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Activiteitenverslag 2013.Indb RAPPORT D’ACTIVITÉS 2013 ACTIVITEITENVERSLAG 2013 Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Quis custodiet ipsos custodes ? est une série de publications qui a pour objectif de stimuler une discussion approfondie quant au fonctionnement, aux compétences et au contrôle des services de renseignement et de sécurité et du travail de renseignement. Cette série reprend notamment des études scientifi ques, les rapports d’activités du Comité permanent R et des rapports de colloques. Rédaction Comité permanent de contrôle des services de renseignements et de sécurité, rue de Louvain 48, boîte 4 à 1000 Bruxelles (02 286 29 88). Déjà parus dans cette série 1) D. Van Daele, en B. Vangeebergen, Inlichtingendiensten en strafprocedure in Nederland, Duitsland en Frankrijk, 2006, 166 p. 2) Comité permanent R, Rapport d’activités 2006, 2007, 147 p. 3) Comité permanent R, Rapport d’activités 2007, 2008, 87 p. 4) Belgian Standing Committee I (ed.), All Source Th reat Assessments in the Fight against Terrorism – Fusion Centres throughout Europe, 2010, 220 p. 5) Comité permanent R, Rapport d’activités 2008, 2009, 131 p. 6) W. Van Laethem, D. Van Daele en B. Vangeebergen (eds.), De Wet op de bijzondere inlichtingenmethoden, 2010, 298 p. 7) Comité permanent R, Rapport d’activités 2009, 2010, 127 p. 8) Comité permanent R, Rapport d’activités 2010, 2011, 119 p. 9) Comité permanent R, Rapport d’activités 2011, 2012, 134 p. 10) W. Van Laethem et J. Vanderborght, Regards sur le contrôle. Vingt ans de contrôle démocratique sur les services de renseignement, 2013, 565 p. 11) Comité permanent R, Rapport d’activités 2012, 2013, 127 p. 12) Comité permanent R, Rapport d’activités 2013, 2014, 212 p. RAPPORT D’ACTIVITÉS 2013 Comité permanent de contrôle des services de renseignements et de sécurité Comité permanent de contrôle des services de renseignements et de sécurité Antwerpen – Cambridge Le présent Rapport d’activités 2013 a été approuvé par le Comité permanent de contrôle des services de renseignements et de sécurité lors de la réunion du 24 juillet 2014. (soussignés) Guy Rapaille, président Gérald Vande Walle, conseiller Pieter-Alexander De Brock, conseiller Wouter De Ridder, greffi er Rapport d’activités 2013 Comité permanent de contrôle des services de renseignements et de sécurité © 2014 Intersentia Antwerpen – Cambridge www.intersentia.be ISBN 978-94-000-0551-8 D/2014/7849/156 NUR 823 Tous droits réservés. Sous réserve d’exceptions explicitement prévues par la loi, aucun élément de cette publication ne peut être reproduit, stocké dans une base de données automatisée ou publié, de quelque manière que ce soit, sans l’autorisation expresse préalable des éditeurs. TABLE DES MATIÈRES Liste des abréviations . xiii Préface . xv Chapitre I. Le suivi des recommandations du Comité permanent R . 1 I.1. Initiatives et réalisations dans la lignée des diff érentes recommandations . 1 I.1.1. Une stratégie fédérale en matière de protection des systèmes d’information et de communication. 1 I.1.2. Destruction d’anciens dossiers . 2 I.1.3. Une nouvelle note de service de la VSSE sur le suivi de parlementaires . 3 I.1.4. La fonction « analyste opérationnel » au sein du Service général du renseignement et de la sécurité . 3 I.2. Retour sur des recommandations antérieures . 4 Chapitre II . Les enquêtes de contrôle . 7 II.1. Le rôle du Service général du renseignement et de la sécurite dans le suivi de la situation en Afghanistan . 7 II.1.1. La place, la structure et les compétences du SGRS . 9 II.1.1.1. La place et la structure du SGRS . 9 II.1.1.2. Les missions du SGRS . 10 II.1.1.3. Les compétences du SGRS et le principe de territorialité . 11 II.1.1.4. La communication de renseignements à des pays tiers . 12 II.1.1.5. Quelques autres acteurs dans le domaine du recueil de renseignements . 12 II.1.2. La place et les compétences du SGRS au sein de l’ISAF . 13 II.1.2.1. L’opération ISAF . 13 II.1.2.2. La présence belge en Afghanistan avec une attention pour le SGRS . 15 II.1.3. Le cadre normatif applicable au SGRS en Afghanistan . 17 II.1.3.1. Le cadre national . 17 Intersentia v Table des matières II.1.3.2. Le cadre international . 18 II.1.3.3. Quelques points à améliorer . 19 II.1.3.3.1. Des normes intégrées, des notions de base communes et des objectifs précis en matière de renseignement . 19 II.1.3.3.2. Une méthodologie documentée dans le cadre de la préparation d’une mission . 19 II.1.3.3.3. Une méthodologie documentée dans le cadre de l’exécution d’une mission . 20 II.1.3.3.4. Une approche intégrée pour toutes les divisions . 20 II.1.3.3.5. Un manque de clarté sur la nature des renseignements à recueillir . 20 II.1.4. L’évaluation par les clients du SGRS . 21 II.1.5. Conclusions . 22 II.1.5.1. Le contrôle de légalité et d’autres aspects réglementaires . 22 II.1.5.2. La nécessité d’évaluer les risques pour le personnel dans des zones de confl it . 22 II.1.5.3. La nécessité d’avoir une approche systématique de l’engagement du SGRS en zone de confl it . 23 II.1.5.4. La nécessité de disposer du matériel adéquat . 23 II.1.5.5. Les recommandations de la commission Rwanda . 23 II.1.5.5.1. Des règles d’engagement claires traduites en directives compréhensibles . 23 II.1.5.5.2. Une préparation adéquate de la mission . 24 II.1.5.5.3. Un réseau de renseignement solide . 24 II.1.5.5.4. Disposer de suffi samment d’analystes compétents . 24 II.1.5.5.5. La nécessité de déployer des équipes spécialisées . 25 II.2. Notes secrètes sur l’Église de scientologie dans la presse . 25 II.2.1. La note secrète du 12 décembre 2012 sur l’Église de scientologie . 27 II.2.1.1. Le contenu de la note . 27 vi Intersentia Table des matières II.2.1.2. Les destinataires de la note et leur need to know . 27 II.2.1.3. L’obligation d’information . 28 II.2.2. L’analyse de phénomène relative aux activités non étatiques d’ingérence . 29 II.2.2.1. Le contenu de l’analyse de phénomène . 29 II.2.2.2. Les destinataires de l’analyse de phénomène et leur need to know . 30 II.3. Un informateur au sein du Vlaams Belang ? . 31 II.3.1. Le suivi du Vlaams Blok, dénommé plus tard Vlaams Belang . 32 II.3.2. Les contacts entre Bart Debie et la VSSE . 34 II.3.3. Filip Dewinter dans la base de données de la VSSE . 36 II.3.4. Rapports à la ministre de la Justice . 37 II.4. Le suivi de mandataires politiques par les services de renseignement . 37 II.4.1. Quelques chiff res relevés dans le cadre de la nouvelle enquête . 39 II.4.2. Le suivi de responsables politiques tout au long du cycle de renseignement . 40 II.4.2.1. Le pilotage des activités de renseignement . 40 II.4.2.1.1. Règles applicables au recueil de renseignements concernant des mandataires politiques . 41 II.4.2.1.2. Mention de partis politiques dans les plans annuels d’action ou de renseignement . 42 II.4.2.1.3. Pilotage ad hoc par le ministre de la Justice : modalité d’application de la directive du 25 mai 2009 . 42 II.4.2.2. La collecte . 44 II.4.2.3. L’organisation de l’information . 46 II.4.2.4. L’analyse . 46 II.4.2.5. La diff usion de renseignements . 47 II.5. La position d’information de la Sûreté de l’État concernant une transaction internationale d’une entreprise belge . 48 II.5.1. Une plainte relative à une licence d’exportation refusée . 48 II.5.2. Les constatations . 49 II.6. Faits prétendument répréhensibles d’un service de renseignement étranger et position d’information de la VSSE . 51 II.7. Atteinte éventuelle à la réputation à la suite de déclarations de la VSSE . 53 Intersentia vii Table des matières II.8. Diff usion prétendument illégitime de données personnelles par la VSSE . 54 II.8.1. Le contexte . 54 II.8.2. Constatations de l’enquête . 54 II.9. Plainte relative au vol d’un ordinateur portable . 55 II.10. Rapports intermédiaires dans les enquêtes faisant suite aux révélations d’Edward Snowden . 56 II.11. Enquêtes de contrôle pour lesquelles des devoirs d’enquête ont été posés en 2013 et enquêtes qui ont débuté en 2013 . 57 II.11.1. Le suivi d’éléments extrémistes dans l’armée . 57 II.11.2. La VSSE et sa mission légale de protection des personnes . 58 II.11.3. La manière dont les fonds spéciaux sont gérés, utilisés et contrôlés . 58 II.11.4. Enquête de contrôle sur la Joint Information Box . 59 II.11.5. Agents de renseignement et médias sociaux . 59 II.11.6. Membres du personnel de l’OCAM et médias sociaux . 60 II.11.7. La position d’information des services de renseignement et de l’OCAM concernant un élève pilote . 60 II.11.8. Une plainte de l’Église de scientologie contre la Sûreté de l’État . 60 II.11.9. Les contacts internationaux de l’OCAM . 61 II.11.10. Enquête de contrôle relative aux éléments transmis par la VSSE dans le cadre d’un dossier de naturalisation . 61 II.11.11. Plainte relative à la manière dont la VSSE suit le gérant d’une société d’exportation belge .
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