Airpower Journal, Published Quarterly, Is the Professional Journal of the United States Air Force

Wínter 1994 JOURNAL

rrM . Lü 1

Secretary of the Air Force Dr Sheila E. Widnall

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Ronald R. Fogleman

Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Henry Viccellio, Jr.

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley

Commander, College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Leroy Barnidge, Jr.

Editor Col Thomas M. Kearney

Associate Editor Maj John M. Poti

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Steven C. Garst, Director ofArt and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Thomas L. Howell, Prepress Production Manager

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other matters of national defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a cour- tesy line.

JOURNAL Wlnter 1994. Vol. Vlll. No. 4 AJRP 101

Editorial 2

Desert Storm: The First Inform ation W ar? Col Edward Mann, USAF 4

M ilitary Ethics Col Richaxd Szafranski, USAF Dr James H. Toner lst Lt William D. Casebeer, USAF 15 N onlethal Concepts: Im plications for Air Force Intelligence Capt Edward F. 0 ,Connell, USAF lst Lt John T. Dillaplain. USAF 26

Inform ation W arfare: Principies of Third-W ave W ar Col Owen E. Jensen USAF 35

H eavy Bom bers Holding the Line Maj David W. Schneider, USAf 45

Ricochets Letten 3 Net Avsessment Reviews of Current Uterature 56 Index 84 Contributo» 95

tor paul nibwription Information, sec page 52 For hasis of issue and official dlstribution Information, w page 44 answer two questions: What do we do? and EDITORIAL What should we do? The answers to these questions keep an organization focused on its purpose and its goals. If the two answers don't match, it is time for change. When we asked the questions at APJ, the responses var- Changes: Faces and Fòcus ied more than expected. There was general agreement on the first answer: We publish a hange may be the only constant. Some- journal for midcareer personnel that focuses Ctimes it happens so slowly we don't see on air power at the operational levei. That it until it's moved past us. At other times wasn't surprising since it has been editorial we see it coming and don't even have time policy for over seven years. What did sur- to duck. For the past few months, we've ex- prise us was the range of things people perienced more of the latter. We have new thought we "should" be doing. After all the faces behind the desks and beginning with voices had been heard, the answer to the sec- the Spring issue, we will have a greatly ex- ond question is, We should produce a jour- panded focus for the Journal. nal that focuses on air power at the If you've been in the Air Force for more operational and strategic leveis. than a month, you've seen new faces arrive I can't pinpoint the moment our focus and familiar faces depart. It's a way of life needed to be broadened. Maybe it was when and it's something we all come to expect. the Berlin Wall fell. Maybe we should have Part of that expectation encompasses a belief changed course when the collapse of the So- that the process is managed. We never ex- viet Union highlighted our singular position pect all the experienced people to rotate at as the world's only aerospace power. A rea- the same time, but it sometimes happens. sonable argument can be made that the piv- In July, our new associate editor, Maj John otal moment occurred when Desert Storm Poti, arrived a few days before his predeces- finally gave substance to Giulio Douhet. sor departed. He grabbed the stick, asked Perhaps the specific instant doesn't matter some questions, and started to work. Just as all that much. Let's simply say that in 1987 we started to adjust, we got word that our the APJ had an intentionally narrowed focus editor was moving to his next assignment that best advanced the understanding of air earlier than expected but that his replace- power, and this issue marks the end of that ment, Lt Col Bill Spencer, wouldn't arrive era. until November. So in August I took charge, Beginning with the Spring 1995 issue, the destined to become the shortest-lived editor APJ will broaden its coverage of air power of the APJ. and encourage authors to submit articles Although -challenging, the changes dis- that deal with strategy and policy issues. cussed thus far are ones of circumstance This fundamental change in direction will rather than substance. As such, it is unlikely help ensure a more comprehensive under- that they will be of Iasting import except to standing of air power. But in the final those directly concerned. But when we en- analysis, a comprehensive understanding of counter change of substance, we expect air power will require authors who can ar- broader effects. The decision to realign the ticulate all sides of an issue—and, more im- focus of the APJ is a change of substance, portant, readers who challenge assumptions, mandated by self-reflection. attack inconsistencies, and force debate. APJ Every once in a while it's probably a good will provide the court and the bali. It's your idea for the members of an organization to serve. TK

2 We encourage your comments via letters to the editor is long overdue. 1 believe the demise of the ex- or comment cards. Alt correspondence should be ad- cellent Air University Review in 1987 was indica- dressed to the Editor, Airpower Journal, 401 Chen- tive of what Earl Tilford—the last editor of the old nault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. You can joumal—called "the Air Force's unilateral disar- also send your comments by E-mail to mament in the war of ideas." Let me explain. Spences=James%ARJ%CADRE@ Chicago. AFWC.AF. From 1987 to 1991 I taught strategy at the MIL We reserve the right to edil lhe material for over- Army Command and General Staff College and all length. then joined the faculty at the Air War College. While I found all of my Air Force students ex- CORE VALUES tremely intelligent and many plainly brilliant, In his aiticle "Core Values in a Quality Air Force: their overall understanding of strategy and na- The Leadership Challenge" (Summer 1994), Chap- tional policy in Air War College seminars was less lain, Lt Col Alexander B. Roberts describes the than that found among the captains and majors at values that are important to a quality Air Force. the Army Command and General Staff College. At He then addresses the challenge facing Air Force the sênior Service schools, this gap widens. For the leadership to raise leveis of commitment to these Army War College, the contribution of criticai, values and makes some recommendations con- unencumbered strategic debate in Parameters and ceming achieving this goal. The values are, as the publications of the Strategic Studies Institute Colonel Roberts States, core values; that is, they is clear. are subservient to other character aspects, espe- Currently, the Air Force excels at "inside the cially one's morality. Beltway" politics and the operational levei of war. Core values in the Air Force underlie the more Many Air Force officers also have a sophisticated fundamental values of love of God and country. grasp of national security strategy and world af- My commitment to Air Force core values grows fairs, but they have developed this through indi- out of patriotism, and my patriotism stems in vidual effort, more in spite of the Air Force's large part from the degree to which our country perspective and values rather than because of allows freedom of worship and the degree to them. While it would be only a very small step in which our national laws and actions mirror Chris- a wider transformation of institutional attitudes, tian morality. Integrity, competence, courage, te- the Air Force needs a strategic journal. Long live nacity, and Service all need to have a foundation Airpower Journal, but bring back Air University Re- in something larger than simply an organization. view! There is not only room for both, but in this In my case, God's law is the basis of my morality; time of dramatic strategic transformation, there is my moral principies determine my character; and also a pressing need. my character results in actions which exhibit what Colonel Roberts calls core Air Force values. Steven Metz Colonel Roberts suggests that transformational Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania leaders proclaim the real meaning of our organization, the Air Force. I suggest that without other meaning and higher commitments in life, this REBUFF cannot be accomplished. The critique in "Ricochets" (Summer 1994) of the Lt Col Steven T. Lofgren, USAF mystery author's article "A New Defense Indus- Beavercreek, Ohio trial Strategy" (Fali 1993) was remarkable for three reasons. First was its insistence that the STRATEGIC JOURNAL costs of doing depot business are "their" fault— "their" being, variously, the threat, the Congress, Kudos on your devotion of the recent special edition of Airpower Journal to strategic issues. This continued on page 53

3 DESERT STORM The First Information War?

C ol Edwar d M ann, USAF*

Know the enem y and know yourself: in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. —Sun Tzu

INTO THE SILENCE there dropped the notes of rhythm, and so there were less killed than was ex- the dove: the grasshoppers were still now. Into pected. the silence there dropped the thunder of cannon Still, great numbers were left behind on the and the sharp clear sounds of rifles. . . . plain. . . . On and on through the tall green grass, Moved by a spirit that was outside ourselves and their plumes touched by the wind of death . . . our captains, we went forward on to the plain. . . . their death-screams were heard above the roaring [The leader] kept the pace midway between walk of the guns. .. . Indeed people were falling so fast and run. There was a rhythm to the firing of the that they made a sort of fence behind which the cannon: as the enemy jumped clear there came a living hid while they fired. . . . puff of smoke and then the great wind of the bul- The war cry of Zulu filled the sky and the tread of let. Our leader sent fifty runners to tell the men Zulu shook the earth.1 that they must drop to the ground when they saw the puff of smoke, then the big bullet would go *This artide is an excerpt from Colonel Mann's book Thun- over their heads. The men having caught his der and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates, forth- words fitted themselves into our enemies' coming from Air University Press. DESERT STORM 5

HE WORDS ARE fiction, but the Perhaps Operation Desert Storm was, as scene is real and vividly illustrates some people claim, the first information the fate of preindustrial warriors op- war,4 but it wasn't—by a long shot—the first posing industrial-age firepower. time an armed force perished for lack of SuchT warriors, though they sometimes win knowledge. Sun Tzu recorded the principie the field, pay a horrible price in blood. In- for us nearly 25 centuries ago. The struggle deed, the industrial-age force would have to to dominate the enemy in terms of informa- be incredibly stupid to lose such a battle. For tion and knowledge is not new, but it has re- instance, Lord Frederic A. Chelmsford lost cently taken on dramatically increased the battle of Isandhlwana in 1879 (the battle relevance in war fighting. It is possible^er- described above) because he declined "local haps even likely—that "information warfare" advice concerning the adversary and terrain represents a true revolution in war fighting5 before him on the grounds that 'the broad and will require new understandings of mili- principies of tactics hold good in África tary force and force application. If so, the equally as well as in Europe'."2 The British overwhelming defeat of Iraq by the US-led army paid heavily for Chelmsford's failure to coalition in 1991 may be attributable in large obtain knowledge concerning the enemy and measure to the fact that Saddam Hussein's his deployments. Though Chelmsford's main industrial-era armed forces ran up against a column slaughtered Zulus by the hundreds, postindustrial military whirlwind. This article examines how air and space power con- only 355 of 2,800 in the British force sur- tributed to coalition dominance in the vived the battle. Just one day later, however, collection, dissemination, and application of at Rorke's Drift, a British force of 85 drove information and knowledge, and how this off thousands of Zulus, killing 400-500 while process affected the outcome of Desert losing only 17 men themselves.3 The major Storm. difference was that the smaller force knew Rapidly gaining and exploiting informa- the Zulu attack was coming and had pre- tion dominance was clearly a key goal of the pared for it. Chelmsford might have known, Desert Storm air campaign plan. The first but he chose not to. Iraqi targets attacked were air defense, lead- 6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

ership (including command, control, Com- tion partners contributed a few systems, munications, and intelligence [C3I]), and such as the British Tornado GRIAs, but the electrical grids,6 all of which had the highest US provided the vast majority.) Before and priority because of their impact on the during the war, satellites and airborne sys- Iraqis' flow of information. The integrated tems collected electronic intelligence, find- air defense command and control (C2) Sys- ing and fixing C3I nodes of all types for later tem, known as Kari (Iraq spelled backwards attention from less benign systems such as in French), provided tracking and targeting the USAF's 61 F-4Gs and 12 specially configured F-16 Wild Weasels, highly sophisticated systems capable of detecting and destroying electronic radiation sources (especially radar Perhaps Operation Desert Storm emissions) with high-speed antiradiation was, as some people claim, the first missiles (HARM) and Shrike antiradiation information war, but it wasn't—by missiles. The Navy and Marines contributed a long shot—the first time an less sophisticated—yet very capable—F/A-18, EA-6B, and A-7 HARM and Shrike shooters. armed force perished for lack of (These aircraft could detect and shoot at ra- knowledge. diation sources but, lacking some of the information available to the Weasels, could never be sure they had released their missiles within range of the target.) Many strike air- information for Iraqi fighter and surface-to- craft carried their own electronic jamming air missile (SAM) engagements of coalition equipment to counter Iraqi attempts to track aircraft. Breaking down this flow of infor- and shoot them with radar-guided systems; mation would fragment the enemy's air de- additionally, EF-llls, EC-130s, and EA-6Bs fense effort, forcing his SAMs into accompanied most strike packages, employ- autonomous mode and leaving his intercep- ing even more sophisticated (and powerful) tors virtually helpless. This situation al- jamming equipment.10 The apparent Iraqi lowed coalition aircraft to exploit Iraqi fears that radiating was both futile and dan- airspace at will. Leadership C3I targets pro- gerous were certainly well founded, if not to- vided linkages between the highly central- tally accurate.11 The enemy's ability to ized decision-making elements (principally collect and use information was severely dis- Saddam) and both the Iraqi population and rupted, but creating that déficit represents the fielded military forces. Disrupting these only half the battle. Systems would upset and discredit the re- According to Col John Boyd's observation- gime, while simultaneously reducing its ca- orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop pability to control military forces.7 Without theory, this kind of offensive effort can "en- electrical power, Communications would be mesh [the] adversary in a world of uncer- reduced to verbal and handwritten messages tainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, conveyed by courier. Thus, a successful at- fear, panic, chãos . . . and/or fold [him] back tack against the Iraqi power grids would dis- inside himself so that he cannot cope with rupt nearly every kind of information flow events/efforts as they unfold."12 This factor within the nation.8 Plans called for main- probably contributed greatly to the mass de- taining pressure on Iraqi "information sertions and surrenders of Iraqi troops and nodes" throughout the war to help create an almost certainly to their general ineffective- exploitable "information differential."9 ness as a cohesive fighting force. Of course, To build and maintain this pressure, the as Boyd also States, this disruption of the ad- US brought a tremendous array of electronic versary's flow of information represents only warfare systems to the fight. (Other coali- one side of the equation. The real objective DESERT STORM 7

is to complete one's own OODA cycles faster of intelligence assets which could be than the adversary completes his; thus, while brought to bear) did not have a full comple- "stretch[ing]-out [the] adversary['s cycle] ment of information on Iraq.16 Much of the time," one must also "compress [his] available data was old, of poor quality, own."13 Although caught somewhat flat- and/or incomplete.17 The US had satellites in footed in August 1990, the coalition immedi- place that could and did monitor military ac- ately began working this part of the tivity, but little was known about the re- equation and continued with a vengeance gime^ intentions.18 Consequently, there was until the air war began in January 1991. no consensus on the probability of the Iraqi According to Colonel Boyd, "the O-O-D-A invasion before it actually occurred.19 Nei- loop can be thought of as being the C&C ther was there a consensus on Saddam [command and control] loop."14 Surely, Hussein's intentions beyond the occupation Boyd is actually referring to all aspects of of Kuwait. Some people thought that he what we call C3I (or what many people now would continue the attack into Saudi Arabia call C41—the fourth C standing for "comput- in early August, while others thought he had ers"). Logically, then, (1) intelligence15 pro- already overextended himself and would vides observation (in accordance with now only dig in and try to hold.20 The coali- command elements' requirements); (2) tion immediately began the scramble to im- working together, intelligence and command prove the flow of information. elements provide orientation (i.e., they de- The first deployments to theater included termine what to observe, which observed in- US airborne warning and control system formation is of greatest value, and how it is (AWACS) aircraft to enhance the develop- to be used in making decisions); (3) comment of an "air picture" for coalition mili- mand elements make necessary decisions tary leadership and forces. This knowledge and direct the actions required to execute not only was criticai to the defense of Saudi those decisions; and (4) field units and their Arabia against air threats, but also helped discrete elements (aircraft, tanks, people, monitor Iraqi training activity and improve etc.) execute the directed actions (and con- coalition understanding of the Iraqi air tribute to observation through postaction re- force's readiness leveis and sortie-generation ports, at which point the cycle begins again). capability. Behind the initial air defense All these elements are interconnected force deployments carne a plethora of recon- through the Communications element of C3I naissance and surveillance aircraft to moni- (and computers of C4I). The whole can be tor Iraqi activities and define orders of only as strong as the weakest link. Even battle. These included RF-4s, RC-135s, TR-ls, though at least one of its links was very weak indeed (i.e., orientation, discussed below), the coalition—after weathering a slow start— would eventually dominate in every element The true purpose o f information of this cycle. d o m i t i a n c e . . . is to pr o v i d e an The slow start resulted in part from the exploitable knowledge dominance. orientation of US operations planning—and, therefore, intelligence collection—for the Middle East prior to early 1989. Before that time, planners concentrated on a potential P-3s, E-2s, RF-5s, and specially configured F- Soviet threat in the region. That orientation, 14s and Tornado GRIAs—a total o f more combined with the "aggressive security and than 100 such aircraft. Additionally, Pioneer counterintelligence policies of the Iraqi re- unmanned aerial vehicles flew nearly 300 gime," meant that the US (therefore, the coa- reconnaissance sorties.21 Two experimental lition, since the US owned the vast majority E-8 joint surveillance target attack radar sys- 8 A1RP0WER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

tem QSTARS) aircraft contributed their own Some vital information-such as the loca- brand of near-real-time battlefield reconnais- tion of mobile Scud missile launchers— sance. Though using them was a risky gam- proved to be just too difficult to obtain. bit (because of their developmental status), Highly effective Iraqi deception efforts and these aircraft provided tracking of both employment procedures made targeting the friendly and enemy ground forces, thus re- Scuds very difficult; confirming successful ducing fratricide and making possible some attacks was almost impossible.26 The only spectacular—usually one-sided—air-to-ground indication of success against the Scuds was engagements such as the one that produced the gradual reduction in the number of mis- the now-famous "highway of death."22 On siles fired, although a resurgence in firings top of all that, a significant array of military during the last week of the war tended to and civilian space systems augmented air- cloud this assessment. (Nevertheless, the last breathing reconnaissance and surveillance week's firings were still less than half those systems, providing meteorological informa- of the first week.)27 tion and imagery of various types.23 Even Though far from mobile, Iraqi nuclear re- this massive reconnaissance and surveillance search facilities proved nearly as difficult a capability couldn't satisfy the coalition's in- problem. Coalition intelligence uncovered satiable appetite for information on Iraq and only eight known or suspected nuclear facili- its army's field deployments, so several other ties before or during the war, yet postwar in- types of fighter aircraft "flew reconnaissance spections by the International Atomic missions in an attempt to overcome the Energy Administration turned up at least an shortage."24 additional 18. The fact that 16 of the 26 were considered "main facilities"28 means that at least eight major nuclear facilities es- It is possible—perhaps even likely— caped detection until after the war. Although these intelligence "failures" that "information warfare" were significant (especially the timing lag represents a true revolution in war for national systems, which was never really fighting and will require new un- fixed), the coalition totally dominated the derstandings of military force and Iraqis in terms of information collection force application. (i.e., observation). Saddam's forces had nothing to rival the coalition's collection capability and no means of countering it other than tactical deception (which, though used But coalition military leaders still effectively by Iraq, clearly has limits). The couldn't seem to get sufficient information gap in information collection—huge at the quickly enough. Throughout the war, the- outset of hostilities—grew rapidly over time. ater planners had to contend with an unac- This was especially true after the opening of ceptable lag in information flowing to them the air war, when the coalition expanded its through normal intelligence channels. Fur- collection efforts while quickly altering force thermore, the people who assigned priorities deployments and carefully denying useful for imagery collection were often not in- information to Iraq. With regard to observa- volved with target planning (and, therefore, tion, the coalition held all the cards. not in touch with the decision makers' pri- Orientation gets nowhere near the atten- orities). Because required information, once tion from US military forces that observa- collected, frequently arrived too late to be tion does, yet it is probably the most criticai useful, planners had to use out-of-channel element in the entire OODA loop. Colonel work-arounds to assess bombing results Boyd notes that "the second O, orientation— within the 72-hour planning cycle.25 as the repository of our genetic heritage, cul- DESERT STORM 9

tural tradition, and previous experiences—is becomes useful when it is fitted into a the most important part of the O-O-D-A loop scheme of operations (are tanks to be de- since it shapes the way we observe, the way stroyed or left alone to support a potential we decide, the way we act" (emphasis in coup d'etat?) to make informed decisions. original).29 In effect, orientation is the real One need not do this perfectly—only better starting point of the OODA loop, even af- and faster than the adversary. fecting what we decide to observe (and then, Knowledge processing, then, requires the what we decide to do). Lord Chelmsford, for ability to orient on the right information instance, decided not to observe anything (e.g., using surveillance systems to collect about the Zulus he would face or about the data about Iraq instead of the Soviet Union) terrain on which he would face them. Sad- and then on discrete elements of informa- dam Hussein made a similar decision tion necessary to the decision at hand (e.g., (though less overtly) and therefore had no examining a particular set of pictures or resources with which to observe coalition documents such as those that reveal Iraqi nu- activities beyond his own front lines (other clear facilities). Thus, the true purpose of in- than international sources such as radio and formation dominance (which requires television, which were considerable but no- proper orientation on information collection where near sufficient).30 For this lapse, both and dissemination) is to provide an exploit- Chelmsford and Saddam paid an enormous able knowledge dominance. price. Orientation is the criticai link between information—which is nice to have— and knowledge, which (when properly considered and acted upon) saves one from Throughout the war, theater peril. planners had to contend with an The difference between information and unacceptable lag in information knowledge may seem very subtle at first, but flowing to them through normal in warfare it is truly criticai. On the one hand, information is passive and always ex- intelligence channels. ists (at least in the abstract) whether anyone pays attention to it or not. Among other things, it can be collected, collated, ana- The ability to discriminate between useful lyzed, "fused," packaged, disseminated, and information and background "noise" (i.e., even managed. Of particular relevance to orientation) may have been the weakest link the Gulf War, it can be stored, protected, and in the US-designed C3I system used by the concealed or suppressed, sometimes even coalition in the Gulf.32 In fact, US national from one's own decision makers.31 It can intelligence appears to be biased toward forc- also be jammed up in a system of data flow ing all available information through chan- that will eventually deliver it to decision nels and shows little regard for shifting makers but perhaps not in time to be useful priorities in the field. Often, discrete ele- to them. Knowledge, on the other hand, is ments of information needed by command- active and must be possessed if it is to exist— ers and planners were already collected and let alone be useful. Somewhere, someone available but awash in a much larger stream must process the collected raw material (in- of data that was working its way through the formation) into something recognizable and s y s t e m . 33 However, i f p l a n n e r s r e q u e s t e d useful for decision making (knowledge). For these elements from key individuais within example, the location of a tank is informa- the system, they could be extracted and for- tion, whether anyone knows it or not; it be- warded hours-to-days faster than normal. comes knowledge only when someone has Dave Deptula, a key planner in the US Air seen and taken note of it. Such knowledge Forces, Central Command (CENTAF) special 10 AÍRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994 planning group (which quickly became was still in conceptual development). The known to other CENTAF planners as the US did not have much in the way of "Black Hole," because people and things Communications capability in-theater when went in and never came out),34 cites an ex- Iraq invaded Kuwait, and Saudi telecommu- ample of "normal time delays involved in nications Systems were of limited use for a getting information [through the formal Sys- large military operation such as Desert tem]": Shield/Storm. But Communications systems began moving right alongside the combat We wanted a photo o f a particular target. . . . forces on 8 August 1990.39 In fact, by [Then-Brig Gen Buster C.] Glosson picks up the phone, calls [Joint Staff deputy chief of war's end, CENTCOM had greater electronic staff for intelligence (J-2) Mike] McConnell, Communications connectivity than US Euro- and we get the photo in about 4 hours. . . . pean Command, according to Lt Gen James Twenty-four hours later, about, he gets a photo S. Cassity, the Joint Staff director of the from CENTCOM [US Central Command] or Command, Control, and Communications CENTAF/IN [Intelligence]. About 24 hours after that, 48 hours later, we get the same System Directorate (J-6) during Desert photo from CENTCOM/J-2 [Intelligence].35 Shield/Storm.40 At its peak, the system could handle over 700,000 telephone calls and Data from the Gulf War Air Power Survey 152.000 messages per day. In addition, com- confirm such scenarios.36 Obviously, this was municators managed and monitored over not an observation problem since the re- 35.000 frequencies to ensure interference- quired information was available in the Sys- free radio connectivity for the theater.41 tem and eventually would have reached the Much of the system that communicators planners—whether they needed it or not! ultimately cobbled together was vulnerable to interference, yet—for whatever reason—it was never successfully attacked by the adver- The differetice betweeti sary. SaddanTs forces probably could have information and ktiowledge may seriously stressed coalition capabilities with a moderate investment of time and effort. seem very subtle at first, but in In particular, they apparently could have in- warfare it is truly criticai. terfered with tactical satellite Communica- tions (TACSATCOM; ultrahigh frequency [UHF] and superhigh frequency [SHF] ra- Nor can the delays be blamed on lack of dio Communications) but either never tried Communications (although they often are, or were unsuccessful.42 Since the overall especially by apologists for the national in- theater Communications architecture, as it telligence system)37 because once the specific evolved, depended heavily upon TACSAT- need had been identified to the "right" peo- COM, successful jamming would have se- ple in the system (i.e., once proper orienta- verely degraded coalition Communications tion was provided), delivery was nearly capability.43 Iraq's almost total lack of op- immediate. Of course, Communications position in the electromagnetic spectrum al- problems existed, especially during the early lowed the coalition to very quickly build deployment phase. The CENTCOM area of and maintain a system capable of delivering responsibility was an immature theater, and required information. The fact that Glosson Communications suffered from the common could get a call through to McConnell at initial deployment problem of Desert Shield: all—not to mention receiving a photograph incomplete time-phased force and deploy- from him within four hours—indicates that ment data38 for operations plan (OPLAN) sufficient Communications were available to 1002-90 (CENTCOM's contingency plan for deliver what planners needed. Faster data defense of Saudi Arabia; in August 1990 it transfer will always be desirable, but it is not DESERT STORM 11 the root of the intelligence problem in De- the coalition.48 Saddam's intelligence was sert Shield/Storm. Nor does the solution lie oriented on internai, not externai, issues.49 in increasing the flow of data. He possessed no space-based observation ca- The problem lies in a systemic orientation pability of his own and failed to arrange ac- that favors data flow over user needs. This at cess even to commercially available products least partially explains the debate between such as the French SPOT. Of course, since intelligence and operations over the intelli- France was a member of the coalition, it was gence systenTs Desert Shield/Storm perfor- not likely to sell information to Saddam, but mance. That is, intelligence delivered "tons" he could have availed himself of more sur- of information as fast as possible (IN's self- reptitious means of obtaining such products. imposed measure of merit), while operations These sources certainly would have exposed wanted specific "pounds" of it delivered the movement of two reinforced US Army much more quickly than the system was ca- corps 150 miles to the west. That single pable of. Operations planners, unable to get piece of information, received and properly a satisfactory resolution within the intelli- processed, would have revealed the hopeless- gence system, resorted to unofficial work- ness of his force deployment in terms even arounds and informal arrangements outside he could understand and thus might have al- the system.44 tered his subsequent actions. Examples of these externai sources in- Like other two-dimensional thinkers, Sad- clude General Glosson's special relationship dam failed to see the implications of Col with Admirai McConnell and the Black Hole John Warden's "air-Schlieffen" plan, but connection to Checkmate4S for targeting in- even he could not have failed to understand formation. Planners also used unofficial, in- the seriousness of a powerful two-corps sur- formal arrangements to get battle damage face force deploying beyond his right flank, with nothing standing between it and Basra (or Baghdad, for that matter). But, then, that Operations planners, unable to get was the major implication of air-Schlieffen: because Saddam and his forces could not ob- a satisfactory resolution within serve, they could not orient and therefore the intelligence system, resorted to could not decide sensibly and therefore unofficial work-arounds and would act stupidly or not at all. The only informal arrangements outside the sensible action open to Saddam—acceding to system. coalition demands—escaped him at this point. When the moment carne, many of his forces would try to fight, but their situation was hopeless. To reiterate Colonel Boyd's as- assessment (BDA) and measurements of bat- sessment, they were enmeshed "in a world of tlefield attrition leveis (a subcategory of BDA uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, dis- that became very contentious during the order, fear, panic, chãos" and folded "back war) that intelligence was not providing.46 inside [themselves] so [they could not] cope (In some cases, information was available, with events/efforts as they unfold[ed]." The but intelligence sources would not use it or coalition had unquestionably met Boyd's re- make it available to operations planners.)47 quirement of operating inside the Iraqis' Fortunately, Saddam did not experience a OODA loop, sometimes by a matter of days. similar problem with information sorting. With observation platforms such as the Indeed, coalition efforts to deny him useful TR-1 and JSTARS linked directly (or through information were so successful that once the AWACS) to both command elements and war started, he couldn't even follow the posi- fighting units, coalition forces could spot, tions of his own forces—let alone those of target, attack, and destroy Iraqi armor and 12 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994 supply columns, literally in minutes. This general guidance—as well they should-but sequence of events occurred at Al Khafji, on specific targeting decisions were made in the the highway of death outside Kuwait City, CENTAF planning cells.52 and—somewhat less dramatically—elsewhere General Glosson's delegated decision- in Kuwait and southeastern Iraq. Even infor- making authority extended downward to the mation from national systems (satellites) flying units by virtue of General Horner's could sometimes affect events in near-real position as joint force air component com- time. A phone call from Checkmate or Ad- mander (JFACC). By selecting Glosson for mirai McConnell, for instance, could put the position of chief air campaign planner bombs on the "building with the Mercedes with the concomitant authority to control parked out front" within minutes.50 the air tasking order (ATO) (in which all This was possible not only because of the overland flights had to appear), Horner dele- rapid observation and orientation cycles gated him authority over flying units' (relative to those of Iraq), but also because wartime taskings. The reorganization of Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf and then-Lt CENTAF in December 1990 further en- hanced Glosson's authority by making him Gen Charles Homer delegated decision mak- commander of 14th Air Division (AD), coming to the lowest possible levei consistent prised of the USAF fighter and fighter- with centralized control of air power. Before bomber wings. At the same time, Glosson execution—and for most of the 42 days of was named CENTAF director of campaign the air war—decisions about targeting were plans, a position that expanded his role from made in the CENTAF planning cell. Only directing strategic offensive planning in the after the Al Firdos bunker incident did Black Hole to controlling all CENTAF plan- high-level decision makers (probably ning functions in the newly formed Cam- Schwarzkopf, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs paign Plans Division. Thus, Glosson had of Staff Gen Colin Powell, or both) intrude both functional authority (as the JFACCs campaign plans director) and Service author- themselves by withholding most Baghdad ity (as commander of 14th AD) over all USAF targets.51 Other than that, decisions did not fighter units. There was no confusion what- require specific approval at multiple com- soever concerning his direction of their ac- mand leveis and therefore could be made tivities.53 quickly. Just as Glosson's authority and the role of The division of targets into categories cor- the Black Hole planners evolved from strictly responding to previously defined enemy informal to ever more formalized modes, so centers of gravity—combined with careful did their ability to provide the orientation explanations of the categories and associated necessary to the collection and dissemina- objectives, as briefed to sênior officials— tion of intelligence. Increasing at much the helped desensitize leaders such as same rate was their ability to impose deci- Schwarzkopf and Powell (perhaps even Sec- sions on the rest of the CENTAF plans divi- retary of Defense Dick Cheney and President sion and the flying units that would execute George Bush) to specific target selections. the plan. Following the December reorgani- When a target clearly fitted one of the cate- zation, Glosson and his planners were pow- gories, everyone assumed that it served a le- erful enough and sufficiently "connected" to gitimate military purpose (and ultimately, control the OODA loop for the entire air therefore, the political objectives)-an as- campaign. Their innovative, informal ap- sumption that seems vindicated by results. proaches eventually overwhelmed and, in Glosson and his planners had free rein to some cases, swallowed up the formal Sys- make adjustments as they saw fit. tem—witness the December reorganization Schwarzkopf and Homer gave support and of CENTAF's plans division under Glosson's DESERT STORM 13

direction and the key roles played by Black men probably took days for Saddam—if it Hole planners in the new organization. could be completed at all.54 As Col John They also formed their own BDA cell, Boyd would say, the outcome was all but in- which—by using gun-camera video and other evitable. Victory was assured over 30 days information obtained outside intelligence before coalition ground forces moved to channels—bypassed the formal system al- contact. most entirely. In other words, they "drove" A new chapter in warfare was written on their own OODA loop from the special plan- 17 January 1991. With the advent of postin- ning cell and made it respond to their 72- dustrial warfare, information warfare, or hour planning priorities. Indeed, they made knowledge warfare—whatever one might it responsive enough to handle immediate choose to call it—a window opened, giving priorities as well. They then aggressively and discerning people an opportunity to gaze continuously attacked and further degraded into the future. Although the view remains Iraq's capability to OODA. A decision cycle blurred and imperfect, warriors who make similar to one that moved from observation the most of it increase their chances for vic- to action in minutes or hours for Horner's tory in the next round. □

Notes 1. Daphne Rooke, Wizards Country (Cambridge, Mass.: technologies," a relationship that makes it a perishable Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957), 253-54. advantage, dependem upon continued US superiority in 2. Andiew Duminy and Charles Ballard, eds., The technology development. Anglo-Zulu War. New Perspectives (Pietermaritzburg, Natal: 10. Keaney and Cohen, 195-97. University of Natal Press, 1981), 65. 11. Col S. D. Ramsperger, cited in Alan D. Campen, "Iraqi 3. John Young, They Fell like Stones: Battles and Casualties o f Command and Control: The Information Differential," in the Zulu War, 1879 (London: Greenhill Books, 1991), 52-69, Campen, 173. 88-89; and R. Emest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The 12. Col John R. Boyd, "A Discourse on Winning and Encyclopedia o f Military History from 3500 B.C to the Present Losing," 1987, 177. Unpublished briefing slide set avaiiable at (New York; Harper & Row, 1986), 851. Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 4. See, for instance, Alan D. Campen, ed., The First 13. Ibid. Information War The Story of Communications, Computers and 14. Ibid., 222. Intelligence Systems m the Persian Gulf War (Fairfax, Va.. AFCEA 15. For the sake of simplicity, intelligence is used here to International Press, 1992). Campen declares (among other subsume all information sources. The author recognizes that things) that the Gulf War “differed fundamentally from any much of a commander's or staffs vital information is not previous conflict" in that “the outcome turned as much on provided by the intelligence system. superior management of knowledge as . . . upon performances of 16. Keaney and Cohen, 122. people or weapons" (page vii; emphasis in original). Despite 17. Col James Blackburn, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C., his use of the term information warfare, Campen tacitly avers the transcript of interview with Lt Col Suzanne B. Gehri, Lt Col truth—suggested by Sun Tzu 2,500 years ago—that the ultimate Richard T. Reynolds, and author, 21 April 1993, 102-4, Desert goal of the struggle is to dominate the enemy in knowledge—not Story Collection, US Air Force Historical Research Agency, Information. Collection and analysis of information is, of Maxwell AFB, Ala. course, a part-but not the whole—of the issue. 18. Conduct o f the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, 5. Or perhaps this is simply an important part of a larger vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.; Department of Defense, April 1992), military-technical revolution (MTR; others have called it a C-2. revolution in military affairs [RMA]). A third possibility is that 19. See, for example, Bruce W. Watson et al„ eds., Military Information warfare, MTR, and/or RMA are simply different Lessons o f the Gulf War (London: Greenhill Books, 1991), 146; names for the same phenomenon. and H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, General H. 6. Conduct o f the Persian Gulf War. Final Report to Congress, Norman Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography: lt Doesn't Take a Hero vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, April 1992), (New York. Bantam Books, 1992), 293-94. 156. 20. Schwarzkopf, 310, 313-14; Col Steve Wilson, 7. Ibid., 126-27; and Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Washington, D.C., transcript of interview with Lt Col Suzanne B. Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington, D.C.; Gehri, Lt Col Richard T. Reynolds, and author, 11 December Department of the Air Force, 1993), 36-37. 1991, 50-51, Desert Story Collection, US Air Force Historical 8. Conduct o f the Persian Gulf War, vol. 1, 127. Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.; and Triurnph without 9. Like several other concepts used in Desert Storm (e.g., Victory: The Unreported History o f the Persian Gulf War (New parallel attack and simultaneity), information differential York: Random House, 1992), 97-98. acquired its name after the war. See Joint Pub 1, loint Warfare of 21. Keaney and Cohen, 184, 195. the US Armed Forces, 11 November 1991, 57. It is worth noting 22. Conduct o f the Persian Gulf War, vol. 2, T-84 to T-87. that this concept is specifically tied to "advanced US 23. Ibid., 1: 194. 14 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

24. Keaney and Cohen, 195. 40 years." Quoted in Conduct o f the Persian Gulf War vol * 2 25. Ibid.. 140-41. K-26. 26. Ibid., 83. 41. Ibid., K-26 to K-27. 27. Ibid., 83-84. 42. Alan D. Campen, "Information Systems and Air 28. Ibid., 123. Warfare," in Campen, 27; and idem, "Iraqí Command and 29. Boyd, 222. Control," in Campen, 175. 30. Campen, in Campen, 172. 43. Wentz, in Campen, 10-13. 31. For example, according to Lt Col Dave Deptula, 44. Keaney and Cohen, 129-30. intelligence personnel withheld certain photographs needed by 45. Directed by Col John Warden, the Checkmate Division Black Hole planners unti! the end of the war because they "were was part of Air Force Plans and Operations. Under Warden's afraid that if they gave them to the Black Hole, they would get guidance, Checkmate planners designed the Instant Thunder air lost." Lt Col Dave Deptula, Washington, D.C., transcript of campaign plan, which became the basis for the air war against interview with Lt Col Suzanne B. Gehri, Lt Col Richard T. Iraq. Reynolds, and author, 12 December 1991, 103-4, Desert Story 46. Keaney and Cohen, 138-39; and Deptula, 12 December Collection, US Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell 1991, 25-27, 54-64, 89-92, 101-3. AFB, Ala. 47. Although much informatíon was available outside the 32. If so, the problem is nothing new. Roberta Wohlstetter, intelligence System, sometimes it was difficult to persuade for example, points to the US failure to anticipate the Japanese intelligence personnel to use nonsystem informatíon. A case in attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. "To discriminate significant point is gun-camera video, which intelligence personnel sounds against this background of noise, one has to be listening initially refused even to review. Deptula, 12 December 1991, for something or for one of several things. In short, one needs 87-89.' not only an ear, but a variety of hypotheses that guide 48. Conduct o f the Persian GulfWar, vol. 1, 215. observation" (emphasis added). In other words, if one is to 49. Ibid., 94; Campen, "Iraqi Command and Control," in determine which specific elements of informatíon are important Campen, 174; and James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, From to the issue at hand and then turn that informatíon into useful Shield to Storrn: High-Tech Weapons, Military Strategy, and knowledge, one must have specific orientation on key Coalition Warfare in the Persian Gulf (New York: William Morrow questions—not simply indiscriminate collection and and Co., 1992), 348^19. dissemination. Pearl Harbor: Waming and Decision (Stanford, 50. Deptula, 12 December 1991, 32-34. Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), 55-56. 51. Even in this case, however, the CENTAF planners 33. Maj Gen James R. Clapper, Jr., assistant chief of staff of retained a great deal of latitude, since they were Ieft to define Air Force Intelligence during Desert Shield/Storm, says that the the limits of Baghdad for themselves. They appear to have flow of US intelligence operates on a "push" rather than a "pull" chosen a relatively narrow definition that allowed them to System. That is, field units receive mostly what analysts deign continue attacking the outskirts of Baghdad and surrounding to give them rather than what they need. According to General areas without specific approval. Lt Col Dave Deptula, Clapper, the intelligence community is fixing this particular Washington, D.C., transcript of interview with Lt Col Suzanne B. problem. James R. Clapper, "Desert War: Crucible for Gehri, Lt Col Richard T. Reynolds, and author, 23 May 1991, Intelligence Systems," in Campen, 81-85. 64-67, Desert Story Collection, US Air Force Historical Research 34. Lt Col Sam Baptiste, Maxwell AFB, Ala., transcript of Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.; Maj Gen Buster C. Glosson, interview with Dr Diane Putney and Lt Col Richard T. Reynolds, Washington, D.C., transcript of interview with Lt Col Suzanne B. 24 September 1992, 24-25, Desert Story Collection, US Air Force Gehri, Lt Col Richard T. Reynolds, and author, 29 May 1991, Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 81-88, Desert Story Collection, US Air Force Historical Research 35. Deptula, 12 December 1991, 91-92. Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.; and Keaney and Cohen, 68-69. 36. Keaney and Cohen, 131-32. 52. Glosson, 29 May 1991,81-84. 37. See Clapper, in Campen, 82. 53. Lt Col Dave Deptula, Washington, D.C., transcript of 38. Larry K. Wentz, "Communications Support for the High interview with Lt Col Suzanne B. Gehri, Lt Col Richard T. Technology Battlefield," in Campen, 8. Reynolds, and author, 11 December 1991, 28, 30-31, Desert 39. Conduct o f the Persian GulfWar, vol. 2, K-27 to K-28. Story Collection, US Air Force Historical Research Agency, 40. "The Services put more electronic Communications Maxwell AFB, Ala. connectivity into the Gulf in 90 days than we put in Europe in 54. Campen, "Iraqi Command and Control," in Campen, 171-73. MILITAR? ETHICS

C ol Ric h a r d Szafranski, USAF Dr James H. Toner 1 ST L t W il l ia m D. C a sebeer , USAF

This article is an edited transcript of a ZAFRANSKI: I'm concerned about the conversation among three people on the number of reported ethical trans- gressions among officers, especially subject o f military ethics. Lieutenant sênior officer "problems." Some of [Casebeer, Colonel Szafranski, and Dr S these reports may be inaccurate or just mali- Toner respond to the increasingly nega- cious—the "moral equivalent of fragging."1 tive perceptions of the ethical standards Anyway, it seems we have a serious problem of members o f the armed forces, as re- with ethics in the armed forces. ported in the public media. Each man believes that the armed forces miist be Toner: 1 agree. Based only upon publicly more ethically robust or pure than the available sources such as newspapers,2 the society at large—even more so than opinion that there is an ethics crisis in the other professions. The academic and military seems to be well founded. l'm Iphilosophical natiire of the conversa- afraid that published reports are only the tip tion is a function of the participants' of the iceberg. How extensive the moral ero- individual personalities. We print this sion is, I couldn't say. I certainly remember what it was like when I was a company-grade article to raise issues that suffuse the officer 20 years ago.3 1 thought the comer (subject of ethics in the armed forces. had been turned. Hasn't it? 16 AIRPO WER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

Casebeer: As a company grade officer, I'm Casebeer: Whether or not a person like not so sure we're any worse off now than my More can be moral for selfish reasons-at perceptions of where we were 20 years ago. least in a utilitarian system, where results are Tailhook aside, the vast majority of military equated with morality—our goal should be men and women strike me as sensible and to determine what ethical standards we are ethical individuais. Of course, there's always to hold ourselves to, no matter what the in- room for improvement, and the military is dividual reason for doing so: love of coun- by no means a perfect institution. So, to try, love of God, love of flying, and so forth. make sure we're in the same ballpark, let's This is an admittedly utilitarian or results- define some terms. Dr Toner, when you use oriented standard and not a deontological or ethics and crisis, what do you mean? intention-based yardstick.

Toner: By ethics, I mean simply the ability Szafranski: That may be a starting point, to distinguish between what is honorable because these reported scandals hurt and and what is shameful—in the sense of "duty, embarrass all of us in the armed forces, pro- honor, country." By crisis, I refer to a time fessionally and personally. It does appear, or situation of great danger or trouble. But however, that somehow a negative form of to be more specific, the word moral would selfishness has interposed itself in our rules refer to custom, and in a more practical of behavior and has become more wide- sense, the word ethics would refer to a code spread than it should be. And now, because that transcends social convenience. of this selfishness, we are in danger of losing something. After all, how can someone charged with the public trust and the lives of Szafranski: 1 understand honorable to mean others come to believe that others exist to something like unselfish—something subor- serve him or her, or that the public trust can dinate to an imperative that's unselfish. But be maintained if there's a lot of misbehav- honor can mean different things to different ior? But I agree with you, Bill— if some- people. Bushido is honor to some; omertà is thing^ broken, we've got to fix it. Period. honor to others.4 To me, honor means something like the absolute commitment to putting something, someone else, first. Casebeer: Precisely. If careerism and excessive self-love are really the root of the problem, then our system needs to be retailored to address and punish egoistic behavior. If Ifexcessive careerism is being someone truly cares only about his or her rewarded in today's Air Force, career, and that career can only advance if it's our fault as individuais the person is ethical, then egoism would ac- for letting the selfish be rewarded. tually provide for a straightlaced force. If excessive careerism is being rewarded in today's Air Force, it's our fault as individuais for letting the selfish be rewarded. Toner: I think that's a useful concept, yes. But a person can certainly be selfish and still be honorable. I think of Sir Thomas More Toner: While I think there's nothing wrong (1478-1535), who went to the gallows for with appropriate self-love and self-respect, what he believed, despite the pleas of his wife my complaint is that in the military, exces- and family to accede to the king's demands sive self-love—egoism—becomes careerism, for religious conformity.5 Was More selfish? where the officer—whether soldier, sailor, air- Sure, in a sense. He followed the dictates of man, or marine—says, "I come first." This his conscience. But he was also honorable. attitude is particularly heinous when it ap-

16 MIL1TARY ETHICS 17

pears in military Service, where leaders have the military, ethics isn't academic or clinicai; to be aggressive, take-charge people, intent it's an everyday, living reality. There really on mission accomplishment. Yet, that ag- are "school Solutions," and the people tasked gressive attitude tovvard the mission can eas- with teaching ethics must inculcate the right ily spill over into an aggressive attitude way of doing things. But I wonder how there toward self-promotion. So how do we set up can be a "right way" when people actually a system in which legitimate self-concern is talk about shoplifters as "nontraditional balanced by appropriate devotion to the shoppers"? If there is no ultimate social community? agreement on matters of ethics, then there is no society.

Casebeer: That's a classic question of political philosophy: how do we balance the needs Szafranski: Yet, these scandals seem to have of the State against the needs of the individ- cropped up suddenly, out of nowhere, and it ual? The framers of the Constitution recog- seems we're seeing more of them. The prob- nized this inherent tension and resolved it by lem goes beyond mere self-promotion. forming a governmental system of checks Something—some removal of inhibition or and balances. On the other hand, Tm sure restraint, some loss of moral compass bear- many evolutionary biologists would disagree ing—must have occurred recently to cause the that self-concern is largely natural and in- kinds of alleged misbehaviors and shameful stinctive, preferring to believe that coopera- behavior that are reported as widespread. tion and symbiosis developed naturally in Why does this seem so much more a prob- our ecosystem despite the reward for being lem now rather than two years ago— or 10? self-concerned.6 Perhaps societal condition- ing is really the largest factor affecting self- love. Toner: I agree that excessive self-promotion and intemperate self-gratification have always been problems. Even though it may be Szafranski: Let's leave biology and political somewhat of an overstatement, however, I philosophy. Where did these ethical prob- think that until the 1960s, certain cultural lems in the military originate? totems and taboos were in place that helped to restrain the darker side of our nature. The notion that everyone can pretty much do Toner: We can leave biology, but we can't what he or she wants to do seems to have leave philosophy. I would argue, like Thucy- emerged full force in the late sixties, and dides, that human nature is essentially un- we're seeing the ripples of that effect today. I changed over the centuries. But good suspect it will get much worse before it gets societies—good social structures—generally any better because so many of the 1960s facilitate reason and impede passion.7 Break campus radicais who subsequently joined down institutions like the family and relig- university faculties are now tenured, and ious communities or any other means by many of them remain unchanged in their which societies encourage the best in us, views about ethics and politics. The teaching and—as in William Golding's Lord o f the of traditional ethics is an essentially conser- Flies*—there will be political and moral vative enterprise, for ethics is a constellation chãos. All questions, at their heart, are relig- of beliefs about wisdom and virtue that ious and political. One of the problems in- comes to us from the centuries. If such wis- volved with ethics education is that, dom and virtue are derided as the things and especially in the military, we just cannot thoughts of "dead, white, European males,"9 teach about ethics; we must teach ethics. In then traditional ethics—the heart of the mili- 18 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

tary ethic—will not be taught, for there is no that "some things just aren't done"? There one to teach that discipline. must be an atmosphere-a milieu or expectation—of what is done and not done. The Casebeer: Roger Kimball in Tenured Radicais military notion of the "officer and gentle- and Dinesh D'Souza in Illiberal Education10 man" and the article in the Uniform Code of say essentially the same thing—that people Military Justice about "conduct unbecom- who lost the ideological struggle that took ing" capture this spirit. place in the late sixties and early seventies sought refuge in the universities and col- Szafranski: So we've got to do something. leges. Nonetheless, if this were the heart of We can't afford to let these attitudes and be- the problem, we would expect to see the haviors prevail. Our obligations as warriors most flagrant ethics violations taking place are so big we'11 lose the trust necessary to in the age group of officers and enlisted per- carry heavy burdens if we can't even carry sonnel who attended college in the late sev- light ones. We warriors have in our hands enties and early eighties when these radical the means to rob others of their very exist- viewpoints were fresh on the minds of the ence. This is the essence of our trade. How newly estranged Left. That would mean the can the moms and dads of America trust me problems would center around our most with the lives of their sons and daughters if I junior personnel—those who attended col- can't tell the difference between sobriety and lege and high school during the Reagan drunkenness—or between the lawful exercise years. But that just isn't so. of authority and the abuse of authority? These allegations and kinds of things—like or- Szafranski: Good point. Then this egoism ganized public drunkenness, like witnessing or self-centered legacy of the sixties and sev- debauchery and not intervening, like exert- enties has become a pernicious disease that ing abusive or unlawful influence, like ridi- has pervaded all aspects of the force. Do culing the president, like mismanaging a either of you think it's "terminal," or is procurement program—I find hard to relate there something we can do about it? to cultural totems, taboos, or the 1960s.

Toner: I think you're exactly right when you Toner: Dick, your response to the things you use the term disease. I think we're in the list derives from an objective standard that middle of a moral bubonic plague. Our ethi- you have internalized on a personal levei—a cal hygiene is generally so bad that we spread standard that used to be the core of the mili- the disease practically unknowingly. Ed- tary ethic. If, however, I have no internalized mund Burke (1729-97), the British statesman, standard, then self-indulgence and self-pro- talked once about prejudice, which he used in motion are what spur me toward any action. a good sense to mean "unarticulated social My standard of right and wrong, honor and custom."11 Today, we must instruct people in shame, virtue and vice becomes merely what rules that many of us used to take for pleases me. I think a substantially different granted. The very fact that we have to do this ethic worked in our parents' time—one much is a symptom of the epidemic we face; natu- more in keeping with the profession of arms. rally, it carries over into our warriors. I think People joined "the Service" during World of the graphically sexual lyrics in songs and War II. Increasingly, today's military is seen the slogans on shirts today that, when I was as a career opportunity, a business enter- in high school in the early 1960s, would prise, a place for experimentation in total have been unthinkable. I think of the major- quality management. The idea that a soldier ity of Tailhook offenders who had no con- is a "secular Jesuit" seems laughable to to- cept that their behavior was wrong—even day's recruit, but it shouldn't be. The mili- criminally so.12 How do you teach someone tary is and must continue to be a MILITARY ETHICS 19

profession—a community of comrades-in- Toner: A very good point. Professional arms locked in common, high purpose. It military education (PME) should reinforce must never become IBM with M-16s and F- previous education. Again, by education, I 16s. refer to instruction in wisdom and virtue. But imagine trying to sell that notion on Casebeer: Good point. All too often, the most campuses today! military is viewed as a means to an end— such as a way to get a good education, a way Casebeer: Still, more instruction and train- to build up a resume before you enter the ing in ethics would definitely help the prob- private market—instead of an end in and of lem. The ultimate solution, though, is itself. However, I wouldn't be so pessimistic backbone: when we see ethical violations about toda/s military. In general, our sol- occurring, we must stop them immediately. diers are professional and dedicated Service Turning the other cheek might help us "get members. along," but it won't help the military polish its tamished character. Szafranski: You're right; there are more good folks than errant ones, and none of us is perfect. But if the dominant social ethic is sick, the problem is just beginning. Like a The military is and must continue real epidemic, it can run its course only by to be a profession—a community mortal means. It seems that the ethically of comrades-in-arms locked in ill—the mortally ethically ill—in our profes- common, high purpose. sion must die, or our profession will die because of them. If that's so, who does the vaccinating against this plague? From what we've said, parents and society at large are at Szafranski: OK, but let's hold off on that fault. We can't fix all of that. What can idea of individual integrity for a minute and warriors do? get back to this idea of education. If we accept the idea that the solution—the vaccine— Toner: If the disease runs its course, I trem- is education, who will be charged to conduct ble for the society our warriors are supposed this education? Is there a moral or ethical to protect. No, this disease must be arrested elite of whom I'm unaware? and cured. The problems, certainly, are not only in the military. Consider the accusa- tions of depredations by priests and minis- Casebeer: In relation to values, childhood is ters, for example, that have been commonly still the most important formative period in reported in the media. If there is a vaccine, I a person's life. So the majority of the bur- think it resides in good education. But re- den here is going to fali on parents. Yet, in any educational situation we would set up, cent changes in the curriculum at the US Air we'd have to deal with the quandary in our Force Air Command and Staff College at society's value system posed by ethical rela- Maxwell AFB, Alabama, don't seem to offer tivism— the belief system that posits there are much hope. If I am to believe published re- no absolute and independent standards of ports,13 there is little—or no—instruction in right and wrong. ethics. Isn't that a mistake? Szafranski: Specifically? Szafranski: Uníortunately, by the time you reach your "majority," it's probably too late Casebeer: The quandary is this: if all moral anyway. statements are relative to one's beliefs, then 20 AIRPO WER JOURNAL WINTER 1994 relativism is itself relative. However, I can guys—people-on board. Ethics can be very choose to accept an absolute standard and practical stuff. effectively disprove relativism. This is what we all do when we pledge to defend the Con- stitution of the United States with our lives. Szafranski: I don't want a cookbook, but I So for our intents and purposes, we do want some clues as to wherein you both shouldn't give up hope—an ongoing process think the remedy lies. Some of the new peo- of a somewhat "absolutist" military educa- ple we're bringing on board in our premier tion can help correct the errant ways of its warrior schools are lying, cheating, raping, members. In today's valueless society—at the and stealing, and the military academies very least—we can attempt to provide a ra- haven't immunized themselves to the disease tional, ethical nervous system for those peo- either, it would seem. What specifically is ple whose consciences have been left vacant the fix? Who is the agent of change? Where by the nihilism of the past two decades. do we start?

Toner: In that case, we have to return to Casebeer: Well, the Service academies are in good teaching rather than to political cor- a unique situation to help, but they're also rect ness. Almost every week in U.S. News & problem-ridden. In the sixties, the ethics World Report, John Leo has a column about violations that took place there may not have the inanities and excesses of political cor- been as flagrant; of course, class sizes were rectness. In many respects, ethics cannot much smaller then, and sensitivities about be politically correct because inculcating tra- sexism are much higher now. But part of the problem stems from an honor system that ditional ethical values is an inherently con- gets bogged down in technicalities and game servative enterprise. Much of what we playing. understand as ethical is the fruit of traditional religious, philosophical, political, historical, and literary reflection—much of what Toner: Yes, which reminds me of something has been "deconstructed" by political cor- we touched on before—the idea that the vac- rectness, which is at heart a leftist ideol- cine for this disease also has to be in the ogy.14 minds, hearts, and souls of men and women of character and gumption—people with enough sense and substance to say, from Szafranski: Jim, this is sounding either time to time, "No! This is wrong! It must Ciceronian ("O têmpora! O mores!") or Dy- stop!" They know something is wrong for lan Thomasesque ("Rage, rage against the dy- many reasons that I won't explore here.16 ing of the light"), and neither of these views But the "elite teacher corps" is already is very productive.15 I refuse to be fatalistic around; they just don't know it yet! More about this; nevertheless, we must restore— than 40 years ago, Gilbert Highet wrote a unarguably—honor to this sometimes oner- wonderful little book called The Art of Teach- ous profession. ing,17 in which he says that all of us are—or must become—teachers. Certainly, anyone Toner: You're right. If you know that some- who holds a commission—which means "with mission"— is, ipso facto, a teacher. If thing—some component—flat-out doesn't one sees a minor abuse of protocol (e.g., not work in an aircraft and that such failure can saluting a sênior), one has the responsibility endanger your life, it seems to me that you'll to make a correction. How much more criti- take action as soon as practicable to get the cai it is, then, that officers realize they must thing fixed. If you can't trust the guys on set the standards in their commands. Offi- your left and right, you'll try to get new cers don't tcach ethics; they are ethics. MIL1TARY ETHICS 21

Szafranski: But I repeat, Jim, how does the Toner: There is clearly something in what teacher get taught? you both say. I think fear can serve an initial teaching purpose in some situations, but my chief concern is that we'll acciden- Toner: By seniors, by society, by self. To tally create a political or military Franken- some extent, one is what one is because oth- stein who will terrorize us in the name of the ers have cared. They have taught that person holy. All Systems use fear, I know, and that what they know best. Society customarily may not be bad. I prefer, however, to think taught us standards that we collectively en- that our ultimate "vaccine" lies in the two dorsed as a nation. The Nuremberg, Manila, areas of grace20 and of reason. 1'11 not pur- and Tokyo war-crimes tribunais taught us, sue the former here, but because we are ra- again, the importance of listening to seniors tional beings, we can see error around us. and society and of accepting ultimate re- Hurt can lead to resolve. Resolve can lead to sponsibility for ourselves. Again, this is not reformation. I agree with you, though, that just philosophy; it's the law of the land! Fi- fear can be made to complement reason. nally, I have my own conscience. Of course, conscience is not an ultimate answer unless it Szafranski: So, the agenda for reformation is formed by consent to values that transcend seems to be in assuming these charac- the ego. John Henry Cardinal Newman teristics. First, it must begin within our- (1801-90) once said, "Conscience has rights selves; second, others can help us through an because it has duties."18 Following the dic- education process; and third, the right way is tates of an exclusively selfish or ill-formed the way of reason with the discernment conscience is unlikely to lead one to do what given by grace. Still, I'm stuck with a prob- he or she should. lem. How can we keep the reformation simple for the people involved in it? Casebeer: Exactly. No matter what we choose to present in education programs, ul- Toner: One doesn't teach ethics—it used to timately the individual is the key. Society and be called "character guidance"—in basic nation are aggregate terms—what we do and training by assigning readings in Aristotle. believe as individuais determines what our Troops don't need to read AFP 110-31, Inter- society and nation look like. Any problems national Law: The Conduct ofArmed Conflict start there and have to be stopped there. and Air Operations (November 1976), to understand the rudiments of just conduct. I come back to Burke's term prejudice. There Szafranski: Society will continue to fail us. are some standards so basic—yet, so criticai— So how is it possible for the individual, the that anyone entering the military must know moral self—Lieutenant Adam and Lieutenant them before he or she graduates from basic Eve, in a garden of earthly delights and training or boot camp. In this way, we can snakes—to save himself or herself and thereby teach ethics without becoming embroiled in save us. Perhaps fear is a solution. Make us academic debate and in philosophical jargon. all afraid to misbehave.

Casebeer: Yes, externai punishments are Officers don't teach ethics, they needed. But if we frame the issue deon- are ethics. tologically, where intent and attitude toward duty are important, then it isn't enough to punish, for that does nothing to change the dictates of an individuaPs free will—the in- Casebeer: I think the Air Force Academy's tent behind the action.19 honor oath is well put: "I will not lie, steal, 22 AIRPO WER JOURNAL WÍNTER 1994

or cheat nor tolerate those who do. Further- duct properly suggests); but mom is first. more, I resolve to do my duty and live hon- What I mean is that if we imagine our moms orably, so help me God." seeing us do things we should be ashamed of, we might be able to cease doing them. It Szafranski: So, would "I will not lie, steal, is hard to imagine a drill sergeant discussing or cheat or tolerate those who do" work as a deontological ethics in basic training. But it simple formula for the whole Air Force, is not hard to imagine an instructor telling maybe buttressed by appropriate amounts of soldiers, "If you would be ashamed of having your mother see you do it, it's probably frequently underscored fear? wrong." Terribly simple? Sure. There are numerous exceptions. Married people make Toner: Well, it's an excellent starting point. love—and there is certainly nothing wrong "Duty, honor, and country" is good too, but with it—but it is not a public activity for it's not something readily understood by mothers or for anyone else to observe. That everyone. 1 have tried to develop a way to doesn't make sexual intimacy in marriage inculcate this for 18-year-olds. I came up wrong. Soldiers might have to bayonet the with the notion of principie—purpose—people. enemy, and they would not want their moth- That is, the soldier's first responsibility (back ers to see that, either. But the action of kill- to Nuremberg) is to follow legal orders; sec- ing the enemy in combat may well be ond, to get the job done right; third, to take necessary. The idea to get across is that care of his or her fellow soldiers. some actions (e.g., lying, cheating, and stealing) are almost always wrong, and somebody Szafranski: That is very, very good. It is should say so very early on. "These actions simple, understandable in human terms, and are wrong! Do them, and you will pay the put in such a way that it fixes us in relation price [fear]! You will not do them because to others—good relations, unselfish relations. you are educated in our profession, in our So if we vaccinate the 18-year-olds, how community of values." about the 50-year-olds? What's to be done for or about them? Szafranski: I'm beginning to see a way out Casebeer: Incompetence can be moral as of this swamp! 1 really think most people are well as, say, m echanical.21 The issue of pro- good or want to be good. The military, with fessional incom petence is thorny. If we its emphasis on teamwork and group ac- equate a lack of professional knowledge with countability, is really made up of special peo- immorality, then busting a check ride makes ple—unselfish people—as Bill mentioned you an evil person. earlier. Maybe all we need is a little more openness about ethics and good conduct. So how do we proclaim that without a doubt, Toner: The incompetents, in either sense, must be weeded out by professionals over the reformation has begun and cannot be the years. Although these are difficult times stopped? for the military because of cutbacks, this is also a good time very carefully to choose the Toner: The first leadership principie I people "on your left and right." Let me say learned at Infantry Officer Candidate School one more thing about teaching, though. An- (OCS) was "be technically and tactically other phrase 1 use to teach this idea is competent." I always thought ethically rnother—niission—nien—me. I us e men for rea- should fit in there too. Dick, I know the bad sons of alliteration only. I put me last; my guys won't be won over by appeals to their buddies (or my command) come(s) ahead of sense of shame, but when somebody says, me (whenever possible); the mission has to "Think about what you're doing! Is it come before the men (as the Code of Con- right?" most of us will listen. It's time for MILITARY ETH1CS 23

warriors to get back to the notion of the com- Training School (OTS) three months. How munity. does a new officer learn the community—the professional—values of the Service (and thus Szafranski: OK. On some levei, I'm both become a model of them) in three months? comforted and challenged by our discussion. The very people who have the key teaching We've pointed out ways and words that can roles-fieutenant colonels and colonels—have provide the vaccination against the disease. relatively little time to learn their profession How do we formalize this educational pro- and much less time [usually] to pass its val- cess within the warrior clan? You mentioned ues on before they are retired. Doctors, law- basic training, officer formation programs, yers, and college teachers, by contrast, have a and PME. Do you see a continuing program professional lifetime to master their profes- of moral armament and rearmament? sion and to pass along its values.

Casebeer: Great term! Moral armamentl Casebeer: Or in the case of the Service Returning ethics to the commonsense levei academies, four years sometimes isn't even makes a lot of sense. We still need to be enough. Even so, we face a dilemma. We wary, though, that today's conception of need to purge ourselves of those who can't common sense—greed? immorality?—is com- meet military standards of conduct; yet, the patible with our military mission. very act of getting rid of soldiers puts "the community" at risk. How can we develop a Toner: As a teacher, I always think of read- sense of community in a reduction in force ing lists—and theyTe important. PME—in- (RIF) and selective early retirement board deed all military education—should have (SERB) atmosphere? such lists. TheyTe necessary for moral armament but not sufficient. We need models. Toner: Tough call. Still, warriors must real- That is one reason, as you know, that the ize that honor—military virtue—is not just a Service academies for years have insisted on nice thing to have; it's a functional impera- officers teaching—because officers must un- tive. One of the sad things about military derstand the values that suffuse those pro- education is that teachers are rotated into grams. and out of slots so fast that there's little chance to create a real honor guard—that is, Casebeer: My experience at the Air Force the core (and corps) of seasoned military Academy drove home the importance of hav- teachers who know ethical theory but (far ing good role models. Military members in more important) model ethical behavior. the classroom provided both positive and They teach well because they live well. I be- negative examples of officership. lieve that there should be a corps of professional teachers in the military—it should be a military occupational specialty or Air Force Szafranski: As we've said, all officers must specialty code—that would allow seasoned answer again the call to arms and become professionals to earn their advanced degrees the role models they were meant to be. But and then to teach at the Service academies, you just addressed PME. What about some OCS/OTS, ROTC, and the PME schools. set of recurring, annual, whatever, "core We've got to stop penalizing these folks in value" training for everyone? our promotion, RIF, and SERB processes simply because theyTe educators. Toner: Agreed. A major problem with any military education is the shortness of time permitted for "enculturation" or socializa- Szafranski: The "crisis" is not without its tion. It took me a year in the Army to earn a bright side. That is, it provides the justifica- gold bar. It takes people in Air Force Officer tion for now deliberately and consciously ap- 24 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

proaching these issues with an eye toward trivial stuff; thus, we "practice" wrong! authentic reformation. You've given me a Every athletic coach knows that as you prac- new awareness of the foundation of the war- tice, you will play. Lie, cheat, and steal in rior "coda." It's because we hold the stuff of petty matters, and you'll very likely do the life and death in our hands—sometimes, in same when lives are on the line. After a time, dire straits, trusted with ensuring the very in fact, people who lie, cheat, and steal can't survival of our country and its institutions even separate truth from fiction. They be- and values—that we must be adherents to and come lost souls, figuratively and literally. practitioners of right thinking and right behaving. Further, we can fight or fix anything as long as we can pinpoint the enemy. Casebeer: In the strictest moral sense, even the slightest ethical violation is tantamount to committing the gravest of sins. If we can't Toner: Too, I think we have all profited from trust ourselves on the "unimportant issues," lousy teachers. Maybe the ethically stunted how can we trust ourselves when truly im- officers we've referred to have done us all a portant moral problems confront us? good turn by modeling how not to be an officer. Thomas Jefferson told us that "we hold these truths." We need to get back to the Szafranski: I agree. The only hard part is truths we hold— and all of us, as C. S. Lewis getting started. Coach Bob Knight at Indiana once told us, share so many truths in com- University used to say, "Everyone has the will mon.22 But we need to practice ethics daily. to win, but only winners have the will to pre- Taking a hill by fire and Steel is rarely done pare to win." If we prepare ourselves and by most professional warriors. But fraud, practice right thinking and right behaving, waste, and abuse issues, though not glamor- we'll win. But if we don't, all of us lose. Like ous, are really the stuff of daily military eth- Toner says, we're lost souls—literally and ics. We usually lie, cheat, and steal over the figuratively. □

Notes 1. This phrase was used by Maj Glen Sanborn, a member of 5. See Robert Bolt's A Man for All Seasons (New York: the judge advocate general corps and formerly the chief of Random House, 1962) or refer to William E. CampbelFs Erasmns, military justice for the 7th Bomb Wing at Carswell AFB in Fort Tyndale, and More (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1950). Worth, Texas. Sanborn used it as a possible explanation for the 6. The framers of the Constitution were undoubtedly large number of complaints levied against sênior officers working from a certain set of assumptions about human nature. beginning in 1990 and continuing to the present. He Checks and balances were introduced in that document to offset hypothesized that the troops were unhappy with the changes our natural drive toward selfish behavior. Biologists may not be and rate of change that occurred in the armed forces after the working from these same assumptions about human goodness. cold war ended. The troops, he speculated, took their For an excellent exposition about how altruistic behavior in revenge—in many cases—by moral fragging. That is, they nature can sometimes be rewarded by the evolutionary mortally hurt their superiors by alleging that they had engaged mechanism, see Richard Dawkins's The Selfish Gene (Oxford: in some kind of misconduct. The presumption of innocence, an Oxford University Press, 1990) or The Blind Watchmaken Why ímportant principie in our country, never seems to make the the Evidence o f Evolution Reveals a Universe wlthout Design (New news. York: Norton Press, 1987). 2. References to the ethics crisis in the military are based on 7. For an excellent OverView, see Russell Kirk, The Politics o f reports about Tailhook, about inappropriate command influence Prudence (Bryn Mawr, Pa.: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, in the selection of general officers, and about other matters well 1993). covered recently in the press. 8. William Golding, Lord o f the Flies (New York: 3. See James H. Toner, The American Military Ethic: A Coward-McCann, 1962). Meditation (New York: Praeger, 1992). 9. Dead, white, European males (DWEM)—Shakespeare, for 4. Bushido is the code of the samurai. Omertà is the code of example-are seen by some professors as representing class, silence among the Cosa Nostra ("our affair"). Honor can be gender, or perhaps religious interests different from the values of interpreted differently by different groups. Ask yourself what it many others (e.g., "people of color”). In a typical college means to you. course—the reasoning sometimes goes—there are only so many MILITARY ETHICS 25

books on the reading list or syllabus thai the professor can 18. Quoted ln Pope John Paul II, The Splendor o f Truth assign. Therefore, it is important to be certain thal a wide (Boston: St. Paul Books, [1994]), 50. variety of authors—some of them perhaps not well known-be 19. Deontologists believe that the intent behínd an action is induded. To concentrate on the supposedly great literature of crucial to determining whether the action is "moral" or not. DWEMs is to inculcate a certain set of Western, white, male Results are irrelevant. This schema is based on the assumption values into what ought to be a multicultural educational that we can't perfectly predict the future, so how can we make enterprise. our morality contingent on chance? Intent and good will-not 10. Roger Kimball, Tenured Radicais: How Politics Has outcomes—are what count. One of the most famous Corrupted Our Higher Education (New York: HarperCollins deontologists is the eighteenth-century German philosopher Publishing, Inc., 1991); and Dinesh D'Souza, llliberal Education: Immanuel Kant, who says in his Foundation for the Metaphysics of The Politics of Sex and Race on Campus (New York: Maxwell Morais (1785), "An action done from duty derives its moral Macmillan International, 1991). worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but 11. See Glenn Tinder, Political Thinking: The Perennial from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does Questions, 3d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979). Burke's term, of not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but course, is from his classic book Reflections on the Revolution in merely on the principie of volition by which the action has taken France (New York: Doubleday, 1989). place" (from Philosophic Classics, ed. Walter Kaufmann 12. Department of Defense Inspector General, Tailhook 91, [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1968), 495). Part 2: Events at the 35th Annual Tailhook Symposium 20. It is increasingly difficult in our sodety even to raise the (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993). idea of grace, which is a religious concept. See Stephen L. Carter, 13. See, for example, Maj P. Mason Carpenter and Maj The Culture of Disbelief (New York: Basic Books, 1993); and James George T. McClain, "Air Command and Staff College Air Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense (New York: Free Press, 1993). Campaign Course: The Air Corps Tactical School Reborn?" 21. No one has made this point better than Col Malham Airpower Journal 7, no. 3 (Fali 1993): 72-83. Wakin of the Air Force Academy. See his two fine essays on "The 14. Political correctness may be defined as conformity to Ethics of Leadership," in War, Morality, and the Military liberal or ultraliberal political and social norms. Such Profession, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986). conformity is supposedly required by a number of American Another excellent book is Col Anthony E. Hartle's Moral Issues in institutions. Military Decision Making (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of 15. Cicero, In Catilinam, no. i, sec. 2; and Dylan Thomas, Kansas, 1989). Hartle teaches ethics at West Point. "Do Not Go Gentle into That Good Night," line 3. 22. See William E. Bennett, ed., The Book o f Virtues: A 16. See James H. Toner, The Sword and the Cross: Reflections Treasury o f Great Moral Stories (New York: Simon and Schuster, on Command and Conscience (New York: Praeger, 1992). 1993); and James H. Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden 17. Gilbert Highet, The Art o f Teaching (New York: Knopf, o f Military Ethics, forthcoming. 1950). CONCEPTS Implications For Air Force Intelligence

C apt Edwar d R 0 ’ C onnell 1 ST LT jOHN T. DlLLAPLAIN

ECENTLY A NEW class of "non- However, according to Don Henry, staff spe- lethal weapons" has garnered a con- cialist in the Office of Tactical Warfare Pro- siderable amount of interest in grams, Under Secretary of Defense, defense and law enforcement cir- Acquisition and Technology, "Preliminary cles, resulting in the increased likelihood of evaluations suggest that the use of non-lethal the actual deployment of these new tech- weapons, in either the more traditional con- nologies at the operational levei. The in- ventional missions or the newer missions as creased interest in the development of suggested by operations other than war, seems nonlethal means to achieve limited politi- more probable than possible."1 cal, economic, and military objectives may The term nonlethal has come into wide use require new considerations in how Air Force despite the objections of many observers who intelligence goes about its business of sup- claim that these weapons could result in le- porting the war fighter. thality in some situations. A Rand study Emerging technologies supporting the de- headed by Dr Gerald Frost used the term non- velopment of nonlethal weapons are some- lethal concepts, defined as a system that can what scattered, with many potential players. incapacitate an adversary's capability while

26 ... i;;§O T L attempting to prevent noncombatant injuries, and propagation through precipitatl friendly/adversary casualties, and collateral smoke, and dust.6 damage.2 Of these technologies, many have A brief rundown of other promising non- potential air power applications. lethal technologies would include special Nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) Chemicals, antitraction lubricants, and anti- generators could potentially be fitted into personnel technologies. Optical munitions air-launched cruise missiles. The nonnuclear such as an isotropic radiator would be con- EMP burst is produced by a conventional ex- tained in a flare dispenser for the purpose of plosion that releases a microwave energy pulse disabling infrared missiles instead of merely that can damage or disable electrical compo- luring them away from an aircraft. Chemi- nents thousands of feet away.3 These weapons cals such as superacids, caustics, and embrit- could not only disable enemy weapons in the tlement agents degrade certain materiais, field but could also damage or "functionally while antitraction lubricants make road sur- kill" hardened, underground command, con- faces inoperable. Antipersonnel technolo- trol, Communications, computers, and intelli- gies, perhaps more suited to law enforcement gence (C4I) nodes.4 or special operations, include sticky foams, Another promising technology is high- entanglement nets, volume confinement de- powered acoustic generators that are used to vices, calmative agents, flash devices, and rub- produce infrasound (below 20 hertz and in- ber bullets.7 audible). This low-frequency, high-decibel The USAF application of nonlethal con- sound is emitted in bands that resonate in cepts could cover a wide range of scenarios certain body cavities, causing the disturbance ranging from covert air insertion of special of body organs, visual blurring, and nausea. operations forces in an antiterrorist operation These effects, becoming more severe as the to a broader application of air power in sup- decibel levei increases, range from temporary port of crises and lesser conflicts (CALC). The discomfort that disappears after a few minutes delivery of nonlethal weapons as a force mul- to permanent damage or lethality. Addi- tiplier in a major regional conflict (MRC) has tional antimaterial effects include the embrit- the potential to become a common part of tlement or fatigue of metais, thermal damage, future warfare. and the delamination of composites.5 The driving factor behind the development The Scientific Applications and Research of nonlethal concepts is the increasing empha- Associates (SARA), Incorporated, of Hunt- sis on limiting casualties on both sides of a ington Beach, Califórnia, is workingon acous- conflict. As we have witnessed in all US tic devices that can be attached to rotary-wing operations since Desert Storm, the emergence aircraft or inside penetrating munitions. of the global media (i.e., the "Cable News SARA researchers see acoustic technology as NetWork [CNN] factor") has become a key meeting weapons requirements by being consideration in conducting modem warfare. compact, rugged, transportable, and relatively An illustration of this was the decision process cheap. The benefits of acoustic weapons in- leading to the cruise missile attack on the Iraqi clude a tunable degree of effect, area denial, intelligence headquarters. Before authoriz-

27 28 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994 ing the attack, President Bill Clinton wanted future conflict will no doubt push us further to know precisely how many civilian casual- down this continuum. Therefore, decision ties to expect. When Gen Colin Powell, makers should understand that any move- chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave him ment toward a "cleaner, safer" war is a process a probable number (12), the president ap- whereby investment in more advanced muni- proved the attack.8 This shows that individual tions, weapon platforms, training, and intelli- military operations are being scrutinized at gence is traded for fewer casualties, less the highest leveis to determine the potential collateral damage, and the neutralization of media fallout from civilian casualties. We the CNN factor. can expect this to keep the collateral damage The situation presented to Gulf War plan- issue a key part of any future policy guidance ners by Iraqi MiG aircraft parked in front of from the national command authorities the Iraqi Ziggurat temple during Desert Storm (NCA). As Alvin and Heidi Toffler noted in offers some insight into the potential benefits War and Anti-War, future wars are likely to be for the Air Force from nonlethal concepts. At fought increasingly in the low- to mid-inten- that time, joint forces air component planners sity conflict range.9 These are precisely the engaged in target development efforts against types of conflicts where nonlethal applica- Iraqi air assets were confronted by the questions could play a preeminent role. The more tion of how to attack two Iraqi aircraft in the cautionary environment created by consen- open yet parked proximate to one of Iraq's sus-based coalition warfare and peacekeeping most significant cultural symbols.10 Due to operations tends to make nonlethal concepts concerns raised about damage to the temple an attractive option for changing an enemy's under the laws of armed conflict (LOAC), behavior. planners could not select it for force applica- Nonlethal concepts, at least in terms of Air tion.11 Precise geolocation and imagery (tar- Force applications, do not appear to be a get development) existed on a valid target departure from the normal evolution of air (aircraft in the open), yet because of the lack power. Since the air campaigns of World War of suitable fielded weapons, such as super II, we have witnessed a steady improvement caustics or embrittlement agents, the target in the accuracy of our weapon systems as well could not be attacked safely within the stated as an increased specialization among both guidance and objectives to limit damage to weapon platforms and the ordnance that they cultural, historical objects. deliver (fig. 1). The net effect of this evolu- Recent Air Force intelligence efforts to bet- tion has been the ability to more effectively ter support the war fighter by refocusing Sys- destroy criticai targets while at the same time tems and personnel forward at air operations reducing collateral damage. The deployment centers will also better equip us to support of a wide array of nonlethal munitions in a nonlethal operations. Each of the Air Force

WORLD WAR II DESERT STORM FUTURE WAR • DUMB BOMBS PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS/ • PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS/ (HIGH COLLATERAL DAMAGE) DUMB BOMBS NONLETHAL TECHNOLOGIES (LESS COLLATERAL DAMAGE) (MINIMAL COLLATERAL DAMAGE)

Figure 1. The Evolution of Air Power NONLETHAL CONCEPTS 29

OPEN SOURCE GUIDANCE

• EMERGING NATIONAL NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE COMMAND • CIVILIAN DATA BASES AUTHORITIES •GLOBAL MEDIA FILESERVERS NONLETHAL OBJECTIVE T MINIMIZE CASUALTIES/COLLATEFIAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT í COMMAND MISSION PREPARATION • AN AL VS IS OF CULTURAL SENSITIVITIES ■ -NETTING-OF INTERDISCIPLINARY EXPERTS ■ MORE FLEXIBILITY FOR • NONLETHAL JOINT MUNITIONS INTELLIGENCE ROLE FORCE APPLICATION EFFECTIVENESS MANUALS REQUIRED - TRANSLATE MULTISOURCE DATA ■NONLETHAL TARGET - ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN - ASSIST IN ASSESSING SELECTION "BACKEND PLANNING ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS - ASSIST IN ESTABLISHING MEASURES OF BATTLE EFFECTIVENESS (MOE) MANAGEMENT TASKING TT DATA SURVEILLANCE BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT MISSION EXECUTION J

• MORE TAILORED • FUNCTIONAL KILL • PLATFORM MUST HAVE IMINT AND SIGINT • NONSTANDARD MOE ASSESSMENT-FRIENDLY • INCREASED HUMINT • •NETTING" OF NONLETHAL EXPERTS CAPABILITY

Figure 2. Strategy to Task Framework — Intelligence Applications for Nonlethal Concepts

missions described above, from CALCs to Air Force targeting process, coupled with ex- MRCs, will require the traditional levei of isting collection resources, is not necessarily support provided by the intelligence commu- inadequate for the effective support of non- nity. However, some missions will require lethal concepts. Nevertheless, an increased specially tailored intelligence support to plan- demand for some tailored inputs may require ners, operators, delivery platforms, and weap- some fine tuning of the process. ons. The intelligence community, along with weapon developers and operators, will have to In Desert Storm, as we've seen, some targets determine the proper mix of information re- were not attacked due to concerns over collat- quired to support nonlethal applications. eral damage. However, nonlethal concepts, Equally important, the community will have once deployed as weapons, will give com- to leam how to translate nonlethal warfare mand decision makers more flexibility in the objectives and guidance, potentially through force-application stage, enabling them to Serv- a nontraditional target development and ice targets that would otherwise not be at- weaponeering process, to recommend courses tacked. In a mid- or high-intensity conflict, of action that operators have to plan and then the normal targeting process will provide a execute. small number of residual targets that may One potential way to examine the implica- require nonlethal ordnance. A low-intensity tions of nonlethal concepts on Air Force intel- conflict or one-time limited strike may fali entirely into the nonlethal realm due to the ligence is to run the targeting process "hands-on" interest from national decision (including nonlethal concepts) through makers. (Depending on the scale of conflict, Rand's strategies-to-tasks framework (fig. command could reside at a specialized squad- 2).12 In doing so, we observe that the current ron's mission-planning cell, the intervention 30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

wing's operations center [WOC], or at the air intelligence systems specialists must establish operations center[AOC] supporting the joint information paths in peacetime to ensure eas- forces air component commander [JFACC].) ier access to this data in wartime. The diffi- Intelligence officers must assist the planners culty is that such "path clearing" must be in dividing the targetset into lethal, nonlethal, done in a low-profile, yet ultimately publicly and overlapping categories (fig. 3).13 known, manner. In the future, we can prob- The hub of intelligence support for non- ably expect to access interactive data bases lethal concepts will take place in the assess- that "leave no footprints," giving us sources ment cell located within the command of targeting information that are currently infrastructure. In the future, the assessment untapped.14 of potential targets will change from a simple With no current measures of effectiveness task to multidimensional work, involving the (MOE) for nonlethal concepts, intelligence "netting" of interdisciplinary experts from analysts will help command planners estab- varied nontraditional support fields (meteor- lish MOEs for assessment and battle damage ology, physics, chemistry). Intelligence spe- assessment (BDA) purposes by discussing al- cialists such as targeteers, who have been temative options with interdisciplinary ex- trained to fuse all-source intelligence, are a perts, potentially over interactive video nets. potential unrealized resource for use in the An example of this would be the potential use assessment task of translating multisource in- of acoustic generators deployed in specially formation for nonlethal operations. Support configured penetrating weapons. Planners for nonlethal concepts will require ready ac- might need to confer with weapon developers cess to open-source information. Air Force and geologists over video links in order to

DISCRIMINATING VERSUS TARGET SETS WEAPONEERING FORCE-APPLICATION DECISIONS ?

LETHAL NONLETHAL • STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM • AIRFIELDS • LEADERSHIP •C3 • NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL • MOBILE MISSILE FORCE • MECHANIZED INFANTRY • MILITARY STORAGE AND PROLIFERATION SITES M • NAVAL FORCES AND PORTS -m pr • RAILROADS AND BRIDGES • ELECTRICITY • PETROLEUM. OIL, LUBRICANTS

PRECISION AREA PRECISION WEAPON WEAPON WEAPON

Figure 3. Discerning Nonlethal Target Sets NONLETHAL CONCEPTS 31 show them the underground command post craft may be tasked for images timed to corre- they are targeting and to seek their expertise spond to previous weapon effects; or if con- in assessing the potential effectiveness of stant surveillance is required in a high-threat acoustic waves propagating through a particu- area, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or re- lar rock formation or soil type. motely piloted vehicles (RPV) might be the The surveillance function will be tasked by best option. Some effects may only be dis- intelligence analysts to provide more special- cernible to personnel on the ground. For this ized imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals reason, we can expect a greater role for human intelligence (SIGINT) for damage assessment. intelligence (HUMINT) in support of non- One significant property of some of the po- lethal concepts, with greater access coming tential nonlethal weapons will be the onset from a system of classified fileservers, con- time for the weapon to take effect. Figure 4 necting us with data bases from coalition illustrates that we may have to wait several member countries, national agencies, and sis- minutes or even hours for the effect to take ter Services.16 place.15 In order to record these nonlethal One part of the debate concerning the de- effects, the aircraft delivering the ordnance velopment of nonlethal weapons will be how might be required to extend its loiter time, to integrate them into operational units. In a thus exposing itself to increased risk from broader context, as the weapons become more enemy defenses. Tactical reconnaissance air- commonplace, they will eventually become another tool in the commander's "toolbox."17 However, in the meantime, we may see a more limited distribution of these weapons. The use of nonlethal force in a peace enforcement Notional Onset Times to Affect Targets: scenario or limited raid may require the quick Intelligence Collection Considerations deployment of air power in the form of a specialized squadron. This further reinforces the "new rule" discussed in Michael Hammer and James Champy's Reengineering the Corpo- ration—he\d personneFs (in this case, squadron intelligence officers') ability to send and receive information wherever they are.™ With a high learning curve initially en- countered by all players in the nonlethal targeting process, mission preparation may become more problematic from a planning standpoint. As observed from studying recent peace enforcement efforts in Somalia, mission preparers and mission executors at lower leveis could not afford the time for HUMINT information requests to be approved and sent "up channel" without a negative effect on mission success. Case studies from the Janu- ary 1993 Operation Southern Watch air attacks show that we have to move our notion of "back-end" planning "up front" so that information is more effectively communi- Sourcs: Dr Gerald Frost and Dr Calvin Shipbaugh, Rand Corporation cated to the mission executor.19 With the potentially more diverse nature of nonlethal Figure 4. Onset Times for Nonlethal Weapons concepts, it will be even more important for r

(A#*

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) might be the best To support nonlethal operations, mission option for tactical reconnaissance images timed to cor- executors may be selected based on their respond to weapons effects or if constant surveillance is required in a high-threat area. added value to the BDA function. In the De- sert Storm and Southern Watch operations, battle damage from F-16 and F-18 strikes using ordnance with proximity fuzes against Iraqi radars was not easily confirmed because of personnel at the mission-preparation stage to difficulty in analyzing imagery to establish reduce confusion and nonvalue-adding work frag damage to radar vans. This was com- by actively participating in "back-end plan- pounded by these aircraft's lack of BDA sen- ning" through direct interactive video Sys- sors to confirm blast to the targets. Such tems when confronted with attacks against controversies will only be exacerbated by the infrastructure or when performing detailed assessment of new MOEs for nonlethal opera- preplanned targeting. When mission plan- tions in which the "effect" may be the embrit- ners are developing strikes against enemy tlement of the metal or the slickness of a forces or considering more adaptive targeting paved surface. Such devices as air-delivered problems such as those in Bosnia, they will incapacitating acoustic mechanisms make ac- need to provide "in-time" nonlethal-related curate battle damage assessment—which relies intelligence to the operators.20 The intelli- on our current emphasis/mix of collection gence specialist at this levei might require systems—just as problematic. access to an information carousel comprised of different fileservers containing blocks of In a new era marked by instantaneous data (from the composition of metal found in global media reports (somewhat outside of Serbian artillery tubes to the current geoloca- our control), as well as the likelihood of more tion of each piece). limited enforcement operations, targets may

32 NONLETHAL CONCEPTS 33

be selected with the criteria being ease of sure that when they design information paths battle damage assessment. If Air Force intelli- in the future, they consider all frictional im- gence does not have the requisite protocol and pediments to the successful support of non- systems in place to assess nonlethal concepts, lethal concepts. Former Air Force Chief of Staff Merrill McPeak has summed up his we may inadvertently contribute to a CINC's thoughts on nonlethal technology: perception that use of air power may be pro- hibitive. In scenarios in which CINCs have We should address so-cailed non-lethal been given strict guidance to limit casualties technologies, non-lethal in human terms but and collateral damage, they must have a good quite lethal in terms of killing systems or picture of what nonlethal force will entail and degrading capability. ... 1 admit, this all how the results will be verified. Otherwise, sounds a little James Bondish; not something that should come from a guy who's spent lots they will not accept the risks associated with of time thinking about putting "fire and Steel" its use. on target. But, I believe this is the kind of Since the Gulf War, the gap between non- Creative thinking we all must do.21 lethal technology development and intelligence capabilities required to support the From an intelligence perspective, the Air command, mission preparation, and mission Force is well suited to be a leader in the execution functions in figure 2 is closing rap- eventual employment of nonlethal weapons. idly. Though many nonlethal concepts are As General McPeak emphasized, the time for still in the development and early demonstra- Creative thought is now, before these weap- tion stages, intelligence systems specialists ons become operational. □ and communication engineers need to make

Notes 1. Don Henry, staff specíalist, Office of Tactical Warfare 12. The model in figure 2 was created by the authors using Programs, Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and Rand's strategies-to- tasks framework. Technology, interview by authors, 2 August 1994. 13. The graphic in figure 3 was developed in accordance 2. Rand briefing, Brig Gen William S. Hinton, Jr., Air with guidance from Maj Gen Kenneth Minihan, USAF, AIA/CC, Combat Command, subject: Application of Nonlethal Weapons 17 May 1994. for Air Force Missions, June 1994. 14. Dr Bruce Don, Rand Corporation, sênior researcher, 3. "ALCMs Given Non-lethal Role," Aviation Week & Space Criticai Technologies Institute, interview by Captain 0'Connell, Technology 138, no. 8 (22 February 1993): 20-22. 15 November 1993. 4 Barbara Star, "Proliferation: The New High Ground for 15. Rand briefing, "Application of Non-Lethal Weapons." USA," ]ane's Defence Weekly, 14 May 1994, 1. 16. JCS/J-7 Joint Publication 2-0, loint Doctrine for 5. Dr Gerald Frost and Dr Calvin Shipbaugh, GPS Targeting Intelligence Support to Operation, VI1-6. Methods for Non-Lethal Systems, Rand Publication RP-262 (Santa 17. Briefing by authors, Maj Gen Ervin Rokke, USAF/IN, Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1 February 1994), 3. subject: Nonlethal Concepts: lmplications for Air Force 6. John P. Dering, staff scientist, SARA, Lnc., interview by Intelligence, 7 June 1994. the authors at SARA, lnc., Huntington Beach, Calif., 3 June 1994. 18. Michael Hammer and James Champy, Reengineering the 7. Frost and Shipbaugh, GPS Targeting Methods, 3. Corporation (New York: Harper Business, 1993), 96. 8. "National Affairs," Newsweek, 12July 1993, 20. 19. Rand briefing, Brig John Casciano, USAF/INX, subject: 9. Alvm Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: A Targeting Process for the Future: lmplications of Case Studies, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (New York: Little, 6 October 1994. Brown, and Company, 1993), 56. 20. Air Force Intelligence Modemization Plan (AFTMP), 10. Then-Lt Col Dave Deptula, USAF, interview by Captain executive summary, 9 March 1994, edited by Capt YuLin 0'Connell at 33 TFW, Eglin AFB, Fia., 22 June 1992. Whitehead, AF/INXX. 11 The authors realize that the MiG aircraft parked in front 21. Gen Merrill McPeak, Air Force chief of staff, "Ensuring of the temple was a "baiting" tactic. Therefore, any type of Technology Preeminence of U.S. Air and Space Forces," address, attack would remam problematic due to overriding concems Scientists Group dinner, Andrews Air Force Base, Md., 5 January with Arab sensitivities and the potential effect on coalition 1994. soüdarity. Fali 1994 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNER

Capt Charles T. Barco, USAF

for his article Valuing Leadership in an Era of Prophets, Politicians, and Pugilists

Congratulations to Capt Charles T. Barco on his If you would like to compete for the Ira C. selection as the Ira C. Eaker Award winner for Eaker Award, submit an article of feature the best eligible article from the Fali 1994 issue length to the Airpower Journal, 401 Chennault of the Airpower Journal. Captain Barco receives Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. The award a $500 cash award for his contribution to the is for the best eligible article in each issue and Air Force's professional dialogue. The award is open to all US military personnel below the honors Gen Ira C. Eaker and is made possible rank of colonel or equivalent and all US gov- through the support of the Arthur G. B. Metcalf ernment civilian employees below GS-15 or Foundation of Winchester, Massachusetts. equivalent.

34 INFORMATION WARFARE PRINC1PLES OF THIRD-WAVE WAR

C ol O wen E J ensen. USAF

SURGE OF INTEREST, analysis, and This effort culminated in the recent publica- discussion has arisen concerning a tion of their newest book, War and Anti- topic variously referred to as infor- War.] Although differing in many major mation warfare, command and con- areas from US Air Force forecasts, their views A establish the tenor of current dialogue and trol (C2 ) counterwar, knowledge war, or third-wave war. Since the Air Force has estab- certainly constitute mandatory reading for lished an Information Warfare Center and any US military leader today. seems to have adopted the term Information Activity and discussion at all leveis in the warfare, that is the term that will be used Pentagon regarding information warfare have here. Terminology aside, however, if current coalesced and become centered in specific proponents are right, we are at a turning offices where interest in this type of warfare point in history. Future wars will never be has intensified over the last few years. As the same. Military strategy must be re- testimony to the interest in the subject, we thought in order to capture not only a should note that virtually all the Services have change in technology but a new set of goals resources committed to implementing infor- and even new principies. mation warfare in one or more of its forms; The popular press has joined the debate. the Air Force has held a four-star summit on In fact, in some cases it is leading the discus- the subject; and inspector general teams have sion. Alvin Toffler, author of Future Shock named it as a special interest item for their and (with his wife Heidi) The Third Wave and unit visits. Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence What are all these people talking about? at the Edge of the 21st Century, has written For those who need a tutorial on the basics, extensively on this topic in his latest works. the Tofflers provide probably the clearest

35 36 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

and most accurate explanation of how this the agrarian realm and others have advanced new type of warfare evolved. Briefly, they only to the industrial State, a few have bro- explain that warfare follows wealth. In other ken out into a completely new era—the infor- words, the culture, technology, communica- mation age. Information societies connect tion, technical skill, and organizational pat- through interlaced Communications and cor- tern that develop in a society and define its respond via terminais and gateways. We economy, also describe the constellation of have seen a rapid evolution from hand- patterns which result in the way that society cranked telephones to cellular units, fax ma- makes war.2 In the history of man, three ba- chines, integration with computers and even sic types of warfare have evolved—agrarian, with cable television, while our society and industrial, and informational. economy have undergone fundamental and First carne the agrarian age, which, of unalterable infusion and mutation caused by course, produced agrarian warfare. When information technology. Nearly every prod- man learned to grow food, he no longer had uct we use today has either been designed to wander and hunt. Populated towns devel- with Computer assistance or actually has an oped, and the practice of hoarding a surplus imbedded brain. Instead of mass production of food became possible. It was then that we find customized production for markets true warfare—a "bloody clash between or- using intelligent technology. These eco- ganized States"3—began. Weapons, handheld nomic changes are reflected in military and handcrafted, were agrarian. The agrar- forces employing smart weapons with fo- ian goals of capturing surplus wealth and cused lethality and a conscious reduction of land justified and motivated wars. Wars fol- collateral damage. Information warfare re- lowed agrarian patterns, being fought only lies on sophisticated communication, im- during intervals between reaping and sow- bedded intelligence, access to space, and ing. And technology changed, but slowly real-time decision loops. It is permeated by over time. Agrarian warfare principies were information feeding precision weaponry, espoused by a well-known guru—Sun Tzu. multispectral sensors providing real-time Much of what he wrote was timeless, and data about the battlefield, and tightly woven much pertained only to agrarian warfare. command and control of combined arms The agrarian economic and military cli- elements. Although the Tofflers have ex- mate began to change in the seventeenth pounded on the origins of this type of war- century with the introduction of steam fare, no guru has yet established its power. This change accelerated with the principies. Hopefully, this paper will start us growing manufacture of interchangeable, down that path. machined parts. It flowered with urban de- The author of this article accepts, as a first velopment, the French Revolution, the levée assumption, that the reader understands en masse, and the concept of a "nation in enough about third-wave change to believe arms." We call this era the industrial age, that it exists and that we must accommodate and with it carne industrial warfare. Here we concomitant shifts in military operational find standardized weaponry, professional doctrine. Just as military Science mirrored full-time soldiers, mass production, mass de- agrarian and industrial age cultures, it can struction, and goals echoing the Darwinian not help but reflect the reality of the infor- industrial economic struggle: annihilation, mation age. But even when we accept the unconditonal surrender, and subordination. fact that information warfare is real, we find Once again, we know the guru of this era— that we are struggling to understand it—par- Carl von Clausewitz. Much of what he wrote ticularly in the realm of operational applica- is timeless, and much pertained only to in- tion. We look back at past wars and clearly dustrial warfare. see when a second-wave country prevailed While some areas of the world remain in over a first-wave enemy. We look at Opera- INFORMATION WARFARE 37

tion Desert Storm and recognize the advan- fense, in turn, will not be able to talk to the tages of third-wave applications. But when head of his armed forces. Army command- we hold information warfare ideas up to pre- ers will be out of touch with divisions, divi- sent situations in Korea, Bosnia, and sions will be cut off from battalions, and so Moldavia, we have trouble figuring out how on down to the small-unit levei. By fogging to employ its strategies. The basic principies our forces and strangling his, we make sure are missing. that he knows nothing. Therefore, under Industrial armies know how to fight—con- this broad objective, we find two principies— centrate in one place, use mass and surprise electronic decapitation and sensor denial. to break through, operate along interior lines, and so forth. But these principies The Principie o f Decapitation don't apply to information warfare. At least we find great difficulty in trying to force Deny enemy command and control elements them to fit. What we need are equivalent, the use of any automated or electronic deci- understandable principies to guide our un- sion aids. This constitutes "electronic de- derstanding of how to actually employ infor- capitation." Data bases, data fusion systems, mation warfare to real situations. That is the electronic processing and display systems for purpose of this article. It is for those seeking command centers, combat information cen- a few fundamental principies to guide them ters, and the like must "go dark." Introduce in applying information warfare to specific "combat amnésia" to the enemy. Target key scenarios. It contains distilled principies, decision-making nodes at the top of each en- not a full explanation of theory. emy echelon—i.e., his national command Old concepts of defense and offense do authorities, his joint staff, his theater com- not apply precisely to information warfare. mander in chief (CINC), the headquarters of It seems that we should instead spread its each enemy field army, each division, and principies across four broad categories with every battalion. Leadership must not be al- two principies per category. If the four cate- lowed to overcome our focused and purpose- gories were summarized, they would instruct ful introduction of war fog. Go for the brain us to (1) thicken the fog of war for our en- shot, not the body shot. emy, (2) lift the fog of war for ourselves to create a transparent battlefield, (3) ensure that our enemies can't turn these tables on us, and (4) always fight the information war When we hold information with full intensity. Now, with these few warfare ideas up to present words as introduction, let us examine the proposed principies more closely. situations in Korea, Bosnia, and Moldavia, we have trouble figuring out how to employ its strategies. Category I: Denial The basic principies are missing. (The Fog of War) Ideally, our enemy will be capable of neither gaining knowledge of our forces or in- Cut or deny all the enemy's information- tentions nor of communicating among his transfer media—telephone, radio frequencies own units at any levei. On our side of the (RF), cable, and other means of transmission. front, our forces and movements will be in- Sever the nervous system. Deny, disrupt, de- visible to him. On his side, the chief of State grade, or destroy every transmission. will find it impossible to communicate with Stop all "gray system" access. Close off to his minister of defense. The minister of de- the enemy all third-party Communications 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

satellites (COMSAT), whether they belong to international consortia or to commercial en- terprises or are assets of uninvolved nations. The purchase of bandwidth should not necessarily guarantee the buyer Communications in time of war. Deliberately introduce confusion and fear. Ensure that the body retains no will to march on after the head is gone. Disrupt the direction and motivation of enemy forces.

The Principie of Sensor Primacy Kill sensors, not people, first. Open the way to the enemy's army by blinding all his defenses. Deny electronic radiation. If it radiates, it dies. Seek absolute silence over the battlefield. Homing weapons, jamming, and lethal and nonlethal suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) must all be employed. There is no excuse for allowing an enemy to get away with exposing his position by openly broadcasting RF energy. It gives him too much information, but it is also easy to detect and kill. Overpower passive sensors. Burn passive detectors. Use lasers on optical trackers. RF receivers should be blown. The enemy can use his vision across a broad band of the electromagnetic spectrum. Your reply must come in focused, in-band, overpowering energy or brilliantiy targeted conventional weapons. The principie of sensor primacy seeks absolute silence Enforce gray-system cooperation immedi- over the battlefield. If it radiates, it dies, just as this Iraqi ately. Third-party satellites for weather col- Fan Song radar did during Desert Storm. lection, earth sensing, and other missions, must not prçvide information to the enemy. hear him, we seek out his hiding places. We The same is true for terrestrial sensors. Any know his weapons, and his troop disposi- sensor that provides information to an en- tions and movements. We catalog his com- emy is an enemy sensor. mand and control networks, his intelligence sources and databases, and all his sensors. He can't talk without us hearing him. He Categoiy II: Force can't move without us seeing him. Enhancement (The Transparent Battlefield) The Principie o f Kttowledge The enemy completely and forever loses Ensure that your surveillance and reconnais- the element of surprise. We watch him, we sance are frequent, thorough, and multi- INFORMATION WARFARE 39

spectral. Achieve total situation awareness. tion should be ready anytime a shooter Don't let this awareness grow stale or out- needs it. The same is true with tanker an- of-date. Don't overlook "unlikely" avenues chors and other air tasking order (ATO) data. of attack. Look through clouds, precipita- All data relevant to engaged forces must be tion, darkness of night, and penetrable sur- kept fresh and flowing, arriving before it's faces. Spend energy and sensor resources needed. recklessly. Do anything to stay ahead of an Ensure that the bandwidth has the capac- enemy's knowledge-feedback cycle. Give ity and flexibility for the full flow of data. yourself the opportunity to always move Don't send criticai information over jam- first. mable, fragile media. Don't send high-vol- Ensure open-ended reception of remote ume information over narrow, slow media. sensor data by allied forces. Avoid funneling Splurge on bandwidth. Get all you can. sensor information to a vulnerable choke Don't get in your own way by choking deci- point. Don't take time to process the data sion makers with Communications bottle- unless you have to. Hand it out to all shoot- necks. ers directly so they can use it instantly. Match the precision of information to the Category III: Survivable precision of the weapon. If a smart weapon can hit a known spot within a one-meter cir- Situation Awareness and C3 cular error of probability (CEP) day or night, (Duck the Counterblow) feed it one-meter target information all day A military most vulnerable to information and night. warfare strategy is one from an information Ensure rapid, insightful, accurate battle society. What information warfare can do damage assessment. Don't waste resources for us can also be used by an enemy against on decoys or targets you've already killed. us. The more we depend on our sensors and Use multiple phenomenology to discrimi- computers and space-based Communica- nate live targets from dead targets with ex- tions, the easier we are to unplug. There- quisite resolution. Do this quickly; the next fore, our information warfare systems must day's frag (fragmentary order) has already be made robust. We must discover elec- been built. tronic survivability.

The Principie o f Survivability The Principie ofAlacrity Centralize policy strategy and planning, but Ensure that allied forces enjoy a tighter, decentralize force planning and execution. faster decision loop than the enemy. Com- Use many thinking heads. Don't make de- bine the principies of decapitation, sensor capitation easy for the enemy. Take advan- primacy, and knowledge with a sense of tage of the inherent strength in the competitive urgency. Shoot-move-shoot, American military's policy that allows for lo- and do it fast and accurately, while the en- cal initiative and flexibility and eschews rig- emy is hit-staggered-hit and doesn't know idly centralized command and control. where you went. Take advantage of all national assets and En force readiness and ensure that re- use all sectors of society—television news- quired information is available on a mo- casts, off-the-shelf computers or Communi- ment's notice—anytime. Too often attack cations systems, existing COMSATs, fax pilots are ready to fly but have to wait on machines, Computer bulletin boards, and in- the latest intelligence. Full, complete, and ternational corporate connectivity. All these finished intelligence and targeting informa- and other assets should be considered as po- 40 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

tential parts of the national war effort. If we can employ a Civil Reserve Air Fleet, why not a Corporate Reserve Communications Net- Work? Proliferation breeds survivability. In general, many nodes, many Systems, many pathways, many frequencies—and many of anything else—make a harder target set than just a few things. Employ tactical deception. Hide your command, control, and Communications (C3) backbone. Use small, moveable COM- SAT receivers and move them often. Bury cable and fiber lines between fixed sites. Ra- diate deceptively from noncritical nodes. Employ Red Teams that regularly try to steal or deny your Communications. If your theater passes all Communications through a large, stationary gateway, you're dead. Use redundant pathways, always keeping a backup Communications plan. The backup must be more survivable than the primary. It does no good to plan to use FM rádios as a replacement for a base phone system if you know the enemy has equipment and training to jam FM. Ensure that you have a C3 technological advantage. Change to stay ahead of the threat. Pay for upgrades. It's money well spent. Don't scrimp on C3 to buy more bul- The principie of knowledge seeks to achieve total situ- lets. ation awareness. Surveillance and reconnaissance should be frequent, thorough, and multispectral. Here, Iraqi tank locations in Kuwait are pinpointed by Air Force reconnaissance. The Principie o f Interoperability of industrial warfare. In information war- Maintain interoperability and rationalization fare, we should seek multiple, different, of systems with other Services and allies. An- but interoperable systems so that a golden ecdotes about incompatible C3 systems BB can't take them down. abound. Who hasn't heard about the soldier who called from a phone booth on Grenada back to the States to get a message passed to US Navy ships lying in sight offshore? Who Category IV: Leveis doesn't know that the ATO in the Gulf War (Fight Your Own Fight) had to be printed, copied, and carried to the Navy by hand because Communications Of all categories, this one is the most con- were incompatible? Such incompatibility tentious. It appears that armies at a higher could cost lives in the next war. levei win. Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Avoid C3 standardization. Full stan- and Genghis Khan all fought agrarian war- dardization promotes vulnerability. It reeks fare versus agrarian warfare, but their tactics INFORMATION WARFARE 41

were more disciplined, regimented, and in- veillance, or electronic tagging and tracking. dustrial compared to their enemies', and In more conventional scenarios, it will en- they were therefore successful. Industrial- sure that we are not surprised—that all en- age Napoleonic France had a field day with emy movement and reinforcement are agrarian European armies but had more dif- watched, understood, and attacked. ficulty with industrial England. The same Our information society has certain in- was true with the industrial North against herent vulnerabilities. Enemies will exploit the agrarian South, England against the these weaknesses no matter what we decide Boers, the cavalry against the Indians, and about fighting at one levei or another. We the Japanese against the Chinese. In Viet- have to employ the principies of survivabil- nam, once we stopped trying to fight an ity and interoperability in any case. agrarian war against an agrarian enemy and Force on force, we can still be outnum- began employing industrial-age power—mas- bered and overpowered on distant battle- sive B-52 strikes against industrial targets— fields around the world—at least until the enemy carne to the bargaining table reinforcements arrive. Our only hope is to quickly. We expected a bloody fight with fight smarter with better intelligence and thousands of allied casualties in Desert greater precision, efficiency, and lethality. A Storm. The fact that it was so easy is seen in shot to the head can even the odds between retrospect as a discovery of the power of David and Goliath. We must make sure that third-wave over second-wave armies. Should we play the role of David. we therefore fight a third-wave war against industrial North Korea or revert to massive, dumb, nuclear second-wave strategies? The The Principie oflntensity advice here is to fight our own fight. Never drop to the lower-level warfare of the enemy. If you are going to make war, then make it. This is a principie that is not unique to information warfare. Problems come from fighting at half speed against an enemy fighting The Principie o f Hierarchy at full speed—or from fighting with limita- Don't fight a lower-level enemy with a lower tions against an enemy who has no re- levei of warfare. If a third-wave army faces a straints. Whereas industrial warfare was so first-wave or second-wave army, it should not powerfully and indiscriminately destructive fight a first-wave or second-wave war. It as to invite restrictions, information warfare should fight a third-wave war. is much more carefully focused and more Even the warlords of Mogadishu need in- conducive to being waged without limita- telligence. Even North Korean forces need tions on its intensity. command and control—particularly if we do Take information warfare seriously. Don't something to surprise them and force them revert to second-wave strategies because they to react. All enemies are vulnerable to fog; are familiar. Dumb bombs and mass tactics all need to communicate. Finding ways to may be easy to use, but they also demand thicken the fog and strangle communication large forces that may not be available. Against may take imagination in some of the more North Korea, we must plan for full-scale war unconventional conflicts, but that must be where the enemy could vastly outnumber us. our task if we are to make this work. If we use second-wave strategies, we are likely Our amazing technology should be used to lose. Therefore, we must adopt all princi- in any situation to create transparency. In pies appropriate to a third-wave force fight- low-intensity conflicts, the technology may ing a second-wave army. To seriously apply look more like anticrime than armed force third-wave strategy against such an adversary activity. It may include bugging, Street sur- will take determination and creativity. 42 A1RP0WER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

The mushroom cloud represented the stopping the Gulf War when the behavior we logical culmination of industrial warfare. wanted (Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait) oc- The consequences of an all-out effort by our curred. In every future conflict, we must armed forces in the nuclear age became liter- carefully specify what an enemy must do to ally unthinkable. As a result, we have grown bring a cessation of hostilities. accustomed to fighting with one arm behind our back. To go further invited global disas- Minimize casualties. Reduced casualties ter. But information warfare promotes preci- and reduced collateral damage, both ours as sion strikes. It strives to eliminate collateral well as the enemy's, are absolute require- damage and to minimize casualties. It does ments of tomorrow's war. We must always not aim for brutal annihilation of the enemy provide ways for an enemy to satisfy our de- army but rather to paralyze his nervous Sys- mands without total surrender. The cor- tem and cause him to change his behavior. nered-rat syndrome will cause a fight to the We can go from full stop to full speed in in- last man. While our forces must engage fully formation warfare without fear of overstep- with a combination of lethality and preci- ping political limits. At last, our military sion, they must leave an avenue by which planners can be freed of political con- the enemy can ultimately escape. Smart, pre- straints. At last, our CINCs can fight all out cision weapons also add to our capability to when American lives are at risk. focus lethality and to limit enemy casualties as well as collateral damage. Very detailed intelligence is needed to direct such precise power. Overall, the application of a higher A military most vulnerable to form of war against an enemy fighting a information war strategy is one lower form of war is directed at producing from an information society. What the quickest, and therefore the least costly, information warfare can do for us result. can also be used by an enemy Change from deterrence theory to in- against us. ducement theory. Deterrence theory is cata- strophic if it doesn't work. It uses fear to motivate an adversary before war begins, and So those are the principies. But to fully it depends on the credibility of a threat. implement the strategies outlined above, we Many examples show that opponents, with must understand that information warfare strong motives for going to war, misjudge goals are very different from first-wave and that credibility to the point where their fear second-wave goals. As already mentioned, inis overcome. Once the war has started, there dustrial warfare followed goals of uncondi- is no motive to stop the fighting. Once the tional surrender and annihilation, but the line is crossed, it becomes a de facto fight to American public currently finds such goals the finish with no alternative except uncon- to be unacceptably costly in lives, material, ditional surrender. collateral damage, and time. Today we expect To employ inducement—which is continu- wars to be short, cheap, and clean. There- ously applied before, during, and after the fore, our goals must be as focused and as conflict—we must (1) make it clear what the specific as our weapons. We must aim to do enemy will gain by conformance behavior, the following: (2) be willing to use force if a rogue actor breaches clear limits of nonconformance be- Change behavior. Don't seek outright ca- havior, and (3) always stay ready to revert to pitulation; seek more modest behavioral a peaceful status quo ante with the cessation changes. The president was exactly right in of hostilities. Stated another way, we must INFORMATION WARFARE 43 offer incentives to change, change quickly to buildup) will result in obsolescence before it extremely lethal force when clearly neces- achieves full rate. Our only alternative is to sary, then be ready to switch back to offering seek more perfect knowledge of events as incentives based solely on the behavior of they change, to select those events that we our adversary. We must make this clear. must force to change for our own self-inter- Steadiness of purpose must be maintained est, and to focus our energy on specific for such a strategy to succeed, while, at the change strategies. Tomorrow's enemy may same time, quickness to go to war when nec- not even be a nation-state. It may be a radi- essary will reinforce our credibility. cal fundamentalist or extremist ethnic We all know that change is accelerating in group. Tomorrow's ally might be a Corpora- every aspect in both our individual and col- tion instead of a United Nations task force. lectives lives. In such a world, standing still Hopefully, the principies outlined in this ar- long enough to mass-produce anything is ticle will start us thinking about how we can foolish. A long production run (or force deal with such events. □

NOTES 1. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-Wan Survival at the 3. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, "War, Wealth, and a New Era in Dawn of the 21st Century (New York: Little, Brown and Co., History," World Monitor, May 1991, 46-52. 1993). 2. Ibid., 18-19.

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44 HEAVY BOMBERS HOLDING THE LINE

M aj David W. Schneider . USAF

ECENTLY, THE composition of the sential step in keeping our limited number of US Air Force’s heavy bomber force bombers capable of their future tasking. De- has received high-level interest. The veloping, documenting, and training using eventual makeup of the force will un- procedures that will allow the diverse systems doubtedlvR be a reduction from current leveis. to achieve the levei of interoperability desired The ability of this force to perform its mis- are criticai issues that often do not receive sions in the future will depend on effectively enough attention. In an era of declining utilizing force multipliers such as precision budgets, the choice of fielding a modification munitions, equipment modifications, and as- or adding a weapon to the inventory often sets that maximize bomber potential. The de- overshadows the need to learn how to best cision to deploy force multipliers is an es- utilize these new assets once fielded. The 46 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994 following fictional scenario, set in the near that the aggressive nature of Serbian expan- future, should provide food for thought on sionism had to be thwarted. We had to op- this topic. pose the precedent of allowing an invasion of a sovereign country for the purpose of protecting certain ethnic groups or else risk future Russian exploitation. These factors had Historical Background all combined to make this invasion a legiti- The situation in Bosnia had turned from mate US security interest requiring active bad to worse. The Serbian army had shed its combat opposition. Once the strategic deci- behind-the-scenes support of Bosnian Serb sion to oppose the invasion was made, the forces for an overt military invasion with the national command authorities went to the strategic goal of establishing control of the joint planners to see what operations plans to Adriatic ports and easing the effects of long- implement. standing economic sanctions. The ability of the United Nations to stabilize the situation evaporatcd when Rússia endorsed the Serbian invasion as a legitimate action to ensure the Operational Objectives safety of ethnic Serbs still in Bosnia. Russia's All established plans hinged on the use of endorsement was logical in order to legiti- NATO bases. Unfortunately, NATO refused to mize its own security doctrine, which ac- allow offensive operations during the criticai knowledges Russia's intent to continue initial period of the conflict. The use of Italy protecting, with force if needed, ethnic Rus- as a staging ground to support a US unilat- sians in former Soviet Union States. Russia's eral action was met with little enthusiasm by veto in the Security Council left open unilat- the Italians. Gaining consent for operations eral United States or North Atlantic Treaty from NATO forces was agonizingly slow due Organization (NATO) action to keep Serbia to the recent inclusion of Rússia as a Consult- from totally overrunning Bosnia. The op- ing member of NATO. Until NATO reached a tions open to the Western forces were few. consensus to support US involvement, NATO The fact that ground forces were needed to ordered that all of its forces stationed in stop the Serbian army was obvious. The Bos- Europe be restricted to defensive combat op- nian forces were too weak to withstand a erations only. This seriously limited support fully supported "modem" Serbian offensive. for US operations during the opening days of The Bosnian arms embargo had only recently the invasion. The US operational planners been lifted, and the supplies had not yet im- decided to send the Marine Expeditionary pacted Bosnian readiness and combat power Force, stationed in the Mediterranean Sea, to appreciably. land in Bosnia and began moving US Army This Serbian invasion presented many heavy divisions from the continental United risks to the future security of Europe and to States (CONUS) to eventually reinforce the US interests. The Moslem world was scream- beachhead. The strategic objectives required ing genocide and threatening military action the establishment of a secure beachhead and if the Serbs were not stopped. No European then, when combat forces reached sufficient country welcomed the specter of Turkey or strength for offensive operations, to push the another Moslem country becoming involved Serbian army back to its own borders. Once in the conflict, expanding the scope of fight- the border was secure, these forces would ing. World War I loomed as a bloody specter hold it until relieved by reconstituted Bos- to many historians. The correlation of the nian forces capable of maintaining the bor- origins of that conflict to this crisis was too der. Their strategic objectives were sup- close for sane observers to ignore. The his- ported by the US public and politicians, but torical lessons of appeasement had taught the initial question remained: Could the HEAVY BOMBERS HOLDING THE LINE 47

Aerial refueling provides heavy bombers the capablity to fly CONUS-to-CONUS missions in support of over- seas operations when forward bases are unavailable. Global reach-global power is a reality because of our air refueling capabilities. marines hold the beachhead until heavier Force. With the destruction of the bridges, forces arrived? The theater commander's the first priority—slowing or attriting advanc- first operationai objective was to slow the ing Serbian armor and mechanized forces— Serbian army's advance to allow for the inser- was a close second. Serbia is extremely tion and buildup of ground forces. This task rugged with few roads capable of heavy traf- required that an interdiction plan be devised. fic. Interdicting travei on these lines of com- The Bosnian interdiction plan had to be radi- munication would ensure that whatever cally different from those on the books due forces arrived to fight the marines would be to restrictions imposed by NATO. piecemeal and easily pushed beyond their The missions required to halt the Serbian point of endurance. With the tasks defined, advance involved dropping the bridges link- assigning capable aircraft became the major ing Serbia and Bosnia. The Serbians needed headache. the bridges if they expected to fight offensive Considering the restrictions placed by actions against the Marine Expeditionary NATO and the resulting long duration of the 48 AJRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

Many of the System modifications mentioned in this scenario are in development and await the decisions of the requirements community whether or not to field them for the B-52. Without these modifications, the B-52 faces the ballistic inaccuracies and targeting shortcom ings that lim it its utility as a diverse weapons carrier. proposed missions, a high priority was bombers capable of CONUS-to-CONUS op- placed on maximizing delivery of an ade- erations to provide the muscle behind the quate volume of varied munitions in each effort to halt the initial Serbian drive. Luck- sortie to meet the mission objectives. A quick ily, recent command initiatives to promote survey of the forces capable of the task re- joint operations had laid the foundation for sulted in a sobering list. The composite Air Force bomber, Navy striker, and special wings designed and ready for completing forces cooperation. The procedures and in- this task, d-ue to NATO restrictions, were teroperability issues tested during numerous without a forward base from which to oper- peacetime joint tactics development and ate. They would have to wait for the marines evaluation tests paid off when the iron to capture a Bosnian airfield capable of sup- started to fali. To increase the value of each porting their operation. The strike aircraft in sortie, adequate targeting was essential. The NATO were grounded and those stationed in insertion of special forces for target identifi- the US did not have the range for this opera- cation and targeting quickly commenced. tion. Most of the Navy's strike aircraft sta- With these pathfinders in place along the tioned in the Mediterranean were tied to roads and around the bridges, the ability to supporting the marine landing. That left an deliver weapons efficiently became conceiv- insufficient Navy force to complete the inter- able. There would still be the need for diction effort. The task then fell to heavy autonomous target detection and delivery if HEAVY BOMBERS HOLDING THE LINE 49

Communications with the special forces The Have Naps effectively blinded the Ser- failed. bian air forces, which had rarely practiced night operations. The lack of ground control further reduced the effectiveness of Serbian interceptors. The scattering of cluster bomb Weapons Systems and unit (CBU)-89 cluster bombs at the Serbian airfield by the B-ls further delayed the Serbs' Procedures willingness to mount an air defense at night But enough of the conflict's historical ba- against a force of undetermined composi- sis and operational goals. Now let us delve tion.2 A small force of Navy F-14s acting as into the weapons systems and procedures combat air patrol (CAP) effectively handled used to accomplish this admittedly hypo- the few Serbian interceptors that rose to thetical example of US power projection. threaten the strikers. This initial confusion The need for the suppression of enemy air was sufficient to allow the follow-on strikers defenses (SEAD) and the negation of the Ser- to penetrate and attack their targets. bian command and control in Bosnia re- With air superiority temporarily achieved quired precision weapons delivery and over the border, the B-52s armed with preci- standoff capability. By 1996, only a handful sion guided munitions (PGM) systematically of B-2 Spirits was available. They formed the dropped the bridges that first night. Since crux of the initial suppression forces, and the B-52s were not able to self-designate their they were followed by B-52Hs armed with PGMs, they relied on Navy attack aircraft and AGM-142 Have Nap missiles and conven- special operations forces to designate for tional cruise missiles (CALCM). them.3 Released from the need to carry the It took 48 hours to prepare a combined actual PGMs, the Navy aircraft were B-52, B-l, and B-2 strike. By then the special equipped for self-defense and designating forces had located, and with the help of intel- only. This allowed them to make the multi- ligence using available imagery, had targeted ple passes needed to guide the PGMs to the the air defense control sites and communica- bridges. Acting as bomb trucks and using tion nodes. The destruction of these sites Communications techniques established would give future strikers acceptable pene- through joint doctrine exercises, the B-52s tration risks. each carried ten 2,000-pound class laser The B-2 missions were able to penetrate guided bombs (LGB) on their externai racks. and deliver their munitions with complete Once they had dropped their LGBs, the B-52s tactical surprise. They struck the regional air acted in conjunction with the special forces defense center in Serbia and the forward con- and Rivet Joint targeteers to hunt down the trol centers in Bosnia. Their recent certifica- lines of Communications in Serbia and Bos- tion to release conventional weapons from a nia and release their internai loads of conven- rack assembly, coupled with their accurate tional munitions. Some carried 27 M117s avionics, gave the B-2s the ability to tempo- and others released CBU-71s with delayed ac- rarily cripple the Serbs' air defense capability. tivation and Destructor land mines.4 The The B-52s, backing up the B-2s, used their majority of the Serbian forces in Bosnia were precision strike capability to knock out the forced to seek cover or be destroyed on the hardened command bunkers. Capitalizing roads. Either way, they were stopped from on the confusion sown by the B-2 strikes and their advance and this allowed criticai time numerous CALCM shots, B-52s were able to for the marines to land and deploy. penetrate at low levei close enough to launch The recent installation of the improved four Have Naps per aircraft.1 Another B-52, forward looking infrared radar (FL1R) moni- flying a high-level standoff profile, per- tor5 and the laser detection and ranging (LI- formed the final targeting for these missiles. DAR) system gave the B-52s the accuracy they 50 AIRPO WER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

required for tracking targets along roads and Rivet Joint, the joint surveillance and target for delivering general purpose weapons accu- attack radar system (JSTARS), and their own rately from the altitudes that kept them out FLIR. 1 his allowed them to effectively de- of range of tactical antiaircraft artillery and liver CBUs with delayed activation to hold surface-to-air missiles.6 The B-52s were able the enemy in place. The B-52s accurately de- to detect concentrations of Serbian forces termined the coordinates of the concentra- with the assistance of special forces units, tions using a combination of their dual inertial navigation systems and global positioning system (GPS). Once the locations of these concentrations were targeted and relayed to the airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC), B-ls flying low with full loads of MK-82s or CBUs arrived to continue to interdict the Serbs.7 Through a combination of preplanned targets, in-flight mensuration and targeting capability, and secure Communications procedures, the maximum bombing effort of the first three days of the campaign enabled the marines to land against token resistance. The eventual lifting of the NATO restrictions and the arrival of heavy army divisions gave the US forces the mass they needed to push the Serbs back to their borders. The situation was still tense, but the Moslem world stayed out of the fight and Europe returned to some semblance of normality.

Future Requirements The success of these missions hinged on effective Communications and control of the fluid air battle through the ABCCC. Recently tested Communications plans and secure data relay procedures have ensured that the strikers received their targets en route to the theater. Previous testing of the interoperable, secure Communications gear gave the operating units confidence in their systems. The need for establishing, documenting, and training a hierarchy of control that is tested, capable, forward deployed, and probably airborne is essential to achieving the levei of acceptable risk and mission success desired when employing heavy bombers in forward Concentrations of enemy forces were accurately pin- areas of responsibility (AOR). pointed using a combination of inertial navigation Sys- tems and the global positioning system. Once these The use of heavy bombers as described in forces were targeted, B- 1s arrived to interdict the Serbs. this scenario was possible given proper back- HEAVY BOMBERS HOLDING THE UNE 51

ing by theater commanders. Our prime con- ning in the above scenario may not be cern should be validating the command and possible. Present-day bombers would not be control interfaces with airborne and ground capable of the effective strategic interdiction agents that would provide effective bomber that a theater commander may require with- targeting and weapons guidance. The results out the assistance of fighter and SEAD assets of these tests should be incorporated into deployed forward. In this time of decreasing joint employment manuais and widely dis- forward presence, strategic bomber tests seminated. Unfortunately, individual units and modifications that foster autonomous often develop procedures as the tasking ar- capabilities must receive high priority if rives, without the benefit of definitive test our boast of power projection is to be results. Without tactics development and credible. evaluation test results, we face the problem The war-fighting commands must place of arriving in the theater with each unit us- the emphasis of training dollars and high- ing its own best guess at the Communica- level direction on formalizing the bomber tions procedures and joint tactics that would joint communication and targeting proce- make this scenario a success. dures. Stating our theoretical bomber capa- Many of the system modifications men- bilities in documents like the Bomber Road tioned in this scenario are in development Map is essential to planners. Actual testing and await the decisions of the requirements of the procedures and documenting them in community whether or not to field them for multicommand manuais (MCM) is vital to the B-52 and B-l. Without the procurement the crew members who will be flying the of the improved FLIR, GPS, and LIDAR Sys- missions. Giving them the best documents tems, the B-52 faces the ballistic inaccuracies with which to train is the duty of the com- and the targeting shortcomings that limit its mands. MCM 3-1 is supposed to describe utility as a very diverse weapons carrier. tactics that have been validated through Without improving the B-1's conventional tests. Many times its authors lack actual test weapons capability, it would only be able to data on joint interaction. Greater attention bring MK-82s to this conflict, severely limit- must be placed on the joint aspects of our ing its utility. tactics. Bomber missions that deploy to for- Many operational plans are predicated on ward AORs for training should have specific the use of forward basing and indigenous as- test goals that aid in the formalization of sets to achieve their objectives. When these joint interoperability issues. These test goals are denied, the theater commanders must should be centrally controlled and docu- rely on our heavy bombers to hold the line mented to ensure that the tactics one unit until adequate tactical forces arrive. During devises improve effectiveness, are built on Desert Shield, B-52s were called upon to be previous experience, and are spread through- ready to interdict Iraqi forces should they out the commands. A document distributed decide to invade Saudi Arabia. Those who to the bomber community outlining the were tasked with this challenge faced many pending joint interoperability issues to be obstacles in planning for that action. Unfor- tested and documenting completed tests tunately, many of the same obstacles that would expedite this process. MCM 3-1's Tac- made bombers stopping an Iraqi offensive tics Analysis Bulletins and the Weapons and daunting in 1990 continue to confront op- Tactics Center's Weapons Review are not reac- erational planners today. Joint targeting tive enough or are, by regulation, inappro- capabilities, buddy laser designation proce- priate for this task. Whatever document is dures, and ballistic accuracy are all still vital used to facilitate the cross talk, the need per- concerns today for the bomber community. sists for the war-fighting commands to iden- If joint interoperability issues and bomber tify their interoperability requirements upgrades are not aggressively pursued, win- down to the unit planners. The bomber 52 AIRPOWER fOURNAL WINTER 1994

community must then test, document, and line in future conflicts. We may not have disseminate by the widest means possible the months to iron out our interoperability is- tactics that meet these requirements. Joint sues during the next conflict as we did dur- tests must receive higher priority, and in- ing Desert Storm. Tests in peacetime will teroperational procedures must be in place if save lives in war. □ heavy bombers will be expected to hold the

Notes 1. Technical Order (TO) 1B-52G-43-2-4, Aircrew Weapons 5. Platinum Silicide FUR Phase IIIPreproduction Validation Test Delivery Manual (Nonnuclear) B-S2/AGM-142, lSJanuary 1994, 7-8. OperationsSurnrnary (Barksdale AFB, La.: 49th Test Squadron, June 2. Bomber Roadmap, white paper (Washington, D.C.: De- 1994). partment of the Air Force, June 1992). 6. LJDAR/B-52 High-Altitude Bombing Technology Demonstra- 3. B-S2 Laser Guided Bomb Employment Tactics Development tionIIAfter-Action Report (Barksdale AFB, La.: 49th Test Squadron, and Evaluation Test Plan, ACC Project Number 93-509F (Langley June 1994). AFB, Va.: Air Combat Command, November 1993). 7. Bomber Roadmap. 4. TO 1B-52G-34-1, Aircrew Weapons Delivery Manual (Non- nuclear) Description and Procedures, 15 November 1991, 5-3, 4.

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Ricochets type message from the radar center was not re- continued from page 3 ceived because the teletype operator in Manila was eating lunch and had not been replaced by a and the sinister forces that deny "funding control relief operator, and (3) a telephone warning from to responsible program officials." Second was its the radar center was received but was not insistence that we continue preparing to fight promptly relayed. If meteorological conditions World War II. For some reason I'm unable to had not disrupted the radar center's radio Com- fathom, this World War II preparedness paradigm munications, if the teletype operator had been re- seems to be a fundamental tenet for those who placed for lunch, if passing on the telephonic resist needed reform of the depot system. Third, waming had been given higher priority—there are finally, and most significant was its remarkable times and situations in which if can be a truly big assertion that we need to know "the author's word—the American aircraft at Manila would not background" in order "to assess the fidelity of the have been caught on the ground by the Japanese information the article contains." What kind of attack. hogwash is this? Trial by resumé? Proof by Although it's unquestionable that more care grade, aeronautical rating, or AFSC? This is an should have been taken to ensure the mainte- unacceptable form of prejudice, and I commend nance of unbroken Communications with the ra- you for withholding the author's identity. Once dar center, the oft-repeated, widely accepted in a while this might be a good idea. picture of US military personnel sitting around LePs remind ourselves that the test of argu- unconcerned about a Japanese air attack on 8 De- ments is the arguments themselves, not some per- cember 1942 is historically inaccurate. sonal or prejudicial assessment of the author's credentials. Good on you, APf. Not so good on Joseph Forbes those who would judge the value of what is said Pittsburgh, Permsylvania by the value they capriciously place on whoever said it. Col Richard Szafranski, USAF Maxwell AFB, Alabama HISTORICAL ERRATUM The Liberators book review in the summer issue left me somewhat perplexed. The reviewer "wholeheartedly recommends it" yet devotes a STATIC . . . whole paragraph outlining its "basic problem." In his Spring 1994 article "Surprise and Intelli- The reviewer may not have been aware that the gence: Towards a Clearer Understanding," Maj referenced documentary was pulled by the Public Jeffrey 0'Leary quotes a 1962 book which claims broadcasting System's (PBS) Thirteen/WNET in that although the Philippines had 9-10 hours' early February 1993 after an extensive examina- waming of a possible Japanese attack, "there was tion by the American Jewish Committee, a few no sense of urgency. . . . When the Japanese investigative reporters, a Washington, D.C. attor- bombers arrived shortly after noon [8 December ney, a professional historian, and numerous chal- 1942], they found all the American aircraft wing- lenges by veterans, including veterans from the tip to wingtip on the ground." 761 st Tank Battalion. They determined that Lib- But in fact there had been appropriate aware- erators was marred by numerous historical inac- ness of the danger. As a safety precaution, the curacies. Shortly after PBS Thirteen/WNET Army Air Corps commander in the Philippines, Iaunched its probe, and after five months of in- Maj Gen Lewis H. Brereton had ordered his planes vestigation, Liberators was found to be seriously into the air that moming. Later the aircraft flawed because it lacked "diligent and compre- landed for refueling and maintenance and for the hensive" research. In the meantime, the book's crews to have lunch. Radar was functioning and publisher, Harcourt Brace, issued a disclaimer ad- should have provided adequate and timely alert of mitting that there were questionable oral testi- the approach of Japanese airplanes. However, monies and recollections. when radar did reveal the coming air attacks, un- Author Lou Potter, who crafted the documen- fortunate Communications failures prevented retary with William Miles and Nina Rosenblum, ception of the wamings: (1) static fouled the was irresponsible in his research. Citations in the radio message from the radar center, (2) the tele- book were very meager and lacked judicious pri- 54 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994 mary sources. For example, the 761st's after-ac- invent military history as a means of satisfying tion reports, S-2 (intelligence) and S-3 (Opera- their social, monetary, and political self-indulgen- tions) joumals, and the battalion's morning re- cies. It is also a story of mythmaking by the elec- ports were not examined to verify the historical tronic media and their supporters, the claims of Liberators, including the so-called oral newspapers. It attempts to execute a political interviews. In addition, on the issue of liberating agenda by abrogating the history of one of the Buchenwald on 11 April and Dachau on 29 April most decorated World War II African-American 1945, the 761 st's history (Trezzvant W. Anderson's tank battalions. The Black Panthers had an im- Come out Fighting) and the battalion commander pressive combat record of 183 days, engaging in and veterans acknowledged that the "Black Pan- some of the most tenacious fighting in Europe. thers" were nowhere near the infamous concen- Toward the end of the war, the battalion did in- tration camps. They were too busy fighting the deed liberate a concentration camp. While as- Germans elsewhere. Buchenwald was liberated by signed to the 71 st Infantry Division, it was a unit from the 6th Armored Division, and credited with that division's liberation of Guns- Dachau was liberated by units from the 42d and kirchen, a subcamp of the Mauthausen complex 45th Infantry Divisions. in Áustria. At the same time, the Black Panthers The tragedy of Liberators is that Potter and were fighting prejudice and racism not only in the Miles Productions invalidated the 761st's true his- States but in the military. Eventually the Black tory. They took away the 761st's moment in his- Panthers received a Presidential Unit Citation for tory by presenting a seriously flawed account of their true accomplishments in World War II. its members' accomplishments. Liberators is a story of dysfunctional nonhistorians—faulty or Dr George F. Hofmann impaired researchers who select, manipulate, and Cincinnati, Ohio

COMMENT CARDS

STRATEGIC: USE WITH CARE really believe STRATCOM owns the rights to the word strategic? I can't believe that in an article (Special Edition 1994) relating to the DOD definition of strategic Maj Judy M. Graffis, USAF in 1994 the author fails to mention or interview Whiteman AFB, Missouri leadership from the unified command responsible for strategic matters. The US Strategic Com- mand (USSTRATCOM), not SAC, not ACC, has purview. APJ CRITIQUE I have been reading for 15+ years. I've also Name withheld APJ been reading Proceedings for the same period. Your magazine isn't in the same league as Proceed- ings. You need to get out of the "academic" mind-set and publish an operational magazine The Author Responds like Proceedings. I spend my own money for Pro- ceedings but would never buy APJ. How about I agree that interviews with sênior USSTRATCOM color photos? How about articles like "What It's officials could have strengthened my article. Like to Fly the B-2"? However, the "STRATCOM position" on the use of the word strategic would not have changed the No name given basic finding of my research. The use of the word strategic has changed over time, from shorthand for "long-range nuclear" to a descriptor for ac- EDITOR 'S NOTE: Fiscal realities do not afford us tions that directly support achievement of the the luxury of color photographs. Private publica- goal. Does the writer of the above comment tions like Proceedings gaiti additional revenue RICOCHETS 55

through advertisements. As far as article content is ommend adding one "strategy/policy" article to concerned, our editorial focus is on the operational each APJ edition along with the operational arti- levei o f war. We are broadening our focus along the cles. upper end of the spectrum to include some strat- Lt Col Ira D. Good, USAE, Retired egy/policy topics (see editorial on page 2). APJ is the Bhulensburg, Maryland proper fórum for an article on how to employ the B-2 but not for an article on what it's like to fly one. JMP EDITOR'S NOTE: Obviously, great minds think alike! We liked the 1994 Special Edition so much we're going to do it again in 1995. The INSS will RE: SPECIAL EDITION 1994 once again sponsor the funding and research. We're [The Special Edition is a] good idea. 1 enjoyed all also going to start includitig strategy/policy-level ar- the articles. They contained timely topics which ticles just as you suggest. Air power needs a voice at should be useful to many planners. I would rec- this levei, too. TK

I Can Write Better than That!

OK, then do it! Airpower Journal is always looking for good articles written by our readers. If you've got som ething to say, send it to us. W e'll be happy to consider it for publication. The Journal focuses on the operational levei of war—that broad area between grand strategy and tactics. W e are interested in articles that will stim ulate thought on how warfare is conducted. This includes not only the actual conduct of war at the operational levei, but also the im pact of leadership, training, and support functions on operations. We need two typed, double-spaced draft copies of your work. We encourage you to supply graphics and photos to support your article, but don't let the lack of those keep you from writing! We are looking for articles from 2,500 to 5,000 words in length—about 15 to 25 pages. As the professional journal of the Air Force, APJ strives to expand the horizons and professional knowledge of Air Force personnel. To do this, we seek and encourage challenging articles. W e look forward to your subm issions. Send them to the Editor, Airpower Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. N E T E N T

Live always in the best company when However, there is no confusion in Dr Toner's po- you read. sition. The fundamental purpose of the US mili- — Sydney Smith tary and every military member "is to kill national enemies of the United States." "When Reading is to the mind what exercise is to soldiers are not actually killing, they should be training to kill. Some soldiers die; when they are the body. not dying, they should be preparing to die." — Sir Richard Steele From this framework, Dr Toner provides very interesting reviews of such cases as that of the USS True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Mili- Pueblo (off the coast of Korea in 1968) and Comdr tary Ethics by James H. Toner. The University Lloyd Bucher's decisions. Pursuing the principie Press of Kentucky, 663 S. Limestone Street, of civilian control of the military, he provides Lexington, Kentucky 40508-4008, 1994, 208 criticai commentary for the cases of a number of pages, $25.00. generais—Douglas MacArthur, John D. Lavelle, Mi- chael Dugan, and Harold N. Campbell. "This book proceeds not only from the belief Toner carefully details the necessity for includ- that soldiers can be moral, but from the convic- ing ethics in military training, and he has a sepa- tion that soldiers must be moral." This explana- rate chapter devoted to the role of ethics in tion from the preface of Jim Toner's most recent military education. He includes a clear analysis contribution to the field of military ethics is accu- of the murky issue of disobedience to illegal or rate. This is a very good book, revealing Dr immoral orders. Here he includes 10 case studies, Toner's sincere and forcefully stated convictions. nine of them actual, one fictional. Each raises He decries the failure of modern approaches to important concerns; none is easily resolved; all ethics because they seem to have lost the clear are certain to evoke spirited discussion. He calls distinction between right and wrong, and some for the restoration and fostering in the military of have sublimated the concept of real evil in the the basic moral virtues. He deals with the current world altogether. He points out the current prob- controversial issues: the role of women in the lems in US society of "social decay" and the per- military, openly declared homosexuals in the sistent and pernicious influences of emotivism Service, when a military professional should re- and ethical relativism. He cites numerous studies sign, fraternization, peacekeeping missions, the to substantiate-his concerns before highlighting Tailhook affair, and others. Some will find his the importance of character, competence, and the tough-minded stand on the homosexual issue ex- study and practice of ethics in the military pro- tremely controversial. Some will find his views fession. on noncombat uses of the military similarly con- Toner's background and references for this dis- troversial. But his positions are clearly stated and cussion are voluminous and to the point. From clearly reasoned. Some will be especially excited each of our wars to the most recent cheating epi- by his criticai treatment of the "trendy" creeds sode at the US Naval Academy, he examines issues and canons of total quality management (TQM). of fundamental ethical import to the military. He All who read his views will certainly be chal- cites the various codes of the military Services, lenged to think about the issues from a strong noting their hortatory value but also their limita- moral perspective. tions. He examines the nature and role of the In the chapter titled "The Profession of Arms," military in contemporary US society and finds Professor Toner proposes a practical ethics guide confusion presently about roles and missions. for military professions to assist soldiers at every

56 NET ASSESSMENT 57

levei in the hierarchy in resolving ethical issues, formation, insight, or analysis of the events of 7 including those involving obligations to disobey. December 1941. His guide consists of six simple tests that he dubs Oral history does have its place within histori- the shame test, the community test, the legal test, cal study, but overreliance on this method is aca- the situation test, the consequences test, and the demically dangerous. Forty-year-old memories, God test. In his brief chapter titled "Excursus," he even of a momentous event, can be notoriously makes very specific suggestions for "teaching and unreliable. Gordon Prange's At Dawn We Slept: leaming about military ethics," recommending a The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, the highly de- number of sources including joumals, books on tailed and definitive account of the Pearl Harbor ethics, and fictional works whose characters ex- battle, included a large number of interviews hibit moral virtues. This chapter and the exten- from Prange's own research. Gordon Prange, sive selected bibliography he includes will be however, worked to reconcile these accounts with invaluable for teachers of ethics and extremely existing documents from both sides. The end useful for those who wish to leam more about product still contains a great deal of oral history, military ethics. but it is bound to be a more accurate account. True Faith and Allegiance is a very lively treat- Remembering Pearl Harbor unfortunately con- ment of military ethics; its style is forceful and to tains a great deal of inaccuracy and misinforma- the point and extremely readable. Jim Toner has tion. Many of the accounts consist of clearly packed considerable challenge into this brief vol- apocryphal stories of the 7 December battle. In- ume, a challenge to which all of us who care terviewees relate stories about the numerous Japa- about the future of this country and its military nese spies and fifth columnists on Oahu and profession must respond. about Hawaiian Japanese openly taunting US sol- Col Malham M. Wakin, USAF diers in the aftermath of the attack. They claim Colorado Springs, Colorado that some of the Japanese pilots were graduates of Honolulu prep schools and that the Japanese spy network in Hawaii was so thorough that the Japa- nese pilots bombed only the US Army aircraft hangars containing vital equipment and ignored Remembering Pearl Harbor: Eyewitness Ac- empty hangars. Not only are such remembrances counts by U.S. Military Men and Women ed- pure nonsense, but many of the silliest stories ited by Robert LaForte and Ronald Marcello. come from people who later reached high rank in SR Books, 104 Greenhill Avenue, Wilmington, the US military. In addition, the editors failed to Delaware 19805-1897, 1991, 303 pages, $24.95. catch some obvious errors. Bellows Field (where the reviewer's father was stationed) was not at- The fiftieth anniversary of World War II has tacked at 0748; it experienced its first strafing at unleashed a flood of memoirs, oral histories, and about 0830—a half hour after the battleships were eyewitness accounts upon the military book mar- bombed. ket. In their attempt to help the reader under- Remembering Pearl Harbor is a disappointment. stand the events in question, most of these books It is a good example of why oral history must be have a very limited value. Remembering Pearl Har- used very cautiously. bor is one of the better oral histories; however, it James S. Co rum still demonstrates the deficiencies of the oral his- Maxwell AFB, Alabama tory method. Remembering Pearl Harbor is the product of 350 interviews with military veterans who experienced the Japanese attack on Hawaii. The interviews were compiled over a 15-year period by the The Fifth Star: High Command in an Era of University of North Texas Oral History Project. Global War by George M. Hall. Praeger Pub- Forty interviews of veterans representing all the lishers, 88 Post Road West, P.O. Box 5007, Services and most of the major units on Oahu Westport, Connecticut 06881-5007, 1994, 248 were selected and edited for this book. While it pages, $39.95. represents a tremendous effort, the book does not accomplish what good history ought to accom- This is an interesting book, but it never fulfills plish. It provides nothing in the way of new in- its potential. It does, however, have some high 58 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

points. After being given a quick introduction to to the Odyssey and Iliad and the frequent refer- the principais and a chapter that describes the ences to Greek mythology, although apropos, de- global setting and explains the book's purpose tract from the author's purpose. 1 had to spend and format, the reader comes to the core mate- time reacquainting myself with these epies to un- rial—career outlines of 10 sênior strategic leaders derstand the author's references. of five-star military rank. The author follows a The strengths of this book are the biographies pattern of describing family, upbringing, educa- and the chapter comparing the background and tion, assignments, career highlights, and influ- experience of the principais. Much can be ences. He uses historie and anecdotal examples learned from the examination of these sênior stra- to emphasize and enrich the chapters. It is an tegic leaders. All did their best despite personal excellent format that produces a concise, clear feelings. All were ambitious. All but Halsey had picture of the subjects, including their faults. mentors who developed them. Most were vora- Gen John J. Pershing was a martinet, Gen George cious readers. The comparisons are revealing but C. Marshall was austere, Adm Ernest J. King was do not lead to better interservice understanding ascerbic, and Gen Douglas MacArthur can be of joint operational leadership as Hall intended. judged ottly by God. The author's purpose is not For the reader who is unfamiliar with the subject, to thoroughly sketch each individual, but only to however, the work provides models for career suc- present similarities and differences in order to cess and a stimulus for further study. "encourage better understanding among the Ser- Lt Col William J. Troy, USAR vices as the importance of joint operations Chino, Califórnia grows." Still, there are many times that significant events or experiences are dismissed in a sen- tence or two. "Perspectives of War" is the framework the author uses to compare and contrast these leaders. These perspectives are heroism, tactics, operations or campaigns, theaters, and national Arc Light by Eric L. Harry. Simon & Schuster, purpose and resources. Hall explains their com- 1230 Avenue of the Américas, New York 10020, mon factors: purpose or objective, ways and 1994, 551 pages, $23.00. means, and consequences of failure. Their common reference is time. The author compares the Like William Shakespeare's Mark Antony, Eric principais' character and flaws, information Pro- Harry has "cr[ied] havoc, and let slip the dogs of cessing, intelligence, perception, personality or war," or perhaps has unleashed the Four Horse- style, leadership capability, and situational levei men of the Apocalypse. Fresh out of today's of perspective. In a chapter entitled "Entangle- headlines, Arc Light is complete with a North Ko- ments," the author presents seven events that col- rean invasion of South Korea, a desperate Russian lectively involved all the leaders and that still attack against the Chinese along their much- remain controversial. They are the employment fought-over border, and a renegade Russian gen- of American troops in World War I, the lack of eral who temporarily seizes control of the nuclear preparedness at Pearl Harbor, antisubmarine war- control mechanisms at a crucial moment. This is fare in the Atlantic, Operation Torch, Adm Wil- a story of mistakes, miscalculations, political in- liam F. Halsey's action at Leyte Gulf, the decision trigue, and coups that bring the world to the to bring the Soviet Union into the war against brink of, and into, World War III. More than just Japan and to use the atomic bomb, and the Ko- another technomilitary thriller, it has a premise rean War. that is totally believable, results that are frighten- Presenting the evaluation criteria and method- ingly realistic, and its warning, couched in fic- ology before the narratives on the principais tion, is all too real. Eric Harry vividly reminds us would facilitate easier study as the reader would that even though the cold war is over, we mav be be more attuned to the author's purpose. Like- facing one of the most dangerous situations the wise, the chapter on "Leadership Facets" should world has seen to date—the collapse and breakup precede the biographies. "Entanglements" is of the Soviet Union. Hall's way of presenting examples of the leaders Arc Light takes its name from the Vietnam-era functioning at different leveis of perspective; this B-52 bombing missions in South Vietnam, but can be missed in the presentation. The analogy those aging aircraft play only a minor role in this NET ASSESSMENT 59

tale of conventional and nuclear conflict. Arc member—the bombs and missiles are still out Light begins with an attack on South Korea by there. their implacable foes to the north, then shifts to Maj M. J . Pet er s en, USAI the planning councils of the Russian supreme Maxwell AFB, Alabarna military command. The Russians are planning to use nuclear vveapons to destroy much of the Peo- ple's Republic of China's northem military forces in a nuclear first strike followed by a massive ground invasion. Plans go awry almost from the start. The unstable Russian government is temporarily taken over by a rogue army general who, thinking that Chinese nuclear-armed missiles are 1794: America, Its Army, and the Birth of the being supplied by the United States, manages to Nation by Dave R. Palmer. Presidio Press, launch a counterforce strike against the United 505-B San Marin Dr., Suite 300, Novato, Cali- States. Detailed glimpses of nuclear war-fighting fórnia 94945-1340, 1994, 290 pages, $24.95. command and control (Looking Glass, Night- watch, and all the other ground and airborne 1794 tells the story of this country's early command and control systems are here) add struggles to become a sovereign nation. It inves- credibility to what would otherwise be just an- tigates the period from the closing days of the other end-of-the-world, doomsday book. How- Revolutionary War through 1794. Why 1794? ever, despite suffering grievous losses to nuclear This year proved to be a turning point in our detonations, a vengeful United States survives an- history, a year in which we as a nation proved our other "Day that will live in Infamy" and by the resolve on both foreign and domestic issues. The end of the book manages to accomplish what book's emphasis is on the establishment of a Napoléon, Kaiser Wilhelm, or Adolf Hitler could military structure in our democracy and on the not do— invade Rússia and capture Moscow. origin of the American form of government. Eric Harry has created a scenario straight out The Revolutionary War held colonial America of the pages of today's post-cold-war headlines. together against a common enemy. When Great His characters, from the young national security Britain signed the treaty ending the Revolution- advisor George Lambert (through whom most of ary War, tremendous differences emerged among the story is told) to the scared civilians in reloca- the previously united revolutionaries. Winning tion camps around the United States, are well de- the Revolutionary War against the British was veloped, real people who find themselves in a against the odds. Given the magnitude of the terrifyingly believable situation. It is the detail ensuing problems, winning the peace was even filling these pages that makes this story so chill- more unlikely. It was very much in doubt if the ingly credible. This is not a rah-rah, hooray-for- confederation of colonies could ever succeed as a the-red-white-and-blue, the US-wins-again plot. nation. These were difficult times. Everything When I finished reading this narrative of what was at stake. A standing military was needed but could happen (today, tonight, or tomorrow), I was viewed as a potential danger to the nation. felt as though a prediction had been revealed. Within this turbulent and unpredictable environ- This book reminds us that even if the United ment, the foundations of our government and States is the only superpower remaining in the military structure were formed. The author, Lt world, that world is still a very dangerous place, Gen Dave R. Palmer, US Army, Retired, brings this and the threat of global war may not have receded struggle to life. very far at all with the collapse of the Soviet The book sets the stage militarily, politically, Union. In Arc Light, the world survives a limited and economically. In 1783, the fighting was over, nuclear exchange and a vicious conventional war but there was much discontent in the Continental between the United States and Rússia. Let's all Army due to poor conditions and no pay. Con- pray that these events stay firmly between the gress was unwilling, or perhaps unable, to raise covers of this book. If you want to feel the hairs sufficient funds to meet the financial commit- rise up on your neck, if you want to know what it ments of back pay and pensions necessary to may be like to be aboard an airborne command muster out the Continental Army. George Wash- post when a missile attack warning comes, then ington, as commander in chief of the Continental read this book. Otherwise, pass it by. But re- Army, was perhaps the most influential person in 60 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994 the country. He was forced to use his influence fined during this criticai period. The Army con- to intercede and quell the unrest. quered native Indians, forcing peace treaties upon After the war, the United States was pressured them. It also quelled a domestic revolt during from all sides. Britain, France, and Spain sought the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania. to maintain their colonial holdings, often at each In all cases, America expanded its military siowly other's expense. Barbary pirates threatened US and cautiously—wary at each step of the potential shipping and trade in the Mediterranean. As set- of a standing army to overthrow the government. tlers moved westward into the Ohio valley and The new nation's prudent use of a regular mili- beyond, conflict with native Indian tribes became tary served notice that the United States was here inevitable. This conflict was often fanned by to stay and would defend its territories. The agents of Britain and France hoping to gain ad- author provides a thorough discussion of Amer- vantage. In response to tribal threats and attacks, ica^ first campaigns on the new frontiers, bring- Congress voted to fund the establishment of a ing American defeats and victories to life. His regiment to include 300 regular army troops. account is well written and informative. This proved totally inadequate. In addition, by 1794 provides a look back to our foundations. 1785 the Continental Navy had been disbanded Today we often take our democracy and Consti- and Revolutionary warships sold. The United tution for granted. From our current perspective States was virtually defenseless. as the world's only superpower, it is hard to grasp Politically, there existed a split between those exactly how fragile our nation really was in the who favored a strong federal government—Na- post-Revolutionary War period. This book pro- tionalists—and those who distrusted central vides that insight. Palmer's account is thought authority and favored States' rights—the Antina- provoking as he explains the concepts and atti- tionalists. This split was evident on most issues tudes behind our remarkable Constitution. He discussed in Congress. also explains American traditional perceptions, Economically, there were many problems: expectations, and fear of the military. I highly shortages of currency, unequal taxation, inade- recommend this book to military personnel as quate representation, excessive legal fees, and ar- well as to others interested in America's contin- tificially low prices for produce. In short, there ued success. was economic chãos. This resulted in a 1786 re- Lt Col Chris Anderson, USAF volt in western Massachusetts known as Shay's Maxwell AFB, Alabama Rebellion. This was the environment that delegates faced as they met in Philadelphia in 1787 to draft the Constitution. Palmer concludes a discussion of British history with the belief that American fear of a strong standing army was a holdover from our British ancestry—based primarily on Oliver Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Air- CromwelPs actions against the British monarchy. power Strategy in World War II by Conrad C. In addition, America feared a strong chief execu- Crane. University Press of Kansas, 2501 West tive. The role of the chief executive was drafted 15th Street, Lawrence, Kansas 66049, 1993, 208 based on a consensus of belief that George Wash- pages, $29.95. ington would assume the position as the first president. Their confidence in his character and Bombs, Cities, and Civilians is a soldier- integrity played an important part in defining the scholar's rebuttal of two recent works on Ameri- president's role and responsibilities. The Conti- can strategic bombardment in World War nental Congress declared the Constitution duly II—Michael Sherry's revisionist The Rise of Ameri- ratified on 2 July 1788. can Air Power: The Creation o f Armageddon (1987) Many of the ideas and concepts ratified in the and Ronald Schaffer's condemnatory Wings o f Constitution were not firm until they were put Judgment: American Bombing in World War II into effect and tested by time. The roles of the (1985). The latter works argue that American president and vice president were defined by policies against indiscriminate strategic bombard- Washington during his eight years in Office. The ment were so broadly interpreted and so fre- principie of maintaining a standing military in quently violated that they were meaningless. A strict subservience to civilian rule was also de- commitment to high-altitude precision daylight NET ASSESSMENT 61

bombardment may have existed in theory but not ends and bad means. According to Professor in fact. According to Professor Sherry, the Crane, the latter sought to continue precision as- sources of this schism were racism, technological saults against military and industrial targets and fanaticism, and "a slow accretion of large fears, to avoid the siren song of indiscriminate terror thoughtless assumptions, and incrementai deci- bombing. Yes, the author admits, their standards sions" (page 4). Professor Schaffer, in turn, has of precision deteriorated as the war continued, tried to foist the odium of indiscriminate area but their commitment to the concept of pinpoint bombing onto Henry ("Hap") Amold and other accuracy survived. It was the exigencies of war Air Force leaders. In his opinion, any claim that rather than calculated policy decisions that con- these leaders harbored a moral revulsion towards tributed to the growing imprecision of aerial area (i.e., terror) bombing is a myth. In both the bombardment. As a result, civilian casualties re- European and Pacific theaters, Schaffer argues, mained an unintentional and regrettable conse- American air forces yielded to "military neces- quence of attacking military and industrial sity" and routinely violated the letter and spirit targets, which included the German transporta- of predsion bombardment doctrine. As a result, tion network and oil industry. moral scruples did not prevent a growing number By focusing on both operators in the field and of overt attacks against enemy civilians. military elites in Washington, Bornbs, Cities, and According to Professor Crane, however, such Civilians admirably attempts to refute the recent revisionism actually distorts the historical record. revisionism of others. Professor Crane's argu- In fact, the Army Air Forces' pursuit of accurate ment is compelling: when it carne to choosing bombing "remained a primary goal throughout between precision or terror bombing, the hearts World War II, influencing American tactics and of some American airmen were in the right place. technology during that conflict and setting They did slow the rush to unlimited aerial war- precedents for later wars" (page 5). There were fare. However, Bornbs, Cities, and Civilians does factors that led American airmen to increasingly have some limitations. Its emphasis on the doc- risk enemy civilian casualties by mid-1944—the trinal autonomy of local commanders, for exam- tantalizing possibility of a knockout blow deliv- ple, unwittingly makes it easier to blame ered from the air; the need to cooperate with the individuais for increased civilian casualties. But British, who constantly pressured the US to was Curtis LeMay's extreme pragmatism more re- mount area attacks against German morale; and sponsible for civilian deaths in Japan than the "the temptation to exploit and magnify the psy- impersonal, systemic forces that created the B-29? chological effects of bombing civilians" (page The point is debatable. Second, there are times 9)-but the commitment to precision bombard- where Bornbs, Cities, and Civilians reads like an ment and the minimizing of noncombatant suf- apologia for American airmen. It does not, for fering remained firm despite a growing reliance example, always challenge contemporary claims on relatively inaccurate radar-bombing. This that targets were "militarily significant," nor does commitment survived, according to the author, it always clarify what a "military" or "industrial" because operational and tactical commanders en- target actually was. As the war progressed, the joyed genuine latitude in waging the air war. terms became increasingly sloppy and did include They shaped American bombing policy without a growing disdain for noncombatant immunity. real direction from Washington, and as their as- Finally, there is the problem of evidence. Profes- saults against Berlin (Operation Thunderclap) and sor Crane either qualifies his basic theme repeat- the German transportaiion network (Operation edly (words like probably abound in the text), or Clarion) illustrate, US air commanders in Europe he merely asserts rather than proves his points. consciously tried to avoid morale-oriented terror (The author admits that it is impossible to deter- bombing even when distant superiors encouraged mine what impact ethical restraints had on strate- the idea. Thus, there were utilitarians—Hap Ar- gic bombing with the documentation now nold, Ira Eaker, Curtis LeMay, and Frederick An- available.) Most significantly, he interprets his derson—who thought military necessity/ data too narrowly in order to support what ap- efficiency, public relations, and inter-Allied soli- pears to be a previously determined theme. Data darity took precedence over morality. On the that actually illustrates the multiple motives be- other hand, there were moralists—Carl Spaatz, hind Carl Spaatz's behavior, for example, too Jimmy Doolittle, Richard Hughes, and Charles often ends up only illustrating his moral discom- Cabell—who wrestled with the problem of good fort with area bombing. Ultimatcly, such reduc- 62 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994 tivism is unfortunate but does not undermine the well-written summary of African-Americans in fundamental thesis of this well-crafted work. the Navy throughout history. Following this, Maj Peter R. Faber, USAF each individuaPs biography forms a separate Colorado Spríngs, Colorado chapter, prefaced by a short introduction. This pattern aids the transition from one chapter to the next. The language and tempo of each account capture each man's character; serious- minded officers are definitely distinct from the more jovial ones. Clear, well-chosen photographs in the text also helped develop the biographies. The Golden Thirteen: Recollections of the First Additionally, the inclusion of accounts by three Black Naval Officers by Paul Stillwell. Naval white officers involved with the Golden Thirteen Institute Press, US Naval Institute, 118 Mary- adds balance. Some of the best information land Avenue, Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5035, about the selection, training, and evaluation 1993, 256 pages, $22.95. process of the officer candidates appears in these three chapters. Furthermore, these white men of- African-Americans have served with great dis- fer an informative contrast to the lives of the tinction in the United States Navy since its incep- black officers and a revealing portrait of how dif- tion, but it was not until the Second World War ferently African-Americans were treated in this that blacks were commissioned as naval officers. period. In the spring of 1944, 13 men, later known as the The Golden Thirteen captures the rushed, cha- Golden Thirteen, became the first African-Ameri- otic feeling of America's entry into World War II cans to receive commissions as active duty naval from the perspective of the common man, black officers. As part of the United States Naval Insti- and white. One feels the difficulty of making tute's ongoing oral history project, Paul Stillwell extremely important life decisions, like quitting interviewed the eight surviving members of this college to enlist, getting married, or opting for group and accumulated over 2,000 pages of tran- the Navy over the Air Corps, as the United States scripts in the process. The Golden Thirteen is his entered a wartime status almost overnight. carefully edited summary of their recollections. The book also illustrates how criticai these 13 He intended to make the book an examination of men were in paving the way for future African- how blacks were treated by society in the twenti- Americans to serve as officers in the Navy and to eth century, using these men as examples, rather participate more fully in society. Like Jackie Rob- than a collection of World War II biographies. inson breaking the color line in major league He clearly succeeds in this goal and crafts an ex- baseball, the Golden Thirteen were pioneers in tremely readable and historically important work. entering another area of America monopolized by However, many questions about the core of his whites. This task was not an easy one as the 13 subject, the training and commissioning of Amer- were denied use of officers' club facilities, white ica^ first black naval officers, remain unan- enlisted men refused to salute them, and they swered. received no combat assignments upon commis- In order to achieve his goal of presenting a sioning. broader social history, the author sacrifices de- However, by the end of the war, partially due tails from the'criticai period revolving around the to their heroism, the Navy became more accept- officer training itself from January to March ing of African-Americans and perhaps acted as a 1944. The inclusion of events from before and catalyst in integrating American society in the after the war in each subject's account was effec- decades after the war. Certainly this is the opin- tive in developing their individual biographies as ion of Gen Colin Powell, who pays homage to the a whole, but readers are left wondering what the Golden Thirteen in a foreword to the book, and group's experiences during the training were re- of African-Americans in the Navy today, who give ally like. Descriptions of the first day of class or thanks to these pioneers whenever they meet their performance on specific exercises, for exam- them. Many of the 13 were conscious of their ple, would have provided a more tangible feel for criticai role in this process and cite it as a reason their experiences. for their willingness to put up with so many Nevertheless, the editing of the individual ac- abuses. The Golden Thirteen is an important counts is very well done. The book begins with a book because it eloquently tells the stories of NET ASSESSMENT 63

brave m en w ho cham pioned the cause o f free- went to Pensacola in 1938 and managed to "steal" dom against both enem ies abroad and society at a fighter assignment after graduation from flight hom e. school. He was assigned to the Marine squadron Capt Jam es M . Tucci, USAF defending Midway Island in June 1942. In his Colorado Spríngs, Colorado first combat, he managed to score victories, but his squadron was completely destroyed as a fighting unit. Following Midway, Carl went to Guadal- canal, where he had the distinction of becoming the Marine Corps's first "ace." After Guadalcanal, Pushing the Envelope: The Career of Fighter he was reassigned to the States, where he did war- Ace and Test Pilot Marion Carl by Maj Gen bond tours and, in the process, met his future Marion E. Carl, USMC, Retired, with Barrett wife. After starting up a new squadron of F4U Tillman. Naval Institute Press, 118 Maryland Corsairs as its commander, he returned to the Avenue, Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5035, Solomons in 1943. There his excellent chance of 1994, 133 pages, $23.95. finishing the war as the Marine Corps's leading As World War II Marine Corps fighter aces go, ace was killed by a move up to a staff job. both Greg ("Pappy") Boyington and Joe Foss are Following the war, General Carl's engineering probably better known than Maj Gen Marion background earned him a place as a test pilot. He Carl. However, of the three, only General Carl flew such aircraft as the Douglas D-5 5 8 1 completed a full military career after the war. Skystreak jet, in which he set a short-lived world While comparisons to Boyington and Foss are speed record. Later he flew the D-558 II rocket- only natural, readers familiar with the careers of powered aircraft as well. General Carl continued Brig Gen Charles ("Chuck") Yeager and Col Bud to advance in the Corps, doing well at a variety of Anderson will see General Carl as more their contemporary than his Marine Corps brethren. In command and staff jobs. Regardless of what his addition to being "aces," all entered into the test job was, however, General Carl made sure he got pilot business immediately after the war, had a stick time. As commander of a Marine expedi- variety of command jobs, served in Vietnam, and tionary brigade in Vietnam, he routinely flew his retired after long successful careers, thanks to tre- helicopter (Carl was the first marine qualified in mendous skill and a measure of good fortune. choppers) into hot spots to keep tabs on his Pushing the Envelope is not an autobiography; troops. General Carl retired in 1973 with over it provides the reader exactly what its title States— 14,000 flying hours. Today he is still regarded by a review of the 35-year career of Marion Carl. friends and aviation contemporaries as "The During that time, General Carl flew almost every Best." type of aircraft the Marine Corps had from General Carl's collaboration with Barrett Till- Grumman F3F biplane fighters to F-4 Phantom man has produced a fast-paced, highly readable jets, including numerous experimental and proto- rendering of the general's career. As a successful type aircraft. Acting as bookends for this career aviation author, Tillman undoubtedly influenced are two brief chapters, basically summed up as the structure of the book; however, the straight- life before and after the Marine Corps. The over- forward, unassuming manner of General Carl riding theme of this book is flying, or, more ap- comes across on every page. Be sure to read the propriately, the love of flying. inner flaps on the dust jacket of the book as well Bom in Hubbard, Oregon, in 1915, Marion as Tillman's introduction. Otherwise, you will Carl grew up on a farm. He enjoyed athletics and have no ciue as to the magnitude of the aviation fast cars. In 1938 he completed an engineering accomplishments of Marion Carl. Pushing the En- degree and, though he was an Army ROTC gradu- velope is highly recommended to all students of ate, took advantage of an old congressional act to World War II, test-flight, and general aviation get a reserve Marine Corps commission. Flying fans. A good, fast read! was in Carl's blood; his private license earned in Lt Col Dave Howard, USAF college only whetted his appetite for more. He Maxwell AFB, Alabama 64 A1RP0WER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

Wrong Place! Wrong Time! The 305th Bomb months before long-range escort fighters were Group & the 2nd Schweinfurt Raid, October available. More than just another "buff" book, 14, 1943 by George C. Kuhl. Shiffer Mili- this one is an attempt to analyze just what went tary/Aviation History, 77 Lower Valley Road, wrong on this disastrous mission. He comes to Route 372, Atglen, Pennsylvania 19310, 240 the conclusion that the lst Division's heavy pages, $24.95. losses were due to more than just the fact that there were no long-range fighters available. Trac- On 14 October 1943, the Eighth Air Force's lst ing the mission in an almost minute-by-minute and 3d Bombardment Divisions of the 305th fashion, he convincingly argues that the 305th Bombardment Group left Chelveston, England, had inept leadership on that fateful day. for a second attack on the German ball-bearing However, the reader must always keep in mind plants at Schweinfurt, Germany. In an air battle that this is a book based not only on archival lasting over three hours, Eighth Air Force lost the sources but, more importantly, on the recollec- battle for air superiority over Germany. Wrong tions of 50-plus aircrew members interviewed 45 Place! Wrong Time! is George Kuhl's analytical years after the event. If these nearly half-century- narrative history of that decisive day. He argues old recollections are accurate, then Kuhl's conclu- that not only was the Eighth Air Force's strategy sion that the wrong person was leading the 305th unrealistic, but that those making the decisions is dramatically understated. He concludes that had "thrown away the 'book' on planning a suc- "Major Normand [305th mission commander] cessful military operation." gave his version of what took place. It was obvi- Although he was a member of the 305th Bom- ously not the txuth and quite different from what bardment Group, B-17 pilot George Kuhl and his actually happened" (page 251). crew did not arrive at Chelveston until December Wrong Place! Wrong Time! presents its evidence 1944, more than a year after the Schweinfurt with obvious diligence and persuasiveness. The raids. Although the aircrews who had flown the primary sources appear credible, although, as mission had by then either returned to the States suggested earlier, the passage of time is a factor. or been shot down during later missions, the If, however, these primary sources—particularly author found that "Second Schweinfurt" was still the interviews—tend to substantiate each other a topic of conversation among the permanent (and there does not appear to be any reason to party members at the base. Forty-five years later, doubt their veracity), then his conclusions con- he finally decided to satisfy his curiosity about cerning the leadership of the 305th Bomb Group what had happened to the aircrews who had left and the lst DiVision are convincing. This small Chelveston the morning of the 14th. volume may cause air power historians to recon- Wrong Place! Wrong Time! is based on personal sider interpretaiions of the second Schweinfurt interviews with more than 50 of the survivors, mission and the bombing offensive over Ger- plus extensive research in the National Archives many in 1943 in general. It raises more questions and the archives of the USAF Historical Research than it answers and is a must read for anyone Agency. Divided into two sections, the book tells interested in the air war over Germany and the the story of the 305th and the second Schweinfurt strategic bombing campaign in particular.

raid through the stories of the men who were Maj M. J. Petersen, USAF there. Section one is devoted to setting the stage Maxwell AFB, Alabama with a discu$sion of such topics as the Eighth Air Force, the B-17 itself, and a nearly minute-by- minute narration of the premission briefing, the takeoff, the mission itself, and the return home of the two surviving B-17s of the 305th. The second Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of section is devoted to not only an analysis of what State by George P. Shultz. Charles Scribner's the author feels "went wrong," but also to the Sons, 866 Third Avenue, New York 10022, 1993, stories of those flyers who were shot down and 1,184 pages, $30.00. who were either interned or evaded the Germans and escaped. When he replaced Secretary of State Alexander Extensively documented through archival re- Haig, George Shultz carne to an office in a decade search and interviews, Wrong Place! Wrong Time! that would see the collapse of the Soviet Union. puts the reader in a B-17 over Germany in the But in the summer of 1982, Soviet-US relations NET ASSESSMENT 65

were more threatening than they had been since War II." As he reports, Margaret Thatcher was the early 1960s, terrorism was exploding every- right when she said in a Washington Post and where, and the specter of nuclear war cast its pall Newsweek interview in November 1988, "We're over the globe. When he departed six and one- not in a Cold War now." Even though there are half years later, Soviet-American relations were many uncertainties remaining in the world, by better than they had been in decades, and the the time Shultz closes his weighty memoirs, the stage was set for the curtain to drop on the "evil world has become a fundamentally different empire." Was this George Shultz's doing? place and he has been a witness in the center of Over a thousand pages of dry, no-nonsense the turmoil. prose later, I've read of progress and despair over This book is not light bedtime reading. It is the Middle East, the "gardening" aspects of diplo- nothing less than a study of the inner workings macy, Soviet-American relations, relations with of the highest circles of intemational relations Japan and China, struggles over Central America, and the US government. It is well worth invest- the "setback" of Iran-Contra, and the "last of the ing the time necessary to plow through it. Superpower summits." Still, these are interesting Maj M. J. Petersen, USAF and instructive stories that take the reader down Maxwell AFB, Alabama the corridors of intemational relations to sit and get a fly-on-the-wall gümpse into the inner workings of the Reagan cabinet. These are the tales of a participant, but one who seems unwilling to dig deeper into this past and reveal glimmers of ques- FDR, into the Storm, 1937-1940: A History by tions that he would just as soon not answer. The Kenneth S. Davis. Random House, Inc., 201 parts dealing with Iran-Contra were, in the final East 50th Street, New York 10022, 1993, 691 analysis, somewhat unsatisfactory, not because pages, $35.00. they failed to pin the blame on anyone but rather because they avoid the deeper issues surrounding At the time, what happened was generally regarded the affair. Other sections are fascinating read- as a renewal of the war of 1914-18, and indeed that ing—the real story behind Reykjavik, what to do war m ight be truly said never to have ended, in the about terrorism, and especially the continuing sense of reaching a conclusion or settlem ent of its drama of American-Soviet relations, which culmi- basic issues. It had m erely been suspended until nated at the Washington Summit. one of the com batants, having collapsed of Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the exhau stion, regained su fficient strength to renew the struggle. That Germ any would renew the memoirs is what George Shultz thought about struggle had been virtually ensured by the "peace" President Ronald Reagan. Shultz, too, was a con- th at the A llies, them selves on the verge o f collap se servative, confident in his anti-Communist stance w hen jo in ed by the U nited States, im posed u p on her and absolutely convinced of the superiority of at V ersailles*—a "peace" whose perfection of the United States's democratic system. He agreed econom ic stupidity was unmarred by the slightest with the president's attitude that the United hint of econom ic realism, a "peace" whose States had lost political power in its intemational perfection o f nationalistic vengefulness was but relationships during the years of the Carter presi- slightly m arred by the establish m en t o f a toothless dency and fully supported the rearmament pro- League of Nations, a "peace" that was otherw ise gram that President Reagan sponsored. However, quite m arvelously devoid of rational dealings with the deepest of the war's root causes, (page 465) he was also convinced that any negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union This book should be mandatory reading for would work in our favor because the Soviet Un- anyone who will be trying to assess the New ion understood that America was recovering its World Order as it unfolds into the next century. strength at the same time that the Soviets were It may be trite to say that we must study facing an ever-increasing period of vulnerability. history to avoid repeating it, but it is also true. Shultz clearly shows that President Reagan was The parallels in the intemational arena between truly convinced that the Soviet Union and its ide- the era of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) ology were indeed headed for history's dustbin. Shultz sees the Reagan years as a turning *"This is not a peace," commented French marshal point, the result of "the ideas and institutions put Ferdinand Foch when the Versailles Treaty was signed. "It is an in place in the criticai period right after World armistice for twenty years." 66 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

and today should not be lost on even the novice Supreme Court, the House, the Senate, and, for among history buffs. In fact, this is one of those that matter, in the economy. There are examples books that causes the reader to actually read the to be studied for problems with immigration, po- footnotes so as not to miss anything! litical appointees, and the accelerating pace of The historical value of the book aside, Ken- technology. neth S. Davis has done a masterful job of telling We in the Air Force can begin to see how we the story of a man who was at once made by the got to where we are today. There is merit, after times in which he Iived and the maker of the all, in reflecting on the key role that FDR played events of his time. We will feel the impact of in the expansion and mobilization of US air FDR's presidency and indeed of his political life power. Davis gives us a good deal of detail on the for a long time to come. The more we examine political reality of the times and the decision fac- his rise to power and his exercise of that power, tors that exerted influence on the Oval Office. the more complex the man becomes to our un- Yet, had FDR chosen an alternative path, the derstanding. Finally, we come away with an im- world would probably be a very different place age that has grown more mysterious with each and the Air Force would most assuredly look a insight. whole lot different than it does today. These were, after all, dangerous and treacher- This book is very readable and well docu- ous times, and we are just now beginning to feel mented, and I have difficulty finding fault with the fu 11 import of the events of this momentous it. Davis does a masterful job of putting Presi- epoch in our history. The United States was on dent Roosevelt at the center of a controversy over the US involvement in a foreign war, a domestic the verge of formal entry into an alliance that economic crisis, and ultimately at the center of a would manifest itself in terms of a coalition re- clash over who would lead the world on a path sponse to the threat of Nazi domination of the toward freedom. We see the behind-the-scenes European continent. The world was changing at mechanics of a president as a political power bro- a pace that was difficult for the people of the time ker dealing with the US Congress and the Su- to understand. Technology had begun to reshape preme Court. We even catch a glimpse of his the political world and the political loyalties. more human side through comments to close Some would even argue that the American strate- friends and aides. It is well worth the effort and gic bombardment campaign was created around the time to read FDR, into the Storm, 1937-1940: A History. and later driven by changes in technology. These were the times into which FDR carne to Lt Col Albert U. Mitchum use his skills. There was a definite pacifist bias in Maxwell AFB, Alabama the country that bordered on isolationism as the people sought to stay out of wars that did not directly threaten US interests (page 494). There D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of was an immigration "problem" to be resolved as World War II by Stephen E. Ambrose. Simon tens of thousands of oppressed people fled to our & Schuster, 1230 Avenue of the Américas, New shores looking for the "American Dream" and at- York 10020, 1994, 656 pages, $30.00. tempting to avoid persecution in their homelands D-Day, 1944 edited by Theodore A. Wilson. Uni- (page 269). Additionally, he had to contend with versity Press of Kansas, 2501 West 15th, the international results of decisions and appoint- Lawrence, Kansas 66049-3904, 1994, 430 pages, ments made solely for domestic political reasons cloth $45.00, paper $22.50. such as the appointment of Joseph Patrick Ken- nedy to the post of US ambassador to the Court The arrival of the 50th anniversary of the of St. James's (page 323). On the technological "Longest Day" has spawned a tremendous out- front, he was deaít a hand to play that included pouring of memoirs, collections, and analyses of the nuclear wild card (page 473). Meanwhile, the the invasion of the French coast of Normandy by domestic economy was in worse condition than the troops under Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower's at any time before or since (page 201). command. More than any other, this was the cli- The intent of the previous paragraph was to mactic battle of the war in Europe. As the sun set whet your appetite to read a book about a presi- on 6 June 1944 and darkness covered the broken dent who changed the way we do business in the vehicles and bleeding bodies of Allied and Ger- NET ASSESSMENT 67

man troops along that stretch of French beach, so and die. Criticai analysis has its place, but so too set the sun of the Third Reich. Stephen Ambrose does a narrative history that puts the reader in and Theodore Wilson have presented their histo- the wet boondockers of the scared infantryman ries of that fateful day in two complementary vol- crawling his way out of the red surf on Omaha umes. Historian and Eisenhower biographer Beach. Too often, the military historian concen- Stephen Ambrose has masterfully utilized the col- trates on analysis and forgets the humanity who lection of oral and written histories in the Eisen- fought and died. D-Day, June 6, 1944, in the hower Center at the University of New Orleans. words of one participant, takes the reader to doz- Professor Theodore Wilson, taking another tack, ens of "little battlefields . . . maybe 45 yards has put together an outstanding anthology of es- wide." says composed by leading scholars covering all D-Day, 1944 will satisfy the reader who is aspects of the "Longest Day." searching for a criticai analysis of the Normandy D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle o f invasion. Drawing together a collection of essays World War II is not the climactic history of the by 20 notable historians such as Forrest Pogue, Normandy invasion. It is, however, a history as Robin Higham, Alexander S. Cochran, and told by the participants in the preparations for Maurice Matloff, this volume is an assessment of and the landings on the shores of northern the lessons and meaning of the "Longest Day." France. Above all else, it is most especially a The authors, delving into newly opened archival story of the American visit to the hell of "Bloody sources, have presented a compendium that will Omaha" and the chãos that reigned on the shell- expand the reader's comprehension of such di- swept shingle of that blood-soaked beach in front verse subjects as coalition war fighting, logistics, of the bluffs at Vierville. It ultimately becomes a air operations, the contributions of special forces, chronicle of the men of the 29th ("Blue and intelligence, leadership, and the capabilities of Gray") Infantry Division, especially its 116th American, Canadian, and British forces. Taken Regiment, whose companies were decimated as together, these essays clearly demonstrate why, 50 they ran, crawled, bled, and died on their way to years later, this single day is still one of the defin- the partial security of the seawall that rose out of ing points of the epoch of World War II. This, the shingle before the escarpment in front of too, is an excellent volume. Wilson has drawn them. Although the other actors in this great play together a sterling collection of essays that clearly are here—the paratroopers, the Canadians, the indicates the scope of not only the battle but also British, the glider troops, and the Wehrmacht—the the planning and preparations that began long overwhelming feeling that strikes the reader is before the first shell burst from the gun muzzles that the invasion was made by those valiant men of the ships gathered off the Normandy shore. who landed at Omaha's Dog Green Beach. I D-Day, 1944's criticai analysis dramatically found it difficult to be objective about Ambrose's complements the narrative history of D-Day, June concentration on the 29th Division—my father 6, 1944. Every student of World War II should was a medie attached to the 116th Regiment and read both of these volumes. Together they pre- one of the few from those first waves of the "Blue sent a picture and analysis of what was the begin- and Gray" that survived the day—but perhaps it is ning of the end for the Third Reich. deserved because it was here that the invasion's Maj M. J. Petersen, USAF success was assured. As a synthesis of oral Maxwell AFB, Alabama histories, Ambrose's work is less concerned with presenting an analysis of the strategy, operational art, and tactics of the invasion, and this can be unsettling to the professional historian who is accustomed to (and often prefers) criticai analysis Stealth Fighter Pilot by D. M. Giangreco, in The and not narrative history. However, narrative has Power Series. Motorbooks International, P.O. its place, and Ambrose has successfully presented Box 2, 729 Prospect Avenue, Osceola, Wiscon- a valuable picture of the invasion of Normandy sin 54020, 1993, 128 pages, $14.95. through the eyes of the participants. As one reads modem criticai history, and especially military If the Gulf War was the first high-tech war of a history, it is easy to forget that these are real new, post-cold-war era, as many observers have people with real hopes, dreams, fears, and most asserted, then this book on the role of the F- 117's especially real flesh, blood, and bones who bleed development and employment in that contest de- 68 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

serves very close attention by air power profes- and reduced appropriations, this question is by sionals. No advanced conventional weapon Sys- no means academic. It is one made frequently by tem developed by the United States over the last Russian commentators on the Gulf War and its decade of the cold war was held in deeper cover lessons. This book is recommended for all those and expected to have a greater role in future war interested in air power, aviation history, and the than the stealth fighter, or Black Jet, as she was application of advanced technology to warfare. known to her pilots and ground crews. This Dr Jacob W. Kipp book, which is richly illustrated with more than Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 100 color and black-and-white photos, takes the stealth fighter from a concept to prototype at Lockheed and to production, deployment, crew training, and then combat utilization. This is a book about aviators—the men who tested, trained on, and fought in the F-117. The author has made their stories into an interesting narrative. Those interested in modem air warfare will Silent Descent by Dick Couch. G. P. Putnam's find much of interest in the chapters devoted to Sons, 200 Madison Avenue, New York 10016, the planning, preparation, and conduct of the air 1993, 288 pages, $21.95. campaign in the Gulf. Designed originally as a Silent Descent is a novel about Russia's selling weapon for covert operations, the F-117 matured a portion of its nuclear arsenal to third world into a combat multiplier in the Gulf, where countries in 1993. The book is action-packed and stealth technology and advanced conventional uses current events to formulate the scenario. munitions combined with deadly effect against The intriguing aspect is that the scenario is not Iraqi command and control capabilities; nuclear, far-fetched. The author is a former member of Chemical, and biological facilities; and airfields in the Navy Sea Air Land (SEAL) unit, with two the face of heavy air defenses. It was the F-117s tours of duty in Vietnam. that took the war to downtown Baghdad with Lieutenant Moody, USN, must take a SEAL such devastating effect. The performance of the team into Rússia and make contact with a CIA Black Jet crews was extraordinary. Critics have operative who has gone underground and hasn't pointed to the number of sorties that had to be been heard from in several years. The operative aborted because of bad weather, which made tar- is the only one who can confirm whether Rússia get acquisition difficult or impossible. The re- is dismantling its nuclear weapons and creating sults were, however, very successful by any newer, more accurate models from them—ones standards. that can be launched from aircraft. Only one The historian in me originally was put off by person (an Army Special Forces noncommis- the prologue, a fictional account of the response sioned officer who speaks fluent Russian) knows of frustrated Iraqi air defenders to the nighthawks the location and identity of the operative. The that struck without warning. Yet, it was precisely responsibility of developing the operations plan the picture from the other side of the hill that goes to an Air Force major. These circumstances makes clear the radical effect of stealth technol- set the tone for a joint operation. Once the plan ogy on air warfare. Without an account from is formulated, all players have about 30 days to "the other side of the hill," the story of stealth in prepare for the mission (which predictably gets the Gulf would be incomplete. accelerated). Only a handful of people, including In the epilogue, the author discusses the post- the president, have any knowledge of the plan mortem assessments of the F-117's performance and the people involved. and concludes that the investment in stealth had The team members are given carte blanche saved lives and shortened the war. Military theo- anywhere they go, enabling them to get any sup- rists concerned with future war and the role of plies, equipment, personnel, and so forth, they stealth technology in such a conflict have noted desire. This includes a specially fitted KC-10 that the Gulf War was one-sided. The question is tanker made to look like a Royal Dutch KLM air- still open regarding the impact of stealth technol- craft, from which they jump at night at 40,000 ogy when both sides can deploy and use such feet onto the Kola Península in northern Rússia. platforms and advanced precision guided muni- Once the aircraft is airborne and the mission has tions against each other. In an era of downsizing been given the green light, the suspense really NET ASSESSMENT 69

kicks in gear. The author sustains the suspense Ribbentrop, not as Hitler's great minister of for- throughout the novel by adding twists and turns eign affairs but as an average individual who was at the proper time, some of which are predict- drawn into German nationalism by Hitler's per- able. For instance, the SEAL team is to be ex- sonality. tracted from Rússia by an American submarine, At a glance, Ribbentrop: A Biography seems like which must go under the Arctic ice into Mur- another stuffy biography about a Nazi hench- mansk to pick them up. The submarine is de- man. However, Michael Bloch blends a mire of tected by the Russians right before it is ready to go under the ice mass. Once the sub is under the documented facts into a quick-reading historical ice, it must wait there for several days before the book. Of particular note is the easy reading style SEAL team arrives for pickup. Bloch uses to provide the reader with an under- Naturally, the suspense continues when the standing of Joachim von Ribbentrop. Bloch gives SEAL team is almost detected several times after it the reader an in-depth background on Ribbentrop is in Rússia. The team is eventually detected and and his immediate family. He also does an out- pursued because someone in Washington, D.C., standing job of showing the influence of events brags about the mission in a local bar. The bar- during Ribbentrop's childhood through his early tender, a Russian spy who has been in place for twenties that shaped Ribbentrop's personality many years, immediately notifies authorities in and views. Rússia, and they take appropriate action. Military people can certainly appreciate this "sinking of Bloch's portrayal of Ribbentrop leaves the the ship." reader with a feeling of regret, not for Ribbentrop Couch keeps the book moving at a quick pace the self-important diplomat and politician, but without going overboard with his characters. He Ribbentrop the individual. As an individual, Rib- provides just enough characterization to give the bentrop was a success in business and family life. reader good insight and develop the plot. He also His downfall was the intoxication of power mixed does not delve into great detail about all the as- with his self-induced perception of importance. pects of the mission. If he talks about the equip- Bloch brings this out through a narrative descrip- ment the SEALs are using, he briefly identifies it tion of Ribbentrop's tenure as ambassador to and describes its capabilities without going into too much detail. This practice keeps the book Great Britain. Bloch describes the diplomatic under 300, quickly read pages. blunders of Ribbentrop during this period and The book's only fault is its reference to the the cause of his resentment and eventual hatred USAF Security Police as the Air Police, a designa- of Great Britain. Bloch describes the buildup of tion that changed over two decades ago. Al- Ribbentrop's disenchantment for the British from though many readers would overlook this point, two points. The first is Ribbentrop's lack of tact it struck me because I spent 11 years as a security and a self-created image he projects concerning specialist prior to my commissioning. Neverthe- his influence in pre-World War II German for- less, this suspenseful, excellent book is well eign policy. Bloch draws out this point through worth reading. his Creative style of describing Ribbentrop blun- Lt Walter Klose, USAF ders such as telling the British Foreign Office to Maxwell AFB, Alabama come to him when they have concerns about the political scene in Berlin. The British politely declined by telling Ribbentrop that they had an ambassador in Berlin for that specific purpose. The second point Bloch brings out is Ribbentrop's obsessive blind obedience to Adolf Hitler. Bloch Ribbentrop: A Biography by Michael Bloch. describes Ribbentrop's efforts to secure an Anglo- Crown Publishers, Inc., 201 East 50th Street, German alliance against communism, then his at- New York 10022, 1992, 528 pages, $25.00. tempts to persuade the British to support The life of Hitler's wartime foreign minister, Germany's interests and expansions to the East. Joachim von Ribbentrop, is fascinating and bi- During this period, Ribbentrop attempts to ra- zarre. The author brings to light the persona of tionalize and justify the Nazi agenda of Le- 70 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

bensrautn, or German expansionism to the East rity. I highly recommend this book to anyone for economic growth. Up to the end of Ribben- wanting to understand the fanatical mind-set of trop's tenure as ambassador to Great Britain, you Nazism and how the German war machine was really have to wonder just how he could be taken able to start, sustain, then lose a world war. seriously by foreign governments and especially Maj Thoxnas A Torgerson, USAF the Nazi political machine on the eve of World Peterson AFB, Colorado War II. Bloch ties Ribbentrop's political survival to his relationship with Hitler. Hitler, like everyone else who had contact with Ribbentrop, described him The Search for Strategy: Politics and Strategic as stiff, boring, humorless, and vain. But unlike Vision edited by Gary L. Guertner. Green- Ribbentrop's political adversaries, Hitler used Rib- wood Press, 88 Post Road West, Box 5007, bentrop for his own political advantage. Bloch Westport, Connecticut 06881, 1993, 360 pages, explains Ribbentrop's dedication and obedience $60.00. to Hitler as his greatest strength. Another Ribben- The Search for Strategy is a collection of 16 trop attribute that gained Hitler's favor was Rib- papers focusing on the problem America faces in bentrop's inflexibility. Hitler maintained his creating a coherent and long-lived security strat- power base by using Ribbentrop's loyalty and egy following the end of the cold war. The pa- stubbornness to keep other Nazi leaders at bay pers deal with the unique elements of the and quarreling. American strategy development process, prob- Bloch describes Ribbenrtop's involvement, or lems with that process, and the examination of lack of involvement, in major German political possible strategic "concepts" that might be useful events before and during World War II. If Rib- to consider when formulating policy in the future. bentrop was not personally involved in the major The major thesis is that the dominant factor in decisions, he would maneuver himself to gain fa- the development of an American national secu- vor with Hitler or gain public importance rity strategy is the domestic political environ- through the press. Bloch brings this out by ment. In keeping with that thesis, part 1, pointing out Ribbentrop's lack of involvement in comprising one-third of the book, examines the the Austrian annexation. Ribbentrop's greatest creation of national security strategy as an aspect Nazi achievement was his planning and negotiat- of the American political process. Interesting es- ing of the nonaggression pact with the Soviet Un- says in this part include the opening essay, "Why ion. It is through this pact that Ribbentrop can is Strategy Difficult?" by David Jablonsky, which stretches the Clausewitzian trinity of warfare to be credited with the solidification of the Allies argue that any effort at harmonizing the compet- against Germany and the forced alignment of Ja- ing domestic and foreign policy objectives to pan and Italy with Germany for the start of achieve a stable national security strategy must World War II. be based on identifiable national interests, not Ribbentop's paranóia was his downfall, as specific threats. Another interesting essay in this Bloch best describes through the Nuremberg trial section is Robert Art's "Strategy and Management period. Ribbentrop can be described as needing in the Post-Cold War Pentagon." Aft argues that intensive psychiatric help because of his dissocia- as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization from the Jewish problem, when in fact Rib- tion, the management of the Department of De- bentrop^ zealous directions to his subordinates fense is superior to its strategy. The concluding may have been the catalyst for the extermination essay by Gary Guertner argues that maintenance of millions of Jews and others. To the very end, of a core military strength has to be presented to Ribbentrop was devoted to Adolf Hitler and his the public as integral to the continued economic ideais. vitality of the country and necessary to keep Michael Bloch does credit to himself by his open access to vital resources. well-documented book about a man who was per- Parts 2, 3, and 4 of the book are detailed to ceived to be a mastermind, but in reality was an look at certain concepts (defined as ways to deal individual without personal strength and integ- with security problems or threats) that appear to NET ASSESSMENT 71

be prudent choices for inclusion in an American limit conventional proliferation will have to be post-cold-war strategy. Part 2 examines the fu- multilateral to be effective. ture of deterrence and seeks to find aspects of The final concept, collective security, is dis- nuclear deterrence that are transferable to con- cussed in part 4. The centerpiece of this section is ventional deterrence in a multipolar world. Inis Claude's essay "Collective Security after the George Questor revisits his groundbreaking work Cold War." Claude argues that collective security on prenuclear deterrence in "Deterrence before in the pure sense is unattainable, but collective Hiroshima: The Past as Prologue" and finds that security in a more narrow sense can be realized the capacity to inflict pain (in a countervalue under US leadership and legitimized by interna- sense) will be a necessary component of any post- tional organizations like the United Nations. But cold-war conventional deterrence. Robert Haffa Claude also sees the continued need for bilateral then follows with an essay outlining a theory of and multilateral defense agreements. In that vein, extended conventional deterrence for the future. Sheldon Simon then discusses the Asian dimen- Key to Haffa's theory is that contrary to nuclear sion of collective security arrangements. He ar- deterrence, for conventional deterrence to work, gues that US presence in the form of bilateral the US will have to use military force both to defense agreements is necessary in Asia because protect its interests in the event of a criticai threat of deep economic, political, and military differ- and to validate the viability of conventional de- ences between nations in the region. The final terrence to future aggressors. Gary Guertner con- essay in this part is an appraisal of European se- cludes this part by arguing for a force structure curity efforts. Here Douglas Stuart hints that a based primarily on conventional forces. The wider role as a pan-European peacekeeping or- deterrent ability of such a force structure lies in ganization may be in NATO s future. Fortunately, the greater possibility of its use (unlike nuclear he qualifies this at the end of the paper with the weapons, conventional forces are less likely to be observation that prior peacekeeping organizations self-deterring) and its flexibility. have performed poorly. Given the impotence of Part 3 examines technological superiority as a the European response to the Bosnian crisis, this concept applicable to security strategy in the caveat is more than justified. The book concludes coming years. The first two essays in this part with an interesting discussion on the need to in- deal with the development of technology in sup- tegrate the strategic and political paradigms to port of a security strategy. In his essay "Compen- create a national security strategy that does not sating for Smaller Forces through Technology," seek an unrealistic concept of victory (which is Anthony Cordesman argues that joint doctrine undefinable and unattainable in the foreseeable will need to be developed and strengthened so international milieu) but instead promotes and that our smaller military can take full advantage defends vital national interests. of the force-multiplying effects of advanced tech- The book presents very little that is brand new, nology. James Blackwell then follows with an es- but it is a useful reader for the officer seeking say that cautions against overdependence on background on current issues in the national se- limited and very expensive technologies. He ar- curity strategy debate. gues that in the future a technology must be Maj Budd Jones, USAF flexible and efficient to warrant further develop- Maxwell AFB, Alabama ment. The two concluding essays in this part deal with the problem of nuclear and conventional weapons technology proliferation. In his discussion of nuclear proliferation, Leonard Spec- Cold War Casualty: The Court-Martial of Major tor argues that it is in the interest of those States General Robert W. Grow by George F. Hof- already possessing nuclear weapons to keep them mann. The Kent State University Press, Kent, out of the hands of hostile proliferators and that Ohio 44242, 1993, 250 pages, $26.00. diplomatic/economic efforts along these lines are preferable to military actions. Michael Klare then In 1952, Maj Gen Robert W. Grow was con- revisits his work on conventional weapons prolif- victed by court-martial for breaching security eration, ultimately arguing that it is safer for measures by keeping a diary containing classified American interests to view arms transfers as po- Information. Though certainly not the first tential proliferation risks rather than as security American general to keep such a personal record— assets. He also notes that any successful effort to Dwight Eisenhower, Ornar Bradley, and Mark 72 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

Clark, for example, kept wartime diaries that were thirst for power and control that factored into his later published as books—Grow was the only one role in the affair. Bolling, perhaps, feared he to have his journal used as a source for Soviet might lose influence in the Army because of the propaganda. ease with which Grow's diaries were compro- Using the Freedom of Information Act to gain mised in Frankfurt. Also, no doubt, playing access to the previously closed investigations and heavily on Bolling's mind were the results of the court-martial proceedings, Hofmann unravels the CIC [Counter Intelligence Corps] investigation in Grow affair. Included among Grow's duties as EUCOM [European Command], which had un- the American military attaché to Moscow from covered a possible Soviet mole and deplorable 1950-52 was that of assessing Soviet military security measures at a hotel used by ranking strengths, movements, and viability. In the sum- American officials. Perhaps the G-2 [intelligence mer of 1951, parts of his diary were photographed branch] had much to lose—which was ample mo- at a small US Army hotel in Frankfurt, West Ger- tivation for caution and silence (page 101). This many, while Grow was there for a conference. Ex- sparse speculation—he offers no supporting docu- tracts were published in January 1952 in an mentation—is Hofmann's only explanation for obscure East German book that was obviously the Taylor/Bolling actions. Communist propaganda. The Army compared Hofmann's objectivity is clearly suspect. A the extracts with Grow's act uai diary and posi- former member of the Army's armored branch, tively concluded that all the excerpts were either he wrote The Super Sixth: History o f the Sixth Ar- misquotes or out-and-out forgeries. Grow was mored Division in World War II and Its Post-war clearly innocent of abetting Communist propa- Association. Grow commanded that division in ganda efforts. World War II, and in the preface to Cold War But the Army faced a dilemma: It must either Casualty, Hofmann acknowledges several promi- allow Communist propaganda to go unchal- nent members of the division who give Grow lenged or expose it as false and, in the process, due credit . . . for his many years of honorable reveal lax Army security procedures. The answer, Service to his country (page xii). argues Hofmann, was to deflect attention by He first became aware of General Grow's court-martialing Grow on trumped-up security court-martial through Col Robert Grow, the gen- charges. A small group of Army general officers eraTs son, who suggested a historical investiga- in the Pentagon, led by Lt Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, tion of the incident. Hofmann writes, "The deputy chief of staff, and Maj Gen Alexander R. reader may conclude at times that I am pleading a Bolling, the assistant chief of staff for intelli- defense for General Grow" (page x). Though he gence, made the decision to prosecute Grow. In further says he is merely evaluating evidence, I fact, Hofmann's real purpose is to reveal what he must agree with his initial assessment—he is in- believes is institutionalized resistance by many deed pleading a defense for General Grow, who Army commanders to legal changes in court-mar- died in 1985. tial procedures. Most disturbing is that Hofmann barely, and That Taylor and Bolling exercised direct, covert then only reluctantly, acknowledges that Grow command influence seems undeniable based on did anything wrong. Regardless of Grow’s honor, evidence Hofmann uncovered. The Taylor man- competence, or sense of duty—qualities Hofmann agement group misled the secretary of defense plainly demonstrates the general possessed—he and the Army chief of staff as to the nature of the still did, in fact, violate security requirements by Grow affair. More directly, it orchestrated the keeping an unsecured, classified personal diary. court-martial by withholding criticai information In his trial, Grow's defense lawyers fell back and manipulating evidence, witnesses, court on inexcusable rationalization, arguing that the members, and the press. While Hofmann's Grow classified information Grow kept was already well was the good soldier who faithfully did his duty, known to the Soviets, and therefore inconsequen- Taylor and Bolling emerged as manipulators more tial. Hofmann accepts this irresponsible justifica- concerned with "careerism" than justice. tion with blinders on. Hofmann provides overwhelming evidence Despite its many flaws, Cold War Casualty is an that Taylor and Bolling did indeed orchestrate excellent book that reveals the extent to which Grow's court-martial, but he never satisfactorily powerful forces will go to advance selfish agendas. addresses the more intriguing question, "Why did At times reading Iike both a spy thriller and a they do it?" Taylor, he suggests, had an apparent riveting courtroom drama, General Grow's court- NET ASSESSMENT 73

martial is a modern morality play that provides reader who hopes for a narrative of the Kuwaiti lessons for all American military men and women. resistance during the occupation will be disap- pointed here. Khalil spends more time on the M aj W illiam L. Coode, USAF Starkville, Mississippi "Highway of Death" than he does on the occupation. Makiya compounds this by focusing on inter-Arab perceptions and prejudices more than on the events of late 1990 in Kuwait, which an Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising in American would be interested in. the Arab World by Kanan Makiya. W. W. Nor- "Abu Haydar" is a pseudonym for any number ton & Co., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York 10110, of Iraqi soldiers who took part in the Shia upris- 1993, 367 pages, $19.95. ing in Najaf in early 1991. This chapter is per- In Cruelty and Silence, Kanan Makiya has pro- haps the most useful since, in describing the duced a strange mixture of a book. Both grip- uprising from several firsthand viewpoints, it pro- ping and boring, the book manages to blend vides accounts and information that are not well fascinating personal accounts with pages of tedi- known in the West. It will be of particular inter- ous tangents. In the first half—"Cruelty"—he est for Iraqi analysts as it discusses the role of continues the polemic against the Iraqi regime Ayatollah Khoei, the former Shiite cleric in Iraq that he began under the pen name Samir al-Khalil during the uprisings. in Republic o f Fear. In the second half—" Silence" — The chapter "Ornar" is perhaps the most inter- Makiya attempts to find the cause of the cruelty esting reading. Ornar is an Iraqi victim of the he finds in the modem Arab world and lays a Baathist regime, just one of many implicated in significant portion of the blame at the feet of an imaginary plot against the regime. His story Arab intellectuals. The second half of the book gives insights into the Iraqi security structure and will only be useful for those interested in the techniques through the eyes of the common social psychology of the Arab world. However, Iraqi. He is the best narrator of all Makiya's the first half provides valuable insight into the sources, and the reading is gripping as well as workings of the Baathist regime of Iraq as well as informative. the popular uprisings in Iraq of early 1991 that "Mustafa" is a Kurd, a victim of the use of were hidden from Western eyes. Chemicals by Saddam Hussein's regime. Mustafa As a whole, and from a Western point of view, lost most of his extended family in one Chemical the book is not very well written. It too easily slips bombing raid on their village—despite precau- away from a subject into musings and self-exami- tions against the use of Chemicals. With this nations; and it assumes knowledge of the Middle chapter, Makiya begins his focus on the Kurdish East and Iraq that many readers do not have. How- side of the Iraqi equation that continues with ever, for those interested in why Saddam Hussein's "Taimour," a Kurdish boy. The Iraqi army/secu- Iraq and dictatorships like it have to be resisted, rity forces took Taimour when he was less than 10 there are gems of personal testimony within these years old to be executed along with the rest of his pages that should not be missed. village. He escaped from a mass grave and is now Makiya divides "Silence" into sections devoted a symbol of Kurdish resistance against Al-Anfal—a to the personal accounts of cruelty that individu- poíicy of the Baathist regime aimed at ridding ais have suffered at the hands of the Iraqi govern- Iraq of the Kurdish "problem." The parallels be- ment. Although these accounts are perhaps not tween the extcrmination policies of Saddam surprising, they still manage to convey horrifying Hussein's Iraq, Hitler's Germany, and Pol Pot's details of the actions and State policies of the Sad- Cambodia are too clear to need emphasis here. dam-centered Baath regime. These are the inter- In the second half of the book, "Silence," esting and valuable sections for Air Force readers. Makiya quickly loses the reader in a morass of Following are some examples. self-examination, examination of the State of the "Khalil" is a Kuwaiti victim of the Iraqi inva- Arab psyche, and examination of the State of Arab sion of August 1990 who describes some of the intellectual life. I think he wants to make the atTOcities committed by the Iraqi army while in point that the academic world, especially Arab Kuwait. His real name is Khaled Nasser al-Sabah. intellectuals, has the obligation to speak out He is, as his name suggests, a member of Kuwait's against the continuing atrocities in the Middle ruling family who chose his wartime pseudonym East. He fails to make his point clearly and com- in honor of the author of Republic o f Fear. The pounds his problems by holding those intellectu- 74 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

ais responsible for the State of Arab society to- the B-17 Flying Fortress. The War Department day—surely a responsibility that must be shared originally ordered 13 of the bombers, but it re- more widely. Most disappointingly, Makiya uses mained skeptical of totally endorsing the B-17. this book to indulge in what seems to be a per- Strapped for cash after building the original pro- sonal vendetta against Edward Said, the Palestin- totype, Boeing's president orchestrated an im- ian-American author and scholar. Makiya accuses pressive B-17 flyover at the 1938 Argentinian Said of aiding Saddam Hussein by not speaking inauguration parade (Lt Curtis E. LeMay was a out against the invasion of Kuwait, a puzzling ac- navigator on one of the aircraft). After the cusation since Said was at the forefront of those flyover, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) en- condemning the invasions. thusiastically endorsed the plane, and Congress, Fortunately, the "Silence" section is the second the War Department, and the Air Corps fell in half, and the reader has gleaned the useful infor- line. The next year, FDR authorized $50 million mation before being bogged down in Makiya's for airplane procurement, and the War Depart- poorly presented agenda. Despite the problems ment ordered 512 B-17Es in 1940. Wells was pro- with the second half, the first half on cruelty moted to chief engineer on the B-17 project in speaks volumes about the plight of Arabs in mod- 1943. Gen James H. ("Jimmy") Doolittle, describ- em police States. For those who will not have the ing the tremendous impact that the planes even- misfortune to experience life in Iraq or Syria or tually had on the war effort, proclaimed that the any number of Middle Eastern States, Cruelty and B-17 had a rendezvous with destiny (page 91). Silence opens a window onto those benighted so- Wells next was asked to become involved in de- cieties. signing the B-29, a high-altitude bomber good

Capt Donald G. Rose, USAF enough to repeatedly bomb Japan. Now a major Hurlburt Field, Florida general, LeMay decided to use a stripped-down version of the B-29 for his incendiary raids over Tokyo and ultimately the missions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Boeing's Ed Wells by Mary Wells Geer. Univer- After the war, Wells began working on jet air- sity of Washington Press, P. O. Box 50096, Se- craft designs for Boeing. Still heavily entwined attle, Washington 98145, 1992, 179 pages, in military aviation, Wells's name again carne to $24.95 the forefront for his work on designing the B-52 long-range heavy bomber. With the engines Who better to write a personal biography of placed on pods outside rather than built into the the aviation engineering legend Edward Wells wing, and with the inclusion of air-to-air refuel- than his sister, Mary Wells Geer? After Wells's ing capabilities, the mighty B-52 began setting death in 1986, Geer received several boxes of his distance and speed records. Turning to civil avia- belongings containing, among other things, let- tion, Boeing and Wells transformed some of these ters, original plane designs, patents, Boeing designs and produced the Boeing 707. But Wells's memoranda, and speeches—in her words, a record ties to military aviation were still strong, and the of seventy years of his life. Using primarily this 707 designs inspired the KC-135 Stratotanker, now very personal archive, Geer has reconstructed her giving LeMay's B-52s unlimited range. Wells's brother's life as she witnessed it. Though much great influence on Boeing's military aviation pro- has been written about the man, Geer shows us jects Ied to his election to Boeing's board of di- the personal side of this National Aviation Hall of rectors at age 40. Wells's mastery of aviation Fame member and why he is considered an avia- design continued to be evidenced throughout the tion engineering genius. cold war, as Boeing designed and fielded the Min- A 1931 Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Stanford's uteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) School of Engineering, Wells began his career at system as well as the first stage of the giant Sat- Boeing not only in the midst of the Depression urn booster and the lunar rover. Wells retired in but also in the early stages of Boeing's ties to 1971 as sênior vice president of Boeing and died military aviation. Wells quickly gained notoriety in 1986 of pancreatic câncer. for designing a retractable landing gear, first used Geer has written what could be called a per- on the Air Corps's P-26 monoplane pursuit sonal portrait of this influential engineer. Her fighter. But Wells is probably best remembered as story of Wells's work at Boeing is interwoven the designer of the workhorse of World War II, with personal glimpses of her brother, their fam- NET ASSESSMENT 75

ily, and WeLls's family. Although providing a As you read the book, you will come to the good personal insight into the man, her work be- conclusion that Major Wells-Petry provides a fac- comes tedious at times with immaterial family tual argument to maintain the exclusion policy trivia. Details such as his wife's wedding dress and to explain why the mission of the US military having princess point lace, Wells's love for his will be in trouble if homosexuals are openly al- Toyota Camry, and meticulous information on lowed in the Services. The book justifies the US neighborhoods and Wells's boats sometimes military's discrimination in its personnel policies cause the reader to wonder whether he is reading because the military has a responsibility to en- about Wells and aviation engineering or a family sure that the force structure of the military is history. However, Geer has also reconstructed, combat-ready to carry out the demands of na- through her brother's association with them, a tional security. She points out that the discrimi- history of Boeing and its influence on military nation is towards groups of people, not aviation. Personalities such as Henry ("Hap") Ar- individuais, because the welfare of the corporate nold, Carl Spaatz, Doolittle, and LeMay pepper body of the military outweighs the needs of any the story of Boeing and Wells laboring to satisfy individual. In support of the personnel policy is the aviation requirements of the Air Corps and the legal principie that no one has a right to mili- the Air Force, thus providing the reader a histori- tary Service, just as no one has the right not to cal insight into military research, development, serve. Major Wells-Petry logically discusses the and procurement. Family trivia notwithstanding, prudent and rational process of how personnel Geer's work is worth reading for this reason. policies are derived and regulated by the Services. There is no doubt that Ed Wells had a tremen- To support her position, Major Wells-Petry ad- dous impact on Air Force history. Geer has writ- dresses both the legal and constitutional claims ten an ardent account of her brother's place in that homosexuals and gay rights activists have that history and the story of one whom his col- used to stake their right to serve in the US mili- leagues called "an incredible man." tary. The two basic positions they use in arguing

C apt P h illip L. O sb o m e, USAF against the exclusion policy are their fundamen- San Antonio, Texas tal rights and their status as a "suspect" class— that is, as a discrete, immutable, and politically powerless minority group that has suffered a history of discrimination. Specifically, Major Wells- Exclusion: Homosexuals and the Right to Serve Petry presents legal findings and rulings of why by Maj Melissa Wells-Petry. Regnery Gateway, the rights of privacy and speech are not violated 1Í30 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. by the Services and why homosexuals can't pass 20036, 1993, 337 pages, $20.00. the legal acid test for being a "suspect" class. The other areas Major Wells-Petry tackles are This book couldn't have been published at a the social theorist positions of occupation versus more opportune time for the American military. profession for military Service and social goals for Maj Melissa Wells-Petry has drafted a nonemo- the military (should the military accommodate tional, concise, logical, and legally under- social changes?). Advocates for changing the ho- standable book on the homosexual issue mosexual-exclusion policy use three models to confronting the American military today. She justify inclusion of homosexuals in the military. has provided every military leader, commander, The author discusses each model by providing the and supervisor with a reference book to better advocates' position and then logically discussing understand and uphold the policies and laws gov- the fallacies of each. erning homosexuals in the military. She uses the To bolster her case that the exclusion policy US Army as the basis for preserving the homosex- should be maintained, Major Wells-Petry ad- ual-exclusion policy for the US military. Al- dresses two key defenses of the exclusion policy. though she writes from the perspective of the US First, she discusses the traditional relationship of Army—having been a judge advocate general offi- the military member and society—specifically, cer involved in many of the Army's legal battles what the civilian population expects from its to uphold the ban—Major Wells-Petry supports military force. The second defense is that policy- the defense of maintaining the exclusion policy makers must be restrained from making snap by noting actual court cases involving homosexu- changes in personnel policy to accommodate per- als against all branches of the military. ceived or actual social changes. The basis of such 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

restraint, according to Major Wells-Petry, is de- marching back and forth. Waves of blood- rived from the constitutional fact that the US stained soldiers surging around village fences, military has constitutional checks and balances splashing over the rocklike peasantry, here one to ensure that it is truly a military of the people. dawn, gone the next, leaving dead bodies and ani- Major Wells-Petry does an excellent job of pre- mal carcasses and empty rice bowls, fading like a senting the positions of homosexual activists and dream only to reappear in the next generation, an legal rebuttals to these positions. The benefits to unpreventable nightmare that would come again any reader are that you come away from this in a long night, unbidden. It was this historical topic more aware of the homosexual-exclusion constant, the oppressive presence of foreigners in policy and are more able to discuss it using fact his country, that provided General Giap with the and logic rather than subjective emotions. motivation at an early age to fight for and help I highly recommend this book as a reference lead his country to independence. to any individual who wants to understand the From humble beginnings as a student agitator ramifications and problems involved with this in Hanoi during the 1920s, Giap grew more and highly emotional social issue from a factual posi- more involved in clandestine nationalist activities. tion. Through his readings of anticolonialist literature,

Maj Thomas A. Torgerson, USAf Giap became acquainted with communist ideology Peterson AFB, Colorado and grew to fervently embrace its precepts. As a founding member of the Vietnam Independence League with Ho Chi Minh in 1941, Giap went on to be a leader in its military component, the Viet- Giap: The Victor in Vietnam by Peter Macdon- minh. He served as minister of the interior in Ho ald. W. W. Norton & Company, 500 Fifth Ave- Chi Minh's govemment during the Japanese occu- nue, New York 10110, 1993, 348 pages, $25.00. pation and assumed leadership of the armed forces as chairman of the Military Council in 1946. Giap As the commander in chief of his nation's led Vietnamese armed efforts to force the French armed forces for 30 years and a decision maker at from his country, which culminated in the defeat the highest leveis of govemment for almost half a of French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The decade, Vo Nguyen Giap eamed a large share of departure of the French after their humiliating the credit for defeating the French and the United defeat brought the United States to South Vietnam States militaries, repelling the 1979 Chinese inva- to prevent countries in Southeast Asia from falling sion of Vietnam, and securing the unification and like dominoes to communism. Giap continued to independence of his nation. So writes British serve as the leader of his nation's armed forces until author and former army officer Peter Macdonald America was forced to withdraw from an engage- in an insightful and historically comprehensive ment described by French general Jacques Philippe biography of one of the most successful and re- LeClerc as "not a fight against an army [but] . .. spected military leaders in history. a fight against a whole nation." Macdonald's book is the first published effort From a military strategist's perspective, Mac- to document the life of General Giap, self-admit- donald's book provides a worthwhile account of tedly a challenging enterprise. The closed nature the military commander in charge of the massive of the Vietnamese regime and society, as well as Vietnamese war effort against France and the the private character of the Vietnamese people, United States that spanned over 30 years. As a made writing an extremely personal biography leader of the Vietnamese "People's War" that was unrealistic. For this reason, Giap: The Victor in implemented according to the principies of Mao Vietnam is as much a detailed record of the Viet- Tse-tung, General Giap faced enormous chal- namese people and their decades of struggle to lenges. He directed the employment of conven- attain independence and unity as it is a portrait tional as well as irregular troops and strove to of General Giap's life. combine their operations for maximum effect The centuries of invasions and occupation of against the enemy. Giap's leadership was cen- Vietnam by the Chinese, the French, the Japanese, tral to Vietnamese military successes, but Mac- the British, and eventually the Americans seem donald's account makes it clear that the will of almost incomprehensible to the Western mind. the Vietnamese people to persist in their fight was As Macdonald eloquently writes, turbulence is the the derisive factor that caused Vietnamese mili- word that encapsulates Vietnam's history. Armies tary shortcomings, like limited command and NET ASSESSMENT TJ

control capabilities, to be minor inconveniences exposing and subsequently correcting in the pref- on the path to total victory. ace this misconception about gender, Miriam Giap: The Victor in Vietnam provides a portrait Cooke and Angela Woollacott skillfully plant the of an undeniably successful and influential mili- seed for questioning other traditional concepts tary leader, as well as an insightful description of associated with gender and war. Indeed, the main his nation's people and their violently tumultu- value of this collection of 13 essays lies in its ous history. Unfortunately, however, the book ability to force readers to rethink traditional leaves the reader with the mistaken impression views of men and women as combatants and ci- that the goals of the North Vietnamese commu- vilians at the front and at home in war and in nists and the leadership of the COSVN (Central peace. Office for South Vietnam) were identical. In A In the introduction, Cooke and Woollacott Vietcong Memoir, one former COSVN official de- whet the reader's appetite by promising essays scribes the betrayal which he and other Vietcong that "confirm and challenge" these traditional leaders felt after the takeover of the South in views and that "examine the dynamic intersec- 1975. They were largely excluded from the newly tions between men's and women's experience of unified govemment of Vietnam, and their ideais war and its articulation in languages and images." of freedom and liberty in an independent Viet- Furthermore, the editors virtually assure readers nam were certainly not advocated by the north- they will find something appealing by providing em communists. This conflict, which took place a potpourri of cross-cultural and multidiscipli- between the northem communists and the nary essays. Readers can select from an assort- COSVN leaders after unification, is overlooked by ment of European, American, Middle Eastern, and Macdonald and does not receive the attention it Latin American models of warriors and their undoubtedly deserves. methods of waging war as portrayed in literature, It is an ironic footnote to his life story that after film, drama, history, psychology, and philosophy. decades of difficult fighting, the deaths of thou- Finally, the editors arrange the essays into sands of human beings, and military "successes," five sections—Presenting the Unpresentable, War the faith that Giap held in communist ideais was Mythopoeia, Home/Front?, Engendering Lan- demonstrably misplaced. Just as the Tet offensive guage, and The Politics of Representation—provid- did not lead to the expected general uprising of the ing readers with a thematic road map for South Vietnamese population in the final stage of exploring the concept of gender and war in words People's War, neither has the post-1975 Vietnamese and images. communist experiment led to a fair, just, and class- Of the 13 essays in Gendering War Talk, two less society—"the possibility of happiness for all deserve special comment. In "Gendered Transla- mankind," in the words of Giap. Macdonald's tions: Claude Lanzmann's Shoah," Marianne biography of Giap is worthwhile reading for any- Hirsch and Leo Spitzer offer an intriguing per- one seeking to better understand the Vietnamese spective about Lanzmann's treatment of gender people, their history of struggle, and the remark- differences among the victims of the Holocaust. able man who helped lead them to independence. In Shoah, Lanzmann focuses on the Nazi death

2d Lt Wesley A. Fryer, USAF machinery, which was "designed ... to degen- México City, México der" Jews as a means of rendering them powerless and ultimately extinguishing them as a people. Hirsch and Spitzer, however, see Lan- zmann taking this "degendering" process one Gendering War Talk edited by Miriam Cooke and step further in his cinematic narration of the Angela Woollacott. Princeton University Press, Holocaust. They argue that in portraying this 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey process of rendering the sexes sexless, Lanzmann 08540, 1993, 325 pages, $49.50. almost completely obliterates women from the screen and thus from the experience. They main- When I picked up Gendering War Talk, I tain that Lanzmann's camera lens validates the thought, "Here's another book about women and existence of "degendered" men by focusing on war." Halfway through the first paragraph of the and capturing their experience on film; but his preface, I realized that I, like many people, had "degendered" women are, at best, only "disem- mistakenly assumed gender meant women when, bodied" voices and fleeting images across the in fact, it refers to both men and women. By screen with nothing to validate their experience— 78 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

and thus their existence. Hirsch and Spitzer's is a major contribution that helps fill the litera- analysis, therefore, implies that Lanzmann's male ture gap on low-intensity conflict. victims Iive to tell the tale because they have Low Intensity Conflict consists of 15 essays by identity outside their sexuality, whereas his fe- military officers, State Department officials, and male victims have no identity without the power academics. The book provides an outline of the of reproduction and therefore no power to give contemporary problems and lays a framework of birth to their own experience on film. analysis in several case studies of low-intensity In "The Threshold of Thrill: Life Stories in the conflict. Most of the authors have the advantage Skies over Southeast Asia," Stanley D. Rosenberg of direct experience in LIC, and the questions compares war stories of American combat pilots asked and conclusions drawn are rooted more in in World War II, Vietnam, and Desert Storm. His practical experience than in abstract theory. basic premise is that these combat pilots used lan- In the introduction, Stephen Sloan discusses guage to construct an identity that enabled them the problem of adapting to the ambiguity of the to cope with "the complex experiences of excite- New World Order. Since the fali of the Soviet ment, self-affirmation, fear, horror, guilt, avoid- Union, the agencies of the US government have ance, and denial during war." In supporting his been engaged in nonstop turf battles over aspects argument, Rosenberg shows how the language of of foreign policy and low-intensity conflict. For combat pilots reflected their fusion with their an- example, which agency will take over the war on thropomorphized aircraft to create an identity of drugs? Is narcoterrorism to be treated as low-in- an indestructible and lethal weapon. He also tensity conflict? To date, there have been no shows how these pilots used metaphors to ob- clear answers to such questions as these. scure and transform the nature of their actions so In their essay "United States Government Or- they could "live with death as if death were not ganization and Capability to Deal with Low-In- real." Rosenberg, however, spends most of his tensity Conflict," Edwin Corr and David Miller time discussing how the brotherhood of combat provide a useful organizational history of the pilots with its fraternal language created a "col- various approaches the US has taken towards low- lective defense" that allowed them to be the In- intensity conflict since World War II. In general, struments of death while ignoring its perils and there has been a reluctance by the US government consequences. He ends his analysis with the sug- to deal with LIC, owing to what the authors call gestion that surviving pilots continue to pursue the "World War II Syndrome"—the political and death and destruction in order to feel alive while emotional need to end a conflict with the uncon- simultaneously repressing the guilt and shame as- ditional surrender of the enemy on the deck of sociated with those acts long after the war guns the USS Missouri. Low-intensity conflicts rarely are silenced. end that way. They slowly peter out, such as in El The remaining articles range in quality from Salvador, or become dormant, as in the Philip- obscure to obvious in their criticai analyses and pines. Because low-intensity conflicts have such conclusions. But each adds something to the an ambiguous nature, organizing a US response body of knowledge in this new field of academic and assigning responsibility are major problems. inquiry and is worth reading. This book will not be popular with the Clinton administration because it argues that only the De- Lt Col N ancy Linzy, USAF Maxwell AFB, Alabama fense Department has the true capability for man- aging and maintaining low-intensity conflict programs. As such, the book is an argument for higher Department of Defense funding in this Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New area. Low Intensity Conflict contains several useful World edited by Edwin G. Corr and Stephen LIC case studies, especially that of David Palmer Sloan. Westview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, on Peru's Shining Path, Edwin Corr's on El Salva- Boulder, Colorado 80301, 1992, 317 pages, dor, and Caesar Sereseres's on Guatemala. The $18.85. first three-quarters of the book is a superior con- Of all the major aspects of conflict, low-inten- tribution to the field. The final part, however, sity conflict (LIC) has received the least attention contains a disappointing essay by Adm William and scholarly analysis during the last decade. Crowe on "The Implications of Low Intensity Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World Conflict for United States Policy and Strategy" NET ASSESSMENT 79

that is dearly the weakest essay in the book. ant, including size, power plant, weight, fuel load Crowe's essay lacks substance and reads Iike an and range, speed, and performance statistics. The address intended for the locai Rotary Club weekly ordnance section is also interesting and includes luncheon. With all the military experts who details on all known weapons in the inventory, could have provided some serious analysis on including some details on the conventional- LIC, the editors have chosen one who seems un- armed cruise missile launched by B-52Gs at the wilíing to say anything of consequence. start of Desert Storm. Overall, the book is well With the exception of the Crowe essay, Low done, packed with detail, and is an excellent ad- Intensity Conflict is a useful book that should be dition to any library that needs a good reference read by military officers. The editing and organi- work. zation are well done, and the writing style is clear The Gulf Air War Debrief, a slightly misleading and direct. I recommend it highly as one of the title, is not only pilot and crew interviews but few good books available on low-intensity con- also a day-by-day brief outline of the events of flict. the air campaign. The volume is divided into Dr James S. Co rum seven major components in chronological order Maxwell AFB, Alabama beginning with the invasion and the deployment, the initial air strikes, the concentration in late January and early February in the south, preparation of the battlefield, and then the ground war. Gulf Air War Debrief edited by Stan Morse. AIR- This is all rounded out with a brief group of ap- time Publishing Inc., 10 Bay Street, Westport, pendices detailing such information as the air or- Connecticut 06880, 1991, 232 pages, $24.95. der of battle, the aircraft, ordnance, and each of U.S. .Air Force Air Power Directory: World Air the "shoot-downs" and coalition aircraft losses. Power edited by David Donald and Jon Lake. The best part of the volume is the "debrief" in AIRtime Publisfüng Inc., 10 Bay Street, West- which selected members of the various coalition port, Connecticut 06880, 1992, 232 pages, air forces tell of such incidents as the first "kill" of the war, landing C-130s on desert roads, $29.95. flying from Incirlik, Turkey, in Operation Proven Published by the London-based World Air Force, performing tactical recon and helicopter Power Journal, these two glossy, coffee-table operations, and sitting in the gunner's seat in an books were an interesting "read." The US Ai r Apache in the ground war phase. It is the air- Force Air Power Directory is well organized into crew's story that makes this an interesting vol- eight sections covering US Air Force organization ume. Adding to the volume are several sections and deployment, war-fighting roles, aircraft (this exploring such things as laser-guided weapons is the main, and longest, section), ordnance, and how they are used, electrooptical weapons, bases, units, order of battle, and glossary. Amply defense-suppression missions, the airbome warn- illustrated with glossy color photographs and line ing and control system (AWACS), RC-135 Rivet drawings throughout, the book is well put to- Joint, and EC-130 Compass Call. Filled with gether and overall is fairly accurate. Most of its more detail than would be expected from a cof- inaccuracies come in the unit section, where the fee-table book, Gulf Air War Debrief is a fascinat- recent sweeping changes have outpaced just ing read and perhaps the first to really tell the air about anything in print. For example, it shows war "as it was" from the aircrew's viewpoint. the 28th Wing at Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota, as Maj M. J. Petersen, USAF still having the 4th Airbome Command and Con- Maxwell AFB, Alabama trol Squadron (ACCS), when the unit was effectively closed in 1992. Perhaps the most interesting section is that of the aircraft. It is well A Woman at War: Storming Kuwait with the illustrated wdth both color photographs and U.S. Marines by Molly Moore. Charles Scrib- either black-and-white or color line drawings of ner's Sons, 866 Third Avenue, New York 10022, each of the aircraft currently (1991) in the inven- 1993, 336 pages, $22.50. tory. Each aircraft has a brief history of its development and employment, a review of armament, During the 100-hour ground war with Iraq roles it is assigned to, current variants and serial that capped off Operation Desert Storm, atten- numbers, and finally, specifications of each vari- tion focused on the "left hook" in the western 80 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

section of the combat theater, where the US Army Marine tank platoon commander, at intervals spearheaded the surprise drive that won the war. throughout the action. Her close-up look at the life Far less has been written about the US Marines in of this company grade officer in combat is de- the east who breached Iraqi defenses, stormed oc- scribed with a keen eye for detail. The dialogue cupied Kuwait, and liberated Kuwait City. crackles. The burden of responsibility weighing Molly Moore has put right this long-standing down on this Marine officer is apparent without omission. Moore, the Washington Post's Pentagon being overstated. Moore sees the captain as correspondent for five years ieading up to the "jugg[ling] three roles . . . part military com- Persian Gulf War, accompanied Lt Gen Walter mander, part social worker, and part father to the Boomer's fast-moving command post—a few men of his platoon." vehicles, "down and dirty" on the battlefield— Though she deserves credit for writing in plain during the hours when Boomer's Marine expedi- English, with a minimum of jargon and acronyms, tionary force took on a numerically superior Moore runs repeatedly into other problems. She Iraqi army. After several other journalists passed confesses that she had never heard of air campaign up the opportunity, Moore became one of the commander Lt Gen Charles Horner before the war, few reporters and the only woman ever to go into even though Horner commanded Ninth Air Force battle with a ranking American field commander. and was well known in his Service. A Pentagon A Woman at War is meant, in part, to com- repórter should be less awkward with military pensate for Moore's inability to file timely dis- terms than Moore is. She repeatedly uses an espe- patches with the Post, thanks to rapid movement cially irritating construction of the media, fighter and Communications glitches. There is little of jet, when she means jet fighter. Female airmen the "big picture" here. Instead of grand strategy, become airwomen. Navy squadron VF-143, known Moore provides glimpses into personalities, in- as the Pukin Dogs, becomes the Puking Dogs, while cluding an abrasive side to Gen H. Norman a Learjet is called a C-12 (it's actually a C-21). Schwarzkopf that at times strains his conversa- Moore also tells us (page 146) how she learned the tions with Boomer. plan for the ground war hours in advance and gave Despite its title, more than half of Moore's it away over an open telephone to her editors! volume deals with Operation Desert Shield and In a world where many are at work to end with the five-week air war that preceded ground discrimination on the basis of sex, Moore had an fighting. Moore went with Defense Secretary opportunity with this book to move our world a Dick Cheney for his August 1990 call on King giant step closer to being gender blind. All she had Fahd and "jumped ship," remaining in Saudi to do was entitle this book A C o r r es p o n d en t a t War. Arabia throughout the buildup and conflict. She Instead, Moore seems to be in search, repeatedly offers numerous insights into the practical diffi- throughout the text, not of equality but of special culties of working with the Pentagon's pool Sys- favor due to her gender. Though her report of tem; the desire of virtually every newspaper and General Boomer's ground war is welcome and over- broadcast station to have its own repórter on due, this reviewer thought more of Moore before the scene resulted in crowding, pressure on able- reading this book than after. but-hard-pressed public affairs officers, and silly Robert F. Dorr behavior by inexperienced amateurs not accus- Oakton, Virgínia tomed to covering military affairs. Female reporters immersed in rigid Saudi culture faced added difficulties: to get around a local rule against a woman staying in a hotel unescorted, Moore and others had to carry an authorization Warthog: Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War by from the American Embassy that became known William L. Smallwood. Brassey's (US), 8000 as the I-Am-Not-a-Whore letter. Westpark Drive, McLean, Virgínia 22102, 1993, Many, but not all, of the Iraqis who swarmed 241 pages, $23.00. around Boomer and Moore at night on the desert were bent on surrendering rather than fighting, as William Smallwood spent the summer of 1991 it turned out. No one could have predicted this, interviewing 143 of the pilots from the A-10 but it does make Moore's tale somewhat anti- squadrons who deployed for Desert Shield and climactic. The repórter compensates by taking us then flew into history during Desert Storm. into the world of Capt William F. Delaney, a young More than just a dry recitation of facts, Warthog NET ASSESSMENT 81

takes the reader into the cockpit of the A-10 cessful attempts to ship steaks packed in dry ice, through the eyes and minds of the piiots who and the "sanitary kits" sent by sympathetic wives. flew it day and night into the skies over Kuwait Really more than just a story of the A-10, this and Iraq. Within just a few pages, it becomes book becomes a tribute to the flexibility of air obvious that the author became emotionally in- power. The Warthogs began the war flying mis- volved with his story, which adds to the book's sions they had never planned on—battlefield air appeal rather than detracting from it. interdiction, search and rescue escort, Scud hunt- More than just a story of a war, it's the story of ing, and shooting up ground control intercept an airplane literally built around a two-ton, (GC1) sites. Improvising tactics such as dive- 20-foot-long, 30-mm Gatling gun. The Warthog bombing Iraqi tanks at night like their Luftwaffe was specifically designed to attack Soviet tanks counterparts did during World War II, the A-10 on the plains of Central Europe. Once accused by and its piiots proved themselves over and over the CBS program "Sixty Minutes" of being "a again. This is an excellent book—well worth read- near-useless airplane, unwanted by the Air Force, ing by everyone. You get a real glimpse into what and the pork-barrel project of self-serving politi- it's like to plan, prepare, wait, and then go to war cians protecting lucrative defense contracts in in a very personal way. their districts," it proved itself beyond a shadow Maj M. J. Petersen, USAF of a doubt not only in its tank-killing role, but Maxwell AFB, Alabama also in roles it was never designed for. By the end of the war, the A-10 and its piiots had convinced even its most sênior unbelievers. For example, Lt Gen Charles Homer, Air Force commander in Op- Working Scared: Achieving Success in Trying eration Desert Storm, says, "I take back all the bad Times by Kenneth N. Wexley and Stanley B. things l've ever said about the A-10. 1 love them." Silverman. Jossey-Bass Inc., 350 Sansome Beginning with the terror of flying a com- Street, San Francisco, Califórnia 94104, 1993, pletely manually operated airplane across the 176 pages, $24.95. Atlantic at night, in formation, through thunder- storms, A-10 piiots had to plug into tanker refuel- With today's trend in both the public and pri- ing booms more times in this one flight than vate sector toward total quality, the title of this they had in the past two years. Smallwood then book seems to capture the feeling of most work- briefly traces the A-10's development before he ers. Working Scared describes what many workers retums to the real story and the initial deploy- are experiencing in a time of dramatic change ment into Saudi Arabia. The book offers insight and uncertainty in the business world. Wexley into the tactical perspective of preparing for the and Silverman use an innovative approach to help war. Early on, the squadrons discovered their tac- the reader cope with this new business philoso- tics would have to change, and here Smallwood phy and paradigm called total quality manage- does the reader a real favor by carefully describ- merit. ing the thoughts of the piiots and their com- Wexley and Silverman cover eight major areas manders as they threw out the tactics book and of organizational change caused by the turbulent started from scratch. Here's the development of times workers face today. The first change, less the "Night Hogs"-and the discovery that the supervision, occurs as organizations cut back on Maverick missile could be used as a very rudimen- the number of managers and supervisors, result- tary forward-looking, infrared radar (FLIR) night ing in the remaining managers having more em- vision device, the "Recce Hog," the "Observation ployees report to them and not being able to give Hog," and the "Fighter Hog." By the end of the them as much time. The next change is teani war, the piiots believed their Warthogs could do culture, which means that nowadays employees of anything. all kind—factory workers, Service people, techni- In addition to the flying and fighting, there is cians, supervisors, and managers—are expected to humor. There are the stories of the successful work in a team environment. The authors argue and unsuccessful attempts to circumvent the that many find it difficult to function as an effec- alcohol-free environment they found themselves tive team player at work. The next area, focus on in, the hundreds of cases of Macadamia Nut quality, is much like a total quality management Crunch shipped by a sympathetic company from (or Quality Air Force as we coin the term) primer. the States after a friend went pleading, the suc- This chapter explains what total quality is all 82 A1RP0WER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

about and presents a who's who of the quality excellent book for employee and manager alike, movement gurus such as Deming, Crosby, Feigen- and I recommend it for anyone feeling even a baum, Ishikawa, Juran, and others. It provides an little bit uneasy working in trying times. excellent review of total quality concepts, tools, and quality awards. Next, Wexley and Silverman M aj Eugene D. Barr, USAF discuss downsizing, which is characterized by lay- Kelly AFB, Texas offs, cutbacks, retrenchment, reductions in force (very applicable to today's military force), and so forth. Our economy has caused many organizations to conclude that they must get "lean and Future Wars: The World's Most Dangerous mean" if they are to survive. After all, most of Flashpoints by Col Trevor N. Dupuy, US Army, these organizations are responsible to their stock- Retired. Warner Books, Inc., 1271 Avenue of holders, who emphasize profits. So, large num- the Américas, New York 10020, 1993, 334 bers of American workers are working scared, pages, $21.95. fearing that they might be the next to go. Prior- service captains and majors, along with many Many recent books that describe future wars colonels and lieutenant colonels, know that feel- have delved into the apocalyptic scenario of ing. Following this, the authors talk about mergers World War III. Since the collapse of the Iron Cur- and acquisitions—when two companies combine tain and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, or one company gobbles up another. These forces many people have dreamed of a world free of of business affect every single person within the armed conflict. Many have forgotten the hard organization. Next comes an increasingly diverse lessons taught by history. work force and Wexley and Silverman's contention The potential for major regional conflicts that the American work force is steadily becom- dominates the current international environment. ing more and more diverse. For many American For example, current tinderboxes include many employees, working collaboratively with others States of the former Soviet empire (e.g., Rússia, who are culturally different can be scary. The Moldavia, Armênia, Geórgia, and Ukraine), as authors also expand on this theme with the Inter- well as countries on nearly every continent (e.g., national environment. They maintain that some Rumania, the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Paki- workers consider an international assignment ex- stan, índia, North Korea, Peru, Nicaragua, Angola, citing but many see it as scary, especially if it Sudan, and Iraq). Ethnic and religious violence as means uprooting their family for several years. well as economic and ideological power struggles Coping in a foreign country is stressful, and re- are the norm in history. The "traditional" dis- turning home is not always an easy adjustment. putes "on hold" during the cold war are now re- The authors conclude with innovative pay strate- surfacing with a vengeance. gies. They assert that in the years ahead, employ- It is this environment that Colonel Dupuy, the ees will experience changes in the way they are prolific military historian and writer, describes in remunerated. Regular paychecks based on straight this, his latest book. In it he succinctly presents salaries or number of hours worked or number of 10 scenarios for armed conflict that could de- units produced are becoming a thing of the past. velop by 1996. (Interestingly enough, in only For each of those eight dimensions presented two cases does US military power play an active above, the authors begin by explaining the envi- role.) The scenarios are narrated as if the author ronment or situation that is making the employee were discussing events that recently transpired. uneasy. They then present an anecdote about a In each case, Dupuy works from current events real person (Pat, Mike, Lois, Terry, etc.) and how (as recent as early 1991) and extrapolates a situ- he or she is affected by one of these particular ation that could lead to war. Every scenario is challenges. Following this lead-in, the authors plausible and hauntingly realistic in light of cur- present what I think is the most important part of rent events. the book—strategies for both the worker and man- In his introduction, Dupuy thanks the people ager to cope with the challenge, thus reducing who helped him and disavows any ability to fore- their anxiety and fear. The book is well organ- tell the future. This disclaimer illustrates his ized and provides a very helpful how-to approach implied belief that anyone aware of current inter- in coping with those eight dimensions that are national news will easily recognize the potential causing many employees to work scared. It is an for armed conflict on a wider scale around the NETASSESSMENT 83

world. (Clairvoyance aside, some of the scenarios reaction; and every other item that is usually raised by Dupuy are still unfolding today.) taught in our various professional military However, two points arise to detract from this courses that touches on the operational art of war. otherwise pleasurable reading. The first drawback In the case of the US military involvement, he is that Dupuy does not adequately explain why he discusses the importance of forward presence, chose the book's particular 10 scenarios out of strategic lift, and prepositioned equipment. In the more than 20 he considered for inclusion. every case, all the points we seek to see raised in What were these other scenarios? Why were they the staff's estimate of the situation are covered. discarded in favor of the ones he chose? The lack Two items stand out: the pivotal role that air of explanation detracts from the reader's ability power plays in each of the conflicts (Dupuy obvi- to fathom why one scenario was considered a bet- ously believes that air power can be decisive and ter candidate than another for inclusion in the that air superiority is a prerequisite to victory) book. The second drawback, also minor, is the and the necessity of conflict-termination plan- lack of a clear point (or date) to mark where Du- ning. The second is of particular interest to all of puy departs from factual reporting and starts his us since it is a very timely topic in the Service extrapolation from "current" historical events. schools. Woven into each scenario is a discussion (We only know that the introduction was penned of the belligerents' termination goals, or of the in August 1991.) While this is a tribute to Du- lack of clear and achievable goals on the part of puy^ dever writing, it prevents the reader from one or more of them, before and during the hos- gauging the extent of Dupuy's "clairvoyance." tilities. The use of military force to coerce or In any case, the fast-paced text which quickly drive a "favorable" solution is always fraught involves the reader in the Sixth Arab-Israeli War, with danger, especially if the other side is willing the Fourth India-Pakistan War, the Second Civil to fight for its survival with no holds barred, in- War in Rússia, the Second War for África [Angola cluding the playing of the nuclear card. In almost versus South África], the Third Gulf War, the Sec- every case, at least one belligerent errs, inaccu- ond Korean War, the Second Sandinista War, the rately analyzing how neutrals and potential allies War for Transylvania [Hungary versus Rumania], of the enemy would react. In every case, the ag- Egypt's War with Libya and Sudan, and the Sino- gressor fails to correctly calculate costs in terms Russian conflict. Each scenario includes a page or of personnel, equipment, and international sup- two of the results of the Tactical Numerical De- port. terministic Model that Dupuy used to analyze In summation, Dupuy's book is an engrossing some of the pivotal battles. In every case, the compendium full of pertinent and concrete ex- background for war is succinctly set with a discus- amples of operational warfare. The discussion of sion of the politico-military context. Then Du- the diplomatic backdrop before, during, and after puy concisely outlines the operational planning each conflict helps to highlight the importance of both sides before he describes the campaign of clear and achievable political goals in war. that follows. In his discussions of the plans and Anyone who deals with deliberate or crisis action the actual operations, Dupuy stays at the strategic planning should read this book. Anyone who be- and operational leveis. He includes the key as- lieves that the current world is kinder and gentler sumptions; the force ratios; quality of equip- must read this book. ment, troops, and leadership; the governing Lt Col Ricardo G. Cuadros, USAF factors; the enemy's likely courses of action or Norfolk, Virgínia AIRPOWER JOURNAL Volume V III

AUTHOR INDEX

Aldrich, Maj Richard W., and Maj Norman K. Thom pson. H artzer, Dr Ronald B. "V alidating Air Force Civil Engi- "Verifying Chem ical and Biological W eapons Trea- neering C om bat Support D octrine in the G ulf W ar," ties: Is the C onstitu tion a Stum bling Block?" SE no. 2 (Summer 1994): 62-71. (Special Edition 1994): 11-27. H unter, M aj Roger C. "D isabling System s and the Air Baker, Dr Bud. "O n the Importance of Image: Some Force," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 43^ 7. Lessons from the B-52, Curtis E. LeM ay, and P. D. Jen sen , C ol O w en E. "In fo rm atio n W arfare: P rincipies o f Eldred," no. 2 (Summer 1994): 55-61. Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. B arco, C ap t C h arles T. "V alu in g Leadership in an Era o f Kearney, Col Thomas M. "Changes: Faces and Focus" Prophets, Politicians, and Pugilists," no. 3 (Fali 1994): (editorial), no. 4 (W inter 1994): 2. 4-13. Kent, Lt Col Jim . "Canaries, Minnow s, and Arms Control: B aum , Lt C ol M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The Biom onitoring for Verification and Com pliance," SE W eaponizationofSpace," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 52-62. (Special Edition 1994): 28-40. Becker, Lt M iriam D. "Strategic Culture and Ballistic Larsen, Lt Col Jeffrey A. "USAF Institute for National M issile Defense: Rússia and the United States," SE Security Studies (IN SS)" (editorial), SE (Special Edi- (Special Edition 1994): 57-68. tion 1994): 3. C asebeer, ls t Lt W illiam D ., C ol R ichard Szafranski, and Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problem s Associated Dr Jam es H. T on er. "M ilitary E th ics," no. 4 (W inter w ith B attlefield Prep aration in D esert Sto rm ," no. 1 1994): 15-25. (Spring 1994): 4-21. C lark, Lt Col Richard B. "T rilevel Th in kin g" (editorial), M ann, Col Edward. "D esert Storm : The First Inform a- no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 2. tion W ar?" no. 4 (W inter 1994): 4-14. ______. "W hy a Special Edition? Or, What Have They McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. “Drohende Gefahr West: The Done to APJ?" (ed itorial), SE (Special Edition Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Summer 1994): 1994): 2. 4-17. Coulom be, Lt Col Stephen A. "The Airborne Laser: Pie in M urphy, Lt C ol T im o th y G. "A C ritiqu e o f The Air Cam- the Sky or Vision of Future Theater M issile Defense?" paign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. no. 3 (Fali 1994): 58-68. N icholls, M aj David, and Maj Todor D. Tagarev. "W hat D h illon , M aj Jogind er, Lt Col C harles Shotw ell, and Capt Does Chãos Theory M ean for W arfare?" no. .3 (Fali D eborah C. Pollard. "B allistic M issile D efense for the 1994): 48-57. Tw enty-first Century: At the Crossroads of Global 0'Connell, Capt Edward P., and 2d Lt John T. Dillaplain. Security," SE (Special Edition 1994): 42-56. "N onlethal Concepts: Im plications for Air Force In- D illaplain, 2d Lt Jo h n T., and C apt Edw ard P. 0 'C o n n e ll. telligence," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 26-33. "N onlethal Concepts: Im plications for Air Force In- 0'Leary, Maj Jeffrey. "Surprise and Intelligence: To- telligence," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 26-33. wards a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Erwin, Lt Col Douglas. "The United States and Nuclear 34-50. W eapons in Europe," SE (Special Edition 1994): Parsons, Capt David W. "British Air Control: A M odel 69-88. for th e A pplication o f Air Pow er in Low -Intensity Fayne, M aj Gwendolyn D. "Becom ing a Citizen-Soldier: Conflict?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 28-39. A Perspective on C ou ntry" (editorial), no. 3 (Fali Pollard, Capt Deborah C., Lt Col Charles Shotwell, and 1994): 2-3. M aj Jo gin d er D hillon. "B allistic M issile D efense for ______. "W h a t Does lt Matter Anym ore? A Perspective the Tw enty-first C entury: At the C rossroads o f G lobal on H onor" (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 1994): 2. Security," SE (Special Edition 1994): 42-56. Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating Roberts, Chaplain, Lt Col Alexander B. "Core Values in the Past. . . Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. a Q u ality Air Force: T h e Leadership C h allen g e," no. G lock, Capt John R. "The Evolution of Air Force Target- 2 (Sum m er 1994): 41-53. ing," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 14-28. Sch n eid er, M aj D avid W . "H eavy Bom bers H olding the Graffis, Capt Judy M. "StTategic: Use with Care," SE Line," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 45-52. (Special Edition 1994): 4-10. Shotw ell, Lt Col Charles, M aj Joginder Dhillon, and Capt G riffith, Lt Col Thom as E., Jr. "Air Pressure: Strategy for D eborah C. Pollard. "B allistic M issile D efense for the the New W orld Order?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): Tw enty-first Century: At the Crossroads of Global 18-26. Security," SE (Special Edition 1994): 42-56.

84 INDEX 85

Szafranski, Col Richard, Dr Jam es H. Toner, and lst Lt tíes: ls the C onstitution a Stum bling B lock?" SE (Spe- W illiam D. C asebeer. "M ilitary E th ics," no. 4 (W inter cial Edition 1994): 11-27. 1994): 15-25. Toner, Dr Jam es H., Col Richard Szafranski, and lst Lt T agarev, M aj T o d o r D ., and M aj D avid N ich o lls. "W h a t W illiam D. C asebeer. "M ilitary E th ics," no. 4 (W in ter Does Chãos Theory M ean for W arfare?" no. 3 (Fali 1994): 15-25. 1994): 48-57. W addell, C ol D onald E., III. "A Situ ation al Leadership Thom pson, Maj Norm an K., and M aj Richard W . Aldrich. Model for Military Leaders," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 29-42. "Verifying Chem ical and Biological W eapons Trea-

TITLE INDEX

"A irbom e Laser, The: Pie in the Sky or Vision of Future "JFACC Problem s Associated w ith Battlefield Preparation Theater M issile Defense?" Lt Col Stephen A. Cou- in Desert Storm ," Col Richard B. H. Lewis, no. 1 lombe, no. 3 (Fali 1994): 58-68. (Spring 1994): 4-21. "A ir Pressure: Strategy for the New W orld O rder?" Lt Col "M ilitary E th ics," ls t Lt W illiam D. C asebeer, C ol R ich - Thomas E. Griffith, Jr., no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 18-26. ard Szafranski, and Dr Jam es H. T oner, no. 4 (W inter "B allistic M issile D efense for the Tw enty-first Century: 1994): 15-25. At the Crossroads of Global Security," Lt Col Charles "N on leth al C oncepts: Im p lication s for Air Force Intelli- Shotwell, M aj Joginder D hillon, and Capt Deborah C. gence," Capt Edward P. 0'Connell and 2d Lt John T. Pollard, SE (SpecialEdition 1994): 42-56. Dillaplain, no. 4 (W inter 1994): 26-33. "B eco m in g a C itizen-Soldier: A Perspective o n C ou ntry" "O n the Im portance of Image: Som e Lessons frorn the (ed ito ria l), M aj G w en d o ly n D . Fayne, n o . 3 (Fali B-52, Curtis E. LeMay, and P. D. Eldred," Dr Bud 1994): 2-3. Baker, no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 55-61. "B ritish Air C on trol: A M odel for the A pplication o f Air "Situational Leadership M odel for M ilitary Leaders, A," Power in Low-Intensity Conflict?" Capt David W. Col Donald E. Waddell III, no. 3 (Fali 1994): 29^ 2. Parsons, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 28-39. "Strategic Culture and Ballistic M issile Defense: Rússia "Changes: Faces and Focus" (editorial), Col Thomas M. and the United States," Lt M íriam D. Becker, SE Keamey, no. 4 (W inter 1994): 2. (Special Edition 1994): 57-68. "Canaries, Minnows, and Arms Control: Biom onitoring "Strategic: Use with Care," Capt Judy M. Graffis, SE for Verihcation and Com pliance," Lt Col Jim Kent, (Special Edition 1994): 4-10. SE (Special Edition 1994): 28-40. "Surprise and Intelligence: Towards a Clearer Under- "C lose Air Support: Repeating the P ast. . Again?" Capt standing," Maj Jeffrey 0'Leary, no. 1 (Spring 1994): Scott A. Fedorchak, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. 34-50. "C o re V alues in a Q u ality Air Force: The Leadership "Trilevel Thinking" (editorial), Lt Col Richard B. Clark, C h allen g e," C h aplain, Lt Col A lexander B. Roberts, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 2. no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 41-53. "U nited States and N uclear W eapons in Europe, T he," Lt "C ritique of The Air Campaign, A," Lt Col Tim oth y G. Col Douglas Erwin, SE (Special Edition 1994): 69-89. Murphy, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. "USAF Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)" "Defiling the Altar: The W eaponizationofSpace," LtCol (ed itorial), Lt Col Jeffrey A. Larsen, SE (Sp ecial E dition M ichael E. Baum, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 52-62. 1994): 3. "D esert Storm : The First Inform ation W ar?" Col Edward "Validating Air Force Civil Engineering Com bat Support Mann, no. 4 (W inter 1994): 4-14. D octrine in the G ulf W ar," Dr Ronald B. Hartzer, no. "D isablín g System s and the Air Force," M aj Roger C. 2 (Summer 1994): 62-71. Hunter, no. 3 (Fali 1994): 43^17. "V aluing Leadership in an Era of Prophets, Politicians, “Drohende Gefahr West: The Pre-Normandy Air Cam- and Pugilists," Capt Charles T. Barco, no. 3 (Fali paign," Lt Col Maris M cCrabb, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 1994): 4-13. 4-17. "Verifying Chem ical and Biological W eapons Treaties: Is "Evolution of Air Force Targeting, T he," Capt John R. the C onstitution a Stu m bling B lock?" M aj Richard Glock, no. 3 (Fali 1994): 14-28. W. Aldrich and Maj Norman K. Thompson, SE (Spe- "H eavy Bom bers Holding the Line," M aj David W . cial Edition 1994): 11-27. Schneider, no. 4 (W inter 1994): 45-52. "What Does Chãos Theory Mean for Warfare?" Maj "Inform ation W arfare: Principies of Third-W ave W ar," David Nicholls and Maj Todor D. Tagarev, no. 3 (Fali Col Owen E. Jensen, no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. 1994): 48-57. 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

W hat Does It M atter Anym ore? A Perspective on AP/?" (editorial), Lt Col Richard B. Clark, SE (Special Honor" (editorial), Maj Gwendolyn D. Fayne, no. 1 Edition 1994): 2. (Spring 1994): 2. W hy a Special Edition? Or, W hat Have They Done to

SUBjECT INDEX

Air Base Survivability Murphy, Lt Col Timothy G. "A Critique of The Air Cam- Hartzer, Dr Ronald B. "Validating Air Force Civil Engi- paign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. neering Com bat Support Doctrine in the Gulf W ar," 0'Leary, M aj Jeffrey. "Surprise and Intelligence: To- no. 2 (Summer 1994): 62-71. wards a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 34-50. Aircraft Parsons, Capt David W . "British Air Control: A Model Baker, Dr Bud. "O n the Im portance of Image: Som e for th e A p plication o f Air Pow er in Low -Intensity Lessons from the B-52, Curtis E. LeM ay, and P. D. Conflict?" no. 2 (Summer 1994): 28-39. Eldred," no. 2 (Summer 1994): 55-61. Schneider, Maj David W. "Heavy Bom bers Holding the Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating Line," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 45-52. the P ast. .. Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. G riffith, Lt Col Thom as E., Jr. "Air Pressure: Strategy for Air Power History the New W orld Order?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 18-26. Baker, Dr Bud. "O n the Im portance of Image: Som e McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The Lessons from the B-52, Curtis E. LeMay, and P. D. Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): Eldred," no. 2 (Summer 1994): 55-61. 4-17. Baum , Lt C ol M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The Air Defense W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 52-62. Baum , Lt C ol M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): the Past... Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. 52-62. Glock, Capt John R. “The Evolution of Air Force Target- Air Force Organization ing," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 14-28.

Baum , Lt Col M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The G riffith, Lt Col Thom as E., Jr. "Air Pressure: Strategy for W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): the New W orld Order?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 18-26. 52-62. McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): Air Power 4-17. Coulom be, Lt Col Stephen A. "The Airborne Laser: Pie M urphy, Lt C ol T im o th y G. "A C ritiqu e o f The Air Cam- in the Sky or V ision o f Future Theater M issile D e- paign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. fense?" no. 3 (Fali 1994): 58-68. 0'L eary , M aj Jeffrey. "Surprise and Intelligence: To- Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating wards a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): the Past... Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. 34-50. Glock, Capt John R. "The Evolution of Air Force Target- Parsons, Capt David W . "British Air Control: A Model ing," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 14-28. for the Application of Air Power in Low-Intensity G riffith, Lt Col Thom as E., Jr. "A ir Pressure: Strategy for Conflict?" no. 2 (Summer 1994): 28-39. the New W orld Order?" no. 2 (Summer 1994): 18-26. H artzer, Dr Ronald B. "V alid ating Air Force Civil Engi- Air Superiority n eerin g C o m b at Su p p ort D octrin e in the G u lf W ar," Baum , Lt C ol M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 62-71. W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Jensen, Col Owen E. "Inform ation W arfare: Principies of 52-62. Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFA CC Problem s Associated the Past... Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. w ith B attlefield Prep aration in D esert Sto rm ," no. 1 G riffith, Lt Col Thom as E .,Jr. "A ir Pressure: Strategy for (Spring 1994): 4-21. the New W orld Order?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 18-26. McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problems Associated Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): with Battlefield Preparation in Desert Storm ," no. 1 4-17. (Spring 1994): 4-21. INDEX 87

McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The Budget/Planning Process Pre-Norraandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Summer 1994): Baum , Lt C ol M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The 4-17. W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): M urphy, Lt Col Tim othy G. "A Critique of The Air Cam- 52-62. paign, 'n o . 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. 0'Leary, Maj Jeffrey. "Surprise and Intelligence: To- Clausewitz wards a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): B arco, C ap t C harles T. "V alu in g L ead ership in an Era of 34-50. Prophets, Politicians, and Pugilists," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 4-13. A rrro C on trol C asebeer, ls t Lt W illiam D ., C ol R ichard Szafranski, and Aldrich, M aj Richard W „ and M aj N orm an K. Thom pson. D r Jam es H. Toner. "M ilitary E th ics," no. 4 (W inter "Verifying Chem ical and Biological W eapons Trea- 1994): 15-25. ties: Is the C onstitution a Stum bling B lock?" SE (Spe- Graffis, Capt Judy M. "Strategic: Use with Care," SE dal Edition 1994): 11-27. (Special Edition 1994): 4-10. Baum , Lt C ol M ichael E. "D efiling the Altar: The Jensen, Col Ow en E. "Inform ation W arfare: Principies of W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. 52-62. Murphy, Lt Col Timothy G. "A Critique of The Air Cam- Graffis, Capt Judy M. "Strategic: Use with Care," SE paign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. (Special Edition 1994): 4-10. 0'Leary, Maj Jeffrey. "Surprise and Intelligence: To- wards a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Kent, LtC olJim . "Canaries, M innows, and Arms Control: 34-50. B iom onitoring for V erification and C om p liance," SE (Special Edition 1994): 28-40. Close Air Support

Aviation Technology Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating the Past.. . Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. (See also Computer Technology, M ilitary Technology, M urphy, Lt Col Tim othy G. "A Critique of The Air Cam- Space Technology, Technology) paign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. Baum , Lt C ol M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Cold W ar 52-62. Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating the Past.. . Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. the Past. . . Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. Parsons, Capt David W . "British Air C ontrol: A M odel Jensen, Col O w en E. "Inform ation W arfare: Principies for the A p plication o f Air Pow er in L ow -Intensity of Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35^43. Conflict?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 28-39. 0'Leary, Maj Jeffrey. "Surprise and Intelligence: To- wards a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Command and Control

34-50. Jensen, Col Ow en E. "Inform ation W arfare: Principies of Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. B allistic M issile D efense Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problem s Associated Becker, Lt M iriam D. "Strategic Culture and Ballistic with Battleíield Preparation in Desert Storm ," no. 1 M issile Defense: Rússia and the United States," SE (Spring 1994): 4-21. (Special Edition 1994): 57-68. M ann, Col Edward. "D esert Storm : The First Inform a- Baum , Lt Col M ichael E. "D efiling the Altar: The tion W ar?" no. 4 (W inter 1994): 4-14. W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The 52-62. Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): Coulom be, Lt Col Stephen A. "The Airborne Laser: Pie 4-17. in the Sky or Vision of Future Theater M issile De- M urphy, Lt C ol T im o th y G. "A C ritiqu e o f The Air Cam- fense?" no. 3 (Fali 1994): 58-68. paign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. Shotwell, Lt Col Charles, Maj Joginder Dhillon, and Capt D eborah C. Pollard. "B allistic M issile D efense for the Computer Technology Twenty-first Century. At the Crossroads of Global (See also A viation T ech n olog y , M ilitary T ech n ology, Security," SE (Special Edition 1994): 42-56. Space T echnology, T ech n ology) Jensen, Col Owen E. "Inform ation W arfare: Principies of Basing Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. H artzer, Dr Ronald B. "V alid atin g Air Force Civil Engi- Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problems Associated neering C om bat Support D octrine in the G u lf W ar," w ith Battleíield Preparation in D esert Sto rm ," no. 1 no. 2 (Summer 1994): 62-71. (Spring 1994): 4-21. 88 A1RPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

Nicholls, Maj David, and Maj Todor D. Tagarev. "What Jensen, Col Owen E. "Information Warfare: Principies of Does Chãos Theory M ean for W arfare?" no. 3 (Fali Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. 1994): 48-57. Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problem s Associated Counterair Operations w ith B attlefield P reparation in D esert Sto rm ," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 4-21. Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problem s Associated McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The with Battlefield Preparation in Desert Storm ," no. 1 Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): (Spring 1994): 4-21. 4-17. M urphy, Lt C ol T im o th y G. "A C ritiqu e o f The Air Cam- Murphy, Lt Col Timothy G. "A Critique of The Air Cam- paign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. paign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. Deception 0'L eary , M aj Jeffrey. "Su rprise and ln telligen ce: To- wards a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Baum , Lt C ol M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The 34-50. W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 52-62. Douhet Jensen, Col Owen E. "Inform ation W arfare: Principies Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating of Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. the Past.. . Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The Editorial Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 4-17. Clark, Lt Col Richard B. "Trilevel Thinking," no. 2 (Sum - mer 1994): 2. 0 ’Leary, M aj Jeffrey. "Surprise and ln telligen ce: To- ______. "W h y a Special E dition? O r, W h at H ave T hey wards a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Done to AP/?" SE (Special Edition 1994): 2. 34-50. Fayne, M aj G w end olyn D. "B eco m in g a C itizen-Soldier: Defense Reform A Perspective on Country," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 2-3. Baum , Lt Col M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The ______. "W hat Does lt M atter Anym ore? A Perspective on W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Honor," no.l (Spring 1994): 2. 52-62. Kearney, Col Thomas M. "Changes: Faces and Focus," 0 'L ea ry , M aj Jeffrey. "Su rprise and ln telligen ce: To- no. 4 (W inter 1994): 2. vvards a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Larsen, Lt Col Jeffrey A. "USAF Institute for National 34-50. Security Studies (INSS)," SE (Special Edition 1994): 3. Deterrence Electronic Warfare

H artzer, D r Ronald B. "V alid ating Air Force Civil Engi- Baum , Lt Col M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The neering C om bat Support D octrine in the Gulf W ar," W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 62-71. 52-62. Jensen, Col O w en E. "Inform ation W arfare: Principies Jensen, Col Ow en E. "Inform ation W arfare: Principies of of Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35^13. Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. Lew is, C ol R ichard B. H. "JFA C C P roblem s A ssociated Parsons, Capt David W . "British Air C ontrol: A M odel w ith Battlefield Preparation in D esert Sto rm ," no. 1 for th e A p plication o f Air Pow er in Low -Intensity (Spring 1994): 4-21. Conflict?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 28-39. Fighter Operations Doctrine Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating Baum , Lt C ol M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The the Past... Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The 52-62. Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): Coulombe, Lt Col Stephen A. "The Airborne Laser: Pie 4-17. in the Sky or V ision o f Future Theater M issile D e- fense?" no. 3 (Fali 1994): 58-68. Fighter Techniques Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating the Past... Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. the Past... Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. G raffis, C ap t Ju d y M . "Strateg ic: U se w ith C are," SE (Special Edition 1994): 4-10. Foreign Military Forces H artzer, Dr Ronald B. "V alidating Air Force Civil Engi- Baum , Lt C ol M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The neering Com bat Support Doctrine in the Gulf W ar," W eaponization of Spaçf," no. 1 (Spring 1994): no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 62-71. 52-62. Hunter, M aj Roger C. "D isabling Systems and the Air G riffith, Lt Col Thom as E„ Jr. "Air Pressure: Strategy for Force," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 43^ 7. the New W orld Order?” no. 2 (Summer 1994): 18-26. INDEX 89

Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problems Associated Jen sen , C ol O w en E. "In fo rm atio n W arfare: P rin cip ies o f w ith Battlefield Preparation in Desert Storm ," no. 1 Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. (Spring 1994): 4-21. Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problems Associated McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The w ith Battlefield Preparation in D esert Sto rm ," no. 1 Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Summer 1994): (Spring 1994): 4-21. 4-17. Parsons, Capt David W. "British Air Control: A M odel Murphy, Lt Col Timothy G. "A Critique of The Air Cam- for the Application of Air Power in Low-Intensity paign" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. Conflict?" no. 2 (Summer 1994): 28-39. Parsons, Capt David W. "British Air Control: A Model Shotw ell, Lt Col Charles, M aj Joginder D hillon, and Capt for th e A p plication o f Air Pow er in Low -Intensity D eborah C. Pollard. "B allistic M issile D efense for the Conflict?" no. 2 (Summer 1994): 28-39. Twenty-first Century: At the Crossroads of Global Security,” SE (Special Edition 1994): 42-56. In telligen ce Baum , Lt Col M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The Interservice Conflict W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Baker, Dr Bud. "O n the Im portance of Im age: Som e 52-62. Lessons from the B-52, Curtis E. LeM ay, and P. D. Glock, Capt John R. "The Evolution of Air Force Target- Eldred," no. 2 (Summer 1994): 55-61. ing," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 14-28. Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating Jensen, Col Owen E. "Information Warfare: Principies the Past... Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. of Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. Murphy, Lt Col Timothy G. "A Critique of The Air Cam- Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problem s Associated paign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. with Battlefield Preparation in Desert Storm ," no. 1 Parsons, Capt David W . "British Air C ontrol: A M odel for (Spring 1994): 4-21. the A p plication o f Air Pow er in L ow -Intensity C o n - M ann, Col Edward. "D esert Storm : The First Inform a- flict?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 28-39. tion W ar?" no. 4 (W inter 1994): 4-14. Jo in t O perations McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Summer 1994): the Past... Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. 4-17. Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problem s Associated 0'Connell, Capt Edward P., and 2d Lt John T. Dillaplain. w ith Battlefield Preparation in D esert S to rm ," no. 1 "N onlethal Concepts: Im plications for Air Force In- (Spring 1994): 4-21. telligence," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 26-33. McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The 0'Leary, M aj Jeffrey. "Surprise and Intelligence: Towards Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 4-17. 34-50. Murphy, Lt Col Timothy G. "A Critique of The Air Cam-

Interd iction paign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. 0'Leary, Maj Jeffrey. "Surprise and Intelligence: To- G riffith, Lt Col Thom as E., Jr. "A ir Pressure: Strategy for wards a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): the New W orld Order?" no. 2 (Summer 1994): 18-26. 34-50. McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The Schneider, M aj David W . "H eavy Bom bers H olding the Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): Line," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 45-52. 4-17. Murphy, Lt Col Timothy G. "A Critique of The Air Cam- Korean W ar

paign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. Glock, Capt John R. "The Evolution of Air Force Target- ing," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 14-28. In tern atio n al R elations G riffith, Lt Col Thom as E., Jr. "A ir Pressure: Strategy for A ld rich, M aj R ichard W ., and M aj N orm an K. T h o m p son . the New W orld Order?" no. 2 (Summer 1994): 18-26. "Verifying Chem ical and Biological W eapons Trea- tães: Is the C onstitution a Stum bling B lock?" SE (Spe- Leadership/M anagem ent cial Edition 1994): 11-27. Baker, Dr Bud. "O n the Im portance of Image: Som e B ecker, Lt M íriam D. "Strateg ic C u lture and B allistic Lessons from the B-52, Curtis E. LeM ay, and P. D. M issile Defense: Rússia and the United States," SE Eldred," no. 2 (Summer 1994): 55-61. (Special Edition 1994): 57-68. Barco, Capt Charles T. "Valuing Leadership in an Era of Erwin, Lt Col Douglas. "The United States and Nuclear Prophets, Politicians, and Pugilists," no. 3 (Fali 1994): W eapons in Europe," SE (Special Edition 1994): 4-13. 69-88. Baum , Lt Col M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The G riffith, Lt Col Thom as E., Jr. "A ir Pressure: Strategy for W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): the New World Order?" no. 2 (Summer 1994): 18-26. 52-62. 90 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

C asebeer, ls t Lt W illiam D., C ol R ichard Szafranski, and Military Education Dr Jam es H. Toner. "M ilitary Ethics," no. 4 (W inter C asebeer, ls t Lt W illiam D ., C ol R ichard Szafranski, and 1994): 15-25. Dr Jam es H. T on er. "M ilitarv E th ics," no. 4 (W inter Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problems Associated 1994): 15-25. w ith B attlefield Prep aration in D esert Sto rm ," no. 1 R oberts, C h ap lain, Lt C ol A lexand er B. "C o re V alues in (Spring 1994): 4-21. a Quality Air Force: The Leadership Challenge," no. McCrabb, Lt Co! Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The 2 (Summer 1994): 40-53. Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): W ad d ell, C ol D on ald E., III. "A Situ atio n al Leadership 4-17. Model for Military Leaders," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 29-42. Roberts, Chaplain, Lt Col Alexander B. "Core Values in a Quality Air Force: The Leadership Challenge," no. Military Technology 2 (Summer 1994): 40-53. (See also Aviation Techology, Computer Technology, W addell, C ol D onald E.( III. "A Situ ation al Leadership Space T echnology, T ech n ology)

M odel for Military Leaders," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 29-42. Coulom be, Lt Col Stephen A. "The Airborne Laser: Pie in the Sky or Vision of Future Theater M issile Defense?" Legal Issues no. 3 (Fali 1994): 58-68. Aldrich, M aj Richard W ., and M aj Norm an K. Thom pson. Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating "V erifyin g C h em ical and B iological W eapons Trea- the Past. . . Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. ties: Is the Constitution a Stum bling Block?" SE (Spe- Hunter, M aj Roger C. "D isabling Systems and the Air cialEdition 1994): 11-27. Force," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 43-47. C asebeer, ls t Lt W illiam D ., C ol R ichard Szafranski, and Jen sen , C ol O w en E. "In fo rm atio n W arfare: Principies o f Dr Jam es H. T on er. "M ilitary E th ics," no. 4 (W inter Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. 1994): 15-25. 0'Connell, Capt Edward P., and 2d Lt John T. Dillaplain. Shotw ell, Lt Col Charles, M aj Joginder Dhillon, and Capt "N o n leth al C oncep ts: Im p lication s for Air Force In- D eborah C. Pollard. "B allistic M issile D efense for the telligence," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 26-33. Tw enty-first Century: At the Crossroads of Global 0'Leary, Maj Jeffrey. "Surprise and Intelligence: To- Security,” SE (Special Edition 1994): 42-56. wards a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Logistics 34-50. Parsons, Capt David W . "British Air Control: A M odel Baum, Lt Col M ich ael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The for th e A pplication o f Air Pow er in Low -Intensity W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Conflict?" no. 2 (Summer 1994): 28-39. 52-62. H artzer, Dr Ronald B. "V alidating Air Force Civil Engi- Military Thought neerin g C o m b at Su p p ort D octrin e in th e G u lf W ar," Baum , Lt Col M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 62-71. W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Lew is, C ol Richard B. H. "JFACC Problem s Associated 52-62. w ith B attlefield P rep aration in D esert Sto rm ," no. 1 C asebeer, ls t Lt W illiam D., C ol R ichard Szafranski, and (Spring 1994): 4-21. Dr Jam es H. T on er. "M ilitary E th ics," no. 4 (W inter Low-Intensity Conflict 1994): 15-25. Clark, Lt Col Richard B. "Trilevel Thinking" (editorial), Jensen, Col Ow en E. "Inform ation W arfare: Principies of Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. no. 2 (Summer 1994): 2. Parsons, Capt David W. "British Air Control: A Model Fayne, Maj Gw endolyn D. "W hat Does lt M atter Any- for th e A p plication o f Air Pow er in Low -Intensity m ore? A Perspective on Honor" (editorial), no. 1 Conflict?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 28-39. (Spring 1994): 2. Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating Management/O rgan ization the Past. . . Again?” no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. Barco, Capt Charles T. "Valuing Leadership in an Era of Jensen, Col Owen E. "Information Warfare: Principies of Prophets, Politicians, and Pugilists," no. 3 (Fali 1994): Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. 4-13. McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The W ad dell, C ol D onald E., III. "A Situ atio n al Leadership Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Summer 1994): Model for Military Leaders," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 29-42. 4-17. M urphy, Lt C ol T im o th y G. "A C ritiqu e o f The Air Cam- Middle East Affairs paign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problem s Associated N ich o lls, M aj D avid , an d M aj T o d o r D. T agarev . "W h a t w ith B attlefield P rep aration in D esert Sto rm ," no. 1 Does Chãos Theory M ean for W arfare?" no. 3 (Fali (Spring 1994): 4-21. 1994): 48-57. INDEX 91

0'Leary, Maj Jeffrey. "Surprise and Intelligence: To- Naval Operations wards a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The 34-50. Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): R oberts, C haplain, Lt C ol A lexander B "C ore V aiues in 4-17. a Quality Air Force: The Leadership Challenge," no. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 2 (Summer 1994): 40-53. Erw in, Lt C ol D ouglas. "T h e U n ited States and N uclear Military Training W eapons in Europe," SE (Special Edition 1994): Clark, Lt Col Richard B. "Trilevel T h in kin g" (editorial), 69-88. no. 2 (Summer 1994): 2. Nuclear Strategy H artzer, D r Ronald B. "V alid atin g Air Force Civil Engi- neering Com bat Support Doctrine in the Gulf W ar," Becker, Lt M iriam D . "Strateg ic C u ltu re and B allistic no. 2 (Summer 1994): 62-71. M issile Defense: Rússia and the United States," SE R oberts, C haplain, Lt C ol A lexander B. "C ore V aiues in (Special Edition 1994): 57-68. a Quality Air Force: The Leadership Challenge," no. Erwin, Lt Col Douglas. "The United States and Nuclear 2 (Summer 1994): 40-53. W eapons in Europe," SE (Special Edition 1994): W addell, C ol D onald E., III. "A Situ ation al Leadership 69-88. Model for Military Leaders," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 29-42. Graffis, Capt Judy M. "Strategic: Use with Care," SE (Special Edition 1994): 4-10. Morale C asebeer, lst Lt W illiam D., C ol R ichard Szafranski, and Nuclear War Dr Jam es H. Toner. "M ilitary Ethics," no. 4 (W inter Erwin, Lt Col Douglas. "The United States and N uclear 1994): 15-25. W eapons in Europe," SE (Special Edition 1994): H artzer, D r Ronald B. "V alidating Air Force Civil Engi- 69-88. neering C om bat Support D octrine in the G u lf W ar," Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problems Associated no. 2 (Summer 1994): 62-71. w ith Battlefield Preparation in D esert Sto rm ," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 4-21. National Security Policy Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating Pacific Region Affairs the Past. .. Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating Hunter, M aj Roger C. "D isabling Systems and the Air the Past... Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. Force," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 43-47. Persian Gulf Conflict Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problems Associated w ith Battlefield Preparation in D esert Sto rm ," no. 1 Baker, Dr Bud. "O n the Im portance of Image: Som e (Spring 1994): 4-21. Lessons ftom the B-52, Curtis E. LeMay, and P. D. McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. ‘‘Drohende G efahr West: The Eldred," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 55-61. Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Summer 1994): Glock, Capt John R. "The Evolution of Air Force Target- 4-17. ing," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 14-28. Parsons, Capt David W . "British Air Control: A Model G riffith, Lt Col Thom as E .,Jr. "A ir Pressure: Strategy for for the A pplication o f Air Pow er in L ow -lntensity the New W orld Order?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 18-26. Conflict?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 28-39. H artzer, Dr R onald B. "V alid atin g Air Force C ivil Engi- neering Com bat Support Doctrine in the Gulf W ar," National Strategy no. 2 (Summer 1994): 62-71. B ecker, Lt M iriam D. "Strateg ic C u lm re and Ballistic Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problems Associated M issile Defense: Rússia and the United States," SE w ith B attlefield P rep aration in D esert Sto rm ," n o. 1 (Spedal Edition 1994): 57-68. (Spring 1994): 4-21. C lark, Lt Col Richard B. "Trilevel T h in kin g" (editorial), M ann, Col Edward. "D esert Storm : The First Inform a- no. 2 (Summer 1994): 2. tion W ar?" no. 4 (W inter 1994): 4-14. Erwin, Lt Col Douglas. "The United States and Nuclear 0'Leary, Maj Jeffrey. "Surprise and Intelligence: To- W eapons in Europe," SE (Special Edition 1994): wards a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 69-88. 34-50. G raffis, Capt Judy M . "Strategic: Use w ith C are," SE (Special Edition 1994): 4-10. Personnel Issues G riffith. Lt Col Thom as E., Jr. "A ir Pressure: Strategy for Casebeer, lst Lt W illiam D., Col Richard Szafranski, and the New World Order?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 18-26. Dr Jam es H. T on er. "M ilitary E th ics," no. 4 (W inter H unter, M aj Roger C. "D isabling System s and the Air 1994): 15-25. Force," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 43-47. Fayne, M aj G w endolyn D. "W hat Does lt M atter Any- Jensen, Col Owen E. "Information Warfare: Principies of m ore? A Perspective on H onor" (editorial), no. 1 Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35^13. (Spring 1994): 2. 92 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER1994

H artzer, D r Ronald B. "V alidating Air Force Civil Engi- Jensen, Col Owen E. "Inform ation W arfare: Principies neering Com bat Support Doctrine in the Gulf W ar," of Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 62-71. McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The R oberts, C h ap lain, Lt C ol A lexand er B. "C o re V alues in Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Summer 1994): a Quality Air Force: The Leadership Challenge," no. 4-17. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 40-53. Roberts, Chaplain, Lt Col Alexander B. "Core Values in a Quality Air Force: The Leadership Challenge," no. Planning 2 (Summer 1994): 40-53. Baum , Lt C ol M ich ael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Principies of W ar 52-62. Baum , Lt Col M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The G riffith , Lt C ol T h o m as E., Jr. "A ir Pressure: Strategy for W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): the New W orld Order?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 18-26. 52-62. H artzer, Dr Ronald B. "V alidating Air Force Civil Engi- G riffith, Lt Col T hom as E., Jr. "Air Pressure: Strategy for neerin g C o m b at Su p p ort D octrin e in the G u lf W ar," the New W orld Order?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 18-26. no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 62-71. Jensen, Col O w en E. "Inform ation W arfare: Principies Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problem s Associated of Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. w ith B attlefield Prep aration in D esert Sto rm ," no. 1 McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The (Spring 1994): 4-21. Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Summer 1994): McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The 4-17. Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): M urphy, Lt C ol T im o th y G. "A C ritiqu e o f The Air Cam- 4-17. paign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. 0'Connell, Capt Edward P., and 2d Lt John T. Dillaplain. 0'L eary , M aj Jeffrey. "Surprise and Intelligence: To- "N onlethal Concepts: Im plications for Air Force In- wards a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): telligence," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 26-33. 34-50. 0'L eary , M aj Jeffrey. "Surprise and Intelligence: To- Procurem ent wards a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Baum , Lt Col M ichael E. "D efiling the Altar: The 34-50. W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): P o liticai-M ilitary A ffairs 52-62.

Baker, Dr Bud. "O n the Im portance of Image: Som e Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating Lessons from the B-52, Curtis E. LeMay, and P. D. the Past. . . Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. Eldred," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 55-61. H artzer, D r R onald B. "V alid atin g Air Force C ivil Engi- Baum , Lt Col M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The neering Com bat Support Doctrine in the Gulf War," W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): no. 2 (Summer 1994): 62-71.

52-62. Professionalism G riffith, Lt Col Thom as E .,Jr. "Air Pressure: Strategy for C asebeer, lst Lt W illiam D., C ol Richard Szafranski, and the New W orld Order?” no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 18-26. Dr Jam es H. T on er. "M ilitary Eth ics," no. 4 (W inter Lew is, C ol Richard B. H. "JFA CC Problem s Associated 1994): 15-25. w ith B attlefield P rep aration in D esert Sto rm ," no. 1 Fayne, Maj Gw endolyn D. "Becom ing a Citizen-Soldier: (Spring 1994): 4-21. A Perspective on C ountry" (editorial), no. 3 (Fali Murphy, Lt Col Timothy G. "A Critique of The Air Cam- 1994): 2-3. paign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. ______. "W hat Does lt M atter Anym ore? A Perspective 0'L eary , M aj Jeffrey. "Surprise and Intelligence: To- on Honor" (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 1994): 2. wards a Cleaber Understanding,” no. 1 (Spring 1994): 34-50. Psychological Warfare Hunter, Maj Roger C. "D isabling Systems and the Air Preparedness Force," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 43-47. Baum , Lt Col M ich ael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): Public Affairs 52-62. Baker, Dr Bud. "O n the Im portance of Im age: Som e Clark, Lt Col Richard B. "Trilevel Thinking" (editorial), Lessons from the B-52, Curtis E. LeM ay, and P. D. no. 2 (Summer 1994): 2. Eldred," no. 2 (Summer 1994): 55-61. Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating Recruiting/Retention the Past... Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. H artzer, Dr Ronald B. "V alidating Air Force Civil Engi- Casebeer, lst Lt W illiam D., Col Richard Szafranski, and Dr Jam es H. Toner. "M ilitary Ethics," no. 4 (W inter neering Com bat Support Doctrine in the Gulf W ar," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 62-71. 1994): 15-25. INDEX 93

Research and Developm ent Strategy Baum , Lt Col M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The Baum , Lt Col M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The W eaponizatlon of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 52-62. 52-62. Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating Becker, Lt M iriam D . "Strategic C u lture and B allistic the Past. . . Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. M issile D efense: Rússia and the United States," SE 0'Connell, Capt Edward P., and 2d Lt John T. Dillaplain. (Special Edition 1994): 57-68. "N on leth al C oncepts: Im p lications for Air Force In- Graffis, Capt Judy M. "Strategic: Use with Care," SE telligence," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 26-33. (Special Edition 1994): 4-10. Roberts, Chaplain, Lt Col Alexander B. "Core Values in G riffith, Lt Col Thom as E., Jr. "A ir Pressure: Strategy for a Q uality Air Force: The Leadership C hallenge," no. the New World Order?” no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 18-26. 2 (Summer 1994): 40-53. Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problems Associated w ith B attlefield P rep aration in D esert S to rm ," no. 1 Reserve Forces (Spring 1994): 4-21. Murphy, Lt Col Timothy G. "A Critique of The Air McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The Campaign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Summer 1994): 4-17. Royal Air Force Murphy, Lt Col Timothy G. "A Critique of The Air Cam- Parsons, Capt David W. "British Air Control: A M odel paign" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. for th e A p plication o f Air Pow er in Low -Intensity Conflict?" no. 2 (Summer 1994): 28-39. T actical A ir C o n tro l System Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problem s Associated Space Operations w ith B attlefield P rep aration in D esert Sto rm ," n o. 1 Jensen, Col Ow en E. "Inform ation W arfare: Principies (Spring 1994): 4-21. of Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. Tactical Air Power

Space Technology Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating (See also Aviation Technology, Computer Technology, the Past. . . Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. M ilitary T echnology, T ech n ology) G riffith, Lt Col Thom as E., Jr. "A ir Pressure: Strategy for

Jensen, Col Owen E. "Inform ation W arfare: Principies of the New W orld Order?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 18-26. Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problem s Associated w ith B attlefield P rep aration in D esert Sto rm ," no. 1 Strategic Bom bing (Spring 1994): 4-21. Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The the Past. . . Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): G lock, Capt John R. "The Evolution of Air Force Target- 4-17. ing," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 14-28. Murphy, Lt Col Timothy G. "A Critique of The Air G riffith, Lt Col T hom as E., Jr. "A ir Pressure: Strategy for Campaign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. the New W orld Order?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 18-26. Technology Lew is, C ol R ichard B. H. "JFA C C P roblem s Associated (See also Aviation Technology, Com puter Technology, w ith B attlefield Preparation in D esert Sto rm ," no. 1 M ilitary T echnology, Space T ech n ology) (Spring 1994): 4-21. McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The Coulom be, Lt Col Stephen A. "The Airborne Laser: Pie Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): in the Sky or Vision of Future Theater M issile De- 4-17. fense?" no. 3 (Fali 1994): 58-68. Schneider, Maj David W. "Heavy Bombers Holding the H artzer, Dr Ronald B. "V alid ating Air Force Civil Engi- U ne," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 45-52. neering C om bat Support D octrine in the G ulf W ar," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 62-71. Strategic Operations H unter, M aj Roger C. "D isabling System s and the Air Glock, Capt John R. "The Evolution of Air Force Target- Force," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 43-47. ing," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 14-28. Jensen, Col Ow en E. "Inform ation W arfare: Principies Graffis, Capt Judy M . "Strategic: Use with Care," SE of Third-Wave W ar," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 35-43. (Special Edition 1994): 4-10. Kent, Lt Col Jim . "Canaries, M innow s, and Arms Control: McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The Biom onitoring for Verification and Com pliance," SE Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign." no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): (Special Edition 1994): 28-40. 4-17. Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problem s Associated Schneider, Ma| David W . "H eavy Bom bers H olding the w ith B attlefield P rep aration in D esert Sto rm ," n o. 1 Une." no. 4 (W inter 1994): 45-52. (Spring 1994): 4-21. 94 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1994

0'Connell, Capt Edward P., and 2d LtJohnT. Dillaplain. Vietnam War

"N onlethal Concepts: Im plications for Air Force In- Glock, Capt John R. "The Evolution of Air Force Target- telligence," no. 4 (W inter 1994): 26-33. ing," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 14-28. Sh otw ell, Lt C ol C h arles, M aj Jo g in d er D h illon , and C apt War Gaming Deborah C. Pollard. "Ballistic M issile Defense for the Tw enty-first Century: At the Crossroads of Global N ich o lls, M aj D avid , an d M aj T o d o r D. T agarev. "W h a t Security," SE (Special Edition 1994): 42-56. Does Chãos Theory M ean for W arfare?" no. 3 (Fali 1994): 48-57. Theater W arfare W orld W ar 1 Baum , Lt Col M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): G lock, Capt John R. "The Evolution of Air Force Target- 52-62. ing," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 14-28. Coulom be, Lt Col Stephen A. "The Airborne Laser: Pie Parsons, Capt David W. "British Air Control: A Model in the Sky or V ision of Future Theater M issile De- for the A p plication o f Air Pow er in Low -lntensity fense?" no. 3 (Fali 1994): 58-68. Conflict?" no. 2 (Summer 1994): 28-39. Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating W orld W ar II the Past. . . Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. Baum , Lt Col M ichael E. "D efilin g the Altar: The G riffith, Lt C ol Thom as E., Jr. "A ir Pressure: Strategy for W eaponization of Space," no. 1 (Spring 1994): the New W orld Order?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 52-62. 18-26. Fedorchak, Capt Scott A. "Close Air Support: Repeating Lewis, Col Richard B. H. "JFACC Problem s Associated the Past... Again?" no. 1 (Spring 1994): 22-33. w ith B attlefield P rep aration in D esert S to rm ," no. 1 Glock, Capt John R. "The Evolution of Air Force Target- (Spring 1994): 4-21. ing," no. 3 (Fali 1994): 14-28. McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The G riffith, Lt Col Thom as E., Jr. "A ir Pressure: Strategy for Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): the New W orld Order?" no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 18-26. 4-17. McCrabb, Lt Col Maris. "Drohende Gefahr West: The Values and Ethics Pre-Normandy Air Cam paign," no. 2 (Sum m er 1994): 4-17. Casebeer, lst Lt W illiam D., Col Richard Szafranski, and M urphy, Lt C ol T im o th y G. "A C ritiqu e o f The Air Cam- Dr Jam es H. T on er. "M ilitary E th ics," no. 4 (W in ter paign," no. 1 (Spring 1994): 63-74. 1994): 15-25. 0'L eary , M aj Jeffrey. "Surprise and Intelligence: To- Fayne, M aj G w end olyn D. "B eco m in g a C itizen-Soldier: wards a Clearer Understanding," no. 1 (Spring 1994): A Perspective on C ou ntry" (editorial), no. 3 (Fali 34-50. 1994): 2-3. Parsons, Capt David W . "British Air Control: A M odel for ______. "W hat Does lt M atter Anym ore? A Perspective the A p plication o f Air Pow er in L ow -lntensity C o n - on H onor" (editorial), no. 1 (Spring 1994): 2. flict?" no. 2 (Summer 1994): 28-39. C ü N T T R S

Dr James H. Toner (BA, St. Anselm College; CoJ Edward Mann (BS, Pepperdine University; MA, College of William and Mary; PhD, MA, University of Southern Califórnia) is chief Col Richard Szafranski (BA, Florida State University of Notre Dame) is professor of of the Doctrine Research Divlsion, Alrpower University; MA, Central Mtchlgan University) International relations and military ethlcs at Research Instítute, College of Aerospace is the flrst holder of the Chair for National the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE), M ilitary Strategy at the Air War College, Dr Toner, who previously taught at Norwich Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Heis a command piiot Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Colonel Szafranski’s University in Vermont, is the author of The wlth 5,200 hours ln the KC-135 alrcraft. duties have included staff positlons ín the American Military Ethic: A Meditation, The Previously, he was deputy chief of the Alrbome headquarters of Strategic Air Command, Swonl and the Cross: Repections on Command Command/Control Divlsion, Headquarters United States Space Command, North Amer- and Conscience, and True Faitli and Allegiance: Strategic Air Command, Offutt AFB, Nebraska; ican Aerospace Defense Command, and Air The Burden o f Military Ethics. National Defense Fellow, International Se- Force Space Command. He has commanded curlty Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law B-52 units at the squadron and wing levei, most and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, recently as commander of the 7th Bomb Wing, Massachusetts; and a military doctrine analyst Carswell AFB, Texas, from 1991 to 1993. He was at CADRE. He has written for Military Review, also the base commander of Peterson AFB, Air Force Times, and Airpower Journal. Colonel Colorado. His writings on military strategy Mann is a graduate of Squadron Offlcer School, and operatlonal art have appeared previously Air Command and Staff College, and Air War tn Airpower Journal as well as in Parameters and College. Strategic Review. Colonel Szafranski is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and Air War College.

lst Lt John T, DUlaplain (BS, Texas A&M University) Is chief of research support for the Air Force element at the Rand Corporation. He provldes securlty authentlcation Services for Pro|ect Air Force researchers and performs lialson functlons between the Air Force and the Rand Corporation. This Is his íírst asslgnment after completlng the Intelligence Applications Offlcer Course at Goodfellow AFB, Texas. lst Lt William D. Casebeer (USAFA) Is chief of the CENTAF command staff brleflng team. Prevlous assignments have included ln- telUgence school at Goodfellow AFB, Texas, and the US Air Force Academy, where he was a member of the adjunct faculty.

95 Capt Edward P. 0 ’Connell (BS. University of Col OwenE. Jensen (BA, Unlversity of Illinois; Maryland; MS, Joint Mllltary Intelligence MA, University of Oklahoma; MA, Naval College) is a research fellow representing the Postgraduate School) is vice commander, Maj David W. Schneider (BA, Wittenberg assisiaru chiei of staff for intelligence, Fourteenth Air Force, Vandenberg AFB, University; MS, Califórnia State University, Headquarters USAF, at the Rand Corporation. Califórnia. Previous assignments inciude key Stanislaus) is a B-S2 test flight commander in During Operations Desert Shield and Desert roles with US Air Force space efforts at Space the 346th Test and Evaluation Squadron, Storm, heservedasa target intelligenceadvisor Command and at Headquarters USAF, and as Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota. He previously at the Defense Intelligence Agency. led a commander of the 73d Space Group during its served as chief of current operations, 93d mobile-missile-targeting initiative sponsored activation as the nation’s first and only space Operations Support Squadron, Castle AFB, by J-2, and deployed on a CENTAF-sponsored control unit. He served three years as an air Califórnia. damage-assessment team into Iraq. He attaché with the US Embassy in Ottawa, recently served on the USS Kennecty, providing Canada. He has published several articles on intelligence support for the initial airdrops military space operations. into Bosnia. Captain 0'C onnell is a distinguished graduate of the Joint Milítary Intelligence College.

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