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NSA-FOIACASELOG-2016.Pdf This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of: The Black Vault The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military. Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000 FOIA Case: 100503A 4 April 2017 JOHN GREENEWALD Dear Mr. Greenewald: This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated 1 January 2017 which was received by this office on 2 January 2017, for "a copy of the FOIA case log for calendar year 2016." For purposes of this request and based on the information you provided in your letter, you are considered an "all other" requester. As such, you are allowed 2 hours of search and the duplication of 100 pages at no cost. Since processing fees were minimal, no fees were assessed. Your request has been processed under the FOIA, and the logs for calendar year 2016 are enclosed, along with a FOIA Case Dispositions reference sheet that explains the final case dispositions. Please be advised that the logs do not contain the number of pages released. They contain a final disposition if the case was closed at the time the logs were created. If there is no final disposition, the case was still pending at the time the logs were created. Certain information has been deleted from the enclosures. This Agency is authorized by various statutes to protect certain information concerning its activities, as well as the names of its employees. We have determined that such information exists in these documents. Accordingly, those portions are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the third exemption of the FOIA, which provides for the withholding of information specifically protected from disclosure by statute. The specific statute applicable in this case is Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 3605). Personal information regarding other individuals has been deleted from the enclosures in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6). This exemption protects from disclosure information which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. In balancing the public interest for the information you request against the privacy interests involved, we have determined that the privacy interests sufficiently satisfy t~e requirements for the application of the (b)(6) exemption. In most cases requesters seeking the FOIA logs agree to omit Privacy Act or first-party requests from the logs. Please be advised, therefore, that when processing our FOIA logs, we typically remove first party requests as non-responsive, since they represent requests from individuals seeking information on themselves. Those entries, in addition to being exempt under (b)(6), are also marked as non-responsive. FOIA Case: 100503A Since these deletions may be construed as a partial denial of your request, you are hereby advised of this Agency's appeal procedures. You may appeal this decision. If you decide to appeal, you should do so in the manner outlined below. • The appeal request must be in writing and addressed to: NSA/CSS FOIA/PA Appeal Authority (P132) National Security Agency 9800 Savage Road STE 6932 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6932 • The request must be postmarked no later than 90 calendar days of the date of this letter. Decisions appealed after 90 days will not be addressed. • Please include the case number provided above. • Please describe with sufficient detail why you believe the denial of information was unwarranted. • NSA will endeavor to respond within 20 working days of receiving your appeal, absent any unusual circumstances. You may also contact our FOIA Public Liaison at foialo({l{nsa.gov for any further assistance and to discuss any aspect of your request. Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services National Archives and Records Administration 8601 Adelphi Rd- OGIS College Park, MD 207 40 ogis@nara. gov (877) 684-6448 (202) 741-5770 Fax(202) 741-5769 JOHN R. CHAPMAN Chief, FOIA/PA Office NSA Initial Denial Authority Ends: ajs UNCLASSIFIED FOIA Case Dispositions lSpOSl ton: D escnptton: Administratively Closed (AC) Administratively closed by the FOIA Office when the requester has not complied with the law or established regulations or policies (the request was not perfected). Includes failure to verify continued interest in a request. Records Not Reasonably Described Requester does not respond to a request for (CLARIFY) clarification of what he/she is seeking. Duplicate Request (DUPE) Duplicate request; e.g., either a mailed copy of an earlier faxed request, or multiple internet requests because requester hits the submit button more than once Fee Related Reason (FEE) Requester does not agree to pay, or chooses not to · pay, for a records search; or a requester does not pay incurred fees. Full Denial Based on Exemptions (FD) Everything that the requester sought is denied (could also pertain to a case for which parts are NR, parts FD, and parts GLOMAR) .. Neither Confirm nor Deny (GLOMAR) Response neither confirms nor denies the existence of responsive records (for the entire request) Granted in Full (GF) The requester is provided with everything requested, and no infonnation is withheld/protected; or requester agrees to accept document as previously released: Improper FOIA Request (IFR) The request does not meet the criteria to be a FOIA request (asks questions, asks for records that are not yet created, etc.). MISDIRECTED Request was not submitted to the proper DoD component and was referred to the correct component.' Not an Agency Record (NAR) Case was closed because what was requested was not an Agency record (no possession or control). No Records (NR) No records were located for all portions of the OR request. Includes requests for which only a Negative (NEG) limited search is done because the information requested is not within NSA's purview. No Agency Equities (NEQ) No NSA equities were found in other-agency documents. NOCONTACT Unable to contact the requester. Not Within Purview (NP) The subject of the request does not fall within NSA's mission (not used after 181 quarter 2009- see NR). OPSFILE NSA Operational Files are exempt from FOIA search under 50 USC 432b - no search conducted. Partial Denial/Partial Grant (PD) Part of what the requester sought is denied. PUBAVAIL All responsive documents are publicly available. REFERRED All documents located are referred to another agency for action (no NSA documents). Witpdrawn (WD) Requester advises in writing or by phone that he/she is no longer pursuing the request. No Disposition Case was not completed at the time the log was created. ~fproved for Release by NSA o~J UNCLASSIFIED 0-25-2011 FOIA Case# 43988 UNCLASSIFIED Dispositions for cases in FOIA Log reports prior to July 2008 do not always indicate that the cases were completely processed. A disposition pertaining to only one part of a request may have been selected during preliminary processing of the request; or a reviewer may have preselected a disposition while processing the request. The final disposition may have been changed when the case was completed. UNCLASSIFIED Doc ID: 6565673 FOIA LOG 1ST QTR CY2016 Case II on.tlllltlon Date Receive Dlte Requester Subject Disposition (U) Records and source code relating to Prosecutor's Management Information System (AKA Promis, PROM IS, Prom is '82, Enhanced Prom is) and derivatives thereof, and the related matter '83461 1/1/2016 1/4/2016 of lnslaw Inc. v. United States Government. Please include any records relating to the transfer and/or sale of PROM IS and/or Promis-derivatives between Robert Hanssen and his Russian handlers and the sa le of Prom is and/or Prom is-derivatives on the Ru ss ian black market (blat), MICHAEL BEST and its alleRed use bv ai -Qaeda and/or Usama bin Laden. Copy of the lntellipedia entry lfr'!m all three Wikis that make up the lntellipedia) tor the following entry(s) (Or whatever t.opic may pertain if it is slightly worded differently): 83431 1/2/2016 1/4/2016 sim il a~ JOHN GREENEWALD OPERATION ALERT No Records 83432 1/4/2016 1/4/2016 the location metadata (s pecifically latitude, longitudo and time of day for them) for the days of JUSTJN MEYERS October 31 20ll5 thm,.oh NnvPmho · ~ ?00~ fnrl NP;thPr Cnnfirm Nnr l"lPnv I ""Y d"U d" '"d"U"dO O~CWt<Y M~~"CY l"OMJ O~LUOU> "OCOU U "'lS''-"'0 V'l ' !'~ ": '~~ OU business/consulting/advisory promotions141dvertisements, contracts, agreements tg show · · · ' ' ' ..... ' .. ' ' ....· :' :':::; \ publicly between January 1,1963 and Ja nuai-, .20, 1969: 1) affiliations, ties, relations~ips .·: : between, through/for NSA Officials, agents, attorneys, clients, employees, attorneys, and/or advisors to ltek Corporation, which was on/about July 15, 1965 at 10 rvii!guire Non - Responsive 83442 1/4/2016 1/5/2016 headqu a i-t~red I I (b) ( 6) Road, Lexin gton 73, Massachu setts, Telephone number VOLUNTEER 2-6200 regarding .• . computer translation of Mainland Chinese dialects [e.g, _Mandarin] into English/Russian, · •• . .. .. · encoding of Chinese written cha racters in a computer lan'g~ age [e.g. Chicoder]. and Chine"! .. ·· . RICHARD TANSEY stenotypy. All records pertaining tol I who worked for the Naripnal Security Administration ·• . • 83471 1/7/2016 1/7/2016 •' •' ANDREW HOLTER around 1968-1969. .... Full Denial an electronic list of all National Securlty.Agency employees locate d·~ithin the Ge_orsi•, • 83472 1/6/2016 1/7/2016 Tennessee, and Alabama regions.
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