide-ranging consequences not only for the TNI leadership but also for the TNI institution in general. The TNI believed that if chief commander, Gen. Wiranto could be punished, other officers linked to abuses, including those in the Soeharto era, could be held accountable as well. The war crimes tribunal in the

253 Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi was interviewed on November 8, 2006 in Jakarta. 254 Rusdi Marpaung and Al-Araf, human rights activists from Imparsial, were interviewed on April 9, 2008 in Jakarta. 255 AS Hikam was interviewed on April 10, 2008 in Jakarta. 256 Mufti Makaraim was interviewed on July 24, 2006 in Jakarta. 257 Kusnanto Anggoro was interviewed on October 11, 2006 in Jakarta.

198 International Court in Den Haag, which was trying Serbian leaders for gross human rights abuses at that time, caused serious concern for Wiranto and his subordinated generals.258 Charged with crimes against humanity they would have a lot to loose: their rank, prestige, wealth and even freedom. Hence, their stiff resistance against human rights investigations.

Responding to speculation that Wahid intended to dismiss leading military figures, including.TNI chief and coordinating minister for defense and national security, Gen. Wiranto, army chief Gen. Sutarto and Kostrad commander Lt. Gen. Djaja, the pro- Wiranto spokesman, Maj. Gen. Sudrajat, abruptly disputed the president’s authority over the TNI. Interpreting the constitution, he argued that the clause vesting the president with the highest authority over the army, navy, and air force did not mean that he was the supreme commander, a title that was used only in the United StatesS.259 Wahid sought to immediately discharge Sudrajat, but was hindered of doing so by the military leadership. Confronted with a dominance of conservative generals, it took him 1 month to finally get the military spokesman replaced.

As a result, when KPP HAM Timtim started its investigation in mid-December 1999, it corresponded with another upsurge in religious violence in Indonesia. It is true that the country had to grapple with endemic unrest since the beginning of Habibie’s civilian rule, but it must be underlined here that never before had so many conflicts exploded simultaneously. This was even more surprising as the country’s economy was gradually recovering from the disastrous effects of the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998. Within a month, no less than half a dozen incidents broke out, inter alia, the Wisma Doulos attack, the escalation of the Maluku conflict, separatist rebellions in Aceh and Irian Jaya, the religious uprising in Lombok, and new waves of mysterious killings of the alleged dukun santet or dukun tenung (black magic healers or practitioners, or witches) in Java.

Table 5 List of Major Incidents of Violence During Wahid

T i m e Incidents of Violence December 1999 New wave of of sectarian conflicts in Maluku December 1999 New wave of conflict in Aceh December 15, 1999 Attacks on Christian humanitarian foundation (Wisma Doulos) in East Jakarta.

258 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 341-342. 259 ”Kapuspen: Presiden Bukan Pangti TNI” (“TNI Spokesperson: President Not Chief in Chief”), Harian Republika, December 28, 1999: 2.

199 December 1999 - January 2001 Mysterious killing of dukung tenung (witches) March 5, 2000 Assassination attempt on Matori Abdul Djalil, PKB chairperson and MPR deputy speaker April - June 2000 New waves of sectarian conflicts in Poso, Central Sulawesi May 28, 2000 Bomb explosion in GKPI church in Medan July 2000 Ninja Action in Central Kalimantan July 22, 2000 Bomb explosion in Santa Anna and HKBP churches in Medan and Jakarta July 2000 The beginning of new sporadic conflicts in Irian Jaya August 1, 2000 Bomb explosion in front of the Philippine Embassy August 20, 2000 Bomb explosions in GKRI and GKII churches in Medan August 27, 2000 Bomb explosion in the house of a Protestant Priest September 13, 2000 Bomb explosion in the Jakarta Stock Exchange building October 14, 2000 Bomb explosion in, Newmonth, a multi national company in Sumbawa. November 12, 2000 Bomb explosion in ISTP, an educational institution founded by a noted Protestant figure, TD Pardede, in Medan September-December 2000 Escalation of conflict in Aceh December 15, 2000 Youth brawl which later instigated new wave of ethnic clashes in East Kalimantan December 24, 2000 Bomb explosions in churches and other Christian targets in Jakarta, Bekasi, Sukabumi, Medan, Pematang Siantar Pekan Baru, Batam, Mataram March 2001 Escalation of ethnic clashes in Central Kalimantan Source: Harian Kompas, Majalah Tempo, and Majalah Panji Masyarakat December 1999-March 2001

In the regions of East and Central Java, where most of President Wahid’s NU supporters lived, the killings of the alleged dukun santet rapidly began to spread again. In fact, in Java, these incidents occurred repeatedly, following the escalation of political tensions and elite conflicts in Jakarta. According to a NU investigation team, 143 people, including eighty-three NU members, have died since the Banyuwangi killings started in

200 1998, along with another 105 murders in neighbouring regions such as Jember, Lumajang, Pasuruan, and Sumenep.260 At this time only about eighteen victims were reported by the mass media, but the total number was believed to be higher and the method of the murders was essentially the same as in early July 1998. Additionally, in a press conference the East Java police chief stated that Jakarta thugs had been hired to carry out the killings through covert intelligence and psychological operations. According to this source, they were paid around Rp. 3 million for one killing.261

It was not, therefore, by chance, that the cases emerged barely 3 months after an evidently planned scorched-earth campaign in East Timor had been accomplished. They coincided with the KPP HAM Timtim’s hearings, which were held between mid- December 1999 and late January 2001, when the violence across the country peaked. Certainly, not all incidents might have been orchestrated by the military, but rather have been triggered by the prolonged economic crisis and social injustice. Yet, there was abundant reason to believe that the new wave of violence was intentionally incited to divert government attention from KPP HAM Timtim and impel the president to stop enquiries into human rights abuses of the military in East Timor.262

The findings of the KPP HAM Timtim enquiry, which held TNI responsible for at least fourteen cases of human rights violations in the form of killings, rapes, tortures, forced disappearances and so forth,263 further increased the tensions. After President Wahid had forced Gen. Wiranto to step down from his position as coordinating minister for politics and security as a result of the KPP HAM investigation, coup rumors swept through Jakarta and persisted for several months during the escalating conflict between the president and Wiranto.

Regarding the military reactions to human rights investigations, O’Donnell and Schmitter noted that the more brutal, inhumane, and extensive the military’s human rights violations had been, the more the perpetrators feel threatened. Failing to provide an amnesty or resorting to some sort of amnesia in this case would cause the military to remain a serious threat to the emerging democracy.264 It was thus no coincidence that the coup rumours subsided after Wahid obtained a guarantee from UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that Wiranto would not be tried by the International Court in The Hague. In the light of military pressure it was also quite obvious why Attorney General Darusman’s

260 “East Java Cleric's Killing 'Politically Motivated'”, Laksamana.net, November 30, 2003; “Ninja Killers' Resurface in East Java”, Laksamana.net, November 30, 2003. 261 ”Pelaku Pembunuhan ‘Dukun Santet’ di Malang Dibayar Rp. 3 Juta” (“The Perpetrator of ‘Whitch’ Killing in Malang Paid Rp. 3 Million”), Harian Republika, December 27, 2000: 1. 262 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 345. 263 Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on April 10, 2008 in Jakarta. 264 O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whiteheads (eds.), 1986, loc. cit: 29; Elster and Slagstad (eds.), 1988, loc. cit: 24-26.

201 final list of suspects excluded Gen. Wiranto, Maj. Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim and Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, and only included Maj. Gen. AdamDamiri --who was Kodam IX Udayana regional commander from June 16, 1998 until November 1, 1999, whose responsibility consisted of the former East Timor province-- in addition to four colonels and six lieutenant colonels.265

For Darusman it was evident that the major impediment to the prosecution of the alleged human rights abuses in East Timor was intractable elements inside the military.266 Similarly, Wahid had stated that the provocateurs of the religious conflicts and the perpetrators of the serial bombings were supporters of the previous authoritarian Soeharto regime and anti-reform figures, including those inside the military, who were attempting to undermine his government and oust him.267 His moves between April 2000 until May 2001 to dismiss Gen. Endriartono, the army chief, was a manifestation of his frustration with the army and the latter’s growing resistance to his presidency. Predictably, Wahid failed to dismiss Endriartono who not only had the backing of the TNI headquarters but also of all TNI regional commands.

The bombings and the violence incited by military elements thus went largely unresolved and unpunished. Quite to the contrary, rising military pressure and his intensifying conflict with the legislature eventually forced Wahid to relent in his stance on human rights courts. In mid-April 2001, he signed a presidential decree that established a legal basis for ad-hoc human rights courts, but it was restricted to only trying the violations that occurred after the August 30, 1999 East Timor referendum. His decision was a concession to the military, effectively excluding the pre-referendum human rights violations that had been investigated by the KPP HAM Timtim268 and which according to the KPP HAM Timtim indicated TNI elements’ involvement and lack of responsibility in preventing systematic violence and crimes against humanity.269 Darusman’s account thus contradicted the one of Lt. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri, an Indonesian commander who was in charge of East Timor post-referendum security operations. Asked by the Joint Indonesia- Timor Leste Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) in a public hearing on October 24, 2007, in Jakarta, Kiki contended that there were no planned violations of human rights.270

265 O’ Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 375. 266 Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on December 17, 2007 and April 10, 2008 in Jakarta. 267 Abdurrahman Wahid was interviewed on October 14, 2006 in Jakarta. 268 Marzuki Darusman, in the interview on December 17, 2007 and April 10, 2008 in Jakarta, also told that constraint. 269 Author’s interview with Marzuki Darusman on April 10, 2008 in Jakarta; “Laporan Lengkap KPP HAM Timtim oleh Komnas HAM,” http://www.elsam.or.id/pdf/monham/timtim/Laporan%20Leng- kap%20KPP% 20HAM%20Timtim%20oleh%20Komnas%20HAM.pdf, was accessed on July 3, 2010. 270 Desy Nurhayati, “TNI ‘Armed’ East Timor Civilians,” The Jakarta Post, October 25, 2007, loc.cit.

202 Neither was President Wahid able to proceed with the prosecution of the Trisakti shootings and the May 1998 tragedy. Under heavy pressure of the TNI/Police faction in the DPR and supported by the Islamist parties, a Special Commission of the Parliament (Pansus) investigating the cases, had designated them as ordinary crimes, reducing their status from gross human rights violations as recommended earlier by Komnas HAM.271. In other words, the cases would not be processed in an ad-hoc, but rather a military tribunal, disregarding the conclusions of the previous enquiries.272 Consequently, Attorney General Darusman could not prosecute active or retired generals in the TNI for their alleged involvement.273 Wahid’s move to disclose the alleged involvement of the military in past military atrocities reconciled Lt. Gen. Prabowo, who was earlier accused of masterminding the May 1998 riots, with his main rival, Gen. Wiranto. Both of them thus shared an interest in challenging and eventually ousting President Wahid.

While it was obvious that the riots were not about race or ethnicity but rather an orgy of organized violence stemming from an intra-elite conflict, especially inside the military,274 Wahid’s hands to shed further light into these incidents were bound. What his government could finally do was only to uncover the case of the kidnapping and forced disappearance of political and student activists during 1996-1998. These cases became the prologue of the May 13-15, 1998 anti-Chinese riots and the Trisakti shootings which were connected with them in terms of cause and effect.275 But again, in the cases of the kidnappings, forced disappearances and the Trisakti shootings only middle-ranking officers up to the rank of colonel were considered responsible and could be sent to court, while the generals could not even be summoned.276 Moreover, due to the DPR legislation mentioned above, these middle-ranking soldiers could not be brought to an ad-hoc human rights court as required in Law (UU) No. 39/1999 on human rights. Instead, they were tried by a military court. This meant that the cases of kidnapping and forced disappearance were not tried as gross human rights abuses, but only as ordinary violations of military discipline and rules.

Much to the dismay of the victims of the gross human rights violations as well as their families the military courts freed all defendants accused in connection with the

271 Quite disturbingly, rather than being examined as a suspected perpetrator, Lt. Gen. Prabowo was treated like a hero while giving testimony in parliament, according to the reports of the Joint-Fact Finding Team and other independent investigation teams. The writer was present at the testimony held by DPR Pansus (Special Committee) at that time (2000). 272 Harold Crouch, “Establishing Civilian Supremacy in Southeast Asia,” in Uwe Johannen and James Gomez (eds.), Democratic Transitions in Asia, Singapore: Select Publishing, 2001: 182. 273 Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on December 17, 2007 and April 10, 2008 in Jakarta. 274 John McBeth, “Shadow Play”, Australia Review, July 23, 1998. 275 Ibid. 276 “Penantian Panjang Korban Pelanggaran HAM,” (“Deep Expectation of Human Rights Victims”), Wa- cana Ham, 2nd Edition, VI,July 1-31, 2008, http://www.komnasham.go.id/portal/files/wacana%20edisi% 20 JULI%202008.pdf, was accessed on May 11, 2010: 5-6.

203 Trisakti and May riots. Because of the pressure and intervention of the military, President Wahid was unable to show his consistent respect to human rights as he had done in the past as a societal leader. Understandably, the reform movement massively criticized this setback to implementing transitional justice which they attributed to the TNI’s interest in protecting their soldiers from prosecution for alleged gross human rights violations,277 and President Wahid’s political weakness. Wahid’s behavior in fact corroborated O’Donnell and Schmitter’s argument that a policy of amnesty or amnesia on the part of the civilian regime in the post-authoritarian period would be less dangerous for the new democracy than proceeding with the prosecution of human rights violations.278

IV. Coping with Separatism

IV.A. What Had Influenced Wahid’s Response to Secessionism?

Because Indonesia was an archipelagic state, for Wahid, a unitary state was more suitable for keeping the more than 17,000 islands together rather than a federal state. His inclination to the unitary principle became apparent when he chaired NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), the mass-organization professinga syncretic Islam that incorporated elements of Javanese mysticism, as well as ancient Hindu and Buddhist traditions, from 1984 until 1999. In reverse, he declined to support the adoption of a federal state as proposed by Amien Rais, the leader of Muhammadiyah, the other large Islamic socio-religious organization which in contrast to NU stood for a modernist version of Islam. He supported decentralization and special autonomy, provided that they remained within the framework of the unitary state of Indonesia.279

In order to avert moves for initiating federal states, such as what had been promoted by Marwah Daud Ibrahim and other politicians from Sulawesi frustrated with Habibie’s defeat and Javanese domination of politics, Wahid took early steps by putting national integration near the top of his government agenda. This included appointing ministers from a wide variety of regions to his cabinet.280 Moreover, at his presidential swearing-in ceremony, he vowed to defend the integrity of the territory of Indonesia against “other countries that sometimes underestimate our feelings and dignity.”281 His emphasis on the need to protect the country’s territorial integrity could be associated with

277 Rusdi Marpaung and Al-Araf, human rights activists of Imparsial, were interviewed on April 9, 2008 in Jakarta. 278 O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (eds.), 1986, loc. cit: 29. 279 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 16, 431. 280 David Bourchier,“Habibie’s Interregnum: Reformasi, Elections, Regionalism and the Struggle for Po- wer,“ in Chris Manning and Peter van Diermen (eds.), Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Refor- masi and Crisis, Singapore, ISEAS, 2000. 281 “Indonesian President Pledges to Uphold Democracy,” loc. cit.

204 his disappointment in the result of the referendum in East Timor which had led to the secession of the province and the formation of an independent state.

Later, responding to the manifold internal threats Indonesia was facing and the various pressures produced by globalization, Wahid often restated the importance of Indonesia’s territorial integrity. According to him, good international relations should be based on the principles of mutual respect, and Indonesia would not allow other countries to pass judgment on Indonesia or interfere in its interal affairs. He knew that this was an uphill task given Indonesia’s great diversity, and the continuing communal and separatist unrest threatening to tear the country apart and raising the spectre of Indonesia becoming a “failing state.” However, by quoting what the founding father of the nation, Sukarno, said, Wahid stated that Indonesia had a reason to be one nation with a notion of the unitary state, which should be consistently upheld.282

In view of the threat of disintegration, Wahid was aware that the country needed a strong leader who could effectively respond to a greater trend of fundamentalism, factionalism, and separatism which endangered the NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia --Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia), a key element of Pancasila, Indonesia’s state ideology. Persistently he reminded others that religion and, more specifically, Islam had merely been used by political elites as a political vehicle to meet their ambition for power. For this reason, he asked political elites and their supporters to uphold Pancasila. For him the nation’s commitment to the unitary state was not negotiable.283

In his response to the jihad campaign of radical Muslims, President Wahid demanded that they abstain from combatting Christians, but rather defend NKRI from disintegration. For Wahid, defending the NKRI and the Pancasila ideology was a religious duty.284 That is why he supported the initiative of various youth groups and religious leaders in organizing a national youth oath ceremony day to reinforce the nation’s commitment to keep on protecting the NKRI.

However, critics accused President Wahid of excessively pursuing romantic Javanese ideals of social harmony.285 His offer of governmental posts to all elements of the political spectrum, including the ancient régime, had associated him with the notion of inclusiveness or “integralism” that characterized Javanese politics. No less important, he was another Indonesian leader who was fond of Javanese culture as exemplified by the wayang shadow plays. It was therefore argued that President Wahid was a culturalistic

282 Ibid. 283 Windoro Adi, “Apel Pancasila: Kamu-kamu, Kita-kita” (“Pancasila Day Celebration: Between You and Us”), Harian Kompas, June 8, 2006: 5. 284 “Pertahankan Pancasila” (“Uphold Pancasila”), Harian Kompas, September 22, 2006, loc.cit: 2. 285 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 195, 344.

205 Muslim with the instincts of a Javanese king. Asked about whether he would prefer to maintain the principle of the unitary state over democracy amid the threat of disintegration, one of these king-like sentiments became manifest as he affirmed that he preferred to preserve NKRI, although this would make him somewhat despotic.286 That is why Sebastian pointed out that despite their vastly different perceptions of concepts such as “revolution,” “development,” or “reform,” Sukarno, Soeharto, and Wahid shared an adherence to a conservative ideology derived from Javanese tradition.287

IV.B. What Had Influenced Military Response to Secessionism?

In the past, in order to facilitate the process of nation building, President Soeharto introduced a policy of social integration through transmigration. At first glance, his original idea to integrate different ethnic groups across the country through the melting pot policy of transmigration with the ultimate goal of creating “a new Indonesian society” and to build national identity and awareness appeared quite plausible. This policy, which was backed by the military however became counter-productive in the long-run. What Soeharto and his military implemented was not a process of true integration of migrants and local inhabitants, but rather a process of Javanization. Thus, the regime sent large numbers of Javanese to be settled in regions outside Java, where they often failed to recognize local traditional customs and come into conflict with the indigenous population.288

As pointed out by Fearnside, the Soeharto regime made no secret of its objective of quickening the demise of tribal cultures and languages, and replacing them with the dominant Javanese culture.289 The feeling of alienation and even hatred among the local population towards the domination by Javanese migrants in both the governmental as well as the private sector was therefore not surprising as even casual observers noticed.290 Schmitz described the process of Indonesianization of the archipelago as no more than the Javanization of the Indonesian Republic, while Klein observed that, in the construction of Indonesia’s national culture, Javanese culture played a principal role.291

286 “Pertahankan Pancasila” (“Uphold Pancasila”), Harian Kompas, September 22, 2006: 2. 287 Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 48. 288 Patrick Guiness, “Local Society and Culture,” Hal Hill (eds.), Indonesia’s New Order: the Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation, Honolulu, 1994: 278. 289 Philip M. Fearnside,“Transmigration in Indonesia: Lessons from its Environmental and Social Impacts,” Environmental Management, No. 4, 1997: 563. 290 Riwanto Tirtosudarmo,“Economic Development, Migration, and Ethnic Conflict: A Preliminary Obser- vation,” Sojourn, No. 2, 1997: 315. 291 Martin Klein, Javanismus und Herrschaft in Indonesien: Zum Zusammenhang von Kulturinterpretation und Ideologie, Suedostasien Working Papers der Humboldt Universitaet zu Berlin, No. 6, Berlin, 1997, Schmitz, 2003, op.cit: 75.

206 Javanization permeated in the civilian bureaucracy from the highest to the lowest levels, and the public as well as the private sector. Further, the Javanese cultural hegemony was strengthened by a similar Javanization of the military institution, whose structure or hierarchical structure paralleled the civilian bureaucracy. Thus, with its repressive approach, for more than three decades, the military played a key role as the government’s tool in safeguarding Soeharto’s politics of homogeneity and a nation building process dominated by Javanese political culture.292

Additionally, the strong existence of feudal values in Indonesian politics and military life was reflected by the persistent use of Javanese terminologies of power. Some of these were: satria piningit (model leader in Javanese society), kesatyaan (loyalty), and, mostly, manunggaling kawula-gusti (the unity of people and the king, who represents God in the microcosms or on earth), which was later developed into kemanunggalan rakyat dengan tentara or the unity between people and soldier (and no separation between political and military functions), and which had been adopted to support the dual function of the military.293 In this relation, military leaders during the Wahid period, such as Wiranto and Ryamizard, often referred in analogy to pre-colonial Javanese Kingdoms and their rulers in order to explain Indonesia’s current situation.294 Wiranto, for instance, often mentioned kesatyaan to show his loyalty and respect to previous leaders such as Soeharto, and emphasized keselarasan (harmony) to oppose aspirations of federalism and pressure for reform.295 In fact, Wiranto’s loyalty to Soeharto was never in doubt. Immediately after the short resignation ceremony of Soeharto, he took the microphone and announced to the nation that he would personally protect the safety and the dignity of the former president and his family.296 Usually, someone deeply socialized in Javanese culture would publicly use the word “harmony” in order to send a strong message to those who were challenging his power that he would ultimately use force (gebuk) against his challengers. It was, therefore, as earlier stated by Magnis-Suseno that rukun (harmonious community) was a keyword to venture at all times that contained signs of social or personal tensions, and to preserve the impression of harmonized social relationships as much as possible.297

292 Schmitz, 2003, op.cit: 94. 293 Interview with Permadi, an expert on Javanese political culture, member of Committee I, dealing with military and defense issues, in DPR, on November 25, 2006 in Bogor. 294 Interview with Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta; See also, Bilveer Singh, Ryamizard -- in the Footsteps of Gajah Mada, Sydney: Book House, 2005. 295 See, for example, Shenon, 1998, loc.cit; also Idi Subandy Ibrahim (ed.), Dari Catatan Wiranto: Ber- saksi di Tengah Badai (From Wiranto Notes: Testimonials in Mid of Storm Attack), Jakarta, IDe, Indonesia, 2003. 296 Endy M. Bayuni, “How Soeharto Schemed and Habibie Botched it”, The Jakarta Post, October 9, 2006: 2. 297 Magnis-Suseno, 1997, op. cit: 43.

207 Gen. Ryamizard habitually cited Gajah Mada, the greatest general of pre-modern Indonesia. Gajah Mada was also the prime minister and an important ruler of the old Javanese Majapahit kingdom, who was credited with the territorial expansion and maintenance of the kingdom, particularly during the years 1331 to 1364, which is considered by the military as the origin of the Indonesian state and nation.298 In replying to his opponents, he frequently reminded them to pay respect the country’s principle of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (unity in diversity), which also originated from old Javanese language, and also Pancasila, the five principles derived from the Majapahit and Gajah Mada era. Furthermore, he often mentioned national unity, national territory, the life and culture of the armed forces, their role in national politics, and their pursuit for unity. All these references can be traced to the Gajah Mada period and the practices and experiences of this era.299

However, the strong reliance on values of Javanese political culture made military leaders target for critics. Officers like Ryamizard who was never trained abroad reacted defensively to such critique. Ryamizard, for example, responded to reform pressure by stating that the country is under cultural attack. Despite its great historical past and rich cultural heritage, external forces had been attempting to transplant alien ideas into the country in the name of development and modernization. In Ryamizard’s view, ideas such as democracy, human rights, and accountability should be adapted to Indonesia’s conditions and needs even though they were progressive and became part of the recent global discourse. The semantics of Javanese politics thus signified that the military was not prepared to follow their civilian president and his refomist policies.

As explained by Choirie, the existing influence of Javanese political culture on the military was reflected in its leaders’ views on the concept of the unitary state, accumulation of power, culture of violence, and the use of repressive measures which were in accordance with its defensive response to the mounting pressure for federalism, separatism, security sector reform, and civilian supremacy, demands that had been raised by the reform movement.300 As already discussed earlier, the Javanese conceived power as a concrete matter, not as something abstract. More fundamentally, it was sacred: it was transferred by God to the king. In order to show that the king was in possession of wahyu (mandate), power had to be concentrated in him completely. It could not be reduced or divided to another person. A division of power would mean that the king no longer held full wahyu from God, leading to the loss of his legitimacy as king.301 For the Javanese, there existed only one sun, meaning that in society or a state, and even an organization,

298 Singh, 2005, op. cit: 18-19. 299 Ryamizard was interviewed on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta; See also, Singh, 2005, op. cit: 18-19. 300 Effendy Choirie was interviewed on July 11, 2006 in Jakarta. 301 Anderson, in Claire Holt (ed.), 1972, loc.cit; Anderson, 1990, op.cit: 19-20; 22-24, 36, 41; Sebastian, 2006, op. cit: 9-10.

208 they admitted only one single authority. There were no twin leaders that had the same or equal authority or power (ora ana srengenge kembar).302 Thus, the more of power the king held, the stronger was the legitimation of God and the people he obtained.

More specifically, every Javanese king would preserve the traditional values of keselarasan (harmony) and keheningan (tranquility) in his government as long as possible. Otherwise, people would question whether he still deserved the whole wahyu or not, raising doubts that he was still the right king to govern. Therefore, the king would seek to maintan keselarasan and keheningan, even if this included the adoption of repressive means through his hulubalang (guards).303 Thus, the adherence of Indonesian leaders since Sukarno, as well as their military, to the principle of the unitary state of Indonesia (NKRI) had its historical and cultural roots in the Javanese concept of power. This immersion had been further laid down in the modern 1945 State Constitution and in state ideology, Pancasila. For this reason, the idea of devolution, or even federalism, was difficult to accept.304

Not surprisingly, military leaders such as Wiranto, Tyasno and Ryamizard were not at ease with proposals for amendments to the 1945 State Constitution raised by the reform movement. Wiranto, for instance, argued that the amendments would change the essential philosophies of keselarasan, manunggaling kawula-gusti, and so forth that in due course would damage keheningan. This, for him, would threaten state integration because the amendments would be against the nation’s basic principle of kebersamaan (togetherness) and negara kekeluargaan (familiness).305

Former army chief Tyasno stated that the amendments would eradicate keseragaman (uniformity), which had become the identity of the nation, kesetiaan (loyality), and other political values inherited from the past, thus jeopardizing the unitary state (NKRI).306 He suspected foreign countries behind the mounting pressure on the amendments of the 1945 State Constitution.307 Especially, liberalization would challenge the existence of Indonesia as an integral state, based on the national principle of togetherness and the organic family principle.308

302 Subroto, 2009, op.cit: 456. 303 Maj. Gen. Saurif Kadi was interviewed on November 8, 2006 in Jakarta. 304 Ibid. 305 “Amandemen Jangan Digagas Politisi” (“Amendments May Not be Proposed by Politicians“), Harian Kompas, March 22, 2007: 1. 306 “Gerakan Revolusi Nurani Anggap Perubahan UUD 1945 Tidak Sah” (“The Moral Revolution Move- ment Views the Amendments of the 1945 Constitution Not Legitimate“), Harian Kompas, January 4, 2007: 3. 307 ”Tyasno: Amandemen UUD’45 Tidak Sah” (“Tyasno: The Amendments of the 1945 Constitution Not Legitimate“), Suara Pembaruan, September 21, 2006: 2. 308 “Indonesia Harus Kembali ke UUD 1945 Asli dan Pancasila”, Harian Kompas, July6, 2006: 4.

209 Similar to Tyasno, in a more direct way, Ryamizard accused foreign countries of assisting certain groups in society encouraging fundamental changes in Indonesia. His accusation was actually targeting the reform movement which he suspected of having turned into conspirators selling their country in exchange for personal benefits. While charging that reformist aspirations had started to damage the country, he claimed that the military had responsibility for preventing the country from disintegration caused by the fundamental changes of the NKRI principle, the 1945 State Constitution, and the Pancasila.309 Therefore, as Nordholt pointed out, the military always perceived itself as the only force that could keep the Indonesian state intact.310

IV.C. Military Views on Decentralization

The Indonesian military officers’ mindset was centralistic in nature. Since its formation, the leaders of the armed forces stressed the important existence of the unitary state and their interests to maintain it. Military leaders thus complained that the decentralization policies initiated through Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999 under Habibie and implemented by Wahid, would severely damage national integration mainly because the authority of local governments would become too extensive. Moreover, as Law No. 22/1999 stipulated that provincial and district heads would be directly elected, the appointment of military personnel to local government positions as practiced under the dual function doctrine would no longer be possible, Henceforth, military officers would have to retire before running in the election. The military thus feared that decentralization would diminish the military’s opportunities to interfere in civilian affairs and continue its socio-political role.311

Decentralization was also seen by the military as a threat in conjunction with the rise of political Islam312 It feared that it would markedly widen the latter’s scope for political mobilization, even to the point of demanding the implementation of the syariah law.313 The military itself still kept its threat doctrine that was developed in the mid- 1980s, which declared that any ideology directed against Pancasila should be crushed. In view of this, conservative Islam was actually perceived as part of the so-called “right extremes” (Honna, 1999).

309 “Kostrad Tetap Loyal kepada NKRI” (”Kostrad Still Loyal to NKRI”), Mei 21, 2000, http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2001/ 05/20/0040.html: 1-3. 310 Nordholt, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc.cit: 52. 311 Eldridge, 2002, op.cit: 140. 312 Suryadinata, 1992, 1998; Rinakit, 2005. 313 Rinakit, 2005, ibid: 77.

210 Military leaders also feared that the transfer of autonomy to the regions would threaten the future of their territorial commands. Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999, which led to an unprecendented increase of regional autonomy, and Government Regulation No. VI/2000, which conveyed the authority to the police to handle domestic security affairs, had affected military organization at district levels. Under the new legal provisions, local government would utilize the police, not the military to combat disturbances of public order. The military’s presence at those levels would thus no longer be relevant, and it would lose its direct access to controlling society. Reasonably, many TNI officers anticipated that their interests would be jeopardized by the continuation of decentralization under Wahid.314

Military resistance against decentralization was indicated by the involvement of soldiers in provoking and exacerbating unrest throughout the country, which hampered the implementation of decentralization. In unstable regions where police could not longer maintain public order, the military now had reason to maintain, and even to re-establish, its territorial commands. In Aceh and Maluku, for instance, the armed forces could re- establish Kodam Iskandar Muda and Kodam XVI Pattimura military regional commands after social violence broke out there again. Thus, an established presence and de facto parallel administrative status provided the military continued strength at the regional and local levels.

As a result, it was not easy to dismantle the military’s territorial structure during the Wahid era. In the absence of adequate police strength, many military officers and even parts of the public regarded the territorial commands as still vital in preserving order in conflict regions. With only 200,000 personnel, the police was totally understaffed and hardly in a position to take over all of the military’s law-and-order functions. Also, in respect to the military’s business interests in various parts of the country, territorial appointments were coveted among many officers who regarded them as avenues to wealth. At the same time, the dismantling of the territorial structure would strongly limit opportunities of soldiers for promotion and access for patronage.315

Therefore, as also observed by Eldridge, although much of its formal authorities had been reduced, the military continued to retain its influence at the regional and local levels by maintaining the territorial system. In regions such as Aceh and Papua, where secessionist threats were serious, the presence of TNI soldiers was the heaviest. Unfortunately, however, they did not demonstrate a willingness to provide security for citizens against outbreaks of disorders. In many cases, they even worsened the situation in order to create local dependency on their presence and increase their bargaining position vis-à-vis the central government. Such a strategy was seemingly meant to undermine

314 Ibid: 79-80.

211 democratic reforms initiated by Wahid. Not surprisingly, accusations emerged that Soeharto loyalists in the military were provoking violence elsewhere to destabilize Indonesia’s fledgling democratic system through the use of their territorial command structure.316

IV.D. Wahid’s Policy Regarding Separatist Conflict in East Timor

During his presidential campaign, Wahid sharply criticized Habibie for his rash proposal of a referendum on East Timor’s independence. Nonetheless, as a newly elected president, he complied with the result of the referendum that granted East Timor independence status, and, remarkably, he offered Indonesia’s cooperation and friendship. He sought to address separatist conflict there in a civilized manner and put an end to the repressive approach that had been adopted by the military since the territory’s 1975 invasion by Indonesian forces.

However, before, while campaigning for presidency, however, Wahid also resorted to a “military-nationalist” language in his attempt to draw military support for his presidential bid. He justified this stance, on the one hand, by arguing that Indonesia had to follow its own rather than others’ understanding of East Timor. On the other hand, however, he accused NGOs of colluding with foreign associates in using East Timor to corner Indonesia. For Wahid, criticism of military errors at that time was exaggerated since such errors derived more from individual than institutional causes, and, more importantly, the military was still in the process of correction.317 He viewed the foreign comdemnation of Indonesia’s East Timor referendum process on the whole as unacceptable.

Surprisingly, faced with the uncontrollable situation in East Timor, Wahid changed his mind and sent a letter to the UN Security Council on September 7, 2000 to strongly condemn the post-referendum killings in West Timor, the nearest Indonesia’s province, which became the new base for TNI after its withdrawal. With US$ 5 billion in World Bank assistance at risk, he demonstrated resolve by shipping two fresh battalions there and inviting international observers to verify progress in seizing the weapons of former pro-integration militias. Later, he supported Komnas HAM and its independent committee for the inquiry on human rights violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM Timtim). It had accomplished its investigation in East Timor and indicted the militias’ main leader,

315 Crouch, in Johannen and Gomez (eds.), 2001, loc.cit: 180. 316 Eldridge, 2002, op.cit: 138-139. 317 Ibid.

212 Eurico Guterres, as a key organizer of riots, and sentenced him to 6 months jail for a weapons offence.318

Due to the rising international pressure and urgent need for foreign aid, Wahid supported KPP-HAM Timtim’s further reports that recommended the prosecution of the military officers.319 He encouraged the start of an official inquiry, for which the Attorney General’s office had named nineteen suspects, including thirteen military officers and three militia leaders.320 Thus, while he was on a series of visits to European countries in early February 2000, KPP-HAM Timtim concluded that the former TNI chief commander, Gen Wiranto, was responsible for what happened in East Timor after the referendum. Wahid immediately reacted by demanding that the general resigns from his current post as coordinating minister for political and security affairs.321 After a dangerous two week stand off and coup rumors circulating in Jakarta, he finally persuaded Wiranto to resign to give a chance for the prosecution.

Wahid’s position vis-à-vis Wiranto became stronger as several leaders of the countries he was visiting conveyed their support to Wahid and expressed great concerns over a military coup. This episode demonstrates how Wahid smartly instrumentalized foreign policy to mobilize international support for his government, thus bolstering his political position in the domestic power struggle. Because of his manoeuvres, the coup d’état threats faded away.322

Under Wahid’s support, the KPP-HAM Timtim had been mandated to investigate reports of systematic killings that led to crimes against humanity, extrajudicial executions, and arbitrary shootings in East Timor during 1999.323 In its findings, the independent commission cited evidences of violent rapes, massive killings, and a planned and systematic scorched-earth policy, which left an estimated 70-80 percent of East Timor’s infrastructure severely damaged by the time the Indonesian military and militia forces withdrew from the territory.324 The KPP-HAM Timtim became the focus of attention because it subpoenaed testimonies from more than thirty prominent officials, militia leaders, or TNI personnel in early December 1999.325 The list included Sjafrie

318 Ibid: 154. 319 Crouch, in Johannen and Gomez, 2001, loc.cit: 182. 320 Eldridge, 2002, op.cit: 157. 321 Sukma, 2003, op. cit: 109. 322 Ibid. 323 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 341. 324 Marzuki Darusman, who chaired the KPP-HAM during the inevestigations, described also this in interview on December 17, 2007 in Jakarta; see also, “East Timor: Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- tices 2000”, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, February 23, 2001, loc. cit. 325 Recently, the vice-chairperson of KPP HAM Timtim, Todung Mulya Lubis, mentioned again the alleged direct or indirect involvements of TNI leaders based on the assumption of commanders responsibility. See,

213 Syamsoeddin and Zacky Makarim, the two alleged planners of the campaign to defend East Timor, and Wiranto. This marked the second time that the three generals had been questioned by an official fact-finding team, following earlier investigations of the May 13-15, 1998 riots in Jakarta during August-September 1998.

Moreover, Wahid also announced a special human rights court on East Timor which however would only try offences after the referendum on August 30, 1999.326 This decision followed a clause in the new Article 28 (I) of the amended 1945 State Constitution, which prohibits trying citizens under retroactive laws, which had been successfully inserted by the military/police faction in the MPR annual session during August 1-18, 2000. Further, he allowed the opening of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) representative office in Jakarta by December 1999, and held direct discussions with East Timorese resistance leaders, overruling military objections. His apology for Indonesia’s past wrongdoings, most of which involved the military, earlier made during an official visit to Dili in February 2000, had generated goodwill and respect among East Timorese, but produced minor protests, especially, from military-nationalist elements in Indonesia.327 Ignoring this reality, on September 1, 2000, Wahid backed Attorney General Darusman in initiating legal proceedings for human rights abuses in East Timor, which came about 6 months after the KPP-HAM recommended trials for the thirty military, militia and civilian figures mentioned above.328

IV.E. Military Response to Wahid Regarding Separatist Conflict in East Timor

The report of the KPP-HAM Timtim of January 31, 2000, presented by Djoko Sugianto, declared that elements of the military, police, and civil government funded, trained, and encouraged militias, both directly and indirectly, that caused human right abuses in East Timor. Similar to Darusman,329 Sugianto, cited evidence of serious human rights abuses conducted in a coordinated, systematic, and a large-scale method. The report specifically acknowledged the form of massacres, searches and seizures, theft, brutality towards women and children, including rape and sexual molestation, forced evacuation, arson, looting, and vandalism. Sugianto said that all these acts represented crimes against humanity. Therefore, the subcommission recommended that the attorney general pursue the investigation of thirty persons, including the entire top echelon of military and

“Restropeksi Pelanggaran HAM di Timtim” (“Retrospection of Human Rights Violations in East Timor”), Harian Kompas, December 22, 2008: 36. 326 Eldridge, 2002, ibid: 157. 327 Ibid: 158. 328 Marzuki Darusman in interview on December 17, 2007 and April 10, 2008 in Jakarta cited the KPP HAM Timtim’s results and recommendations of their investigation. 329 Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on December 17, 2007 and April 10, 2008 in Jakarta.

214 government figures mentioned as responsible in the post-referendum incidents. Remarkably, Soegianto emphasized that paramount responsibility rested with Wiranto on the round that all crimes against humanity in East Timor took place due to the failure of the TNI chief commander to guarantee public security surrounding the balloting process. 330

Several factors, ranging from extensive economic interests of the Soeharto family and military to collusion networks surrounding an ex-provincial governor, led to the creation of the military-nationalist lobby in East Timor. Such interests comprised over half a million hectares of land held for coffee, sugarcane, sandalwood, timber, marble extraction, and a venture in three oil wells and several construction projects. Moreover, Indonesia was interested to exploit oil reserves concentrated in the western region of the territory.331 The loss of all of the military’s vested-interests in East Timor and Wahid’s changing perception towards the military’s role in East Timor after the referendum strongly shaped the military’s behavior to his administration.

Therefore, the Indonesian military continued to push East Timorese refugees to West Timor and preclude their return.332 Reportedly, up to 300,000 people were moved out to the West Timor region, with an estimated 167,000 people arriving in mid-2000. Many who came later had been rounded up by TNI soldiers and paramilitaries, loaded into trucks and boats, and brought to West Timor. Reportedly, the second–in-command officer in the referendum task force, who was also the Bali and West and East Nusa Tenggara (Kodam VI Udayana) regional commander, Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri, played a role in encouraging pro-Indonesia paramilitaries to launch a series of raids across the border into East Timor.333

The paramilitaries also recorded identities of dislocated people at several checkpoints, took control of refugee camps, and aggressively sought out suspected pro- independence sympathizers, many of whom remain unaccounted for. Thus, not only had the presence of the paramilitaries obstructed access of humanitarian aid agencies and the work of UNHCR, but they had also caused the displaced people to be unable to freely decide whether to return home or to stay in Indonesia.334 Their continuing presence through periodic cross-boundary attacks, disinformation campaigns and deterring refugees from returning home, threatened the security of the newly independent state. Later, former

330 Harian Kompas, February 1, 2000: 11, cited in O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 355. 331 Eldridge, 2002, op.cit: 155. 332 Ibid: 156. 333 Lowry,“East Timor: An Overview of Political Developments,” in Manning and van Diermen (Eds.), Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi in Crisis, 2000, loc.cit: 104. 334 Eldridge, 2002, op.cit: 153.

215 minister of defense, Juwono, acknowledged the role of Soeharto loyalists and others attempting to weaken Wahid by supporting the paramilitaries’ activities there.335

A more specific incident, largely connected to the role of the Indonesian military, took place on September 6, 2000, in Atambua, a town located at the border of East and West Timor. Thousands of armed militia assailed the UNHCR office, took the lives of four humanitarian aid workers including an American.336 Obviously, this was hardly a random act of violence. Police officials found Eurico Guterres, the central leader of the pro-Indonesia militia groups, who instructed his followers not to surrender their guns during a recent Wahid government campaign to disarm them, which incited the attack and killings.337 Moreover, the incident occurred just at the time Wahid was at the UN headquarters in New York to deliver a speech before at least 154 other world leaders who assembled for an important world event, the Millennium Summit.338 The official statements of the US Ambassador to the UN at that time, which said that the world had to face the fact that elements within the Indonesian military were directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses, exposed the violent behavior of TNI.339 It does not need much imagination to understand that the incident was aimed at disgracing Wahid. The violence had been used to challenge him, domestically and internationally, in order to prove that the civilian president could not control the current situation and he had lost his credibility.340 One may thus conclude that the human rights investigations on East Timor that began in December 17, 1999 and the subsequent dismissal of Gen. Wiranto from his position as coordinating minister for political and security affairs (Menkopolkam), strongly stiffened TNI resistance against his presidency and led to continued obstruction of the East Timor peace process.

IV.F. Wahid’s Policy Regarding Separatist Conflict in Aceh

Once he was installed, President Wahid ensured quick solutions to regional violence in Aceh and took personal responsibility for it. However, his earlier promise of a referendum for Aceh, which was raised during his presidential campaign, became a major

335 Ibid: 159. 336 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: 107. 337 Sims, 2000, loc.cit. With enough evidence, Eurico Guterres was arrested to become a suspect in the destruction and burning of the UNHCR office in Atambua, while two militia members were arrested and another four were pursued in connection with those killings. 338 John McBeth and Michael Vatikiotis, “Timor: Jakarta’s Shame,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Sep- tember 21, 2000, http://www.feer.com/_0009_21/p16region.html, 339 Warren Caragata,”Batlle of Wills: It’s Still Wahid versus Rogue Military Elements. Can Anyone Win?” Asiaweek, Vol..26, No. 39, October 6, 2000; O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 378. 340 Waluyo, 2007, loc.cit: 125.

216 obstacle for his peace initiatives.341 Wahid thus began his presidency under big pressure from the Acehnese, of whom a large number of ulama (Islamic clerics), local NGO activists, students, and intellectuals joined the SIRA (Sentra Informasi untuk Referendum Aceh --Information Center for Aceh Referendum), and demanded an independence referendum. While Wahid responded evasively to these demands,342 organized demonstrations attended by about one million Acehnese stepped up pressure on the government generating alarm among national elites.343

The increasing Acehnese clamor for a referendum produced a big dilemma for Wahid, because he could not hold a referendum without consulting the parliament. However, such consent could hardly be expected in the light of the earlier disastrous East Timor referendum and the strong position of nationalist parties such as PDIP, Golkar and the military/police faction in the DPR. But also initiatives short of a referendum such as an open-ended dialogue, for which Wahid tolerated a peaceful celebration of the so-called “twenty-third anniversary of the Aceh declaration of independence” of December 4, 1999 and the displays of GAM flags, or his proposal of a complete withdrawal of all central government troops from the province, were no longer acceptable to the Acehnese.

As a result, he had to deny that there would be an independence option. Instead, he offered a new referendum proposal over the introduction of the syariah law and other concessions such as the appointment of Hasballa Sa’ad, a native Acehnese, as human rights minister. While these overtures irritated the military, Acehnese regarded them as worthless.344 Moreover, the promise of a troops withdrawal was not easy to implement given the military’s aversion to such a measure.

Wahid’s policy to preserve the unity of Indonesia and, simultaneously, tolerate more civil liberties and democratization had produced on-going tensions between the military, on the one hand, and SIRA and GAM, on the other. The tensions often caused low-intensity conflicts between TNI soldiers and GAM rebels, triggered by sweeping operations or counter-attacks of each party. Growing international pressure on the military for the atrocities committed in East Timor, increased the military’s frustration of the way the civilian leader was addressing separatist conflicts. Also, the replacement of Gen. Wiranto by Adm. Widodo could not reduce tensions and incidents in Aceh since GAM became stronger and more provocative. According to a report of human rights NGO Kontras (Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Kekerasan --Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence), at least 105 people were killed in Aceh in December

341 The Editors, Indonesia, 2000, loc.cit: 126. 342 “Pemerintah Dinilai Lamban Selesaikan Konflik Makassar” (“The Government Was Seen Slow in Ad- dressing Conflict in Makassar”), Harian Kompas, December 31, 1999, [email protected]. 343 Eldridge, 2002, op.cit: 142. 344 “Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict?” ICG Asia Report, No. 18, June 27, 2001.

217 1999.345 The report was a great embarrassment for the president who subsequently supported the formation of various commissions to inquire into human rights abuses in Aceh, which drew negative reactions from the military.346

But even though the conflict in Aceh worsened, the president did not give up his search for a peaceful settlement. Despite opposition from the parliament and TNI generals, he negotiated a cease-fire with GAM under the mediation of the Henry Dunant Centre, a Geneva-based NGO. On May 12, 2000, the Indonesian government signed with GAM an agreement on a humanitarian pause to stop the armed conflict in the province.

Unfortunately, however, the agreement soon collapsed due to different interpretations of the two due to different interpretations of the two conflicting parties on the implementation modalities. GAM’s proposal for ending attacks and removing all TNI troops, not only for the non-organic (local or special troops), could not be implemented because President Wahid was of the opinion that he still needed the organic troops to maintain formal police operations.

But also in Jakarta, political conditions worsened. The replacement of Gen. Wiranto, and Wahid’s promotions of reformist generals increased TNI resistance against the president. As TNI’s and parliament’s pressure on him mounted, Wahid opportunistically changed his position towards GAM and began to adopt an increasingly tough stance against the separatists. In his accountability speech at the August 2000 MPR annual session, he announced a less compromising approach towards GAM. He vowed that he would no longer allow any separatist movement, and that he would take firm action against separatists. Yet, he was still committed to the policy of special autonomy for Aceh that had been earlier agreed by Habibie and the parliament and some parts of which had to be implemented before the end of 2001. Under this framework, Aceh was entitled to a 70 percent share of oil and gas revenues, and autonomy in religious and educational matters, including the adoption of the syariah law.347

Despite the humanitarian pause, violence in Aceh continued almost unabatedly. The incidents between security forces and GAM worsened during the first and second phase of a humanitarian pause that took place before and after September 2, 2000. They climaxed with the bloodshed of November 10-11, 2000 in Banda Aceh which was caused by a clash between security forces and demonstrators participating in a massive rally organized by SIRA in support of a referendum on independence. The violence, in which thirty-nine people died after the security forces, particularly the police, opened fire into

345 The Jakarta Post, January 29, 2000. 346 Crouch, in Johannen and Gomez, 2001, loc.cit: 182. 347 “Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace,” ICG Asia Report, No. 17, June 12, 2001.

218 the crowds, had not only damaged his peace options and impeded subsequent negotiations, but also tarnished the image of his government in Aceh.348

In the meantime, GAM became more aggressive in searching for new targets. After consecutive attacks on cabinet members and American energy giant Exxon Mobil, which disrupted the activities of other major industries in Aceh, President Wahid had no choice but to support TNI in sending 2,000 additional troops to protect the firms so that they were able to continue their operations.349 Also a limited agreement for the cessation of hostilities (COHA) within restricted zones in North Aceh and Bireun for only 2 weeks from March 22 to April 3, 2001 failed.

Thus, in February 2001, Wahid’s defence minister, Mahfud M.D. stated that the government had shown patience for a long time to negotiate a peace accord with GAM. Unfortunately, rather than attempting to show good will, GAM separatists tended to step up their armed attacks in an attempt to hasten the secession of Aceh from Indonesia. Since GAM did not change their response, and as his government was losing patience, Mahfud M.D. warned that President Wahid would no longer tolerate GAM separatist actions.350

On the government side, the military always opposed a soft approach to separatism including political dialogue and negotiations. Lack of consistent support from political parties and growing criticism in the legislative bodies (DPR and MPR) and the charge that Wahid jeopardized the unity of the state due to his persistent negotiations with GAM had undermined his position. Therefore, after all his peace initiatives had failed, beginning in mid-March 2001, he introduced a new policy of “limited military operation” to back the on-going police operations in Aceh.351 His break with a conciliatory approach was also marked by his government’s decision to classify GAM as a “separatist” organization. The issuance of the Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 4 on April 11, 2001 gave both political and legal protections for the TNI’s new operation. Wahid apparently tried to force the Acehnese, especially the GAM rebels, to accept the special autonomy status with more repressive measures. As mentioned by Bourchier, the rising resistance and pressure from the military and other opposition groups to his government offered the president no more scope for compromise with the Acehnese (rebels).352

348 Majalah Tempo 29, No. 37, November 13-19, 2000, cited in Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 180, 246. 349 Majalah Tempo 30, No. 3, March 19-25, 2001, ibid. 350 “Usaha Tangkal Aksi Penyerangan Bersenjata di Aceh, TNI Akan Gelar Operasi Militer Terbatas” (“Deterring Armed Assaults, TNI Will Deploy Limited Military Operations”), http://www.hamline.edu/ apaka-bar/basisdata/2001/02/27/0047.html, February 28, 2001: 1-2; Also, interview with Mahfud M.D. on January 9, 2007. 351 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 181.

219 IV.G. Military Response to Wahid Regarding Separatist Conflict in Aceh

In January 1999, TNI, although formally under the auspices of the national police, launched Operasi Wibawa (Operation Authority), which was infamous for its massacres of civilians.353 Entering the second half of 1999 until the beginning of the Wahid presidency, violence in Aceh escalated, killing at least 260 people.354 Acehnese had earlier called for the complete withdrawal of TNI troops, but this had been repeatedly refused by Wiranto. New human rights abuses committed by the troops prompted the Acehnese demand for a referendum on independence.

Military behavior in the troubling province was also influenced by the policies of the civilian government. Fast growing pressure by civic movements demanding a referendum on independence and President Wahid’s tolerance of separatist activities, motivated the TNI to increase repression. Wiranto’s army chief, Gen. Subagyo, even suggested that martial law be declared in parts of Aceh.355

In a press conference in Tokyo, during his state visit to Japan in mid-November 1999, Wahid, who often made inconsistent decisions, again promised a referendum in Aceh, which would be conducted within 7 months.356 This caused a stern reaction from TNI spokesman, Maj. Gen Sudrajat, who commented that Wahid had been expressing a personal opinion, not speaking in his capacity as president. In blatant insubordination, Sudrajat further suggested that if Wahid rejected the military a free hand in crushing the Acehnese separatists, they might attempt to manoeuvre him out of power.357 Hardly less subtle was the warning of defense minister Juwono that Indonesia might face a Pakistan- style military takeover, if civilians failed to build a “healthy and strong” political atmosphere. There were clear indications that the current military leadership considered civilian rule as a temporary and possibly dangerous experiment.358 That is why Wahid suddenly changed his mind. In a state visit to Jordan, on November 24,1999 he told reporters that independence for Aceh was out of context.359

352 Bourchier, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc.cit: 34. 353 “A Reign of Terror: Human Rights Violations in Aceh 1998-2000”, Tapol, March 2000, in Damien Kingsbury, “The Blessing of September 11: The 'War on Terror', Reform and the TNI,” Joyo Indonesia News, Kabar Irian, June 29, 2004 (Part 2). 354 “Indonesian President Says Acehnese Have Right to referendum,” Agence France-Presse, November 4, 1999, http://meltingpot.fortunecity.com/albania/726/president.htm.. 355 Agence France Press, November 21, 1999; Bourchier, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc. cit: 34. 356 “Indonesia Wahid: Wants to Hold Referendum on Aceh in 7 Months,” Dow Jones, November 16, 1999, cited in O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 334. 357 “Wahid’s Statement on Aceh Vote Only Personal Opinion: Army Spokesman,” Agence France-Presse, November 17, 1999, ibid. 358 The Jakarta Post, 23 November 1999; Bourchier, in Manning and van Diermen (eds.), 2000, loc.cit: 34. 359 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit.

220 In the meantime, failing to prevent people attending the celebration of the twenty- third anniversary of the declaration of independence of Aceh organized by GAM on December 4, 1999, the TNI launched attacks with full strength on GAM targets while making their sweeping operations in various regions of Aceh. On the other side, GAM stepped up its counter-attacks on military and police targets. On account of the rising number of innocent victims in Aceh, and based on the initiative of Acehnese representatives, the DPR made a testimonial hearing by inviting leading generals. The hearing was attended by three ex-chief commanders, e.g. Gen. Benny Murdani, Gen. Try Sutrisno, and Gen. Feisal Tanjung, and ex-operational and territorial officers, e.g. Maj. Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim, who knew much about the “Operasi Jaring Merah I and II” (“Red-Web I and II” operations) which had been conducted in Aceh, and Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid, ex-Liliwangsa resort (Korem) commander. Passionate accusations by DPR members, especially Teungku Nasruddin Daud, a respected PPP’s ulama, of TNI’s past human right abuses, demanding their leaders’ accountability, had embarrassed all the generals attending the hearing.360 It was not known whether there was connection between the testimony and the death of Daud in Medan, near Aceh, when he made a working visit soon afterward. It was reported further that at least thirty people were killed in one week alone in mid-January 2000, which was an abnormally high toll.361

In fact, Wahid’s support for the prosecution of human rights abuses allegedly involving middle-level officers, which had just begun on April 21, 2000, was met by TNI resistance. The lieutenant-colonel in command of the troops who were accused of killing over fifty villagers in Desa Betong Ateuh (West Aceh regency) on July 23, 1999 had mysteriously disappeared, leaving a captain as the most senior officer among those charged.362 Meanwhile, high-level officers or generals who might be accountable in preparing brutal campaigns in Aceh were not prosecuted.

Wahid’s move to further negotiate with the Acehnese armed rebels (GAM) to reach a humanitarian pause under the mediation of the Henry Dunant Centre of Switzerland was countered with even greater resistance by the military. Fighting between TNI and GAM continued when Wahid won the international community’s respect for his attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully such as by negotiating an agreement of cessation of hostilities in Geneva. Apparently, the 1999 East Timor referendum, which resulted in the province’s secession made the military more distrustful of any sort of international involvement in the country’s conflict resolution.

The resumption of TNI and GAM clashes caused new violence in various areas of Aceh despite the renewal of the humanitarian pause agreement until December 2000. As

360 The hearing was attended by the writer. 361 “I Could Have Taken Power,” The Age, January 23, 2000. 362 Crouch, in Johannen and Gomez, 2001, loc.cit: 182.

221 revealed by Kontras in July 2000, there were at least eight incidents of armed conflict, seven attacks on civilians, eight attacks on security personnel, and three sweeping operations, in which sixty people died and eighteen were injured, including security forces officials.363 In a press release, new TNI spokesman, Rear Marshall Graito Usodo, disclosed that up to the end of the first humanitarian pause on September 2, 2000, TNI had noted forty civilian dead and 122 injured. In addition, twenty security forces officials (military and police) had been killed.364 Altogether more than 960 people died in clashes in 2000, twice as much as in 1999.365 Among them was the clash on November 10-11, 2000 between pro-referendum demonstrators and the security forces in Banda Aceh. The latter confrontation virtually ended the political dialogue between the Wahid government and GAM.366

As GAM bargaining position improved, the military increased activities in Aceh. Responding to the guerilla tactics of GAM, TNI soldiers often demonstrated little restraint. GAM’s attacks on two visiting cabinet ministers and on Exxon were answered with the preparation of new military operations and troop reinforcements. As mentioned by Eldridge, TNI in Aceh faced a stark choice between withdrawal, with full legal acknowledgement of past human rights abuses, or re-imposing a martial law.367

The end of President Wahid’s soft approach, due to the rising pressure of military leadership and the parliament to his policy, had created a situation that favoured the TNI’s approach of eliminating GAM. His failure in maintaining reformist generals on the one hand, and TNI conservative leaders’ success in impeding security sector reforms on the other, had resulted in a more repressive approach by TNI toward Aceh. In due course, TNI had been able to convince the president that GAM could no longer be tolerated and should be crushed.368

TNI campaigns launched after the issuance of Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 4/2001 drastically increased violence in Aceh. Within one to 2 months, in May, and June 2001 alone, 367 people were reportedly killed.369 With President Wahid on their side, TNI, as part of security forces, had a reason for showing less tolerance for any kind of peaceful demonstrations, let alone demanding a referendum on independence in Aceh. After that, it was reported that the death toll mounted by around fifty up to a hundred

363 Harian Kompas, July 18, 2000 in Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 179. 364 The Jakarta Post, September 22, 2000, ibid. 365 Majalah Tempo 29, No. 37, November 13-19, 2000; AFP, November 11-14, 2000; AFP, January 6, 2001. 366 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 180, 246. 367 Eldridge, 2002, op.cit: 142. 368 The Jakarta Post, August 7, 2000; Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 181. 369 Majalah Tempo 30, No. 18, July 2-8, 2001.

222 people per month.370 Attacks into 2001 indicated that dozens of local people continued to be killed by security forces each week, despite another cease-fire being signed in May 2001.371

IV.H. Wahid’s Policy Regarding Separatist Conflict in Irian Jaya

To stop the widespread protests caused by the policy of Habibie, President Wahid withdrew the planned division of Irian Jaya by revoking the law that had been passed by the DPR and endorsed by the Keppres (Presidential Decree) of September 25, 1998. He tried then to introduce a more tolerant towards Papuans. Unlike Habibie, Wahid tolerated the display of Bintang Kejora (Morning Star) flags in Timika beginning on November 10, 1999 without any intervention from security forces. He permitted the flag raising ceremonies as long as Indonesian Merah Putih (Red and White) flags were also on display. Thus, on December 1, 1999, Morning Star flags were raised in eleven towns, and massive gatherings held everywhere to celebrate “West Papuan independence”. According to Elsham, a human rights NGO, up to 800,000 people took part in these events, which would have been impossible during the past authoritarian period of Soeharto.372

To calm the Papuans, Wahid visited the region by December 31, 1999 and had talks with community representatives and nationalist leaders. In a symbolic act of reconciliation, he renamed the Irian Jaya province Papua. This name, which acknowledged Papuans’ cultural claims, had not been used since the Soeharto regime took over the province from the Dutch through the Pepera (referendum).373 Nevertheless, he restated that for his government, independence was not an option.374 In fact, the name change was never officially used under the Wahid presidency because it was attacked by parliamentarians, especially the TNI/police faction members in the DPR, charging that it jeopardizes national unity.

On January 1, 2000, at the regional command (Kodam XVII Trikora) headquarters, Wahid announced the using of the original name of Irian Jaya, Papua, which was greatly appreciated by the Papuans, but strongly rejected by the military since it sounded less nationalistic. He later assigned his deputy, Megawati, to give more attention to the most-eastern province of Indonesia, and she was accompanied by nine ministers on the visit to Papua from May 18-22, 2000. The delegation visited eleven municipalities and

370 O’ Rourke, 2003, op. cit: 395. 371 Ibid. 372 “Indonesia: Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions in Papua, 1999-2000”, Human Righst Watch: New York, 2000: 27-30. 373 Eldridge, 2002, op.cit: 143. 374 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 156, 242.

223 two districts, which never happened in the past. Rather than trying to discuss political issues that were long awaited by the Papuans, during her visits, Vice-President Megawati unfortunately talked a lot about cultural issues. Also, because she used an official car and was tightly guarded by security guards, it was almost impossible for the Papuans to communicate with her. Even a daughter of the main tribal chief who was widely respected in Papua had not been almost allowed to meet her. This caused more criticism and damaged the Wahid government’s image.375 Wahid’s investigation of Soeharto’s alleged KKN cases had resulted in growing opposition and pressure, not only in Jakarta, but also in Papua. Theys Eluay and Yorrys Raweyai, two Papuan informal leaders, became more active in provoking and mobilizing Papuans to struggle for independence. Ryter, a researcher who studied the Indonesian paramilitary organizations, pointed to the connection between Yorrys’ separatist activities in Irian Jaya with the Soeharto family’s struggle for survival in Jakarta.376 According to Ryter, within weeks after the investigations against Soeharto started, Yorrys was able to mobilize independence protests in Jayapura. O’Rourke, in addition, claimed that Yorris, who was also the leader of PP (Pemuda Pancasila --Pancasila Youth) a pro-Soeharto paramilitary organization, had provoked separatism and ethnic conflict to worsen the sense of crisis in Jakarta.377 After the fall of Soeharto, Yorrys was observed continuing to position himself as a leading Irianese or Papuan figure. Although a native Papuan and widely known, he was not a credible freedom campaigner in Papua since his interests noticeably rested in Jakarta. He had, however, a background of long and dedicated service to the Soeharto family and the military, involving his PP members. This occurred while PP chief legal counsel, Ruhut Sitompul, was working as Wiranto’s personal lawyer in the KPP HAM Timtim’s investigation of the general’s alleged involvement in East Timor’s gross human rights violations.

Meanwhile, Theys’ rise to prominence in 1998-1999 was connected with Yorrys and Soeharto’s backing.378 Many believed that both might be trying to manipulate the Papuan separatist aspiration to the advantage of Jakarta elites and the Soeharto family. In a failed attempt to reduce pressure created by the Soeharto family and their loyalists, President Wahid took an initiative seeking reconciliation with them. Yorrys represented them in Soeharto’s Cendana residence, and it was broadcasted by many national

375 J. Osdar,“Sentuhan Para Presiden kepada Papua” (“Presidents’ Policies to Papua”), December 1, 2005, http://www. Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0512/01/Politikhukum/2254535.htm: 2. 376 Ryter, in Anderson (ed.), 2001, loc.cit: 46, 66. 377 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 350. 378 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 157.

224 television channels. Thus, Wahid had visited Yorrys in Cendana, where Soeharto, his family, and cronies attended the meeting.379

After the failure of the reconciliation meeting, Theys and Yorrys intensified their separatist activities. These were connected with political tensions following Wahid’s dismissal of Golkar cadres from the cabinet, namely, Jusuf Kalla, Bomer Pasaribu, and Mahadi Sinambela. As Theys and Yorrys were Golkar members, with Yorrys being the leader of the party’s youth wing, AMPI (Angkatan Muda Pembaruan Indonesia --Young Generation for Indonesia’s Reform), the turbulences in Jakarta had repercussions in Papua.380 Papuan nationalists formalized their movement by organizing two big congresses on February 23-26, 2000 and May 29-June 4, 2000, which resulted in the establishment of Presidium Dewan Papua (PDP), or Presidium of the Papuan Assembly. Wahid responded to this challenge of his government by a soft approach. He tolerated the raising of the Morning Star flags which he regarded as cultural expressions, and not necessarily separatist acts. He had, moreover, donated 1 billion Rupiah to finance the second congress. Also, he had arranged a meeting on July 4, 2000 with Theys, the newly emerging leader of the separatist movement, whose influence among Papuans increased rapidly.381 However he failed in renaming Irian Jaya province to Papua as his opponents in the MPR became stronger after Megawati’s PDIP and the Golkar factions aligned themselves with the TNI/police faction in the DPR.

Implementing MPR Decree No. 4 /2000, the Wahid government and DPR passed special autonomy laws for Papua (Law No. 21/2001) and Aceh (Law No.18/2001). The one on Papua, agreed to in April 2001, comprising clauses preserving and enforcing Papuan values and culture, transferred a substantial amount of power to the province, and recommended that 80 percent of revenue be retained by the provincial government. At the same time, however, the MPR decree prevented Wahid from introducing a more progressive solution to Papuans by offering federalism.

379 Again, on occasion of the 2005 National Conference of Golkar, Yorrys was assigned by the party to extend a special appreciation and award, namely Anugerah Bhakti Pratama, or the Most Distinguished Award to the ex-party’s Advisory Council Leader, to Soeharto for his highest devotion. See, Indra Subagja, “Soeharto Bantah Ajukan Syarat Terima Penghargaan Golkar” (Soeharto Not Give Conditio-nality for the Golkar’s Award”), http://jkt1.detiknews.com/indexphp/ detik. read/tahun/2005/bulan/11/tgl/ 24/time/2130- 43adnews/485918/id-kanal/10: 1-2. 380 See, also, “Ikrar: Yudoyono Tidak Memiliki ‘Leadership,’” (“Ikrar: Yudoyono Has No ‘Leadership’”), Suara Pembaruan, http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2005/11/19/Nasional/nas07.htm: 1-2. 381 Bertrand, 2004, op.cit: 243.

225 IV.I. Military Response to Wahid Regarding Separatist Conflict in Irian Jaya

The military’s support of Wahid’s victory in the presidential election influenced his decision to retain Gen. Wiranto as TNI chief commander. However, his good relations with the military turned into conflict as he began to investigate the alleged reports of the Soeharto’s KKN and Wiranto’s involvement in the East Timor mayhem. The conflict worsened after Wahid continued to use a democratic approach through cooperative responses to settle separatist conflict in the eastern-most of Indonesia’s provinces, Irian Jaya. In contrast to him, who tolerated Papuan demonstrations and congresses, and even the display of the Morning Star flag, the military adopted a repressive approach. Moreover, after Foreri (Forum Rekonsiliasi Rakyat Irian Jaya --Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya People) raised the issue of independence, TNI tightened their control over Papuans, and prohibited them from displaying the Morning Star flag and from using their original provincial name Papua.382 Army chief Gen. Sutarto also warned that TNI would not tolerate any secessionism, including the one in Papua that undermined the existence of Indonesia.383

As a result of the hardline stance of the military, several Papuan were killed or wounded in Nabire (July 2000), Sorong (August 2000) and Merauke (February 2002), following clashes provoked by flag-raising incidents. The prohibition of flag raisings and TNI’s repressive measures also caused serious clashes in Wamena, where thirty-seven people were killed, eighty-nine injured, dozens arrested, and more than 13,000 people reportedly left the area on October 6, 2000.384 Also, the commemoration of the Papuan independence, which was held across the province on December 1, 2000, produced several incidents, and caused a number of Papuans in Merauke, Fak-fak, and Tiom killed when security forces pressurized people to take down the flags after the permitted time. As reported by Komnas HAM, killings, torture, and forced disappearances also occurred in Wasior on June 13, 2001.385 Meanwhile, Papuan separatist leader Theys Eluay and several members of the PDP were arrested and imprisoned for 2 months due to their separatist activities in the flag raising ceremonies and organizing the two big congresses mentioned above.

Alleged backing and financial support from the Soeharto family stifled initiatives of local authorities to prohibit Theys and Yorrys from more activities in provoking Papuan people to demand independence.386 With the suspected role of third parties,

382 Eldridge, 2002, op.cit: 143. 383 “TNI Tidak Tolerir Pemisahan Irian Jaya” (“TNI Not Tolerate Separation of Irian Jaya”), http://www. hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2000/11/13/ 0048.html, November 14, 2000: 1-3. 384 Bertrand, 2004, op.cit: 158. 385 “Pemerintah Dinilai Lebih Cinta SDA daripada SDM” (“Government Preferred Natural to Human Re- sources”), Harian Kompas, June 5, 2006: 8. 386 See again Ryter, in Anderson (ed.), 2001, loc.cit: 46, 66.

226 especially military territorial units, it was unproblematic to mobilize the Papuans who mostly lived in remote highlands and coastal areas to come to the two big congresses held within a short time interval. Irian Jaya, although being rich with natural resources, was the least developed region of the Eastern Indonesian provinces, everything was costly there, and most Papuans still lived in great poverty and had poor educational backgrounds. In the absence of facilities, particularly transportation means, the holding of the two big congresses would be impossible without the logistic assistance of TNI’s territorial units. For their part, Theys and Yorrys were new leaders known only by Papuans who lived in the main cities.

Therefore, it is likely that pro-Soeharto local authorities and military territorial units facilitated the access of Theys and Yorrys to remote areas. After the 1961 Mandala military operation to free Irian Jaya from the Dutch colonial rule, and also the 1968 Pepera referendum, Soeharto became popular among the Papuans. Ryter’s description of the triangle relations between Soeharto, TNI, and the Pemuda Pancasila paramilitary group explain the military’s double game in response to the separatist movement in Irian Jaya.387 At the beginning, the territorial units helped the separatists in organizing their activities with the effect of identifying their identity and exposing their sanctuaries. With this knowledge, the military was later able to crush them by using intelligence operations of Kopassus units. The same two-pronged strategy had been previously used by the military in eliminating separatist movements in East Timor (Falintil), Aceh (GAM), and Maluku (RMS).

In fact, Theys’ arrest was not followed by the arrest of Yorrys. Unlike Theys and other Papuan political leaders, NGO activists, and foreigners who were tightly watched, Yorrys could freely come to and leave Irian Jaya. As expected, shortly after the two big congresses, the Papuan separatist movement was paralyzed by repressive measures of the military. Similar to what happened in East Timor, Aceh, and Maluku, in Irian Jaya, TNI repression was evidence of the military’s determination to prevent at all costs a referendum with an independence option.388 The mobilization of militias such as Pemuda Pancasila against the separatists was a strategy to forego future accusations of human rights abuses, albeit one bound to fail.

Moreover, in the mounting tensions between Wahid and TNI leaders, the military intensified their security approach in Papua. Consequently, killings, torture, and kidnappings occurred as TNI troops began to eradicate the separatist movement in Papua. The deep suspicions of TNI troops of indigenous people pushed them to treat every Papuan as if he or she were member of the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka -- Organization for An Independent Papua) separatist group. Not coincidentically, TNI

387 Ibid: 45 et seqq.

227 presence in Papua remained high. This meant that Kopassus personnel were positioned at district-level (Kodim) headquarters where they were particularly visible.389 Simon Patrice Morin, a native Papuan, told of the aggressive behaviour of the TNI soldiers posted in Papua. This is why he was of the opinion that the Papuans feel more secure if there were only a few TNI soldiers. In other words, due to the unchanging approach, the more TNI soldiers that were posted there, the more the Papuans felt insecure.390

IV.J. Understanding Wahid’s Compromise with the Military

Interestingly, Wahid had always argued that political culture greatly influenced Indonesian leaders and their style of government.391 Similar to Soeharto, Wahid was seen as symbolizing Semar, who, in the Javanese wayang or shadow puppet, performed as the servant of the good heroes, who was well respected due to his seniority and authority, and reputed to be blessed with magical powers from God.392 More than this, Semar perceived himself as the representative of God in the King’s palace.393

Meanwhile, authority and power are seen as a concrete matter by Javanese whose life is marked by symbols. As widespread unrest occurred in various regions, many people believed that President Wahid had lost the support of the majority of Indonesians. This meant that he had lost the wahyu or the sacred mandate from God to govern the country. President Wahid was aware that he would face a critical situation when he could not prevent or end the unrest that, as he later knew, had been instigated by military elements.394

Likewise, the spread of political rallies throughout the country and the “seizure” of various symbolically important buildings and monuments by anti-Wahid demonstrators and the military were seen as being politically significant by the majority of the population due to their traditional perception of the heavenly wahyu. For most Indonesian leaders, especially those who had Javanese native backgrounds, such culturally inspired rejection was so important that it greatly influenced their political actions. Not surprisingly, when Wahid was cornered by the rallies, which had been backed-up by the military, he immediately sent his traditional supporters to handle the unrest and calm the

388 Eldridge, 2002, op.cit: 138-139. 389 The Editors, Indonesia, 2000, op.cit. 390 Simon Patrice Morin was interviewed on April 2, 2008 in Jakarta. 391 Abdurrahman Wahid was interviewed on October 14, 2006 in Jakarta. 392 At the office of Muhaimin Iskandar, chairperson of PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa -- Nation Awa- kening Party), the picture of Wahid with Semar costume and character was hung on the wall, see, “’Korban Gus Dur Bertambah” (“Another Gus Dur’ Victims “), Media Indonesia, Maret 28, 2008: 1. 393 Singh, 2000, op. cit: 137, 154. 394 Abdurrahman Wahid was interviewed on October 14, 2006 in Jakarta.

228 demonstrators. He also sent NU members from the grass root level to counter rumors that had been spread regarding his allegedly corrupt attitudes. The news was considered as bringing humiliation on Wahid and to undermine his position. This is why those who spread the rumors became the target of intimidation by his militant supporters, in particular, Banser (Barisan Serbaguna --the Versatile Guard), a paramilitary organization of Ansor, the youth wing organization of NU.395

Arguing that he was not Soeharto who had misused the sacred mandate, Wahid said that he could actually maintain his mandate by resorting to more violence. This was a common habit of Javanese rulers in the past when facing rebellion or coup attempts. However, different from Javanese leaders from central Java or wilayah pedalaman --the mainland, where the Mataram kingdom was located-- who never interact with Western rationality and still are strongly influenced by their rural culture, Wahid who was born in East Java and studied abroad, avoided to make reprisals. He was aware that reprisals could produce civil war, as often happened in the country’s history. In other words, if he defended his mandate by using force, there would be bloodshed.396 Therefore, Wahid lost his presidency after being forced to resign; or as the Javanese put it: lengser ke prabon, not through a normal political succession. He regarded his impeachment as an “unconstitutional” transfer of power, similar to a coup d’état. He believed it had been organized by his opponents who were backed by the military.397 Nevertheless, for the majority of Indonesian people, mystical, supernatural, or cultural rejection was in some ways more significant than the truth, that is, the unconstitutional succession.

Regarding the Indonesian political culture, which was still to a considerable extent feudalistic due to the considerable influence of Javanese culture, Wahid recognized that there were aspects of Javanese political culture that were not democratic. Referring to the concept of government as ruling like a king, he maintained it is widely internalized by political elites and their military supporters. This cultural explanation of events under Wahid was even shared by Arief Budiman, an Indonesian sociologist, who normally pursues a structuralist approach.398

Furthermore, President Wahid’s unwillingness to punish big violators of human rights that had allegedly created the violence afflicting Indonesia for some time created his reputation of not decisively suppressing violence. Mochtar Pabotinggi, a political analyst from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), argued that if President Wahid were against violence, he would have created a very strong deterrent by strictly and

395 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: 126. 396 Abdurrahman Wahd was interviewed on October 14, 2006 in Jakarta. 397 For the military’s veto player role during Wahid’s impeachment, see Ziegenhain, 2008, op.cit: 130-131. 398 Bhaskara, 2000, op.cit: 117-118.

229 rigidly punishing violators of human rights.399 In reality, Wahid’s lack of courage to take firm action and enforce the law had resulted in the spread of violence throughout the country. Responsible military leaders were thus able to escape adequate punishment during his presidency. Worse even, under pressure by the military he finally acquiesced to address separatism in Aceh and Papua through repressive means and by supporting intensified military operations there.400

Other political analysts, such as Harry Tjan Silalahi from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, linked Wahid’s Javanese cultural background to the compromises he made with the military. In this point Harry, who was also an expert of Javanology, came to similar conclusions like a structuralist such as Arief Budiman. Harry argued that in order to understand Wahid’s presidency, one had to understand different types of Javanese political culture. Harry, like Arief, saw a relationship between President Wahid’s behavior and the slowness, inconsistency and indecisiveness of the Javanese people from wilayah pesisir, coastal areas, where the Majapahit kingdom was located and its people have interacted with foreigners since a long time. For example, in the case of Gen. Wiranto, the former chief commander, President Wahid was unable to take firm action. He had suspended his decision to dismiss Gen. Wiranto several times. In the end, he was too late to release Wiranto from his post as coordinating minister for political and security affairs to get an opportunity to summon him to the court that was dealing with his alleged involvement in gross human rights violations in East Timor before and after the referendum. For Wahid, Gen. Wiranto has also attempted to maintain East Timor inside the NKRI, protecting it from foreign intervention. Therefore, he did not support an international tribunal for trying Gen. Wiranto, and even showed no reaction when the Indonesian ad hoc human rights tribunal released him later from any responsibility.

Additionally, President Wahid did not really like to be criticized. Although he easily communicated with other people and one could tell him everything, it had to be done in a Javanese or kyai (a respected traditional Javanese Islamic leader) way. He was said not to be the scholarly type of decision maker, who sat down with experts and debated with them. Instead, conforming to Javanese culture, he slowly arrived at a conclusion. Also, he would give full attention to what input others might have for him, but he made his decision on his own. More clearly, in the eye of the German-born Indonesianist, Magnis-Suseno, President Wahid was some sort of a combination of a Javanese king and a wali, the respected traditional Javanese propagator of Islam.401

399 Ibid: 91 et seqq. 400 Ibid. 401 Ibid: 142-143; Also, interview with Franz Magnis-Suseno on October 14, 2006 in Jakarta.

230 President Wahid’s views on the on-going conflicts across the country that broke out since the fall of Soeharto made clear his cultural disposition. From his perspective, the conflicts were kinds of amuk massa or riots, allegedly produced by Soeharto’s loyalists who could not accept his fall. They run amok because their leader was forced to resign which they considered as an insult for him. Responding to their anger, President Wahid took the initiative to visit Soeharto and former chief commanders, such as Murdani and Try Sutrisno, to prevent further incidents provoked by the past regime’s followers. By approaching the former New Order’s ruler and supporters in a conciliatory move, President Wahid attempted to rebuild the disturbed keselarasan (harmony) and keheningan (tranquility).

Due to the Javanese culture’s call for deference towards elders, for this reason, too, he was reluctant to impose stringent punishments on Soeharto.402 He understood that in the Javanese political culture, the new leader had to keep the principle of mikul dhuwur mendem jero, meaning that past leaders should be respected and released from any charge of wrongdoings they did in the past. Otherwise, their followers would demand vengeance for their discontents. The same culture logic also prevailed when Wahid’s followers themselves rioted in various regions in Java. In their view, Wahid was insulted by the DPR with its memorandum threatening him with a proposal to the MPR to impeach him, even though the attorney general’s office had made clear that he was not involved in the scandal over the embezzlement of Bulog funds.

V. Coping with Islam and Radical Muslims

V.A. Wahid and Islam

Wahid was enormously critical of all that smacked of Islamic fundamentalism, sectarianism and religious extremism. He could not hide his dislike of fanatics who claimed to be more religious than others. By contrast, Wahid’s Muslimhood was open, far from exclusive. It did not, as in the case of other Muslim leaders, disengage him from people of other religions and beliefs. He was identified with Islamic liberalism and Islamic secularism since he had frequently praised Muhammad Sahid Al Asmawi, one of the promoters of secularist Islam.403

Importantly, Wahid had been on a lifelong campaign to promote religious tolerance. For him, “political Islam” stood in stark contrast to his Javanese-based cultural and traditional Islam. In fact, it was the more fanatic elements of political Islam who had mounted armed insurrections in West Java during the 1950s and in Aceh until to the

402 Bhaskara, 2000, op.cit: 93, 118. 403 Ibid: 43-44, 144.

231 present. In Wahid’s view, radical and Middle Eastern variants of Islam struggling for the introduction of syariah law to Indonesia, would keep apart Indonesia’s religious minorities. Although they formed no more than 12 percent of the national population, in reality, some of these minorities were the majority groups in certain distant regions of the Indonesian archipelago, especially, in the eastern parts, such as Maluku, Papua, and Nusa Tenggara Timur. Thus, the advance of “political Islam,” Wahid argued, would exacerbate secessionist tendencies in the regions where minorities were dominant, and put national unity at risk.

It was thus only consequent that Wahid upheld the state ideology Pancasila, which embodied the Javanese idea of harmony and unity. For Wahid, without it, Indonesia would cease to be a state. In fact, he urged Indonesians to abolish all regulations, provisions, and laws that violated Pancasila.404

Wahid recognized the equality of all religions and had the ability to interact with other religions. He never felt more Islamic than others, and never judged the “Muslim- ness” of other Muslims.405 As a “neo-modernist,” adopting Barton’s terminology, Wahid was committed to pluralism and the core values of democracy. His pluralistic views had been woven into the very fabric of his version of Islamic faith as the principal values of Islam itself.406

As Indonesia’s national unity was based on a living political ideology, namely, Pancasila. Therefore, Wahid argued that Muslims should conform to live in a state that would never be based on the formal recognition of Islam as objectively “better” or more deserving of government support than other religions. Otherwise, he reminded, such a development would jeopardize national unity.407 Together with NU’s scholars, Wahid declared that there was no need to establish an Islamic state, and that Pancasila was compatible with the principles of Islam. Clearly, in many ways, Pancasila had become his preferred ideological vehicle for the expression of his political messages. Yet, he feared that democratization would provide Indonesians with the opportunity to “choose Islam,” which in turn may play into the hands of radical Muslims, or the military, which would eventually reject and fight both democracy and political Islam.408

As an advocate of secularism, Wahid shared parallels with Sukarno, Indonesia’s first civilian president, He also recommended Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a Turkish leader who eliminated Islamic formalism in politics, as a model to be used in Indonesia. Wahid

404 “Pidato Gus Dur” (“Gus Dur Speech”), Suara Pembaruan, June 8, 2006: 2. 405 Mochtar Buchori, “NU: A Bullwark of Indonesian Democracy?“ The Jakarta Post, December 7, 1994. 406 Barton in David Bourchier and John Legge, (Eds.) Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s, Victo- ria: Monash University, 1994: 144-147. 407 Ramage, op.cit: 62. 408 Ibid: 72.

232 insisted that democracy in this country, despite the reality that around 90 percent of its population is Muslim, could only thrive in a setting of religious harmony. Within this context, Wahid strongly believed that the character of Indonesia as a Pancasila state, and its stress on religious harmony, was a basic requisite for the maturity of a real democracy in the country. In other words, Islam was mentioned not as an exclusive option to other systems of social order, but as a complementary element among a broad range of other aspects in the nation’s life.409

In Wahid’s view, the problem was that Islam was not fully comprehended by the majority of Muslims in Indonesia. Different from his view on Islam, which assured democracy and equal treatment, the Islam that was practiced in Islamic countries, e.g. the Middle East, and became the orientation of radical Muslims in Indonesia, was a legal formality. President Wahid was aware that during his rule religious fundamentalists would keep fighting for Islamic laws for Indonesia. In his view, Islamic laws, if adopted, would breach Pancasila ideology and the 1945 State Constitution that guaranteed the principle of the unitary state (NKRI).

V.B. Wahid and Radical Muslims

Wahid’s secularist view on the separation of religion and state and his refusal to grant a more pronounced role to Islam in the government and legal system exposed him to criticism from radical Muslims. Despite their rejection of Wahid’s secularist views after the withdrawal of Habibie from the 1999 presidential contest, radical Muslims had no alternative, but supported and voted for him to stop the woman candidate from the winning party of the legislative elections, Megawati Soekarnoputri, to be chosen as the country’s next president. Wahid’s open criticism of Megawati, in which he opportunistically questioned Megawati’s readiness as a female leader of a predominantly Muslim country, had contributed to broad support for his election from the radical Muslims and conservative groups in the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR).410 Thus, one of the key factors behind Wahid’s election victory was support from the powerful alliance of Islamic parties, particularly, conservative groups under the leadership of Amien Rais (PAN), Hamzah Haz and Aisyah Amini (PPP), Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Hartono Marjono and Ahmad Sumargono (PBB), Nur Hidayat Wahid (PK), and Marwah Daud Ibrahim (ICMI).411 They all expected something in return for their support, namely, access to

409 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Indonesia’s Muslim Middle Class: An Imperative or a Choice?“ in Richard Tanter and Kenneth Young, eds., The Politics of Middle Class in Indonesia, Victoria: Monash Universi- ty, 1990, 24, Sukma, 2003, op.cit: 119. 410 Tran, loc.cit: 1-3. 411 See again, Havely, 2005, loc.cit; also “Indonesian election triggers violence,” BBC News, 2005, loc.cit.

233 political power and concessions from the Wahid government, to be able to realize their conservative notions on an Islamic state and society.

Nonetheless, the support Wahid obtained in the presidential election would not stop him from opposing the political Islamists and their radical activities. For example, he denounced leaders and followers of FPI (Front Pembela Islam --Front for Islam Defenders) for their attacks on Christian religious sites in Wisma Doulos and Lombok and on places, such as discotheques, nightclubs, bars, and so forth in the name of Islam. According to Wahid, such brutal behavior could not be tolerated and had to be stopped because it did not respect rule of law and led to anarchy.

As a Muslim leader, Wahid also publicly denounced the alleged involvements of radical Muslims of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in serial bombings and terrorist attacks across Indonesia. These attacks increased when he faced rising resistance and pressure from the Soeharto family and its cronies as well as the military due to his reform policies. It was Wahid, too, who reprimanded and instructed the security forces to prevent the Laskar Jihad from going to Maluku to aggravate sectarian conflict there. He refused to give in to the demands of radical Islamic leaders such as Abu Bakar Ba’syir (the Founder of the MMI and JI) and Ja’far Umar Thalib (the Laskar Jihad leader) who had proposed to wage a holy war in Maluku and the formation of the Laskar Jihad. Wahid’s clear opposition against violence in Maluku drew aversion from radical Muslim leaders and their followers at the grass roots level. Therefore, his opponents blamed him for being excessively tolerant towards other religions while criticizing his own and being indifferent to Islam.

Wahid’s opposition to the aspiration of radical Muslims for syariah, which was revitalized during his presidency, was laid open when he mentioned that there were certain groups in society who wanted an alternative ideology beyond Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. For Wahid, the growing pressure for adopting the syariah law could damage the current transition process. To avoid this, he urged ulama (Islamic clerics) and national leaders to learn from history, in particular on the common interest of the military and radical Muslims who would sacrifice national interests and democratic consolidation for their own narrow agenda.412

Besides the issue of syariah, Wahid’s initiative to open trade and broad diplomatic relations with Israel also irritated radical Muslim groups. Wahid hoped that with this move he could improve Indonesia’s international image, an important precondition for accelerating the recovery of the country’s economy. This pragmatic approach caused growing dissatisfaction by Islamist parties after their representatives had been ousted from his coalition cabinet on November 26, 1999. The relationship of the president with

412 Abdurrahman Wahid was interviewed on October 14, 2006 in Jakarta.

234 leaders of Islamist parties worsened because they were more interested in nurturing their sectarian politics and therefore did not hesitate to order Islamic militias to join the jihad against Christians in Maluku and Poso. The move obviously aided military leaders in their conflict of interest with Wahid and therefore wanted national security to deteriorate.

V.C. Wahid, Radical Muslims, and the Green Generals

In January 2000, radical Muslims organizations, including KISDI, FPI, and DDII, organized large-scale demonstrations in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Makassar. On January 7, in a big rally in Jakarta, twenty-two militant Islamic organizations gathered in Monas square, near the Merdeka palace. Present in this demonstration were also Amien Rais and Ahmad Sumargono, prominent Islamic leaders associated with PAN and PBB. In their political sermons, they encouraged the demonstrators to practice jihad in Maluku and Poso, because in their view the government was unable protect the Muslim minorities in these regions. The two political leaders were known as being close to ICMI and the green generals and believed of having been under the protection of Lt. Gen. Prabowo during the increase in political tension between ICMI, Soeharto and Gen. Wiranto in the months preceding Soeharto’s resignation. Even more disquieting however, was the presence of many speakers and organizations that had track records of co-operating with the military, both institutionally and individually. They hailed the decision to send Maj. Gen. Marasabessy, a conservative officer, to Maluku in order to resolve the conflict. This officer, a native of Maluku, was the preferred leader of the TNI’s peace-making mission because he was widely known as a determined Islamist general.413

Still, in January 2000, radical Muslims openly aligned themselves with TNI chief commander Gen. Wiranto, and thus increased their influence on the military. Two years earlier, they had played a significant role in assisting him to provide security for the November 1998 MPR special session. Before that, their representatives in MPR, FPDU (Fraksi Partai Daulatul Ummah --Sovereignty of the Islamic Community Parties Faction) had backed the formal nomination of the general to run for vice-president.414 Now, some of their representatives joined the military defense team to help Wiranto respond to the KPP HAM Timtim’s accusation that he was responsible for gross human rights violations in East Timor. On behalf of PBB, an Islamic party controlling thirteen seats in the DPR and that since its formation in 1998 had built an alliance with military figures, legislator Hartono Mardjono contributed his expertise as a lawyer to the military defense team headed by Adnan Buyung Nasution. Prominent party leaders such as Ahmad Sumargono

413 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 345. 414 See also, “The 1999 Presidential Election and Post-Election Developments in Indonesia: A Post- Elec- tion Assessment Report”, No. 28, 1999, Jakarta/Washington DC, 1999: 7, loc.cit.

235 defended Wiranto in the DPR, while PBB chairperson, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, attacked Darusman’s dual role as Attorney General and chairperson of the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM). The two PBB leaders were instrumental in organizing pressure to force Darusman’s resignation from Komnas HAM.415

Supported by Golkar, PBB, PPP and the military quietly joined forces to block a new human rights law to be passed by the DPR. Without this law, Darusman would have difficulty in trying someone accused of gross human rights violations. Radical Muslims shared with the military the belief that the accusations of the TNI leaders’ involvement in East Timorese atrocities were orchestrated by foreign countries and targeted at the Indonesian Muslims. No coincidentically, in January 2000, FPI held a peaceful demonstration in front of the office of the Secretariat General of the Komnas HAM, harshly criticizing the latter’s obsession with East Timor, even though Indonesian Muslims were also suffering in the territory.416 Some speakers there called for a jihad against the intervention of the international peace keeping force. They criticized that Wahid’s decision to establish human rights tribunals was against Muslims’ interests in the country.417

FPI demanded the dissolution of the Komnas HAM for paying less attention to, and failing to deal with, the violence in Maluku, which caused great suffering to Muslims as the sectarian conflict emerged there. Several months afterwards, in June 2000, a radical group of Muslim students, HAMMAS (Himpunan Mahasiswa Muslim Antar Kampus -- Inter-University Muslim Students Association), demonstrated in front of the Komnas HAM office, smashing some of its windows. A few days later FPI, mobilizing three truckloads of protestors armed with sticks and stones, launched another attack on the office of the human rights commission, citing the same reasons.418 In view of these incidents, AS Hikam, a member of Wahid’s cabinet, concluded that the failure to comprehensively prosecute gross human rights violations allegedly committed by TNI before and after the Wahid presidency must also be attributed to the strong pressure of the Islamists.419

Meanwhile, the campaigns and preparations of Islamists for jihad in Maluku continued. At the beginning of April 2000, the Laskar Jihad held a tabligh akbar (big gathering) in Jakarta. It was attended by around 100,000 participants and it condemned the disaster that had been afflicting the Maluku Muslims, who were perceived as facing a

415 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 345. In interview on December 17, 2007 in Jakarta, Darusman described the pressure he received from the conservative or rightist factions in parlia-ment which had hampered his moves to fulfill reform demands which wanted to be endorsed by the Wahid government. 416 ICG, 2001, loc. cit: 8. 417 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit. 418Kompas, June 24, 2000, The Jakarta Post, June 24, 2000, ibid. 419 AS Hikam was interviewed on April 10, 2008 in Jakarta.

236 genocidal threat.420 Seeking to counteract the threat, the leader of the group, Ja’far Umar Thalib, announced the necessity for armed holy battle. He openly confirmed the determination of the group’s members to go to the battlefield in the Maluku islands and stand with the Muslims fighting against their Christian opponents. After the rally, he established a paramilitary training camp in Bogor, about 60 km from Jakarta. Here, thousands of young men were trained, volunteers to engage in combat in the trouble spots across Indonesia.

The Laskar Jihad recruited, trained, and equipped Javanese youths to fight Christians in Maluku based on their belief that “jihad is not a crime, rather a holy obligation of the believers to defend Islam from other religion’s threats”.421 On April 6, 2000 they marched to the Merdeka palace, and sent six of their representatives, among others, Ja’far Umar Thalib and Brig. Gen. (ret) Rustam Kastor, to meet President Wahid. At the meeting, the delegation blamed Wahid of favouring Christians and of having led his country into the trap set by either a West-Zionist conspiracy or, alternatively, a communist plot,422 as indicated by the escalation of the conflict occurring in the islands. As a result, the meeting came to an abrupt end after Wahid asked them to leave his office.423

In Yogyakarta and Makassar, FPI branches and Forkap-Malut (Forum Komunikasi untuk Propinsi Maluku Utara --Communications Forum for the Province of North Maluku) offices were established to recruit volunteers for jihad in Maluku. In the meantime, a jihad force in Ternate had already been sent to North Halmahera to back Muslims without any intervention from the regional military command (Kodam XVI Pattimura), which had just been founded by the Habibie government.424 In Jakarta, in April and May 2000, jihad volunteers commenced to leave for Maluku, after organizing the above-mentioned show of force in front of the Merdeka palace and the DPR building with their white uniform, swords, and some military equipment. Within weeks Laskar Jihad had sent several thousand fighters through different shipments to the troubled

420 Noorhaidi Hasan, “Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indone- sia”, Indonesia, 73, April 2002: 147. 421 Darwin in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: 122; “Gertakan Jihad Lewat Posko” (“Threat of Jihad from Command Post”), Majalah Tempo, January 17, 2000. 422 Radical Muslims continued to be concerned about a revival of communism in Indonesia, in particular, after President Wahid proposed the lifting of the ban on communism early in 2000. See, ICG, 2002, loc.cit: 9. 423Harian Kompas, April 7, 2000, cited in Hasan, 2002, loc.cit: 148. 424 Majalah Gatra 6, No. 10, January 22, 2000, Majalah Gatra 6, No.11, January 29, 2000, cited in Ber- trand, 2004, op.cit: 131.

237 province.425 Their arrival made a turning point in the sectarian conflict as the level of violence became considerably higher than before.

The radical Muslim alliance was not restricted to political manoeuvres and public showing-off, but it seemed that a more forceful approach was also applied. This came in mid-December 2000 when Attorney General Darusman decided to set a trial date for Aitarak militia’s notorious militia leader, Eurico Guterres, who was known as one of the military’s most reliable allies in the 1999 East Timor chaos. Because they are not guarded by the state apparatus, churches became easy targets of several bombing attacks. On May 28, 2000, an explosion at a Protestant church injured at least forty-seven people, while bombs found in two other churches had failed to explode. Three months afterwards, in August 2000, another church was damaged in a bomb explosion in Medan.426 A week before the East Timor trials, on Christmas Eve, bombs exploded at Christian targets in ten cities throughout Indonesia. The bombings killed a total of nineteen people and seriously injured 120 others.427 The East Timor trials were indefinitely postponed, but the perpetrators of the bombings were never put on trial, although several suspected were arrested and a host of clues were obtained.

Suspicion of military involvement increased since most events were conducted in a professional way.428 As reported by O’Rourke, in Batam, Riau, two perpetrators of three bomb explosions which had wounded twenty-nine people were caught by the military police. The perpetrators included a soldier of a Kopassus unit and another from the Kodam II Sriwijaya regional command.429 In Jakarta, an intelligence agent reportedly implicated in the bombing of the Catholic Katedral church, around 500 meter from the Merdeka palace, who had caught by the police was quickly freed.430 Moreover, of the ,three men who were caught with bomb-making equipment, two were double-agents suspected of working for both the GAM (A Movement for an Independent Aceh) and Bais (military strategic intelligence board) and one was an ethnic-Chinese financier, whom military officials in Medan acknowledged as one of their business partners. Citing the local police report, Tempo magazine reported that they were suspected of organizing bomb explosions in Medan, North Sumatra. Also apprehended was a lieutenant-colonel of Kopassus, who was an intelligence chief for the Kodam 1 Bukit Barisan regional

425 Darwin in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit: 122; “Gertakan Jihad Lewat Posko” (“Threat of Jihad Through Command Camp”), Majalah Tempo, January 17, 2000. 426 “47 Injured in Medan Church Blast”, The Jakarta Post, May 29, 2000; “Medan Church Bombs Linked to Provocateurs”, The Indonesian Observer, August 21, 2000; ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 4. 427 “Sekelumit Fakta Seputar Bom Natal” (“A Fact about Christmas Bomb”). Majalah Tempo, February 25, 2001: 62-63; O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 385-6. 428 See, Honna, 2003, op.cit: 277. 429 “Cerita dari Mosaik Bom Natal” (“The Story About the Christmas Bomb”), Majalah Tempo, February 25, 2001: 61.

238 command.431 The plot thus showed that intelligence officers were connected through their sponsors and GAM double-agents with the suspected bombers. Moreover, as also reported, the suspected bombers themselves had longstanding ties to the Kopassus. The best indication was in Bandung, where a bomb exploded when it was being assembled in a workshop, killing three, and injuring two people. One of the dead was carrying an address book, in which he had written the phone number of the Jakarta residence of an active two-star general.432 Importantly, investigators found clear signs of a plan in the various cases.

An alternative investigation conducted by Forum untuk Indonesia Damai (Forum for Peaceful Indonesia), an independent team consisting of notable figures of moderate Muslims, including Nurcholish Madjid, Emil Salim, and Mar’ie Muhammad, also suspected an involvement of active or retired military personnel in the serial bombings.433 Several years thereafter, the trials of JI activists involved in subsequent bombing incidents in Bali and Jakarta corroborated the radical Muslims’ connection to Ba’syir, their cleric, and other leaders who in January 2000 had attended the rally declaring jihad. More significantly, the easy access of JI activists to explosives and military standard weapons, including from army manufacturer Pindad, came under scrutiny as did the obvious disinclination of the military to prevent the bombings.

Attorney General Darusman Marzuki therefore connected the recent instability with the government’s initiative to prosecute past East Timor gross human rights abuses as well as Soeharto and his family’s alleged corruption cases.434 The bombing incidents occurred amid the rising tension between President Wahid and the military and the rising rivalry between military and police institutions. They also coincided with the civilian president’s failure to control military intelligence units, and the breakup of his fragile coalition with Islamic parties and conservative leaders whom earlier supported him.435

V.D. Wahid, Radical Muslims, and the Red-White and the Green Generals

430 “Tamu Misterius di Biara Fransiskan” (“Mysterious Guest in the Fransiscan Closter”), Majalah Tempo, February 25, 2001: 76. 431 “Bom di Jalur Kontak GAM-TNI” (“Bomb in the Hot Spot of GAM-TNI“), Majalah Tempo, February 25, 2001: 69. 432 “Cerita dari Mosaik Bom Natal” (“The Story About the Christmas Bomb”), Majalah Tempo, February 25, 2001: 60. 433 “Political Briefs,” Van Zorge Report, January 22, 2001: 38; O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 386-7. 434 Marzuki Darusman was interviewed on April 10, 2008 in Jakarta. 435 Waluyo, 2007, loc. cit: 125.

239 Wahid’s moderate Islamic vision and nationalist spirit linked him to the red-white generals, such as Benny Murdani and Try Sutrisno. His respect for minority groups produced his good relationship with, and confidence in, Christian generals, such as Luhut Panjaitan and Johnny Lumintang. Not surprisingly, he had sympathizers in the military faction in the DPR such as Maj. Gen. Ferry Tinggogoy who did not agree with their commander’s opposition to Wahid.

Before becoming president, Wahid entertained relatively good relations with the younger generation of military leaders, including Gen. Wiranto. His cooperative attitude towards these military leaders had helped him gain support from the military faction in the parliament in his bid for the presidency in October 1999. Otherwise, he would have failed in obtaining Golkar’s support to challenge his main rival, Megawati, the leader of the largest parliamentary faction in the presidential election in the MPR.436

After the election, Gen. Wiranto became part of Wahid’s kabinet pelangi (rainbow cabinet), in which he occupied a high position as coordinating minister for political and security affairs. Within a few months, however, the relationship suddenly soured due to the impact of the human rights violations in East Timor after the referendum. The relations worsened when the new president forced his minister to resign due to the rising pressure from donor countries to prosecute the human rights violations before and after the independence referendum in East Timor.

Relations between Wahid and most military leaders turned from tension into conflict after Wahid promoted Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah to Kostrad commander, replacing Lt. Gen. Djaja Suparman. Wahid’s move to promote more reformist generals to occupy important positions and encourage his radical reform agenda produced growing frustration among conservative military commanders. An example was the promotion of Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi as army chief assistant for territorial affairs. Circulation of the fabricated Bulakrantai document, accusing the reformist generals of influencing Wahid to reshuffle TNI officers,437 increased pressure on Wahid. The green generals, too, exterted pressure on Wahid by using their Muslim militias, which for the last few years they had protected.438

Through their representatives in the DPR, radical Muslims responded to Wahid and the reformist generals. For instance, PBB legislator Abdul Qaedir Djaelani charged that the masterminds of the Christmas bombings were Lt. Gen. Wirahadikusumah and Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi, TNI’s two leading reformers.439 However, this accusation was hardly plausible as the two reformist generals persistently criticized atrocities committed

436 “Profile Abdurrahman Wahid,” 2005, loc.cit. 437 For details on the Bulakrantai document, see page 35-36. 438 Ikrar Nusa Bhakti was interviewed on May 15, 2006 in LIPI, Jakarta.

240 by the TNI in its operations. Saurip rejected this claim in an interview with the author, but admitted he was sidelined after the conservative officers organized their resistance to against the reformers proposals for more progressive military reform.440 In the light of multiple links between the military leadership and radical Muslim organizations, Djaelani’s verbal attack against reformist generals suggests that conservative officers may have coordinated their attacks against military reformers with Islamist forces.

Compared with previous cases confronting Wahid, there were similarities between the violent actions conducted by the radical Muslims and those that were organized by their patrons, the green generals. The FPI, for example, on December 15, 1999 reportedly played a role in attacking and torching the buildings of a school and hospital (drug rehabilitation center) run by a Christian humanitarian foundation (Wisma Doulos) in East Jakarta. These institutions had been accused of influencing Muslims to leave Islam. Also, the eruption of religious violence in Maluku, which involved radical Muslim militias, occurred just days after KPP HAM began its investigations with the Wisma Doulos incident.441 The attack by some 300 people allegedly from FPI with sharp weapons and Molotov cocktails against Wisma Doulos, which caused three dead, thirty wounded, and some buildings burnt down, had been seemingly planned before.442 The foundation was located about 500 meters from TNI headquarters and the military personnel deployed at a nearby territorial post were reportedly unwilling to intervene.443 Thus, the rioters could freely wreck the facilities of the foundation, which had faced threats by militants already months before.444 No military personnel was sent to fight the raging fire, which lasted until the early morning.

The Wisma Doulos incident was the worst case of religious violence in the capital city since the Ketapang riots in November 1998. There was sufficient reason to believe that the same paramilitary group that participated in the Ketapang riots, namely, the FPI, had perpetrated the attack. A least two of nine suspects being held by the city police were FPI members.445 FPI was a volunteer group formed to combat what they called the “enemies of Islam.” Evidence disclosed that it functioned in the style of a military-backed gang. No less important, it was generally believed that FPI’s military patron was

439 Majalah Gatra, January 27, 2001: 27. 440 Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi was interviewed on November 8, 2006 in Jakarta. 441 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 346. 442 Darwin, in Ananta (ed.), 2003, loc.cit. 443 “Wisma Doulos, Serangan Malam” (“Wisma Doulos, Night Attack”), Majalah Tempo, December 26, 1999. 444 Doug Bandow, “Jakarta's Seething Volcano”, Chronicles Magazine, March 2001. 445 “Noegroho says 'brochures provoked Doulos burning'”, The Jakarta Post, January 03, 2000.

241 Wiranto’s protégé and loyalist, Kostrad commander Lt. Gen. Djaja, who was against Wahid.446

More obviously, FPI was established immediately after Djaja had been promoted as Jakarta regional (Kodam Jayakarta) commander in mid-1998. FPI was among the paramilitary groups that he used to protect the 1998 MPR special session.447 Following its suspected involvement in the Ketapang riots, rather than attacking prostitution compounds, nightclubs, gambling centres, and drugs and narcotics networks, all of which were widely trusted to be backed by military elements, FPI customarily targeted obscure nightspots on a regular basis without prevention from the security forces and Jakarta’s authorities under Governor Lt. Gen. Sutiyoso. This vigilante group has often taken the law into their own hands.448 In effect, it functioned as the army’s racketeering group, which was used to put pressure on businesses that challenged the army in the entertainment sector, or on the owner of businesses or their bosses that stopped giving contributions to their patrons inside the army institutions.449 Like the New Order’s Pemuda Pancasila (PP), the FPI was manipulated by the military for political ends.

Not surprisingly, rather than concentrating on issues that directly affected Muslims, such as violence in Aceh and corruption in state-run pilgrimages to Mekkah, FPI’s interests corresponded with those of the army. Besides defending both MPR special and annual sessions, it also protested against KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum --the General Elections Commission). This was done on behalf of conservative Islamic political parties organized in the Partai Daulatul Ummah faction (FPDU), which had nominated Wiranto for vice-president.450 In December 1999, its leaders also chose to take on a matter that was actually to have no relevance to them, namely, KPP HAM’s investigation on East Timor.451 Many rallies were organized to defend Gen. Wiranto from accusations of gross human rights abuses in East Timor. Like other militant Muslim organizations, FPI’s demonstrations took place in front of the Komnas HAM office,452 which was damaged in the process.453 This situation gave a clear indication that the rise of

446 See, for instance, George Junus Aditjondro,“Financing Human Rights Abuses,” November 20, 2000, http://www.koteka.net/part1.htm. 447 See O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit. 448 ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 2. 449 “Perjalanan FPI Membasmi Tempat Maksiat” (“FPI Long Way to Sinful Places”), Bali Post, December 19, 2000; ICG, 2001, loc.cit. 450 See also, “The 1999 Presidential Election and Post-Election Developments in Indonesia: A Post- Elec- tion Assessment Report,” No. 28, 1999, Jakarta/Washington DC, 1999, loc.cit: 7. 451 “FPI Pertanyakan Profesionalisme KPP HAM dan Marzuki Darusman” (“FPI Questioned Professiona- lism of KPP HAM and Marzuki Darusman”), December 27, 1999, http://www.Berpolitik.com/articles/99/ 12/27/1948200.shtml, Berpolitik.com. 452 See again page 112-113 of this dissertation. 453 See again, “FPI Rusak Kantor Komnas HAM dan Kafe Jimbani”, Harian Kompas, June 24, 2000, “FPI members attack rights commission headquarters”, The Jakarta Post, June 24, 2000.

242 fundamentalist Islam and its political movement hamstrung democratisation in tandem with military restiveness, as had been argued by Huntington.454

Apart from FPI, there were about thirty other militia and paramilitary groups with approximately 700,000 members, the majority of which were radical Muslims. Combined with an absence of rule of law and together with several groups in the military, which used to stand above the law, these forces became a serious threat to the fragile process of democratization under Wahid.455 For example, in March 2000, the FPI held a rally in the centre of Jakarta, in which banners were displayed with slogans like “We are ready to slay communists” and “We are ready to behead communists.”456 Elsewhere, some fifty radical Muslim groups established what they called the AAK (Aliansi Anti-Komunis --Anti- Communist Alliance) together with the Front Merah-Putih (Red-White Front) headed by the East Timorese militia leader, Eurico Guterres,457 who maintained close relations with military leaders. Also major groups in AAK, for example, the FPI, Front Hizbullah and, Ikhwutan Sunnah Waljamaah (ISW), were known to have established close ties with the military. ISW was chaired by Habib Al-Habsyi, a militant Muslim cleric imprisoned in 1980 for bombing the world’s largests Buddhist sacred site, the Borobudur temple, who was surprisingly freed before the end of his sentence in 1999 on the orders of Gen. Wiranto.458

In the name of AAK and as part of their anti-communist campaign, the radical Muslims embarked on a “sweeping” operation in May 2001. They took certain books that had been declared pro-communist publications from bookstores and publicly burnt them. In their operations they also destroyed books regarded anti-Soeharto and anti-military. Therefore, the whole operation was hardly a pure religious affair, but rather a planned military (intelligence) operation. After launching the rowdy campaign of destroying “communist” books, the Alliance leaders threatened to begin “sweeping” people.459

Another Muslim group allegedly working on the military’s behalf was PPMI (Persatuan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia). Chaired by a certain Eggi Sudjana, PPMI was a Muslim labour union founded to challenge the pro-reform SBSI (Serikat Buruh Seluruh Indonesia). The latter was an independent Indonesian labor association founded and led by Muchtar Pakpahan, a Christian who was an anti-Soeharto activist. Sudjana allegedly supplied Muslim paramilitaries to Kostrad commander Djaja Suparman. Moreover, he

454 Huntington, 1991, op. cit. 455 Siar News Services, May 18, 2000; Togi Simandjuntak (ed.), Premanisme Politik (Political Thugs), Ja- karta: ISAI, 2000: 59-60; Nordholt, in Colombijn and Lindblad (eds.), 2002, loc.cit: 51. 456 “FPI Activists Rally against Communism”, The Jakarta Post, March 19, 2000. 457 ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 9. 458 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 400. 459 “’Sweeping’ Buku Berbau Kiri Tetap Akan Berlanjut”, Harian Kompas, May 8, 2001; ICG, 2001, loc. cit.

243 was believed to enjoy strong connections to Wiranto, and to have worked with legislators from PBB who had aligned themselves with the general.460 Supposedly acting as a frontman of the military, on January 17, 1999, he organized a demonstration in Lombok, Mataram, the capital city of West Nusa Tenggara province, to express solidarity with Muslims in riot-torn Maluku. The event attracted a crowd of around 5,000 people.461

After the rally, about half of them run amok around the small island, killing five people, devastating dozens of churches, public buildings, and a large number of Christian businesses and homes in an amazingly short range of time. The mass-media speculated that the attack was pre-arranged, and the perpetrators were not unruly masses, but well- organized paramilitaries,462 bringing target lists and using walkie-talkies. They had split up and attacked widely scattered districts at the same time. Two big command posts of Kopassus troops located in the surrounding area did nothing to intervene when the riots occurred. Lombok was also hosting of a large number of military personnel that had just been removed from East Timor. Meanwhile, as several units of marines and police began to contain the riots, their field-radio communications were said to have been electronically jammed.463

These and other militant activities of radical Muslim groups -- like the training of jihadis to be sent to Maluku in a camp near Bogor under the tutelage of a retired military general464-- raised concerns on the return of a military-backed authoritarianism, but under the disguise of Islamic politics. In many of these incidents, the radical Muslims had apparently been employed by the military to defend the remnants of the ancient régime and simultaneously confront newly emerging democratic forces. Of course, the rise of religious extremism endangered the prospects of reforms, since the TNI response to religious extremism was poorer than to separatist movements in various areas of the country.465 As it was reasonable to prevent other acts of terror across the country, Wahid gave instruction for the capture of Habib Ali bin Alwi al Ba’aqil, a famous figure in the FPI. His alleged role with Tommy Soeharto has been cited in the case of the JSX bombing. Habib Ali had claimed to be a close friend of Gen. Wiranto and Maj. Gen. Djaja Suparman.466 The collusion between militant Muslims and the military was undoubtedly a concerted effort by the military of resisting civilian supremacy under Wahid.

460 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit: 350. 461 See also, “Indonesia Muslims, Christians Move to Avoid Conflict”, UCA News, February 14, 2000. 462 John M. MacDougall Jr,“Lombok Unrest: Description and Analysis,” January 22, 1999, http://www. groups.yahoo.com/group/berita-bhinneka/message/14813. 463 “Reports Highlight Army’s Role in Lombok’s Riots,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January 27, 2000. 464 For details, see again page 55, 56 and 114 of this dissertation. 465 Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi was interviewed on November 8, 2006 in Jakarta. 466 “Baagil di Balik Bom?” (“Baagil Behind the Bombing?”), Majalah Tempo, October 1, 2000: 26; ICG, 2001, loc.cit: 12-13.

244 V.E. Common Interests of Radical Muslims and the Green Generals

In the history of Indonesia, military alliances with radical Muslim groups were artificial and opportunistic in nature. The alliance was usually the result of coinciding short-term interests (symbioses mutualisma).

As stated by Choirie, military leaders such as Wiranto, Prabowo, and Djaja were allegedly behind the activities of the radical Muslim groups, conservative Islamic parties, and political Islamists in pursuit of their own pragmatic interests in struggling for power.467 Their existence was seen as very fruitful in the eyes of military leaders. The groups could challenge student demonstrators and pro-democracy and human rights activists who demanded military leaders to be summoned for their alleged involvements in the past gross human rights abuses. In return, the radical Muslims needed military support in their struggle to force President Wahid to adopt the syariah law. Thus, the military recruited radical Muslims to be trained as volunteers as well as militias to respond to their common enemies such as student demonstrators, human rights activists and radical reformists. Militant Muslims and conservative military leaders shared a common interest in rejecting of what they despised as Western ideas such as democratization, human rights, and gender parity.

In the past, the military usually ended its toleration of the activities of radical Muslims after accomplishing its objectives. It would then initiate military operations against those who still demanded to adopt the syariah law or raised other demands directed against Pancasila. During Sukarno’s leadership, the military hunted radical Muslim leaders, for example, Kartosuwiryo and Kahar Muzakkar, and rooted out their followers, namely, DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia --Islamic soldiers/ Indonesian Islamic soldiers) devotees in West Java and South Sulawesi. Likewise, under Soeharto, various military operations were conducted, including covert intelligence and psychological operations, to crush Imron, Amir Biki, Sungkar, and Ba’syir, and their respective fanatic disciples in the 1980s. These Muslim militants still sought to form NII (Negara Islam Indonesia -- the Indonesian Islamic State) through underground organizations such as Komando Jihad, Majelis Mujahiddin, and Jemaah Islamiyah. Other military operations against what were considered as Islamist sectarians included the Woyla, Lampung (1988), and Priok, Jakarta (1984), incidents, causing hundreds of deaths.

In 1999 and 2000, under the protection of their military patrons, radical Muslims could freely pursue their political agendas and exert strong pressure on Wahid. L’histoire se repete, as in 1945 and 1959. Attempts to call for the insertion of the Jakarta charter in

467 Effendy Choirie was interviewed on July, 11, 2006, in Jakarta.

245 the Constitution and the implementation of the syariah law were made by PPP and PBB through the aggressive pressure of their supporters who frightened their critics and opponents. Their actions during the year 2000 also contributed to undermining the Wahid presidency since the security forces, consisting mainly of military elements, took no measure to stop the actions on the streets, parliament building compound, and public places. Military reluctance to take appropriate measures to stop the disruptive actions of the radical Muslims was associated with its interest to muster support from Indonesian Muslims to defy investigations of their gross human rights violations in East Timor as demanded by the international community.

Although radical Muslims were a minority in post-Soeharto Indonesian politics, their existence could not be ignored due to the military’s role behind their activities. As argued by Ikrar, the military’s role was also motivated by the necessity of gaining militant Muslim’s support against President Wahid’s agenda of military reforms, particularly after he promoted Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah and other reformist generals who were strongly acclaimed by pro-democracy activists.468 Because of this reciprocal support, the bargaining position of both the military and radical Muslims in national politics became much stronger. Their representatives in the parliament had successfully built a grand coalition with Soeharto’s old party, Golkar, and PDIP, the victorious party of the 1999 parliamentary elections, to oppose Wahid and his declining number of supporters from PKB and PDKB (Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa --Love the Nation Democratic Party). In fact, the alliance between the military and the radical Muslims extended into 2001 as the military had not yet achieved its final objective, namely, to exert greater control over the presidency.

As mentioned by reformist generals such as Saurip Kadi, the re-emergence of the radical Muslim groups after 1998 and their increasing pressure for the syariah law became a serious obstacle for the country’s democratic transition. Although the groups did not represent a majority of Muslim citizens in the country, their uncompromising attitude damaged the prospect of democratic consolidation. However, Saurip predicted that military alliances with the radical Muslim groups would lessen once Megawati, a pro- military and an ultra-nationalist figure, came to power.469

VI. Conclusion

Abdurrahman Wahid, who was democratically elected by the MPR as Indonesia’s fourth president, faced a formidable agenda to continue reform, namely, eliminating the military’s role in politics and society while preserving at the same time the unitary state. A legacy of Soeharto’s decades’ long dictatorship and the military’s strong role had

468 Ikrar Nusa Bhakti was interviewed on May 15, 2006 in LIPI, Jakarta. 469 Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi was interviewed on November 8, 2006 in Jakarta.

246 hamstrung his presidency and his efforts to fulfill reform demands. In this constraining context, the mercurial president attempted to promote political and military reform in the country.

As most military officers had inherited Javanese cultural values that had been preserved for a long time in the educational system, curricula, literatures, and traditional ceremonies, the military still believed that it had a right to interfere in politics. Fear of loosing the power, privileges, and prestige that it had enjoyed for more than three decades, as well as facing prosecution for alleged gross human rights violations involving the military as an institution, as groups, and as individuals, on the one hand, and President Wahid’s unwillingness to protect its interests, on the other, caused it to oppose his reform agenda, particularly after the president promoted pro-reform generals to influential posts.

This resistance disrupted the stability of his government due to the escalation of political tensions and conflicts throughout the country. Likewise, the hostile political atmosphere consumed much of his energy, and was to blame for leaving him little time to improve government policies. His efforts to prosecute Soeharto’s suspected KKN cases and ambiguous response to separatist movements had further increased military pressure on his leadership. As in the Habibie era, the military resorted to various forms of covert military intelligence and psychological operations to block Wahid’s reform agenda, especially in the military and security sectors.

Most elements in the military were critical of Wahid in the way he governed the country. Frustrated by his military reshuffles and reform agenda, the military supported his opponents, especially the radical Muslims and in the legislature, to impeach the president. As under Habibie, the existence of the radical Muslims impeded the country’s efforts to reduce violence, while the president had difficulties abandoning the predominant Javanese political culture, which was preoccupied with the accumulation of power and a culture of violence.

Unlike under Soeharto, military officers including the territorial and Kostrad commanders, the military spokesman, and the army chief, openly resisted the president. Short of a coup, they displayed their displeasure with the president by demonstrative gatherings and show of force, a posture climaxing with the rejection of implementing Wahid’s decree of a state of emergency. During this time, tensions between different factions in the TNI also emerged, especially between reformist officers and conservative generals, in the course of which Lt. Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah and his adherents lost their strategic posts.

Wahid’s efforts at asserting control over the military were only partially successful. The absence of common perceptions on reform, and the lack of compensation he given to military leaders resulted in his failure to uphold civilian supremacy.

247 Preventing Gen. Wiranto from an international tribunal for his alleged involvement in gross human rights violations in East Timor was not sufficient to regain his military’s trust. In fact, a human rights ad hoc tribunal in Indonesia profoundly disgraced military leaders and stirred their open resistance to Wahid civilian regime and its supporters.

The Wahid era thus confirms the thesis formulated at the outset of the study that the more reformist a civilian government, the more restive the military and the stronger the latter’s efforts to interfere in the political process. Yet, as will be shown in the next chapter, collusion between civilian politicians, especially legislators and political parties with the military in impeaching Wahid, markedly strengthened the position of the military in Indonesian politics which experienced a resurge under the presidency of Megawati Soekarnoputri.

248 Chapter Five

The Megawati Government (2001-2004)

I. Coping with Military Reform

I.A. What Had Influenced Megawati to Introduce Reform?

Megawati Soekarnoputri, born on January 23, 1947 in Yogyakarta, is the second child of the Indonesian first president, Sukarno. She grew up in luxury in the Merdeka palace, attended universities, but never earned a degree. She went to Padjadjaran University in Bandung to study agriculture, but dropped out in 1967, after her father’s fall from power. Her family was ignored by the new regime of Soeharto provided they stayed out of politics.1 She went to the University of Indonesia in 1970 to study psychology but dropped out after 2 years. She had little knowledge of the world outside Indonesia, and her warmest admirers would not claim that she was an intellectual.2

Megawati got married with a Javanese military officer, Surindro Suprijarso, who died in a plane crash in Irian Jaya in 1970, the year Sukarno died. With her current husband, Taufiq Kiemas, she had three children who grew up and pursued education in Indonesia. She is a Muslim but also followed traditional Javanese beliefs and had great faith in astrology.3 She rarely wore headscarf and Muslim traditional clothes like most Muslim women in Indonesia and often dressed in military uniforms in various occasions of state and military ceremonies. Though born in Java and being a Muslim, she lived in Bali, where she built up a large base of political support among the Hindu and Christian communities who mostly inhabited the outer islands of Indonesia, the larger part of that big country.4

Although her father’s followers continued to see her as his political heir, she avoided politics for nearly 20 years, describing herself as a simple housewife. She began her political career in 1987 as she and her husband joined PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia --the Indonesian Democratic Party), a government-sanctioned party which provided a façade of democratic choice in the Soeharto’s New Order government. She was elected to the rubber-stamp parliament as a reward for her apparent acceptance of the

1 “Megawati Sukarnoputri Biography,” http://megawati-sukarnoputri.biography.ms/: 1-4, was accessed on October 29, 2005. 2 Ibid. 3Ibid. 4 “Megawati Sukarnoputri Biography,” http://www.bookrags.com/biography-megawati-sukarnoputri-ema- 04/: 1-2, was accessed on October 29, 2005; Adam Schwartz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability, second edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.

249 government, helped by her father’s charisma. In DPR, from 1987-1992, she did not perform as an active and a vocal member.

Despite her lack of experience in politics, she immediately became hugely popular in 1995, after she won control of the PDI. More importantly, after her decision to become an opposition to the Soeharto regime in 1994-1995, accusing it of rampant nepotism and corruption, she emerged as the symbol of people’s resistance to Soeharto and the New Order government. Due to Soeharto’s anger at her political move, in 1996, the New Order government started to intervene in her party. By using its supporters in the PDI, the government ousted her from the party’s leadership through an extraordinary party congress. A military operation to crush PDI by attacking the party headquarters triggered rioting in Jakarta. Although she herself was never in danger, she became a symbol of resistance.5 In fact, the exclusion of her from contesting the May 1997 legislative election only increased her popularity.

In 1998 she established a new party, PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan -- the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle). She displayed great courage in opposing the government and became a symbol of hope for democratic reform. Although she was a focus for opposition against the Soeharto regime, she was barely involved in the mass-movement which overthrew Soeharto. Therefore, many doubted her judgement and leadership qualities.6 Her strongest support came from the uneducated and poor people who had been badly hit by the country’s worst economic crisis in a generation. Her party emerged as the largest party in the June 1999 free legislative elections, the first time since 1955, but did not win an absolute majority of votes or a majority of seats in the parliament.

Her populist appeal as someone who stood for the poor and disenfranchised as well as nationalist interests was not sufficient in the face of her politically smart rival Abdurrahman Wahid.7 Due to the Muslims opposition to a woman president, and her lack of experience, other parties united to block her. Her erstwhile friend and ally, as well as political mentor and advisor, Wahid, a moderate Muslim cleric, who previously gave support for her presidential nomination, was chosen instead. To appease her supporters who were angry because of the “betrayal” and unexpected defeat of their leader in the October 1999 MPR special session, Megawati was elected as vice-president. Following the controversial impeachment of Wahid in the June 2001 MPR special session,

5 “Megawati Emerges from Sukarno’s Shadow,” http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/ 07/23/indo.mega/: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005. 6 Anton Alifandi, “Analysis: Megawati’s Struggle for Power,” BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia- pacific/481341.stm: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005. 7 Ibid.

250 Megawati was installed as the fifth President of Indonesia. This made her the first woman in the country to occupy the most important position.

Apart from her election, Megawati had few visible talents as a politician. She avoided media interviews, and refused to take part in head to head debates. She had been criticized by many politicians for being aloof and complacent.8 She seldom spoke in public and rarely discussed anything approximating policy. Many observers saw her presidency as a product of backroom intrigue and power-brokering of anti-Wahid groups, including the military, which had been adversely affected by Wahid’s maneuvers and policies. The very same coalition of forces that united to keep her out of the top job after the 1999 election had then united to elevate her to the presidency.9 It was true that she was adored by millions of loyal followers, but little was known about her political skills. Many still wondered if her rise to power had been a result of her own skills, or the will of others who wanted to govern through her, especially, the still powerful military.

As the eldest daughter of Indonesia’s founder and first President Sukarno, who ruled the country from 1945 to 1966, Megawati inherited his thoughts on politics and statecraft. Her ideology focused on preserving her father’s legacy, the 1945 State Constitution, which allowed for a strong central power and the unitary state named the Republic of Indonesia which her father helped found in 1945 and included the provinces which were incorporated or annexed later, such as Irian Jaya (1969) and East Timor (1975).10 Her supporters called her the “Mother of the Nation.” Though urban intellectuals backed her, her mass base among the “little people” rested on the symbolism of being Sukarno’s daughter, a throwback to the current mythologized days of national unity and pride.

Comparable to her father, she often mentioned the need for the Indonesian people to have strong commitment to UUD 1945 (the 1945 State Constitution), Pancasila (state ideology), and the existence of NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia --the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia). In her view these three institutions were sacred and had to be preserved due to their historical importance. In her official statements and presidental speeches, she frequently reminded the nation that the three institutions were part of the proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945, and, thus, they must be maintained in the future. She also pointed out that these three important pillars of the state had been constructed by the founding fathers of the republic, particularly Sukarno.

8 Ibid. 9 Tony Karon, “Megawati: The Princess Who Settled for the Presidency,” Time, http://www.time.com/ time pow/printout/0,8816,169130,00.html: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005. 10 Vaudine England,“Megawati and Her Generals”, South China Morning Post, December 26, 2000.

251 In the past, Sukarno held power as president and head of state which resembled practices in old Java under the Hinduistic Majapahit and Mataram Kingdoms. That is why, with the NKRI concept, he sought to concentrate absolute power and to rule with a centralized or “Javacentrist” system of government. Such concept was aimed to protect the central government’s power in order to build Indonesia as a strong state and a great power.11 Due to her commitment to follow her father’s view on NKRI, she was blamed of not appreciating the culture of other ethnic groups. She was also of the view that the Indonesian military was a national asset to protect the NKRI.12

I.B. Military Position to the Rise of Megawati

Megawati’s path to power was widely open as the military and radical Muslim groups in the government and parliament came to the conclusion that Wahid was incapable to continue his presidency because of his “erratic” style of government and alleged involvement in the Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik --State Logistic Agency) corruption scandal although the court could not prove it. She could take over the presidency from Wahid after he had been finally impeached by the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat --the People’s Consultative Assembly).

This was a different situation compared to almost 2 years before, when the military was solidly behind Wahid’s election, disregarding Megawati and frightening her supporters with repressive measures including bomb explosions on the street near the parliament building. Clearly, the bomb explosion at that time which killed and wounded several people sent a message to Megawati and her supporters to bury their aspirations and let Wahid to be elected.13

In the aftermath, however, with Wahid’s indifference to the military’s corporate interests and the emerging resistance of the armed forces to his presidency, the military faction withdrew their support, encouraged the parliament to issue Memorandum (motion of non-confidence) two times, to clear the way for Megawati to succeed him. Contrary to Sukma’s argument,14 this political situation suggested that she could not take over the presidency from Wahid if she was only supported by the Islamic parties, such as PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan --United Development Party) and PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang -- Crescent and Star Party). These parties, known as Poros Tengah or the Central

11 Mochtar Naim,”Mohammad Natsir dengan Konsep Integral dan Toleransinya” (“Mohammad Natsir with His Concepts on Integration and Tolerance”), Harian Republika, July 24, 2008: 4. 12 Franz Magnis-Suseno was interviewed on November 14, 2007 in Jakarta. 13 Havely, 2005, loc.cit. 14 Sukma, 2003, op.cit: 82.

252 Axis, had initially supported Wahid’s election as president, but became increasingly alienated by Wahid’s erratic style of government.

As acknowledged by Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, who was TNI Kaster (Kepala Staf Teritorial --chief of territorial affairs) during the Megawati government, the military could trust Megawati to protect its institutional and its leaders’ vested-interests. This meant that, compared to the two previous civilian presidents, she could be more expected by military officers to protect the TNI’s reserved domains because she would not push the military to continue its internal reforms. In other words, she would not confront the military with reform demands, so that it could maintain its old functions and organization, particularly, the territorial commands. No less important, before her election, she promised to increase the annual budget of TNI.15

I.C. Megawati and Reform Policies

In cooperation with DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat --the House of Representatives), and aided by a favourable political context, the Megawati government had passed 122 laws between July 2001 and September 2004.16 However, most of them were laws concerned with the enlargement of municipalities and cities and good governance, such as the law on foundations, the law on money laundering, the law on the anti-corruption commission and the amending of Law No. 31/1999 on the eradication of corruption,. These laws were made under the pressure of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, although she was much longer in office than her predecessor, Megawati only passed two laws concerned with military and security sector reform, namely, the Law on State Defense (Mo. 3/2002) and the Law on the TNI (No. 34/2004) which had been initiated by Wahid.

Later, the government of Megawati initiated a new political party law and a law on broadcasting, which reduced civil liberties. The President also passed laws on the elections of the President and heads of regional governments which would allow TNI to send its officers to run and give them a better chance to win than civilian candidates due to the continuing presence of TNI’s territorial structure throughout the country. In addition to this, the Megawati government had been responsible for initating a bill on the formation of a commission on truth and reconciliation which, tabled in May 2003, was passed by the DPR as Law No. 27/2004 on September 7, 2004. This law granted impunity for military officers who were involved in the past human rights abuses, while simultaneously disregarding the rights of the victims and their families of obtaining fair

15 Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo was interviewed on June 19, 2006 in Jakarta. 16 Dephumham, http://www.legalitas.org, was accessed on June 11, 2009.

253 trials and compensations. One of its clauses (Article 44) mentioned that the existence of human rights tribunals is not recognized in Indonesia. Different from what South Africa had conducted in addressing past conflicts and creating national reconciliation, this law prevents the formation of such tribunals. Therefore, soon after it was passed, at least six NGOs and a number of human rights activists and victims of human rights abuses filed a judicial review to the Mahkamah Konstitusi (the Constitutional Court), questioning the law’s stipulations, including Article 27 (1), which granted impunity for the gross violators.17 But rather than reviewing the substance of the law and show sympathy to the victims, Megawati preferred to support the enactment of the law. It seemed that the law was tabled to protect members of the armed forces from punishment for past human rights abuses in exchange for military support in the 2004 presidential elections.18

Further, Megawati released Inpres (Instruksi Presiden --Presidential Instruction) No. 1/2003 on the enlargement of fourteen regencies to support the formation of West Irian Jaya province. Actually, this Inpres was not in accordance with Undang-undang (UU) or Law No. 21/2001 on the special autonomy status of Irian Jaya previously initiated by Wahid to ease separatism there without creating a new province and regencies. Megawati continued to enact the Inpres due to her party’s interest to gain more legislative seats for their supporters in the region in future elections.19 She turned a blind eye to the fact that the enlargement would damage the existing borders which would affect the lifes and traditions of the tribes living in the area, create local conflicts and exacerbate separatist activities.20

During Megawati’s term of office, reforms which had been started under Habibie and Wahid continued, but slowed down and became erratic due to her support of the military in the drafting process of the Military Bill which would eventually become Law No. 34/2004 on TNI.21 With several counter-productive laws on politics, including the new laws on political party and broadcasting, she ended her presidency with an incomplete democratic transition. Contrary to Crouch’s view that President Megawati had promoted political reform by urging further amendments to the 1945 State Constitution

17 “UU KKR, Banyak Pasal Dinilai Rugikan Korban” (“Law on Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, Many Clausuls Harms the Victims”), Media Indonesia, April 13, 2006: 5. 18 “UU KKR Abaikan Hak Korban” (”Law on Commission on Truth and Reconciliation Ignores the Rights of the Victims”), Suara Pembaruan, June 22, 2006: 3. 19 Lihat “Pusat Diminta Hormati Otsus Papua” (“Central Government Was Demanded to Respect Papua’s Special Autonomy”), http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2005/11/26/Utama/ ut01.htm: 1-2, was accessed on November 27, 2005. Juga, Robert Isisdorus, “Pilkada atau Pemekaran Papua” (”Regional Elec- tions or Enlargement of Papua”), http://www.suarapembaruan. com/News/2005/11/26/ Utama/ut05. htm,: 1-2, was accessed on November 27, 2005. 20 ”Gubernur Papua Minta Segera Cabut Inpres No. 1/2003” (“Papua Governor Wants Cancellation of Presidential Instructions No. 1/2003”), http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2007/ 04/21/Nusantara/ nus-14.htm, was accessed on April 21, 2007: 1-2. 21 See, Ziegenhain, 2008, op.cit: 132.133.

254 and producing more new laws, in reality, she tried to limit civil liberties by tightening legal provisions for those who wanted to form new political parties and found electronic media enterprises.22 More significantly, she would not revoke Article 19 in the bill on TNI, which allowed the military to impose martial law and transfer power without making prior consultation with the incumbent president, had there not been pressure from the reform movement right before the September 2004 presidential elections.

Furthermore, unlike Habibie and Wahid, Megawati never supported the formation of a federal state in Indonesia in response demands of the regions which resented the profound disparities between Java and the outer islands. Strongly resenting the separatist movements in Aceh, (South) Maluku, and Irian Jaya, the independence of these provincies was absolute anathema for her. Alternatively, she offered a special autonomy status to Aceh by submitting and eventually enacting a particular law. However, a similar law which granted a special autonomy status to Irian Jaya had been undermined by her presidential instruction (Inpres) to enlarge Mimika, Paniai, Sorong, and other regencies in the province.

Civil liberties were threatened by her government as she imposed a strict regulation on public rallies, the first since the fall of Soeharto. This affected those who wanted to criticize the president in public because they could be punished by a defamation clause of KUHP (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana --the Criminal Code) inherited from the Dutch colonial government. Her reservation towards free expression in public also threatened the freedom of the press, especially if it commented on the situation in Aceh and her government’s (repressive) approach in handling separatist conflict there. In an official forum, for example, she complained about the press for its interviews with GAM rebels which were publicized abroad. According to President Megawati, such interviews showed that the press did not possess nationalism or patriotism, leaving the country’s interest behind.23

I.D. Megawati’s Policies Regarding Security Sector Reform

TNI’s role as revolutionary (tentara pejuang) and people’s army (tentara rakyat) was endorsed by different presidents. Most salient in this respect was Megawati, who, similar to Sukarno, her father, in her official remarks frequently praised the important role of the military institution in safeguarding the country and its people from any kind of

22 Harold Crouch was interviewed on April 22, 2006 in Jakarta. 23 Harian Kompas, March 15, 2007: 4.

255 threats since independence.24 To pay respect and show pride of her national military, she always wore TNI uniform when she attended and led military ceremonies. Not surprisingly, her track record showed good relations with the red-white faction of the military that were close to Gen. Murdani and Lt. Gen. Hendropriyono, as well as other pro-Soeharto generals from the new generation, such as Gen. Wiranto, Adm. Widodo, and Gen. Sutarto, who consecutively led TNI afterwards. In most of her official speeches during legislative and presidential campaigns, she took pains to praise Wiranto and his military for their support of her presidency. Attempting to continuously show tribute to TNI leaders, she mentioned that the military was changing from a tool of Soeharto’s authoritarian rule to a professional defence force. Nonetheless, the reform movement became increasingly sceptical to such pronouncements.

It was very clear that since her rise to power, President Megawati did not want to urge TNI to change the old doctrines of Tri Ubaya Cakti (the three sacred principles) and Catur Darma Eka Karma (four tasks one response), which defined TNI’s dual function and gave the military reason to resume its involvement in non-military affairs after the fall of Soeharto.25 The controversial role inherited from the past was also protected by Law No. 34/2004 which was passed in the last few months of her presidency. Thus, under Megawati, there was a stagnation, and, eventually, a setback of military reform efforts.26 As noted by Mietzner, Wiranto’s role in facilitating the rise of the next generation of military officers close to him prevented the complete destruction of the Soeharto regime and allowed many of its key elements, in particular, the military, to make a relatively smooth transfer into the new polity. Megawati supported the military in this process by allowing it to define and implement its own internal reform.This had resulted in the omission of important items from the reform agenda, especially, the territorial command structure, which was left untouched.27

President Megawati’s lacklustre reformism and her mediocre leadership was another factor that caused the stagnation of security sector reform. Meanwhile, the rising threat of international terrorism since 2002 after the series of attacks of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) in Jakarta and Bali provided TNI an additional pretext to cancel its command structure reform. With the renaissance of nationalist-unitarian notions of state security,

24 See, for example, Megawati Soekarnoputri, ”Sikap dan Kebijakan Politik PDI Perjuangan” (”The Posi- tion and Politics of the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle”), paper, the XXVIIIth Regular Course of Lemhannas, Jakarta, DPP PDIP, July 28, 2005. 25 Rusdi Marpaung (eds.), Dinamiika Reformasi Sektor Keamanan (Dynamics of Security Sector Reform), Jakarta: Imparsial, 2005: 176-177; Also, interview with Rusdi Marpaung and Al-Araf, human rights activists from Imparsial, on April 9, 2008, in Jakarta. 26 See, Ziegenhain, 2008, op.cit: 132. 27 Mietzner, 2006, loc .cit : 6.

256 Megawati became even more apathetic to protect civilian supremacy and civil liberties that would positively influence the prospect of TNI reform.28

Reversely, Megawati expanded her concessions to the military by offering greater institutional autonomy and new opportunities to interfere on security affairs. She returned the post of TNI chief commander to the army by promoting Gen. Sutarto, the army chief, in a wide-ranging reshuffling of the top military leadership in 2002. She further encouraged the promotion of Lt. Gen Ryamizard, then Kostrad (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat --Army’s Strategic Reserves Command) commander, who held strong nationalist-unitarian views and opposed progressive reform, that had made him politically controversial but popular with the army mainstream, to the position of army chief. As argued by Effendy Choirie, member of the defense subcommittee of DPR’s Committee 1, by endorsing those hardliners or what he identified as anti-reform officers, President Megawati tried to invite the military back to the political arena, and ignored the post-Soeharto consensus which would have enabled the air force chief to replace Adm. Widodo AS as TNI chief commander.29

No less important, she appointed Matori Abdul Djalil defence minister. Matori was a former aide of Wahid who defected from Wahid’s PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa --National Awakening Party) and transferred support to Megawati’s camp. Matori badly lacked knowledge of military affairs, but sought to compensate this by pursuing a course of accommodation toward the military elite as new minister of defence. Although he had made a constructive effort to define the country’s threat perception in the Defence White Paper (Buku Putih Pertahanan) of 2003, he was also quite comfortable with being the mouthpiece of the most heavily militarized government ministry.30 After he suffered a stroke, Megawati did not fill the vacancy position until the expiration of her term by October 2004. Consequently, her disengagement from details of military management, combined with the absence of a minister of defence, left the military largely in control of their corporate affairs.31

Also, in comparison to Habibie and Wahid, Megawati was more dependent on military support to preserve her position and promote her political interests. Due to this motivation, in 2002 she drastically increased the budget for defence from 3.79 percent of APBN (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara --state revenue and expenditure) or national budget at the end of the Wahid presidency (2001)32 to 7.07 percent. This was slightly less than the allocation for education, which reached 7.76 percent. In 2004, the

28 Ibid: 33. 29 Effendy Choirie was interviewed on July 11, 2006 in Jakarta. 30 Carmel Budiardjo, “Indonesia’s Territorial Integrity and the TNI’s Role in Crushing Separatism”, http: //tapol.gn.apc.org/reports/r030603tni.htm, was accessed on June 3, 2003: 1-5. 31 Mietzner, 2006, loc.cit: 34. 32 Zulfahmi, 2006, loc.cit: 15; Widoyoko, 2005, loc. cit: 1-15.

257 last year of her presidency, the defence budget increased further to 8.40 percent, surpassing the budget she allocated for the educational sector which attained only 7.75 percent. President Megawati supported most of the financial requests made by the military without demanding detailed explanations for particular budget items.33

The condition of Indonesia’s economy in 2003 also improved and became more stable, as suggested by slight improvements of the main economic indicators. Economic growth rose to 4.1 percent from 3.7 percent in 2002,34 and the number of people living below the poverty line decreased by 1 percent from 38.4 million to 37.4 million people, or from 18.4 percent in 2002 to 17.4 percent in 2003.35 Megawati’s success in significantly reducing the inflation rate from 10.03 percent in 2002 to 5.06 percent in 2003 had improved the welfare especially of those at the lowest level of the income distribution.36 A recovering economy and improving monetary conditions resulted in a better condition of the real economy, resulting in economic growth (GDP), which further rose to 5.1 percent in 2004, the highest level after the 1997 Asian financial crisis.37 Likewise, GNP per capita in 2003 steadily increased to Rp. 2.0 million (US$ 200) from Rp. 1.7 million (US$ 170) in 2002 and Rp. 1.4 (US$ 140) million in 2001.38 Summing up, one may argue that in 2004, Indonesia’s economy had partly recovered from the 1997 financial crisis. This economic achievement had also helped President Megawati prevent military opposition. It also indicated the positive relationship between civilian regimes’ success in reaching economic progress and military support for them as earlier argued by Lovemann,39 Crouch,40 and Welch.41

President Megawati supported most of the financial requests made by the military without demanding detailed explanations for particular budget items.42 Because of this, in April 2002, for example, the DPR threatened to create a special committee of investigation (Panitia Khusus or Pansus) to examine from which sources she provided a Rp. 30 billion (about US$ 3 million) grant to the military and the police.43 DPR wanted to know whether the money had been really used to help renovate houses and dilapidated military barracks (asrama) of lower ranking TNI soldiers and the police across Indonesia.

33 Mietzner, 2006, loc.cit: 39. 34 Laporan Perekonomian Indonesia 2003 (Report of Indonesian Economy 2003), Jakarta, Bank Indone- sia, 2004: 3, 27. 35 “Ironi Kemiskinan di Negeri Kaya” (”Irony of Poverty in Rich Country”), Kompas, April 9, 2005: 37. 36 Laporan Perekonomian Indonesia 2003 (Report of Indonesian Economy 2003), 2004, op.cit: 58. 37 Laporan Perekonomian Indonesia 2004 (Report of Indonesian Economy 2004), Jakarta: Bank Indone- sia, 2005: xix. 38 Laporan Perekonomian Indonesia 2003 (Report of Indonesian Economy 2003), 2004, op.cit: 45. 39 Loveman, 1999, op.cit: 186, 213, 254-255; Loveman and Davies, Jr., (eds.), 1978, loc.cit: 5 & 12. 40 Crouch in Ahmad and Crouch (eds.), 1985, loc. cit: 288. 41 Welch (ed.), 1970, loc. cit: 17-35. 42 Mietzner, 2006, loc. cit: 39. 43 Ziegenhain, 2008, op.cit: 147.

258 It was later known that the money the President used had been taken from Bantuan Presiden (Banpres), or the presidential aid funds, something that must be approved by the DPR because they are part of APBN which must be passed as law. In the end, Megawati did not need to come to the parliament for defending the allocation because in the absence of support by the military faction, the proposed establishment of an investigative committee or Pansus Asramagate for questioning the asrama scandal was afterwards withdrawn.

In another case, the President had been heavily criticized by DPR members for failing to consult them before signing the deal of the purchase of the Sukhoi jet fighters and helicopters made during her visit to Moscow in April 2003.44 There was indication that the purchase breached both defense and budgetery laws since the expenditure for the military aircraft was neither included in the 2003 defense budget, nor was it inserted in the military planned budget. Although a special committee of inquiry (Pansus Sukhoi) was formed and carried out its task, only Widjanarko Puspoyo, the Chairperson of Bulog, had been sent to court for the misappropriation of the state logistics agency’s budget.45 More importantly, without the support of the military faction, DPR had stopped the activities of its Sukhoi enquiry committee. Therefore, the DPR’s enquiry into the Sukhoigate scandal, as it became popularly known, had no further impacts on the political position of President Megawati.

More interestingly, close to the 2004 general elections, the incumbent president instructed the branches of her party --the PDIP-- to support military candidates for the positions of governor, major, and regent. One significant example which had upset her supporters was her order to support a military figure as speaker of the elected city council in Jakarta.46 This clearly reflected her increased dependency on the military for her political survival. Not surprisingly, in return, she encouraged the military to intensify its campaign in Aceh against the GAM rebels.47 Before she concluded her presidency, she even allowed the military to submit the draft bill on the Indonesian military (TNI), later passed as Law No. 34/2004, which contradicted with Law No. 3/2002 on National Defence and Law No. 2/2002 on the National Police These two laws were passed under the Wahid administration which had the objective to reform the TNI, end its sociopolitical functions, and separate it from the police.48 As stated above, the TNI bill submitted to the

44 Ibid: 148. 45 Leanika Tanjung and Eduardus Karel Dewanto, “Badan Urusan (Logistik) Pesawat,” (“State Logisctis/ Aircraft Agency”), 29 Juni 2003, Tempo Online, http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2003/06/29/ LU/mbm.20030629.LU88768.id.html, was accessed on May 26, 2010. 46 Sander Thoenes, “Indonesian Military Power Undimmed by Humiliations”, Financial Times, September 21, 1999. 47 Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher, 2005, loc. cit: 85. 48 See Sebastian, 2006, op.cit.

259 legislature by the Megawati government again granted authority to the military to take over power in case of a state emergency, thereby restoring its previous position.

Considering that the military faction was still in parliament until October 2004, and ignoring criticism from reform activists, Megawati endorsed the submission of the law. She conferred ample opportunity to the TNI to improve its position and protect its vested interests. In return, she expected military support for her campaign in the presidential elections scheduled for July and September 2004. If passed into law, the draft bill would seriously threaten the on-going security sector reform. Article 19 of the draft bill, for instance, would allow the TNI to restore its dual function by vesting it tasks other than war.49 The article granted unlimited powers to the TNI chief commander to define when and under what circumstances the sovereignty, the territorial integrity, and the security of the state are under threat.50 This is why Article 19 had been often cited as “pasal kudeta” or “the coup chapter.” The draft article obscured security and defense matters, and fused the functions of the military and the police that had been separated before.

Although the DPR could revise some of the bill’s worst reversals of military reform, including the “pasal kudeta“ (Article 19), with Law No. 34/2004 eventually passed, TNI could retain its political influence and maintain its territorial function which in the past had been misused for protecting illegal business practices.51 In addition, Article 45 opened new access for TNI officers to occupy civilian posts in the cabinet and the bureaucracy, both in the central and regional government offices, without retiring from their military carreers.

Of course, the concessions Megawati made in Law No. 34/2004 increased the risk for the return of the military’s dual function and supremacy over the civilian control. This is why Rinakit commented that it was evident that military power had become a critical factor in the calculations of ambitious politicians such as Megawati.52 Earlier, Alagappa had noted that in the initial stages of democratic transition, civilian authorities for a number of reasons, including lack of expertise or a desire to consolidate their hold on the political realm, might willingly acquiesce to demands of the armed forces which were preserving and possibly even strengthening their prerogatives in institutional and security matters. Such a situation could also be found in Indonesia’s democratic transition under President Megawati Soekarnoputri.53

49 Anggoro, expert on the Indonesian military, in Marpaung (eds.), 2005, loc. cit: 174. 50 Budiardjo, 2003, loc.cit. 51 Marpaung (Eds.), 2005, ibid; Also, interview with Rusdi Marpaung and Al-Araf, human rights activists from Imparsial, on April 9, 2008, in Jakarta. 52 Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher, 2005, loc. cit. 53 Alagappa, 2001, op.cit: 35.

260 Therefore, PKB legislator Choirie maintained54 that from mid-2001 until 2004 Indonesia’s security sector reform slowed down, although, according to Pramono,55 Megawati’s political adviser, political stability was much greater, compared to the period from mid-1998 to early 2001, when the country was governed by Habibie (1998-1999) and Wahid (1999-2001). In an interview with the author, Choirie explained how adamantly TNI leaders opposed the provisions on civilian supremacy and human rights in the military draft bill. In accordance with this, T. Hari Prihatono, chairperson of Propatria, an NGO focusing on Indonesia’s security sector reform, argued that by supporting TNI’s aspiration on the military’s tasks “other than war” which were not rigidly defined in the draft bill, President Megawati wanted also to maintain the military’s territorial function.56 In other words, she did not support the reform movement which demanded the elimination of the tasks that had been largely misused in the past.57

According to Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, a military analyst from LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia -- Indonesian Institute of Sciences), President Megawati actually wanted to create a subjective civilian control --as defined by Huntington58-- over the military with the new law.59 This could be seen, for instance, in her decision to promote Gen. Ryamizard, the army chief, to the post of chief commander. Megawati was beholden to Ryamizard who had played a key role in the impeachment of President Wahid and the installation of Megawati as new president. More specifically, she wanted to perform her role as TNI supreme commander, for which she passionately wore military uniform on many occasions at state ceremonies. Such reality reminded the analyst to Sukarno’s behaviour before the end the first Indonesia’s democratic transition in the 1950s.

President Megawati had also gone out of her way to cheer up TNI soldiers. She had visited two important corps of the army, Kopassus and Kostrad. She participated in parades, rode on heavy equipment, and delivered homilies on the need for self-respect and the duty to protect the nation. At the closing ceremonies of a Kostrad training camp in Cipatat, Bandung, she said, “It will be more important for you to develop a sense of belonging to your corps and your nation in such a way that will help you with your duties in securing our respected and beloved country.”60

As pointed out by Australian military expert, Harold Crouch, President Megawati never encouraged TNI to change its old doctrine of Catur Dharma Eka Karma, the pillars

54 Effendy Choirie was interviewed on July 11, 2006 in Jakarta. 55 Pramono Anung was interviewed on September 21, 2006 in Jakarta. 56 “Warga Sipil Keberatan Upaya Pertahankan Koter” (“Civilians Resisted Territorial Command Exis- tence”), Harian Kompas, March 1, 2007: 2. 57 T. Hari Prihatono was interviewed on July 13, 2006 in Jakarta. 58 Huntington, 1957, op.cit. 59 Ikrar Nusa Bakti was interviewed on May 15, 2006 in LIPI, Jakarta. 60 England, 2000, loc.cit.

261 of the military’s dual function. For this reason, there was no significant change in the structure and composition of the defence ministry, the national intelligence board (Badan Intelijen Nasional --BIN), and other institutions which should actually be controlled by civilians.61 Due to Megawati’s unwillingness to press for reform, the country got stuck in what Crouch and Salim criticized as “half-hearted reform.”

I.E. The Military and Javanese Political Culture

As stated by Ong Hok Ham, a senior Indonesian historian and expert of Javanese culture, TNI perceived their role comparable with the Satria (knights) in traditional Javanese kingdoms, where they played the dominant role. The fact that Javanese values influenced the inner world of the military62 explains why TNI was reluctant to leave its dual-function. In accordance with integrationalist state theory, the Javanese political culture made no separation between military and political functions. The concept inherited by the nation from the Mataram kingdom put the guardians of the kingdom, the knights, or the soldiers, in special position, and conferred privileges on them. As a consequence, even including in the period of the so-called parlamentary democracy in the mid-1950s, the military had always played a dominant role in Indonesian politics.63 At that time, military leaders under Gen. Nasution through his Jalan Tengah (Middle Way) concept laid the ideational foundation to the political role of the military. The MiddleWay was renamed in 1965 to dwifungsi (dual function), and over the years, it became the main doctrine of the military, which imposed its dominant role on every main area of the nation’s life.64 Any attempt to bring the armed forces under civilian control had been met with stiff resistance.

To have a better understanding on the Indonesian military and their political culture, the views of Kusnanto Anggoro, a scholar of military and Javanese political culture from Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, need to be noted. According to him, most soldiers still see themselves as members of a caste rather than a profession. Consequently, current TNI do not differ from Tentara Jawa (Javanese traditional soldiers), Tentara Mataram (Mataram soldiers), or Tentara Wisanggeni in the past who wanted to have control over weapons, reign, and wealth simultaneously.65

61 Harold Crouch was interviewed on April 22, 2006 in Jakarta. 62 Rinakit, in Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher, 2005, loc. cit: 75-76. 63 See also, Crouch, 1978, and ICG, 2000, in Liem Soei Liong, in Colimbijn and Lindblad, 2000, loc. cit: 198. 64 Notosutanto, 1984, in Liem Soei Liong, ibid. 65 Kusnanto Anggoro was interviewed on October 31, 2007, after discussions and book launch entitled Metamorfosis Bisnis Militer: Sebaran Bisnis Militer Pasca Diterbitkannya UU TNI (The Metamorphose of

262 In line with this, Burhan Magenda, a military expert from the University of Indonesia, argued that the behavior of the Indonesian armed forces was deeply influenced by the dominant Javanese political culture existing before the colonial era.66 Using Rueland’s cultural approach, it can be further argued here that Hinduistic and Brahmanic culture dominating the Southeast Asian region in the past had strongly affected Javanese kingdoms which controlled most regions that would form together the modern state of Indonesia.67 This Javanese cultural dominance is associated with a hegemonic Indonesian state. According to Rueland, transmigration policy, which was intensified in the 1970s and 1980s and attempted to ease the population explosion on Java, was also intended to consolidate the military regime’s, particularly, Soeharto’s rule, which strongly relied on Javanese symbols and values by settling Javanese in the outer islands of Indonesia.

Besides, Burhan said that Javanese people gave high respect to the role of their traditional soldiers. They could tolerate that soldiers are profoundly involved in the daily life of society in order to guarantee security, in addition to their role in the palace to protect the king and his family from any kind of internal and external threats of disturbance. Due to their high respect to soldiers’ role as warriors and protectors of the kingdom and society, the Javanese easily forgave them for the wrongdoings such as human rights violations.

Javanese culture also maintains that state and society are inseparable. As argued by Permadi, the independence of Indonesia was founded in 1945 within this integralistic perspective as enshrined in its basic constitution and state ideology.68 Therefore, the practice of the military’s dual function had been tolerated by the Indonesian people for a long time, and became difficult to be removed. Permadi added that such difficulty was influenced by the old value of the manunggaling Kawula-Gusti which perceived the military as an integral part of society that could not be separated from it. More specifically, the old Javanese value interpreted as kemanunggalan tentara dan rakyat had constrained TNI to introduce new cultural values which could lead them to transform themselves to become a modern and professional military that could wholly abandon its social and political roles. On the other hand, the established values that are still taught in TNI training courses continuously motivated soldiers to get involved in civic affairs, and, reversely, to be sensitive to criticism and demands for reform.

Military Business: Military Business after the Issuance of Law on TNI), Jakarta: The Ridep Institute, FES, 2007. 66 Burhan Magenda was interviewed on January 30, 2007 in Jakarta after seminar on “TNI and the Inte-rest to Maintain theTerritorial Command System” held by the Centre for Researches of DPR. 67 Juergen Rueland,”Ethnic Conflict, Separatism and Terrorism,” in Stephan Hoadley and Juergen Rue- land (eds.), Asian Security Reassessed, Singapore: ISEAS, 2006: 211-212. 68 Permadi was interviewed on November 25, 2006 in Bogor.

263 Burhan also believes that that political culture could change, but this would take time, and depend on the extent of external influences to which the military is exposed.69 During the Megawati era the Javanese were still the dominant ethnic group, therefore this situation precluded the change of the political culture. Based on the 2000 census report, with 41 percent of the total population, the Javanese continued to be the largest ethnic group.70 Combined with the Sundanese, Cirebonese, Madurese, Bantenese, Balinese, who were also indigenous ethnic groups of Java and are still close to them, they made up around 64.9 percent of the Indonesian population. The Javanese had a high concentration in almost all provinces of the country; they included at least 15 percent of the local population in thirteen of the thirty provinces. Even outside Java, the Javanese make up the largest single ethnic group in the provinces of Bengkulu, Lampung, and East Kalimantan, while in many other provinces, they were second or third to the local indigenous population in terms of size.71 For instance, they were the second biggest ethnic group in North Sumatra, comprising 32 percent of the provincial population, in Riau with 25 percent, Jambi with 27 percent, Central and South Kalimantan with 18 and 13 percent respectively.72 With this positive cultural predisposition to the military, not surprisingly, there was evidence that the public in general was not opposed to the military role in internal security. A survey conducted at the Gadjah Mada University at the request of the military, disclosed that 78 percent of the respondents were in favor of a military provincial command and a smaller percentage, but still a majority, approved military commands at lower local levels.73 More importantly, although the military had announced the turnover of territorial affairs to local authorities, critics were still doubtful that it would really do this. The civilian minister of defence under Habibie and Wahid, Juwono Sudarsono, acknowledged that the Indonesian people still tolerate the military to practice its territorial function.74

In this relation, two main critics of Javanese culture, Suwardi Endraswara and Mohamad Sobary, reminded that in response to change, the culture shows ambiguous reactions. It generally resists outside pressure for change due to its emphasis on the values of persatuan (unity),75 stabilitas (stability), and ketertiban (orderliness). They are the dominant symbols of the Javanese culture which had been internalized by civilian leaders

69 Burhan Magenda was interviewed on January 30, 2007 in Jakarta. 70 The 2000 Population Census, Central Bureau Statistics, Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 2001. 71 Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, “Who are the Indonesians?” The Jakarta Post, August, 16, 2005. 72 Ibid; see also, Indonesia's Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape. Si- ngapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003. 73 Dwith Y. King in “Sizing-up Indonesia's New Leadership”, conference report, Washington DC: Asia Society, 2001. 74 Juwono Sudarsono was interviewed on July 17, 2009 in Jakarta. 75 “Rukardi, ‘Budaya Jawa Digugat Habis’” (“Rukardi, ‘Javanese Culture Totally Questioned’”), Suara Merdeka, November 19, 2006: 1-2.

264 like Megawati as well as TNI.76 For this reason, Maj. Gen. Sidarto Danusubroto, a former Sukarno aide and President Megawati’s political adviser, argued that the Indonesian military would still be sensitive to reform if the political culture of the nation did not change.77

A similar view came from the TNI institution. Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, the last Kaster,(Kepala Staf Teritorial --TNI chief for territorial affairs) and a proponent of an abolition of the military’s territorial function, admitted that TNI’s institutional culture, which hindered it to accept civilian supremacy, was not easy to be removed. This means that TNI would not give up its dual function, as long as the role of the military in the country’s polity was negotiated by civilian and military leaders who were socialized in the traditional culture.78 A clear example for this, according to Widjojo, is Law No. 34/2004, which again granted the military authority to perform non-military tasks. It had been iniated by TNI leaders and passed by President Megawati and the parliament (DPR). Previously, chief commander Gen. Sutarto often stated that although the role of TNI had been redefined in the amended 1945 State Constitution, TNI would still be involved in the state and government affairs and the nation’s decision making process.79

In fact, during the Megawati presidency, the armed forces still tightly upheld their doctrines of Tri Ubaya Cakti, Catur Dharma Eka Karma, and Sishankamrata (total defence),80 which justified and prolonged their participation in civic affairs, even at village level, supported by the existence of their territorial commands and their rejection to civilian tribunals.81 Military training schools, and, more significantly, the military academy (the Akademi Militer --Akmil), which was responsible for recruiting and preparing army officers, also maintained its old symbols and values which found expression in old Javanese language, for example, adhitakarya mahatvavirya nagara bhakti (creating soldiers or officers with highest devotion to the state),82 trisakti wiratama (creating soldiers or officers who are brave, committed, and devoted),83 and so forth,

76 See Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 5. 77 Maj. Gen. Sidarto Danusubroto was interviewed on November 28, 2006 in Jakarta. 78 Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo was interviewed on June 19, 2006 in Jakarta. 79 ”Militer Menatap Masa Depan” (“Military Anticipates the Future”), http://www.tokohindonesia. com/ ensiklopedi/e/endriartono-sutarto/index.shtml, September 27, 2006: 1-4. 80 See Andi Widjajanto, “Pemberdayaan Wilayah Pertahanan” (“Empowerment of Defense Territory”), paper, presented in Centre for Research and Information Services of DPR, June 6, 2006, Jakarta: 1-4. 81 An evaluation from Muladi, Governor of Lemhannas, National Resilience Council, an important state institution which prepares the promotions of military and civilian officers to strategic posts. See, “DPR Nilai Pemerintah Tak Serius: Kultur TNI Harus Diubah” (“DPR Sees Government Not Serious: TNI’s Culture Must be Changed”), Harian Kompas, September 22, 2006: 4; also interview with Muladi on March 28, 2008 in Jakarta. 82 “Sekilas Akmil: Lintasan Sejarah Akademi Militer” (“A Glance on Military Academy: The History of Military Academy”), http://www.akmil.ac.id/sekilas/php: 1-2; “Lambang Akademi Militer” (“Symbol of Military Academy”), http://www.akmil.ac.id/lambang.php#top: 1. 83 “Visi dan Misi” (“Vision and Mission”), http://www.akmil.ac.id/visi_misi.php: 1.

265 which reflected on the cadets life and decisions. Moreover, soldiers still claimed that they were inseparable parts of the people and upheld Sapta Marga, the seven milestones of the TNI soldiers, in which the third milestone declared that they were knights of Indonesia. They still also preserved Sumpah Prajurit --the Soldier’s Oath-- which stated in its first principle that every soldier must be loyal to NKRI (the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia) which is based on Pancasila (state ideology) and UUD 1945 (the 1945 State Constitution).84 Similar to this, their leaders continued to keep leadership principles which were mostly written in old Javanese language, such as satya (loyal), ing ngarsa sung tuladha (to give the right example and lead from the front), ing madya mangun karsa (to be a driving force from the middle), tut wuri handayani (to guide from behind), and waspada purba wisesa (to supervise subordinates and have the courage to correct them).85 All the same doctrines and values would justify their right to perform socio- political functions in the new post-Soeharto era.86

Reform demands which brought about domestic instability had confirmed and legitimized TNI’s new emphasis on the concept of integralism as its main ideological guideline which was mostly influenced by the Javanese political culture. TNI had reason to defend their ideology by referring to the disintegration in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism and arguing that only its territorial presence in the regions was able to prevent Indonesia from going down similar path.87

Not surprisingly, military leaders, for example, army chief, Gen. Ryamizard, like his seniors in the past, publicly stated that “In Indonesia, we, the Army, are part of the people,” to keep justifying the involvement of the military in political life. This meant as an “Army of the people,” the military had a particular role in guarding against separatism and security disturbances, so that it deserved a bigger role in national security affairs. However, Gen. Ryamizard later denied that the statement suggested a return to politics: “The idea of more involvement in handling domestic security should not be seen as the military’s return to day-to-day politics. We, as the Army, are just sharing our ideas on how to prevent the country from disintegration.”88 Analysts saw the statements well connected with BIN’s (National Intelligence Board, previously known as Bakin) proposal on giving back TNI its role for arrest and investigation explained in the Megawati government’s recent initiative of issuing anti-terrorism regulations after the October 12, 2002 Bali bombings. They would provide again the military space to operate as a quasi- police force, thereby overruling MPR Decree No. 6/2000, which had laid down the separation between the police and the military.

84 See Honna, 2003, op.cit: 212. 85 Ibid: 213. 86 Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 325-326. 87 Mietzner, 2006, loc. cit: 37. 88 “BIN wants its power back from police”, February 24, 2003, Laksamana.net.

266 I.F. Military Response to Megawati Regarding Security Sector Reform

One of the characteristics of Megawati’s leadership that was seen as favourable for the military was that during her presidency she never introduced policies which went against the military. Her pride of the military, on the one side, and poor knowledge on security matters, on the other, led her to give a blanco check to the military. This is why under her presidency domestic security rapidly recovered and national stability increased.

In the absence of military opposition, her goverment was stable and free from military pressure, fabricated opposition, intimidation, and coup threats.89 She could stay longer in power due to her policies which were conducive for the interests of the military. This supported Singh’s argument who had linked stability, regime survival, and the protection of both national and military interest.90 Meanwhile, terorrist attacks such as the bombings in Jakarta, Bali, and Poso actually targeted foreign countries, such as the U.S., Britain, and Australia, not to her government. The “failure” of TNI to prevent radical Muslims from perpetrating the attacks was a reflection of its ambivalent response to reform. Army chief Gen. Ryacudu, for instance, was quoted as saying that his military strategic intelligence unit (Bais), which had relied on a strong intelligence network, had detected terrorist cells in Indonesia a long time earlier. However, it did not act for the reason that it was no longer within its jurisdiction to do so.91 The head of the national intelligence board (BIN), who was also former Kopassus (army’s special forces) officer, Lt. Gen. AM Hendropriyono, and TNI chief commander, Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, also believed that more authority was required to uncover the terrorist network on a larger scale than so far achieved by the police. With this argument, the military intended to regain the Indonesian people’s support for the reinforcement of its territorial command structure and its security functions instead of the national police which was portrayed as being incapable of coping with the international terrorist attacks.92

With the blanco check for reforming itself, the military saw no reason to change its institutional culture.93 In fact, the armed forces clung to their interventionist tendencies in politics. For example, in late 2003, army chief Gen. Ryamizard organized a show of force by deploying his army in Senayan national sports compound, near the parliament building. On that occasion, he warned politicians, especially party leaders, not to exploit the forthcoming September 2004 presidential election for their own narrow interests to

89 Indria Samego was interviewed on June 14, 2006 in Jakarta; Effendy Choirie was interviewed on July 11, 2006 in Jakarta. 90 See Singh, 1996, op.cit: 20-22. 91 Sunday Times, October 27, 2002, cited in Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 105. 92 The Jakarta Post, October 25, 2002, ibid 93 Mietzner, 2006, loc.cit: 43.

267 prevent the country from bloody clashes and security disturbances that would endanger national stability.94 Later, chief commander Gen. Sutarto made a statement before the working meeting of the defence commitee of the DPR, announcing that there were parties who wanted to sabotage the upcoming September 2004 presidential election.95 Earlier, Maj. Gen. Suwarno Adiwijoyo, military spokesman and former assistant of Kasospol (Kepala Staf Sosial Politik --military chief for social and political affairs), said that if TNI only functioned as defence force, it would make them a tool of the government, not of the state, like fire extinguishers which were subordinated to a certain government agency without authority to perform other funtions. Referring to the period of the struggle for independence, Suwarno argued, TNI should be actually allowed to perform again as prajurit pejuang bersenjata or soldiers and, simultaneously, freedom fighters, who had capability to mobilize masses in addition to control military affairs.96

Therefore, TNI leaders and soldiers were reluctant to implement internal reform and ignored the existing laws which required TNI to withdraw from politics, stop business activities, and focus on improving their professionalism. For the time being, they still demanded voting rights for their personnel in the parliament and rejected civilian or public court trials. TNI also continued to deploy huge numbers of their members in rural and urban areas, especially in trouble spots, such as, Aceh, Irian Jaya, and Poso through their territorial structure. The armed forces had effectively defended their autonomy from institutional control, so that previous pressure of reform still had not yet brought major changes to them. In other words, there was actually little progress in transforming the TNI.97

TNI leaders held onto their political culture, even under Adm. Widodo, a chief commander with navy background. His “New Paradigm” proposed on October 5, 2001 was largely similar to his predecessor Wiranto’s agenda. It still emphasised TNI as “part of the national system” which played the same important role like any other civilian institution.98 Such paradigm would obviously provide the military with wide access to exercise its social-political functions. It would be protected by the Military Law No. 34/2004 which the military faction in the DPR sought to pass at the end of Megawati presidency.

94 Asril Sutan Marajo,”Mencermati Kinerja KPU” (“Evaluating KPU’s Performance”), Suara Merdeka, 3 Desember 2003, http://www.suara merdeka.com/ harian/0312/03/kha1.htm: 1-4. 95 Ibid. 96 Suwarno Adijoyo, Kemanunggalan TNI-Rakyat yang Hakiki: Jangan Sekali-sekali Menyakiti Hati Rak- yat (The Essence of TNI-People Integrity: Never Harm People’s Heart), Jakarta: Swadana Bangun Dina- mika Dunia, 2002: 9, 11, 16, 27. 97 Mietzner, 2006: 59. 98 Marpaung (eds), 2005, loc.cit: 149; Also, interview with Rusdi Marpaung and Al-Araf, human rights activists from Imparsial, on April 9, 2008, in Jakarta.

268 As pointed out by Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, with the blanco check from President Megawati, TNI had cancelled its territorial command reform.99 A reform proposal introduced by Widjojo in September 2001 was rejected by the military leadership and the majority of officers who wanted to defend the old system. Widjojo’s move could effectively be blocked after TNI headquarters had disbanded his Kaster office in November 2001 and he was removed to the less significant post of deputy chairperson (Wakil Ketua) of MPR. This removal signified the end of internal military discourses on overhauling the territorial command system, and left the TNI without new proponents of reform.100

Under the new favorable situation, the military consolidated its position and struggled for executive positions in the regions. In 2002 and 2003, the armed forces were successful in winning the elections for governor throughout Indonesia and thus strengthened their political power quite markedly. The success of TNI officers in winning local government elections in many regions was in part helped by Megawati’s instruction to her PDIP to recruit the military candidates.101 Meanwhile, the intense conflict among political parties over key governor positions, for example, in Jakarta as well as Central and East Java, had caused many legislatures to support the incumbents with military background, or, alternatively, they nominated other military officers to replace them. In effect, many retired generals maintained their governorships in regions outside Java. These successes encouraged retired generals such as Wiranto, Prabowo Subianto, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Agum Gumelar to run in the first direct presidential elections in 2004. Their competition became known in the country as the “star wars” of Soeharto’s New Order military figures. Therefore, not only had the military succesfully defended its territorial (political) power base and autonomy from civilian control, it also used the fragmentation of civilian politics to carve out political concessions. As explained by Mietzner, this situation demonstrated how the military as an institution as well as individual protagonists were able to use the new democratic conditions to their own advantage.102 This situation, in addition to the TNI-friendly Military Law No. 34/2004, supported Alagappa’s argument that in exchange for reducing their direct political role in the initial stage of democratic transition, the military might seek to preserve and even strenghten its prerogatives in both institutional and security matters.103

Thus, with Megawati’s concessions, military personnel again began to perceive themselves as more important than civilians. Likewise, her appreciation of the military’s important role as the savior of the state retained its claim that it is an institution which

99 Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo was interviewed on June 19, 2006 in Jakarta. 100 Mietzner, 2006, loc. cit: 42. 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid: 43, 59. 103 Alagappa, 2001, op.cit: 35.

269 must remain in national politics.104 That is why by the end of the Megawati era more than 75 percent of the soldiers resisted reform105 and upheld their belief that soldiers should have supremacy over the civilians. This figure highlighted the conservative views predominant in the military by which soldiers had been socialized since they were cadets in the military academy.

Rear Marshall Koesnadi Kardi, head of educational and training of defence ministry, acknowledged this assessment. As a result, the old composition, structure, doctrines, and mindset, the behavior of TNI soldiers during the early reform era until the Megawati presidency were still the same.106 For this reason, both Samego and Koesnadi were of the opinion that military reform could only be comprehensively realized if these problems had been tackled much earlier. In the absence of strong reform pressure, TNI introduced only a limited organizational reform, an addition to its weapon system reform which was supposedly easier to be conducted.

TNI’s determined effort to end military reform, and to retain its position in politics surfaced in the last period of the Megawati government. Its chief commander Gen. Sutarto, assisted by the TNI faction in the parliament, proposed the new bill on TNI, which, especially in its Article 19, conceded unlimited powers to the TNI chief commander to make his own definition when and under what circumstances “the sovereignty of the state, the country’s territorial integrity and the security of the nation are under threat.”107 Interestingly, the draft bill also allowed TNI to perform non-military tasks, enhancing its ability to interfere in civilian affairs. The military thereby justifies these powers with the argument that it had to retain its personnel in civilian institutions such as the defence ministry (Departemen Pertahanan or Dephan) and the national intelligence board (BIN). By calling for a strict security approach and increasing its authority, the armed forces capitalized on low-intensity conflicts in Aceh, Papua, and Poso, as well as terrorist bombings in order to restore its claim to a domestic security role.108 A unique model of post-Wahid military resistance to civilian regime and reform demands thus occurred in form of collusion between TNI and President Megawati. It resembles the sort of collusion between the military and civilian leaders during transition earlier identified by Finer.109

104 Ikrar Nusa Bhakti was interviwed on May 15, 2006 in LIPI, Jakarta. 105 Indria Samego in “Reformasi Masih Hadapi 75 Persen TNI yang Konservatif” (“Reform Movement Still Faces 75 Procent Conservative TNI”), Harian Kompas, December 21, 2006: 5; Also, interview with Indria Samego in Jakarta on June 14, 2006. 106 “Yang Berubah dari TNI Baru Senjata” (“What has changed only the weapons”), Harian Republika, December 20, 2006: 3. 107 Budiardjo, 2003, loc.cit:1-5. 108 Mietzner, 2006, op.cit: 37. 109 See, again, Finer, 1962, op. cit: 140-163; Ikrar Nusa Bhakti et al, 1999, op. cit: 37.

270 I.G. Military Response to Decentralization

TNI commanders in the Cilangkap Headquarters (Jakarta) had been aware that legal reforms made by the previous regimes would impact on their vested interests. Strong autonomy granted by Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999 to regional governments, especially at the level of municipalities or regencies, had not only jeopardized the principles of centralization and accumulation of power as well as integralism and the unitary state but also curbed political and economic interests of TNI leaders in Jakarta 110 After the issuance of the laws, the TNI chief (Panglima TNI) had to deal with various decision-makers throughout the country to preserve the military’s business interests. The new situation became more complicated because the mayor (walikota) and regent (bupati) positions became much stronger than those of the governors. Active officers were furthermore banned from running in direct elections of governors, mayors, or head of districts (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah --Pilkada). In case they contested, they must have earlier retired from their current posts and compete with civilian candidates.

In another new trend after the separation of the armed forces and the police as one of ther measures of military reform, there were intensifying turf battles over business opportunities between the two institutions. Welcome moves to give the police greater responsibility for internal security had produced the unintended side effect of giving the police opportunities to take over businesses in which TNI had been previously dominant, not only for security and protection services, but also to many other areas. Thus, where the police had begun to displace the TNI, struggles over territory repeatedly had broken out into violence.111

Before 1998, much of the money generated by military businesses in various regions was allocated to senior officers, including to those who worked in TNI higher commands in Jakarta.112 Different from the local commanders who could tap into growing local and regional budgets to cover military expenditures and to wholly control the extra income, higher commanders in their Jakarta bases did not have similar opportunities due to the policy of decentralization. Together with local governments, local commanders could often deeply be involved in illegal logging and other illegal activities of exploiting natural resources because of the uncontrolled autonomy.Meanwhile, higher commanders in Jakarta could not longer be able to use the profits from these operations as previously. With the emergence of new competitors, namely political parties which were struggling to establish a presence at the grass-roots and legislatures and bureaucracies in smaller

110 Rueland, in Hoadley and Rueland (eds.), 2006, loc. cit: 220. 111 Edward Schneier,”Evolving Patterns of Legislative Oversight in Indonesia,” in Rick Stapenhurst et al (eds.), Legislative Oversight and Budgeting, Washington DC: IBRD, WB, 2008.

271 regions which were attempting to cope with their new roles, after 1998 military commanders in Jakarta faced difficulties in taking advantage from the TNI’s territorial function in order to free themselves and the military institution from their dependency on regular government appropriations (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara -- APBN).113

Decentralization was one of the reasons why the military was reluctant to provide security and get involved in different conflicts in the regions. The formation of new municipalities and regencies which in many cases was accompanied by riots and instability had provided opportunities for TNI to create new regional commands. In Maluku, TNI had successfully re-established Kodam XVI Pattimura regional command after the formation of new province Maluku Utara (Malut). In Aceh, after the province obtained its special autonomy status, TNI had re-established Kodam Iskandar Muda regional command which had been dissolved under Habibie. In Poso, TNI failed to realize its proposal to create a Kodam (Komando Daerah Militer --military regional command) as its main base in Sulawesi due to strong opposition from NGOs.

The new dominant role of the military in handling communal conflicts and fighting separatist movements, and also in the war on terror produced political capital for its officers, which was contributing to their resistance against the reform movement. Gen. Ryamizard strongly argued that TNI still needed its territorial role.114 Therefore, the Megawati government and the military faction in the parliament initiated the revisions of the above laws on regional autonomy which had drastically reduced the power and authority of the central government and TNI’s potential control, as well. The reform opponents inside the TNI which were represented by the army mainstream also moved to marginalize Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi and his allies115 and even moderate reformers such as Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo from the center of decision making.

The growing threat of international terrorism caused by radical Muslim groups in Indonesia gave the military more arguments to reject demands for further reform. The three consecutive bomb attacks in Bali and Jakarta between October 2002 and September 2004, and the military’s “inability” to prevent or stop them, actually sent a clear message to the public that the unitary state (NKRI) would be in danger if the military’s territorial function was abolished or reduced. By showing reluctance to take firm action against radical Muslim groups, the military wanted to disclose that the existence of militant Islamist groups could be dangerous and threatening the Indonesian state. Therefore, the

112 Mietzner, 2006, op.cit. 113 “Too High a Price” Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/ja/node/11300/section/3. 114 Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu was interviewed on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta. 115 Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi was interviewed on November 8, 2006 in Jakarta.

272 government also had to reconsider moves to eliminate TNI’s role in non-military affairs, such as security and business.

TNI’s “inability” to support the police in unveiling and crushing the terrorist network drew strong criticism as its extended intellegence operations had hardly changed since Soeharto resigned. With its inactivity, the military was seen in the public to have encouraged the radical Muslim groups to conduct their terrorist activities in different places across Indonesia.116 The groups, whose network during the New Order was suppressed by security officers could now freely choose their targets and conduct bombings in main cities within a short period. TNI’s standard weapons (M16 and SS-1) and the ammunitions and explosives (TNT) used by the groups which had been found during the police investigations indicated that the military was at least informed about the groups and their activities.117

TNI soldier’s alleged individual involvement in the activities of international terrorist groups, including in prayers and regular meetings, that had been succesfully uncovered by police investigators,118 depicted the military as a state institution that was allegedly also responsible for the success of the militants. As Indria Samego pointed out, TNI probably had no direct connection with the terrorist groups, but the heavy bombings could only be perpetrated by actors that had access to high-powered weapons such as those in possession of TNI.119 Under relentless pressure of reform, the military appeared as an institution that would gamble with the country’s security for the sake of its own gain.120

In the 2003 Defence White Paper prepared by the defence ministry, which, except for the minister himself, was controlled by military staff, TNI had clearly mentioned that the country was facing numerous non-traditional threats such as communal conflicts, separatism, and terrorism. It was also described there that it was the explicit task of the TNI to safeguard the nation from the threats which demanded it to be involved not only in “war military operations” but also “non-military operations.” As a consequence, in the Defence White Paper, TNI stated its disagreement with the dismantling of the territorial

116 See, “Military ‘knows’ the bombers, police don’t”, The Jakarta Post, October 25, 2002; ICG, 2005, loc.cit; ICG, 2001, loc.cit. 117 ICG, 2005, loc.cit. 118 See, for instance,“Aksi Balas Dendam Terungkap: TNI Pecat Yuli Karsono karena JI,” (“Act of Ven- geance Corroborated: TNI Discharged Yuli Karsono for Involvement in JI”), Harian Kompas, June 25, 2010: 3. Karsono was army soldier from Cimahi, West Java, found involved in the activity of JI’s followers. 119 Indria Samego was interviewed on June 14, 2006 in Jakarta. 120 Ariel Heryanto,”Udang di Balik Terror,” http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0511/07/opini/2150- 44-5. htm: 1-2, was accessed on November 9, 2005.

273 command system as demanded by its critics. Therefore, it appeared that instead of dismantling the system, TNI preferred to retain or revitalize it.121

In fact, both the civilian defence minister as well as the president, Matori Abdul Djalil and Megawati Soekarnoputri, encouraged the military to strengthen their territorial command system to cope with the rising threat of international terrorism. They also agreed with the re-establishment of TNI regional commands (Kodam) that had been removed under Habibie. Therefore, the terrorist bombings had corroborated the view of the military that national security would be threatened if the wide ranging decentralization scheme initiated in 1999 would be pushed further. It was argued that decentralization might facilitate the spread of the dangerous activities of the radical Muslims throughout the country which, as a result, would be difficult to be controlled by the military.

The revitalization of a militaristic approach to conflict resolution, the change of international security environment after the September 11, 2001 terorrist attacks in the US, and President Megawati’s soft approach to military reform and dependency on TNI gave opportunity to the military to dissociate itself from reform demands. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, the army chief, suggested to the government to revive and expand the intelligence gathering capability of the territorial command to help TNI cope with the terrorist threat. In February 2003, he publically stated that the military’s security role should be reinstated due to the threats of separatism and other security disturbances in the country.122 With the positive response from President Megawati, particularly, after the bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, military personnel became the most important actors in the counterterrorism units previously staffed exclusively with police officers. The previously limited role of the TNI in counterterrorism which had produced their officers’ displeasure led them to argue for a more extensive engagement of the military.123

II. Coping with Soeharto’s Alleged KKN Cases

II.A. Megawati’s Views on Her Mandate

121 Budiardjo, 2003, loc. cit: 1-5. 122 The Jakarta Post, March 3, 2003, cited in Sebastian, 2006, op. cit: 341. 123 Mietzner, 2006, loc. cit: 40-41.

274 As argued in Anderson’s seminal studies, power is the essence of everything in Javanese history and practice.124 The Javanese believe that power is a force that can be possessed by individuals and that it comes from God. Therefore, the question of legitimizing the possessor of the Sinar (light), Cahaya (radiance), and Wahyu (divine mandate and legitimation) is very crucial in a country where the Javanese live as majority. The process of legitimation can take time, and when it is transferred from one person to another, it usually tends to be traumatic.

Also, since power is unitary, it emanates only from a single source. It becomes all the more important to identify who has it, because only a good leader can posses it. This is all the more important as power is not answerable to the people, but to God alone. The Javanese concept of power thus markedly differs from the perception in the West where power is an abstract notion. Identifying such leader or person with power can, thus, become arduous. Therefore, it would be far easier to continue the system rather than attempt to change it as this may bring about unknown consequences.125 Within this framework or mindset, a leader predominantly influenced by the Javanese political culture tends to preserve the system and would not be eager to take any risk for change.

Similar to Soeharto, Megawati originated from a Javanese background and was thus socialized in Javanese political culture and values. Comparable to Soeharto, and also Soekarno, her father, President Megawati behaved in typical Javanese way in running her government. She strove for equilibrium, order, and harmony, or stability more than anything else. In her view, the country was more like a kingdom, therefore, she ruled more like a Javanese queen rather than a president of a modern country who had been elected by the people. Similar to Soeharto who perceived himself as a king and simultaneously a patriot and, thus, could not be badly treated as other Indonesian and Javanese rulers in the past, President Megawati considered herself comparable to a great king or queen from a great kingdom. In this context, she often sent her daughter, Puan Maharani, to represent her in many important occasions and to be treated with the privileges accorded to princesses or princes from the Solo kingdom.126 Meanwhile, cronyism and nepotism were perceived absoloutly legitimate as the traditional leaders saw it as a right to reward their loyal courtiers. Needless to say, her government was also confronted with rampant practices of corruption allegedly involving Megawati’s husband and members of her party.127

124 Benedict ROG Anderson, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture,” in Language and Power: Explor- ing Political Culture in Indonesia, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1992: 17-77. 125 Singh, 2000, op.cit: 20. 126 “Soeharto, Patriot atau ‘Crook’” (“Soeharto, A Patriot or ‘Crook’”), Kompas-online, April 11, 2007, http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0704/11utama/3438004.htm, was accessed on April 11, 2007: 3. 127 Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 25-28.

275 Likewise, Megawati came out to see her role for the most part as a symbol of national unity, because of which she rarely actively intervened in government business. Her apparent passivity in governing was explained by some Indonesian scholars with reference to Javanese mythology.128 According to these scholars, President Megawati saw her father, Soekarno, the first President of the country, as a “Good King” of Javanese legend, while, Soeharto was seen as the “Bad Prince” who had stolen the ”Good King’s” throne. Meanwhile, Megawati perceived herself as the “Avenging Daughter” who unseated the “Bad Prince” and salvaged the “Good King’s” throne. Once this had been accomplished, she was satisfied to reign as the “Good Queen,” and left the business of government to others. Permadi, a close aid of President Megawati in the parliament (DPR), stated that Megawati was perceived as a Satria Piningit or a new leader in the Javanese legend that had recieved the long-awaited divine mandate to bring the country out of a chaotic situation.129

Similar viewpoints had been raised by Franz Magnis-Suseno, a renowned scholar studying Javanese traditional values for a long time. According to Magnis-Suseno, Megawati behaved like a princess from old Javanese kingdoms as often described in the Javanese shadow puppet theatre that tended to wait rather than making pro-active decisions, and who wanted other people to accomplish her duties. Harmony was the highest priority of her administration, which had implications on her lenient policy towards former President Soeharto, who was still supported by many of his followers during her administration.130 Therefore, due to their adherence to conservative values derived from Javanese traditions, the leadership style of civilian leaders like Megawati resembled the one of former authoritarian rulers like Soekarno and Soeharto.131

Two-facedness, hypocrisy, and ascetism, stereotypes of the Javanese people were repeatedly applied by Megawati during her presidency.132 For example, she defended that women needed to turn out to vote and should take a greater role in politics. Yet, as the chairperson of the country’s biggest party, PDIP, she did not recommend many women to run for parliament. It was thus not surprising that she chose only few women in her cabinet although according to the constitution she had the prerogative to appoint ministers. Moreover, she emphasized in many of her speeches the need to implement the rule of law and previously blamed Soeharto and the negative impacts of his rule, but refrained from holding him and his cronies accountable for their abuses and misdeeds.

128 “Megawati Sukarnoputri Biography,” http://megawati-sukarnoputri.biography.ms/: 1-4, was accessed on October 29, 2005. 129 Permadi was interviewed on November 25, 2006 in Bogor. 130 Franz Magnis-Suseno was interviewed on November 14, 2007 in Jakarta. 131 Sebastian, 2006, op. cit: 48. 132 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit

276 Although President Megawati persistently stressed that “all Indonesians should think of themseves as Indonesians first, and Javanese or Sumatran second,”133 her style of leadership suggested that she was more inspired with her father’s Javanese political culture and values. Her style of unilateral communication and reluctance to discuss government policies publicly made her presidency, the power to govern, and the political mandate she received from the parliament a sacred matter.

II.B. Megawati’s Policy Regarding Soeharto’s alleged KKN Cases

Part of President Megawati’s ambivalence toward Soeharto’s alleged corruption, collusion, and nepotism (Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme --KKN) cases is her policy toward Tommy Soeharto. Tommy, on hiding for more than a year, had been sentenced by the Supreme Court to 18 months in prison for real estate fraud in September 2000. He was recaptured in November 2001 being suspected of masterminding the assassination of Supreme Court judge M. Syafiuddin Kartasasmita. The latter was a member of a panel of judges that had sentenced Tommy for graft in a land exchange deal involving the State Logistics Agency (Badan Urusan Logistik --Bulog) and Tommy’s corporation, PT Goro Batara Sakti. A champion of anti-corruption and an assertive judge in the country’s generally corrupt justice system, Syafiuddin was assassinated in July 2001 by two motorcycle-riding gunmen believed of carrying out orders from Tommy.134 Found guilty, Soeharto’s youngest son was then sentenced to 15 years in prison in July 2002 after the public slammed Megawati and security officers for their “inability” to arrest Tommy.

While, the government under public pressure became more assertive in prosecuting alleged KKN cases of Soeharto’s children, it remained passive in dealing with cases incriminating the former Indonesian strongman himself. Megawati had ordered to send a team of doctors whose independency was doubted to examine and make certain the current condition of Soeharto’s health. She shared however the opinion of pro-Soeharto Supreme Court chief, Bagir Manan, who on December 11, 2001 stated that the trial of the former autocratic ruler could not be resumed due to the latter’s ill health. This assessment was backed by the team of doctors who on December 12, 2002 had checked with Soeharto’s personal doctors who had determined that the former president was

133 Ibid: 216. 134 “Indonesia: Corruption Timeline”, Global Integrity Report 2004, loc.cit.

277 “permanently” unfit to stand trial.135 For humanitarian reasons, President Megawati demanded the cases which directly involved Soeharto to close.136

It is general knowledge that since corruption charges were filed against Soeharto in the Habibie period, the former president never appeared in court. But contrary to the judgment of the doctors, in November 2003, he managed to travel to LP Nusakambangan, an isolated prison in a small and inaccessible island in the South Java Sea, to visit his imprisoned son Tommy.137 Concluding Soeharto was in a better health condition than the doctors admitted, the Attorney General’s Office tried to reopen his cases.138 On December 8, 2003, the parliament (DPR) proposed to the Megawati government to discuss again the Soeharto cases and to resume the trial. In March 2004, Transparency International (TI) placed former president Soeharto on top of its list of the most corrupt world leaders. The TI report estimated that he embezzled between Rp. 137 trillion and Rp. 319 trillion (US$15 billion and US$35 billion) during his 32-year rule.139

MPR Decree No. 11/1998 had named Soeharto and his family and cronies as examples for the KKN,140 and mandated to investigate seven charity foundations, for instance, Supersemar, Dharmais, and Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila in which the former president, family members and close associates were involved.141 On March 8, 1999, Attorney General Andi Ghalib reported to President Habibie that his office had found that there was enough evidence to prosecute Soeharto. On March 31, 2000, the former autocrat was named a suspect for collecting more than US$ 600 million misused through the seven charitable foundations controlled by his family.142 On April 12, 2000, the Wahid government’s prosecutors imposed the status of city arrest on Soeharto and forbade him to go abroad. In the subsequent months, he was placed under house arrest, so that in August 2000, he could be formally charged with corruption.

In December 2001, in his report to DPR, Attorney General MA Rachman stated that Soeharto was indicted to have violated Article 1 Section 1, and Article 28 and 34 of Law No.3/1971 regarding the abuse of power. Soeharto had issued Keppres (Keputusan

135 “Perjalanan Perkara Soeharto” (“The Journey of Soeharto’s Legal Case”), Majalah Tempo, May 21, 2006: 30. 136 Heru Margianto, “Megawati: Jangan Paksakan Proses Hukum terhadap Soeharto,” (“Megawati: Don’t Force Legal Process Toward Soeharto,”) Kompas Cyber Media, April 25, 2006, http://www.infoanda. com/linksfollow.php?lh=BlNUUVBQBgRV;kepustakaan-presi-den.pnri.go.id/uploaded_files/.../KCM_ 20060425.pdf, was accessed on January 30, 2010. 137 “Indonesia: Corruption Timeline”, Global Integrity Report 2004, loc.cit. 138 “Perjalanan Soeharto di Ranah Hukum” (“The Journey of Soeharto in Legal Case”), Majalah Forum Keadilan, No.4, May 21, 2006: 25. 139 “Timeline, Global Integrity's 2006 Country Reports Website”, http://www.GlobalIntegrity.org, Was- hington DC, 2006, was accessed on May 29, 2009. 140 Ziegenhain, 2008, op.cit: 101. 141 “Soeharto’s (Un) Pardon”, Asian Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2006, loc.cit. 142 Majalah Tempo, May 21, 2006, loc.cit.

278 Presiden --Presidential Decree) No. 20/1992 and Inpres (Instruksi Presiden -- Presidential Instruction) No. 1/1992 which benefited his families and cronies,143 which caused Rp. 1.7 trillion (US$ 187 million) in losses to the state.144 Once more, he was also accused of misusing a large amount of money from the seven state foundations.

Nonetheless, President Megawati did not change her policy. In her presidential election campaign, she adopted a magnanimous attitude, telling the public that she wanted to treat Soeharto better than he had treated her father. This referred to the fact that Soeharto locked up her father in house arrest despite his serious illnesses in the late 1960s, and widespread belief that the internment had hastened Soekarno’s death.145

Since the beginning of her presidency, President Megawati had already sent a clear message to the Indonesian people, in particular the military, the state institution to which Soeharto spent most of his dedication, that she would not bring Soeharto to trial. Like most Javanese and the majority people in the country who respect religion, she has a high regard for elder people, especially former leaders who have been in the past acknowledged for their dedication to the nation. In front of the media, she revealed that she could not treat the former president as a crook as this would harm his dignity and honor. She reminded that, due to Soeharto’s illness and age, Indonesians might not urge her to send him to court.146

Although there was an opportunity to reopen Soeharto’s trial, President Megawati did not want to endorse it.147 In the absence of a court decision toward Soeharto’s KKN cases, it was also reported that she had proposed an idea to use her prerogative right -- laid down in the 1945 State Constitution and Emergency Law (Undang-undang Darurat)

143 “LSM: Soeharto Harus Diproses Hukum” (”NGO: Soeharto Should be Prosecuted”), Suara Pembaru- an, May9, 2006: 3. 144 ”AGO Reopens Graft Case against Tommy”, The Jakarta Post, July 20, 2007. 145 In this case, Soeharto did not respect Javanese culture which honors elder people or former leaders Gati Gayatri (Depok: University of Indonesia, 2003) in “Konstruksi Realitas Kepemimpinan Presiden Soeharto dalam Berita Surat Kabar: Analisis Kritis terhadap Makna Pesan Politik yang Disampaikan dengan Menggunakan Konsep Ajaran Kepemimpinan Jawa” (Construction of Reality of President Soeharto’s Leadership in Newspaper: A Critical Analysis on the Meaning of Political Message Using Javanese Leadership Concept), revealed Soeharto’s inconsistency with Javanese values on leadership.. 146 Margianto, 2006, loc.cit. 147Arfi Bambani Amri, “Buku Manuver Taufiq Kiemas: Mengapa Megawati Lembek pada Soeharto Faktor Pertama, Soeharto Tak Pernah Berniat Membunuh Bung Karno dan Keluarganya,” (“A Book on Taufiq Kiemas’ Maneuvers: Megawati Introduced Soft Policy to Soeharto, Soeharto Did Not Want to Kill Sukarno and His Family”) January 12, 2010, Viva News, http://politik.vivanews.com/news/read/120386- mengapa_ megawati_lembek_pada_soeharto was accessed on January 30, 2010; Derek Manangka, Jurus dan Manuver Taufiq Kiemas: Memang Lidah Tak Bertulang (Strategy and Maneuvers of Taufiq Kiemas: Lips Service Only), Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2010: 39.

279 No. 11/1954-- to extend amnesty to Soeharto.148 Criticism from law experts and human rights activists, for instance, Adnan Buyung Nasution and Hendardi, prevented her from issuing the amnesty.149

Under President Megawati, there was a setback in response to reform demands to prosecute Soeharto and his cronies. Although she was not part of the New Order regime, in fact, she did not want to send to trial the former leader of the regime. Her husband’s alleged involvement in new KKN practices with conglomerates or Soeharto’s cronies who had connections with military generals and businesses,150 forced her not to follow-up Soeharto’s cases beyond the case of the murder of the judge organized by Tommy. Research conducted by George Junus Aditjondro, an Indonesian sociologist studying corruption, revealed personal and business relations of Lt. Gen. Sutiyoso (former Kodam Jayakarta regional commander), Lt. Gen. Makmun Murod (former KSAD --Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat-- or chief of the army) and Lt. Gen. Hendropriyono (former chief of BIN --Badan Intelijen Negara-- or National Intellegence Board) with the president’s husband, Taufiq Kiemas. It was reported that, for example, Lt. Gen. Sutiyoso, who was at the time Jakarta Governor, had allegedly given the Jakarta Outer Ring Road (JORR) project worth US$ 2.3 billion to Kiemas. As part of the project, Rp. 17 billion (US$ 1.7 million) had been allegedly sent earlier by Sutiyoso to him, and Rp. 10 billion (US$ 1 million) to Roy B. Janis, Megawati’s PDIP Jakarta branch chairman. There is also information that a business permit to open a floating casino in Teluk Jakarta (the North Jakarta gulf) had been allegedly offered to Kiemas in order to stop the investigation of the general’s alleged involvement in the July 27, 1996 attack.151 Meanwhile, Lt. Gen. (ret) Makmun Murod and Taufiq Kiemas’ were closely connected in their businesses with Syamsul Nursalim, one of Soeharto’s cronies.152

Aditjondro specifically revealed Kiemas’ businesses with Artha Graha group and close relations with Tommy Winata, the leader of the group, in which the army through its foundation, the Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi, controlled 20 percent shares of the bank of the group, namely Bank Artha Graha.153 Tommy Winata was cited maintaining good relations with Pemuda Pancasila, one of the pro-Soeharto counter-dissident vigilante

148 “Maju Mundur Penanganan Kasus Soeharto,” (“Inconsistency in Handling Soeharto Case”) Reformasi Hukum, October 5, 2006, http://reformasihukum.org/konten.php?nama=MekanismeLegislasi&op=de-tail_ politik_ mekanisme_legislasi&id=81. 149 “Sebuah Abolisi yang Menguji Megawati,” (“Abolition Which Tested Mgawati”), Liputan6, http://berita.liputan6.com/progsus/200112/25943/class=%27vidico%27, December 25, 2001. 150 Aditjondro, 2006: op.cit: 25-28, 395-398; “Memberantas KKN Tak Cukup Hanya Pidato,” (“Comba- ting Corruption Could Not Only Talk,”) Kompas-Online, August 5, 2003, http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0308/ 05/utama/472505.htm: 3. 151 Majalah Panji Masyarakat, August 30, 2000: 27 in Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 395-396. 152 Aditjondro, 2006, ibid: 26-27; 397. 153 Ibid: 28, 396.

280 groups.154 Meanwhile, by issuing Inpres (Instruksi Presiden --Presidential Instruction) No.8/2002, Megawati protected businesses interests of Soeharto’s cronies, including his daughter, Tutut, by discharging them from obligations of paying back their debts to the state under the BLBI (Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia --liquidity credits of the Bank Indonesia) scheme.155

II.C. Military Response to Megawati Regarding Soeharto’s Alleged KKN cases

The goodwill policy of the Megawati government toward Soeharto resulted in the military support to her presidency. Her positive response to military aspirations, that the former New Order ruler should be treated respectful and not be harassed once he had resigned from his positions in state leadership, indeed led to political stability in Indonesia. In the 40 months of her rule, the longest among the three civilian regimes studied here, neither communal and separatist conflicts nor covert intelligence and psychological operations suspected engineered by the military to pressure the government into abandoning the prosecution of Soeharto, had taken place. This situation differed markedly from the transitional periods under Habibie and Wahid. Taking lessons from past experience, Megawati anticipated security problems if she continued to bring Soeharto and his family to trial.

Although there were new violent incidents in Poso, Jakarta and Bali, they were not related with the Soeharto cases because the Megawati government, contrary to calls by the courts and the DPR, kept his files closed. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the series of bombings in Poso, Jakarta and Bali resulted from the activities of radical Muslims and international terrorists linked to JI and Al-Qaeda attempting to make Indonesia a new front in their fight against the West, and military elements, who wanted to use the volatile situation to strengthen their territorial command structure and function. With the incidents, and their unwillingness to prevent them, TNI eventually obtained the pretext that their intellegence units be upgraded though the strengthening of the territorial command structure across the country.

Different from Habibie and Wahid, Megawati was aware that Wiranto and his successors in the military were determined to protect Soeharto.156 Military interest to

154 Ibid. 155 The Presidential Instruction was cited as “the Released and Discharged letter.” For further information, see Kwik Kian Gie, “Tiga Debitor ke Istana, Soal Kecil!” (“Three Debtors’ Visit to Palace Not A Big Issue!”), Harian Kompas, February 18, 2006: 56. 156 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 228-229.

281 protect its erstwhile patron reserved domains and Megawati’s interest to stabilize her administration thus coincided.157

III. Coping with Gross Human Rights Violation Cases

III.A. Megawati and the Culture of Violence

President Megawati had similar views as the military leaders on how to cope with the various issues the country faced. Both believed in a culture of repression as a means to cope with threats to the unitary state. Hendardi, a noted human rights activist from PBHI (Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum Indonesia --The Indonesian Association for Legal Assistances), complained that her feudal style of governing was favored by military leaders who sought to protect themselves from charges of involvement in gross human rights abuses in the past and currently.158

As pointed out earlier, Megawati’s vision of a leader was more corresponding to that of a Javanese ruler, who was heavily influenced by the philosophy of the Javanese wayang and the traditional stories in the shadow puppet. This influenced her cenralistic, top-down approach to govern and her undemocratic style of leadership. She was inclined to believe that she knew best for the Indonesian people and that she should be the sole interpreter of all matters, including the 1945 State Constitution and state ideology, Pancasila. As a result, she responded with repressive measures against her political opponents, for example, student demonstrators, radical reformists and the pro-democracy movement.

Like her father, Megawati was a leader who relied on the power of the masses to support her rule. Her followers mostly comprised of wong cilik (common people) of the urban and rural areas of Indonesia, where a large number of people remembered her father’s significant role in the country’s history, especially during the formation of the republic. Thus, Sukarno’s popularity helped her in building PDIP as a mass-based party that could be used to support her political career in the future.

The use of popular support to safeguard Megawati’s political interests could be seen in 1995 and 1996 when her followers succesfully protected her from the Soeharto regime’s attempts to remove her from PDIP leadership by interfering in the PDIP Congress in Medan and attacking PDIP headquarters in Jakarta. These incidents caused brawls between her supporters and security forces, followed by killings and arson that claimed hundreds peoples lives, disappearances, and seriously wounded. Megawati did

157 “Suharto Inc.: All in the Family”, Time Asia, May 24, 1999. 158 Hendardi was interviewed on January 16, 2007 in Jakarta.

282 not take any action to prevent and stop her supporters from running amok and becoming easy targets for the security forces.

Another example of Megawati’s effective use of the political masses was in the October 1999 presidential election as she used PDIP followers to challenge security forces in Jakarta, particularly in front of the parliament building, to increase her bargaining position vis-à-vis her rivals. The pressure of PDIP sympathizers contributed to her election as vice-president, defeating Hamzah Haz, after the military, Golkar, and PKB, and other factions in MPR eventually changed sides to support her candidacy. Again, the mobilization of masses by Megawati resulted in the deaths of some of her supporters as a result of bomb explosions close to the parliament building where the election took place.

Later, power struggles between Megawati and Wahid caused tensions between their supporters in political parties and mass-organizations which triggered clashes with a large number of victims. As part of a show of force, Megawati allowed her supporters to cut their fingers and made blood stamps in order to prove that they were ready to die in defending her from threats of Wahid.

As president, Megawati never tolerated independence aspirations for autonomy in the regions and supported the security forces in crushing separatist movements. Support the military emergency imposed on Aceh in May 2003, she stated “it would not do any damage to Indonesia to lose several people rather than jeopardizing 220 million other people.”159 She agreed with TNI’s efforts to strengthen the Kodam Iskandar Muda regional command and to increase the number of both organic and non-organic troops in the TNI’s campaign to eliminate the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) rebels. Her approval of the military’s repressive approach and the declaration of a military emergency status had led to a marked upsurge of human rights violations, increasing the risk for non- combatants or innocent people living there. At the end, the government had stationed approximately 40,000 police and soldiers in Aceh, fighting an estimated 5,000 GAM rebels.160 The military emergency was initially declared for a 6-month period, but on September 4, 2003, TNI chief Endriartono suggested that military operations could last until the GAM no longer posed a security threat.161

159 "Jakarta Bombs Rebels," Reuters, May 29, 2003, in Document-Indonesia: New Military Operations, Old Patterns of Human Rights Abuses in Aceh (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, NAD), Amnesty International Report 2009, London. 160 “Indonesian Military Offensive in Aceh Could Last until April”, Agence France Presse, September 4, 20-03. 161 Ibid; "Jakarta Bombs Rebels," Reuters, May 29, 2003, loc.cit; Document-Indonesia, Amnesty Interna- tional Report 2009, loc.cit.

283 In Irian Jaya, Megawati’s dispensation to TNI to use its repressive approach to OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka --Organization for An Independent Papua) rebels and restate the province as military operations zone contributed to TNI’s difficulty to stop its soldiers’ involvement in human rights violations. New covert intelligence and psychological operations were apparently connected with the kidnapping and (extra judicial) killing of Papuan prominent separatist leader, Theys Eluay,162 and the dissapearance of his driver, Aristoteles Masoka.163 Later, TNI was accused of being involved in organizing the killings of three civilian employees of Freeport, an American transnational corporation based in Timika.164 Under Megawati also the regional command in Irian Jaya had been reinforced.

Predominantly influenced by Javanese political culture, President Megawati believed that challenges to the central government reflected disloyalty of the kawula (regions) to her sacred rule and the unitary state. That is why she encouraged TNI to send troops to trouble provinces, such as Aceh and Irian Jaya, perceiving this policy as sort of punishment of rebels who were underming her rule.165 She ignored the human costs of the policy and did not support the prosecution of old and new cases of human rights violations which happened before and after July 2001, the time she took over power from Wahid. Not surprisingly, she endorsed Law No. 27/2004 on the formation of the Committee on Truth and Reconciliation, which did not end impunity of the perpetrators of gross human rights violations. Mufti and Hendardi, two noted human rights activists, thus strongly criticized her ways of handling human rights violations. NGO activists even classified her as a pro-violence president, worse than Habibie and Wahid.166

Megawati’s bad image regarding human rights had been linked to her government’s poor handling of the July 27, 1996 case. She was not serious in enforcing truth and justice because she did not support the prosecution of former military leaders charged with the case.167 She allegedly offered a large amount of money to the so-called “Kelompok 124 (Group 124),” the victims of the brutal attacks, and further tried to stop

162 See Matthew Moore and Karuni Rompies,”Kopassus Guilty of Eluay Murder,” April 22, 2003, The Age, http://www.theage.com.au/artice/2003/04/21/1050777211770.htl: 1-2. 163 “Pernyataan Sikap Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil untuk Papua: Mendesak Komnas HAM Menuntaskan Ber- bagai Kasus Pelanggaran Berat HAM di Papua (“Statement of Civil SocietyCoalition for Papua: Urging Komnas HAM to Seriously Prosecute Gross Human Rights Violations”),” July 28, 2004, http://www.kontras.org/index.php? hal= sia-ran_pers&id=229. 164 Ibid. 165 Megawati Soekarnoputri, 2005, loc.cit: 7, 13, 16. 166 Mufti was interviewed on July 24, 2006 in Jakarta; Hendardi was interviewed on January 16, 2007 in Jakarta. 167 Otobiografi Politik RO Tambunan: Membela Demokrasi (Political Biography of RO Tambunan: De- fending Democracy), Jakarta: TPDI, 2008; ”Megawati Disebutkan Tahu Rencana Penyerbuan Itu …” (“Megawati Reportedly Already Known the Attack Plan …”), Harian Kompas, July 29, 2008: 5.

284 them demanding the alleged perpetrators, former TNI generals, to face prosecution.168 Her party’s support of a second term of Jakarta Governor Lt. Gen. Sutiyoso suggests that President Megawati obviously did not want the July 27, 1996 case to be comprehensively addressed. Sutiyoso was Kodam Jayakarta regional commander at that time, who together with his military aides, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Sudi Silalahi, was allegedly involved in the incident.169

III.B. Megawati’s Response to Gross Human Rights Violation Cases

Immediately, just a few weeks after she rose to power, in an attempt to mobilize support from the reform movement, on August 1, 2001 Megawati issued Keppres (Keputusan Presiden --Presidential Decree) No. 53/2001 supporting the Central Jakarta regional court to form an ad hoc human rights tribunal. Nevertheless, the prosecution of the Trisakti shootings and the first and second Semanggi Tragedies could not be smoothly conducted, although since August 27, 2001 Komnas HAM (National Human Rights Committee) had formed its ad hoc team to follow-up the cases and by October 5, 2001 had concluded that they were gross human rights violations. A few months later, on January 29, 2002, KPP HAM (Investigation Committee of Human Rights Violations founded by the Komnas HAM) chairperson had sent summons to twenty TNI high and middle-ranking officers. In the absence of Megawati’s determination to enforce the law and to uphold civilian supremacy, the summons could not be enforced. In fact, Megawati, as president and TNI supreme commander, had never instructed TNI chief commander Gen. Sutarto and his subordinated generals to comply with the KPP HAM’s summons.

Therefore, on April 22, 2002, KPP HAM handed over the cases to the Attorney General’s office. However, on March 4, 2004, the Attorney General office declined to summon high and middle-ranking officers, arguing that the cases did not constitute gross human rights abuses so that the accused officers could be tried by ordinary military tribunals.170 This was a surprising change of mind of the Attorney General’s Office, because during the Wahid presidency, when the office was led by Marzuki Darusman, it had reached the same conclusion as KPP HAM. Further, by July 31, 2004, the cases were sent back to the KPP HAM and the Central Jakarta regional court even rejected KPP HAM’s proposal to summon all officers as witnesses.

168 Otobiografi Politik RO Tambunan: Membela Demokrasi (Political Biography of RO Tambunan: De- fending Democracy), Jakarta: TPDI, 2008, op.cit: 172. 169 Ibid: 374. 170 Vincentia Hanni S, “Kejahatan Negara Tanpa Pertanggungjawaban” (“State Crime Without Accoun- tability”), Harian Kompas, May 16, 2006: 4.

285 In the absence of President Megawati’s support, Law No. 39/1999 on human rights tribunals made under the Wahid presidency could not be implemented to prosecute these gross human rights abuses cases. Likewise, the alternative to adopt the Criminal Code to prosecute the cases was no longer pursued by the Central Jakarta regional court. This meant that Megawati wanted the cases to be stopped, because summonning military figures such as Wiranto, Prabowo Subianto, Zacky Anwar Makarim, and Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin could damage the president’s good relations with the military and would have repercussions on the stability of her government.

Apart from the ordinary military tribunals, which on January 30, 2002 had discharged nine policemen and punished them only with 3-6 years imprisonment for the Trisakti case, Megawati had no interest to prosecute other cases. This was a great setback bearing in mind that on August 1, 2001 she had issued Keppres No. 53/2001 encouraging the Central Jakarta regional court to set up an ad hoc human rights tribunal. With the Keppres, she obviously only sought to temporarily appease the victims of abuses and their families rather than demonstrating commitment to reform in seriously prosecuting gross human rights perpetrators. This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that President Megawati later withdrew the decree and replaced it with softer policies such as PP (Peraturan Pemerintah --Government Regulation) No.2/2002, which protects the victims and the witnesses, and PP No.3/2002, issued on March 13, 2002, which provides compensation, restitution, and rehabilitation to the victims. The two government regulations are counterproductive to Keppres No 53/2001 because there is no provision regarding the prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators of the gross human rights abuses.171 She therefore stayed away from handling the main issue.

Megawati also largely ignored other cases of gross abuses such as the Banyuwangi killings and the July 27, 1996 tragedy which targeted her party and killed many of her supporters, although in January 2002 the police had sent the dossiers of the case to the Jakarta high court. Meanwhile, the Pengadilan Koneksitas (connecting court) of the July 27, 1996 tragedy had been formed as a prerequisite for setting up an ad hoc tribunal. The connecting court had been furthermore held by June 23, 2003, more than 1 year before she ended her presidency. Nonetheless, it only summoned unimportant officers, namely, Col. Budi Permana and Lt. Suharto, and several civilians, and disregraded high ranking officers who were allegedly responsible in planning the brutal

171 “Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No. 2/2002” (“Government Regulation No.2/2002”), http:// perlindungansaksi.files.wordpress.com/ 2008/07/pp-2-tahun-2002.pdf; “Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No. 3/2002” (“Government Regulation No. 3/2002)”, http://www.icel.or.id/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=157, ICEL.

286 attack. Worse, all officers, who had been declared suspects, were later freed from any charges by the court on January 6, 2004.172

The final year (2004) of the Megawati presidency was a dark time for law enforcement and human rights protection. Because of her lack of concern for gross human rights violations, activists mentioned 2004 as “the year of humanity crisis.”173 Civil society’s efforts to disclose past abuses met the deaf ear of the government. President Megawati failed to urge Attorney General AR Rachman to follow-up NGO findings of gross violations committed by the state apparatus, cases which mostly involved the military. This is why the prosecution of the May 1998 riots, the Trisakti shootings, and the first and second Semanggi Tragedies did not progress.

Unlike Wahid, Megawati ended her presidency with a setback for the human rights campaign in Indonesia. The third post-Soeharto president, who had more opportunities to advance human rights than Wahid and Habibie, was unwilling to address grave past abuses and to bring to trial high-ranking military officers allegedly involved in the cases. President Megawati’s indifference sent to state institutions such as the Attorney General’s office, the national police, and the courts the message that there is no need to seriously prosecute the past abuses. The institutions which have obligation to protect human rights in the country failed to fulfil the victims’ desire for justice. The mostly low- ranking officers found guilty received only internal sanctions, being removed from their positions temporarily before being promoted to better positions. At the worst, they were dismissed without facing further prosecution and punishment. Courts, the last hope for justice, with their light sentences thus became part of the problem.

In fact, there was no human rights case which had been comprehensively settled under Megawati. While past cases remained unsettled, new ones occurred in Makassar, Bojong (Bogor), Manggarai, and Gorontolo, where students, peasants, and other civilians became the victims of repressive acts of the state apparatus. The state continued to use force against critics rather than offering dialogues to improve its policies concerning education, waste management, and land disputes. Reconciliation was sought not to find the truth, but rather to free the perpetrators of abuses from charges of crimes against humanity. By its critics, particularly NGOs, the Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi (KKR --Committee for Truth and Reconciliation), for instance, had been considered as merely a committee for protecting the perpetrators. 174

172 Ibid. 173 See the comments of Coordinator of Comission for Disappeared People and the Victims of State Re- pressions (Kontras), Usman Hamid, in Kontras’s Annual Evaluation 2004, ”Tahun Gelap Penegakan Hu- kum dan Hak Asasi Manusia,” (The Dark Year of Law and Human Rights Enforcement”), Harian Kom- pas, January 4, 2005. 174 Ibid.

287 Nonetheless, to heal the trauma of the victims of gross human rights violations of the May 1998 riots, especially the Chinese minority, and to show consistency in promoting nationalism, Megawati continued Wahid’s policy in eliminating the discrimination of the Chinese in Indonesia. Under her presidency, for example, the Chinese New Year (Imlek) was declared a national holiday. More fundamentally, through her PDIP faction in parliament, she endorsed amendments to the 1945 State Constitution in the 2001 MPR annual session, deleted the stipulation that the president shall be indigenous and replaced it with the requirement of citizenship. This amendment was a progressive achievement of her government because these constitutional provisions had long been an annoyance for the Chinese community in the country.175

Through the above measures, President Megawati sought to persuade the Chinese capital which had fled the country after the May 1998 riots to return to Indonesia. Yet, there was no prospect in the investigations of the riots and even less in the prosecution of those responsible for them, which would have helped the Indonesian Chinese to heal their trauma. Again, the president did not want to jeopardize the support of the military even though she knew that the military was involved in the riots. She was aware that any attempt of an inquiry into the May 1998 riots would have consequences for important military figures such as former Kostrad (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat - -army’s strategic reserves command) and Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus --army’s special forces) commander Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto and TNI’s noted intelligence officer, Lt. Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim. The prosecution of Prabowo and Zacky could reveal similar practices of military covert operations organized by TNI generals in the past, especially the July 27, 1996 incident, because of the long involvement of both officers in such kind of operations.

In fact, under Megawati, Zacky, who supposedly played a major role behind the scene in organizing a military intelligence operation during the July 27, 1996 incident,176 took command of Bais. Lt. Gen. Sutiyoso, former Kodam Jayakarta regional comman-der at the time the incident occurred, had obtained for his second term one of the government’s most coveted posts, the governorship of Jakarta. Lt. Gen. Yudhoyono, Sutiyoso’s former deputy in the Kodam Jayakarta regional command, was appointed as a member of Megawati’s cabinet, namely, coordinating minister for political and security affairs --an important position controlling TNI and the police. The alleged main perpetrators from the military were thus rewarded with promotions, while, at the same time, Megawati could secure her presidency under their protection. Therefore, any attempt to

175 The Jakarta Post, October 15, 1998; The Jakarta Post, January 19, 2000; Majalah Tempo, 30, No. 52, February 25, March 3, 2002; Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 70, 232. 176 See, O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit.

288 put on trial the alleged perpetrators of gross human rights violations could harm Megawati’s good relations with the military.

III.C. The Military and the Culture of Violence

The Indonesian military was particularly known for its repressive behavior which can be traced to the long period of authoritarianism and the culture of violence in Indonesian society since pre-colonial times. Accounts of the past Javanese kingdoms were full with acts of violence, such as fightings, vengeance, brutal attacks, killings, and wars between individuals, groups, and dynasties, which continued in the colonial period, during the struggle for independence, and in the post-independence period with rebellions, revolts, and coup attempts. The frequency of violent incidents in Indonesian history thus leads to the thesis that violence had roots in the culture of the country’s dominant ethnic group.

Due to the elevated role of soldiers in pre-modern and contemporary Indonesia, not surprisingly, the military, as well as the police, which until 2000 was still under the same institution, namely ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia --the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), as individuals and an institution, became the main perpetrators of violence. It is widely accepted that through covert intelligence and psychological operations the military had been involved in most violent incidents of the more recent past such as the 1965 coup attempt, the 1974 Malari and 1998 May riots, and other cases such as the Tanjung Priok and Lampung tragedies. Even, after the end of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, the military was still accused of being responsible for new incidents in East Java, Maluku, Kalimantan, Poso, Nusa Tenggara, East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya.177

Analysts of cultural and social change and security issues such as Permadi, Kusnanto Anggoro and Burhan Magenda, point out that the culture of violence is nothing new to Indonesian society. As explained by Permadi, the pre-colonial history of Java is full with huru-hara (riot) and amuk-massa (violence) instigated by struggles among members of the dynasties.178 Kusnanto also alleged that recent violence involving the military stemmed from conflicts among officers and civilian leaders who were being obsessed with tahta (reign), kekuasaan (power), and harta (wealth). As argued by Kusnanto, especially for the Javanese, the dominant ethnic group, these three matters are

177 See, for example, O’Rourke, 2002, ibid. 178 Permadi was interviewed on November 25, 2006 in Bogor.

289 essential to guarantee harmony and loyalty in society.179 The importance to guarantee harmony and loyalty is still socialized in society until recently through formal education, part of education since they are in elementary school, and training programs organized by government and state institutions. Informally, Indonesians learn the importance of the dominant cultural values from various cultural programmes such as wayang (shadow puppet) performance in cultural centers and on televisions and radios. They also learn it from books, magazines, newspapers, and comics as well as stories conveyed by their families.180

Burhan Magenda confirmed these views, emphasizing that violence had been inherent in the political culture of the Indonesian military and civilians for centuries. He maintained that military leaders from Solo and Yogyakarta, two power centres of Javanese kingdoms, were known in the past as more feudal and repressive compared to military leaders from other provinces. He gave an example by comparing Javenese generals such as Soeharto, Ali Murtopo, and Benny Murdani with non-Javanese military leaders such as AH Nasution, TB Simatupang and Sumitro. The reason for his argument was that in Javanese society, in which ambiguity, hyprocrisy, and betrayal existed, violence was seen as an effective means for leaders to create and preserve loyalty and harmony.181

More specifically, in the patron-client relation of the Javanese’s kawula-gusti (the people-the king who represents God) concept, soldiers were part of kawula whose life had to be supported by the king. In reverse, in compensation, soldiers had the task to protect the king, his family, and the palace. In case the king did not care for his soldiers’ needs, the soldiers might complain. Apparently, the rioting that broke out and was instigated by military members can be linked to the protest of the palace guards against the poor response of the king to their complaints. Thus, if the king failed to fulfil the needs of the soldiers, this meant that he also failed to grow loyalty from his kawula and create harmony in his kingdom. Obviously, if such a situation continued in the long run, it would undermine the position of the king because he would no longer be perceived legitimate to hold the wahyu or the divine mandate.

179 Kusnanto Anggoro was interviewed on June 6, 2006 and November 18, 2006 in Jakarta. Similarly, Franz Magnis-Suseno said that in a society such as Indonesia where the influence of Javanese political culture was dominant and the role of reign, power, weapon, and wealth were equally imperative, the position of the military was vital, and their existence in politics was not easy to be totally eliminated. Nonetheless, education, personal interests and the capacity of civilian and military leaders could also influence them in intro-ducing reform. Franz Magnis-Suseno was interviewed on November 14, 2007 in Jakarta. 180 See again previous pages, pp. 19-22. 181 Burhan Magenda was interviewed on January 30, 2006 in Jakarta.

290 Rioting provoked by the soldiers instigated power struggles and was usually followed by regime change. The endemic separatist, terrorist, and criminal violence throughout Indonesia at the beginning of reform era which in many cases were instigated by the military could be equated to the pre-colonial restiveness of soldiers. It served to test in how far the President was capable of fulfilling (mengayomi) his/her kawula needs. For the Javanese, a (good) leader should possess qualities of pengasuh (guardian) to lead, guide, and to stimulate subordinates (asuhan).182 Therefore, TNI’s lack of enthusiasm to safeguard the country from serial bombings of terrorist groups that occurred under Megawati could be interpreted as the typical way traditional soldiers demonstrated dissatisfaction with their ruler (Gusti).

The Indonesian military’s intimacy with violence was also connected with its obsession to control territorial integrity of the country. An indication for this is the popular use of old Javanese term mandala (war theatre; land, water and air territories) and keutuhan wilayah (territorial integrity) in society and military institutions. In this relation, every space of mandala and keutuhan wilayah must be defended until the last drop of blood because they deal with dignity (sedumuk bathuk senyari bumi).183 Not surprisingly, Gen. Yudhoyono, Megawati’s coordinating minister for political and security affairs, stated that TNI would not tolerate any separatist movement in Aceh, Irian Jaya or anywhere in Indonesia, and would respond to them with military force.184 He argued that such response was needed to protect the the integrity of the state that in the eyes of TNI cannot be compromised. For this reason, too, concepts such as integrasi nasional (national integration), persatuan nasional (national unity) and kedaulatan bangsa (national sovereignty) are commonly found in his and other military leaders’ rhetoric at that time.185

The military’s obsession with a culture of violence also transpired when chief commander Gen. Sutarto insisted that soldiers are prepared and trained only to achieve one goal, that is, to win the war. This implies that they would win the war, if they could kill and destroy their enemy with maximum force.186 In an attempt to block negotiation with GAM, he reminded Jusuf Kalla, Megawati’s minister for social welfare, who was initiating peace talks on Aceh that the government should not compromise with the rebels or tolerate their separatist goals because it would endanger state integrity.187 At a briefing of military officers in Jakarta in May 2003, Gen. Sutarto ordered TNI soldiers to hunt

182 See, Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 10. 183 I. Basis Susilo, “Ambalat dan Konsep Kuasa-Wilayah” (“Ambalat and the Territorial Rule Concept”), Kompas-online, June 12, 2009, was accessed on June 12, 2009. 184 See, Gen. Yudhoyono’s Biography in Hisyam et al (eds.), 2004, loc.cit: 800. 185 Hisyam et al (eds), 2004, ibid: 805-806. 186 Dewabrata, 2006, loc.cit. 187 “Purnawirawan TNI Khawatir Aceh Lepas” (“TNI Retired Generals Worry Aceh Secession”), Harian Kompas, September 18, 2005: 2.

291 them down and “root out” (membasmi) GAM rebels.188 Likewise, Coordinating Minister Gen. (ret) Yudhoyono mentioned that the only way to address the conflict in Aceh was a military solution because he saw in GAM a traitor organization that attempted to separate Aceh from Indonesia.189

Gen. Sutarto and Gen. (ret) Yudhoyono were supported in their views by high- ranking military officers such as army chief Gen. Ryamizard, who stated that different from politicians, military leaders wanted an effective way to address conflicts throughout the country by exercising force. Since the separatist groups continued their armed struggle, there was always justification for TNI to respond by repressive means. By quoting Javanese words such as pithes (crush) and gebuk (pound) that were used in the past by Soeharto to punish his political enemies, Ryamizard warned that his soldiers were ready to end separatist conflicts in Aceh and Irian Jaya with maximum military force, which could be launched whenever the president ordered it.190 This also included justifying acts such as the extra-judicial killing of Theys Eluay, leader of the Papuan separatist organization (OPM).

In contrast to NGO activists who view the TNI soldiers carrying out the mission to kill Theys as human rights violators, Gen. Ryamizard bluntly stated that the soldiers should be regarded as national heroes since they had accomplished their mission well.191 Moreover, after his visit to the troops stationed in Aceh, he stated that with or without an emergency status, TNI would take any risk to fight GAM in order to stop their separatist activities. Re-emphasizing his preference for a military solution, he was adamant that the military did not participate in the negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Aceh conflict held in Geneva in October 2002. Whatever the outcome of the negotiations, the military would not adopt responsibility for it.192

Ryamizard’s statement was supported by retired military officers in the parliament such as Maj. Gen. Sembiring-Meliala who said that since their formation, the Indonesian armed forces had applied force to suppress separatist movements, rebels, and other groups considered as a threat to the country. State sovereignty was TNI’s main objective which

188 “Indonesia Troops Told to ‘Exterminate’ Aceh Rebels, Spare Civilians,” Agence France-Presse, 20 May 2003, in Document-Indonesia: New Military Operations, Old Patterns of Human Rights Abuses in Aceh (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, NAD), Amnesty International Report 2009, London. 189 “Perang Melawan GAM, Satu-satunya Jalan Selesaikan Aceh” (“Fighting GAM, the Only Solution for Aceh”), http://www.Kompas.com/utama/news/02-08/30/040529.htm, was accessed on September 26, 2006: 1-5. 190 ”Prajurit Profesional Sejati” (”Real Professional Soldier”), http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi /r/ryamizard-ryacudu/index. shtml, was accessed on September 27, 2006: 1-6. 191 Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu was interviewed on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta. 192 ”KSAD: Ganggu Keutuhan NKRI, Otomatis TNI Bertugas” (”Army Chief: NKRI Threatened, TNI Will Act”), http://www.Kompas.com/utama/news/0209/ 18/034818.htm, was accessed on September 18, 2002: 1-2.

292 had motivated it to choose such a response.193 As the TNI were not so much engaged in comprehensively transforming themselves, or had not fundamentally changed their concept on security threats and approach of addressing conflict, violence was still a major characteristic of soldiers’ general behaviors.194 The “soft approach” preferred by the civilian regimes of Habibie and Wahid was deemed by them a great blunder. By contrast, Megawati’s zero tolerance against separatists to protect Indonesia’s territorial integrity was conducive to TNI. However, military repression caused an escalation of conflicts in troubled provinces, with mounting victims, while it simultaneously restored TNI’s claim to a domestic security role and returned it to the center of policymaking in areas affected by sectarian clashes and separatist movements.195

Similar to Ryamizard, lower-ranking military officers such as (Korem) Lilawangsa military resort commander Lt. Col. AY Nasution stated that he would not tolerate the Acehnese in his territory to join the anniversary celebrations of GAM’s declaration of independence. He ordered his soldiers to shoot on sight, no matter who they were, for supporting the separatist activities.196 Such statements set the tone for the behaviour of TNI soldiers during the military operations and left little doubt as to the message from their superiors that they should shoot first and ask questions later. This is why there had been frequent accusations of unlawful killings of both of civilians and GAM members.

According to a TNI document issued by in September 2004, 2,849 GAM members had been killed during military operations since May 2003. Of this figure, 2,409 were mentioned to have been killed during the military emergency and 440 since the implementation of the civilian emergency.197 A military spokesperson in Jakarta put the number of GAM deaths at 400 in the first 6 weeks of the civil emergency.198 The military had acknowledged that there had been civilian casualties. In mid-August 2004, based on media reports, it was revealed that 147 civilians had been killed during the past 10 months.199 Nevertheless, based on figures from the military information centre published in September 2004, the number of civilian fatalities was much higher. According to these

193 Maj. Gen. Sembiring Meliala was interviewed in Jakarta on October 17, 2006. 194 Maj. Gen. Syamsul Ma’arif said that culture of violence had internalized in TNI since a long time, thus, it was not easy to eliminate it, similar to the problem of dual function to totally withdraw TNI from state’s politics and non-military affairs. He was interviewed on July 18, 2006 in Jakarta. 195 Mietzner, 2006, loc.cit: 37. 196 "Indonesia troops told to ‘exterminate’ Aceh rebels, spare civilians," Agence France-Presse, May 20, 2003, in Document-Indonesia: New military operations, old patterns of human rights abuses in Aceh (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, NAD), Amnesty International Report 2009, London. 197 "TNI Klaim Telah Tewaskan 2.800 Anggota GAM" (TNI reported had killed 2,800 GAM members), Acehkita, September 17, 2004, ibid. 198 “Indonesia Army Kills 400 Alleged Aceh Rebels since May 19", Associated Press, July 16, 2004, ibid. 199 "Nearly 1,160 Aceh Rebels Killed in 10 Months", Laksamana Net, August 18, 2004.

293 figures, 662 civilians had been killed, consisting of 579 during the military emergency period and 83 since the beginning of the civil emergency.200

As argued by Mietzner, the relaunching of military operations in provinces threatened by separatist movements had proven the vital role of TNI in upholding law and order, irrespective of the growing pressure for reform.201 Its alleged hand in inflaming new riots and exacerbating the situation in trouble spots was effective in granting TNI a wider domestic security role. Terrorists’ attacks had strengthened TNI’s territorial command and intelligence roles as well as its culture of violence after the issuance of two new government regulations in lieu of a law on anti-terrorism, namely, Perpu No. 1 and Perpu No. 2 of 2003,202 which was viewed by DPR deputy speaker Andi M. Fatwa as a great setback to reform.203 T. Hari Prihatono, chairperson of the Propatria, commented that the increase of human rights violations perpetrated by TNI soldiers tallied also with their political interests.204

III.D. Military Response to Gross Human Rights Violation Cases

Due to her close relations, in politics and business,205 with Lt. Gen. Hendropriyono, President Megawati had promoted him as chief of BIN, the new state intelligence board replacing Bakin, although he had been accused of primary responsibility for the Talangsari incident. The human rights abuse occurred on February 7, 1989, caused at least 246 people dead in Lampung province when Hendropriyono, as a Colonel, was commander of a military resort, namely, Korem 043 Garuda Hitam.206 In June 2001, the National Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM) had set up an ad hoc team for investigating the abuse which included violent killing, arrest and forced detention. Nonetheless, the Megawati government did not endorse the effort to open this case. She would not also open gross cases of human rights abuse which occurred in East

200 "Versi TNI: 662 Warga Sipil Tewas Sejak Darurat Militer" (TNI Source: 662 Civilians Died Since Military Emergency), Acehkita, September 17, 2004, ibid. 201 Mietzner, 2006, loc.cit. 202 See, Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 152-156. 203 See http://www.gatra.com/2003-08-14/artikel.php?id=30641, August, 14, 2003 in AM Fatwa, Meng- hadirkan Moderatisme Melawan Terorisme (Introducing Moderatism to Combat Terrorism), Jakarta: Hik- mah, 2006: 111; see also, Sebastian, 2006, op.cit. 204 T. Hari Prihatono was interviewed on October 31, 2007 after discussions and book launch entitles Me- tamorfosis Bisnis Militer: Sebaran Bisnis Militer Pasca Diterbitkannya UU TNI (The Metamorphose of Military Business: Military Business after the Issuance of Law on TNI), Jakarta: The Ridep Institute, FES, 2007. 205 For further information, see Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 27. 206 “Kasus Talangsari Lampung Dibuka Lagi,” (“Talangsari Lampung Case Is Opened Again”) Tempo In- teraktif, http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2005/0401/brk, 200504..., April 1, 2005, was accessed on March 12, 2010.

294 Timor before and after referendum because such effort could implicate more close allies such as Maj. Gen. Theo Syafei, who was said to have developed business ties with the president’s family, for instance, in North Sulawesi province.207

President Megawati’s ambivalent and lenient approach in handling gross human rights violation cases involving the military had resulted in the latter’s favorable response to her presidency. In fact, throughout her rule, military leaders threw their support to her government. Significantly, political stability could be maintained and she could accomplish her full term of office in September 2004 without pressures to resign or coup threats by which the military would blackmail her into abandoning the prosecution of its alleged gross human rights violation cases.

Meanwhile, an effort by Elsham, a NGO concerned with human rights and legal aid, to investigate a case of human rights violations in Timika, Irian Jaya, in late December 2002 and early January 2003 had been obstructed by TNI. In a shooting incident the NGO’s director was wounded.208 l

A testimony from Deki Murid, an ex-informant of Kopassus disclosed that troops of the 515th Battalion of Kostrad created a shooting incident at the border of Irian Jaya and Papua New Guinea (PNG) to intimidate other parties in order to stop the investigation of the case of shooting the Elsham director.209 The explanation of TNI chief commander Gen. Sutarto that all the shooting incidents were organized by elements of the separatist movement in Irian Jaya to draw international attention was thus questioned by NGO activists. The activists criticized the general’s accusation which had linked their pro- human rights activities to foreign interventions.

With its deeply entrenched culture of violence, the military failed to understand Papuan aspirations for the prosecution of human rights violations which increasingly occurred in the so-called “era of reform.” TNI ignored that native Papuans needed protection on the one hand, and wanted a fair solution toward various cases of human rights violations they experienced in the past, on the other. Even the special autonomy status granted to the Irian Jaya province was not followed-up with the central government’s willingness to handle the cases. This resulted in the growing mistrust of the native Papuans toward Megawati and the military. Markus Yenu, the leader of the transitional government of West Papua National Authority (WPNA), argued that the

207 Aditjondro, op.cit: 27-28. 208“Kasus Penembakan di Papua: Upaya Pisahkan Papua dari NKRI” (”Shooting Incident in Papua To Se- cess Papua from NKRI”), http://www.westpapua.net/news/03/01/030103-kasus_penembakan_di_papua_ upaya_pi..., January 3, 2003: 1-3. 209 Ibid.

295 increasing deployment of soldiers and the police in Papua was part of TNI’s effort to intimidate the Papuans in order to stop their aspirations.210

With the new and much more favorable political context under a pro-military president, TNI was involved in more cases of human rights abuses in the country. Just a few days before Megawati ended her presidency, Munir Said Thalib was found dead on September 7, 2004 in Garuda, a state-owned airline, on a flight from Jakarta to the Netherlands.211 Munir was a prominent human rights activist who had keenly disclosed many cases of gross abuses, for example in Aceh, during military operations under Soeharto, and Jakarta, the Tanjung Priok shooting and the 1997-1998 student activists kidnapping cases, involving TNI and its main generals. An autopsy conducted afterwards in the Netherlands revelead that he had been poisoned with arsenic.212 A joint investigation team (TPF --Tim Pencari Fakta or Fact Finding Team) consisting of investigators from the national police and NGOs indicated the involvement of military officers and generals working for the state intelligence board (BIN).213

IV. Coping with Separatism

IV.A. Megawati and the Unitary State

According to Robison the ideological foundation of Indonesian authoritarianism is the notion of the organic, or integralist state, as contained in the 1945 State Constitution.214 Influenced by a conservative Javanese legal scholar, Raden Soepomo, who played a major role in the making of the 1945 State Constitution, the integralist state became Soekarno’s preferred model of political order, which was upheld by his daughter, Megawati. This model is a selection of ideas which emphasized the supremacy of the state. It entailed a concoction of Javanese notions of authority and traditional law adopted since Dutch colonial times in order to emphasize the values of hierarchy and harmony and of collective identity under an authoritative leadership.215 This explains why state authority, integrity, sovereignty and stability became central themes in Megawati’s presidency. She was fervent to campaign on themes of national pride and simultaneously relentlessly reminded Indonesians to work for the unity of the state.

210 Ichwan Susanto and Edna C. Pattisina, “Otonomi Daerah Papua Barat (4): Jakarta (Masih) Utang,” (West Papua Regional Autonomy (4): Jakarta Is Still Indebted”), Harian Kompas, February 27, 2010: 5. 211 Nur Mursidi,”Munir, A Fighter Never To Be Forgotten,” The Jakarta Post, April 17, 2005. 212 Harian Kompas, December 27, 2004. 213 Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 428, 432-433. 214 Richard Robison, “Indonesia: Tensions in State and Regime,” in Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison, and Garry Rodan (eds.), Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, Sydney: Allen und Unwinn, 1993: 41-47. 215 Henk Schulte Nordholt, “A Genealogy of Violence”, in Colombijn and Lindblad, 2002, loc.cit: 43.

296 Like many other Javanese politicians, President Megawati was obviously a political conservative. This explains why she was preoccupied with the territorial integrity of the state, but neglected individual freedom and broader human rights demands.216 She perceived loyalty as an important element in politics, which was similar to the traditional patron-client relationship between the king and the people in the feudalistic Javanese kingdoms. Due to her aversion to criticism and opposition, it can be understood why she was uneasy with freedom of expression and press.217

Also, as noted by Rueland, Megawati shared with the military strong nationalist sentiments and an equally strong sense of unity. Specifically, she shared with the TNI a Javanese version of nationalism which had laid the foundation for the unitary state she inherited from Soekarno, the founding father of the nation.218 In addition to this, O’Rourke pointed out that she shared the secular-nationalist ideology that prevailed among TNI generals which would make it for her far easier to rule.219

With her aloof style of leadership,220 she was even more Javanese than Soekarno.221 Avoiding dialogues with people in troubled provinces, she chose to stay in her palace. If she conducted a field trip, she preferred to ride in her presidential car with closed windows.222 If she had to meet the people, it had to be arranged under the close watch of the presidential security guards (Paspampres --Pasukan Pengamanan Presiden). Taking into account her bad rapport with the people in troubled provinces, it is comprehensible why she had problems to understand the aspirations and demands of minorities and separatists.

As previously stated, Megawati inherited from her father the preference for the integrationalism that became the concept for Indonesian statehood in the 1945 State Constitution and Pancasila.223 Federalist tendencies thus met her stiff resistance. Indonesian nationalists’ perception of federalism was strongly influenced by historical experience. They closely associate federalism with the Dutch colonialists’ devide-et- impera policies of the late 1940s. At that time, the division of Indonesia into several smaller states such as Negara Indonesia Tengah, and Negara Indonesia Timur, which preferred to transfer their loyalties to the Dutch colonial government rather than to the Indonesian government in Java,224 hastened separatism and disintegration. The fear that

216 Mietzner, 2006: 35. 217 “Indonesia Tak Punya Sejarah Kebebasan Pers” (“Indonesia Has No Past Pers Freedom“), Harian Kompas, March 15, 2007: 4. 218 Rueland in Hoadley and Rueland (eds.), 2006, loc.cit: 215. 219 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 216. 220 Maj. Gen. Sembiring-Meliala was interviewed on October 17, 2006 in Jakarta. 221 Hendardi was interviewed on January 16, 2007 in Jakarta. 222 Osdar, 2005, loc. cit. 223 Henk Schulte Nordholt, “A Genealogy of Violence”, in Colombijn and Lindblad, 2002, loc.cit: 43. 224 Ikrar Nusa Bakti was interviewed on May 15, 2006 in Jakarta.

297 unlimited autonomy of the regions would invite foreign intervention further spurred her aversion to federalism.225

Like most Javanese leaders she believed that negara adalah pusat dan pusat adalah negara (the state is the central government, and reversely, that the central government is the state). Peripheral rulers must go along with the central ruler.226 Megawati did not want provinces and smaller regions to challenge the authority of Java as a center of power and government because this would undermine the whole country due to the regions’ increasing autonomy.227 Her strong opposition to Law No. 22/1999 on regional autonomy and Law No. 25/1999 which increased regional governments’ fiscal autonomy must be attributed to these worries. This explains why shortly after taking office she supported moves to amend the two laws.

In the view of Crouch, fear of a reduction of central government authority was a strong reason why Megawati avoided responding to discourses on federalism which became a hot subject at the beginning of reform era.228 From the perspective of Javanese political culture, federalism would undermine the greatness of power of the ruler. As argued by Moedjanto, in the Javanese conception power was not divided but was rather a totality.229 Therefore, for a Javanese ruler such as Megawati, there must be only one sun in the world, “ngendi ana surya kembar,” meaning that there was no one who competed for the ruler’s power.

From the point of view of Megawati, separatism would jeopardize the country’s Javanese-based concept of Wawasan Nusantara, or the unity of Indonesian archipelago under the control of the central government in Java, a state doctrine pursued since the Majapahit kingdom.230 In other words, separatism would damage the organic totality of the state.231 As cited in the Indonesia’s history, the concept of NKRI, bendera merah- putih (the red-white flag), and the principle of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (unity in diversity) originated from the Majapahit kingdom, which became the foundation for the formation of Nusantara (Indonesia) and its regions under one national state and government (Wawasan Nusantara).232 Kings and even Indonesian leaders born after Soekarno often

225 Permadi was interviewed on November 25, 2006 in Bogor. 226 Susilo, loc. cit, 2009. 227 Pramono Anung was interviewed on September 21, 2006 in Jakarta. 228 Harold Crouch was interviewed on April 22, 2006 in Jakarta. 229 Moedjanto, 1993, op. cit: 104. 230 Interview with Pramono Anung on September 21, 2006 in Jakarta; Interview with Ryamizard Ryacudu on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta; See also, Bilveer Singh, Ryamizard --in the Footsteps of Gajah Mada, Sydney: Book House, 2005, op. cit: 18-19. 231 See Michael Van Langenberg, “The New Order State: Language, Ideology, Hegemony”, in State and Civil Society in Indonesia, edited by Arief Budiman, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 22, Clayton: Monash University, 1990: 124; Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 15. 232 See MC Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since C. 1200, Stanford University Press, 2001.

298 mentioned the Majapahit kingdom, reminded of the good traditional values maintained at that time, and glorified its accomplishments under chief commander Gajah Mada, who had conquered other kingdoms outside Java and made the Majapahit kingdom much more respected by its neighbours.233 Gajah Mada was well known for his oath, “Amukti Palapa,” which declared that if other islands ouside Java had been conquered, he would be able to take a rest (lamun huwus kalah nusantara, isun amukti palapa).234 Not surprisingly, as a strong defender of the unitary state principle Megawati believed that the unitary state proclaimed in the 1945 State Constitution had always been regarded as a central article of faith that she would be prepared to defend.235

Megawati could tolerate aspirations on autonomy in provinces as long as it would not produce new rulers that undermine her government. She rejected an independent administration in Indonesia’s provinces under the umbrella of federalism since this would undermine the power of the central government.236 She sought to avoid a comprehensive power sharing that could damage the unitary state.

Due to her devotion to the unitary state, she could not tolerate aspirations of separatism so that she pursued a repressive approach in Aceh, Maluku, and Irian Jaya.237 She criticized Habibie for the referendum on independence in East Timor. In reverse, she assisted pro-integration refugees who wanted to be resettled to West Timor after the disappointing result of the ballot. She often attacked Habibie over East Timor but kept quiet on the Indonesian military’s role there.238

Moreover, she advocated a tough line against the Aceh separatist movement (GAM). The unitary state was a final solution to the country.239 A peaceful settlement of separatism could only be on the central government’s terms and in way that might not harm the principle of the unitary state. Megawati also did not support a peaceful settlement of separatist conflict under the brokerage of a foreign country. In her official addresses, she often stressed that Indonesian problems must be solved by Indonesians.240 Such a rigid approach contributed to the breakdown of the Framework Agreement of the COHA (Cessation of Hostilities), which was concluded between the central government

233 Dahono Fitrianto and Ingki Rinaldi, “Bayang-bayang Sebuah Kejayaan” (“Shadow of A Glory”), Hari- an Kompas, January 4, 2009: 18. 234 Achmad Sunjayadi, “Membaca ‘Dongeng’ Nusantara” (“Reading the ‘Tale’ of Nusantara”), Harian Kompas, October 27, 2008: 39. 235 Megawati Soekarnoputri, 2005, loc.cit: 3. 236 Ibid. 237 Karon, loc cit. 238 Sander Thoenes, “Indonesian Military Power Undimmed by Humiliations”, Financial Times, September 21, 1999, loc.cit. 239 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 182. 240 Ibid.

299 and Aceh’s GAM rebels in Tokyo on May 17-18, 2003 with the help of the Geneva-based Henry Dunant Centre.

GAM failed to firmly declare its acceptance of the proposal of a special autonomy law for Aceh and refused to abandon its armed struggle and its separatist activities. It persistently breached the cease fire agreement by continuously declaring its aspirations for independence and the separation from the unitary state of Indonesia (NKRI). GAM also failed to lay down its weapons as required by COHA, it established a rival local governmental structure, continuously recruited fighters for the “Aceh National Army,” extorted Acehnese people and imposed levies called as “Nangroe tax.” These GAM activities were viewed not only as violating Indonesian national law but also the spirit and letter of the COHA.241 Due to the weakening trust resulting from reports on new provocations by both parties and, after the failure of a peaceful conflict settlement, President Megawati imposed military emergency status on Aceh and backed TNI to launch a military campaign by May 19, 2003.

President Megawati acted similarly in addressing the separatist conflict in Irian Jaya where she also opted for a military solution. In the Javanese concept of power, there is a view which says that the more remote an object is, the less light it gets from the lamp, meaning that the more remote a territory the more difficult it is for the central government to control it.242 Irian Jaya as the easternmost province of Indonesia was therefore seen by President Megawati as the most vulnerable to separatism.

Even the granting of special autonomy to the province by Law No. 21/2001 could not wipe out her doubts about the province’s loyalty to the central government. With this special autonomy status, Papua has got authority over all government functions except on foreign policy, defense, religion, and finance. It is also entitled to receive special allocation fund (dana alokasi khusus), additional allocation fund (dana alokasi tambahan) and sharing revenue (dana perimbangan) from tax and natural resources which can reach 90 percent in addition to national allocation fund (dana alokasi umum nasional). Because of her doubts about Papuan loyalty, and also motivated by her party’s objective to gain more seats in the national parliament (DPR), she issued Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 1/2003 which markedly curtailed the provincy’s special autonomy. Crouch commented that Megawati’s Javanese background must be attributed to her fear of coping with the fast increasing power of governor and mayors in the province.243

241 “Press Release Joint Council in Tokyo Failed to Reach An Agreement,” Kedutaan Besar Republik In- donesia Tokyo, http://www.kbri-canberra.org.au/press/press030519e.htm. 242 Rinakit, 2005, loc.cit: 76-77. 243 Harold Crouch was interviewed on April 22, 2006 in Jakarta.

300 President Megawati’s priority to preserve the unitary state was also in line with her choice to implement “subjective control” over the military.244 With such a kind of control, she treated the military as a guardian of her regime survival as often occurred during the pre- and post-colonial times. She wanted the military to be more dedicated in its loyalty to her personal rather than to the state interest.245

IV.B. The Military and the Unitary State

Since their formation in 1945, the Indonesian armed forces legitimized their political role with the argument that they were the soldiers of the people and had to remain close to the people. Therefore, it was often said that any attempt to distance the military from the people was an abuse of the very essence, which in Javanese terminology is known as the jati diri and kodrat, or identity and providence, of TNI.246 For TNI, “being part of the people” could only be attained by the retention of their territorial command function throughout the country, or, to use a very popular expression, by “embedding” the soldiers in the Indonesian people.247 Maj. Gen. Priyanto, territorial asssistant of army chief, admitted that only with the territorial command function the military could secure the nation’s integrity and the unitary state (NKRI) because that function would make the military the most organized and the most powerful institution in the country.248 In reverse, TNI feared that reform demands could damage its capability to cope with threats to NKRI.

TNI chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto and army chief Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu frequently insisted that the unitary state project could only be secured by offering TNI a greater role in fighting separatism. In response to the rising threat of separatism, Gen. Endriartono reminded that he was witnessing many regions demanding to secede from the Indonesian state in their effort to deal with the country’s multi-dimensional crisis. For this reason, he urged the Indonesian people to share a united vision on national integrity and to eliminate their vested interests. He stated:

“All Indonesian people have to possess and demonstrate a high spirit of nationalism and have healthy souls that will never support national disintegration ... As long as the Government works for the sake of the interests of the entire nation and people, we must be loyal. The most

244 Huntington, 1957, op.cit. 245 Ikrar Nusa Bhakti was interviewed on May 15, 2006. 246 Budiardjo, 2003, loc.cit. 247 Ibid. 248 Maj. Gen. Priyanto’s explanations in seminar on TNI’s territorial function after Soeharto held on June 6, 2006 by Center for Research and Information Services, DPR, Jakarta.

301 important thing is that what’s best for this nation will be best for TNI [the armed forces].”249 In March 2003, Gen. Ryamizard convened a meeting of hundreds of active and retired top-ranking military officers to express TNI concern for the existence of the unitary state. In the meeting, the army chief urged the government to restore TNI’s security role due to the rising dangers of separatism and other security disturbances across Indonesia. Gen. Ryamizard argued that building military professionalism might be good for the armed forces of a country like America, but, for Indonesia, whose process of nation-building had not yet been accomplished, this was not enough. For Gen. Ryamizard and TNI there was no way to compromise over the unitary state.250 TNI preoccupation with the unitary state thus relegated the reform process to a backseat.

Inside TNI, Gen. Ryacudu was broadly known as an army general who had close connections to the red-white faction and the most vocal representative of the anti-reform wing. He frequently stated that the Indonesian military was unique, and, therefore, did not need to seek international advice on its reform agenda.251 Like the country’s civilian leaders, he often glorified and referred to the Majapahit Kingdom and its chief commander Gajah Mada.252 However, his inward looking attitude had isolated him from international affairs. He often spoke out against deficiencies in governance and the risk of national disintegration that made him a visible symbol for the military’s reluctance to progressive reform. Due to his closeness to President Megawati, attributed to the fact that his father was a loyalist of Soekarno and that he himself originates from Palembang, the same South Sumatran town as Megawati’s husband Taufiq Kiemas, Ryamizard exerted great influence on government policies.253

Gen. Ryamizard and Gen. Sutarto followed their predecessors, Gen. Wiranto and Adm. Widodo, in attributing great importance to preserve NKRI and Wawasan Nusantara. These ideas provide the TNI with space to become involved in state and society affairs. As stated by Ryamizard, the military’s stance toward the NKRI and Wawasan Nusantara has never changed since independence.254 As a result, TNI could not agree with the aspirations on federalism which emerged in late 1940s and in early years of reform era. The armed forces strongly believed that this would encourage other regions to separate from the republic. Ryamizard thus refused to negotiate with representatives of

249 England, 2000, loc.cit. 250 The Jakarta Post, March 21, 2003; Budiardjo, 2003, loc.cit; Interview with Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta. 251 Mietzner, 2006: 69. 252 Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu was interviewed on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta. See also, Bilveer Singh, Ryamizard --in the Footsteps of Gajah Mada, Sydney: Book House, 2005, op. cit: 18-19. 253 Mietzner, 2006, op. cit: 49-50. 254 Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu was interviewed on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta.

302 separatist movements who did not want to withdraw to give up their secessionist ambitions. It was in line with this view that TNI should not support the framework agreement with GAM on the COHA in Aceh and peaceful conflict resolution with RMS in Maluku and OPM in Irian Jaya since TNI could not tolerate such disloyalty toward NKRI.255

Likewise, Adm. Widodo, who was TNI chief until June 2002 warned the Papuans that Irian Jaya was an inseparable part of NKRI so that the military would not allow it to become independent.256 Not surpisingly, TNI soldiers were strongly involved in the low- intensity conflict with the Papuan rebels that resulted in the extension of the status of Irian Jaya as a military operations zone (Daerah Operasi Militer --DOM). Widodo’s successor, Gen. Sutarto, defended his predecessor’s decision to punish provinces defying central government control by preparing more military campaigns on a higher scale.257 On the Aceh rebellion, he declared the press, “GAM adalah pengkhianat bangsa karena hendak memisahkan diri dari NKRI!” (“GAM was the real traitor of the nation since it mobilized the Acehnese to separate from NKRI!”).258

Meanwhile, Gen. Tyasno, Gen. Sutarto’s erstwhile contender for the post of TNI chief, linked the threat to NKRI to the amendment process of the 1945 State Constitution which could create instability if it reduced the power of the central government. He suspected that the constitutional amendments could endanger the principle of integralism and the TNI’s role in protecting the NKRI. He thus urged the whole nation, particularly civilian leaders and politicians, to restore and strengthen their commitment to the country’s historical and cultural legacy of integralism.259 Resolving the conflict in Aceh by inviting foreign mediators would likewise undermine Pancasila ideology, the 1945

255 Ibid. 256 “Widodo AS: Papua Bagian Integral RI yang Sah” (“Widodo AS: Papua An Integral and Legitimate Part of Republik of Indonesia”), http://www.metronews.com/berita.asp?id=14320., was accessed on April 7, 2006: 1. 257 “Kasus Penembakan di Papua: Upaya Pisahkan Papua dari NKRI” (”Shooting Incident in Papua To Secces Papua from NKRI”), http://www.westpapua.net/news/03/ 01/030103-kasus_penembakan_di_pa- pua_upaya_pi..., January 3, 2003, loc. cit: 1-3; ”Panglima TNI: Reformasi TNI Jalan Terus” (“TNI Chief Commander: TNI Reform Continues”), http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0206/08/utama/pang01. htm, June 8, 2002: 1-3. 258 “Panglima TNI, Itu Tergantung GAM, Penyelesaian Kasus Aceh Lebih Baik Via Diplomasi” (”TNI Chief Commander, It Depends on GAM, Aceh Solution Better Via Diplomacy”), http://www.Pikiran- rakyat.com/cetak/0403/15/0502.htm, April 15, 2003: 1-2;”Perang Melawan GAM, Satu-satunya Jalan Selesaikan Aceh” (”War on GAM, The Only Solution for Aceh”), http://www.Kompas.com/utama/news/ 0208/30/040529.htm, was accessed on September 26, 2006: 1-5. 259 “Indonesia Harus Kembali ke UUD 1945 Asli dan Pancasila” (”Indonesia Should Return to the Origi- nal 1945 and Pancasila”), Harian Kompas, July 6, 2006: 4; “Mantan KSAD: TNI Jangan Dipaksa Gunakan Hak Pilih” (”Ex-Army Chief: TNI Should Not be Forced to Vote”), Suara Karya, November 17, 2006: 4; ”Tyasno: Amandemen UUD’45 Tidak Sah” (”Tyasno: The Amendments of the 1945 Constitu-tion Not Legitimate”), Suara Pembaruan, September 21, 2006, loc. cit: 2.

303 State Constitution, and national sovereignty.260 Gen. Tyasno’s recommendation to return to the original 1945 State Constitution was, as we have seen in Chapter IV, highly controversial.261 He was backed by then TNI spokesman, Maj. Gen. Suwarno Adiwijoyo,262 and territorial assistant in the TNI headquarters, Maj. Gen. Syamsul Ma’arif,263 that it became the main duty of the TNI to safeguard and defend the 1945 State Constitution and the Pancasila ideology. Any attempts, therefore, to change the pillars of the unitary state by proposing an alternative constitution and ideology, and to install a federal political system, would be crushed by TNI.

The promotion of conservative generals and hardliners such as Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, Lt. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu and Maj. Gen. Bibit Waluyo to top positions in TNI, consecutively as chief commander, army chief, and Kostrad commander, constituted the military’s increasing concern on the unitary state caused by the reform and the separatist movements. Kusnanto argued that Megawati’s view, which was preoccupied with the NKRI, encouraged the TNI to become more resistant to reform compared to previous periods.264 Similar perceptions on the prospect of the unitary state between President Megawati and military leaders contributed to their similar response to reform and separatism during 2001-2004.

As a result, the unitary state principle was maintained, while Megawati and the conservative generals could preserve her presidency and their top posts in TNI. In effect, the uneasiness of the military about the increasing danger of separatism during democratic transition had created a coincidence between TNI leaders and the top representatives of the new civilian regime in protecting the state by sacrificing the progress of reform.265 A deep sense of humiliation caused by the “loss” of East Timor and a determination not to lose any more territory pushed military and civilian leaders to align themselves.266 For Megawati and the TNI, the loss of more territory had to be prevented by all means.

IV.C. Civilian and Military Leaders’ Cooperation to End Separatism in Aceh

260 “Kembalikan Pancasila ke Aceh” (“Return Pancasila to Aceh”), Suara Pembaruan, January 6, 2009: 2. 261 See again, “Indonesia Harus Kembali ke UUD 1945 Asli dan Pancasila” (”Indonesia Should Return to the Original 1945 and Pancasila”), Harian Kompas, July 6, 2006, loc.cit; “Mantan KSAD: TNI Jangan Dipaksa Gunakan Hak Pilih” (”Ex-Army Chief: TNI Should Not be Forced to Vote”), Suara Karya, November 17, 2006, loc.cit; ”Tyasno: Amandemen UUD’45 Tidak Sah” (”Tyasno: The Amendments of the 1945 Constitution Not Legitimate”), Suara Pembaruan, September 21, 2006, loc. cit. 262 Adijoyo, 2002, op.cit: 11, 18. 263 Maj. Gen Syamsul Ma’arif was interviewed on July 18, 2006 in Jakarta. 264 Kusnanto Anggoro was interviewed on June 6, 2006 in Jakarta; see also, Yulianto, 2002, op.cit: 451- 452. 265 In his studies, Aguero anticipated military uneasiness during democratic transition, see Aguero, 1995, op. cit: 12. 266 Budiardjo, 2003, loc. cit.

304 Megawati began her presidency with a different approach than Wahid in coping with the separatist conflict in Aceh. Previously, as Wahid’s deputy, she had no opportunity to impose a military approach in the troubled province. However, as president she could introduce a policy to the western-most province of Indonesia based on her nationalist ideals.

On September 8, 2001, she visited Aceh, apologized to the Acehnese for the central government’s neglect, and promised a more responsive government attitude for the future.267 Yet, she avoided entering a dialogue with the Acehnese, depriving her of a better understanding of the Acehnese grievances and demands. After her failure to win the hearts and minds of the Acehnese, GAM rebels gained in increasing support to resume their separatist activities. At this point, Megawati returned to a policy similarly repressive than in the New Order period, by allowing TNI to resume military operations with the objective of eradicating GAM and ending its aspiration for independence. She further issued Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 7/2001 to facilitate deploying troops in Aceh. Before the annual MPR session on November 1, 2001 she announced sending more TNI troops to the province and endorsed the re-establishment of Kodam Iskandar Muda regional command earlier dismantled by Wahid.268 While stepping up military operations, President Megawati enacted the law on a special autonomy status of Aceh passed in 2001 (Law No. 18/2001) which had never been implemented by Wahid. It was also an attempt to appease the Acehnese with concessions, including the option to implement shariyah law and allowing the province to retain 70 percent of the revenues from oil and gas exploration. Finally, she renamed the province Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, which meant a peaceful, prosperous, and free region, to meet the aspirations of the Acehnese.269

Megawati’s long established relationship with the red-white military faction was favourable for TNI to reaffirm its position as security and defence forces, particularly in the regions confronted with separatism. Her leadership style which was hostile toward separatist movements granted comfortable space for TNI to freely conduct military operations in Aceh. The issuance of Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 7/2001 and her statements in the MPR annual session of November 1, 2001 signaled to the TNI that Megawati would not object to a military solution of the conflict. With the president taking its side, TNI could not only reinforce its forces with fresh troops from outside Aceh, but also upgrade its logistical capability and re-establish a regional command. Further, TNI introduced restrictions on political life in a region where hundreds of thousands had rallied for independence in August 2000.

267 Tjahyo Kumolo et al, Megawati Soekarnoputri: Presiden Pilihan Rakyat (Megawati Soekarnoputri: The Peoples’ President), Jakarta: Global Publika, 2004: 89. 268 The Jakarta Post, January 11, 2002; Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 182. 269 Majalah Tempo 29, No. 5, April 3-9, 2000; The Jakarta Post, November 27, 2000, May 18, 2001, and January 2, 2002: 182, 246.

305 In the light of the new more accommodating attitude of GAM in 2002, Megawati introduced softer policies on Aceh. She sent coordinating minister for political and security affairs Gen. Yudhoyono to attend talks with GAM leaders in Geneva mediated by the Henry Dunant Centre. She further sent coordinating minister for social welfare Jusuf Kalla to talk on a more comprehensive peace plan. However, in contradiction to these initiatives, she tolerated TNI to resume military operations. Under the increasing pressure of the Megawati government, intimidated by TNI’s massive campaigns270 and under the impact of new government overtures, GAM hesitantly agreed to a new Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) which was signed by December 9, 2002.

Within this framework, the rebels pledged to cease their attacks and disarm, while the government agreed to use police units to conduct normal policing activities. This agreement paved the way for a new dialogue, including the military, with the Acehnese people on the basis of the special autonomy law on Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, which also provided for democratic elections in Aceh.271 A limited form of autonomy was introduced in Aceh on January, 1, 2003 before it would be transformed into a special autonomy. The province was also promised a greater share of oil and gas revenues and free and direct elections for its governor.272

Nevertheless, such progress did not sufficiently address the root of the separatist conflict because it takes time for regaining the trust of the Acehnese in the central government. Also, by the time of the dialogues the Megawati government had not yet introduced a bureaucratic reform which was needed to replace the Javanese-dominated provincial government which existed since her father’s and Soeharto’s rule.273 COHA had not yet made much headway since the separatist Acehnese wanted more, particularly after another formerly troubled Indonesian province, East Timor, won its independence.274 GAM openly expressed its position by announcing that while it accepted autonomy as a basis for negotiations during the peace talks in Geneva, it had not dropped its demand for full independence.275

Despite the fact that President Megawati had signed the Framework Agreement of the COHA, TNI did not withdraw all of its forces from Aceh. TNI justified this with the argument that GAM rebels resisted total disarmament and instead of accepting special

270Ibid: 219. 271 Majalah Tempo 31, No. 41, December 8-15, 2002; “Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Acheh Movement,” http://www.hdcentre.org/Programmes/aceh/aceh%20COH.htm, January 15, 2003; Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 182, 246. 272 “Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Acheh Movement,” http://www.hdcen-tre.org/Programmes/aceh/aceh%20COH.htm, January 15, 2003; Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 182, 246. 273 Rueland, in Hoadley and Rueland (eds.), 2006, loc. cit: 230-231. 274 Rachel Clarke,”Aceh’s Bloody War”, BBC News Online, July 17, 2002. 275 “Activists Urge Jakarta Not to Declare Emergency in Aceh”, Agence French Press, July 12, 2002.

306 autonomy continued to strive for independence. This was the pretext for TNI’s hardliners to resume counter-insurgency operations, which also served to protect their alleged interests in marijuana plantations, illegal logging, smuggling, and other racketeering businesses,276 including security protection services for Ameircan firm ExxonMobile’s oil and natural gas projects in the province.277

President Megawati’s declining trust in GAM in the next few months was in line with TNI’s effort to secure its position in Aceh. With the president’s support, the military could take a tough response against GAM’s putative misinterpretations of the new peace agreement (COHA). Meanwhile, overreacting by soldiers that provoked new violence could not be prevented due to the president’s dependency on TNI. New cases of human rights abuses emerged although the level of intensity dropped in comparison to the previous period. The improved performance of the police forces in conducting normal policing activities contributed to the decrease.

Meanwhile, TNI was broadly suspected of sabotaging the peace deal by engineering attacks on monitors of the cease-fire and provoking GAM rebels to engage in battle again.278 Without support for a peaceful conflict settlement and still haunted by the secession of the East Timor province, Megawati declared martial law and endorsed one of the largest military campaigns in the country’s history.279 The COHA collapsed entirely when President Megawati on May 19, 2003 gave greenlight for TNI in starting its offensive to stamp out 26 years rebellion in Aceh.280

TNI launched massive operations in an all out war against GAM by deploying its PPRC (Pasukan Pengendali Reaksi Cepat --new rapid strike forces).281 In those operations, hardliners such as Gen. Sutarto, Gen. Ryamizard, and Lt. Gen. Bibit Waluyo played significant roles. Ryamizard justified these operations by explaining that GAM could not be trusted because the rebels still wanted independence. Therefore, TNI could not support the COHA.282 It was rather TNI’s duty to crush the rebels.

In accordance with this, Maj. Gen. Djali Yusuf accused monitors from the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) that they had often met people associated with the separatist group.283 He questioned for what reason the HDC had summoned activists of various

276 ICG Report No. 17, loc.cit: 14. 277 Erhard Haubold, “Jakarta im Wettlauf mit der Zeit,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November, 15, 1999, Schmitz, 2003, loc.cit: 113. 278 “The Aceh Stalemate,”Laksamana.net, January 31, 2005, http://ocha-gwapps1.unog.ch/rw/rwb.nsf/db 900sid/VBOL-696KKJ?OpenDocument, was accessed on June 1, 2010. 279 Mietzner, 2006, loc. cit: 38. 280 Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 153. 281Ibid. 282 Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu was interviewed on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta. 283 “Activists Urge Jakarta Not to Declare Emergency in Aceh”, Agence French Press, July 12 2002.

307 non-governmental organisations to their secretariat in Aceh, which according to him could not be justified. In his view many foreigners were involved in Aceh to advance their own interests. The general also said he had obtained the identities of those who waged an international campaign for an independent Aceh and local activists who were selling Indonesia. He likened these activities to similar subversion in East Timor.284 This is why TNI’s security forces sought to identify their identities and keep them under surveillance.

It is true that Megawati had signed a peace agreement with GAM. Yet, the new peace agreement could not be effectively implemented since GAM became much stronger due to TNI’s failure in regaining Acehnese trust. Also, because of her lack of experience and capability, Megawati could not immediately impose civilian supremacy on the military in order to prevent the reoccurrence of incidents between TNI and GAM. In the end, as a result of the deteriorating security in Aceh, she imposed darurat militer (the status of military emergency) on the province.

Megawati’s Menkopolkam Gen. (ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono complied with requests from Kodam Iskandar Muda regional commander Maj. Gen. Djali Yusuf for more troops. During an inspection trip to Aceh, Yudhoyono called GAM “terrorists” and insisted that the government would not tolerate armed separatism. Irrespective of the opposition of human rights activists in the province, he too favoured declaring a state of emergency.285 Although there were already at least 28,000 troops in Aceh, Maj. Gen. Djali suggested 8,000 more to be sent.286

In early 2003 Ryamizard belonged to the fiercest opponents of the Aceh peace process, and many believed that he played a major role in its failure.287 In early June 2003, military operations in Aceh entered their third week.288 In line with the campaign, TNI established an emergency administration in the local governments to replace the ineffective civilian bureaucracy. Many of the civilian posts remaining vacant for fear of the TNI’s or the rebels’ revenge were filled with army officers imported from TNI’s vast territorial network, giving the military the chance to justify the continued importance of the territorial command system.

During the new offensive, TNI largely restricted press activities in the troubled province, especially in the hot spots, and discouraged journalists from interviewing GAM leaders. For this reason, it was impossible to verify military data related to the offensive, including the number and classification of victims. Nonetheless, a source disclosed that the massive campaign had resulted in hundreds of deaths, causing the total death toll to

284 Ibid. 285 Ibid. 286 Clarke, loc.cit. 287 Mietzner, 2006, loc.cit: 50. 288 Budiardjo, 2003, loc. cit.

308 over 12,000 since 1976.289 TNI themselves claimed that 213 of their soldiers died and hundreds were wounded.290

Within 1 year, GAM’s guerrilla operations could be contained so that on May 19, 2004 President Megawati was able to downgrade the status of the military emergency to a civil emergency. TNI complied with her decision because its troops had regained momentum and strengthened their strategic position on the ground. Importantly, however, despite the improved situation, violence against civilians, especially women did not subside. A report of investigation of an anti-violence NGO, Kontras, found out that for the time of the emergency from May 2003 to August 2005, sixty-five out of 103 cases of violence against civilians occurred.291 Less, namely fourteen cases happened from mid- 2001 to May 2003.292 International and local human rights organizations had consistently raised concerns about abuses being allegedly committed by TNI and GAM rebels.

Explicitly, President Megawati supported military campaigns in troubled provinces, especially Aceh, by saying that soldiers fighting against separatists were patriots who did their duty to save the nation and the NKRI. For this mission, they had the authority to carry out both military and non-military operations. They were protected by political decisions which meant that TNI soldiers had national responsibility to root out the rebels and to put an end to secessionism.293

President Megawati consistently backed TNI in deploying more troops and launching massive operations, especially in remote areas controlled by GAM rebels. She defended TNI operations by arguing that they were necessary to protect Indonesia’s sovereignty and integrity.294 She rejected international assistance to resolve separatist conflicts because it would compromise national sovereignty. It was Megawati’s firm belief that the conflict in Aceh should be settled by the Indonesian government within the framework of the 1945 State Constitution and the unitary state. GAM should not be treated as a foreign entity but rather as part of the nation which rebelled against the central government. Separatism in Aceh was in other words a purely domestic affair which had to be solved by Indonesians.295

TNI chief commander, Gen. Sutarto, stated that the military operations conducted for 2 years since May 2003 was a great success. He argued that evidence for this success is the substitution of the military emergency by a civilian emergency status for the

289 Far Eastern Economic Review, June 5, 2003: 16; December 25, 2003: 21. 290 Megawati Soekarnoputri, 2005, loc.cit. 291 “Mayoritas Kekerasan Terjadi Saat Darurat Militer” (”Most Violence Occurred during Military Emer- gency”), Harian Kompas, January 23, 2007: 4. 292Ibid. 293 Megawati Soekarnoputri, 2005, loc.cit: 12. 294 Ibid: 12.

309 province, that the total number of separatist rebels could be reduced to 9,593 from approximately 10,000, and 2,330 various standard weapons such as AK-49, M-16 and SS- 1 could be seized. TNI could moreover regain control over most areas in the province although about 10 percent or 600 villages were still under GAM influence.296 The figures presented by Gen. Sutarto drew criticism. The media questioned TNI’s success since it could not demonstrate its performance by significantly reducing the number of the separatist rebels.297 In an interview, Ryamizard, however, acknowledged the progress achieved by TNI. He was convinced that the separatist movement in Aceh could be ended by the massive military campaigns.298

IV.D. Burying the East Timor Trauma

Megawati had a firm view on East Timor, opposing the proposal of the Habibie administration to conduct a referendum on independence in the province. Her counter- proposal was to grant a special autonomy status to the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia as a final and everlasting solution. Within this framework, East Timor would be under the control of the Indonesian government and there would be no foreign interference into the territory’s domestic problems. Secession, on the other hand, would not be tolerated and would be met with repressive measures of the central government.

Megawati had criticized Habibie for his lack of nationalistic awareness in offering to surrender East Timor to the pro-independence group and international opinion. The pro-independence vote was for her a result which represented a rejection of Soeharto’s New Order regime rather than of Indonesia itself.299 For her, the “loss” of East Timor was a humiliation that could jeopardize the country’s integrity. She was therefore determined not to give up any more territory300 and rejected any proposal for a referendum in other troubled provinces, such as in Aceh and Irian Jaya. According to Megawati, Habibie’s policy in East Timor breached Indonesia’s democratic procedure, by-passed parliament (DPR) and thus violated the 1945 State Constitution.

She shared the view of the TNI on East Timor’s secession. TNI opposition to East Timor secession reflected its concern that a referendum would create a dangerous precedent for other provinces with separatist tendencies. According to TNI, the ballot process in East Timor and its outcome were purportedly unfair, manipulated by unfriendly

295 Ibid: 8-9. 296 Ibid. 297 Far Eastern Economic Review, June 5, 2003, loc.cit; December 25, 2003, loc.cit. 298 Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu was interviewed on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta. 299 Eldridge, 2002, op.cit: 154. 300 Budiardjo, 2003, loc. cit.

310 outsiders.301 Moreover, Megawati and TNI perceived the pro-integration militias as brothers who deserved support and understanding. By contrast, they considered Western countries, especially the United Stated and Australia, as being driven by racial, religious, and geo-political motives, and which used East Timor to dismember Indonesia. They suspected that external forces and Indonesia’s economic dependence and political incompetence had forced the civilian Habibie government into a humiliating surrender of national territory.302 For this reason, President Megawati had never asked for forgiveness to the government of the new independent state of Timor Leste and the East Timorese for what had been done by Indonesia for more than two decades, including the post- referendum riots allegedly orchestrated by the TNI.303

To spare the country from humiliation, she did not support the prosecution of the security forces accused of human rights violations before and after the referendum. On September 7, 2003 she initiated a bill, which later became Law No. 27/2004, to addresss the accusations through a committee on truth and reconciliation which would not seriously hold the human rights violators accountable.304 Likewise, she sided with military leaders who suggested that the human rights violations in East Timor were ordinary crimes which could be tried by military tribunals.

Not unexpectedly, the military tribunals turned out to be sham trials. Some officers, including Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri, ex-Kodam IX Udayana regional commander, and Col. Muis, ex-Korem Wiradarma military resort commander, who had received moderate sentences by the tribunals were later freed from charges by higher tribunals. They even gained promotions in their own corps, while, in contrast with this, ex-civilian local leaders and leaders of paramilitary groups were sent into prison before they were also released after a short time. As a consequence, critics mentioned that the tribunals were no less than a political show, an engineered solution, created by President Megawati to appease the victims and their families, and, at the same time, protect and please military officers involved in the abuses, and TNI, in general.

By endorsing the military tribunals, President Megawati ignored the demands of the East Timorese who wished a fair and comprehensive solution of the problems resulting from the conflict. East Timorese leaders, such as Xanana Gusmao and Ramos

301 Megawati Soekarnoputri, 2005, loc. cit; Eldridge, 2002, op.cit. 302 Eldridge, 2002, ibid. 303 Similar response had also showed by her Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, Gen. (ret) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who was also former military leader (Kasospol and Kaster), when he became the next president after Megawati. For further information see “Ramos Horta: Indonesia Harus Minta Maaf” (“Ramos Horta: Indonesia Must Ask for Forgiveness”), Koran Tempo, March 18, 2010: B7. 304 In 2006, the Law No. 27/2004 was annulled by the Indonesian Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Kon- stitusi). For further information, see Rosya, Vini Mariyane. “Pelanggar HAM Masa Lalu Bebas dari Hu- kuman,” (“Past Human Rights Violators Released from Sentence”) Media Indonesia, March 19, 2010.

311 Horta, who earlier keenly demanded transparent human rights tribunals, soon changed their minds, and, similar to Megawati, took an accommodating stance toward TNI. They were concerned with the security of the newly independent state, particularly its border with Indonesia. They were aware of the fact that new incidents occurred after the referendum which had caused security disturbances.

The new TNI leadership under Gen. Sutarto and with the full support of President Megawati resisted international and the reform movement’s pressure for human rights tribunals. By adopting the clauses of the old criminal code (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana --KUHP) inherited from the Dutch colonial government, the military, together with the police could arrest hostile demonstrators who were raising the issues of East Timor abuses and the generals’ accountability.

IV.E. Separatism, Violence, and Conflicting Interests in Irian Jaya

Worried by the domino effect of the separation of East Timor from Indonesia which had repercussions on Aceh, President Megawati initiated a no-compromise approach toward the separatist movement in Irian Jaya. On many occasions, she reiterated her opposition to a new referendum on independence in addition to the one, the Pepera, which had been held in 1968 under the supervision of the United Nations for Temporary Administration (UNTEA). Like in Aceh, she asked for forgiveness for the New Order government’s wrongdoings in the eastern-most province of Indonesia in her independence day address to the nation on August 16, 2001.305 She also committed herself to remedy the injustice and discriminations encountered by the Papuans. At the same time, however, she registered her strong opposition to the secession of Papua. The most she was willing to conede to Papuans was a special autonomy status under Law No. 21/2001, but she did not open a dialogue with the Papuans.

Due to her strong opposition to secessionism, she encouraged the military to crush separatist groups that still could not accept special autonomy.306 Her firm response to the separatist movement in Irian Jaya was strongly influenced by her father’s struggle to expel the Dutch colonizers from the territory and bring it under the fold of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia. It was Soekarno, who in 1961 ordered to send troops to New Guinea and it was Gen. Soeharto who commanded the military operation code named Mandala to free Irian Jaya from the Dutch.307

305 Megawati Soekarnoputri, 2005, loc.cit; Eldridge, 2002, op.cit. 306 Megawati Soekarnoputri, 2005, loc.cit. 307 Eva-Lotta E Hedman, “Papua: the Last Frontier for Democratization, Demilitarization and Decentrali- zation in Indonesia,” in Eva-Lotta E. Hedman (ed.), Dynamics of Conflict and Displacement in Papua, In-

312 In addition to this, Soekarno changed the name “Papua” to “Irian Jaya,” meaning victory, after the success of the military campaign that also influenced the result of the UN Act of Free Choice or Pepera. After annexation of the territory, Soekarno’s successful policy of “national character building,” which integrated native Papuans into Indonesia through political education, had been neglected by President Soeharto who was mainly interested in exploiting the natural resources of the region. With the East Timor lesson in mind, Megawati was committeed to keep the province within Indonesia. She did not support attempts to change Irian Jaya’s status, and even, its name given to it by Soekarno. For this reason, PDIP, her party with the biggest faction in MPR, supported Golkar and other nationalistic factions to reject Wahid’s proposal to rename Irian Jaya into its original name Papua.

In fact, Megawati’s interest to win more legislative seats in Irian Jaya in the April legislative 2004 elections and thereby support her plan to run again in the July 2004 presidential election resulted in her failure to end separatism in the province. In an attempt to enlarge fourteen regencies, she issued Presidential Instruction or Inpres No.1/2003 on January 27, 2003, 14 months since the enactment of UU No. 21/2001 on November 21, 2001. The redefinition of local government boundaries served the objective to form a new province in Irian Jaya to be named West Irian Jaya (Irian Jaya Barat or Irjabar). This effort is not in favour of Chapter 76 of the UU No. 21/2001 which stipulates that any effort to enlarge the Papua province needs the consent of the MRP (Majelis Rakyat Papua --the Papuan People’s Assembly) and DPRP (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua --the provincial House of Representative of the Papuan People).

Furthermore, 2 weeks after the Inpres No.1/2003 was enacted, a retired Brigadier General of the marine corps, Abraham Octovianus Atururi, was installed as the governor of Irian Jaya Barat. Brig. Gen. Atururi was also a former official in the military strategic intelligence agency (Bais).308 President Megawati’s decision which was viewed as a betrayal of the Papuan people’s aspirations309 produced communal conflicts among various ethnic groups that enhanced opposition to Jakarta.310 Nonetheless, with TNI on her side, she could master this problem by deploying more troops in the most volatile areas and endorsing the TNI plan to maintain Irian Jaya as a military operation zone donesia, Refugee Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 42, University of Oxford, September 2007;.Amiruddin Al Rahab, Heboh Papua: Perang Rahasia, Trauma, dan Separatisme, Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2010. 308 Susanto and Pattisina, Harian Kompas, February 27, 2010, loc.cit. 309 Ibid. 310 “Pusat Diminta Hormati Otsus Papua” (“Central Government Was Demanded to Respect Papua’s Spe- cial Autonomy”), http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2005/11/26/Utama/ ut01.htm, loc.cit: 1-2, was accessed on November 27, 2005. Juga, Robert Isisdorus, “Pilkada atau Pemekaran Papua” (”Regional Elec-tion or Enlargement of Papua”), http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2005/11/26/Utama/ut05. htm, loc. cit: 1-2, was accessed on November 27, 2005.

313 (DOM). She declined the separatist leaders’ proposal for an open dialogue involving Papuans living in exile, human rights activists, civil society, and the leaders of the Papuan Council (Presidium Dewan Papua --PDP). She was seemingly more interested in addressing the separatist conflict in the province in her own way rather than searching a new solution.311

TNI responded to the separatist conflict in Irian Jaya in a similar way than in other provinces. In fact, Megawati’s rise confirmed TNI to sustain their military operations and to crack down on the secessionists, mainly the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka -- Organization for an Independent Papua). The Papuans’ loss of trust in the proposal of special autonomy not only fuelled the recommencement of separatist activities but also military operations to stop them. The failure of the implementation of the special autonomy proposal benefited the military, which was disinclined to it due to its belief that it would threaten its control over the province. This deteriorating situation led to new armed clashes between TNI soldiers with the OPM.

Based on their Sishankamrata (Sistem Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta -- total people’s defense and security system) doctrine,312 TNI leaders justify their use of militias in the war against the OPM rebels, not only because their failure to crush the rebels, but also to avoid accusations of gross human righst violations. There were indeed reports on the activities of TNI, in particular, its elite unit, Kopassus, in the formation and training of anti-independence militias in Irian Jaya.313 A number of reports of early June 2002 indicated that the TNI was preparing to intensify the crackdown on independence supporters.

Pro-independence and human rights groups claimed that additional special force troops and Muslim militia groups were being moved into the province.314 Large groups of Laskar Jihad members, nearly all young men, not transmigration families, were entering Irian Jaya every week among the thousands of transmigrants from other areas of Indonesia. Their presence was not only ignored, but seemingly organized by TNI. The militant militias which were trained with arms had earlier been involved in communal fighting in both the Maluku archipelago and Sulawesi.

Toward the end of 2001, the Laskar Jihad leader, Ja’far Umar Thalib, reportedly made a visit to Sorong. Since then, the influx of the radical Muslim militias steadily

311 J. Osdar,”Sentuhan Para Presiden kepada Papua” (“Presidents’ Policies to Papua”), 1 December 2005, http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0512/01/Politikhukum/2254535.htm, loc. cit: 3, 1-3, was accessed on December 1, 2005. 312 See about this, Sebastian, 2006, op.cit: 15-16. 313 M. Davies. Indonesian Security Responses to Resurgent Papuan Separatism: An Open Source Case Study, Canberra: Australian National University, CDSS, 2001; Kingsbury, 2004, loc.cit. 314 John Roberts, “Indonesian Military Steps Up Repression in West Papua”, WSWS, June 8, 2002.

314 increased.315 Also, military training had been taking place, initially in isolated bush areas, but more recently on the premises of a local mosque. In March 2002, twenty church leaders in Sorong issued a statement together with eight clan and youth leaders, complaining about the presence of Laskar Jihad and drawing attention to the dissemination of inflammatory publications and videos alleging that Christians are responsible for “separatist” movements and constitute a threat to Indonesia's territorial integrity. According to Elsham, a leading Indonesian human rights organization, there were around 3,000 members of the Laskar Jihad in Irian Jaya and they had set up a number of branches of its umbrella organization called Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah (Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunnah) in several cities, including Sorong, Fak-Fak, Jayapura, Timika, Nabire and Manokwari.316

Based on reports from the town of Fak-Fak, small boats had been seen arriving since April 2002, each bringing about ten Laskar Jihad members, apparently from Maluku. They had also set up commands in Arso, near Jayapura, the capital city of the province, which had been the location of large transmigration resettlement areas for newcomers from Java. In addition to the spread of the Laskar Jihad, TNI soldiers had been actively promoting the establishment of pro-Jakarta militias known as Satgas Merah Putih (Red-and-White Task Force),317 whose members were recruited from newcomer Indonesian communities, for example, the native Papuans and pro-integration East Timorese.

The Sydney Morning Herald reported that an additional 150 Kopassus troops had been just moved from Sumatra to back up the army presence in the Irian Jaya province.318 To counter opponents of continued Indonesian rule over the province, TNI, with the backing of President Megawati, had resorted to increasingly repressive methods in the period from January 2001 to June 2002. A de facto curfew was imposed, and arbitrary arrest and detention were common. Reportedly, TNI soldiers were directly involved in several murders.319

In their efforts to fight separatists, TNI also conducted intelligence operations to weaken PDP (Presidium Dewan Papua --Papuan Council Joint Leadership), an opposition group established by prominent native Papuans. Its leader, Theys Eluay, became the victim of kidnapping after having been formally invited by local military officers for attending a national ceremony on the Indonesian Heroes Day on November 10, 2001.320 He was found dead several days afterwards in West Koya, around 60 km

315 Ibid. 316 “Laskar Jihad Poses a New Threat”, Tapol, [email protected], September 16, 2002. 317 Ibid. 318 Roberts, 2002, loc.cit. 319 Ibid. 320 Moore and Rompies, 2003, loc.cit.

315 from Matoa Hotel in the city centre Jayapura, where he was watched by military intelligence in his last days.321 The investigation of Theys’ death revealed that Kopassus troops were involved in the kidnapping of Theys and his driver, Masoka, which ended with the death of Theys and the disappearance of Masoka.322 Reportedly, Megawati did not authorize this intelligence operation and regretted the kidnapping and the death.323

As a matter of fact, tension was often built up by the military to serve their parochial interests. For instance, TNI was also accused of being responsible for an “engineered ambush” on a company road under its security control in Timika on August 31, 2002, which killed three teachers, including two Americans, employed by the American-owned Freeport mining company. Company employees suspected military involvement in the ambush, which may have been part of a turf war beween the armed forces and the police, as the company was threatening to cut its support for TNI. Antonius Wamang and his friends, allegedly OPM followers, were later presented as the only suspects of the ambush, and sent to Jakarta for trial. Although he denied the allegation, Wamang obtained a life sentence without having a chance to defend himself properly and explain where the standard weapons of TNI, such as M-16 and SS-1, and their pertinent ammunitions they used came from.324 OPM leaders had denied that they ordered Wamang and his friends to launch an attack on the employees of Freeport.

Other reports also stated that Kopassus was involved in the ambush.325 The army’s counter-insurgency elite had been accused of staging a “freedom-fighter ambush” that could be readily blamed on local tribespeople, known to be strong critics of the American company. U.S. officials, according to a report of the Washington Post, had confirmed that they have evidence that senior Indonesian military officials discussed an operation against the U.S. mining company before the August 31, 2002 ambush.326 Together with Theys’ death and the recent spread of Laskar Jihad and pro-integration militias to Irian Jaya, this ambush followed the assignment of Maj. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon to take charge of the restive province as the Kodam XVII Cendrawasih regional commander. Simbolon was one of key military figures who were accused of orchestrating the violence in East Timor in 1999.327 Similar in East Timor and Aceh, Kopassus officers deployed in rebellious

321 Author’s interview on June 2-4, 2008 in Jayapura, Irian Jaya; Author’s interview on June 8, 2008 in Jayapura, Irian Jaya. 322 “Penegakan Hukum Tak Membaik” (“Law Enforcement Not Improved”), Harian Kompas, January 28, 2005: 8; Moore and Rompies, 2003, loc. cit. 323 O’Rourke, 2002, op. cit. 324 Wamang informed that the standard weapons of TNI and their ammunitions had been sent by military leaders he knew in Jakarta, see, “Penegak Hukum Harus Adil dalam Kasus Antonius Wamang” (“Law En- forcer Should be Fair in Antonius Wamang Case”), Suara Pembaruan, http://www.suara-pembaruan. com/News/2007/04/21/Nasio-nal/nas02.htm, was accessed on April 21, 2007: 1-2. 325 Kingsbury, 2004, loc.cit. 326 Fawthrop, 2002, loc.cit. 327 Ibid.

316 Irian Jaya apparently conducted covert operations in a desperate bid to prevent the province from breaking away from Jakarta.

Another incident which involved the local government apparatus occurred in Wamena on April 4, 2003.328 Here, too, were reports of killings, torture, and forced disappearances as a result of TNI operations against OPM followers who were accused of being responsible for the surprise attack on an ammunitions depot and the loss of several weapons of Kodim (military district command) 1702 Wamena.329 By early June 2003, the military, supported by its main forces from Kopassus and Kostrad, under the coordination of Korem (military resort command) 171 Jayapura, intensified its operations in the Central-Highlands of Irian Jaya, not only in Wamena but also in Kwiyawage, where many had been reportedly tortured and murdered.330 Under Megawati and two Kodam XVII Cendrawasih regional commanders, namely Maj. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon and Maj. Gen. Nurdin Zainal, military operations to stop OPM’s flag (Bintang Kejora) raising and to hunt its followers had been conducted.331

Ryamizard, the new army chief, suspected that the activities of separatists there would become the next major threat to the country after a similar development in Aceh. He, therefore, encouraged to set up billboards and displayed banners reading “NKRI adalah harga mati” (The unitary state of Indonesia is the final solution) and “TNI Benteng NKRI” (TNI is the fortress or defender of the unitary state) in front of the headquarters of Kodam (provincial level regional command), Korem (regency or municipality level regional command), and other TNI territorial commands at the lower levels as well as strategic places in Irian Jaya. The objective of this propaganda was to warn Irianese that TNI would not tolerate federalist sentiments and secessionism challenging the unitary state.332 The independence of Irian Jaya would mean that the country and the military would lose the most resource-rich region with huge security payment, or upeti, in Javanese terminology, which between 1998 and 2004 had lined up the pockets of the military and police generals, colonels, majors, and captains and their units nearly US$ 20 million, while, at least an additional US$ 10 million was also paid to them during those years.333

328 “Penegakan Hukum Tak Membaik” (“Law Enforcement Not Improved”), Harian Kompas, January 28, 2005, loc.cit. 329 “Pemerintah Dinilai Lebih Cinta SDA daripada SDM” (“Government Preferred Natural than Human Resources”), Harian Kompas, June 5, 2006: 8. 330 Budiardjo, 2003, loc. cit; Al Rahab, 2010, op.cit: 60-61. 331 Al Rahab, 2010, ibid: 64-65. 332 The billboards and banners were still there when the writer came to Irian Jaya for conducting fieldwork in June and December 2008. 333 Jane Perlez,”Below a Mountain of Wealth, a River of Waste,” New York Times, http://www.ny-times. com/2005/12/27/international/asia/27gold.html?pagewanted=1&n: Part I: 1, was accessed on December 28, 2005.

317 For many years Freeport received security protection from TNI against threats emanating from the separatist movement and the low-level insurgency which can be traced back to the early 1960s. With growing pressure on the activities of the American transnational corporation (TNC), the needs for military presence in Irian Jaya grew. They also grew due to the increasing number of riots directed against foreign firms which were sometimes engineered by military elements.334 This also happened to a Korean TNC Korindo located in Boven Digul which, as revealed by Usman Hamid and Nurvita Indarini from human rights NGO Kontras, also needed additional security protection from TNI units.335

V. Coping with Radical Muslims

V.A. Megawati’s Thoughts on Islam

Megawati’s toughts on Islam were reflected in speeches she delivered on the occasion of state ceremonies and also in media comments. On many occasions, she quoted her father’s views and arguments of how to respond to the aspirations of radical Muslims for an Islamic state. She stressed that becoming a good Muslim does not mean that Indonesians had to adopt the life style of the Arabs.336

Evidently, President Megawati was against syariah law and attempts to adopt it into national laws (undang-undang) and regional government’s regulations (Perda). She believed that the relations between human beings and God was an individual affair and should not be brought into public domain.Corresponding to this background, she did not agree with the idea to form a national law on anti-pornography. She opposed this move because it would use syariah as a parameter that would also affect Indonesians with another religious background, such as Christian, Hinduist, and Buddhist minorities.337

She also shared with her father the belief that the idea of an Islamic state was nothing else than a concept formulated in recent times by Muslim scholars and intellectuals without strong basis in Islamic teachings.338 This means that there is no

334 Part IV, ibid: 4. 335 “Presiden Diminta Terbitkan Inpres Penghapusan Bisnis Militer” (”President Demanded to Issue Pre- sidential Instruction to Diminish Military Business”), http://www.detiknews.com/index.php/detik.read/tahun/2005/bulan/12//tgl/30/time/060: 1-3, was accessed on December 30, 2005. 336 Megawati Soekarniputri,”Menyegarkan Kembali Semangat, Rasa, dan Paham Kebangsaan Kita Mem- peringati Hari Lahirnya Pancasila 1 Juni 2006” (”Refreshing the Spirit and Ideology of Our Nationalism In Order to Commemorate Pancasila Anniversary on June 1, 2006”), Jakarta, DPP PDIP, 2006: 2-3, 8-9. 337 “Megawati Minta Pansus Cermati RUU APP” (“Megawati Asks Special Commitee to Critically Discuss Bill on Pornography”), Media Indonesia, March 8, 2006: 4. 338 Sukarno, Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi (Under the Banner of Revolution), Vol. 1, Jakarta, 1964: 452.

318 obligation for Muslims to create an Islamic state.339 An Islamic state would jeopardize the unity of the state due to its contradiction to the country’s multiethnic reality. For this reason, she was of the opinion that in Indonesia, Islam should not become a state affair.340

To counter radical Muslim aspirations for syariah law, she stated that Islam as a religion respected social diversity. She believed that Islam respected the existence of other religious groups even if they had fewer believers and followers. She stated that Indonesia was not a state based on religious exceptionalism, but rather on Pancasila secular ideology, which included citizens from different religious backgrounds.341

President Megawati argued that those who wanted the formalization of syariah did not understand Islam and ignored the religion’s appreciation on differences which regarded.it as God’s blessing. She added that preserving priority on unity and nationhood in state life would not prevent a citizen from becoming a devoted Muslim. This implies that one can be a nationalist and a good Muslim at the same time.342 The amendments of the 1945 State Constitution, the adoption of syariah law and the establishment of an Islamic state would be a setback for the country.

V.B. Megawati and Radical Muslim Groups

Before the October 1999 presidential election, Megawati did not have good relations with radical Muslim groups in the country. Her strong opposition to Piagam Jakarta (the Jakarta Charter), which orthodox Muslims regard as the basis for implementing syariah law in Indonesia, did not make her popular among these groups. Also, she was unable to enter a political alliance with groups of a different ideology, not even for the sake of winning the presidential election. The only political alliance she had set up with an Islamic organization and political party was with former President Wahid’s NU (Nadhlatul Ulama --The Resurrection of Ulama) and his party, PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa --National Awakening Party) due to the latter’s moderate views on Islam that respected religious pluralism.

Since early 1999 Islamist parties such as PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan -- United Development Party), PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang --Crescent and Star Party), and PK (Partai Keadilan --Justice Party) had launched smear campaigns on women candidates for high political office. PPP, the party coming in fourth in the parliamentary

339 Muhammad Ridwan Lubis, Pemikiran Sukarno Tentang Islam (Soekarno’s Thoughts on Islam), Jakar- ta: Haji Masagung, 1992: 264. 340 Sukarno, op.cit: 407; Sukma, 2003, op.cit: 18. 341 “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Harus Dipertahankan” (”Unity in Diversity Should be Preserved”), Harian Re- publika, June 5, 2006: 3. 342 Soekarnoputri, 2006, loc.cit.

319 elections of June 1999 behind PDIP, Golkar and PKB, had joined calls to reject a woman candidate as next president after Habibie. Its chairperson, Hamzah Haz, stated that his party would enter coalitions with individual Muslim legislators who shared the same platform, mission, and vision, so that they could unite in finding the candidate for the presidency.343 He had prepared measures to press Muslim legislators elected in the June 1999 legislative elections to form an alliance against Megawati, the secular-nationalist presidential candidate. He had confirmed that his party, in accordance with Fatwa Ulama (Muslim scholars’ religious ruling), wanted the best Muslim son, not a daughter, or what he explained as a he, not a she.344

Lacking support from radical Muslim groups, Megawati failed to win the 1999 presidential election. This failure forced her to build a big political coalition with PPP, PBB, PK and others after these parties felt increasingly betrayed by Wahid’s erratic style of government. She decided to throw her party’s (PDIP or Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan --Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle) support behind Hamzah Haz as vice-president, although he earlier opposed a female president. This marriage of convenience between secular-nationalist and radical Islamic groups was made possible only by their common interest to remove Wahid from power.345 Although she followed Soeharto’s strategy of entering alignments with political Islam, the political coalition did not mean that she supported their efforts to pass national and regional regulations adopting syariah law or to create an Islamic state either through contitutional or inconstitutional means.

The common interest to oust Wahid had changed political constellations in the country. While the radical Muslim groups altered their perceptions toward a woman president, Megawati realized the important role of these groups in national politics. The creation of the common front with Islamic groups and parties would guarantee the stability of her presidency until October 2004.

Nevertheless, as noted by O’Rourke, she would soon find her new alliance confronted by the groups which kept on struggling for their original ideas.346 Hamzah’s election as vice-president and her “gotong royong” cabinet signifying her effort to strike a balance between the secular-nationalist and conservative Islamic forces could not guarantee that the marriage of convenience between the two different parties would survive without major problems. The inclusion of two major Muslim parties, namely, PPP

343 “Muslim Leader Moves to Block Megawati,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/ 37-3658.stm: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005. 344 Hamzah Haz was interviewed by Antara, in “Muslim Leader Moves to Block Megawati,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/37-3658.stm: 1-3, which was accessed on October 29, 2005. 345 Sukma, 2003, op.cit: 125. 346 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 404.

320 and PBB, did not eliminate, but only reduce the challenges of Islamic groups to her government.347

Many doubted that Megawati and Muslim groups could keep intact the grand coalition government given the fact that the PPP and PBB were actively involved in the campaign against a woman as president. More significantly, the question of state identity had long been a major point of controversy between PDIP and the two Islamic parties. As the PDIP preferred to maintain the non-religious character of the state, the PPP and PBB had never concealed their determination to incorporate the Piagam Jakarta, which obliged all Muslim citizens to adhere to the syariah law into the 1945 State Constitution. The adoption of the Piagam Jakarta was practically the same as to change the country’s secular identity into an Islamic one. From the PDIP’s point of view, thus, the election of Hamzah Haz as Megawati’s deputy was also combined with the expectation that it would reduce the call for the implementation of the syariah law from militant quarters in the Islamic community.348

But challenges to her government from the radical Muslim groups on the issue of state identity came soon after assuming the presidency. The first was launched just a few weeks after her inauguration when thousands of FPI (Front Pembela Islam --Front for Islamic Defenders) members organized a big demonstration in front of the parliament building. They demanded the insertion of the Piagam Jakarta in the 1945 State Constitution and widely called for the implementation of the syariah law. The pressure of the groups became more significant as PPP and PBB officially proposed to MPR that the Piagam Jakarta should be adopted in the 1945 State Constitution during the annual session of the assembly which was to be held in November 2001.349 Again, in March 2002, a noted radical Muslim figure who was the highest leader of Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, proposed to MPR the inclusion of the Piagam Jakarta, which granted the implementation of the syariah law.350

However, as moderate Islamic organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, and the military did not support these initiatives, the efforts of the radical Muslim groups failed to attract much support, even after their second demonstration during the MPR’s annual session. Not surprisingly, Megawati’s PDIP faction with the support of the Golkar Party and the TNI faction in MPR could end discussions on Piagam Jakarta and the syariah law in the parliament. Thereafter Megawati came under attack from the same

347 Riswanda Imawan,”Make-up of Megawati’s Team: To Please and Appease”; Hadi Soesastro,”Market Will Give the Cabinet the Benefit of the Doubt,” The Jakarta Post, August 10, 2001. 348 Sukma, 2003, op. cit: 126. This was confirmed by the secretary general of PDIP, Pramono Anung, in interview at the party’s headquarters on September 21, 2006 in Jakarta. 349 Sukma, 2003, op. cit. 350 Subur Tjahyono,”Memasyarakatkan Pilar Bernegara hingga ke Ngruki” (“Promoting State Ideology to Ngruki”), Kompas, April 30, 2010: 2.

321 groups, namely PPP and PBB, which publicly criticized her lack of leadership in the mid of an ongoing economic crisis.351 But, without the military behind them, they could not force another secular president to resign as in the case of Wahid. Even the series of terrorist bombings in Bali and Jakarta between 2002 and 2004352 did not lead to her downfall so that she could accomplish her term which ended in October 2004.

V.C. Megawati and the Red-White Generals

Megawati’s positive views on TNI had reciprocally resulted in the military leaders’ strong support for her presidency. TNI Chief commander Gen. Sutarto, for instance, had stated that he would not tolerate any attempts to remove Megawati from her legitimated presidency. In a statement that had drawn criticism from Wahid’s camp -- Wahid’s supporters were still of the view that Megawat replaced Wahid in unconstitutional way-- he further guaranteed that there would be no unconstitional moves to replace her.353 Pro-military legislators from PDIP such as Maj. Gen. Sembiring-Meliala backed TNI’s standpoint by arguing that with Megawati TNI could be at ease for a long time due to her visions and style of leadership that is acceptable to TNI. He stated, “President Megawati understands TNI, and TNI can follow her.”354

Army chief Gen. Ryamizard admitted that Megawati was the only Indonesian post-Soeharto civilian president who was broadly welcomed by TNI. Ryamizard praised her respect of TNI and her unwillingness to interfere in military affairs.355 Like himself who never studied abroad and was not much influenced by foreign ideas, Megawati had a very different personal character and style of management than Habibie and Wahid. Also, she had never introduced policies that had negatively affected the military. Such mutual respect led to good relations between Megawati and TNI leaders until the end of her term.

Pro-Megawati military generals, either from the old or the new generation, such as Maj. Gen. Sembiring-Meliala,356 ex-Kodam XVII Cendrawasih regional commander under Soeharto, and army chief Gen. Ryamizard,357 claimed that TNI did not need to follow all Western concepts on professional soldiers and civilian supremacy. According

351 “Megawati Sukarnoputri Biography,” http://www.bookrags.com/biography-megawati-sukarnoputri-ema --04/: 1-2, was accessed on October 29, 2005; Adam Schwartz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability, Second Edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999. 352 Far Eastern Economic Review, September 12, 2002, loc.cit: 15-22. 353 ”Panglima TNI: Reformasi TNI Jalan Terus” (”TNI Chief Commander: TNI Reform Continues”), http: //www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0206/08/utama/ pang01.htm, June 8, 2002: 1-3. 354 Maj. Gen. Sembiring Meliala was interviewed on October 17, 2006 in Jakarta. 355 Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu was interviewed on November 24, 2006 in Jakarta. 356 Maj. Gen. Sembiring Meliala was interviewed on October 17, 2006 in Jakarta. 357 Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu was interviewed on Novermber 24, 2006 in Jakarta.

322 to the two generals, there was no necessity for TNI to leave their age-honored ways which had been valued as precious national cultural heritage. Strongly defended by Ryamizard, this cultural legacy distinguished TNI from military institutions in Western countries. The dual function and the armed forces’ mission to preserve the unitary state are parts of this cultural legacy which can be traced back to the Majapahit kingdom and Gajah Mada and his soldiers.358

In addition to Maj. Gen. Sembiring-Meliala and Gen. Ryamizard, many nationalist officers from the army, navy, air force, and the police approached or joined Megawati’s party (PDIP). Prominent figures such as Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar and Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono were appointed as minister of transportation and telecommunica- tion, and coordinating minister for social and political affairs, respectively. This showed that Megawati was supported by nationalist generals both from Murdani as well as non- Murdani cadres. Gen. Murdani, himself, former chief commander and an opponent of ICMI, the influential Muslims’ Intellectuals Association, had played a role in preventing Megawati from becoming the target of Soeharto loyalists’ attack in the July 27, 1996 violence against her party’s headquarters in Jakarta’s Diponegoro road. He informed her about the plans of Soeharto’s generals to occupy her party headquarters and to replace her with a pro-Soeharto new leader. Hendropriyono, a nationalist general with links to Murdani, who allegedly played a role in repressing militant Muslims in Lampung which resulted in the Lampung incident when he was military resort (Korem) commander, was promoted as chief of BIN (Badan Intelejen Nasional --National Intellegence Board).

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a general who did not belong to the Murdani faction, was promoted to a cabinet post, namely coordinating minister for social and political affairs, overseeing the TNI chief commander, the chief of the national police, the minister of defense, the chief of BIN, and the minister of home affairs. Although he had been sent to the U.S. for military training and higher education, like many other Indonesian generals and civilian leaders, he also glorified the Majapahit era. He conferred the name of Tunggadewi, who in the Javanese history is known as a respectful queen of the Majapahit kingdom, to his first granddaughter.359

V.D. The Military and Radical Muslim Groups

358 Similar explanations came from Maj. Gen. Syamsul Ma’rif, Aster Kasum TNI (Asisten Territorial Ke- pala Staf Umum TNI --territorial assistant for TNI General Staff), who was interviewed on July 18, 2006 in Jakarta. 359 “Cucu SBY Diberi Nama Almira Tunggadewi Yudhoyono” (“SBY Granddaughter Was Named Almira Tunggadewi Yudhoyono”), Kompas-online, http://www.Kompas.com/read/xml/2008/08/18/14385984/…, was accessed on March 19, 2009: 1.

323 Under the Megawati presidency, TNI leaders did not hesitate to exploit for their personal and corporate interests the bombings organized by terrorist groups such as Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI) and Al-Qaeda which were connected to radical Muslim groups in the country such as MMI (Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia --Indonesian Mujahiddin Assembly), Laskar Jihad (Jihad Warriors), and Laskar Jundullah (Jundullah Warriors). In his reports Aditjondro claimed that there was collusion in a series of bomb attacks between radical Muslim groups and the national intelligence network (BIN) which at the time was controlled by Lt. Gen. Hendropriyono.360 The first of these bombings occurred in Bali on October 12, 2002, targeted Paddy’s café and killed 202 people. Many of them were foreign tourists, twenty-two of them Australians. Dr. Azhahari and Noordin M. Top from JI, the alleged masterminds of the blast, had targeted Australians due to their role in the US invasion in Afghanistan and Irak, and, notably, Indonesia’s former East Timor province.

The East Timor policy of the Howard government had hastened the province’s independence and this contributed to the deterioration of the living conditions of Muslims in the predominantly Catholic territory.361 Another major blast occurred in Jakarta on August 15, 2003, hitting JW Marriott hotel. Like in the Bali blast, the motivation behind the attack was to kill Americans and the Westerners. The last bombing attack targeted the Australian embassy on September 9, 2004, less than 1 month before Megawati ended her presidency.

Police investigations later revealed that the Malaysian leaders of JI, Dr. Azahari and Noordin M. Top, were assisted by Indonesian Islamic extremists, namely, Imam Samudera, Amrozi, Umar Patek, and Dulmatin. They were supported by MMI, which provided them with legal assistance and organized propaganda to counter the accusations from the authorities and the police. Interestingly, before Imam Samudera and Amrozi, the main suspects, were captured, Republika, an Indonesian newspaper that acts as a mouth piece of radical Muslims in the country, persistenly denied that they were behind the above terrorist activities.

The trials of JI bombers later disclosed the connection of the extremist Muslims to Abu Bakar Ba’syir, a cleric running an Islamic boarding school (pesantren) in Solo, and other leaders who were in favour of jihad. They also raised the question how JI activists would have easy access to Indonesian military standard weapons and explosives and why the security forces, especially military intelligence, were not able to prevent the attacks. There were credible reports that Laskar Jihad militias had been in part trained and armed

360 Aditjondro, 2006, op.cit: 425-425. 361 “Azhahari Diduga Tewas: Kelompok Teroris Masih Berikan Perlawanan” (“Azhahari Probably Died: Terrorist Group Still Fight”), http://www.Kompas.com/utama/news/0511/09/200258-.htm: 1-2, was accessed on October 9, 2005.

324 by members of the TNI, including Kopassus, and by veterans returned from fighting against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.362 Laskar Jihad and others, including the smaller but well-trained Laskar Mujahiddin, the Sulawesi-based Laskar Jundullah and, the almost completely unknown Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI) organization were represented on the Majelis Mujahiddin Indonesia or the War Fighters’ Council under the leadership of Abu Bakar Ba’syir, who was later claimed to be the spiritual leader of the JI..363

Kopassus’ links to intelligence agencies such as BIN and Bais raised the issue of both parties’ relationships to several of the extremist organizations, especially Laskar Jihad and Jama’ah Islamiyah.364 It has been common knowledge that BIN and its predecessor, Bakin, had infiltrated radical Muslim organizations such as Jama’ah Islamiyah and its predecessors, including Komando Jihad, Darul Islam (DI), and Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), in order to learn about their activities and for manipulating them for other political purposes, such as “sting” operations. “Sting” operations were conducted in the second half of the 1970s when Soeharto’s covert or special operations unit (Opsus) encouraged radical Muslims to establish links to the DI and NII movements to agitate for an Islamic state.365 The intention by Opsus at that time was to legitimize the authoritarian New Order by discrediting radical Muslims, who were portrayed as a potential threat to state order and security.

For the military, the existence of the radical Muslim groups had a dual benefit. On the one hand, TNI leaders could use them to neutralize and thus soften societal pressure on TNI on the human rights front and help deflect from their dreadful enemies, namely, the student opposition.366 This means also if military leaders grew dissatisfied with Megawati, they could employ the groups to disturb destabilize her government. On the other hand, once they did not need the groups any longer, they would reveal that they are a threat to the future of the unitary state because of their ideals of an Islamic state. Against this background, it can be argued that as long as the military was under reform pressure, it was not fully committed to prevent the bombing activities of the groups in Bali, Jakarta, and other places of the country. This at least could be concluded from a statement by Maj. Gen. Syamsul Ma’arif, Aster Kasum TNI (Asisten Territorial Kepala Staf Umum TNI -- territorial assistant for TNI General Staff), who argued that it would be difficult for the military to stop the activities of the radical Muslim groups due to TNI’s lack of authority to do it. The military general had even directly blamed the reform movement as the source

362 ICG, 2004, loc.cit; Kingsbury, 2004, loc.cit. 363 ICG, 2002, loc.cit; ICG, 2003, loc.cit; Kingsbury, 2004, loc.cit. 364 “Gufron Arrest May Lead to Suharto's Dark Forces”, Laksamana.Net, December 10, 2002; Ken Con- boy, Kopassus: Inside Indonesia's Special Forces Equinox, Jakarta, 2003; Ken Conboy, Intel: Inside Indo- nesia's Intelligence Service Equinox,Jakarta,2003; Kingsbury, 2004, loc.cit. 365 “Kopassus Behind Militia Attacks: Report”, Laksamana.Net, 22 January 2002; Kingsbury, 2004, loc. cit. 366 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 402.

325 of the TNI’s predicament and TNI’s reluctance to crush the terrorist groups and their activities that had produced fear in society.367 If civilians wanted the military to provide security, they should not dissociate the TNI from political and security affairs.368

As argued by Australian scholar Greg Barton, the author of former President Wahid’s biography, since Soeharto’s resignation in 1998, key military generals with Islamist sympathies sought to mobilize Islamist militias for their own purposes. At this time Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and other Jama’ah Islamiyah leaders returned to Java from self- imposed exile in Malaysia. Barton pointed out that in early 2000, when President Wahid sacked Gen. Wiranto over the East Timor post-ballot massacres and began to encourage profound reforms within the military, generals known to be religious hardliners used radical Islamist militia to destabilize the Wahid government.369 Under the Megawati government, the generals still took advantage of the militias’ continuing activities for revitalizing TNI’s territorial and intelligence functions.

V.E. Megawati, the Military, and Radical Muslim Groups

As explained earlier, Megawati’s rise to power was only possible in line with her accomodating approach to the military and political Islam. The military and the Islamic groups could continue exploiting the divisive issue of religion to keep their opponents at bay. A conservative general such as Gen. Endriartono Sutarto was in power and proficient at extracting support, particularly in parliament, from radical Muslim groups, for instance, PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang --Crescent and Star Party).370 Gen. Endriartono played a key

367 Maj. Gen. Syamsul Ma’arif was interviewed on July 18, 2006 in Jakarta. 368 In fact, after the radical Muslims’ bombing happened again in Jakarta, namely on July 24, 2009, targeted at the same place, Hotel JW Marriott, where many foreigners gathered or stayed, 6 years after the first attack, which had killed nine and wounded dozen people, the idea to revitalize the deployment of TNI soldiers at the lowest level of every province of the country, namely sub-district or village (Koramil -- military sub-district command), to control civilian activities in order to assist the police in conducting their security task obtained wide support from civilians at the end of the first term of the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.This meant that the rising threat coming from terrorism organized by the radical Muslims had successfully improved the image of Babinsa (Bintara Pembina Desa --petty, training, or non- commissioned officers at the village level) and invigorated its territorial intelligence function. Therefore, chief commander Gen. Djoko Santoso, further suggested to return the authority of TNI to be allowed to arrest and interrogated civilians who were suspectedly behind bombing and other terrorist activities. See, for example, “Antiteror TNI Kerahkan Pasukan ke Kecamatan” (“TNI’s Anti-Terrororist Desk Sends Troops to Village”), Koran Tempo, August 12, 2009: A2; “25 Gembong Teroris Mengancam” (“25 Terrorist Main Activists Threaten“), Suara Pembaruan, August 13, 2009: 1-8; “TNI Akui Mampu Hadapi Terorisme: Tiga Kemampuan Angkatan Darat Menganggur” (“TNI Is Capable to Handle Terrorism: Three Army’s Potentials Were Idle“), Harian Kompas, August 19, 2009: 4; Adhitya Cahya Utama, “Militer Usul Intelijen Bisa Menang-kap” (“The Military Proposed Intelligence Allowed to Arrest”), Jurnal Nasional, September 8, 2009: 9. 369 Fawthrop, 2002, loc.cit. 370 See O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 402-404.

326 role in the 2001 ouster of reformist President Wahid and his replacement by his deputy Megawati Soekarnoputri.371 At the time of the Soeharto regime’s collapse, Endriartono commanded the Jakarta-based presidential security force regiment (Pasukan Pengaman Presiden --Paspampres) and maintained close contact with former President Soeharto afterwards.372

Endriartono, the close ally of Soeharto, on June 17, 2002 took command of TNI and helped the institution restore its powerful position. He took over the position of chief commander from Navy Adm. Widodo Adisutjipto after the admiral had been promoted by Wahid as the first non-army officer to head the Indonesian military in its 57-year history. By appointing Gen. Endriartono, Megawati bypassed an air force commander who was next in line for the job. Endriartono’s appointment was criticized as a reversal of Wahid’s policy of ending the army’s domination of the military by promoting top officers from the navy and air force services considered untainted by human rights abuses.373

With Megawati at its side, it was clear that the only opponents of the military were student demonstators and radical reformers. However, the support of her party (PDIP) was successful in blocking the pressure of the demonstrators and reformers on military’s interests in the parliament. In fact, the military’s tactical proximity to radical Muslim groups had encouraged President Megawati to depend on the military, so that she did not find herself confronted by an alliance between the military and radical Muslims.374

Nevertheless, in general, the Indonesian military still preferred secular-nationalist ideals. Although there were military leaders involved in or backing the activities of radical Muslims groups, namely, those who became known as the “green generals,” their involvement or support was tactical or temporary in nature. Moreover, the generals who sympathized with sectarian religious groups were only a minority in the institution, which since its formation in 1945 had not changed its doctrine and educational system predominantly influenced by secular-nationalist ideals, the Pancasila ideology and the 1945 State Constitution. Consequently, the number and the influence of the red-white, that is, the-pro secular-nationalist generals were much greater than the one of the green generals.

Both military and civilian analysts who were interviewed for the study confirmed the scenario depicted above. In addition, Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, TNI territorial chief (Kepala Staf Teritorial --Kaster) during the Megawati era, noted that the emergence of the two military factions was stirred by the personal interest of these leaders and not TNI as a

371 Slobodan Lekic, “Suharto Loyalist Takes Over Military”, Associated Press, June 18, 2002. 372 Subroto, 2009, op.cit: 435-436. 373 Lekic, 2002, loc.cit. 374 Ibid.

327 state institution.375 It was this factionalism that facilitated the military’s deep involvement in civilian affairs, especially, in sticking to its territorial function. Promotion or political ambitions were the main motivations for the opportunistic behaviour of individual military leaders and for betraying their secular-nationalist ideals. Thus, like their Islamist civilian counterparts, pro-Islamic generals appeared willing to exploit religion as a political vehicle.376 Army generals such as Wiranto, Djaja Suparman, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, Prabowo Subianto, and Zacky Anwar Makarim, and others, who temporarily backed the formation and the activities of radical Muslim groups such as FPI, KISDI, LJ, and PBB, were by no means fanatical Muslims.377

V.F. The End of Religious Conflict and the Return of Stability in Maluku

Megawati took over the presidency from Wahid who was impeached by the MPR with a solid support from retired red-white generals in her PDIP. She gave a key position to Maj. Gen. Theo Syafei in PDIP as member of its central board, and appointed Lt. Gen. Hari Sabarno as minister of domestic affairs, Lt. Gen. Agum Gumelar as minister of transportation, and Lt. Gen. Hendropriyono as chief of the national intelligence board (BIN). Since the fall of Soekarno, Megawati and her family cultivated good relations with the navy corps that influenced her decision to retain Adm. Widodo as armed forces commander. She removed Gen. Tyasno Sudarto and Lt. Gen. Djaja Suparman from their respective positions as army chief and Kostrad commander and replaced them with Gen. Sutarto, a close ally of Gen. Wiranto, and Lt. Gen. Ryamizard, a son in law of Gen. Try Sutrisno, a red-white general and associate of Gen. Moerdani, and former vice-president under Soeharto.

The transfer of military support from Wahid to Megawati improved Megawati’s capability in addressing religious conflict in Maluku. In May 2002, she ordered the transfer of authority for security operations in Maluku from the police to the military thereby ending the dispute between the two institutions over who should lead the effort to return stability to the strife-torn region.378 Her tough anti-separatist policy was echoed by the military which exerted pressure on the Laskar Jihad and other warrying parties in the region to withdraw their militias. TNI also controlled its troops more effectively so that their involvement in communal and separatist conflicts in the various areas of Maluku drastically decreased, and the number of incidents and casualties dropped.

375 Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo was interviewed on June 19, 2006 in Jakarta. 376 O’Rourke, 2002, op.cit: 404. 377 Ikrar Nusa Bhakti was interviewed on May 15, 2006 in LIPI, Jakarta. 378 Mietzner, 2006, loc. cit: 37.

328 In accordance with the re-establishment of the Kodam XVI Pattimura regional command and the election of a former regional commander as the new governor of the conflict-ridden province which had been endorsed by President Megawati, TNI performed a high-profile engagement in returning peace in the province since May 2002. With the recovery of TNI’s territorial function, the Kodam XVI Pattimura regional commander, Maj. Gen. Djoko Santoso, was no longer reluctant to control security in the province. By coincidence, TNI was also able to help the central government to effectively prevent the Christians from reviving the proposal to establish RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan --the Republic of South Maluku). In the conflict with Wahid, military elements from Kopassus had protected RMS symphatizers and leaders such as Berti Coker and Alex Manuputty.

With the full support of the military, the Laskar Jihad and other paramilitary groups could be disbanded by the government and forced to leave Maluku. This situation had significantly reduced the scale of conflict and tensions in the entire region. The influential Laskar Jihad leaders, especially Ja’far Umar Thalib, together with many of his followers, were deported to Jakarta with government transportation facilities. The great influence of Megawati’s PDIP among native Christians in Maluku was also considered very helpful in downscaling conflict.

In accordance with the disappearance of tensions between civilan and military leaders in Jakarta, North Maluku returned to a peaceful condition, and also in the other parts of Maluku province, the situation improved markedly. Under such favorable circumstances, the Megawati government could initiate peace talks in Malino. The active role of Yusuf Kalla, minister of people’s welfare, who was in charge of the negotiations, greatly contributed to the successful conclusion of a peace pact in February 2002. Although the so-called “Malino Peace Agreement I” was interrupted several times by violence and fighting which still sporadically broke out in some locations, the new incidents could be contained due to Megawati’s capability in developing a stable political system and the resultant positive response from the military in assisting the implementation of the peace pact on the ground.379 The Malino Peace Agreement II complemented the first peace accord. It was concluded to fasten a comprehensive peace settlement in Maluku. TNI’s compliance to President Megawati led to the successful implementation of the last Malino peace pact, which contributed to the recovery of Maluku stability in 2003.380 A comprehensive and permanent conflict resolution could be realized in the entire archipelago before the Megawati presidency ended.

379 Bertrand, 2004, op. cit: 133. 380 Ibid: 133, 238.

329 V.G. Religious Conflict in Poso and Pressure for Formation of TNI’s New Regional Command

Several months after Megawati assumed her presidency, a new wave of violence erupted in Poso. From November 26 to December 2, 2001, a group of armed people organized a series of attacks in Sepper and Silanca, and other regions in Poso. In the attacks four TNI soldiers and three civilians were killed, while eighty-eight houses, four religious sites, and the offices of Kelurahan (the lowest level of the regional government) and Puskesmas (Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat --center for public health services at Kelurahan level) were damaged.381

On December 20, 2001, Minister Kalla visited Poso to initiate peace talks between Muslim and Christian groups who were at war with each other in the central region of Central Sulawesi province. After several rounds of dialogues with the warring parties, Kalla’s tireless efforts resulted in a peace declaration which was signed in Malino. Nonetheless, in the absence of law enforcement and due to the work of to the agents of provocateurs,382 the Malino declaration could not effectively eradicate violence. Worse even, new incidents caused more brutal killings with a larger number of victims, including teenagers and women.383

While security in Aceh and Maluku steadily improved, in Poso, religious conflict escalated because the TNI still allowed radical Muslim groups such as the Laskar Jihad, Laskar Mujahiddin, and Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), which had connections to Abu Sayyaf of the South Philippines,384 and moreover, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),385 to infiltrate the region. The arrival of various extremist groups from outside the region

381 “Rekomendasi ’Mandul’ Pansus Poso?” (“’Vain’ Recommendations of Special Committee on Poso”), Harian Kompas, July 14, 2005. 382 For further information, see, for example, Yosef Tor Tulis, Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva, Mari- nus Riwu: Kisah Tiga Martir dari Poso (Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva, Marinus Riwu: A Story about Three Martirs from Poso, Jetpress, Juli 2007. 383 “Inpres No. 14/2005 tentang Poso, Menguji Kesungguhan Pemerintah” (“President Instruction No. 14/ 2005 on Poso, Testing Government’s Consistency”), http://www.suarapembaruan. com/News/2005/12/ 01/ Sorotan/sor01.htm,: 1-3, was accessed on December 1, 2005. 384 Identified as a Philippine terrorist group, Abu Sayyaf, which split from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), is one of the two major Muslim separatist movements in the southern Philippines operating in the Sulu archipelago. Abu Sayyaf recently attempted to retaliate against the Philippine government which had started an offensive against Muslim insurgents. Indonesian activists such as Amrozi, Fatur Rachman Al-Ghozi, Dulmatin and Hambali, who were also graduates of the Ngruki Islamic boarding school of Solo, Central Java, were senior figures in the JI. Since its establishment in the early 1990s, the Abu Sayyaf group had conducted violent acts in what they describe as their fight for an independent Islamic province. See, for instance, “Abu Sayyaf,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Sayyaf, was accessed on May 4, 2010; see also, “Abu Sayyaf Group (Philippines, Islamist separatists),” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/9235/abu_sayyaf_group_philippines_islamist_sepa-ratists.html. 385 “Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process,” Asia Report, No. 80, July 13, 2004, ICG, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/080-southern-philippines-backgrounder-terrorism-and-the-peace-process.aspx?alt_lang=id.

330 initiated a new phase of conflict marked by armed clashes and explosions. For example, on March 23, 2002, the building of the branch office of the social welfare ministry was blasted.386 Also, on October 12, 2003, a group of armed people assaulted several villages in the coastal area of Poso, killing eight and injuring dozens.387

In response to the worsening situation, Megawati ordered more security forces to Poso. To follow up this, military leaders sent battalions from neighbouring regions and Java.388 Ironically, the presence of more security forces could neither reduce the violence nor prevent new strife from occuring. Local informal leaders and NGOs activists, like Irianto Kongkoli and Prof. Mamar, criticized the presence of TNI’s special forces units, such as Kostrad and Kopassus, because Poso, until that time, was never declared as a military operation zone (DOM) such as East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya.389

NGOs demanded an investigation to identify the reasons for the deteriorating communal conflict. They were stopped by increasing harassment. Adnan Arsal, a local Muslim leader and chairperson of FSPUI (Forum Silaturahmi dan Perjuangan Umat Islam --Muslim Forum for Communication and Struggle) charged that the violence in Poso was no longer the work of the inhabitants but the security forces.390

Despite the deteriorating security in Poso, Megawati did not review military presence and did not heed to the informal leaders’ suggestions to investigate mysterious shootings (Penembak Misterius) and killings since 2001, the method of violence which had been widely used during the New Order era. She also did not oblige the military to work hard to return stability to the region by arresting the trouble makers, including former Moro Jihad fighters and recalcitrant elements of the TNI. According to a report of Kontras (The Commission for the Disappeared and Victim of Violence), there were nineteen cases of violence in all regions of Central Sulawesi during 2002, ten cases during 2003, and seven cases during 2004. Aside from shootings, there were four cases of killings in 2002 and three cases in 2003. In addition to this, bombing incidents occurred fourteen times in 2002, eight times in 2003, and four times in 2004.391

386 “Rekomendasi ‘Mandul’ Pansus Poso” (“’Ineffective’ Recommendations of Special Committee on Po- so”), Harian Kompas, July 14, 2005, loc.cit. 387 Ibid. 388 Ibid. 389 Ibid. 390 “Semua Berharap Penderitaan Itu Segera Berakhir” (“Everyone Hope the Misery Immediately Ends”), http://www.suara-pembaruan.com/News/2005/12/ 01/Sorotan/sor02.htm,: 1-2, was accessed on December 1, 2005. 391 “Siaran Pers Bersama tentang Menyikapi Eskalasi Kekerasan di Sulawesi Tengah” (“Joint Pers Release on Response to Escalation of Violence in Central Sulawesi”), October 31, 2005, http://www.Kontras.org/ index.php?hal=siaran_pers&id=203, was accessed on April 10, 2010.

331 With the escalation of conflict, TNI had a rationale to expand their role in Central Sulawesi. It initiated the Sintuwu Maroso operation to bring back law and order, involving thousands of troops and police members. According to a research report authored by Kelompok Perjuangan Kesetaraan Perempuan Sulteng (group for gender parity struggle in Central Sulawesi), the operation affected civilians: around 400 women became the victims of sexual harassment of warring parties and security forces.392 Rather than improving security in Poso, the presence of TNI soldiers worsened the communal conflict. As noted by Sydney Jones, head of the Jakarta branch of the International Crisis Group (ICG), TNI spurred the escalation of the conflict in order to bargain for a higher military budget.393 There was also a report which said that around Rp.168 billion of the budget distributed to recover stability in the region had been misused. Importantly, Rp. 605 million allocated for refugees had been sent to the office of national intelligence board (Badan Inteljen Nasional --BIN) in Central Sulawesi, and the state apparatus in the province and lower levels.394

Therefore, in the absence of their territorial function in the region, TNI was reluctant to prevent and stop the escalating communal conflict. In pursuing its interest for acquiring a greater budget, TNI wanted to preserve the unstable situation in Central Sulawesi. In the Tentena bomb explosions, two Kopassus soldiers were captured by the police, but they were shortly released after the police was told that they had no authority to interogate them. Local leaders and NGOs activists openly criticized the involvement of TNI in the new cases of violence.395 They argued that the religious conflict was apparently kept alive by TNI in order to reach the formation of a new regional command in the province.396

Human rights NGOs like Kontras and Imparsial claimed that the new cases of violence were systematically planned with similar methods by operatives who were experienced in preparing and conducting attacks, and with access to sophisticated weapons, ammunitions, and explosives. They were trained in timing the attacks so that they would provoke new incidents.397 The appearance of Ninja, mysterious kidnappings,

392 Suara Pembaruan, June 16, 2006: 4. 393 Sydney Jones was interviewed on April 19, 2006, in Jakarta. 394 “Melemahkan Jaringan Kelompok Mujahidin di Indonesia: Pelajaran dari Maluku dan Poso” (“Weake- ning Mujahidin’s Group Network in Indonesia: Lessons from Maluku and Poso”), Asia Report, No. 103, October 13, 2005, ICG: Jakarta, Brussells: 15-16. 395 “Tokoh Agama Poso Protes Polisi” (“Poso Religious Leaders Protested Police”), http://www.Kompas. com/utama/news/0511/25/682541-.htm.: 1-2, was accessed on November 25, 2005. 396 “Semua Berharap Penderitaan Itu Segera Berakhir” (“All Expect the Misery Immediately Ends”), http: //www.suara-pembaruan.com/News/2005/12/ 01/Sorotan/sor02.htm, loc.cit: 1-2, was accessed on Decem- ber 1, 2005. 397 “Siaran Pers Kontras No. 26/SP-Kontras/XI/2004: Keberadaan Efektifitas Pasukan Keamanan di Poso Harus Dievaluasi (“Pers Release of Kontras No 26/SP-Kontas/XI/2004: The Presence and Effectiveness of

332 shootings and killings, and bomb explosions were patterns of the violence found in many incidents across Indonesia in which the TNI were allegedly involved through covert intelligence and psychological operations. In these incidents, soldiers organized terror in small units with operatives who were well-trained killed targets effectively and escaped after accomplishing their operations. Some of the terror activities were conducted not far from the barracks of TNI or the office of the police. A group identified as Tim Bunga (Flower Team) organized terror which was similar to what happened in Banyuwangi, Ciamis, and East Timor during 1998-1999, and, moreover, reminded NGOs to Tim Mawar (Rose Team) of Kopassus which had organized kidnappings and forced disappearances of students in 1997 and 1998.398

Corroborating these assumptions was Maj. Gen. Arief Budi Sampurno, the Kodam VII Wirabuana regional commander (Pangdam --Panglima Daerah Militer), whose responsibility included Sulawesi, who argued that TNI should establish new territorial commands in Central Sulawesi down to the local level because his command headquarters in Kalimantan could no longer effectively control security in Central Sulawesi. Previously, TNI had suggested the formation of a new battailon, namely Batalyon 714, to improve security in Poso regency. Since October 2003, then Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, had launched an intelligence operation399 and increased the number of security forces, of which TNI contributed half, from 2,024 in 2001 to 3,238 in 2002, and to 4,764 in 2003, not counting the intelligence forces.400 Arief’s argument is surprising because when Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah was Kodam VII Wirabuana regional commander, he could immediately address the horizontal conflict in Poso. The arrival and involvement of the Laskar Jihad, Laskar Mujahiddin, and JI could have been prevented if Maj. Gen. Arief was seriously interested in returning stability to the province. The military’s behavior in that province was thus a response to the reform movement, which at that time continued

Security Forces in Poso Must be Evaluated“),” November 9, 2004, http://www.kontras.org/index.php?hal= siaran_pers&id=238. 398 Such activities were disclosed by Haris Azhar and Edwin Partogi, who respectively were head of data and research division and head of operational division of Kontras in Jakarta on November 21, 2005. See, “Penanganan Poso Perlu Dukungan Politik Presiden” (“Poso Conflict Resolution Needs President’s Politi- cal Support”), http://www.Suara-pembaruan.com/News/2005/11/ 22/Nasional/nas14.htm: 1, was accessed on November 22, 2005; “Presiden Harus Beri Dukungan Politik ke Polri” (“President Should Give Political Support to the National Police”), http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0511/22/politikhukum/22337-08. htm, loc.cit: 1, was accessed on November 22, 2005. 399 “Siaran Pers Bersama Kontras, ICW, KAMUST, PBHI, Kelompok Kerja untuk Perdamaian Poso, Wal - hi, dan LPSHAM Sulteng mengenai Perluasan Konflik dan Kekerasan di Palu, Sulawesi Tengah” (“Joint Pers Releases of Kontras, ICW, KAMUST, PBHI, Kelompok Kerja untuk Perdamaian Poso, Walhi, and LPSHAM”),” December 15, 2004, http://www.kontras.org/index.php?hal=siaran_pers&id=234. 400 “Siaran Pers Kontras No. 26/SP-Kontras/XI/2004: Keberadaan Efektifitas Pasukan Keamanan di Poso Harus Dievaluasi (“Pers Release of Kontras No 26/SP-Kontas/XI/2004: The Presence and Effectiveness of Security Forces in Poso Must be Evaluated“),” November 9, 2004, loc.cit.

333 to demand the eradication of TNI’s territorial function throughout the country.401 Until 2004, the final year of Megawati’s presidency, more atrocities happened such as the shootings of a Christian judge, Ferry Silalahi, in May and a priest of the Palu Christian church (GKS), Susianti Tinulele, in July, and a lecturer of the University of Tadulako, as well as attacks on public targets, such as markets, religious sites and schools, which often occurred on the eve of religious holidays.402

VI. Conclusion

Contrasting with her party’s vision and mission to uphold pluralism of Indonesian society, Megawati Sukarnoputeri became an authoritarian leader. Her views and background contributed to her performance which resembled more a traditional Javanese king rather than a democratically elected president. Her introverted personality and lack of political experience, on the one hand, and her aversion to political manoeuvring, which had led to the destruction of her party under Soeharto and her loss in the 1999 presidential election, on the other, influenced her to avoid dialogues with her opponents in handling issues of separatism.

Although there was considerable disappointment of the reform movement with Megawati’s mediocre performance in office, with the military at her side, she was able to survive her term. Her lack of decisive leadership and her indifference toward further reform and democratization was conducive to TNI interests.

Her unwillingness to bring Soeharto and his family as well as military leaders to trial due to their alleged involvement in various cases of corruption, collusion and nepotism and gross human rights violations also contributed to the military’s support to her presidency. Her inactivity in these issues stabilized her government and reduced threats coming from her opponents.

Her authoritarian leadership and her ideational proximity to TNI made her an ideal ally for the military. In fact, as a president, she never introduced new policies which would harm TNI’s vested interests. Quite to the contrary, her regime produced new or amended laws which were at variance with reform demands and slowed down security sector reform. At the same time, the culture of violence of the civilian regime and TNI employed to protect the unitary state (NKRI) continued.

401 See “Sulawesi Perlu Koter: Tak Ada Anggota TNI yang Terlibat Kasus Poso” (“Sulawesi Needs Terri- torial Command: No TNI Members Got Involved in Poso Conflict”), http://www.Kompas.com/kom-pas- cetak/05-11/13/daerah/2208379.htm: 1-2, was accessed on November 13, 2005. 402 “Gorries Mere Pimpin Tim Tangani Terorisme di Sulteng” (“Gorries Mere Led Team to Address Ter- rorism in Central Sulawesi”), http://www.Kompas.com/utama/News/ 0511/21/160617/.htm: 1, was accessed on November 22, 2005.

334 Her lack of enthusiasm for reform produced the military’s positive response to her regime. Military support was essential for her to create political stability for concluding her presidential term, without intimidation and coup threats. Moreover, friction among leaders inside the military decreased during her term of office. Under Megawati, Indonesia’s internal stability increased, and communal and separatist conflicts could be handled more effectively.

Providing higher state budget allocation for defence and security sectors, and concessions to the military in the new bill on TNI passed as Law No. 34/2004 contributed to the military’s compliance with her government. Moreover, her decisions to promote and maintain conservative generals such as Gen. Endriartono Sutarto and Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu weakened the opposition, including separatist movements. Her preoccupation with Indonesia’s territorial integrity and firm policy to respond separatism had favoured TNI position. At this point, Megawati’s nationalist-unitarian view was conducive with TNI actions in trouble spots.

In fact, Megawati had a solid regime which could not be jeopardized by pressures of radical Muslim groups due to her good relationship with the military. Reversely, in the absence of military’s support for them, radical Muslim groups were forced to reduce their political activities and pressure to her government. Megawati’s cooperative approach to the military which had been disgraced at the time of Soeharto’s fall and threatened under new civilian regimes of Habibie and Wahid helped the TNI to regain much of their influence.

335 Chapter Six

Conclusion

It was the objective of this study, to explore the relationship between the reform performance of Indonesia’s civilian regimes in the security sector and the military’s response to these reforms. The period of investigation spanned the entire process of democratic transition from the resignation of President Soeharto and the collapse of his authoritarian New Order regime in May 1998 to the end of the presidency of Megawati Soekarnoputri in October 2004. With the subsequent presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Indonesia entered a period of political consolidation. By that time, a lengthy process of constitutional change had come to an end and ushered in a new presidential political system which has been rated by Freedom House1 and other democracy indices as the most democratic in Southeast Asia. Yet, the preceding analysis has shown that democratic consolidation is incomplete. By the end of the transition process the military as the former authoritarian regime’s major pillar had regrouped and rescued many of its erstwhile privileges and reserved domains into the Era Reformasi.

This thesis has examined the reasons why military reform in Indonesia was only partial and why military influence resurged in the post-Soeharto years. It departed from the theoretical transition literature, combining actor-oriented, structural and cultural perspectives. Empirically the study rests on extensive interviews, newspaper analysis, internet research and analysis of websites, publicly accessible documents, statistics and scientific literature. The study explored for each of the three transitional civilian presidencies between 1998 and 2004 (Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri) military responses to civilian reform overtures in areas such as prosecution of human rights violations by the military, the investigation of corruption cases (KKN --Kolusi, Korupsi, Nepotisme) involving the former President Soeharto and his cronies, separatism and Islamic radicalism. At the end it turned out that the hypotheses formulated at the outset of the investigation could be largely confirmed. The study showed that even though the armed forces were in retreat after the end of the New Order regime and discredited in large parts of the public due to flagrant human rights violations and severe military repression in the Soeharto era, the TNI managed to remain a major power factor in the Indonesian political system. The armed forces benefited in their recovery from the weakness of civilian regimes, the power struggles within the civilian political elite which sought alignments with the military (thus establishing the

1 Freedom in the World 2006, Freedom House//Rowman & Littlefield, 2007, ISBN 0-7425-5802-9; “Freedom in the World,“ http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15, was accessed on July 1, 2010.

337 type of subjective military supervision of which Huntington had warned)2 and the relenting external pressure on the military following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington as well as the Bali bombing in October 2002.

When President Habibie came to power after the resignation of President Soeharto he was widely regarded as an exponent of the ancient regime. A former close associate of Soeharto, Habibie was vice president at the time of Soeharto’s resignation. He ruled with a cabinet in which he retained most of Soeharto’s ministers and in which the military was represented with six posts. Heavily criticized and distrusted by the reformasi movement, and in dire need to build up his own power base, Habibie embarked on a democratization course which freed the formation of political parties from former restrictions, guaranteed freedom of assembly and of the press, freed political prisoners, promised parliamentary elections and launched a bold decentralization program. For the military most threatening were Habibie’s announcements --concessions to the reform movement-- of investigating former human rights violations of the armed forces, most notably the kidnappings of democracy activists and the riots in Jakarta prior to the departure of Soeharto during which more than 1,200 people died. The Habibie administration was also at loggerheads with the military over its decision to investigate the alleged widespread corruption under the Soeharto regime. Although the incumbent military leadership had played a major role in forcing Soeharto to step down, it had also vowed to protect the former strongman against harassment by subsequent governments. Another issue of civil-military dissent became Habibie’s surprising decision to hold a referendum on the future of East Timor which eventually led to the secession and independence of the province which was annexed by Indonesia in 1975.

Conservative elements in the military responded to Habibie’s reform policies by instigating violence across many parts of the country. This included series of bombings in Jakarta and atrocities committed by black ninjas in East Java which coincided with the prosecution of President Soeharto’s son Tommy for his involvement in the murder of a judge and the investigation of the former President himself on charges of corruption. The military also built up pro-Indonesian militias in East Timor which went on rampage after 80 percent of the East Timorese had voted for independence from Indonesia on August 30, 1999. In Jakarta the military leadership mobilized para-military forces and militias, supposedly to protect the MPR session scheduled for November 1998 against street protest of the reform movement, but more likely to intimidate reformers who sought to curtail military influence in politics. It was hardly surprising that under these circumstances, the October 1998 MPR session were overshadowed by massive violence, henceforth known as the First Semanggi Incident, in which security forces killed four persons and wounded dozens. Rogue elements in the military and factions loyal to former

2 Huntington, 1957, op.cit.

338 President Soeharto also increasingly used contacts to radical Muslim groups to incite unrest in many parts of the country.

As Habibie failed to win over parts of the reform movement and in his bid to gain control over the Golkar Party in the run-up to the MPR session in October 1999 in which a new president was to be elected, the president made compromises with the military. His policy shift became visible in slowing down or even halting the prosecution of human rights crimes committed by the military at the end of the New Order period, the KKN cases involving Soeharto and his clan and the investigation of the transition violence in which military elements and radical Muslim groups were involved. This alliance of convenience brought back the military as a political player in the decisive MPR session in November 1999 which once more was accompanied by street violence. The Second Semanggi Incident caused even more victims than the First Semanggi and once more it were the security forces which were blamed for the escalation of violence. In the MPR session, the military was instrumental in Habibie’s resignation as president and even more in the wheeling and dealing which brought to power Abdurrahman Wahid as his successor.

Although the new president’s party, the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) controlled only about 10 percent of the seats in the legislature, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR), and his support in the presidential election by the military notwithstanding, Wahid soon initiated major reforms in the security sector. The military leadership felt increasingly threatened by these moves, as they jeopardized the military’s autonomy in deciding how far reforms should go. Under Habibie, the military had made tactical concessions which found their expression in the New Paradigm, but which, despite a retreat from civilian political positions still left intact many of the military’s corporate interests. Wahid increased pressure on TNI by dismissing Gen. Wiranto as coordinating minister for political and security affairs, and by several command reshuffles which markedly increased the profile of a reformist faction in the TNI led by Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah. Although this group of military reformers was clearly a minority in the officer corps, it was vocal and highly present in the media. It attracted the ire of the conservative majority of military officers by calls for gradually dismantling the army’s territorial command structure, the main pillar of the latter’s political influence, and the complete abrogation of the dwifungsi, which had been the ideological underpinning for the military’s elevated political and social role in the Soeharto era. Agus also initiated investigations into alleged military corruption which implicated senior officials. Wahid, for his part, increased military anger about his rule even more by resuming investigations into the Soeharto clan’s KKN cases, past military human rights violations, and by a less violent approach to solve separatist rebellions in Aceh and Irian Jaya as well as ethno-religious strife in the Moluccas (Maluku), Kalimantan and Central

339 Sulawesi. Wahid thus initiated the most far-reaching security sector reforms of all three presidents of the transition period between 1998 and 2004.

The military responses to Wahid’s reform policies resembled very much the one under Habibie, even though --given the more serious challenge-- they produced more violence than before. By either tolerating separatist insurgencies and ethno-religious clashes or even instigating them, the military sent out the message that without a strong TNI the country would sink into chaos. The military regarded only itself in the position to guarantee the integrity of the Indonesian unitary state (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia --NKRI), one of the sacred legacies championed by the military since the revolutionary struggle for independence. The military or rogue military elements had their hand in the fighting in the Moluccas between Christians and Muslims, the training and arming of radical Muslim militias such as Laskar Jihad, provocations and abuses in Aceh which drove Acehnese in scores into the arms of the separatist Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Movement for an Independent Aceh), while in Irian Jaya, Kopassus special forces conducted covert operations with the objective of encouraging separatist activism of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Organization for an Independent Papua --OPM). The military also intervened late in violent ethnic and religious clashes in Kalimantan and Central Sulawesi (Poso), thus tacitly tolerating an escalation of violence in these provinces. Unrest was here often also linked by the military to demands for a revitalization of the territorial command system.

While these moves destabilized the Wahid government and seriously eroded not only its own legitimacy, but also the one of the new democratic political system as a whole, Wahid contributed to the failure of his reformist polices by his own severe blunders, misjudgments and a highly erratic style of government. Although his party commanded only few seats in the DPR, Wahid soon antagonized virtually all parties represented in his grand coalition or “rainbow cabinet” by high-handed cabinet reshuffles. Fearing for their influence on the government and the loss of patronage, these parties soon orchestrated powerful opposition against Wahid. Already less than a year after his rise to the presidency Wahid was locked in a fierce battle with the legislature which launched corruption charges against him and --as the president continued to treat the legislature with contempt-- eventually initiated an impeachment process against Wahid. In the process, also constitutional changes seeking to end military representation in the country’s legislatures, including the MPR, DPR and local parliaments (DPRDs), became an object of the president’s conflict with the DPR. Due to their need for TNI support, and in order to improve their position for a future presidential contest, party leaders made concessions regarding the exit of the military representatives from the parliament.

The infightings among civilian politicians paved the way back for the military into the political game. In their conflict, Wahid as well as the legislature, sought the support

340 of the military. Wahid made concessions to the military leadership by sidelining the reformist officers in new command reshuffles. Soon thereafter he had again to turn for support to the reformist faction when his conflict with the legislature climaxed and the military openly defied his plans to call a state of emergency and to dissolve the legislature. In the end the legislature impeached Wahid with the support of the DPR’s military faction in a questionable, coup-like procedure in which the military cornered the embattled president through open insubordination.

The special MPR session that impeached Wahid also elected Megawati Soekarnoputri as the new president. Megawati had nurtured close ties to conservative military officers who continuously rose through the ranks during her presidency. At the same time, she approved the complete sidelining of the remnants of the reformist faction in the TNI. Proposals to abolish or at least downsize the territorial command system became from then on anathema. At the same time, the president tolerated the repressive approach of the TNI to end the separatist insurgencies in Aceh and Irian Jaya. The TNI offensive launched in Aceh against GAM in May 2003 was one of the largest military operations ever in the country. In return for their free hand, the military ended covert operations and stop destabilizing the political authority. By allying with the TNI, Megawati could thus rely upon much greater political stability than her predecessors. As a quid pro quo, Megawati painstakingly avoided anything which could be perceived by the TNI as reform initiatives. Under Megawati, pressures for reform came mainly from civil society, the academe, parts of the media and the legislature. Her government launched a military draft bill which, if passed by the legislature, would have given the military far-reaching powers in cases of emergencies. However, opposition against the draft bill coming from some sectors in the Defense Ministry, public pressure and a critical stance of the DPR ensured that the most problematic provisions encoding discretionary powers for the TNI could be watered down. .Military Law No. 34/2004 eventually stressed the political neutrality of the military and obliged TNI to recognize norms such as democracy, civilian supremacy, human rights, national and international law. It also provided for the transfer of the military’s businesses to the state, although leaving open the modalities. Yet, the law also remained unspecific on other key issues of the military reform postponed for subsequent resolution. Some notorious examples of such omissions with future consequences for the democratic consolidation and the military reform are: it did not touch the issue of the territorial command structure, it retained elements of dwifungsi and it did not regulate the crucial issue of military justice. In negotiations surrounding the constitutional amendments the military agreed to completely withdraw from the country’s legislatures by 2004, 5 years earlier than demanded by reformasi movement in the first months of regime change ,but it did so only in exchange for concessions in the legal procedures concerning the prosecution of human rights violations. Staunch resistance to the reform of the military justice system and the attack on the Law No 26/2000 on human rights at the Constitutional Court with regard to the

341 principle of retroactive prosecution made it difficult to hold TNI members individually accountable for alleged past human rights abuses. Moreover, TNI’s repeated efforts to undermine the investigation into past human rights abuses by Komnas HAM and within the ad hoc human rights courts (found as compromise with respect to the question of retroactivity) together with the unsatisfactory ruling of these courts created a strong impression among the public and political analysts that TNI has decisively opposed any civilian intervention on judicial grounds.

The Megawati presidency thus confirmed the second hypothesis formulated at the outset of the study: The less threatened the vested interests of the Indonesian military were by the reform policies of the civilian regimes, the more likely it was that the military behaved cooperatively with the respective regimes and favored their toothless military policies. However, while this brought back political stability to the country, it also shut doors to further military reform. By the end of her presidency the military had regrouped and regained a position which, although less powerful than in the Soeharto era, it was far too influential for an admissible standing of the armed forces in a full-fledged democracy.

Yet, it should not be overlooked that the resurgence of the military as a power factor in Indonesian politics was closely linked to external influences. The terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, London and Madrid and, in particular, in Indonesia itself, including the Bali bomb blasts, as well as the bombings of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta and the Australian Embassy directed attention to counter-terrorist measures. The United States, which had imposed an arms embargo on Indonesia since the Dili (Santa Cruz) massacre in East Timor in 1991 (which was reinforced with military training ban after the post-referendum riots in the former Portuguese colony in 1999), initiated a process of rapprochement to the TNI. The war against terror reduced reform pressures on the TNI which again became a partner for foreign powers which hitherto had ostracized the Indonesian military.

Finally, the study also confirmed the last of the three hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2. Here, the argument was made that the combination of historical and cultural factors and the civilian regimes’ poor performance was conducive to the Indonesian military’s resistance to reform. In the previous chapters, it was amply demonstrated that the ideological underpinnings of the TNI still resonated strongly with the integralistic and organicist conception of statehood which became the main characteristic of the 1945 State Constitution. Indonesian organicism was closely linked to seemingly traditional Javanese notions of power and kingship which also attributed an elevated role to the ksatria, the warriors. These notions of statehood which combined conservative Western influences with Javanese tradition were inculcated into the collective memory of the armed forces through the soldier’s oath, military doctrines such as the Sapta Marga and at all levels of officers training. They fell on fertile ground as until today a majority of the TNI officer corps is of Javanese descent. More importantly, however, many of the

342 organicist and integralistic notions of statehood are shared not only by the military, but also by wide sections of the public. Especially Megawati Soekarnoputri shared these ideas which she adopted from her father, Indonesia’s first president, Soekarno, but they are also highly popular in her party, the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P) and many other nationalist forces in the country. With these cognitive predispositions in wide sections of the Indonesian political class, the military and the public, it may be explained why the military influence on Indonesian politics is so resilient. It also does not bode well for military reform which after the stalemate reached under the Megawati presidency will proceed only very slowly in the future.

343 Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich im Rahmen der politikwissenschaftlichen Transitionsforschung mit der Problematik der zivil- militärischen Beziehungen und deren Einfluss auf den Demokratisierungsprozess in Indonesien. Der Untersuchungszeitraum umfasst die politischen und gesellschaftlichen Prozesse seit dem Zusammenbruch des autoritären Regimes im Jahre 1998 bis hin zum Ende der Präsidentschaft von Megawati Sukarnoputri im Oktober 2004.

Ausgangspunkt der politischen Transition in Indonesien waren der Rücktritt Suhartos und der damit verbundene Zusammenbruch der autoritären “Neuen Ordnung” im Jahre 1998. Im Zuge des sich daran anschließenden Demokratisierungsprozesses wurden von den Zivilregierungen der Folgejahre mehrfach Versuche einer Reformierung des indonesischen Sicherheitssektors vorgenommen. Das Widererstarken des Militärs in den letzten Jahren lässt jedoch erkennen, dass speziell im Bereich des Sicherheitssektors bislang nur partiell Reformen durchgesetzt werden konnten. Am Ende des Transitionsprozesses hat es das Militär, welches die wichtigste Stütze des autoritären Vorgänger-Regimes war, geschafft, sich zu reorganisieren und eine Vielzahl seiner alten Privilegien in die Era Reformasi zu überführen. Obwohl Indonesien mit der Präsidentschaft von Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono im Jahre 2004 in die Phase der demokratischen Konsolidierung eingetreten ist und das neue demokratische System von verschiedenen Demokratie-Indizes durchaus positiv bewertet wurde, muss in Anbetracht der gegenwärtigen Einflussmöglichkeiten des Militärs auf zivil-politische Prozesse davon ausgegangen werden, dass der Konsolidierungsprozess in Indonesien noch nicht abgeschlossen ist.

Ausgehend von der Frage, warum der Einfluss der Streitkräfte in der post- Suharto-Ära wieder zugenommen hat, wird untersucht, was die Gründe für die lediglich partielle Reformierung des Militärs in Indonesien waren. Diesbezüglich werden die Reformvorhaben im Bereich des indonesischen Sicherheitssektors und die Reaktionen des Militärs auf diese in den drei Präsidentschaftsperioden der indonesischen Transitionszeit zwischen 1998 und 2004 in welcher Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid und Megawati Soekarnoputri regierten, analysiert.

In allen drei untersuchten Regierungsphasen wurden Reformvorhaben im Bereich des Sicherheitssektors angestoßen. Diese bezogen sich unter anderem auf die Strafverfolgung von Menschenrechtsverletzungen, die Untersuchung von Korruptionsfällen im Umfeld des ehemaligen Präsidenten Suharto und den Umgang mit separatistischen und militanten islamischen Gruppierungen.

344 Die theoretische Fundierung der Dissertation bilden politikwissenschaftliche Transitionstheorien, anhand welcher durch die Kombination von akteurszentrierten, strukturalistischen und kulturalistischen Ansätzen eine multiperspektivische Herangehensweise intendiert wird. Empirisch beruht die Studie auf umfangreichen Interviews, Internetrecherchen und der Analyse von Zeitungsartikeln, Internetseiten, öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, Statistiken und fachwissenschaftlicher Literatur.

Die Ausgangsthese der vorliegenden Arbeit lautet, dass das Militär in Indonesien nach wie vor einen bedeutenden Machtfaktor innerhalb des politischen Systems darstellt. Trotz des Rückzuges der Streitkräfte infolge des Endes der „Neuen Ordnung” und ihrer Diskreditierung in weiten Teilen der Öffentlichkeit aufgrund von Menschenrechtsverletzungen und militärischen Repressionen während der Suharto-Ära, hat es das Militär geschafft, einige zentrale Einflusssphären in die Phase der demokratischen Konsolidierung zu überführen und sich als fester Bestandteil des neuen politischen Systems zu etablieren.

Die unzureichende Entmachtung der Streitkräfte kann sowohl auf interne als auch auf externe Einflussfaktoren zurückgeführt werden. So wurde das Wiedererstarken des Militärs durch die Schwäche der zivilen Regierungen und die Machtkämpfe innerhalb der politischen Elite, welche diese zur Kooperation mit militärischen Kräften veranlasste, begünstigt. Darüber hinaus hat aber auch der nachlassende externe Druck, der auf einen Bedeutungszuwachs des Militärs im Rahmen der internationalen und nationalen Terrorismusbekämpfung zurückzuführen ist, zu einem Wiedererstarken der Streitkräfte beigetragen. Die Terroranschläge in den USA und Europa und insbesondere jene in Indonesien selbst, lenkten die Aufmerksamkeit zunehmend auf Strategien der Terrorismusbekämpfung. Demzufolge wurde das Militär, welches als wesentlicher Akteur des „Krieges gegen den Terrorismus” innerhalb Indonesiens betrachtet wurde, auch von internationalen Mächten wie den USA rehabilitiert, was zu einem Nachlassen des Reformdrucks im Bereich des Sicherheitssektors führte.

Zudem können für jede der drei untersuchten Regierungsphasen spezifische Problemkonstellationen herausgestellt werden, die das Verhalten von Zivilregierung und Militär hinsichtlich der Reformierung des Sicherheitssektors beeinflusst haben.

Nach dem Rücktritt Suhartos im Jahre 1998 übernahm zunächst Habibie die Rolle eines Übergangspräsidenten, der das Land durch die erste Phase der politischen Transition führte. Aufgrund seiner Position als ehemaliger Vize-Präsident und enger Vertrauter Suhartos galt er als Vertreter des Ancien Régime. Das damit verbundene Misstrauen, welches ihm von der indonesischen Reformbewegung entgegengebracht wurde, veranlasste Habibie zu demokratischen Reformen, die u.a. die Durchsetzung der Versammlungs- und Pressefreiheit, die Freilassung politischer Gefangener, die Aufhebung von Beschränkungen im Bereich von Parteiengründungen, die Einleitung

345 eines umfassenden Dezentralisierungsprogrammes und die Durchführung von Parlamentswahlen vorsahen. Von Vertretern des indonesischen Militärs (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) wurde insbesondere sein Vorhaben, Untersuchungen zu den von Militärs begangenen Menschenrechtsverletzungen einzuleiten und eine Überprüfung der Korruptionsvorwürfe gegenüber dem Suharto-Regime vorzunehmen, als Provokation wahrgenommen. Ein weiterer Gesichtspunkt der zivil-militärischen Meinungsverschiedenheiten war die Ost-Timor-Frage, zu welcher Habibie überraschenderweise ein Referendum ausrufen ließ, welches letztendlich zur Unabhängigkeit der 1975 von Indonesien besetzten Provinz führte. Konservative Kräfte innerhalb des Militärs nahmen diese Bestrebungen Habibies zum Anlass, paramilitärische Milizen aufzubauen und in vielen Regionen des Landes gewalttätige Ausschreitungen anzustiften. Im Hinblick auf die Präsidentschaftswahlen im Rahmen der Beratenden Volksversammlung (MPR) im Oktober 1999 versuchte Habibie durch zunehmende Kooperation mit den Streitkräften seine Machtbasis zu stärken. Dieser Wandel seiner politischen Strategie offenbarte sich in der nahezu vollständigen Einstellung der Strafverfolgung von Menschenrechtsverletzungen und Korruptionsfällen. Diese Zweckallianz ermöglichte zwar ein Wiedererstarken der Streitkräfte im politischen System Indonesiens, führte für Habibie aber letztendlich zu dessen Rücktritt im Oktober 1999 und begünstigte die Wahl seines Amtsnachfolgers, Abdurrahman Wahid.

Trotz der geringen Anzahl der Parlamentssitze, die Abdurrahman Wahids neugegründete Partei Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) innehatte und der Unterstützung durch die Streitkräfte bei seiner Wahl zum Staatspräsidenten, initiierte er eine Reihe von weitreichenden Reformen und Umstrukturierungen im Bereich des indonesischen Sicherheitssektors. So veranlasste Wahid die Neubesetzung einiger Posten innerhalb des TNI und des Kabinetts, um damit die Reformbewegung innerhalb der Streitkräfte zu stärken. Zwar waren die Reformer innerhalb der Streitkräfte nach wie vor deutlich in der Minderheit, jedoch vermochten sie ihre Forderungen durch eine hohe Medienpräsenz in der Öffentlichkeit zu artikulieren. Eine ihrer wesentlichen Forderungen war der allmähliche Abbau der territorialen Kommandostruktur der Armee, welche eine der wesentlichen Säulen ihres politischen Einflusses darstellt. Darüber hinaus sollte eine Abschaffung der dwifungsi-Doktrin erreicht werden, was eine grundlegende Revision des ideologischen Leitmodells des Militärs bedeuten würde, da diese die wesentliche Grundlage von militärischer Einflussnahme in zivile Angelegenheiten und von der exponierten Rolle des Militärs während der Suharto-Ära darstellte. Da die Streitkräfte in diesen Maßnahmen eine zunehmende Beschneidung ihrer Autonomie sahen, wurden sie von den konservativen Kräften des TNI zunehmend als Drohgebärde wahrgenommen. Zudem wurde auch der Konflikt zwischen Militär und Regierung durch die Wiederaufnahme der Untersuchungen zu Korruptionsfällen des Suharto-Klans und von Militärs begangenen Menschenrechtsverletzungen nochmals verschärft. Überdies setzte Wahid eine moderatere Strategie gegenüber den separatistischen Bewegungen in Aceh

346 und Irian Jaya und bezüglich der ethnisch-religiösen Kämpfe auf den Molukken, in Kalimantan und in Zentralsulawesi durch. Im Vergleich mit seinem Vorgänger Habibie können die von Wahid initiierten Reformvorhaben damit als sehr viel weitreichender gewertet werden.

Die militärischen Reaktionen auf Wahids Reformpolitik war weitestgehend mit jenen unter Habibie identisch, jedoch setzte das Militär unter Wahid in verstärktem Maße auf gewalttätige Ausschreitungen. Durch die Tolerierung bzw. Anstiftung zu separatistischen Aufständen und ethno-religiösen Konflikten auf den Molukken, in Aceh und in Irian Jaya, versuchte das Militär der Öffentlichkeit zu suggerieren, dass Indonesien zur Befriedung seiner Außengebiete eines starken Militärs bedürfe und das Land ohne dieses im Chaos versinken würde. Niemanden außer sich selbst betrachtete das Militär als im Stande die Integrität des indonesischen Einheitsstaates (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia --NKRI), eine der sakrosankten Hinterlassenschaften seit dem Unabhängigkeitskampf, zu garantieren. Während diese Geschehnisse die Wahid- Regierung destabilisierten und zu einer Erosion ihrer eigenen Legitimität und jener des neuen demokratischen Systems als Ganzem führten, hat auch Wahid selbst durch einen unbeständigen Regierungsstil zur Diskreditierung seiner Reformvorhaben beigetragen. Die Parteien des „Regenbogenkabinetts” mit welchem Wahid regiert hatte, fanden sich bereits ein Jahr nach seinem Amtsantritt in einer starken Opposition gegen ihn zusammen. Dieser Konflikt mit der Legislative mündete in Korruptionsvorwürfen und einem Impeachment-Verfahren gegen den Präsidenten. In diesem Prozess wurden auch die Verfassungsänderungen, welche die Einflussnahme des Militärs auf die legislativen Organe MPR, DPR und die lokalen Parlamente DPRDs beschneiden sollten, zum Streitpunkt zwischen Präsident und DPR. Aufgrund ihrer Abhängigkeit von der Unterstützung durch das TNI und im Hinblick auf zukünftige Präsidentschaftswahlen, machten die Vorsitzenden der Parteien Zugeständnisse im Bereich des geplanten Ausschlusses des Militärs aus dem MPR. Die internen Machtkämpfe der zivilen Politiker fungierten daher als Wegbereiter der Streitkräfte in ihrer Rückkehr auf das politische Parkett. Sowohl Wahid als auch die Legislative strebten nun nach der Unterstützung des Militärs. Durch Umstrukturierungen der Kommandostruktur, welche dazu führten, dass reformorientierte Offiziere kaltgestellt wurden, machte Wahid letztendlich Zugeständnisse gegenüber der militärischen Führungsriege. Trotzdem musste er sich bereits kurz darauf wieder den reformorientierten Militärs zuwenden, als sein Konflikt mit der Legislative sich immer weiter aufschaukelte und das Militär seine Pläne, den staatlichen Notstand auszurufen und das Parlament aufzulösen, offen ablehnte. Letztendlich leitete die Legislative mit Unterstützung der Militärfraktion im DPR ein Amtsenthebungsverfahren gegen Wahid ein, welches durch coup-artig anmutende Prozeduren, wie die offene Befehlsverweigerung des Militärs gegenüber dem Präsidenten gestützt wurde.

347 Megawati Soekarnoputri, die als Nachfolgerin Wahids eingesetzt wurde, pflegte bereits zu Beginn ihres Amtsantritts enge Bindungen zu den konservativen Teilen der Streitkräfte, welche sie im Laufe ihrer Präsidentschaft zunehmend ausbaute. Diese Allianz ermöglichte zwar eine Stabilisierung des politischen Systems, führte aber gleichzeitig auch zu einem Aussetzen jeglicher Reformen im Bereich des Sicherheitssektors und begünstigte einen Machtzuwachs der konservativen Kräfte des TNI im Verhältnis zu den reformorientierten Militärs. Im Laufe ihrer Regierungszeit ließ Megawati die nahezu vollständige Entmachtung der reformorientierten Kräfte innerhalb des TNI zu. Dies hatte zur Folge, dass eine Beschneidung der territorialen Kommandostruktur der Streitkräfte zunächst von der politischen Agenda verschwand. Dementsprechend tolerierte die Präsidentin auch das repressive Vorgehen des Militärs gegenüber den separatistischen Bewegungen in Aceh und Irian Jaya. Zudem sah ein Gesetzesentwurf der Regierung Megawati eine enorme Machtausweitung des Militärs in Notstandszeiten vor. Erst im Jahre 2004 wurde ein neues Gesetz (No. 34/2004) erlassen, mit welchem die Streitkräfte zur Anerkennung einer Reihe von demokratischen Normen verpflichtet werden sollten. Dies beinhaltete demokratische Grundsätze, Menschenrechte, die Anerkennung von nationalen und internationalen Gesetzen und das Supremat der zivilen Kräfte gegenüber dem Militär. Es schaffte zudem die Voraussetzungen für die Transferierung militäreigener Unternehmen an den Staat, obwohl diesbezüglich keine genaueren Modalitäten erarbeitet wurden. Daher verblieb das Gesetz in vielen wichtigen Bereichen unspezifisch. Auch die territoriale Kommandostruktur des Militärs, die dwifungsi-Ideologie und die militärische Gerichtsbarkeit wurden durch das Gesetz nicht angetastet.

Die zivil-militärische Kooperation der Megawati-Ära begünstigte das Einverständnis des Militärs, sich bereits bis zum Jahre 2004 --und nicht erst wie zuvor gefordert erst 2009-- aus allen Legislativen inklusive des MPR zurückzuziehen. Jedoch konnte dieses Zugeständnis nur auf Basis eines Kuhhandels errungen werden, welcher Zugeständnisse im Bereich der Strafverfolgung von durch Militärs begangene Menschenrechtsverletzungen betraf. Diese Unterminierung der Strafverfolgung im Bereich von Menschenrechtsverletzungen führte auch in der Öffentlichkeit zu dem Eindruck, dass die Versuche einer Unterordnung der Streitkräfte im neuen demokratischen System gescheitert waren. Die Analyse der Präsidentschaftszeit Megawatis hat daher die zweite forschungsleitende Hypothese bestätigt: Desto weniger die Interessen des Militärs durch Reformbestrebungen der zivilen Kräfte bedroht waren, umso wahrscheinlicher war es, dass das Militär sich dem jeweiligen Regime gegenüber kooperativ verhielt und mit gemäßigteren Mitteln für seine Interessen kämpfte. Während dies einerseits zu einer politischen Restabilisierung des Landes führte, wurden hierdurch aber auch die Möglichkeiten zu weitergehenden Militärreformen unterbunden. Zum Ende von Megawatis Präsidentschaft hatte sich das Militär reorganisiert und eine Machtposition zurückerlangt, die zwar nicht mit seiner Stellung in der Suharto-Ära

348 vergleichbar war, jedoch ebenso wenig als mit einem demokratischen Regierungssystem vereinbar betrachtet werden kann.

Die ideologischen Grundlagen des indonesischen Militärs orientieren sich nach wie vor an einer integralistischen und organischen Staatskonzeption, wie sie bereits in der Verfassung von 1945 als wesentliches Charakteristikum des indonesischen Staates vorgelegt wurde. Dieses spezifisch indonesische organische Staatsverständnis ist in der Wahrnehmung der Streitkräfte eng mit traditionellen javanischen Wertvorstellungen von Macht, Herrschaft und Königtum verknüpft, welche den ksatria, den Kriegern, eine prioritäre Rolle im politischen System zuweisen. Diese Vorstellung von Staatlichkeit, welche konservative westliche Einflüsse mit javanischen Traditionen verbindet, hat sich durch militärische Rituale wie den soldatischen Eid, die Militärdoktrinen und die Offiziersausbildung in das kollektive Gedächtnis der Streitkräfte eingeprägt. Darüber hinaus werden diese Vorstellungen auch von großen Teilen der Öffentlichkeit und der Politelite geteilt. Mit diesen kognitiven Prädispositionen von weiten Teilen der politischen Klasse, des Militärs und der Öffentlichkeit kann erklärt werden, warum der Einfluss des Militärs in Indonesien derart beständig ist. Dies veranlasst auch zu eher negativen Prognosen hinsichtlich der Reformierung des indonesischen Sicherheitssektors für die nahe Zukunft.

Zusammenfassend lässt sich mit diesen empirischen Befunden damit auch die dritte Arbeitshypothese verifizieren, die davon ausgegangen war, dass die Reformverweigerung des indonesischen Militärs letztendlich durch eine Kombination aus historischen und kulturellen Faktoren und unzureichender Regierungsperformanz begünstigt wurde.

349 Bibliography

Abdillah, Masykuri. Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy (1966-1993). Hamburg: Abera Verlag Meyer & K.O.K.G, 1997.

Abdullah, Taufik. “Civil-Military Relations in the Third World: An Introductory Taxonomy.” Prisma, No. 20, March 1981.

“Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict?” ICG Asia Report, No. 18, June 27, 2001.

“Aceh: Kenapa Kekuatan Militer Tidak akan Membawa Perdamaian Kekal.” ICG Asia Report, No. 17, June 12, 2001.

“Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace.” ICG Asia Report, No. 19, June 12, 2001.

Adijoyo, Suwarno. Kemanunggalan TNI-Rakyat yang Hakiki: Jangan Sekali-sekali Menyakiti Hati Rakyat. Jakarta: Swadana Bangun Dina-mika Dunia, 2002.

Aditjondro, George Junus. Korupsi Kepresidenan: Reproduksi Oligarki Berkaki Tiga, Istana, Tangsi dan Partai Penguasa. Jakarta: LKIS, 2006.

______. Pemekaran Kodam Sulawesi, 2002.

Agüero, Felipe. Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective. Baltimore: the John Hopkins University Press, 1995.

Agüero, Felipe and Jeffrey Stark (eds.). Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America. University of Miami: North-South Centre Press, 1998.

Alagappa, Muthiah (ed.). Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives. Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center, 2001.

______(ed.). Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Albright, David E. “A Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations.” World Politics, Vol. 33, No. 4, July 1984.

Al Rahab, Amiruddin. Heboh Papua: Perang Rahasia, Trauma, dan Separatisme. Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2010.

Ananta, Aris. (ed.). The Indonesian Crisis: A Human Development Perspective. Singapore: ISEAS, 2003.

350 Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. (ed.). Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia. New York: Cornell University, 2001.

______. “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture,” in Language and Power: Exploring Political Culture in Indonesia. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1992.

______. Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990.

______. Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972.

______. “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture,” in Holt, Claire (ed.). Culture and Politics in Indonesia, Ithaca. New York: Cornell Univerty Press, 1972.

Andrzejewski, Stanislaw. Military Organization and Society. London:Routledge and K. Paul, 1954.

Anggoro, Kusnanto. “Politik Militer dan Konsolidasi Demokrasi di Indonesia.” Analisis CSIS, No. 3, Tahun XXXII/2003, Jakarta: CSIS.

______. “Militer dan Transisi Menuju Demokrasi” in Maruto MD and Anwari WMK (eds.). Reformasi Politik dan Kekuatan Masyarakat: Kendala dan Peluang Menuju Demokrasi. Jakarta: PT. Pustaka LP3ES Indonesia, 2002.

Azca, Muhammad Najib. “In Between Military and Militia: The Dynamics of the Security Forces in the Communal Conflict in Ambon.” AJSS, 34: 3, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2006.

______. “Security Sector Reform, Democratic Transition, and Social Violence: the Case of Ambon, Indonesia,” Berghof.

Bahar, Ahmad. Abdurrahman Wahid, Gagasan dan Pemikiran: Biografi Kiai Politik. Jakarta: Bina Utama, 1999.

Bandow, Doug. “Jakarta's Seething Volcano.” Chronicles Magazine, March 2001.

Barton, Greg. “The impact of Islamic neo-Modernism on Indonesian Islamic Thought: The emergence of a new pluralism”, in Bourchier, David and John Legge (eds.). Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s. Victoria: Monash University, 1994.

Beatty, Andrew. Varieties of Javanese Religion: An Anthropological Account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

351 Bertrand, Jacques. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Bhakti, Ikrar Nusa et al. Tentara Mendamba Mitra: Hasil Penelitian LIPI tentang Pasang Surut Keterlibatan ABRI dalam Kehidupan Kepartaian di Indonesia. Jakarta: Mizan, 1999.

Bhakti, Ikrar Nusa et al. Tentara yang Gelisah: Hasil Penelitian Yipika tentang Posisi ABRI dalam Gerakan Reformasi. Bandung: TAF, PPW-LIPI & Mizan, 1999.

Bienen, Henry. “Civil-Military Relations in the Third Worlds.” International Political Science Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1981.

Bourchier, David. “Habibie’s Interregnum: Reformasi, Elections, Regionalism, and the Struggle for Power,” in Manning, Chris and Peter van Diermen (eds.). Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis. Singapore: ISEAS, 2000.

______. “Skeletons, vigilantes and the armed forces’ fall from graces,” in Budiman, Arief, Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury (eds.). Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia. Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1999.

Bourchier, David and John Legge (eds.). Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s. Victoria: Monash University, 1994.

Bos, Ellen. “Die Rolle von Eliten und kollektiven Akteuren in Transitionsprozessen,” in Merkel, Wolfgang (ed.). Systemwechsel 1: Theorien, Ansätze und Konzeptionen. Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1994.

Bresnan, John. Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy. New York, Colombia University, 1993.

Britton, Peter. Profesionalisme dan Ideologi Militer Indonesia. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1996.

Brown, David. “The State of Ethnicity and the Ethnicity of the State: Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, No. 1, 1989.

Brown, Jason. “Why Did Over a Hundred Black Magic Practitioners Die in East Java Late in 1998?” Inside Indonesia, 1999.

Budiman, Arief, Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury (eds.). Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia. Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1999.

Bunga Rampai Paradigma Baru TNI. Jakarta: Staf Komunikasi Sosial TNI, 2003.

Cahyono, Heru. Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro dan Peristiwa 15 Januari 1974. Jakarta: PT Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1998.

352 Cammack, Paul. “The New Institutionalism: Predatory Rule, Institutional Persistence, and Macro-Social Change.” Economy and Society, Volume 21, No. 4, November 1992.

Castle, James et al (eds.). Who’s Who in Indonesia’s Political Arena: The Players, the Parties: A Comprehensive Guide. Jakarta: Castle, 1999.

Chega! (Volume 1-6) CAVR. Jakarta: Kompas-Gramedia, 2010.

Cohen, Joshua and Deborah Chasman (eds..). Islam and the Challenge of Democracy. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (eds.). Roots of violence in Indonesia: contemporary violence in historical perspective. Leiden : KITLV Press, 2002.

“Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan.” ICG Report, No. 19, June 27, 2001, Jakarta/Belgia: ICG, 2001.

Conboy, Ken. Intel, Menguak Tabir Dunia Inteljen Indonesia. Jakarta: Pustaka Primatama, 2007.

Crouch, Harold. “Establishing Civilian Supremacy in Southeast Asia,” in Johannen, Uwe and James Gomez (eds.Eds.). Democratic Transition in Asia. Singapore: Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 2001.

______. “Wiranto and Habibie: military-civil realations since May 1998,” in Budiman, Arief, Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury (eds.). Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia. Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1999.

______. The Army and Politics in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.

______. Militer dan Politik di Indonesia. Jakarta: PT Sinar Harapan, 1986.

______. “The Military and Politics in Southeast Asia,” in Zakaria, Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (eds.). Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Danopoulos, Constantine P.(ed.). Military Disengagement from Politics. London: Routledge, 1988.

Darwin, Muhadjir, “Freedom from Fear: Social Disruption and System of Violence in Indonesia,” in Ananta, Aris. (ed.). The Indonesian Crisis: A Human Development Perspective. Singapore: ISEAS, 2003.

353 Davies, M. Indonesian Security Responses to Resurgent Papuan Separatism: An Open Source Case Study. Canberra: Australian National University, CDSS, 2001.

Della-Giacoma, Jim. “The Violent Archipelago: Rethinking Its Place in History.” Indonesia, 82, October 2006, New York: Cornell University, SEAP, 2006.

Democratization in Indonesia: An Assessment, Forum for Democratic Reform. Sweden: International IDEA, 2000.

Di Palma, Giuseppe. To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transition. Berkeley, 1990.

Diamond, Larry. “Introduction: In Search of Consolidation,” in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien. Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, 1997.

Dwipayana, G. and Ramadhan K.H. Soeharto: Pikiran, Ucapan dan Tindakan Saya. Jakarta: PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989.

Eldridge, Philip J. The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia. London and New York, Routledge, 2002.

Elster, Jon and Rune Slagstad (eds.). Constitutionalism and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Erb, Maribeth, Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, and Carole Faucher (eds.). Regionalism in Post- Suharto Indonesia. London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005.

Esposito, John L. and John O. Voll. Islam and Democracy. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Estiko, Didit Hariadi and Prayudi. Berbagai Perspektif tentang Memorandum kepada Presiden: Suatu Studi terhadap Pemberian Memorandum DPR-RI kepada Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid. Jakarta: P3I Setjen DPR-RI dan KAS, 2002.

Fatwa, AM. Menghadirkan Moderatisme Melawan Terorisme. Jakarta: Hikmah, 2006.

Feith, Herbert. The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. New York, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962.

Fidel, Kenneth (ed.). Militarism in Developing Countries, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1986.

Finer, Samuel E. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. New York: Preager, 1962.

354 Forrester, Geoff (ed.). Post-Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos? Singapore and Leiden: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and KITLV Press, 1999.

Freedom in the World 2006. Freedom House//Rowman & Littlefield, 2007, ISBN 0- 7425-5802-9.

Friend, Theodore. Indonesian Destinies. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003.

Funston, John (ed.). Government and Politics in Southeast Asia. Singapore: ISEAS, 2001

Gayatri, Gati. “Konstruksi Realitas Kepemimpinan Presiden Soeharto dalam Berita Surat Kabar: Analisis Kritis terhadap Makna Pesan Politik yang Disampaikan dengan Menggunakan Konsep Ajaran Kepemimpinan Jawa.” Disertasi Doktor. Depok: Universitas Indonesia, 2003.

Guiness, Patrick. “Local Society and Culture,” in Hal Hills (eds.). Indonesia’s New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,1994.

Habibie, Bacharuddin Jusuf. Detik-detik yang Menentukan: Jalan Panjang Indonesia Menuju Demokrasi. Jakarta: THC Mandiri, 2006.

Hadar, Ivan A. “Militer dan Pemerintahan Otoriter”. Wacana, Edisi 17, Tahun III, 2004, Yogyakarta, Insist Press.

Harjanto, “Masa Depan Peran TNI dalam Tatanan Demokrasi di Indonesia,” in Sukma, Rizal and J. Kristiadi (eds.). Hubungan Sipil-Militer dan Transisi Demokrasi di Indonesia: Persepsi Sipil dan Militer. Jakarta: CSIS and the Asia Foundation, 1999.

Harjanto, Nico T. Budi. “Masa Depan Peran TNI dalam Tatanan Demokrasi di Indonesia: Harapan Kalangan Militer,” in Sukma, Rizal and J. Kristiadi (eds.). Hubungan Sipil-Militer dan Transisi Demokrasi di Indonesia: Persepsi Sipil dan Militer. Jakarta: CSIS and the Asia Foundation, 1999.

Hasan, Noorhaidi. “Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia”. Indonesia, 73, April 2002.

Hedman, Eva-Lotta E. “Papua: the Last Frontier for democratization, demilitarization and decentralization in Indonesia,” in Eva-Lotta E. Hedman (ed.). Dynamics of Conflict and Displacement in Papua, Indonesia, Refugee Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 42, University of Oxford, September 2007.

Hefner, Robert W. (ed.). The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001.

355 Herriman, Nicholas. “Sorcerer Killings in 1998 in East Java: An Analysis of Press and Academic Reports.” Paper presented to the 17th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Melbourne July 1-3, 2008, the Monash Asia Institute.

Hill, Hal (eds.). Indonesia’s New Order: the Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation. Honolulu, 1994.

Hisyam, Usamah (ed.). HA Muhammad Ghalib: Menepis Badai Menegakkan Supremasi Hukum. Jakarta: Dharmapena, 2000.

Hisyam, Usamah et al (eds.). SBY: Sang Demokrat. Jakarta: Dharmapena, 2004.

Holt, Claire (ed.). Culture and Politics in Indonesia, Ithaca. New York: Cornell Univerty Press, 1972.

Honna, Jun. Military Politics and Democratization. Indonesia: London: RoutledegeCurzon, 2003.

Hunter, Wendy. “Politicians Against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Post- Authoritarian Brazil.” Comparative Politics, 27, No. 4, July 1995.

Huntington, Samuel P. “After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave.” Journal of Democracy, October 1997, Volume 8, Number 4. Washington DC: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.

______. Gelombang Demokratisasi Ketiga, translated edition of The Third Wave. Jakarta: Grafiti, 1997.

______. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman and London: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

______. Tertib Politik dalam Masyarakat yang Sedang Berubah (trans. Political Order in Changing Society). Jakarta: Rajawali, 1983.

______. Special Adaptation from Political Order in Changing Societies. Bombay: G.U. Mehta, 1975.

______. The Soldier and the State. New York: Vintage Book, 1957.

Ibrahim, Idi Subandy (ed.). Dari Catatan Wiranto: Bersaksi di Tengah Badai. Jakarta: IDe, Indonesia, 2003.

“Indonesia: Corruption Timeline.” Global Integrity Report 2004.

356 “Indonesia: Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions in Papua, 1999-2000.” Human Rights Watch, New York, 2000.

“Indonesia: Overcoming Murder and Chaos in Maluku.” ICG Asia Report, No. 10, December 19, 2000.

Indonesia's Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003.

“Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims.” ICG Indonesia Briefing Paper, October 10, 2001. Jakarta/ Belgia: ICG, 2001.

Irving, David and Louis Horowitz. “The Military Elite,” in Lipset, Seymour Martin and Aldo Solari (eds.). Elites in Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Johannen, Uwe and James Gomez (eds.). Democratic Transition in Asia. Singapore: Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 2001.

Kahin, Audrey R (ed). Regional dynamics of the Indonesian revolution: unity from diversity. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1985.

Kammen, Douglas. “The Trouble with Normal: The Indonesian Military, Paramilitaries, and the Final Solution in East Timor,” in Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. (ed.). Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia. New York: Cornell University, 2001.

Key Indicators 2002 of Developing Asian Pacific Countries, ADB, 2003.

Kingsbury, Damien. The Politics of Indonesia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Kingsbury, Damien and Harry Aveling (eds.). Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia. London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003.

Klein, Martin. “Javanismus und Herrschaft in Indonesien: Zum Zusammenhang von Kulturinterpretation und Ideologie.” Suedostasien Working Papers der Humboldt Universitaet zu Berlin, No. 6, Berlin, 1997.

Kourvetaris, Yorgos A. “Civil-Military Relations and Military Disengagement,” in Danopoulos, Constantine P. (ed.). Military Disengagement from Politics. London: Routledge, 1988.

Kowalewski, David (1991). “Counterinsurgent Vigilantism and Public Response: A Philippine Case Study.” Sociological Perspectives, 34 (2).

357 Kumar, Ann. “The state and the status of the nation: A historical viewpoint,” in Kingsbury, Damien and Harry Aveling (eds.). Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia. London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003.

Kumolo, Tjahyo et al. Megawati Soekarnoputri: Presiden Pilihan Rakyat. Jakarta: Global Publika, 2004.

Laporan Perekonomian Indonesia 2002. Jakarta: Bank Indonesia, 2003.

Laporan Perekonomian Indonesia 2003. Jakarta: Bank Indonesia, 2004.

Laporan Perekonomian Indonesia 2004. Jakarta: Bank Indonesia, 2005.

Latief, Col. A. Pledoi Kol. A. Latief. Jakarta: ISAI, 1999.

Liddle, R. William (ed.). Crafting Indonesian Democracy. Bandung: Mizan, 2001.

Lieuwen, Edwin. Arms and Politics in Latin America. Revised Edition. Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1965.

Lindsey, Timothy. “Indonesia’s Negara Hukum: Walking the Tightrope to the Rule of Law,” in Budiman, Arief, Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury (eds.), Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia. Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1999.

Linz, Juan J. Crisis, Breakdown, and Re-equilibration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore and London: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

______. “Defining and Crafting Democratic Transition, Constitution, and Consolidation,” in R. William Liddle (ed.), Crafting Indonesian Democracy. Bandung: Mizan, 2001.

Lipset, Seymour Martin and Aldo Solari (eds.). Elites in Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Loveman, Brian. For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999.

Loveman, Brian and Thomas M. Davies, Jr. (eds.). The Politics of Anti-Politics: The Military in Latin America. Lincoln and London: The University of Nebraska, 1978.

358 Lowry, Robert. “East Timor: An Overview of Political Development,” in Manning, Chris and Peter van Diermen (eds.). Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis. Singapore: ISEAS, 2000.

Lubis, Muhammad Ridwan. Pemikiran Sukarno Tentang Islam, Jakarta: Haji Masagung, 1992.

Magnis-Suseno, Franz. Mencari Sosok Demokrasi: Sebuah Telaah Filosofis. Jakarta: PT Gramedia, 1995.

______. Javanese Ethics and World-View: The Javanese Idea of the Good Life. Jakarta: PT Gramedia, 1997, translated by Jon Scott and Michael Saunders from Franz Magnis-Suseno, Javanische Weisheit und Ethik: Studien zu einer oestlichen Moral. Muenchen/Wien: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1981.

Makka, A. Makmur (ed.). 60 Tahun Habibie (60 Years Habibie). Jakarta: Pustaka Cidesindo, 1996.

Manangka, Derek. Jurus dan Manuver Taufiq Kiemas: Memang Lidah Tak Bertulang, Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2010.

Manning, Chris and Peter van Diermen (eds.). Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis. Singapore: ISEAS, 2000.

Marpaung (eds.), Rusdi. Dinamika Reformasi Sektor Keamanan. Jakarta: Imparsial, 2005.

Martins, Luciano. “Liberalisasi Kekuasaan Otoriter di Brazil,” in Guillermo O’Donnell, Phillippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.). Jakarta: LP3ES, 1993. Transisi Menuju Demokrasi, Kasus Amerika Latin (II) in Sahdan, Gregorius (trans.). Jalan Transisi Demokrasi Pasca Soeharto. Bantul: Pondok Edukasi, 2004.

Masters, Edward. “Indonesia's 1999 Elections A Second Chance for Democracy.” Asia Society, May 1999.

Maruto MD and Anwari WMK (eds.). Reformasi Politik dan Kekuatan Masyarakat: Kendala dan Peluang Menuju Demokrasi. Jakara: PT Pustaka LP3ES Indonesia, 2002.

Maynard, Harold. “Indonesian Military Elite Role Perceptions,” in Perlmutter, Amos and Valerie Plave Bennett (eds.). The Political Influence of the Military. London: Yale University Press, 1980.

“Melemahkan Jaringan Kelompok Mujahidin di Indonesia: Pelajaran dari Maluku dan Poso.” Asia Report, No. 103, October 13, 2005, ICG: Jakarta, Brussells.

359 Merkel, Wolfgang (ed.). Demokratie in Asien: Ein Kontinent zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie. Bonn: Dietz, 2003.

______. Systemtransformation: Eine Einfuehrung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transformationsforschung. Olpaden: Leske + Budrich, 1999.

______. Systemwechsel 1: Theorien, Ansätze und Konzeptionen. Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1994.

Merkel, Wolfgang and Hans-Jürgen Puhle. Von der Diktatur zur Demokratie: Transformationen, Erfolgsbedingungen, Entwicklungspfade. Opladen/Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999.

Merkel, Wolfgang et al. Defekte Demokratie, Band 1: Theorie. Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2003.

Metamorfosis Bisnis Militer: Sebaran Bisnis Militer Pasca Diterbitkannya UU TNI. Jakarta: the Ridep Institute, FES, 2007.

Mietzner, Marcus. Military, Politics, Islam , and the State in Indonesia. From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.

______. “The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance.” Washington, East-West Center, 2006.

______. “The 1999 General Assembly,” in Manning, Christ and van Diermen, Peter (eds.) London: ISEAS/Zed Books.

______. “From Soeharto to Habibie: the Indonesian Armed Forces and Political Islam during the Transition,” in: Geoff Forrester (ed.), Post-Suharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?, Singapore and Leiden: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and KITLV Press 1999: 65-102.

Moedjanto, G. The Concept of Power in Javanese Culture. Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1993.

Muhaimin, Yahya A. Perkembangan Militer dalam Politik di Indonesia 1925-1966. Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1982.

Nasution, Abdul Haris. Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas. Jakarta: PT Gunung Agung, 1995.

______. Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan Indonesia. Jakarta: PT Gunung Agung, 1989.

360 Nasution, Adnan Buyung. Aspirasi Pemerintahan Konstitusional di Indonesia: Studi Sosio-Legal atas Konstituante 1956-1959. Jakarta: PT Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1995.

Nevins, Joseph. A Not-So-Distant Horror: Mass Violence in East Timor. New York: Cornell University Press, 2006.

Nurhasim, Moch. (ed.). Praktek-praktek Bisnis Militer: Pengalaman Indonesia, Burma, Filipina, and Korut. Jakarta: The Ridep Institute, 2003.

Nordholt, Henk Schulte. “A genealogy of violence,” in Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (eds.), Roots of violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective. Leiden: KITLV Press 2002.

O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. (eds.). Transisi Menuju Demokrasi (III): Kasus Amerika Latin. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1994.

______. Transisi Menuju Demokrasi, Kasus Amerika Latin (II). Jakarta: LP3ES, 1993.

______.Transitions from Authoritarian Rules: Prospects for Democracy, Volume 4. Baltimore and London: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

______. Transitions from Authoritarian Rules: Comparative Perspectives, Volume 5. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

______. Transitions from Authoritarian Rules: Latin America. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

O’Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter. “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusion about Uncertain Democracies,” in O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. (eds). Transitions from Authoritarian Rules: Prospects for Democracy, Volume 4. Baltimore and London: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

O’Rourke, Kevin. Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia. NSW: Allen & Unwinn, Crows Nest, 2002.

Otobiografi Politik RO Tambunan: Membela Demokrasi, Jakarta: TPDI, 2008.

Perlmutter, Amos. “Military and Politics in Modern Times.” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 9, No. 1, March 1986.

______. “The Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes: Formations, Aspirations, and Achievements.” World Politics, Vol. 33, No. 1, October 1980.

361 ______. The Military and Politics in Modern Times. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977.

______. “The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army.” Comparative Politics, April 1969.

Perlmutter, Amos and Valerie Plave Bennett (eds.). The Political Influence of the Military. London: Yale University Press, 1980.

Pleshov, Oleg V. Islamism and Travails of Democracy in Pakistan. Delhi: Greenwich Millennium Press, 2004.

Poesponegoro, Marwati Djoened and Nugroho Notosusanto. Sejarah Nasional Indonesia VI: Zaman Jepang dan Zaman Republik Indonesia. Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1992.

Pridham, Geoffrey (ed.). Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe. New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1991.

Przeworski, Adam. “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts,” in Elster, Jon and Rune Slagstad (eds.). Constitutionalism and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

______. “Sejumlah Masalah dalam Studi Transisi Menuju Demokrasi,” in O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. (eds.). Transisi Menuju Demokrasi (III): Kasus Amerika Latin. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1994.

Pye, Lucian W. “Participation and Auhtority,” in Verba, Sidney and Lucian W. Pye (eds.), The Citizen and Politics: A Comparative Pers- pective, Stamford: Greylook, 1978.

Rabasa, Angel M. and John Haseman. The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power. Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 2002.

Ralhan, Anuj Ralhan. “Psychological Operations in Indonesia’s Recent Hystory.” Washington DC, 2002.

Ramage, Douglas E. Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance. London and New York: Routledge, 1995.

Ratnawati, Tri. Maluku dalam Catatan Seorang Peneliti. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2006.

“Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing.” ICG Asia Report No. 92, Singapote/Brussels, 2005.

362 Reditanaja, Ki. Alap-alapan Drusilawati, Batavia, 1932.

Ricklefs, MC. A History of Modern Indonesia Since C. 1200, Stanford University Press, 2001.

Rieffei, Lex et al. Menggusur Bisnis Militer: Pembiayaan TNI Melalui APBN. Bandung: Mizan, 2007.

Rinakit, Sukardi. The Indonesian Military after the New Order. Singapore: ISEAS, 2005.

______. “Decentralization and the Military,” in Maribeth Erb, Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, and Carole Faucher (eds.), Regionalism in Post-Soeharto Indonesia, London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005: 75-86.,

Robinson, Geoffrey. “The Fruitless Search for a Smoking Gun: Tracing the Origins of Violence in East Timor,” in Colombijn, Freek and J. Thomas Lindblad (eds). Roots of violence in Indonesia: contemporary violence in historical perspective. Leiden : KITLV Press, 2002.

Robison, Richard. “Indonesia: Tensions in State and Regime,” in Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison, and Garry Rodan (eds.), Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, Sydney: Allen und Unwinn, 1993: 41-47.

Roosa, John. Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement & Suharto’s Coup D’Etat in Indonesia. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007.

______. “Brawling, bombing, and 'backing’: The security forces as a source of insecurity.” Inside Indonesia, January-March, 2003.

Rudini, “Legitimasi Sosial Peran Sospol ABRI.” Paper presented at Sesko ABRI Seminar, Bandung, November 4-5, 1996.

Rüland, Jürgen. “Ethnic Conflict, Separatism and Terrorism,” in Stephan Hoadley and Jürgen Rü-land (eds.), Asian Security Reassessed, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006: 211-212.

______. “Demokratisierung in Südostasien: die Asienkrise als Motor politischen Wandels?” Zeitschrift für Politik, Jahrgang 48, Heft 1, 2001. München: Zymanns.

______. „Theoritische, methodische und thematische Schwerpunkte des system- wechselforshung zu Asien,” in Merkel, Wolfgang (ed.) in Systemwechsel 1: Theorien, Ansätze und Konzeptionen. Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1994.

363 Ryter, Loren. „ Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Freeman of Soeharto’s Order,” in Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. (ed.), Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia. New York: Cornell University, 2001.

Said, Salim. Militer Indonesia dan Politik: Dulu, Kini, dan Kelak. Jakarta: PT Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2001.

Sahdan, Gregorius (trans.). Jalan Transisi Demokrasi Pasca Soeharto. Bantul: Pondok Edukasi, 2004.

Scharpf, Fritz W. Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centred Institutionalism in Policy Research. Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, 1997.

Schmitz, Manuel. Ethnische Konflikte in Indonesien und die Integrationspolitik Suhartos. Mitteilungen des Instituts fuer Asienkunde Hamburg, Nummer 362. Hamburg, IFA, 2003.

Schwarz, Adam. A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1999.

______. A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994.

Schuk, Christoph. Der indonesische Demokratisierungsprozess: Politischer Neubeginn und historischer Kontinuität. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesselschaft, 2003.

Sebastian, Leonard C. Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of Military Force. Singapore, ISEAS, 2006.

Sidel, John T. “Macet Total: Logics of Circulation and Accumulation in the Demise of Indonesia’s New Order.” Indonesia, 66, October 1998. New York: Cornell University, SEAP.

Sigelman, Lee. “Research Note: Military Size and Political Intervention.” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Volume 3, Spring, 1975.

Simandjuntak, Togi (ed.). Premanisme Politik. Jakarta: ISAI, 2000.

Singh, Bilveer. Ryamizard --in the Footsteps of Gajah Mada, Sydney: Book House, 2005.

______. Succession Politics in Indonesia: The 1998 Presidential Election and the Fall of Soeharto. London: Macmillan Press, 2000.

______. Dwifungsi ABRI: Asal-usul, Aktualisasi, dan Implikasinya bagi Stabilitas dan Pembangunan. Jakarta: PT Gramedia, 1996.

364 ______. Dwifungsi ABRI: The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Singapore, Institute of International Affairs, 1995.

Soesastro, Hadi, Anthony L. Smith, and Han Mui Ling (eds.). Governance in Indonesia: Challenges Facing the Megawati Presidency. Singapore, ISEAS, 2003.

Soemargono, Ahmad. Saya Seorang Fundamentalis. Jakarta: Global Cita Press, 1999.

Smith, Anthony. “Indonesia: Transforming the Leviathan,” in John Funston (ed.), Government and Politics in Southeast Asia. Singapore: ISEAS, 2001

Schneier, Edward. “Evolving Patterns of Legislative Oversight in Indonesia,” in Rick Stapenhurst et al (eds.), Legislative Oversight and Budgeting, Washington DC: IBRD, WB, 2008.

Stapenhurst, Rick et al (eds.). Legislative Oversight and Budgeting. Washington DC: IBRD, WB, 2008.

Stepan, Alfred. Militer dan Demokratisasi: Pengalaman Brazil dan Beberapa Negara Lain, translated by Bambang Cipto from Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Jakarta: Grafiti, 1996.

Subroto, Hendro. Sintong Panjaitan: Perjalanan Seorang Prajurit Para Komando. Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2009.

Sukarno, Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi, Volume 1, Jakarta, 1964.

Sukma, Rizal. Islam in Indonesian foreign policy. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

______. “Conflict management in post-authoritarian Indonesia: Federalism, autonomy and the dilemma of democratization,” in Kingsbury, Damien and Harry Aveling (eds.). Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia. London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003.

Sukma, Rizal and J. Kristiadi (eds.). Hubungan Sipil-Militer dan Transisi Demokrasi di Indonesia: Persepsi Sipil dan Militer. Jakarta: CSIS and the Asia Foundation, 1999.

Sulistiyo, Hermawan (2001). “Greens in the Rainbow: Ethnoreligious Issues and the Indonesian Armed Forces,” in Hefner, Robert W. (ed.), The Politics of Multiculturalism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001, pp.291-309.

Sundhaussen, Ulf. Politik Militer Indonesia 1945-1967 Menuju Dwifungsi ABRI. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986..

365 ______. “The Durability of Military Regimes in Southeast Asia,” Zakaria, Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (eds.). Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Suryohadiprojo, Sayidiman. Kepemimpinan ABRI dalam Sejarah dan Perjuangannya. Jakarta: Intermasa, 1996.

Tanter, Richard and Kenneth Young (eds.). The Politics of Middle Class in Indonesia. Victoria: Monash University, 1990.

Tanter, Richard, Desmond Ball, and Gerry van Klinken (eds.). Masters of Terror: Indonesia’s Military and Violence in East Timor. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006.

The Editors. “Changes in Civil-Military Relations since the Fall of Soeharto.” Indonesia, 70, October 2000, New York: Cornell University, SEAP.

______. “Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite January 1, 1998-January 31, 1999.” Indonesia, 67, April 1999. New York: Cornell University, SEAP.

The Long Road to Democracy, Jakarta: Yappika, 2002.

The 2000 Population Census, Central Bureau Statistics, Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 2001.

Tirtosudarmo, Riwanto. “Economic Development, Migration, and Ethnic Conflict: A Preliminary Observation,” Sojourn, No. 2, 1997.

Tulis, Yosef Tor. Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva, Marinus Riwu: Kisah Tiga Martir dari Poso. Jetpress, Juli 2007.

Uchida, Eriko. “Latest Graft Cases 'Not a Deterrent' to Corruption in Indonesia.” Basel Institute of Governance, March 25, 2002.

Ufen, Andreas. Herrschaftsfiguration and Demokratisierung in Indonesien (1965-2000). Hamburg: IFA, 2000.

Uhlin, Anders. Indonesia and the “Third Wave of Democratization”: The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World. Curzon Press, 1997.

Van Langenberg, Michael. “The New Order State: Language, Ideology, Hegemony”, in Arief Budiman (ed.), State and Civil Society in Indonesia, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 22, Clayton: Monash University, 1990.

366 Vatikiotis, Michael R J. Indonesian politics under Soeharto: order, development and power for change. London: Routledge, 1993.

______. Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order. London: Routledge,1998.

Verba, Sidney and Lucian W. Pye (eds.), The Citizen and Politics: A Comparative Perspective, Stamford: Greylook, 1978.

Vermonte, Philips Jusario. “The Relationship between the Army and Islamic Groups in Indonesia: Comparing the period of the transition to authoritarian rule in the 1950s and the transition to democracy in the 1990s.” Working paper, Jakarta: Interseksi Forundation, 2007.

Wahid, Abdurrahman. “Indonesia’s Muslim Middle Class: An Imperative or a Choice?” in Tanter, Richard and Kenneth Young (eds.). The Politics of Middle Class in Indonesia. Victoria: Monash University, 1990.

______. Islam, Negara, dan Demokrasi. Jakarta: Erlangga, 1999.

Waluyo, Sapto. “Indonesia’s Predicament to Counter-terrorism Policy in the Era of Democratic Transition.” UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 15, October 2007. Jakarta: Centre for Indonesian Reform (CIR), 2007.

Welch, Claude E. (ed.). Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change. Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1970.

Wessel, Ingrid. “State Nationalism in Present Indonesia,” in Wessel, Ingrid (ed.). Nationalism and Ethnicity in Southeast Asia. Berliner-Asien-Afrika-Studien, 4/2, Muenster/Hamburg, 1994.

______. (ed.). Nationalism and Ethnicity in Southeast Asia. Berliner-Asien-Afrika- Studien, 4/2, Muenster/Hamburg, 1994.

Whitehead, Laurence. „Democracy by Convergence aad Southern Europe: A Comparative Politics Perspective,” in Pridham, Geoffrey (ed.). Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe. New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1991.

Widjajanto, Andi. ”Pemberdayaan Wilayah Pertahanan”, paper, presented at Centre for Research and Information Services of DPR, June 6, 2006, Jakarta.

Widoyoko, J. Danang. ”Dilema Anggaran Pertahanan. “ Paper, workshop on defence forces reform organized by Imparsial, Jakarta, April 25-29.

367 Yulianto, Arief. Hubungan Sipil Militer di Indonesia Pasca Orba di Tengah Pusaran Demokrasi. Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 2002.

Yunanto, S. et al. Militant Islamic Movements in Indonesia and South-East Asia. Jakarta: FES and the Ridep Institute, 2003.

Zakaria, Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch (eds.). Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Zen, Kivlan. Konflik dan Integasi TNI-AD. Jakarta: IPS, 2004.

Ziegenhain, Patrick. The Indonesian Parliament and Democratization. Singapore, ISEAS, 2008.

Zon, Fadli. Politik Huru-Hara Mei 1998. Jakarta: IPS, 2004.

Magazines

“Ambon Violence May Have Had Its Origin in Jakarta.” Far Eastern Economic Review, March 25, 1999.

“A Reign of Terror: Human Rights Violations in Aceh 1998 – 2000.” Tapol, March 2000.

“Baagil di Balik Bom?” Majalah Tempo, October 1, 2000.

“Bila Kingmaker Ingin Menjadi King.” Majalah Tajuk, October 21, 1999.

“Bom di Jalur Kontak GAM-TNI.” Majalah Tempo, February 25, 2001.

“Bombings Leave Southeast Asia Puzzled.” Far Easter Economic Review, January 24, 2001.

Caragata, Warren. “Batlle of Wills: It's Still Wahid versus Rogue Military Elements. Can Anyone Win?” Asiaweek, Vol..26, No. 39, October 6, 2000.

“Cerita dari Mosaik Bom Natal.” Majalah Tempo, February 25, 2001.

“Darurat Sipil di Maluku, Lalu Apa.” Majalah Tempo, July 9, 2000.

“Descend Into Darkest Borneo.” The Economist, March 1, 2001.

“East Timor under the Indonesian Jackboot: An Analysis of Indonesian Army Documents.” Tapol, November 15, 1998.

368 “Endriartono Sutarto: Saya Khawatir TNI Akan Pecah.” Majalah Tempo, October 15, 2000.

Far Eastern Economic Review, Septemrber 12, 2002.

Far Eastern Economic Review, June 5, 2003.

Far Eastern Economic Review, December 25, 2003.

Fearnside, Philip M. “Transmigration in Indonesia: Lessons from Its Environmental and Social Impacts.” Environmental Management, No. 4, 1997.

“Gertakan Jihad Lewat Posko.” Majalah Tempo, January 17, 2000.

Hasugian, Maria et al. “Mencari Keadilan dari Prahara Poso.” Majalah Tempo, April 16, 2006.

“Indonesia’s Dirty War East Timor.” Tapol Bulletin, June 7, 1999.

“Juwono Sudarsono: Kroni Soeharto Mendanai Kerusuhan.” Majalah Tempo, July 19, 2000.

“Komisi Dibentuk, Soeharto Melempar Truf.” Majalah Tempo, December 7, 1998.

“Lagi, Massa Tersulut.” Panji Masyarakat, December 2, 1998.

Lowry. Bob. “East Timor: An Overview of Political Developments,” in “Batlle of Wills,” Asiaweek, October 6, 2000.

McBeth, John and Dini Djalal. “Tragic Island: Ambon Violence May Have Had Its Origins in Jakarta.” Far Eastern Economic Review, March 25, 1999.

Majalah Forum Keadilan, February 10, 1997.

Majalah Forum Keadilan 7, No. 8, July 27, 1998.

Majalah Forum Keadilan, No. 25, March 1999.

Majalah Forum Keadilan 8, No. 16, July 25, 1999.

Majalah Gatra 4, No. 38, August 8, 1998.

Majalah Gatra 4, No. 41, August 29, 1998.

Majalah Gatra 5, No. 20, April 3, 1999.

369 Majalah Gatra 5, No. 53, November 20, 1999.

Majalah Gatra 6, No. 10, January 22, 2000.

Majalah Gatra 6, No.11, January 29, 2000.

Majalah Gatra 10, No. 12, February 5, 2000.

Majalah Gatra, January 27, 2001.

Majalah Panji Masyarakat, July 5, 2000.

Majalah Panji Masyarakat, August 30, 2000.

Majalah Tempo, November 23, 1998.

Majalah Tempo 27, No. 15, January 12-18, 1999.

Majalah Tempo 27, No. 40, December 6-12, 1999.

Majalah Tempo 28, No. 8, April 24-30, 2000.

Majalah Tempo 29, No. 5, April 3-9, 2000.

Majalah Tempo 29, No. 12, May 22-28, 2000.

Majalah Tempo 29, No. 15, June 12-18, 2000.

Majalah Tempo, July 19, 2000.

Majalah Tempo 29, No. 37, November 13-19, 2000.

Majalah Tempo, March 11, 2001.

Majalah Tempo 30, No. 2, March 12-18, 2001.

Majalah Tempo 30, No. 3, March 19-25, 2001.

Majalah Tempo 30, No. 7, April 16-22, 2001.

Majalah Tempo 30, No. 18, July 2-8, 2001.

Majalah Tempo, 30, No. 52, February 25-March 3, 2002.

Majalah Tempo, 31, No. 41, December 8-15, 2002.

370 Majalah Tempo, May 21, 2006.

McBeth, John. “Worse to Come.” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 29, 1999.

McBeth, John, Dan Murphy, Rodney Tasker, and Michael Vatikiotis, “Indonesia: No Way Out.” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 23, 1999.

McCarthy, Terry. “Democrat.or Boss?” Time, Search Time.com, July 09, 2000.

“Operasi Inteljen di Banyuwangi.” Majalah Tajuk, February 1998.

“Peristiwa.” Majalah Tempo, May 13, 2001.

“Perjalanan Perkara Soeharto.” Majalah Tempo, May 21, 2006.

“Perjalanan Soeharto di Ranah Hukum.” Majalah Forum Keadilan, No.4, May 21, 2006.

“Political Briefs.” Van Zorge Report, January 22, 2001.

“Political Brief.” Van Zorge Report, February 2, 2001.

“Political Briefs.” Van Zorge Report, March 19, 2001.

“Provokator Menjahili Negeri.” Majalah Forum Keadilan, February 8, 1999.

“Reports Highlight Army’s Role in Lombok’s Riots.” Far Eastern Economic Review, January 27, 2000.

“Sekelumit Fakta Seputar Bom Natal.” Majalah Tempo, February 25, 2001.

“Setelah Ambon Mana Lagi.” Panji Masyarakat, February 3, 1999.

“Siapa Dalang Bom: GAM, Militer, Atau...” Majalah Tajuk, No. 16, September 28- October 11, 2000.

“Siapa Pengembus Badai SARA.” Majalah Forum Keadilan, December 28, 1998.

“Sipil Aceh: Teroris Atau Kambing Hitam.” Majalah Tempo, October 1, 2000.

“Sipil Berwajah Militer.” Majalah Forum Keadilan, No. 07, June 11, 2006.

“Suharto Inc.: All in the Family.” Time Asia, May 24, 1999.

Suara Hidayatullah, edition 04/XII, August 1999.

“Tamu Misterius di Biara Fransiskan.” Majalah Tempo, February 25, 2001.

371 “Terusir dari Sampit, Merana di Madura.” Majalah Tempo, March 18, 2001.

“Timtim Membara, Habibie Rontok?” Majalah Tempo, September 19, 1999.

“Tiada Kata Jera dalam Demo.” Majalah Forum Keadilan, January 11, 1999.

Time, Volume 153, No. 20, May 24, 1999.

“Yohannes Yakob: Kami Sudah Pegang Kartu Truf.” Majalah D&R, December 12, 1998.

“Wisma Doulos, Serangan Malam.” Majalah Tempo, December 26, 1999.

Newspapers

“47 Injured in Medan Church Blast.” The Jakarta Post, May 29, 2000.

“25 Gembong Teroris Mengancam.” Suara Pembaruan, August 13, 2009.

Abdussalam, Andi. “News Focus: Soeharto's Health and Legal Case.” Antara, May 20, 2006.

“Activists Urge Jakarta Not to Declare Emergency in Aceh.” Agence French Press, July 12, 2002.

Adi, Windoro. “Apel Pancasila: Kamu-kamu, Kita-kita …”, Harian Kompas, June 8, 2006.

Agence France-Presse November 11-14, 2000.

Agence France-Presse, January 6, 2001.

Agence France-Presse, March 17, 2001.

Agence France-Presse, March 25, 2001.

“AGO Reopens Graft Case against Tommy”, The Jakarta Post, July 20, 2007.

“Aksi Balas Dendam Terungkap: TNI Pecat Yuli Karsono karena JI.” Harian Kompas, June 25, 2010: 3.

“Amandemen Jangan Digagas Politisi.” Harian Kompas, Maret 22, 2007.

“Anarkisme Akan Ditindak.” Harian Kompas, June 9, 2006.

372 “Antiteror TNI Kerahkan Pasukan ke Kecamatan.” Koran Tempo, August 12, 2009.

“Attack on Doulos Complex Condemned.” The Jakarta Post, December 17, 1999.

Bayuni, Endy M. “How Soeharto Schemed and Habibie Botched It.” The Jakarta Post, October 9, 2006.

“BB Buka ‘Extra Account’ untuk Tampung Pengembalian Utang.” Suara Pembaruan, August 16, 1999.

Bhaskara, Harry. Questioning Gus Dur. Jakarta: The Jakarta Post, 2000.

“Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Harus Dipertahankan.” Harian R-publika, June 5, 2006.

“Blast Rocks Jakarta Mosque.” BBC News, April 19, 1999.

“Bombing after 1998 Have Not Been Resolved.” The Jakarta Post, January 19, 2001.

“Bom di Kejagung: Dua Pria dalam Hardtop Diperiksa.” Suara Pembaruan, July 14, 2000.

Brummitt, Chris. “Indonesia Marks Eighth Anniversary of Downfall of Ex-dictator Suharto.” Associated Press, May 21, 2006.

Buchori, Mochtar. „NU: A Bullwark of Indonesian Democracy?” The Jakarta Post, December 7, 1994.

Clarke, Rachel. “Aceh’s Bloody War”, BBC News Online, July 17, 2002.

“Country Will Not Become Islamic State.” The Straits Times, October 9, 1998.

“Data Korban Kekerasan Seksual 1998 Diserahkan.” Harian Kompas, May 24, 2008.

Dodd, Tim. “Stabbing Triggers Alarm for Wahid's Rule.” Australian Financial Review, March 7, 2000.

“Di Tengah Evakuasi Pengungsi Sampit, TNI dan Brimob Baku Tembak.” Harian Kompas, February 28, 2001.

“DPR Nilai Pemerintah Tak Serius: Kultur TNI Harus Diubah.” Harian Kompas, September 22, 2006

“Drop Soeharto Trial to Avoid More Violence --Minister.” Reuters, September 15, 2000.

“East Timorese Chose Independence.” Associated Press, September 3, 1999.

373 England, Vaudine. “Megawati and Her Generals”, South China Morning Post, December 26, 2000.

Fawthrop, Tom. “Indonesian Military's Links to Terror.” Asia Times, November 7, 2002.

Fitrianto, Dahono and Ingki Rinaldi, “Bayang-bayang Sebuah Kejayaan.” Harian Kompas, January 4, 2009.

Fointuna, Yemris and Abdul Khalik. “Former Timor Militias Reject CTF Report.” The Jakarta Post, July 15, 2008.

“FPI Activists Rally against Communism.” The Jakarta Post, March 19, 2000.

“FPI Members Attack Rights Commission Headquarters.” The Jakarta Post, June 24, 2000.

“FPI Minta Komnas HAM Dibubarkan.” Kompas, January 11, 2009.

“FPI Rusak Kantor Komnas HAM dan Kafe Jimbani.” Harian Kompas, June 24, 2000.

Galpin, Richard. “Army Accused over Moluccas Conflict.” BBC News, July 17, 2000.

“Gubernur BI: Rp. 546 Milyar Dikembalikan.” Suara Pembaruan, August 18, 1999.

Hanni S, Vincentia. “Kejahatan Negara Tanpa Pertanggungjawaban,” Harian Kompas, May 16, 2006.

Harian Kompas, July 7, 1998.

Harian Kompas, March 4, 1999.

Harian Kompas, March 6, 1999.

Harian Kompas, September 9, 1999.

Harian Kompas, September 13, 1999.

Harian Kompas, July 18, 2000.

Harian Kompas, July 28, 2000.

Harian Kompas, December 27, 2004.

Harian Kompas, January 23, 2007.

“Indonesia Tak Punya Sejarah Kebebasan Pers.” Harian Kompas, March 15, 2007.

374 Harian Republika, January 5-6, 1999.

Harian Republika, March, 6, 1999.

Haubold, Erhard. “Jakarta im Wettlauf mit der Zeit,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November, 15, 1999.

Hotland, Tony. “RI, T. Leste Both Involved in ‘Gross Rights Violations’“: CTF. The Jakarta Post, July 12, 2008.

“I’m Just Anticipating Change Earlier than the Others.” Van Zorge Report, January 7, 2000.

“I Could Have Taken Power.” The Age, January 23, 2000.

Imawan, Riswanda. “Make-up of Megawati’s Team: To Please and Appease.” The Jakarta Post, August 10, 2001.

“Indonesia Belum Miliki Budaya Politik Seperti Korea Selatan.” Media Indonesia, Mei 9, 2005.

“Indonesian Election Triggers Violence.” BBC News, 2005.

“Indonesia Army Kills 400 Alleged Aceh Rebels since May 19.” Associated Press, July 16, 2004

“Indonesia Harus Kembali ke UUD 1945 Asli dan Pancasila.” Harian Kompas, July 6, 2006.

“Indonesia: Missionary Agency Says Borneo Massacre Death Toll 3000, Not 400.” BBC Worldwide, March 6, 2001.

“Indonesian Military Offensive in Aceh Could Last until April”, Agence France Presse, September 4, 2003.

“Indonesia Muslims, Christians Move to Avoid Conflict.” UCA News, February 14, 2000.

“Indonesian President Says Acehnese Have Right to Referendum.” Agence France- Presse, November 4, 1999.

“Indonesia Troops Told to ‘Exterminate’ Aceh Rebels, Spare Civilians,” Agence France- Presse, 20 May 2003.

“Indonesia Wahid: Wants to Hold Referendum on Aceh in 7 Months.” Dow Jones, November 16, 1999.

375 “Inside Story: The Silent Coup.” The Straits Times, September 12, 1999.

“Ironi Kemiskinan di Negeri Kaya,” Kompas, April 9, 2005.

“Jakarta Bombs Rebels,” Reuters, May 29, 2003.

“Kapuspen: Presiden Bukan Pangti TNI.” Harian Republika, December 28, 1999.

“Kelompok Cilangkap Dominan.” Media Indonesia, June 11, 2000.

“Kembalikan Pancasila ke Aceh”. Suara Pembaruan, January 6, 2009.

“Kerusuhan Maluku Makin Meluas.” Harian Republika, Desember 23, 2000.

“Kerusuhan Mei 1998: Kejahatan Negara Tanpa Pertanggungjawaban.” Harian Kompas, May 16, 2006.

Khalik, Abdul. “Ethnic-Based Conflict Continues to Haunt West Kalimantan.” The Jakarta Post, February 28, 2008.

“Kita Tetap Tegas, Tolak Presiden Perempuan.” Koran Tempo, June 23, 2001.

“Komnas HAM: Segera Adili Pelanggar HAM.” Harian Kompas, April 27, 2006.

“Konflik Poso: Pemerintah Seharusnya Evaluasi Operasi Sintuwu Maroso.” Harian Kompas, March 13, 2006.

“Korban Gus Dur Bertambah.” Media Indonesia, March 28, 2008.

“Korupsi Kostrad Terkuak, 2 Kolonel Dipecat.” Koran Jawa Pos, July 15, 2000.

“Koruptor yang Lolos dari Pengawasan Imigrasi.” Media Indonesia, May 3, 2010.

Kwik Kian Gie. “Tiga Debitor ke Istana, Soal Kecil!” Harian Kompas, February 18, 2006.

Lekic, Slobodan. “Suharto Loyalist Takes Over Military”, Associated Press, June 18, 2002.

“LSM: Soeharto Harus Diproses Hukum.” Suara Pembaruan, May 9, 2006.

Lubis, Todung Mulya. “Restropeksi Pelanggaran HAM di Timtim.” Harian Kompas, December 22, 2008.

376 “Mahasiswa Mengaku Informan Minta Perlindungan Komnas HAM.” Media Minggu, November 22, 1998.

“Mantan KSAD: TNI Jangan Dipaksa Gunakan Hak Pilih.” Suara Karya, November 17, 2006: 4.

Mariyane, Vini. “Pelanggar HAM Masa Lalu Bebas dari Hukuman.” Media Indonesia, March 19, 2010.

“Marzuki Siap Mundur dari Komnas HAM.” Harian Republika, December 21, 1999.

“Mayoritas Kekerasan Terjadi Saat Darurat Militer.” Harian Kompas, January 23, 2007.

Media Indonesia, July 8, 1998.

Media Indonesia, November 20, 1998.

Media Indonesia, November 10, 1998.

“Megawati Disebutkan Tahu Rencana Penyerbuan Itu …” Harian Kompas, July 29, 2008.

“Megawati Minta Pansus Cermati RUU APP.” Media Indonesia, March 8, 2006.

McBeth, John. “Shadow Play.” Australia Review, July 23, 1998.

“Medan Church Bombs Linked to Provocateurs.” The Indonesian Observers, August 21, 2000.

“Military ‘knows’ the bombers, police don’t”, The Jakarta Post, October 25, 2002.

“Military Maneuvers.” The Financial Times, September 13, 1999.

Moore, Matthew and Karuni Rompies. “Kopassus Guilty of Eluay Murder,” April 22, 2003, The Age. http://www.theage.com.au/artice/2003/04/21/1050777211770- .htl..

Mursidi, Nur. “Munir, A Fighter Never to Be Forgotten.” The Jakarta Post, April 17, 2005.

Naim, Mochtar. “Mohammad Natsir dengan Konsep Integral dan Toleransinya.” Harian Republika, July 24, 2008.

“Noegroho Says 'Brochures Provoked Doulos Burning.'” The Jakarta Post, January 03, 2000.

377 Nurhayati, Desy. “TNI ‘Armed’ East Timor Civilians.” The Jakarta Post, October 25, 2007.

“Pangdam Jelek, Out Saja.” Banjarmasin Post,March 18, 2000.

Pardomuan, Lewa. “Indonesian Islanders Take Borneo Riots Lightly.” Reuters, March 28, 1999.

“Pelaku ‘Bom Kejaksaan’ Eks Paspampres, Sebuah ‘Hard Top’ Putih Diamankan.” Media Indonesia, July 13, 2000.

“Pelaku Pembunuhan ‘Dukun Santet’ di Malang Dibayar Rp. 3 Juta.” Harian Republika, December 27, 2000.

“Pemerintah Dinilai Lebih Cinta SDA daripada SDM.” Harian Kompas, June 5, 2006.

“Penegakan HAM Tak Membaik.” Harian Kompas, January 28, 2005.

Pereira, Derwin. “Wiranto is the Man to Watch,” and “Inside Story: The ‘Silent Coup.’ The Straits Times, September 12, 1999.

“Perjalanan FPI Membasmi Tempat Maksiat.” Bali Post, December 19, 2000.

Perry, Richard Lloyd. “Dark Forces Strikes Lombok.” The Independent, January 23, 2000.

“Personel Kopassus Akan Dirampingkan.” Suara Merdeka, March 21, 2000.

“Pertahankan Pancasila.” Harian Kompas, September 22, 2006.

“Pidato Gus Dur.” Suara Pembaruan, June 8, 2006.

“Purnawirawan TNI Khawatir Aceh Lepas.” Harian Kompas, September 18, 2005.

Rabasa, Angel M. “Stop Snubbing Indonesia’s Military.” The International Herald Tribune, August 2, 2002.

Rachman, M. Fadjroel. “Rekor Koruptor ‘Top Markotop.’” Harian Kompas, September 20, 2007.

“Ramos Horta: Indonesia Harus Minta Maaf.” Koran Tempo, March 18, 2010.

“Rekomendasi Komnas HAM Soal Timtim.” Harian Kompas, February 1, 2000.

“Rekomendasi ‘Mandul’ Pansus Poso.” Harian Kompas, July 14, 2005.

378 “Restropeksi Pelanggaran HAM di Timtim.” Harian Kompas, December 22, 2008.

“RI Accepts Blame in E. Timor Mayhem.” The Jakarta Post, July 16, 2008.

“Riots Claim 10 Lives.” The St. Petersburg Times, World Watch, March 23, 2001.

Roberts, John. “Indonesian Military Steps Up Repression in West Papua”, WSWS, June 8, 2002.

“Rukardi, ‘Budaya Jawa Digugat Habis,’” Suara Merdeka, November 19, 2006.

“Salah Paham, Aparat Bentrok”, Banjarmasin Post, February 28, 2001.

Samego, Indria. “Reformasi Masih Hadapi 75 Persen TNI yang Konservatif.” Harian Kompas, December 21, 2006.

Sangaji, Arianto. “Kekerasan Poso dan Ekspansi Modal”, Harian Kompas, September 12, 2006.

Santoso, Aboeprijadi. “Generals and the ‘Invention of Tradition.’” The Jakarta Post, May 6, 2008.

“Saya dan TNI Siap Bertanggung Jawab.” Harian Kompas, February 2, 2000.

“Sejumlah Pangdam Ingin Goyang Saya.” Banjarmasin Post, March 15, 2000.

“Seluruh Tapol dan Napol Dibebaskan.” Harian Republika, Desember 24, 1999.

Shenon, Philip. “Suharto Rebuilds His Political Base to Shield Fortune.” The New York Times, July 2, 1998.

“Siapa Bohir Proyek Pembunuhan Matori.” Koran Kontan, March 13, 2000.

Sijabat, Ridwan M. “Political Elites ‘Prolonging’ Poso Sectarian Conflict.” The Jakarta Post, April 29, 2006.

Sims, Calvin. “Jakarta Won't Pardon Suharto Son; Orders Militia Chief's Arrest.” New York Times.com, October 5, 2000.

“Situasi Kebangsaan: Bangsa Terpuruk, Kaum Nasionalis Kumpul.” Harian Kompas, March 20, 2006.

“Soeharto’s (Un) Pardon.” Asian Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2006.

“Suharto Inc.: All in the Family.” Time Asia, May 24, 1999.

379 “Suharto Son Orders Militia Chief's Arrest.” New York Times.com, October 5, 2000.

Sunday Times, October 27, 2002.

Sunjayadi, Achmad. “Membaca ‘Dongeng’ Nusantara.” Harian Kompas, October 27, 2008.

Suryodiningrat, Meidyatama. “Who are the Indonesians?” The Jakarta Post, August, 16, 2005.

Susanto, Ichwan and Edna C. Pattisina. “Otonomi Daerah Papua Barat (4): Jakarta (Masih) Utang.” Harian Kompas, February 27, 2010.

Soesastro, Hadi. “Market Will Give the Cabinet the Benefit of the Doubt,” The Jakarta Post, August 10, 2001.

Suara Pembaruan, June 16, 2006.

“Suspect in Ramayana Blast Testify in Court.” The Jakarta Post, June 16, 1999.

“‘Sweeping’ Buku Berbau Kiri Tetap Akan Berlanjut.” Harian Kompas, May 8, 2001.

“Tahun Gelap Penegakan Hu-kum dan Hak Asasi Manusia.” Harian Kompas, January 4, 2005.

“Terpidana Kasus Poso Diperiksa.” Media Indonesia, April 4, 2006.

“The Aceh Stalemate,” Laksamana.net, January 31, 2005, http://ocha-gwapps1.unog.ch/ rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/VBOL-696KKJ?OpenDocument, was accessed on June 1, 2010.

The Jakarta Post, October 15, 1998.

The Jakarta Post, November 23, 1999.

The Jakarta Post, January 19, 2000.

The Jakarta Post, January 29, 2000.

The Jakarta Post, July 31, 2000.

The Jakarta Post, August 7, 2000.

The Jakarta Post, September 11, 2000.

380 The Jakarta Post, September 22, 2000.

The Jakarta Post, November 27, 2000.

The Jakarta Post, March 8, 2001.

The Jakarta Post, May 8, 2001.

The Jakarta Post, January 2, 2002.

The Jakarta Post, January 11, 2002.

The Jakarta Post, October 25, 2002.

The Jakarta Post, March 3, 2003.

The Jakarta Post, March 21, 2003.

Thoenes, Sander. “Indonesian Military Power Undimmed by Humiliations.” Financial Times, September 21, 1999.

Tjahyono, Subur. “Memasyarakatkan Pilar Bernegara hingga ke Ngruki.” Kompas, April 30, 2010: 2.

Tomagola, Thamrin Amal. “Tolak Tank-Demokrasi Thailand.” Harian Kompas, October 7, 2006.

“TNI Klaim Telah Tewaskan 2.800 Anggota GAM.” Acehkita, September 17, 2004.

“TNI Should be Given More Authority to Maintain Security.” The Jakarta Post, March 2, 2001.

“Tommy and Habib Ali Baaqil.” Indonesian Observer, September 18, 2000.

“TNI Akui Mampu Hadapi Terorisme: Tiga Kemampuan Angkatan Darat Menganggur,” Harian Kompas, August 19, 2009.

“Transisi Demokrasi, Habibie Ingatkan Indonesia Membayar Mahal untuk Demokrasi.” Harian Kompas, June 7, 2006.

“Tyasno: Amandemen UUD’45 Tidak Sah.” Suara Pembaruan, September 21, 2006.

“UU KKR Abaikan Hak Korban,” Suara Pembaruan, June 22, 2006.

“UU KKR, Banyak Pasal Dinilai Rugikan Korban,” Media Indonesia, April 13, 2006.

381 Utama, Adhitya Cahya. “Militer Usul Intelijen Bisa Menangkap.” Jurnal Nasional, September 8, 2009.

“Versi TNI: 662 Warga Sipil Tewas Sejak Darurat Militer.” Acehkita, September 17, 2004

“Wahid’s Statement on Aceh Vote Only Personal Opinion: Army Spokesman.” Agence France-Presse, November 17, 1999.

“Warga Maumere Berdoa Tolak Eksekusi Tibo Cs.” Suara Pembaruan, April 3, 2006.

“Warga Sipil Keberatan Upaya Pertahankan Koter.” Harian Kompas, March 1, 2007.

“Wiranto Risau Terpuruk Solidaritas Kebangsaan.” Rakyat Merdeka, June 1, 2006.

“Wiranto Sues UI Sociologist.” The Jakarta Post, May 1, 2001.

“Yang Berubah dari TNI Baru Senjata”, Harian Republika, December 20, 2006.

“100 Top Officers in Major ABRI Reshuffled.” The Straits Times, January 6, 1999.

Portal Sources

“Abdurrahman Wahid: Southeast Asia History, Biographies.” http://reference.allrefer. com/encyclopedia/W/WahidA.html: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005.

Aditjondro, George Junus. “Notes on the Jihad forces in Maluku.” July 2000. http:// www.angelfire.com/rock/hotburrito/laskar/aditjondro500.html, was accessed on May 5, 2010.

______. “Financing Human Rights Abuses.” November 20, 2000. http://www. koteka.net/part1.htm.

Affandi, Anton. “Analysis: Megawati’s Struggle for Power,” BBC News, news.bbc.co. uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/481341.stm: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005.

Amri, Arfi Bambani. “Buku Manuver Taufiq Kiemas: Mengapa Megawati Lembek pada Soeharto Faktor Pertama, Soeharto Tak Pernah Berniat Membunuh Bung Karno dan Keluarganya,” January 12, 2010, Viva News. http://politik.vivanews.com/ news/read/120386-mengapa_ megawati_lembek_pada_soeharto, was accessed on January 30, 2010;

“Anggaran Militer Naik 62%.” TNI Watch! December 15, 1999.

“Awas, Aksi Kelompok ‘Eks-Tidar.” Siar-XPOS, March 11, 1999.

382 “Awas, Pasukan Ninja Menuju Jakarta.” SiaR News Service. November 4, 1998. Siar@ minihub.org, http://apchr.murdoch.edu.au/minihub/xp,Xpos, No. 43/I/24, Oktober 30, 1998.

“Azhahari Diduga Tewas: Kelompok Teroris Masih Berikan Perlawanan.” http://www. kompas.com/utama/news/0511/09/200258-.htm: 1-2, was accessed on October 9, 2005.

“Bali Bombing Suspect Admits Role in Philippine Embassy Bombing.” Xinhua News Agency, Xinhuanet, 2003-06-19. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-06/19/ content_927980.htm, was accessed on May 4, 2010.

“Bali Suspects Linked to 2000 Blast.” BBC NEWS/ASIA-PACIFIC. http://news.bbc.co. uk/2/low/asia-pacific/2839501.stm, was accessed on May 4, 2010.

Bambani Amri, Arfi. “Buku Manuver Taufiq Kiemas: Mengapa Megawati Lembek pada Soeharto Faktor Pertama, Soeharto Tak Pernah Berniat Membunuh Bung Karno dan Keluarganya.” January 12, 2010. Viva News. http://politik.vivanews.com/ news/read/120386-mengapa_megawati_lembek_pada_soeharto, was accessed on January 30, 2010.

Barton, Greg. Gus Dur. The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid. Equinox Publishing (Asia) Pte. Ltd., 2005. http://www.antarakita.net/reviews/r24.html: 1- 3, was accessed on October, 29, 2005.

“Berita Penerangan Peristiwa Kupang.” http://www.dephan.go.id.

“BIN wants its power back from police”, February 24, 2003, Laksamana.net..

BPS. http://www.bps.go.id, was accessed on November 21, 2000.

Brown, Jason. “The Banyuwangi Murders: Why Did Over a Hundred Black Magic Practitioners Die in East Java Late in 1998?” Inside Indonesia, No. 62, April-June 2000, http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2000/08/16/0015html.

Budiardjo, Carmel. “Indonesia’s Territorial Integrity and the TNI’s Role in Crushing Separatism”, http: //tapol.gn.apc.org/reports/r030603tni.htm, was accessed on June 3, 2003.

“Cerita dari Kakek dan Paman, Keluarga Margono Djojohadikusumo.” March 30, 2009, MegaPrabowo 2009. http://perubahanuntukrakyat.com/2009/03/30/cerita-dari- kakek-dan-paman/, was accessed on February 23, 2010.

“Cerita di Balik Apel TNI di Monas.” Detik.com, July 23, 2001.

383 “Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Acheh Movement.” http://www.hdcentre.org/ programmes/aceh/aceh%20COH.htm, January 15, 2003.

Conboy, Ken. Kopassus: Inside Indonesia's Special Forces Equinox. Jakarta, 2003.

______.Intel: Inside Indo-nesia's Intelligence Service Equinox. Jakarta, 2003.

“Cucu SBY Diberi Nama Almira Tunggadewi Yudhoyono.” Kompas-online, http:// www.Kompas.com/read/xml/2008/08/18/14385984/…, was accessed on March 19, 2009.

Dephumham. http://www.legalitas.org, was accessed on June 11, 2009.

Detik.com July 19, 2000.

Dodd, Mark. “Kopassus in E Timor-Licensed to kill.” The Australian, December 19, 2005.Theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,1760444498%5E28 737,00.html.

“East Java Cleric's Killing 'Politically Motivated'”, Laksamana.net, November 30, 2003.

“Ekspresi Kemarahan Angkatan 1973.” TNI Watch! December 21, 1999.

“Enam Wakil Laskar Jihad Bertemu Presiden.” Harian Kompas, April 7, 2000.

“FPI Pertanyakan Profesionalisme KPP HAM dan Marzuki Darusman.” December 27, 1999,http://www.Berpolitik.com/articles/99/12/27/1948200.shtml,Berpolitik.com.

“Freedom in the World,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15, was accessed on July 1, 2010.

“Gerakan Revolusi Nurani Anggap Perubahan UUD 1945 Tidak Sah.” Harian Kompas, January 4, 2007.

“Giliran Mantan Wakasad Diperiksa.” Harian Kompas, May 4, 2000.

“Gorries Mere Pimpin Tim Tangani Terorisme di Sulteng.” http://www.Kompas.com/ utama/News/ 0511/21/160617/.htm: 1, was accessed on November 22, 2005.

“Gubernur Papua Minta Segera Cabut Inpres No. 1/2003”, http://www.suarapembaruan. com/News/2007/ 04/21/Nusantara/ nus-14.htm, was accessed on April 21, 2007.

“Gufron Arrest May Lead to Suharto's Dark Forces.” Laksamana.Net, December 10, 2002.

384 “Habibie B.J.” http://www.bookrags.com/history/worldhistory/habibie-b-jema-02/.

Havely, Joe. “Analysis: New Hope for Indonesia?” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/ hi/world/asia-pacific/481548.stm, was accessed on October 29, 2005.

Hayati, Istiqomatul. “Polisi Akan Periksa Brigjen (Purn.) Rustam Kastor.” Tempo Interaktif, May 8, 2001. http://www.tempoin-teraktif.com/ hg/nasional/ 2001/05/08/brk, 20010508-14,id.html.

Head, Jonathan.” Profile: President BJ Habibie.” BBC Special Report. http://www.news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ events/indonesia/profiles/98092.stm.

Heryanto, Ariel. “Udang di Balik Terror.” http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas=cetak/05- 11/07/opini/2150-44-5. htm: 1-2, was accessed on November 9, 2005.

Hosen, Nadirsyah. “Habibie, Soeharto, and Yudhoyono: A Better World for All.” May 21, 2006.

“Human Rights Commission Releases Report on Maluku Conflict.” Detikworld, February 6, 2001.

“Ikrar Kesetiaan Kostrad: Tetap Loyal kepada NKRI.” http://www.Kompas.com/ kompas-cetak/0105/21/ UTAMA/teta01.htm, May 21, 2001.

“Ikrar: Yudoyono Tidak Memiliki ‘Leadership.’” Suara Pembaruan. http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2005/11/19/Nasional/nas07.htm.

“Indonesia: Corruption Timeline.” Global Integrity Report 2004. http://www.globalintegrity.com, Washington DC.

“Indonesian Election Triggers Violence.” BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ asia-pacific/480232.stm, was accessed on October 29, 2005.

“Indonesian Military.” http://www.nationmaster.com/country/id-indonesia/mil-military, was accessed on March 21, 2009.

“Indonesia Sues Suharto’s Son Tommy over Car Maker Sale”, Suharto, Indosnesos, May 5, 2008.

“Inpres No. 14/2005 tentang Poso, Menguji Kesungguhan Pemerintah.” http://www.suara pembaruan.com/News/2005/12/ 01/Sorotan/sor01.htm,: 1-3, was accessed on December 1, 2005.

Isisdorus, Robert. “Pilkada atau Pemekaran Papua”, http://www.suarapembaruan.com/ News/2005/11/26/Utama/ut05.htm,: 1-2, was accessed on November 27, 2005.

385 “Javanese.” http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery,jsessionid=agrmk82835k6s?tname= javanese&s...

“Jejak Intel Swadaya.” Tempo Interaktif. http://www.tem-pointeraktif.com/khusus/ selusur/markus2/ page04.php, was accessed on May1, 2010.

Jolly, Joanna. “Militias Vow to Rise from the Ashes”, South China Morning Post, November 19, 1999.

Karon, Tony. “Megawati: The Princess Who Settled for the Presidency,” Time, http:// www.time.com/ time pow/printout/0,8816,169130,00.html: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005.

“Kasus Talangsari Lampung Dibuka Lagi.” Tempo Interaktif. http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2005/0401/brk, 200504..., April 1, 2005, was accessed on March 12, 2010.

“Kasus Penembakan di Papua: Upaya Pisahkan Papua dari NKRI.” http://www.westpapua.net/news/03/01/030103-kasus_penembakan_di_papua_upaya_pi...,January 3, 2003.

Khalik, Abdul. “RI Poised to Recover US$ 800 Million in Stolen Assets.” The Jakarta Post, Septermber 5, 2007, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/09/05/ri- poised-recover-800m, was accessed on May 1, 2010.

Kingsbury, Damien. “The Blessing of September 11': The 'War on Terror', Reform and the TNI.” Joyo Indonesia News, Kabar Irian, June 29, 2004 (Part 2).

“Kopassus Behind Militia Attacks: Repor.t” Laksamana.Net, 22 January 2002.

“Kostrad Tetap Loyal kepada NKRI.” Mei 21, 2000. http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/ basisdata/2001/ 05/20/0040.html.

Kuppuswamy, C.S. “Indonesia: Armed Forces and Their Diminishing Political Role.” Paper No. 528, October 7, 2002. http://www.saag.org/papers6/paper528.html, was accessed on May 4, 2005.

“Lambang Akademi Militer” (“Symbol of Military Academy”). http://www.akmil.ac.id/ lambang.php#top.

Lane, Max. “Bebaskan Semua Tapol.” http://www.xs4all.nl/-prdeuro/LIBERATEN/ Nomor8/mimbar-i.htm.

386 “Laporan Lengkap KPP HAM Tim-tim oleh Komnas HAM.” http://www. elsam. or.id/ pdf/monham/timtim/Laporan%20Leng-kap%20KPP%20HAM%20Tim-tim%oleh %20Komnas%20HAM.pdf, was accessed on July 3, 2010.

“Laskar Jihad Poses a New Threat”, Tapol, [email protected], September 16, 2002.

“Leader of Gus Dur's Party Stabbed.” The Straits Times, March 6, 2000. http://straitstimes. asia1.com.sg/asia/sea1_03-06.html,

Luwarso, Lukas.” Pers Indonesia, Pergulatan untuk Kebebasan.” [email protected] dix.net, http:// www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2000/08/31/0006.html.

“Mabes TNI-AD Bersikeras Mendirikan Korem di Flores.” TNI Watch! Siarlist@minihub.org, December 15, 1999.

Mcbeth , John and Michael Vatiokis. “Timor: Jakarta’s Shame,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 21, 200. http://www.feer.com/000921/p16region.html.

MacDougall Jr, John M. “Lombok Unrest: Desription and Analysis.” January 22, 1999. http://www. groups.yahoo.com/group/berita-bhinneka/message/14813.

“Maju Mundur Penanganan Kasus Soeharto.” Reformasi Hukum, October 5, 2006. http:// reformasihukum.org/konten.php?nama=MekanismeLegislasi&op=detail_politik_ mekanisme_legislasi&id=81.

“Mantan Panglima PPI Dimakamkan di TMP Seroja.” Republika-online, June 11, 2009, was accessed on June 11, 2009.

Marajo, Asril Sutan. “Mencermati Kinerja KPU.” Suara Merdeka, 3 Desember 2003. http://www.suara merdeka.com/ harian/0312/03/kha1.htm.

Margianto, Heru. “Megawati: Jangan Paksakan Proses Hukum terhadap Soeharto.” Kompas Cyber Media, April 25, 2006. http://www.infoanda.com/linksfollow.php?lh=BlNU-UVBQBgRV; kepustakaan- presiden.pnri.go.id/uploaded_files/.../KCM_20060425.pdf, was accessed on January 30, 2010.

McBeth, John and Michael Vatikiotis. “Timor: Jakarta’s Shame.” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 21, 2000. http://www.feer.com/_0009_21/p16region.html.

“Megawati Sukarnoputri Biography.” http://megawati-sukarnoputri.biography.ms: 1-4, was accesssed on October 29, 2005.

“Megawati Elected Vice-President.” BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ asiapacific/481190.-stm, was accessed on October 29, 2005.

387 “Megawati Emerges from Sukarno’s Shadow.” http://edition.cnn.com/ 2001/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/ 07/23/indo.mega/: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005.

“Megawati Orders Quick Arrest of Tommy Soeharto.” The Jakarta Post, online edition. http://www.mega-wati-orders-quick-arrest-tommy-soeharto.html.

“Memberantas KKN Tak Cukup Hanya Pidato.” Kompas-Online, August 5, 2003. http://www.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0308/05/utama/472505.htm.

“Militer Menatap Masa Depan.” http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ ensiklopedi/e/endriar tono-sutarto/index.shtml, September 27, 2006.

“Muslim Leader Moves to Block Megawati,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ world/asia-pacific/ 37-3658.stm: 1-3, was accessed on October 29, 2005.

“Nearly 1,160 Aceh Rebels Killed in 10 Months”, Laksamana Net, August 18, 2004.

“NGOs Suggest Soeharto Be Tried in Absentia.” Antara News, 05/10/2006, http:// www.antara.co.id/en/ print/?i=1147268057, was accessed on May 1, 2010.

“'Ninja Killers' Resurface in East Java.” Laksamana.net, November 30, 2003.

Noorhaidi. Hasan, Laskar Jihad, Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post New Order Indonesia. Utrecht: Unversiteit Utrecht, 2005. https://openaccess.leiden- univ.nl/bitstream/1887/ 13369/1/Dissertation+Noorhaidi.pdf, was accessed on May 5, 2010.

O’Clery, Conor. “Killer Held in Mountains Tells of Murder Plans”, Irish Times, September 22, 1999.

Osdar, J. “Sentuhan Para Presiden kepada Papua.” December 1, 2005, Kompas-online. http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0512/01/Politikhukum/2254535.htm.

“Panglima TNI: Reformasi TNI Jalan Terus.” http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/ 0206/08/utama/pang01. htm, June 8, 2002.

“Panglima TNI, Itu Tergantung GAM, Penyelesaian Kasus Aceh Lebih Baik Via Diplomasi.” http://www.Pikiran-rakyat.com/cetak/0403/15/0502.htm, April 15, 2003.

“Pemerintah Dinilai Lamban Selesaikan Konflik Makassar.” Koran Kompas, Desember 31, 1999. [email protected].

388 “Penanganan Poso Perlu Dukungan Politik Presiden.” http://www.Suara- pembaruan.com/News/2005/11/22/Nasional/nas14.htm:1, was accessed on November 22, 2005

“Penantian Panjang Korban Pelanggaran HAM.” Wacana Ham. 2nd Edition, VI, July 1, 31, 2008. http://www.komnasham.go.id/portal/files/wacana%20edisi%20JULI% 202008.pdf, was accessed on May 11, 2010.

“Penegak Hukum Harus Adil dalam Kasus Antonius Wamang”, Suara Pembaruan, http: //www.suara-pembaruan.com/News/2007/04/21/Nasio-nal/nas02.htm, was accessed on April 21, 2007.

“Penganiayaan Matori: Kelompok Radikal dan Djaja Terlibat.” SiaR-Xpos, SiaR News Service. [email protected], March 11, 2000.

Perlez, Jane. “Below a Mountain of Wealth, a River of Waste,” New York Times, http://www.ny-times.com/2005/12/27/international/asia/27gold.html?pagewanted =1&n- Part I: 1, was accessed on December 28, 2005.

“Prajurit Profesional Sejati.” http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/r/ryami zardryacudu/index. shtml, was accessed on September 27, 2006: 1-6.

“Perang Melawan GAM, Satu-satunya Jalan Selesaikan Aceh.” http://www.Kompas. com/utama/news/02-08/30/040529.htm, was accessed on September 26, 2006.

“Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No. 2/2002.” http://perlindungansaksi.files. Wordpress.com/2008/07/pp-2-tahun-2002.pdf.

“Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No. 3/2002.” http://www.icel. or.id/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=157, ICEL.

“Pernyataan Sikap Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil untuk Papua: Mendesak Komnas HAM Menuntaskan Berbagai Kasus Pelanggaran Berat HAM di Papua.” July 28, 2004. http://www.kon-tras.org/index.php? hal=siaran_pers&id=229.

“Press Release Joint Council in Tokyo Failed to Reach an Agreement.” Kedutaan Besar Republik Indonesia Tokyo. http://www.kbri-canberra.org.au/press/press030519- e.htm.

“Political Culture.” http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/85.htm, May 4, 2005.

“Political Culture in America.” http://www.socialstudieshelp/APGOV_Political1%-20- Culture.htm., May 6, 2005.

389 “Prabowo Menyesal Tidak Kudeta.” Kompas-online, March 31, 2009. http://nasional. kompas.com/read/xml/2009/03/21360125/prabowo.menyesal.tak.kudeta, was accessed on March 31, 2009.

“Presiden Harus Beri Dukungan Politik ke Polri.” http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas- cetak/0511/22/politikhu-kum/22337-08. htm, loc.cit: 1, was accessed on November 22, 2005.

“Presiden Diminta Terbitkan Inpres Penghapusan Bisnis Militer.” http://www.detiknews. com/index.php/detik.read/ta-hun/2005/bulan/12//tgl/30/time/060: 1-3, was accessed on December 30, 2005.

“Press Release Joint Council in Tokyo Failed to Reach An Agreement,” Kedutaan Besar Republik Indonesia Tokyo, http://www.kbri-canberra.org.au/press/press0305- 19e.htm.

“Prioritas Atasi Konflik dan Teroris.” http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/w/ widodo/ index.shtml, September 27, 2006.

“Pusat Diminta Hormati Otsus Papua.” http://www.suarapembaruan.com/News/2005/11/ 26/Utama/ut- 01.htm.

Rachman, M. Fadjroel. “Jejak Langkah (daripada) Partai Golkar.” Kompas-online, December 5, 2005. http://www.Kompas.com/Kompas-cetak/0512/05/opini/22650- 07.htm.

Rosya, Vini Mariyane. “Pelanggar HAM Masa Lalu Bebas dari Hukuman.” Media Indonesia, March 19, 2010.

“Abu Sayyaf.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Sayyaf, was accessed on May 4, 2010.

“Abu Sayyaf Group (Philippines, Islamist separatists) ,” Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/9235/abu_sayyaf_group_philippines_islamist_se- paratist. html.

S. Victoria S. “Mayjen TNI Raden Agus Wirahadikusumah, MPA: Jenderal Kritis di Kursi Pangkostrad.” Indonesia Media Online, Berta 04-2000.htm, April 2000. http://www.indonesiamedia.com/rubrik/berta/berta00april-agus.htm.

“Sebuah Abolisi yang Menguji Megawati.” Liputan6. http://berita. liputan6.com/progsus/200112/25943/class=%27vidico%27,December 25, 2001.

“Sekilas Akmil: Lintasan Sejarah Akademi Militer.” http://www.akmil.ac.id/sekilas/php.

“Semua Berharap Penderitaan Itu Segera Berakhir.” http://www.suara-pembaruan.com/ News/2005/12/ 01/Sorotan/sor02.htm,: 1-2, was accessed on December 1, 2005.

390 “Siaran Pers Bersama Kontras, ICW, KAMUST, PBHI, Kelompok Kerja untuk Perdamaian Poso, Walhi, dan LPSHAM Sulteng mengenai Perluasan Konflik dan Kekerasan di Palu, Sulawesi Tengah.” December 15, 2004. http://www.kontras.org/index.php?hal=siaran_pers&id=234.

“Siaran Pers Kontras No. 26/SP-Kontras/XI/2004: Keberadaan Efektifitas Pasukan Keamanan di Poso Harus Dievaluasi.” November 9, 2004. http://www.kontras.org/index.php?hal= siaran_pers&id=238.

“Siaran Pers Bersama tentang Menyikapi Eskalasi Kekerasan di Sulawesi Tengah.” October 31, 2005. http://www.kontras.org/index.php?hal=siaran_pers&id=203.

Siar News Services, May 18, 2000.

“Soeharto, Patriot atau ‘Crook’” Kompas-online, April 11, 2007. http://www.Kompas. com/Kompas-cetak/0704/11utama/3438004.htm, was accessed on April 11, 2007.

“Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process,” Asia Report, No. 80, July 13, 2004, ICG. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east= asia/philippines/080-southern-philip-pines-backgrounder-terrorism-and-the- peace-process.aspx?alt_lang=id.

S.M, Rahman. “Building Political Culture a New.” http://www.friends.org.pk/rahman/ building%20political.htm.

Subagja, Indra. “Soeharto Bantah Ajukan Syarat Terima Penghargaan Golkar.” http:// jkt1.detiknews.com/indexphp/detik.read/tahun/2005/bulan/11/tgl/24/time/2130- 43ad- news/485918/id-kanal/10.

“Sulawesi Perlu Koter: Tak Ada Anggota TNI yang Terlibat Kasus Poso.” http://www. kompas.com/kompas-cetak/05-11/13/daerah/2208379.htm: 1-2, was accessed on November 13, 2005.

Susanto, Slamet and Tarko Sudiarno.” Schools bring ‘wayang kulit’ to classroom.” The Jakarta Post. http://www,thejakartapost.com/yesterdaydetail.asp?fileid=20050 3- 19.P01, March 19, 2005.

Susilo, I. Basis. “Ambalat dan Konsep Kuasa-Wilayah.” Kompas-online, June 12, 2009, was accessed on June 12, 2009.

Syafei, Ahmad. “Pers Masih Jadi Kambing Hitam.” Suara Merdeka, February 9, 2002. http://www.suara-merdeka.com/harianb/0202/ 09/ analisis1.htm.

391 Tanjung, Leanika and Eduardus Karel Dewant. “Badan Urusan (Logistik) Pesawat.” 29 Juni 2003, Tempo Online, http://majalahtempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2003/06/ 29/LU/mbm.20030629.LU88768.id.html, was accessed on May 26, 2010.

Tempo Online, http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2003/06/29/ LU/mbm. 20030629LU88768.id.html, was accessed on May 26, 2010.

“The Sampit Violence.” http://www.thejakartapost.com/editorial.asp. The Jakarta Post, February 23, 2001.

“Timeline, Global Integrity's 2006 Country Reports Website”, http://www.GlobalIntegrity.org, Was-hington DC, 2006, was accessed on May 29, 2009.

“Too High a Price.” Human Rights Watch. http://www.hrw.org/ja/node/11300/section/3

“TNI Tidak Tolerir Pemisahan Irian Jaya.” http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/2000/11/13/ 0048.html, November 14, 2000.

“Tokoh Agama Poso Protes Polisi.” http://www.Kompas.com/utama/ news/0511/25/68- 2541-.htm, was accessed on November 25, 2005.

Tran, Mark. “Abdurrahman Wahid.” Guardian Unlimited Special Reports. http:///www. guardian.co.uk/in-donesia/Story/0,2763,200655,00.html.

“Usaha Tangkal Aksi Penyerangan Bersenjata di Aceh, TNI Akan Gelar Operasi Militer Terbatas.” http://www.hamline. edu/apaka-bar/basisdata/2001/02/27/0047.html, February 28, 2001.

“Visi dan Misi” (“Vision and Mission”), http://www.akmil.ac.id/visi_misi.php.

Wardhana, Veven Sp. “Mass Media ‘a Hero’ In the Coverage of East Timor.” The Jakarta Post, November 19, 1999. http://www.sidsnet.org/mir/pacific/ usp/journ/nius/docs/nov99/ 24-58.html,

“West Papua: Indonesian Military Colonel Siagian, Indicted for Crimes against Humanity, Rallies Militias in West Papua.” The Institute for Papuan Advocacy & Human Rights (IPAHR), 2007. http://jsmp.minihub.org/ indictmentspdf/Cailacoindnannexeng07feb03; http://jsmp;minihub.org/indictmentspdf/Maliana_Burhanuddin 22_7_03.pdf.

“Widodo AS: Papua Bagian Integral RI yang Sah..” http://www.metronews.com/ berita.asp?id= 14320., was accessed on April 7, 2006.

“Xanana Akan Bawa Laporan Soal Kekejaman Indonesia ke PBB.” Media Indonesia Online, January 18, 2006. http://www.mediaindo.co.id.

392 Documents

Document-Indonesia: New Military Operations, Old Patterns of Human Rights Abuses in Aceh (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, NAD), Amnesty International Report 2009, London.

“East Timor: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2000.” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, February 23, 2001.

“Executive Summary Report of KPP HAM on the Investigation of Human Rights Violations in East Timor.” Jakarta; KPP HAM Timtim, 2000.

Instruksi Presiden (Inpres) No. 14/2005 tentang Poso.

Jusuf, Ester Indahyani. “Item 15: Indigenous issues.” Asian Legal Resource Centre, UNHCR, April 12, 2001.

“Investigation of Human Rights Violations in East Timor.” Jakarta: Komnas HAM, January 31, 2000.

Kontras’s Annual Evaluation 2004.

King, Dwith Y. “Sizing-up Indonesia's New Leadership”, conference report, Washington DC: Asia Society, 2001.

“Laporan Pelapor Khusus Komnas Perempuan tentang Kerusuhan Seksual Mei 1998 dan Dampaknya.” Jakarta: Komnas Perempuan, 2008.

Megawati Soekarniputri. “Menyegarkan Kembali Semangat, Rasa, dan Paham Kebangsaan Kita Memperingati Hari Lahirnya Pancasila 1 Juni 2006.” Jakarta, DPP PDIP, 2006.

______, “Sikap dan Kebijakan Politik PDI Perjuangan.” Paper, the XXVIIIth Regular Course of Lemhannas. Jakarta, DPP PDIP, July 28, 2005.

“Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No. 3/2002.” http://www.icel.or.id/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id =157, ICEL

“Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the Secretary General.” Jakarta: Komnas HAM, January 31, 2000.

393 “Reports of KPP HAM and TGPF on the Investigation on Human Rights Violations in the Trisakti Shootings and the May 13-14, 1998 Riots,” Jakarta: Komnas HAM, 1999.

“The 1999 Presidential Election and Post-Election Developments in Indonesia: A Post- Election Assessment Report,” No. 28, 1999, Jakarta/Washington DC, 1999.

“Update from Becora.” East Timor International

394 Appendix

Table 6 The Names and the Backgrounds of the Interviewees and the Date of the Interview

Interviewee Background Date of Interview Kusnanto Anggoro Military Expert of UI and CSIS Jun6,Oct11,Nov18-06 Ikrar Nusa Bhakti Military Expert of LIPI May 15, 2006 FranzMagnis-Suseno Expert on Javanese culture November 14, 2007 Vonny Kusumastuti Expert on Javanese culture October 11, 2006 Burhan Magenda Expert on Social Change of UI January 30, 2006 Indria Samego Ex-Habibie Political Aide June 14, 2006 Dewi Fortuna Anwar Ex-Habibie’s Spokewoman December 18, 2006 Muladi Habibie’s Minister of Justice March 28, 2008 Andi Ghalib Ex-Habibie’s Attorney General January 8, 2008 Abdurrahman Wahid Indonesia’s Fourth President October 14, 2006 Yenny Zanuba Wahid’s personal secretary and aide October 14, 2006 Juwono Sudarsono Ex-Habibie’s and Wahid’s Minister July 17, 2009 Mahfud MD Ex-Wahid’s Minister of Defence January 9, 2007 AS Hikam Wahid’s Supporter in Cabinet April 10, 2008 Pramono Anung Megawati’s political aide September 21, 2006 T. Hari Prihatono Military Expert of Pro-Patria July 13, 2006 Rusdi Marpaung Human rights activist of Imparsial April 9, 2008 Al-Araf Human rights activist of Imparsial April 9, 2008 Hendardi Human rights activist of PBHI January 16, 2007 Mufti Makarim Human rights activist of Kontras Jul 24-2006/Jan30-07 Harold Crouch Political and Military Expert of ICG April 22, 2006 Sydney Jones Expert on Terrorism of ICG April 19, 2006 Pat Walsh Vice-Chairperson of CAVR March 11, 2009

395 Interviewee Background Date of Interview Effendy Choirie Defence Sub-Committee member July 11, 2006 Permadi Expert on Javanese culture November 25, 2006 Marzuki Darusman Ex-Komnas HAM Sec. General Dec17-2007/Apr10-08 Syarwan Hamid Pro-Habibie Army General January 27, 2008 Saurip Kadi Pro-Wahid Army General November 8, 2006 Sembiring Meliala Pro-Megawati Army General October 17, 2006 Sidarto Danusubroto Pro-Megawati Police General November 28, 2006 Syamsul Ma’arif Territorial Assistant for General Staff July 18, 2006 Agus Widjojo Ex-Kaster, Reformist General June 19, 2006 Ryamizard Ryacudu Ex-Army Chief, Conservative Gen. November 24, 2006 Eurico Guterres Ex-Leader of Aitarak October 10, 2007 C. Soussa Guterres Ex-Falintil Member August 15, 2007 Simon Patrice Morin MP Represented Irian Jaya April 2, 2008 Sutradara Ginting Pro-TNI politician and MP April 2, 2008 Ahmad Basar Army Officer of Kodam Pattimura June 25, 2006 Toga Panjaitan Ex-Deputy Chief of Ambon Police June 20, 2001 Robert Djuenso Head of Jayapura City Resort Police June 8, 2008 Daeng Baranggau Local Resident in Irian Jaya June 24, 2008 Zulfikar Muhammad Activist of Koalisi NGO HAM August 27, 2007 Ali Zamzani Activist of SPKP HAM August 27, 2007

396