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Inside the Temple of Covert Propaganda: the Integrity Initiative and the UK’S Scandalous Information War
Inside the Temple of Covert Propaganda: The Integrity Initiative and the UK’s Scandalous Information War By Mohamed Elmaazi and Max Blumenthal Region: Europe Global Research, December 20, 2018 Theme: Intelligence, Politics Gray Zone Project 17 December 2018 Recent hacked documents have revealed an international network of politicians, journalists, academics, researchers and military officers, all engaged in highly deceptive covert propaganda campaigns funded by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), NATO, Facebook and hardline national security institutions. This “network of networks”, as one document refers to them, centers around an ironically named outfit called the Integrity Initiative. And it is all overseen by a previously unknown England-based think tank registered in Scotland, the Institute for Statecraft, which has operated under a veil of secrecy. The whole operation appears to be run by, and in conjunction with, members of British military intelligence. According to David Miller, professor of political sociology in the school of policy studies at the University of Bristol and the director of the Organization for Propaganda Studies, the Integrity Initiative “appears to be a military directed push.” “The most senior government people are professional propagandists and spooks,” Miller explained. “The ‘charity’ lead on this [Chris Donnelly] was also appointed as a colonel in military intelligence at the beginning of the project — a truly amazing fact that suggests this is a military intelligence cut out.” A minister for the UK FCOhas officially confirmed that it has been funding the Integrity Network. In addition to conducting diplomacy, the FCO oversees both the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) the UK equivalent to the National Security Agency, and the Secret Intelligence Services (SIS) commonly known as MI6. -
Romania Redivivus
alexander clapp ROMANIA REDIVIVUS nce the badlands of neoliberal Europe, Romania has become its bustling frontier. A post-communist mafia state that was cast to the bottom of the European heap by opinion- makers sixteen years ago is now billed as the success story Oof eu expansion.1 Its growth rate at nearly 6 per cent is the highest on the continent, albeit boosted by fiscal largesse.2 In Bucharest more politicians have been put in jail for corruption over the past decade than have been convicted in the rest of Eastern Europe put together. Romania causes Brussels and Berlin almost none of the headaches inflicted by the Visegrád Group—Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia— which in 1993 declined to accept Romania as a peer and collectively entered the European Union three years before it. Romanians con- sistently rank among the most Europhile people in the Union.3 An anti-eu party has never appeared on a Romanian ballot, much less in the parliament. Scattered political appeals to unsavoury interwar traditions—Legionnairism, Greater Romanianism—attract fewer voters than do far-right movements across most of Western Europe. The two million Magyars of Transylvania, one of Europe’s largest minorities, have become a model for inter-ethnic relations after a time when the park benches of Cluj were gilded in the Romanian tricolore to remind every- one where they were. Indeed, perhaps the aptest symbol of Romania’s place in Europe today is the man who sits in the Presidential Palace of Cotroceni in Bucharest. Klaus Iohannis—a former physics teacher at a high school in Sibiu, once Hermannstadt—is an ethnic German head- ing a state that, a generation ago, was shipping hundreds of thousands of its ‘Saxons’ ‘back’ to Bonn at 4,000–10,000 Deutschmarks a head. -
Article Intelligence Sector Reforms in Romania: a Scorecard
Intelligence Sector Reforms in Romania: A Article Scorecard Lavinia Stan Marian Zulean St. Francis Xavier University, Canada University of Bucharest, Romania [email protected] Abstract Since 1989, reforms have sought to align the Romanian post-communist intelligence community with its counterparts in established democracies. Enacted reluctantly and belatedly at the pressure of civil society actors eager to curb the mass surveillance of communist times and international partners wishing to rein in Romania’s foreign espionage and cut its ties to intelligence services of non-NATO countries, these reforms have revamped legislation on state security, retrained secret agents, and allowed for participation in NATO operations, but paid less attention to oversight and respect for human rights. Drawing on democratization, transitional justice, and security studies, this article evaluates the capacity of the Romanian post-communist intelligence reforms to break with communist security practices of unchecked surveillance and repression and to adopt democratic values of oversight and respect for human rights. We discuss the presence of communist traits after 1989 (seen as continuity) and their absence (seen as discontinuity) by offering a wealth of examples. The article is the first to evaluate security reforms in post- communist Romania in terms of their capacity to not only overhaul the personnel and operations inherited from the Securitate and strengthen oversight by elected officials, but also make intelligence services respectful of basic human rights. Introduction Since transitioning away from communist dictatorship in 1989, Romania has become a liberal democracy and a member of the European Union (EU) and NATO. As elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe where the communist secret police had conducted repression, in Romania the backbone of democratization was represented by reforms of the intelligence community, understood to comprise all of the intelligence services operating in the country. -
Action Plan Against Terrorism
PREMIER MINISTRE ACTION PLAN AGAINST TERRORISM LutterEurope Menace Entraver Victimes Protéger Jihadisme Cribler r TechnologiesLutter ée Cr er Résilience Terroriste Menace Cribler tt tés aitre Réprimer Résilience Cibles nn Armes Co ili Lu r Comprendre Menace Identifier ée Europe Cibles ComprendreTechnologies aitre Armes nn Explosifs LutterCréer Cr Identifier Co Protéger Identifier Terroriste Entraver Cibles Victimes Coordonner Renforcer Europe Réprimer Réprimer Armes Vulnérab Protéger Contrôler Europe er Cibles r tt ée Créer Victimes Cibles Cr Résilience Réprimer Cibles Technologies ContrôlerLu ArmeCréer s Entraver Entraver er Victimes Victimes tés Cibles Protéger tt ili Europe Lu Menace Identifier Explosifs CriblerCoordonner Comprendre Europe Créer Cibles RadicalisationMenace erroristeenace Vulnérab TerroristeCibles Armes T M 13 July 2018 « Jihadism has not weakened over the last twenty or more years, it has simply moved to new places and taken on new forms. Responses to the threat it poses require mobilisation of all public policies: intelligence, security, justice and diplomacy. It is the State as a whole, and, in addition, all the national community’s living resources – its local authorities, political forces, enterprises and youth – which must mobilise around these challenges. » (Strategic Review of Defence and National Security. 2017). ACTION PLAN AGAINST TERRORISM Contents FRANCE’S SECURITY STRATEGY: TACKLING TERRORISM TOGETHER 5 1 Since 2016, France has continued to face up to a high terrorist threat 7 2 The action plan against -
Strategies Xxi the Complex and Dynamic Nature of The
“CAROL I” NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE STRATEGIES XXI With the theme: THE COMPLEX AND DYNAMIC NATURE OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT NOVEMBER 22-23, 2012, BUCHAREST Coordinators: Alexandra SARCINSCHI, PhD Cristina BOGZEANU “CAROL I” NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY PUBLISHINGHOUSE BUCHAREST, 2012 SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE - Teodor FRUNZETI, PhD. prof., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania - Ion ROCEANU, PhD. prof., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania - Petre DUŢU, senior researcher PhD., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania - Bogdan AURESCU, PhD. lecturer, University of Bucharest, Romania - Silviu NEGUŢ, PhD. prof., Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, Romania - Rudolf URBAN, PhD. prof., Defence University, Czech Republic - Pavel NECAS, PhD. prof. dipl. eng., Armed Forces Academy, Slovakia - Alexandra SARCINSCHI, senior researcher PhD., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania - Cristian BĂHNĂREANU, senior researcher PhD., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania - Mihai-Ştefan DINU, senior researcher PhD., “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania - Cristina BOGZEANU, junior researcher, “Carol I” National Defence University, Romania ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE - Petre DUŢU senior researcher PhD. - Irina TĂTARU, PhD. - Mirela ATANASIU, PhD. - George RĂDUICĂ, PhD. - Daniela RĂPAN - Doina MIHAI - Marioara PETRE-BĂJENARU COPYRIGHT: Any reproduction is authorized, without fees, provided that the source is mentioned. • -
APR 2016 Part C.Pdf
Page | 1 CBRNE-TERRORISM NEWSLETTER – April 2016 www.cbrne-terrorism-newsletter.com Page | 2 CBRNE-TERRORISM NEWSLETTER – April 2016 After Brussels, Europe's intelligence woes revealed Source:http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/22/brussels-attack-why-europe-must-increase-terror- intelligence.html Mar 23 – Europe must improve the regional Rudd's comments are at the crux of a hot- sharing of intelligence to successfully button discourse about the encroachment on combat the rise of homegrown militants, civil liberties should governments ramp up policy experts told CNBC a day after deadly surveillance and detainment tactics in the explosions hit Brussels. global war on terror. Global terrorist organization ISIS claimed Rudd believes it's a necessary cost to bear. responsibility for Tuesday's attacks that killed "This is not a normal set of circumstances, at least 31 people, the latest episode in the we've got to give our men and women in group's campaign of large-scale violence on uniform and in the intelligence services the the international stage. powers necessary to deal with this. This is no Recent offensives in Paris and Jakarta indicate criticism of the Belgian government but a wake- ISIS is increasingly relying on local up call to all of us who wrestle with this fundamentalists, typically trained in ISIS debate." strongholds within the Middle East, to execute Others agree that European officials must suicide bombings and shootings in busy direct more investment to counter-terrorism, metropolitan areas. despite strained finances for most countries in "The key question here is closing the the region. intelligence gap," said Kevin Rudd, former The fact that the perpetrator of December's Prime Minister of Australia and president of the Paris attacks was caught in Belgium four Asia Society Policy Institute. -
Wd 3 - 3000 - 016/17
Wissenschaftliche Dienste Ausarbeitung Parlamentarische Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste in ausgewählten Staaten Aktualisierung der Ausarbeitung WF III G - 12/06 vom 23. Januar 2006 © 2017 Deutscher Bundestag WD 3 - 3000 - 016/17 Wissenschaftliche Dienste Ausarbeitung Seite 2 WD 3 - 3000 - 016/17 Parlamentarische Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste in ausgewählten Staaten Aktualisierung der Ausarbeitung WF III G - 12/06 vom 23. Januar 2006 Aktenzeichen: WD 3 - 3000 - 016/17 Abschluss der Arbeit: 12. Mai 2017 Fachbereich: WD 3: Verfassung und Verwaltung Die Wissenschaftlichen Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages unterstützen die Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages bei ihrer mandatsbezogenen Tätigkeit. Ihre Arbeiten geben nicht die Auffassung des Deutschen Bundestages, eines seiner Organe oder der Bundestagsverwaltung wieder. Vielmehr liegen sie in der fachlichen Verantwortung der Verfasserinnen und Verfasser sowie der Fachbereichsleitung. Arbeiten der Wissenschaftlichen Dienste geben nur den zum Zeitpunkt der Erstellung des Textes aktuellen Stand wieder und stellen eine individuelle Auftragsarbeit für einen Abgeordneten des Bundestages dar. Die Arbeiten können der Geheimschutzordnung des Bundestages unterliegende, geschützte oder andere nicht zur Veröffentlichung geeignete Informationen enthalten. Eine beabsichtigte Weitergabe oder Veröffentlichung ist vorab dem jeweiligen Fachbereich anzuzeigen und nur mit Angabe der Quelle zulässig. Der Fachbereich berät über die dabei zu berücksichtigenden Fragen. Wissenschaftliche Dienste Ausarbeitung Seite 3 WD 3 - 3000 - 016/17 Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Einleitung 5 2. Dänemark 6 2.1. Überblick über die Nachrichtendienste 6 2.2. Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste 6 2.2.1. Parlamentarische Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste 6 2.2.2. Gremium für die Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste 7 3. Frankreich 7 3.1. Überblick über die Nachrichtendienste 7 3.1.1. Dienst des Innenministeriums 8 3.1.2. -
General Assembly Distr.: General 1 February 2021
United Nations A/HRC/46/37/Add.2 General Assembly Distr.: General 1 February 2021 Original: English Human Rights Council Forty-sixth session 22 February–19 March 2021 Agenda item 3 Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development Visit to France Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, Joseph A. Cannataci*, ** Summary The Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, Joseph A. Cannataci, carried out an official visit to France from 13 to 17 November 2017. In the present report, he highlights concerns about the emergency laws and recommends that French law be reformed further to entrench the oversight powers of the National Commission for the Control of Intelligence Techniques and to bring the safeguards and remedies applicable to foreign intelligence in line with those required for domestic intelligence. * The summary of the report is being circulated in all official languages. The report itself, which is annexed to the summary, is being circulated in the language of submission and French only. ** The present report was submitted after the deadline in order to reflect the most recent information. GE.21-01269(E) A/HRC/46/37/Add.2 Annex Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, Joseph A. Cannataci, on his visit to France I. Introduction 1. The present report was finalized towards the end of 2020, after an evaluation of the preliminary results of the meetings held during the visit to France from 13 to 17 November 2017 and after having cross-checked those preliminary results against follow-up research and developments to date. -
Cultural Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution
Cultural Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution Introduction In his poem, The Second Coming (1919), William Butler Yeats captured the moment we are now experiencing: Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere The ceremony of innocence is drowned; The best lack all conviction, while the worst Are full of passionate intensity. As we see the deterioration of the institutions created and fostered after the Second World War to create a climate in which peace and prosperity could flourish in Europe and beyond, it is important to understand the role played by diplomacy in securing the stability and strengthening the shared values of freedom and democracy that have marked this era for the nations of the world. It is most instructive to read the Inaugural Address of President John F. Kennedy, in which he encouraged Americans not only to do good things for their own country, but to do good things in the world. The creation of the Peace Corps is an example of the kind of spirit that put young American volunteers into some of the poorest nations in an effort to improve the standard of living for people around the globe. We knew we were leaders; we knew that we had many political and economic and social advantages. There was an impetus to share this wealth. Generosity, not greed, was the motivation of that generation. Of course, this did not begin with Kennedy. It was preceded by the Marshall Plan, one of the only times in history that the conqueror decided to rebuild the country of the vanquished foe. -
Resisting Foreign State Propaganda in the New Information Environment: the Case of the EU, Russia, and the Eastern Partnership Countries ISBN 978-9934-8536-9-2
RESISTING FOREIGN STATE PROPAGANDA IN THE NEW INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT: THE CASE OF THE EU, RUSSIA, AND THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES ISBN 978-9934-8536-9-2 UDK 32.019.5 Re708 This publication is a part of the project “Resisting state propaganda in the new information environment: The case of EU member states and EU Eastern Partnership states vis-à-vis the Russian Federation publication/re- search” organised by the Foundation for European Pro- gressive Studies (FEPS) with the support of Brīvības un Solidaritātes Fonds (BSF). RESISTING FOREIGN STATE PROPAGANDA IN THE NEW INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT: THE CASE OF THE EU, RUSSIA, AND THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES Table of contents Foreword Dr. Ernst Stetter 11 Foreword Ervins Labanovskis 17 PART I: INCREASING RESISTANCE TO PROPAGANDA WITHIN THE EU Countering propaganda in Europe: Responses and options Ben Nimmo 23 The role of national strategic narrative in raising resilience to hostile foreign propaganda in European societies Māris Cepurītis 39 Increasing the resistance of democratic states to hostile foreign propaganda— what is the right recipe? Elīna Lange-Ionatamišvili 52 The Audiovisual Media Services Directive and propaganda Andris Mellakauls 71 7 Key findings of the EED’s Feasibility PART III: THE VIEW FROM Study on independent Russian- THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES language media initiatives in the Eastern Partnership and beyond Farther from Russky Mir, Jerzy Pomianowski 89 Closer to the West Tamar Kintsurashvili 173 PART II: THE VIEW FROM THE BALTIC STATES Russian propaganda -
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume II Money Laundering and Financial Crimes March 2014 INCSR 2014 Volume II Common Abbreviations Table of Contents Volume II Common Abbreviations .................................................................................................... iii Legislative Basis for the INCSR ................................................................................... 1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 3 Bilateral Activities ......................................................................................................... 4 Training and Technical Assistance ........................................................................................................... 4 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ................................................. 5 Department of Homeland Security .............................................................................. 6 Customs and Border Protection ................................................................................................................ 6 Homeland Security Investigations ............................................................................................................ 6 Department of Justice .................................................................................................. 8 Drug Enforcement -
Raisa Ekaterina Ivatenko)
Raisa Simian Ela (Raisa Ekaterina Ivatenko) https://www.facebook.com/marcelasimona.fica https://www.facebook.com/explozivenews Nu cred în tinerii frumoși și liberi, nu cred în tehnocrati, nu cred in partidele politice, nu cred în republica asta impostoare, nu cred nici in monarhia dudelor, nu cred în acest Stat mafiot pentru că sunt singura care îi știu adevărata față, îi știu subteranele și crimele. Nu cred în televiziuni, nu cred în vorbe, nu cred în această societate de consum, nu cred în voi, biete conturi cu poze de-mprumut, vocale sub anonimat si moarte prin neasumare! Si - IMPORTANT - daca vreti sa va iau in considerare, atunci intai INFIINTATI STATUL, ca nu aveti niciun act de constituire al lui, imbecililor! Pana atunci, EU SUNT STATUL! .......................................................... Cred în DUMNEZEU, Cred in ADEVAR, Cred in DREPTATE! Nu, nu sunteți deloc pe drumul cel bun! Niciodată nu ați știut să fiți pe un drum. V-a spus-o Antonescu, v-a spus-o Țuțea, v-a spus-o Brâncuși, dar, mai ales, v-a spus-o Eminescu! V-a spus-o chiar și Ceaușescu, în noaptea aceea de decembrie! Nu sunteți, niciodată, pe drumul cel bun! Fiindcă, niciodată, nu ați fost în stare să construiți unul! Un drum nou. Ca să faci un drum nou, și să apuci calea dreaptă, trebuie cu mult mai mult decât porția de fasole gratis de la 1 Decembrie! Dansurile mele rămân aceleași. Tălpile goale, pe spini, la fel! Dar cât de frumos e să fi LIBER! Să vezi lumea de acolo, de sus, din locul unde se nasc vulturii imperiali! Vă doresc asta și vouă! ...............